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    Philosophy

    The Law & Liberty Podcast

    Law & Liberty contributing editor James Patterson interviews prominent authors and thinkers. A production of Liberty Fund, Inc.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Why Patriotism Matters Mar 15, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:18): Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Steven Smith about his new book, Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes. Steven Smith is the Alfred Cowles Professor of Political Science at Yale University. He’s the author of numerous books on Leo Strauss, Spinoza, Hegel, and he previously appeared on Liberty Law Talk a few years ago to discuss his book, Modernity and Its Discontents, which has been released in paperback. So Steven Smith, it’s great to have you on again. Steven Smith (00:53): Thank you, Richard. It’s a pleasure to be back. Richard Reinsch (00:57): Steven, thinking about the book, Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes, why do we need patriotism? Steven Smith (01:06): Well, that’s a good question to start with, why do we need patriotism? Because obviously, not everybody thinks we do. The book began, or grew out of, an attempt to distinguish patriotism from people… Or to reclaim patriotism, I should say, as the title is, to reclaim it from people who don’t like it and therefore who think we don’t need it at all and from people who… What to say? Like it too much. And patriotism, I want to argue, is a disposition which I think is inseparable from politics so long as we are what Aristotle called political animals. So long as we live in polities and political end states. We need patriotism, it’s inseparable from a sense of loyalty and identity to the place where we belong. Nationalists see the country as the only source of their identity. And then this is very easy for it to become coupled with feelings of anger, resentment, and most dangerously the attempt to identify enemies beginning often with the foreign enemies, but then always becoming domestic enemies, domestic others who are seen to present some kind of existential challenge to the national identity. But patriotism, we can go into this, is an easily misunderstood virtue. As I suggested a second ago, from one side, it is identified often with all that’s wrong or even what is responsible for all that’s wrong in our politics today. And from the other side, it seems to express everything and it’s only what’s good in our life, in our political life. So it’s a difficult virtue. It is a difficult virtue and it’s a contested virtue. We can talk about that if you like. Richard Reinsch (02:36): Well, thinking about the title of your book, an Age of Extremes, let’s just bracket for a minute. I think you and I both agree patriotism is a good thing, it’s a needed thing. It’s, I think, a consolation in a difficult life in a difficult world. But what are the extremes right now that are currently operating that are leading us astray from properly understanding it? Steven Smith (02:57): Patriotism has always been contested. Go back to the ancient world. One example I use in my book is Sophocles’ Antigone which puts forward a conflict between loyalty to his family and loyalty to country. Patriotism has always been contested by other loyalties we have and that will never go away. We are beings with conflicting loyalties, and so long as we remain beings with conflicting loyalties patriotism will be challenged by other loyalties we have. The two dominant challenges to patriotism today come from, I’ve already suggested it to left and right to pretty much map onto that distinction. I’ll start with the left, what we might call the cosmopolitan left, the kind of view that you find particularly in educated circles, among business elites, among educated people, among a range of people who believe that we have become, or are becoming, citizens of the world. Our allegiances are to a kind of global humanity and we owe no particular allegiance to the individual states of which we are members. We see that in the enthusiasm, particularly among young people, and it’s just the admirable in many ways, I’m not discounting, but they’re admirable goals to work for international NGOs, to become part of Doctors Without Borders, to think of global concerns like the environment and other things. Again, absolutely real, but the tendency is to downplay or to minimize the role of their identity as citizens, as citizens of a country rather than global citizens of the world. The other extreme is nationalism and that of course has, in the last five or six years or more, even maybe more, become a very potent force throughout the world. In the US too, including the US. We’ve seen nationalism arising in China, in Turkey, in Russia, certainly in places like Brazil, and many other places. Nationalism is a very potent course of political identity, but different from patriotism, I want to argue. They are often linked, but one of the things I try to do in my book is to decouple them. They grow out of a common root. Nationalism and patriotism are not opposite as it’s sometimes said. They are not opposite. They grow out of a common root. That root is to have your way of life and your culture and so on to be strong and respected, natural and within limits, understandable and admirable quality. But patriotism and nationalism are growing out of a common root but move in different directions. Nationalists see the country as the only source of their identity. And then this is very easy for it to become coupled with feelings of anger, resentment, and most dangerously the attempt to identify enemies beginning often with the foreign enemies, but then always becoming domestic enemies, domestic others who are seen to present some kind of existential challenge to the national identity. And it is this kind of friend enemy logic that I think invariably grows out of the nationalist mindset, the nationalist imagination, that is quite different from the patriotic disposition that I try to defend in my book. But those are the two, I think, challenges that kind of frame the debate as I see it. Richard Reinsch (06:58): Do you see, as I read your book, it seems to me also nationalism arising from perceived excesses of, let’s say, humanitarianism, or sort of downplaying what I think would be legitimate interest of the nation. And I think about Brexit. When the Brexit campaign was happening, I saw good arguments on either side for that position. And I ultimately thought, “Well, if the people come out and vote at like 70% and they vote 52%, then I would respect that vote.” But I also said that this belief that the European Union was just ever increasing and some of their statesmen actively downplay I think what I would call a legitimate interest of the nation. And so you get nationalism arising from that, but that in turn feeds it’s opposite. Steven Smith (08:04): Well, let me say, I discuss, I’m certainly not an expert on the EU, but it comes out for some discussion in my book. And I do think the debate about Brexit and I listened to it and followed it. There were powerful arguments on both sides. But I do think the EU is seeing what is or was… The EU is now becoming terribly fractured. But it was seen by many, sort of in the heyday of its ascendancy, as sort of a model of this kind of notion of trans national or trans political citizenship or sovereignty or something. A seamless world of open borders, of common currency, of free trade. It had many dimensions, many of them quite valuable and useful but it created aspirations and dreams and ideals that cannot be satisfied. And this movement was always combined, as you pointed out, with a heavy handed bureaucratic apparatus that really ended up, in many ways, overriding people’s national institutions, their loyalties. They were told they are members of Europe. What is that? And so there was always this tension between, in many ways, the aspiration and, again, the bureaucratic apparatus in which those aspirations were enfolded. So the EU is one example of how exactly this kind of tendency towards cosmopolitanism and to believe that we are now outgrowing the nation state as the basis of our political identity and show how this can go wrong. Let me just say before I sound like I’m simply in the camp of the EU skeptics or the anti EU, I am not. And why do I say that? Because the EU, for everything that is questionable about it, they’ve done one very important thing that I don’t think we can entirely forget, and that is it has managed and still managed to maintain the peace in a continent that was the most violent continent of the last century, certainly the last century, and perhaps even the most violent continent in all of recorded history. The world wars, the Holocaust, the ethnic cleansings that European States imposed on one another were just terrible blemishes on humanity. And the EU has rose to respond to that and to some degree it’s very admirably pacified many of these aggressive European tendencies. So that is nothing to sneeze at. And so I just want to mention that. It’s something that I think deserves to be said about the EU, whatever its other failings. Richard Reinsch (11:11): Yeah, that’s well said. Although it does seem to me now and the history of, you recounted it well and all of its wars, it does seem to me… when I think about Europe in many ways, it’s sort of a lethargic continent now. I was reading recently by 2007 the economy of the European Union was largely on par with America’s, but what’s happened in the last 14 years is it’s barely grown and the American economy has grown and we’ve sort of moved beyond them in a lot of ways. And a lot of people thought the EU economy would overtake us. And then of course now our big concern is China and what it’s doing. And I could produce a lot of examples, demographics. Where Europe just seems, although it was this tremendous dynamo, to me, it just seems sort of like a large vacation park at this point. Steven Smith (12:11): I agree. I don’t want to sit here and opine about the future of Europe- Richard Reinsch (12:16): No … Steven Smith (12:16): … I don’t know, but two devastating world wars within a 50 year span can do a lot to take the life out of a people. Richard Reinsch (12:26): Yeah, that’s true. Steven Smith (12:27): I don’t know. I hear what you’re saying and what you say is probably right in some respects. Richard Reinsch (12:32): You have an interesting epigraph here and I thought it might be a way to get into a question that I’ve got for you, which is you said patriotism is a virtue. And I think that’s at the center of the controversy. You have the epigraph, “I am an American, Chicago born. From Saul Bellow’s The Adventures of Augie March.” Can you elaborate more on that for us? Steven Smith (12:53): Yeah, that’s great. Thank you for mentioning that. I’m glad you caught that because that epigraph means a lot to me. Why? First, I’ve been a more or less lifelong admirer, lover, of Saul Bellow’s literature. That famous opening sentence, “I’m an American, Chicago born,” first sentence, opening sentence, of The Adventures of Augie March captured something to me, not just of the spirit of that novel, but of me. I also am an American, Chicago born, and I lived away from Chicago for many, many years. More than half my life has been spent in New Haven where I live now. But this identification with a place I think is very important. It shaped me to a considerable… For good or bad. I don’t necessarily simply have a kind of rosy nostalgic image of the place where I grew up. I don’t at all, really. But we are shaped by our past, by our histories, our family histories, our national history and I thought that statement, that sentence, captured something pretty important about that. It did to me, at least. Richard Reinsch (14:12): It reminded me of the opening of Ulysses Grant’s memoirs. He says, “My people are American.” That’s always resonated with me. When I read that sentence I always thought, “That’s something new, I would think, in American life at that time,” that you think of this as an American civilization and your people being shaped by it. Steven Smith (14:30): Yes, and Augie March is a very American story. Of course, the difference between him and Grant is Grant traces his ancestors back to the Puritans, back to the real founders. Bellow’s Augie March is like Bellow himself, is the child of immigrants. I am the grandchild of immigrants. So there’s a kind of vibrancy about this too. And the title of the book, The Adventures, it shows that this is a kind of a picaresque novel, an adventure. It’s an adventure story in some ways. And I think that’s very much the American story. I’ve been emphasizing and reemphasizing here this aspirational or creedal dimension of American patriotism. But in many ways that’s only one side of the coin. And I argue in different ways in the book that patriotism is, like all virtues in many ways, patriotism is a matter of both the head and the heart. It is both an intellectual virtue, based upon understanding of our founding documents and the principles for which we stand. But it’s also a matter of the heart and it’s also connected to loyalty. And I hope I tried to capture in my understanding of patriotism that it’s an adventure. It has an aspirational quality to it. And that to me is very much one of the things that distinguishes patriotism from nationalism also is this sense of aspiration and adventure. It’s not just a land and soil ideology. It’s not just America first, it’s not simply, “My country right or wrong.” There is an ideal and an adventure and a creed to it that makes, I think, American patriotism unique. Richard Reinsch (15:46): Let’s talk more about that. In your book, you talk about the elements of American patriotism. Talk about that because as we think about patriotism, you said it’s a disposition, a virtue. So there has to be a common thread there. It can’t just be purely an adventure. Steven Smith (16:03): Sure. No, no, absolutely. There is a core, a broadly defined core, that for generations was called, very loosely, the American Creed. What is the American Creed? It was not anything formulated necessarily in a document or legal text of any kind, but it was a set of beliefs and ideas growing out of our founding documents that shape what it is to be an American. For example, let me just mention three, our commitment to equality, going back most famously to the equality clause in the Declaration of Independence, “All men are created equal.” We are all endowed with a certain basic dignity that is worthy of respect. That egalitarian impulse is a very important aspect of American patriotism. What does equality mean? In part, it means there are no more aristocrats, no more monarchs and aristocrats. It is an open field. It’s an open field for all of us to rise or fall. It’s a field of rights that we have liberties and rights that are essential to that. And once again, these are aspirational that, as Lincoln points out, probably most famously in his speech on the Dred Scott case, that our aspirations to equality and dignity have not been fully achieved. They are constantly being labored for, being worked upon, being, in a sense, a work in progress. But this idea that we are creedal nation, a creedal people, and be a core of the idea of some of our best students of American politics. Let me just mention three of those students, Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Martin Diamond. All of them saw this sense of creedal peoplehood as central to America and that’s in part what my book is an attempt to reestablish. Richard Reinsch (18:14): Yeah, and as I read that, you think about what country has something like the House Committee on Un-American Activities? Obviously, there’s a creedal idea of America that could also be used in various ways. Thinking about that creedal concept, is that enough, I guess was my question for you? And I guess I say is that enough, because as I think about the human person, I think about our relationships with others, our communities, communities of moral worth and meaning that we find. It’s a long conversation, but I think that’s a huge problem now in Americ…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Reading Exodus Mar 13, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Today we’re talking with Leon Kass about his new book, Founding God’s Nation: Reading Exodus. Leon Kass is one of our most significant thinkers and writers. He has the distinction of having a medical degree and being a practicing physician at one point in his career, but also is known for teaching at the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago for decades and also being a major public intellectual. He is at the American Enterprise Institute and is the author of a number of wonderful books and essays, including Reading Genesis. He was also the chair of George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics and, I should also mention, co-editor along with Amy Kass and Diane Schaub of What So Proudly We Hail, a book that American civic educators definitely need at this point. Leon Kass, thank you so much for coming on the program. Leon Kass (01:22): Thank you very much, Richard for having me. Pleasure to be with you again. Richard Reinsch (01:23): It’s my honor to have you on. This book, Founding God’s Nation: Reading Exodus, now, at one level, you write a book on Genesis, so maybe it’s natural or logical that you would turn to another book on Exodus. Yet, this is a weighty book, a lot of analysis, but one that pays well in reading. I can say that to all of our listeners. But why did you turn not just to reading Exodus but wanting to write a book on it? Leon Kass (01:51): Well, I mean partly, as you say, Richard, it is a sequel to the book on Genesis which, like the first book, is being read in search of its wisdom. In Genesis, we saw how after the first 11 chapters from the Garden of Eden, Cain and Abel, the flood, Noah and his sons, and Babel, where it would show us what human life would be like left to its own devices. Beginning with Abraham, God embarks on a project to introduce into the world a way of life that can minimize the evils of human life uninstructed. The rest of that book shows how the germ of that new way of life barely survives two to three patriarchal generations. If you want to know how you get from families to peoplehood, you got to read Exodus. So in terms of subject matter, I want to follow the emergence of the Israelites as a people. For historical reasons, they are one of the world’s oldest and most consequential nations. But continuing to read philosophically, I hope to learn from reading Exodus about nationhood, using the case of Israel as an example. What actually makes a people into a people? What forms their communal identity, holds them together, guides their lives? To what do they look up and for what should they strive? On the assumption that this particular case might provide material for thinking about and maybe even teach us a thing or two of importance about those permanent human questions, that really was what I was hoping to find. Richard Reinsch (03:32): You say you read Exodus philosophically. Now, I thought that was interesting. As a Christian, I’ve always read it as something revealed directly from God through human agency and those who wrote it. You sort of outline that. What did you discover in a philosophical reading of Exodus? Leon Kass (03:53): Well, I should perhaps say a sentence or two more about by philosophical. I don’t mean reading as they would do in a philosophy department necessarily or reading it irreverently. I mean that I treat this book regardless of the authorship and even if it’s a revealed book, I’m reading it not necessarily because it’s binding on me, but because it has wisdom that’s available to me even if I’m not yet a member of the community. Moses, in fact, says deep in Deuteronomy about the laws. He says, “These laws are your wisdom in the eye of the nations.” So there’s a sense in which, although the Bible might be binding in terms of its law and obligations only on the people within the covenant, nevertheless, there are teachings there that if people were willing to have a look, might be available to everybody. So that’s what I mean by philosophical, wisdom-seeking. I don’t want just to learn about the book, but I want to learn from it and to learn from it by dwelling with it, by living with it, by imagining myself a participant in the story, but also stepping back with the aid of the text to reflect on it. I suspend whatever disbelief I might have about God or anything else. I’m just going to enter into this leaving my own prejudices aside as much as I can. I treat the book as a whole book, as an integral whole with a beginning and a middle and an end, not some patchwork quilt from different sources, like the source critics like to talk about. I read it naively. I try to keep my own opinions to myself. I read it without commentary and try to learn from the text how it wants to be read. I treat every word as if every word matters, the juxtapositions, the ambiguities. The silences are invitations to reflection. If you just slow yourself down and ask yourself, “What’s going on here? What does this mean? What sense does it make? What can you learn from it?” It’s amazing what you could learn from it, even if you haven’t signed up as a member of a faith community to begin with. I’ve allowed the text to work on me, to live with me, to live inside me. I’ve had a filling out not only of the political, philosophical questions with which I began, but also in who and what exactly and less who and what, but more what it means to live in relation to this voice and this teaching and this source of this teaching because, as God says to Moses, “I will be what I will be.” Richard Reinsch (06:28): I wanted to ask you a question. I’ve got a lot of questions about something you just said. How does the text, Exodus, want to be read? Leon Kass (06:37): How does the text want to be read? Richard Reinsch (06:39): Yes. Leon Kass (06:42): I mean this is perhaps presumptuous of me to say, but dwelling on it, dwelling in this text for, well, more than 20 years, I first started teaching it at Chicago in 1998, a full course devoted just to Exodus, 10 weeks, four hours a week, undergraduates and graduates. I repeated that five more times, had a study group in Washington with friends and family members, really high-caliber people. I taught a class in Jerusalem at Shalem College, Israeli students, and another very intense seminar where people who really knew the Bible much better than I do read my draft chapters with me and actually got me across the finish line. I had to produce a chapter a week because they were meeting to discuss it. So over this time, look, it tells a story. If you want to read it, you could either read it the way the scholars do as a prism, as an information about the beliefs and myths of an ancient people. Or you can read it as the Orthodox Jews do and pick out from this narrative story what are the laws that are obligatory? The rabbis have, in fact, treated the text in that way to extract the details of the law that have kept alive a way of life even though they were no longer living in the land for 2000 years till Israel was reestablished. Or you can read it by sort of submitting and saying, “What’s going on here?” And try to enter into this text as intimately as you can, to imagine yourself each character, even to imagine yourself Pharaoh, even though he’s the bad guy in the story, and to try to see the world through his eyes so that the power of the contest between Moses and God and Pharaoh turns out to be a real victory and not just beating up on some fellow who’s stupid and stubborn. I think the thing that finally came to me is that the story is not a history book. The story is a book that’s intended to somehow move the soul of the reader to understand certain things, to believe certain things, to come to know not just the story of the people but also of their God. Maybe this is premature in this conversation, Richard, but a person who doesn’t know anything about the book picks it up on the first page, “In the beginning, God created the heaven and the Earth.” I mean we can’t help being moderns in a Judeo-Christian tradition, having some idea of who this character, God, is. Our head is filled with stuff on it. But for a reader who doesn’t have all of that going for him or her, the name, God, is a kind of placeholder in the text, the meaning of which is going to be filled in as you read along. I have to say that these last few times through, the thing I’ve learned the most about in reading Exodus is because I’ve allowed the text to work on me to live with me, to live inside me. If I’ve had a filling out not only of the political, philosophical questions with which I began, but also in who and what exactly and less who and what, but more what it means to live in relation to this voice and this teaching and this source of this teaching because, as God says to Moses, “I will be what I will be,” which is a rejection of the answer for a name that would give His essence, but basically says, “You want to know who I am? Pay attention and see what I do.” In the course of Exodus, you see what He does and you see the effect of what He does. When the tabernacle is erected and you imagine yourself inside with the people, a building that you’ve built under His instructions so that you might have an experience of His presence in your daily life, I imagine myself in that place. I begin to see what it might be like to acknowledge the source greater than us, a teacher who has given us our law, et cetera, et cetera. So I think the thing that I’ve learned this time through, the book wants to be read by a person who imagines himself a character in the story, not one of the ones talked about, but as a living participant in this book, both through memory but also through allowing the text to be actively at work in him. I’ve done that reading Plato’s dialogues. I’ve done it with other books. But it takes a while before you make this book as a book, not just as selected passages, but as a whole book, something that you live with and it works on you. Richard Reinsch (11:58): Building on that question, I love the way you write about Moses in the book. How did you live with his example and trials in the Book of Exodus? Leon Kass (12:13): Look, this is an absolutely astounding figure. God needs a champion to bring the children of Israel out of Egypt. He doesn’t find some Spartacus to lead a slave revolt. He gets Himself an outsider who’s born to the Levi family, the spirited tribe. He gets an Egyptian rearing an education in the palace. The text doesn’t say a peep about it but, boy, it would be really interesting to know what did he study there? It makes a difference. When you first meet him, he’s a spirited defender of the underdog. He’s offended by injustice. He’s a passionate young man, but he also has a kind of philosophical side. He wants to know, and God catches him on the curiosity side of the burning bush. Moses turns aside to see why this bush is not consumed. None of the patriarchs ask why. Moses wants to know the cause. Although he’s curious, his wonder turns to awe when the voice speaks to him out of the bush and says that, “I am the God of your father, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Take off your shoes. You’re standing on sacred ground.” It’s the most beautiful description of awe in literature that I know. And yet, Moses’ philosophical disposition isn’t silenced. He still wants to know God’s name in the conversation there. He takes on the job, but a very reluctant leader. So beginning, you’ve got Moses who’s a spirited young man, a very philosophical man, sort of reluctant about this job, but he goes. Then you see him get on-the-job training with Pharaoh. He’s sort of courageously holding his own in the administration of the signs and wonders known as the plague. He gains stature as God’s agent, but he increasingly takes his own initiative. At the end of the story of the plagues when the Egyptians finally know about God, the Egyptian who’s learned most about him is Moses himself. He learns the difference between a God who is a voice in his head as he goes along the rest of his life. He’s got this voice traveling with him. He learns about God as the antithesis of Egypt and, in a way, as a correction of whatever philosophical teachings he picked up there. Then the next great moment is at the sea of reeds after the Egyptians drown and the children of Israel now trust in God and in His servant, Moses. What does Moses do with that trust? He becomes a poet and he writes the immortal song of the sea which interprets for generations to come the meaning of the event that’s just been witnessed. He teaches the Israelites that this was not a victory that I caused, but this is a victory of the Lord, the man of war who is like you among the gods. This is the equivalent of Lincoln at Gettysburg teaching everybody the meaning of the sacrifice and the meaning of the war. So Moses is not only philosopher and not only spirited leader, but poet and interpreter. Richard Reinsch (15:53): Interesting. In different ways you write about Moses, one of which is something that perhaps we need to learn, although when I say it we’ll automatically think authoritarianism or something. But his obedience to what he’s called to do, because it doesn’t happen right away, that meaning the liberation of the Israelites. But he keeps at it. The first time he goes in to Pharaoh, you point out, he’s arrogant. He goes in with his brother, Aaron. He’s arrogant. He wants to do it his way and he fails. He almost loses everything. And then he has to go back and do it the way he was told by God. I just thought, obedience. I mean I’ve been thinking generally obedience is something we need in appropriate ways to reconsider our culture. But I thought that was worth mentioning. Leon Kass (16:40): Yeah. He is obedient, but gradually as he gets the point, he’s able to embellish and act on his own, not from arrogance but because he’s gotten the spirit of it so that there are certain things he says to Pharaoh later on that he’s not told. In a kind of crucial time for him, I mean we see him … Well, one of the great moments, and this is not generally noticed, Moses doesn’t really like this people, and not without cause. They’re slavish. His first encounter with them when he tries to break up a fight between the battling Israelites and one says to him, “Who made you a prince ruler over us? Do you want to kill us like you killed the Egyptian?” Moses says these people are ungovernable and repeated episodes of that. So he always calls them either, “Your people,” when talking to God or, “That people.” It’s only after the episode of the golden calf where he starts to plead for them against God’s threat to destroy them, that he finally identifies with them and starts calling them, “We, my people, our people, us.” His relation to God is on an intellectual plane. He doesn’t really understand why the people need … He can go 40 days and 40 nights without food and water. He doesn’t understand ordinary people. But finally, finally, he embraces them. He stands for them. It’s really one of the most beautiful moments where you see God makes him, in a way, plead for them. As a result for pleading for them, he now owns them and owns up to being part of them. That’s, in a way, the leader really becoming of the people and not as he’s in endanger of being seen by them as a separate god high and above them. Richard Reinsch (18:45): It’s funny. As I was reading your book, I thought to myself, “I’ve never really given that point consideration, Moses’ separateness.” What did you make of that, that the liberator would be separate from the people? I thought, “I’ve never given that consideration before.” Leon Kass (18:58): The problem of political leadership could be stated something like this. I mean you start with slavery. Then you move to a condition of anarchy. And then you get that before the law is given and they work on Moses’ charisma. Then the law is given and there’s still hierarchy. But…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Boomer Nation Mar 01, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Today we’re talking with Helen Andrews about her new book Boomers: The Men and Women Who Promised Freedom and Delivered Disaster. Helen Andrews is senior editor of The American Conservative, before that managing editor of the Washington Examiner, she was a Robert Novak Journalism Fellow and her writing has appeared in numerous journals, including The New York Times and First Things, among others. She’s also written for Law & Liberty in the past. So we’re glad to have her on the program to talk about Boomers, Boomer nation. Helen Andrews (00:53): That’s us! We are the boomer nation. Richard Reinsch (00:55): So Helen, what got you interested in writing about the Boomers? I mean, there’s been obviously a lot said about them. What did you want to add? Helen Andrews (01:03): Well, I’m a millennial to start by laying all of my cards on the table. And the millennials and the boomers are natural enemies, in many cases because the boomers are our parents. And as I looked around the world, when I graduated from college in 2008, into the teeth of a massive financial crisis, I started thinking that the world that my generation had inherited was not the one that we were supposed to, that something had gone wrong, somewhere. And so I wanted to trace back, where mistakes had been made, in the economy, in politics, in religion, in the family. And every time I tugged on a thread, I found that it led me back to the generation that came of age in the 1960s, and started running the world in the 1990s. And that was the baby boomers. Richard Reinsch (02:00): Something that I’ve always thought about with the baby boomers. And I think about it in terms of my own family, one of my grandfathers grew up on a farm during the Great Depression, in northern Indiana. He talked a bit about that with me difficult times, then very early in his life goes off to fight in a world war in the Navy, and then comes back. And GI Bill goes to college, becomes an engineer, and raises a family. And when I juxtapose his early life with the life he was able to create for his children. And this is I think, throughout the baby boomer generation. And so he would be a part of what’s called the silent generation. So we have a boomer generation that grows up, obviously, underneath the specter of nuclear war. But they grow up compared to previous American generations and conditions of unparalleled prosperity, and peace, and good education systems, largely very much intact families. And what do you think goes wrong there? Helen Andrews (03:13): The long and short of it is that the boomers, as you say, came of age, at a time of unparalleled prosperity. I don’t think America has ever been wealthier in the fullest sense than it was in the 1950s and 60s. And it was also a time of great social cohesion. All the things that make American society great, we’re still functioning at full capacity then, our churches were exceptionally strong in the 1960s, our civil society, and informal volunteerism, all of that good stuff, was hitting record highs in the 1950s. And all of this together gave the baby boomers a sense that that was just the natural order of things, that the natural state of the world is for everybody to be rich, and for society to work well. And for there to be high levels of trust among the people who live together. And they behaved on that assumption over the next six decades. And the result was that they thought they could act out and destroy institutions and that society would continue to function in the wonderful, healthy way that it had when they were young kids. Helen Andrews (04:31): And of course, that’s no longer the case. Prosperity, as we have discovered is not the natural order of things, and that if you destroy institutions like the churches, then the result will be what you see today in the Protestant mainline, which has churches their moribund, is not on their literal deathbed. So that was what happened to the boomers. They came of age at the time when everything was great. And they assumed it would always be that way, no matter how badly they acted. Richard Reinsch (05:00): Question, in your research for this book did you ever take up the question, something that I’ve been interested in. What’s the interaction between, say, the silent generation and these children that they’re raising? And it seems to me at some level, there was just a failure to inculcate time-honored habits and the American past, at some level, did you think about that? Helen Andrews (05:26): I did. But the thing that first made me start questioning that narrative, that it’s actually the silent generation fault. And the greatest generation fault is reading about the phenomenon of the 1960s in other countries because, of course, the baby boom 1960 that was a global phenomenon. And the people in Germany and France, who asked themselves, why is it that all of our students are rioting in the streets and throwing cobblestones at cops in 1968? The answer they came up with was, well, they hate their parents because their parents bequeath them a world of war. Their parents were the generation of fascism and collaboration. And that’s why these young Frenchmen don’t trust anybody over 30. I thought, well, that’s almost the opposite of the situation you had in the United States. Here, the narrative is that the generation that were the boomers’ parents were the good guys, and they made things too nice for their kids. And that’s why they hated them. And you can’t have two opposite explanations for an identical phenomenon. So eventually, I ended up concluding that the generational boomer phenomenon, the 1960s, that rebellion, was a product just of simple demographics, when you have a very large generation, as the boomers were, when they become of age, they start to throw their weight around because there are just so many of them and that makes their desires just so important to the rest of society. So that was what was going on not in the actual… The substance of generational debate did not have a lot to do with it. Richard Reinsch (07:00): You profile six boomers in your book and you in many ways mirror very successful book Eminent Victorians by Lytton Strachey, which was a very successful book at the time for dispelling a vaunted legacy of the Victorians in the English mind. I take it you wouldn’t mind taking that place here in America with regard to the boomers, you profile Steve Jobs, Aaron Sorkin, Jeffrey Sachs, Camille Paglia, and Al Sharpton. I’m wondering, why not Bill Clinton? Isn’t he the quintessential boomer? Helen Andrews (07:35): He was absolutely on my shortlist. And the reason why I ended up passing his name off, even though he is as you say, the quintessential boomer, I agree with you 100% is that I wasn’t sure there was a lot left to say about Bill Clinton that hasn’t already been said. And also, I got a chance to say most of what I wanted to say about Bill Clinton in the chapter on Aaron Sorkin. Because if people out there don’t know, if you watch an episode of The West Wing, there’s a 75% chance that at least one of the plotlines in that episode is ripped from the headlines, as they say in Law and Order from something that actually happens in the Bill Clinton White House. If you know anything about the Clinton years, you will see familiar news stories and anecdotes pop up in The West Wing all the time. So that was where I got my chance to say what I have to say about Bill Clinton. Richard Reinsch (08:32): And then in that regard to Hillary Clinton. I know there is so much that has been said about them. It’s the handprint. The boomer generation is so large, and their print on all aspects of American society continues today. And it to me he just exemplifies that and what he was able to achieve and also dissolve. Helen Andrews (08:56): And also Clinton was a man who squandered what were great gifts, not just the power that he was granted that he then abused, but the gifts that God gave them. He had many virtues, and he did not turn them to as good use as he should have. And that’s the boomer story in a nutshell. Richard Reinsch (09:14): Okay. You profile first, Steve Jobs, he seems to be the one you’re the most sympathetic to. Helen Andrews (09:22): People have told me that I get gradually less sympathetic as the book goes on. That may be true. One of the most fascinating subjects to me of California and business in Silicon Valley, is how the hippie side and the aggressive capitalist side are two sides of the same coin, that they are more alike than people tend to anticipate. Richard Reinsch (09:28): Yes, with Jobs, you profile him. Why? Helen Andrews (09:33): Because you really can’t tell the story of the last sixty years in the United States without talking about technology. And nobody shaped our view of technology more than Steve Jobs. He’s also somebody who exemplifies California more than just about anybody. If you bought Apple products in this century, you’ll probably remember turning over on the back of your iPod or whatever and seeing made in China, but designed in not in America, designed in California. So Apple was very much a California company. And if you think about the boomers’ effect on the world, pretty adequate way to summarize, it would be making us all look a little bit more like California. And that’s what Steve Jobs represents to me. Richard Reinsch (10:20): Jobs in the Apple company and creating the smartphone, which has, I mean, in my mind, transformed so many things and in conjunction with social media, in terms of how we interact with information and interact with one another. Jobs also you write about, there’s certain countercultural strains in Jobs, but also certain other strains as well, in terms of I didn’t know that he wasn’t going to allow pornography apps to be sold on Apple products, et cetera. And he said, “We’re going to do what’s right for our customers.” So there was this interesting, sane part of Jobs that you profiled. Helen Andrews (10:58): Absolutely. He was a quintessential boomer in some ways, but the anti-boomer in other ways, the stand against pornography in the Apple Store is one example. He hated politics. I mean, he would go to a meeting at the Obama White House if they invited him just because there’s always a hobnob with powerful people. But the strain that you see in Silicon Valley now where everybody’s very woke and political, he just had no time for that. And he insulted Bill Gates and his dabbling in philanthropy. For Steve Jobs, he was a true-believing capitalist. That was what he thought was his contribution to the world, which is, in many ways very unboomerish, as well. Richard Reinsch (11:42): There’s the side of Silicon Valley that it was this myth of the hippie in the garage, inventing new tech products that we would use, but it was about creativity, with some amount of bourgeois productivity and business acumen, but this was really the flowering of a new ethos and way of being in business. And do you think Jobs fulfilled that? Or is he a crossways, with that? The reason why the boomers are failing to be a bulwark against crazy woke fanaticism is that they feel like these kids are just believing the same values that they do. You see it in Silicon Valley all the time, the people who run Google in the top management positions, the boomer generation people have the same values as sensibly as the millennials who are terrorizing them. It’s just that they thought we could pursue those values and still be nice to each other. Helen Andrews (12:07): One of the most fascinating subjects to me of California and business in Silicon Valley, is how the hippie side and the aggressive capitalist side are two sides of the same coin, that they are more alike than people tend to anticipate. I think my favorite thing that’s ever been written about Silicon Valley is Tom Wolfe’s essay that’s collected in his collection, Hooking Up about noise in the early founding fathers of Silicon Valley. And because he’s Tom Wolfe, one of the things he notices is the way everybody’s dressed. And he notices that California has a much more casual style and you can spot somebody from East Coast Wall Street when they come out to visit a Silicon Valley company in a second because they’re the only ones wearing a suit and tie. But when I talked to boomers, just to have my personal acquaintance about things that they thought had changed in the last 50 years, one of the things that a lot of them mentioned was workplace attire, that is a lot more casual now than it used to be. And that’s a great example of the Californication of the rest of America. It used to be, you only saw that kind of thing on the west coast. Now you see it everywhere showing up in jeans and sneakers to an office job. But one of the boomers that I talked to about this phenomenon made a chilling observation, he said that this casual workwear coincided exactly with longer hours, that it used to be even in my hardcore New York law office, that everybody kept basically nine-to-five or nine-to-six hours, everybody understood even your boss, that everybody ought to be home for dinner. And it was only as the go-go ’80s started going and especially into the ’90s that they started thinking it’s okay to ask your employees to start staying till 10 o’clock at night on a regular basis. And so supervisors said, “Well if I’m going to do that, I can’t ask them to be in an uncomfortable suit all that time.” So in that way, the rise of casual wear in the office went hand in hand, with employers demanding more and workers losing leverage in the workplace. It’s not about self-expression and dressing how you want no, it’s about them squeezing every drop of labor they can out of you. So I think that’s the kind of California workplace the Steve Jobs represented. Richard Reinsch (14:26): As you say that I think I’m recalling something I read about Marissa Mayer, who was the CEO of Yahoo, that started on the ground floor of Google, that she didn’t go home for 30 days or something like that, something ridiculous like that in the early days of Google. I guess one thing that comes to mind here is so the wokeplace phenomenon in some ways in which is such a part of Silicon Valley and it’s become at least what you and I do. It’s something we interact with every day, an unpleasant reality. And that’s post-boomers though, isn’t it? Isn’t that something that, did they prepare the way for that? Is that a part of this merging of workplace and values and virtues? Or does that come after them? And it sparks the question. Are we afraid of an America after the boomers? Do we fear what that might look like? One place is, the presidential race, we were actually afraid of the next generation of Democratic politicians. So we chose Joe Biden. Helen Andrews (15:27): I think that’s absolutely right. But we can’t let the boomers off the hook because the reason those Millennials are so terrifying, is because of the things that the boomers taught them. And the reason why the boomers are failing to be a bulwark against crazy woke fanaticism is that they feel like these kids are just believing the same values that they do. You see it in Silicon Valley all the time, the people who run Google in the top management positions, the boomer generation people have the same values as sensibly as the millennials who are terrorizing them. It’s just that they thought we could pursue those values and still be nice to each other. They weren’t fanatical about it. So the millennials know that they have the leverage in these battles. Because the boomers claim to believe in the very same thing. So yeah, the boomers are the last barrier between the coming insanity that is the world takeover of absolutely everything. But they were the ones who created the monster in the first place. Richard Reinsch (16:37): I want to skip, this being Law and Liberty. The last person you profile is Justice Sonia Sotomayor, talk…

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    The Myth of an Independent Federal Reserve: A Conversation with Peter Conti-Brown Feb 25, 2021
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    Peter Conti-Brown of the Wharton School comes to Liberty Law Talk to discuss his most recent book, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve.


    Burke's Moral Economy Feb 01, 2021
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    Richard Reinsch (00:19): Hello, I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Gregory Collins about his impressive new book, Commerce and Manners in Edmund Burke’s Political Economy. Gregory Collins is postdoctoral associate and a lecturer in the Program on Ethics, Politics, and Economics at Yale University. Gregory, welcome to the program. Gregory Collins (00:43): Hi, Richard. Thank you for the opportunity to talk. Richard Reinsch (00:44): Excellent. So thinking about political economy, which is the term you used throughout the book, what is Edmund Burke’s political economy? And maybe also, what do you mean by political economy? I think that’s worth thinking about too. We usually just think about economics, and economics almost as a separate sphere of study, but I think you mean something more here. Gregory Collins (01:04): Yes, that’s a great question because much of my book really hinges on an appropriate understanding of what political economy meant in Burke’s time and what it means today. So as you suggested, in Burke’s age, statesmen, thinkers, they studied political economy, not economics. Economics today is more of a specialized narrow field with particular quantitative methodological approaches. While in Burke’s time, it was a more capacious, holistic understanding of the intersecting concerns of commercial activity, trade, both domestic and foreign, as well as the broader social/religious/ethical preconditions for commercial activity. It was in this wide sense that Burke understood and tried to study the implications of commercial activity, which included, certainly, a particular insight into trade, taxation of revenue, but also broader considerations about the role of commerce in the wider social order. Richard Reinsch (01:59): What did Burke… What was his approach to political economy? Gregory Collins (02:03): His approach was… I would characterize it as a resistance towards specialization, in the broadest sense. He used this premise to inform his understanding of commercial activity, both in regard to the free internal grain trade, which was the subject of his primary economic writing, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, and it informed his understanding of the political economy of the French Revolution and the political economy of European civilization as a whole. So, one of the core arguments in the book, which I’m going to jump to it right now, in the chapters on the French Revolution, and the great intellectual historian, John Pocock, the first, I believe, to recognize this in a pioneering essay he wrote on Burke’s political economy on French revolution. Burke grew out of particular ethical preconditions that predated the mass commercial economy. The prior religious and social and ethical traditions that were built up throughout the ages by what he called the ‘spirit of the gentleman and the spirit of religion.’ So British establishment, such as the Church of England, and the hereditary aristocracy, which provided and encouraged a culture of learning, patronage, moral and religious instruction, all furnished the conditions of stability, moderation, an element of courtesy, chivalry, of course, that provided the necessary environment for commercial activity to emerge. Commercial activity which was more prone to vicissitudes, vagaries, unpredictability, and then the more stable orders of religion and the landed aristocracy. So, for Burke, these two pillars were essential for applying this foundation for the emergence of the mass commercial economy. If those two pillars withered way, this is part of Burke’s argument on French Revolution, then social order would decline, which for him would include commercial activity. Richard Reinsch (03:49): You note in the book, this put him at odds with many Enlightenment theorists, including many in the Scottish Enlightenment, on the origins of markets and the perpetuation of markets as well. Gregory Collins (03:59): Yes, yes. This is really a distinctive quality of Burke, with regard to sovereignty at the time. Many of the Scots, who I have to be fond of them, David Hume, Amanda Smith, Adam Ferguson. Well, Adam Ferguson’s argument was probably closer to Burke than the other two. But the general tenor of their understanding of markets is not that they severed markets morality. In fact, as we know Smith’s was moral philosophy, and he wrote a great book on moral philosophy, but as I… I outline the book… And Pocock also mentioned this, they didn’t appear to draw Burke’s specific argument that commercial activity grew out of these preconditions prior to the Enlightenment. And so not only, for Burke was there a necessary moral foundation for markets. This moral foundation was not a modern moral foundation. It was a pre-modern moral foundation. This is not to say that Burke elevated a romantic shimmery, but he thought that the roots of commercial order could be discovered prior to the industrial revolution, prior to the available-hand concept, prior to the elevation of profits as a worthy human endeavor. And then in addition, Burke he held an interesting attitude towards the idea of the doux-commerce theory, which is embraced by the Scots, embraced by the French, Enlightenment theorists as well, Thomas Paine, famously. Richard Reinsch (05:08): What’s the doux commerce theory? Gregory Collins (05:10): So doux commerce theory is the idea, and this idea persists today that the increase in commercial relations between two parties, including two nations, tend to produce peaceful effects over time. Two trading partners, as opposed to invading one another for land or power, they will find mutual interest in trading goods and services from one another. And therefore they have an investment in each other that would discourage them from starting a war with one another. The reasoning goes, therefore, the enhancement of commercial relations will promote peace relations over time. Now, Burke, he does not dismiss this. And in fact, he adopts this reasoning in regard to Ireland and England in his most comprehensive statement on free trade when he wrote two letters to merchants of Bristol, the community who was representing that opposed the free trade measures with Ireland. Burke argued in favor of the free trade measures, for many of the reasons that advocates of doux commerce theory espouse today, that they do tend to promote peaceful social relations on their mutual interest and increasing trade with one another. And he also does this reasoning with regard to the American colonies in his famous speech on America. He lavished his praise on the Americans for their ingenuity, their industry, their intelligence, their hard-work, their commercial undertaking. And these are two of the clearest instances in which Burke does embrace this idea that the increase in commercial relations will tend to promote peaceful social relations, but he does not necessarily adopt this in his broader political thoughts. And the most glaring case was the French. There are a couple examples. In 1786, Anglo-French Commercial Treaty. I mentioned his speech on Traders’ Correspondence primarily 1790s, during the French revolutionary wars, which Burke, push back against this idea that increasing commercial relations with France, or pre-revolutionary France and France during the revolution, would not necessarily have peace relations. The simple idea is that if you are engaged in commerce with an avowed enemy or rival, that is not a guarantee that that rival will tend to adopt peaceful measures. For Burke, in that sense, commercial considerations should be subordinate to wider national aims of honor of national interest. And how I harmonize these various strands of his thoughts and doux commerce, and as has been said before, it was not necessarily systematic thinkers, not treatises mostly. So you have to piece together his different thoughts from various speeches and writings. I argue that, for Burke, even the doux commerce thesis, somewhat to his broader point about how modern commercial activity requires ethical preconditions. The doux commerce thesis, especially international relations, also requires pre-economic commitment, shared values, shared principles, which is why he thought that free trade between England and Ireland, England and the Americans best reflects the doux commerce. But in the case of France, which not have broad shared political principles, he did not think that increased commercial activity between England and France would have a peace relations. And so that’s the distinction I carve out in the book. Richard Reinsch (08:09): Okay. So you wouldn’t say Edmund Burke was a free trader, but you also wouldn’t say he was a mercantilist. You would say he is balancing international trade, or transnational trade, for its good effects and good consequences. But those aren’t its own justification. It has to also be balanced against national interest and the needs of the empire, and what’s going to best serve it, which… As I read your book, I heard you to be saying, “Generally, Edmund Burke favored pretty liberalized trade, but he made crucial exceptions.” And you’ve kind of articulated some of those here. And thinking about Burke’s political economy, I thought we might go to the beginning of your book and think about the arcane topic of Britain’s internal grain trade. You write at the beginning… Because I think it’s instructive in a lot of ways. You write at the beginning of chapter two, you say, “Burke discerned poetry in the elusive motions of England’s internal grain trade.” Gregory, talk about that poetry. Gregory Collins (09:14): Yes. The internal grain trade turned out to be one of the primary protagonists in this narrative. The internal grain trade was a subject of Burke’s primary arcane treatise, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, which really wasn’t a treatise. It was a private letter written for government officials that addressed the particular circumstances of mid 1790s England, which in the middle of French revolutionary war has experienced a number of difficulties, including spiking green prices, increasing normalization, population growth. There’s only a few years before Thomas Malthus wrote his famous book on whether the food supply would be able to sustain the population growth. And for Burke, however, his principle argument in this track, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, is that there was, what I call, poetry in order to their internal grain trade of England, that was delicate, that was fragile, but that nevertheless tended to work absent arbitrary meddling government intervention. And so Burke’s principle message in Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, he wrote this in light of calls to intervene in and increase regulations of the labor contracts between employers, employees, laborers, and farmers, and impose harsh controls, published in the new public graineries. Burke argued for government restraints. He thought that there was this order that emerged from the private contractual arrangements and interactions between farmers and laborers in the grain economy. And particularly in times of scarcity, he was very suspicious of the idea that government meddling, suppress controls, wage regulations, coopered to more beneficial consequences than if the grain trade was left to its own order. Now, this sounds like, and it is, a defense of a free market, a free domestic market. Throughout the book, I decided that this was, for Burkes, the most comprehensive intellectual statement on the internal grain trade. He defended the internal grain trade a number of other instances in the early 1770s and later in 1787, when they were tends to revive bans on, what we today call, middlemen trading activities, forestalling, rebranding and engrossing, which were various ways in which traders would buy up provisions before the edge of the market, and then we sell them at a higher price. So in these various instances, including in Thoughts and Details on Scarcity work issued a robust defense of the middlemen in the grain economy or enabling the efficient distribution of resources, particularly those in need. And the other additional point is that Burke anticipated as it’s described in the book, as a Hayek insight into the limits of rationality in coordinating complex socioeconomic activities. In Thoughts and Details on Scarcity Richard Reinsch (11:55): So, in this period, that he’s writing the Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, you’ve got a crisis, we’ve got food shortages, we’ve got spikes in prices, we’ve got people not making enough money, it seems. You’ve got all of these conditions. We confront those periodically in our own economy in different ways. And he’s pushing back against this… And from what I could read, in a way that Hayek would agree with, that Milton Friedman would largely agree with, he’s emphasizing that in a time of scarcity of seemingly economic failure. And he’s confronting proposals like a minimum wage. As I think about it, they wanted to have the government take over granaries. So you could think about a public option for health care, as an analogy, there’s this desire to eliminate, as you were talking about middlemen, but those are just people who are making money, but they’re also providing an efficient way for grain to reach down-market buyers. And this is an efficiency thing. So he’s confronting all of this, and he’s saying, “Look, you’re actually going to make the situation worse. You’re going to depress the market for longer conditions. The recovery is going to take longer. It’s going to be less robust, but we’re not going to know what the real prices are.” So, all of these provisions are going to backfire,” as we say. “They will have unintended consequences.” And I thought that maybe you can tell us how successful he was in this debate. But I thought that was incredibly instructive. These things continue. These battles over market failure, not taking into account government failure, policy failure. All of this Burke is confronting here in a nice instructive way. Gregory Collins (13:32): Yes, this moment in the 1790s was the defining moment in England’s global economy, including its grain economy in the 18th century, really emerging for the more conspicuous presence, when Burke entered parliament, in 1760s. There were these periods in which there were food shortages, spikes in grain prices, instability in the grain market. And this was a constant subject of Burke’s concern of legislators concern about the time period. As exemplified in 1772, I should mention, when Burke led the repeal of the bans on middlemen trading activities, which were enforced… Not really enforced, but they’re still on the books. Edmund Burke or the repeal and parliament of these bans on the basis of what you just said, that these regulations tend to create conditions that were even worse for participants in the agriculture economy, when back in Burke’s judgment, they actually facilitated smooth efficiency of the distribution of goods and services. Burke provided a thinking, comprehensive rebuke of what he called the paper money despotism of the French Revolution. The French revolutionaries, they seized the property of the Gallican Church, which owned around one 10th of landmass, I believe, in France, at that time. They were going to sell the church property to help pay down France’s debt. They have a financial calamity and short France’s finances. In fact, last semester I taught a course on constitutional and business ethics. And antitrust cases, Standard Oil cases, it referenced this repeal of middleman trade activities. It didn’t mention Burke’s name, but it mentioned this repeal in the early 1770s, as an example of which the English grew to realize that these bans actually tended to help the operation of economic forces in the long run, as opposed to undermine them. And so Burke had an immediate impact on this debate. This is when Burke’s free markets really come out, and it could easily s…

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    The Law of Bioethics and the Human Person Jan 03, 2021
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    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Today we’re talking with Carter Snead about his new book, What It Means to Be Human: The Case for the Body in Public Bioethics. Carter Snead is the director of the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at Notre Dame University where he is also a professor of law and a teacher in the political science department. He is also a member of the Pontifical Academy for Life, the principal bioethics advisory board to Pope Francis. Carter, we’re glad to have you on Liberty Law Talk for the first time. Carter Snead (00:57): No, it’s great to join you. I’m a big admirer. Richard Reinsch (00:59): Great. So what does it mean to be human, and why do you think public bioethics is getting the answer wrong? Carter Snead (01:09): Yeah, so the first claim of the book is a kind of methodological claim, and the argument that I make is the best way into understanding law and public policy is to ask the question of what vision of human identity and human flourishing is underwriting the law and the politics and the public policy? The question of what it means to be human is a perennial question that has been debated and discussed ever since human beings became capable of self-reflection. But my argument is, and this may be counterintuitive to some folks, some people think of law and politics not only separate from normative questions, but separate from what I’m referring to in the book as anthropological questions, as the contested question of what it means to be and flourish as a human being. But the argument in the book that I make is that because law, fundamentally, and is really only intelligible through the lens of its purpose, which is to promote the flourishing of persons and to protect persons, the law has to have an ex-ante assumption about what person is and what constitutes human flourishing. Otherwise, the law, there’d be no way to know if the law is doing what it’s supposed to be doing, there’d be no way to measure its successes, you have to have the metric of its purpose and the premises that underlie those purposes. And so my argument is that if you want to understand the law most richly, most deeply, that’s the question that you have to ask. And it’s especially true in the context of public bioethics, which deals with not only the question of what human flourishing is and what human beings are, but the boundary questions of who counts as a human being? Or who counts as a person rather, the question of who counts as a human being as a biological matter is an easier question, but the question of legal personhood and moral personhood is really the central question of bioethics. And it becomes operationalized in law and policy when it enters the public domain, either through political branches or the judiciary. And so you’d ask, why does public bioethics get the question wrong? Richard Reinsch (02:54): And by the way, just wanted to say, I was pretty sure when I read the title, I knew what public bioethics is, but maybe just set forward that, too. Carter Snead (03:01): Yeah, absolutely. So bioethics as a field of scholarly inquiry emerged in the United States in the late ’60s, early ’70s, in reaction to a series of scandals, public scandals involving human subjects protections in Tuskegee, Alabama, and really all over the country, as documented by Henry Beecher in a article in the New England Journal of Medicine. And so as the field of inquiry, people sort of asking questions about how to think about the clinical relationship and doctors and patients and the ethical dimensions of that relationship, as well as the public policy questions associated with the governance of science, medicine and biotechnology. And when I say public bioethics, what I’m referring to is that area of law and policy, the governance of science, medicine, and biotechnology in the name of ethical goods, and that takes place at the level of the political branches. It takes place in legislatures at the state level and the US government, the federal level. Also takes place in the judiciary, the most prominent bioethics case and maybe the most prominent case of the modern era is Roe vs Wade, which set in motion a cascade of legal policy and ethical disputes over abortion. And so the distinction between bioethics as a field of inquiry and bioethics as public bioethics, is the latter relates to governance, it relates to actually the work of lawyers and judges, and lawmakers. But the interesting thing that happened is, each case, Tuskegee, the Beecher studies, as well as the case involving the just-aborted newborns, the solution was rooted in a kind of vision of human flourishing and human identity that didn’t track the violations that they were responding to. That is to say, every single individual that was violated in those three instances, was not operating at the full range of human autonomy. Richard Reinsch (04:17): What has shaped public bioethics in America? Because you mean to uproot, or really challenge, the standard operating premises and legal assumptions and conclusions of this field, but what’s shaped it? Carter Snead (04:30): Yeah, so public bioethics as a field of law and public policy is reactive. I mean, a lot of law and policy is reactive, but it’s been reacting to scandals. And the first piece of legislation that relates to public bioethics was the National Research Act, which was adopted in the early 1970s, in reaction to these scandals that I just mentioned a moment ago. So there were these scandals of 22 human experiments, documented by Henry Beecher, which involved the most prominent and elite institutions in America, including the Federal government. Research protocols in which individuals, especially very vulnerable individuals, were treated in grossly abusive ways. We had children with intellectual disabilities and injected with hepatitis, we had elderly patients suffering from dementia injected with live cancer cells. This was all done almost entirely without any mention of consent at all, and those narrow cases in which consent was secured by proxy, nothing of the material risks in these protocols were even mentioned. Tuskegee, the 40-year-study, natural history study of syphilis done by the Public Health Service, the US government in Macon County, Alabama, in which they systematically deceived poor African American sharecroppers about what they were doing. It’s been reported that they colluded with local health authorities to prevent them from having access to antibiotics, which became standard of care for syphilis in the mid 1940s. For 40 years, this went on. Richard Reinsch (05:53): Wow, that was incredible reading that in your book. And also they persuaded medical providers locally not to treat these men. Carter Snead (06:00): Yes, that’s exactly right. Richard Reinsch (06:03): It’s incredible. Carter Snead (06:04): It’s shocking. It’s a shocking scandal. It was a shameful abuse of an already vulnerable community in Alabama where I grew up, and then a third scandal that is actually less, and a lot of people have heard of Tuskegee, a lot of people have head of Beecher and his study. Not many people have heard of the third scandal that set in motion American public bioethics, which is a scandal involving researchers from the United States who traveled to Scandinavia, probably with funding from NIH, although that’s not been definitively established, to perform experiments on babies that had just been aborted. And Scandinavia, they performed abortions by C-section, and they would remove the babies intact, and they would expire shortly thereafter. These doctors would go to Scandinavia, contract with the abortionists and the women who were involved and would perform kind of grotesque experiments on these imminently dying newborns who had just been aborted. And The Washington Post had three front page articles about it in the early 1970s, it was a huge scandal. In fact, the Kennedy family, Eunice Shriver, sister of Ted Kennedy and John F. Kennedy, was so upset by this that she reached out to her brother who convened hearings and her daughter, Maria Shriver, who everybody knows is the former First Lady of California and successful American journalist, organized a protest with the Catholic schools in the DC area to come to NIH to protest this research. And so, after a series of hearings, the National Research Act was passed which imposed a moratorium on this live fetal, live neonate research. They created the National Commission on Bioethics, and it was meant to be a kind of national response to these emergent ethical questions that had public policy dimensions. But the interesting thing that happened is, each case, Tuskegee, the Beecher studies, as well as the case involving the just-aborted newborns, the solution was rooted in a kind of vision of human flourishing and human identity that didn’t track the violations that they were responding to. That is to say, every single individual that was violated in those three instances, was not operating at the full range of human autonomy. They were vulnerable, they were diminished, either by circumstances or by their physical condition, their cognitive impairments in the case of the Beecher studies, and the case of immaturity with respect to the babies that were being experimented after they had just been aborted. The solution was to extend informed consent, which is rooted in the concept of autonomy and self-determination, as the primary bulwark against these kinds of abuses. But you don’t need to think about it for very long to realize that people who are not capable, either by virtue of circumstance or their cognitive impairments, of exercising free will to the extent that would be necessary to protect themselves through participating in an informed consent procedure. That’s not the right solution to the problem, and that, you can see immediately that the issues of vulnerability and embodiment that arise in these contexts and the asymmetry between the problem and the solution, the solution is suited for a population of able-minded, able-bodied people who are not subject to circumstances or conditions that impair their free will. And so that kind of asymmetry plays out from the early 1970s to the present day, and in my book, I take the three vital conflicts of American public bioethics, the vital conflict of abortion, the vital conflicts relating to assisted reproduction, and then at the end of life, end-of-life decision making and assisted suicide. And what I try to through this analysis of the premises that underlie the law regarding human identity and human flourishing, I find that we have very much the same problem. The problem is the vision of the person that’s assumed by the law is one that doesn’t reflect or track the lived reality of the people who are endangered in those circumstances. Richard Reinsch (09:51): So talk about this, you set the standard, define the standard, call it embodiment versus expressive individualism. What is embodiment, and why should we follow that standard? Carter Snead (10:06): Yeah, so the simple insight, and it’s a simple insight and I think it’s an insight that’s easy to understand and easy to verify based in reflecting our own experiences, that we human beings are embodied. That is we don’t just have bodies, but we are bodies. That is we come into the world embodied, we experience ourselves as bodies, we experienced one another as bodies, we experience the natural world around us through and as our body. We’re living bodies, we’re dying bodies, we’re subject to the fact that our bodies are corruptible, the fact that we are dependent upon one another by virtue of our vulnerability as embodied beings. We are mutually dependent and we’re subject to these natural limits. And from that reality, the law and policy and the way we relate to one another has to be informed by that reality of embodiment. Now, you take that vision of the human person that is taking the body seriously, and understanding that embodiment is an essential aspect of being a human being, and you contrast that with the anthropology of what Robert Bellah, social scientist who wrote the classic in 1985, Habits of the Heart, and then later philosopher Charles Taylor, and after a fashion philosopher Alistair McIntyre and Michael Sandel, and others refer to as expressive individualism. It’s a very different vision of what it means to be a human being. It’s a kind of abstraction, it conceives of a human being, primarily as a disembodied will. What defines the human person is his or her will. And what constitutes human flourishing is the interrogation of the interior of the self, to discover one’s own unique, authentic, original, maybe transgressive truths, and then configure your life and your destiny according to what you discover inside yourself. You express it, and then you configure your life accordingly. And the fundamental unit of human reality is the individual, is the atomized individual will. And so the world is a world of individual atomized wills seeking to pursue their own hopes and dreams, and everything else is instrumental to that end. Relationships with other people, the natural world itself and fundamentally, also the body is an instrument to realizing the goals of the will. And within this framework, there are no unchosen obligations, there are no obligations that you didn’t agree to in advance. Everything is viewed through the lens of your projects and your purposes as you devise them through the internal interrogation of the depths of yourself. in Paradise Lost, you have this amazing scene where Lucifer addresses the other fallen angels, denying their creaturely status before God and saying, “We have no recollection at all of being created. You tell us that we’re creatures that have obligations of creatures to their creator, but we don’t remember being creatures. We don’t remember any time when we weren’t operating at the height of our powers, when we weren’t self-determined, when we weren’t powerful and able to make our own way in the world.” And Robert Bellah, when he did hundreds of interviews with Americans in the 1980s, found that this is a vision of human identity that is very common in the United States. And Charles Taylor traces the genealogy all the way back to Rousseau, who sort of transposed and reconfigured the human identity from a position that is defined by one’s role in a particular community, or society, or family, or civilization, to focusing on the inner voice as definitive and decisive regarding what one should do and be. And this took hold, not surprisingly, in artistic and literary communities and the romantic literary movement even before that. And you see artists who were reacting against the sort of linear, harmonious traditional standards of art, to try to plumb their own interior depths, to find their own originality and to project it, and not just to project it in their art, but to live it in their lives. And then somehow, in Bellah’s account, is through developments in psychology and Freudian psychotherapy and different corporate forms and different kinds of sociological changes. That notion of expressive individualism moved into the conventional communities and the conventional populations. And then in the 1960s and ’70s, the sexual revolution sort of fixed on the proposition that human sexuality and sexual expression is a key element of expressive individualism, a key element of defining oneself. And it’s not surprising that around that very same time, we see this emergence of public bioethical questions involving abortion, assisted reproduction, end-of-life decision making that largely track that same anthropology. Richard Reinsch (14:07): And just thinking about these three very controversial areas, expressive individualism would seem to have a hard time with the unborn and saying, “Why are they worthy of legal protection?” Anyone who is not sort of fully active and able, mentally and physically,…

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    Rōnin Without Masters: A Never Trump Assessment Dec 21, 2020
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    Richard Reinsch: Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re joined by Steven Teles to discuss his new book, coauthored with Robert Saldin, Never Trump: Revolt of the Conservative Elites. Steven Teles is professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins University and a senior fellow at the Niskanen Center. He’s the author and editor of a number of books, including most recently The Captured Economy: How The Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth and Increase Inequality, with Brink Lindsey, and also Prison Break: Why Conservatives Turned Against Mass Incarceration, coauthored with David Dagan from Oxford. Steven, glad to welcome you to the program to discuss this new book. Steven Teles: Happy to be here, I should mention my coauthor in this book is Rob Saldin of the University of Montana. Richard Reinsch: Okay, excellent. Thinking about this book, what got you interested in writing about the Never Trump phenomenon? Steven Teles: I’ve made a little bit of my business over my now 25-year career of writing about various forms of conservatism, going all the way back to my first book on welfare policy. So, studying conservatives has not been a recent phenomenon, and I’ve largely focused on what you might think of as the elite stratum of conservatives. There’s lots of other political scientists who study conservatism as a mass phenomenon, or who study conservative social movements, but I really focus on what you might think of as the intellectual or professional cadre of conservatives. I studied with conservatives way back when at the University of Virginia, where my advisors were Martha Derthick and Jim Ceaser and Steve Rhodes. So, I’ve been at this for a while, and when the election happened, I obviously paid close attention to the conservatives who had opposed Trump, a lot of whom were very disproportionately in that group of intellectual and professional conservatives who I make it my business to study. And it turned out that Rob Saldin, who I’d known who was also a PhD at the University of Virginia, was also nosing around this subject, and we decided to dive into it together. And so, we partially studied this in a way that you don’t usually get to in political science, in realtime. We started this pretty early in 2017 doing interviews, and I just thought that people who were left behind by a lot of the rest of their party, and yet seemed to be sticking to their guns, was a interestingly counterintuitive phenomenon, and I usually start out not with a theoretical question but with a puzzling phenomenon in the world, with the assumption that I’ll figure out what it is about theoretically later on. And so, that’s where I started. Richard Reinsch: I want to get into the principles and reasons and motivations which you set forth in the book, to understand the Never Trumpers. But before we do that, a question I have for you, and you just mentioned this. One of the great parts of the book are the interviews that you have with these leading thinkers, writers, political operatives, lawyers, et cetera. But do you have a sense in 2020 of what they make of their efforts now? Was it worth it? Regrets? Are they proud of what they’ve done? Where are they four years later? Steven Teles: Yeah, there are very few of the people we interviewed for this book who really turned back on what they did in 2016 and after. Again, the people I’ve talked to, most of them say that they were proud of it, that they think that nothing that’s happened subsequently has altered their view of Donald Trump, and that many of them often express this in terms of, they simply thought this was the honorable thing to do. Now, again, one problem with interviews is it’s always a little hard to know how much of it is post-talk rationalization, but I do think that one fact that we really underestimate in politics is… often because we have cynical, and especially in political science, we have public choice theories that are basically just applied cynicism, we tend to underestimate people’s conceptions of honor. But I think especially among the national security conservatives who really were the sort of leading edge of Never Trumpism, that honor is a really powerful and important part of the way that they make sense of the world. And they found Donald Trump a dishonorable person, and they, I think… You can look at all of the Machiavellianism that you might project on them, but I think simply, a lot of them thought that it would be dishonorable to, as they often use the term, to “bend the knee” to Trump in a way that they thought many other conservatives did. Richard Reinsch: I want to get to the principles question. You’ve kind of touched on that, but I want to ask it. You asked this question on page three, I’ll ask it to you: why did these men and women, who had not long ago been party stalwarts, take the historically dramatic step of actively opposing their own nominee, and then continuing to hound him in office? Steven Teles: Again, one thing to note is that there are different people here who come in different shades, and that some of those differences are actually quite important. I do think there’s one set of Never Trump conservatives who you might think of as the people who are associated with the ancien régime, right? Richard Reinsch: Yeah. Steven Teles: They dislike Trump because he represented a rejection of what they understood to be conservatism, and they liked the old conservatism and didn’t like this new populism that Trump was trying to substitute, and in particular we argue in the book that they believe they were authorized to try to stop Trump. Especially when you think about the public intellectuals, they had a conception of their role in the party that was really about preserving it against what they took to be dissident or unclean versions of conservatism. And for many of them, they had been at that work for quite a long time, so there’s some interesting interview material here with Jonah Goldberg, and Jonah had been having fights with people on the alt-right for a long time. And so, I think when Trump came around, he partially processed Trump through the same fight he’d been having with the alt-right for years. And so, I do think that many of these people thought that they had a particular role in the party, which was to preserve it as a conservative movement party. I think there were other people who stood up against Trump and continued to do so, partially for religious reasons, right? I don’t think it’s an accident that so many Never Trumpers were Jews and Mormons; here’s some very vivid interview material in the book along those lines that… where other conservatives could imagine Trump as someone to negotiate with, or cut a deal with, or that they didn’t love him but they would have to make the most of him, many Jews and Mormons processed him through a very different filter, which we call a catastrophic imagination, an ability to imagine things getting far, far worse. And so, they saw in Trump more than just what was on the surface, and I think reacted to him in a much more intense way than many other conservatives who eventually made their peace with him. Richard Reinsch: What do you make of… I mean, just interesting, the Jews and Mormons… evangelical Christians widely known supported Trump. The vote share that he received was incredible. But also, devout Roman Catholics seem to have had not as much of a reticence supporting him, and I’ve read stories of Cabinet members and those in high places serving Trump in the White House, quite religious along those two lines. What do you make of that? Steven Teles: Yeah. I mean, I do think especially with evangelicals and to some degree with Catholics, and I don’t want to say I’m an expert on the Catholic side of this, but I do think… again, when I mentioned the catastrophic imagination before, in a way, there were sort of two catastrophic imaginations going on in this campaign. We have a long discussion of the famous “Flight 93” article. Richard Reinsch: Yeah. I remember it well. Steven Teles: Yeah, which Michael Anton wrote, which again was this very powerful metaphor of, this election was potentially the last election in which conservatives could still preserve their role in American society, and if they lost, then it was going to be essentially communal destruction with a Hillary Clinton presidency, right? They imagined that their institutions would eventually be regulated out of existence by liberals, and therefore, even if they had concerns about Trump personally, the option of accepting Hillary Clinton was sort of unimaginable. And again, I think Hillary also played her own… just personally had a particular resonance for this community in a way that it didn’t, for example, with Jews and Mormons. So, I do think many evangelicals had convinced themselves that this was not just the normal cycles of American politics, but that a Clinton win would be a more fundamental break in history, and therefore, they needed to find a way to get behind Trump. So, I do think that really was in the background for many Christians, and I think the other thing to say is the fundamental force of polarization is just very powerful. We have a binary political system and not supporting Trump meant supporting Clinton, and many conservatives, especially evangelicals, viewed her as indigestible pretty much to the same degree that they found Trump to be indigestible. Richard Reinsch: Yeah. No, also I think another part of this, too, is how Barack Obama chose to govern throughout most of his presidency regarding the opposition. And I think in particular, the last two years, his use of executive orders to get his way, apart from Congress, I think left a mark on the minds of many people regarding executive power. In the book, you kind of break out different aspects of those who identify as Never Trumpers by specialty, foreign policy, lawyers, political operatives, economists, public intellectuals. The first group you talk about are the foreign policy specialists, and I kept waiting… I mean, was there ever an awareness on the part of this group that maybe they, in fact, their consensus… which you note in the book, their foreign policy consensus, had in fact become the problem? That is to say, that they formed these groups to fight off Rand Paul, or to fight off Donald Trump, that actually, they should have been willing to more dialogue and talk to them, given that they may have been the group most responsible to make Trump possible? Steven Teles: No. I think… at least, I didn’t get… I mean, there was little- Richard Reinsch: I knew the answer to that question. I thought it… Steven Teles: There were references in some of the interviews to Elliot Cohen, who’s now the dean at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, and was a very prominent Never Trumper and had served in the George W. Bush administration. He did say that a lot of the conservatives, the national security conservatives had been, in his quote, “sobered up” by the Iraq war. But I don’t think there was really the kind of fundamental reconsideration of foreign policy conservatism or… and I think a recognition that some of that sort of extends to foreign policy commitments to the United States, were related to support for Trump, and I do think there’s some evidence for that. So, I don’t think that was true. I mean, again, I think they very much thought that Rand Paul and that sort of species of foreign policy libertarianism, or isolationism if you want to put a different term on it, they really did think that that was the enemy. And they thought… And again, going back to that same idea, that they had a obligation, given their role in the party, to protect conservatism and protect the Republican Party against that. Just as many of these others conservatives saw themselves as authorized to perform a kind of guardian role against unclean versions of conservatism. I don’t think that they really re-thought that, or have done so now. I think many of them have more of that, “I didn’t leave the Republican Party. The Republican Party left me,” sort of attitude. Richard Reinsch: Assessing their efforts, when you talked to them, what exactly did they think was at stake? I mean, on one level, it’s sort of obvious, but at another level, as you note in the book, presidential candidates of both parties come to the foreign policy professionals, which you note are of all of the groups the most bipartisan, the most moderate in terms of domestic politics, the most willing to actually cross the aisle and work for another administration of another party. Do they, when they’re sort of looking at and seeing Trump arise, what are they thinking in terms of their overall consensus? What do they see at stake? Steven Teles: Well, I mean, again, to go back a little bit, one thing that really does characterize this group is what you might just think of as a fundamental anti-populist orientation to foreign policy, that they really do think that popular involvement in foreign policy is not a great thing. And in that sense, you might think of them as status. They believe that there is an American national interest, that it’s largely embodied in the continuing institutions of the American foreign policy apparatus, and that’s supported by this particular national security establishment that cuts across both parties. And that really is a fundamental belief that holds together a very large part of this establishment, and differentiates them from the centers on both the left and the right, who often do think that we need more popular involvement in foreign policy. So, they really do have a professionalized conception of this domain of public policy, and again, a lot of what holds the Republicans and Democrats together, even as they disagree about particular policy areas like our stance toward Iran, or how aggressive we should be toward China, they do think that that debate should be mainly dominated by them and not by the hoi-polloi. Richard Reinsch: Not by Congress. Nah, I’m just kidding. Thinking about your work on this group, what do you make of them as a whole? You note in the book, the foreign policy consensus group, they’re all sort of in one block, they inhabit a small network of institutions, they’re all in Washington, DC. Is there something peculiar about this group that sort of left them open to a Trump candidacy? Steven Teles: Yeah, well, I mean, again, one thing that did come across that we did try to make clear is… one of the main reasons why they were so aggressively against Trump is that Trump was so aggressively against them. As compared to any… most of the rest of the professional groups that make up this stratum of the Republican party, Trump was most directly willing to say that he was rejecting their role. We use the concept of jurisdiction, which comes from Andrew Abbott’s fantastic book on profession, and essentially, what Trump was doing was he was rejecting their jurisdiction over foreign policy. And Trump repeatedly said that these guys, in his colorful terms, were losers, that he was going to bring in a whole new group of people. And so, in part, they rejected Trump because Trump rejected them. The other thing I would say is these people are quite distinct in their experience of the state. Almost all of them have had actual governing experience. One quote, I think it was from Phil Zelikow, I’d have to go check, is to say that the lives of people who do this kind of work are characterized by parades and funerals, that the ceremonial element of the state really matters to these people in a way that it’s just not as true for other groups. And I should say, I’m a child of government, although a different part of government, my parents were both civil servants, and procedure and routine and the actual rituals of the state matter to a particular set of people. In some ways, you can think of populism as a rejection of…

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    The Delusions of the Ideologue and the Wisdom of the Statesman: A Conversation with Greg Weiner Dec 21, 2020
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    Editor’s note: This podcast originally aired in May, 2019.

    Greg Weiner, contributing editor to Law & Liberty, and Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs at Assumption College, returns to Liberty Law Talk to discuss his latest book, Old Whigs: Burke, Lincoln & the Politics of Prudence.


    Czars in America Dec 17, 2020
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    This next edition of Liberty Law Talk is a conversation with Mitchel Sollenberger and Mark Rozell on the use of ‘czars’ by American Presidents. Sollenberger and Rozell are authors of The President’s Czars: Undermining Congress and the Constitution. The conversation places this twentieth century presidential phenomenon in constitutional, political, and historical context. We focus on exactly what constitutes and defines a public official being labeled a czar. Of course, most importantly is the constitutional legerdemain engaged in by presidents who create and appoint czars, outside of the senate confirmation process, to exercise power in a manner that is accountable to the president alone. Sollenberger and Rozell also provide an interesting historical perspective on the use of czars by Woodrow Wilson (the first president to create a czar), Franklin D. Roosevelt, Richard Nixon, and, of course, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, where the practice has flourished like never before.


    The Economy after COVID-19 Dec 10, 2020
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    Richard Reinsch (00:18): Welcome to Liberty Law Talk, I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Arnold Kling about the post-COVID economy. Arnold Kling is an economist. He’s a scholar and he’s a writer, frequent public commentator on policy issues, which he approaches from an economics perspective. He writes frequently for EconLog, a sister website to Law & Liberty. He also contributes to Law & Liberty from time to time, usually on issues related to macroeconomics. He’s the author of numerous books, including The Three Languages of Politics: Talking Across The Political Divides, Specialization and Trade: A Re-Introduction to Economics and also Unchecked and Unbalanced. Arnold, this essay that we’re going to discuss, and I’m glad to have you on Liberty Law Talk, this essay appeared in the summer edition of National Affairs and is a sort of an exploration of our economy during this COVID-19 pandemic and how the government is trying to interact with it. Maybe talk more about the themes you explore there. Arnold Kling (01:22): One theme is that I feel that the general macroeconomic paradigm has been breaking down for a while and it’s particularly not useful for this situation. There’s a ton of confusion out there about what’s going on. We can get into sort of what that paradigm is. Richard Reinsch (01:40): Before that though, so we got a number back yesterday, 33% GDP growth in the third quarter. Second quarter GDP had declined by, I’ve got 31.4%. What do you make of those numbers? Arnold Kling (01:56): Not much, actually. Either one, because GDP is most reliable when the nature of the economy is pretty stable and the economy is very different in this COVID environment. So if you’re trying to measure output, what you’re trying to do is add together sort of apples and oranges. And if the relative value of apples and oranges changes, then that addition process doesn’t really work so well. And that’s what’s happened, is that a lot of the so-called lost output, that means the decline in GDP, is stuff that all of a sudden people decide they don’t want. Like they don’t want to take their airplane vacations, stay in hotels. They don’t want to go to conferences. They don’t want to go to big sporting events. Even if the fears of the virus went away tomorrow, people have learned to do a lot of things differently. I think most people who have the luxury of working from home would not want to go back to commuting five days a week. I bet there will never be as many business conferences as there were a year ago. So to value that output at yesterday’s prices and say, well, it’s lost, I think it isn’t correct. And the output that’s regained, kind of a different story, that may be more or less valuable depending on the nature of that. So anyway, GDP is a tough measure. Like you’re trying to add together the value of healthcare services and manufacturing of nails and pins. It’s a difficult measure. So what I prefer to track, see how well the economy is doing overall is employment. And year over year from September to September employment is down by 10 million or about six or 7%. So that to me is an indicator of sort of how off the economy is and that’s pretty far off. That’s a major year over year decline. So rather than try to figure out what’s going on with the GDP numbers, I would use the employment numbers. I would say that the economy has really been thrown off. We have 6%, 7% fewer people working than you did a year ago. Richard Reinsch (04:07): And that kind of gets into your essay. One you talk about macroeconomic dominant paradigm. Right now you don’t think is very useful. And this can be a way to think about how the economy will evolve after the pandemic. So maybe talk more about that. Arnold Kling (04:25): Yeah. So the dominant view is to treat the whole economy as if it were a single factory, I call it the GDP factory where everyone’s producing the same thing and all of a sudden demand falls off for what our single factory produces. And then the factory hires fewer workers. That’s greatly intuitive. It’s a very intuitive picture, but it’s wrong. It’s just wrong. But the challenge with the economy isn’t getting enough demand for what the factory produces. The challenge is to allocate people properly. So you can think of a situation where you have a thousand people and you don’t know really what they’re good at and who’s best at things and which things are valued. How would you allocate them? How you decide who becomes a garbage collector, who becomes an entertainer, who becomes a farmer. The economy challenge is to figure that out. And when the economy is unstable for a while, people mostly have that figured out. Millions of people actually change jobs every month because the economy is constantly reconfiguring in response to changes in technology, other factors. So my view of what happens in a downturn is that in concept, the economy gets confused, it gets mixed up. I think of it as a Rubik’s cube where the pieces have been really shuffled and it’s going take a long time to get them back into the place. Richard Reinsch (06:00): What kind of a crisis do you think COVID poses to the economy, comparative to say the 2008 financial crisis, so to speak? Arnold Kling (06:07): The 2008 financial crisis, first of all, it’s very concentrated in the financial sector. And the economy, I think, is still in the situation where everyone is trying to run with minimal cash reserves as possible. So people wanted to buy a house with no money down, firms were heavily indebted and so you have this very fragile financial situation and then a relatively minor crisis in the broad scheme of things and the real estate industry just cascaded through because people shouldn’t have, not so much people, but businesses and especially banks didn’t have the kind of cash reserves to get through a crisis. So that’s a very different situation. People were not caught so much short of financial reserves. Although businesses, especially small businesses, could have been in better shape. But there was just a change in what people wanted to do. People did not want to be eating in restaurants next to people who might be sick. They didn’t want to go and undertake business travel. They didn’t want to go into the office. And if they didn’t go into the office, they didn’t go out to lunch near the office. So all these activities had to change. The current situation is so extreme in terms of the reconfigurations that are needed, that you need just an awful lot of entrepreneurial activity, and it’s going to take a long time for entrepreneurs to figure out how to use these extra 10 million or so people. So it’s like the Rubik’s cube got really messed up and it’s going to take a long time and a lot of turns of the cube to get it back in shape. And another complication is that you don’t know how much of that is short-term and how much that is long-term. And then if the fears of the virus went away tomorrow, a lot of these activities would come back. But even if the fears of the virus went away tomorrow, people have learned to do a lot of things differently. I think most people who have the luxury of working from home would not want to go back to commuting five days a week. Maybe two days a week, maybe three, I bet there will never be as many business conferences as there were a year ago. It’ll just be, “Oh, we don’t really need to have this conference.” Richard Reinsch (08:21): What do you make of habitation patterns? I mean, you’ve read a number of sort of anecdotal pieces. I’ve had read in The Wall Street Journal of people leaving high cost locales like San Francisco and decamping to Utah and they’re still working there. Their company is still based in Silicon Valley, but they’re now working from Utah, much lower cost of living, et cetera. Do you see that as really a huge change to the urban landscape in America? Arnold Kling (08:47): Potentially yes. But we don’t know how much that will be. I mean, people are arguing back and forth. Some business executives say working remotely doesn’t work well. Other people say it does. I think the typical worker is probably pretty happy to not be commuting and so on. Not have to deal with that. So some of these changes could be changes that would have happened anyway, that have just celebrated by… I mean, everyone just, they’re building what I call remote work capital. People learning to use Zoom and those kinds of tools. There’s a combination of short-term changes and long-term changes. And so we talked about the GDP number which showed a sharp decline that included a lot of short-term changes. And then the bounce back with some of the reversals of those severe short-term changes. But there’s still a lot of long-term changes that are going to be worked through. I mean, do we think that higher education is going to revert back to what it was a year ago? I suspect not. Richard Reinsch (09:53): Yeah. I was just going to say, you in the National Affairs essay, you talk about the way unemployment just lingered at pretty high levels after the financial crisis in 2008 and didn’t really come down until maybe seven or eight years later. And that’s sort of maybe a way to think about the patterns of specialization that you discuss. But then do you see something like that happening with sort of the post-COVID economy that unemployment remains at seven, 8% as we figure out this stuff? Arnold Kling (10:22): The question is, how do we understand what’s going on? I think it was misunderstood in 2008. Now with this old paradigm of the GDP factory. If we just somehow put enough money in people’s pockets, they’ll go to the factory and everything will be fine. Whereas it’s really a problem of figuring out where people fit in, in reconfiguring the economy. In a way it’s odd that it took so long to reconfigure the economy in 2008, or is it that things got so bad. But I think again, it was because banks and businesses were operating on very thin margins. And so a lot of people went under that wouldn’t have had to if they’d had more reserves. And also the policies that were followed were again, based on the assumption of GDP factory, if anything, what you need, in my opinion, when the economies get shaken up in this way, there’s a lot of entrepreneurial activity because people need to start new businesses and figure out new projects that employ people. What’s the best use for the people who are not working. Are there 10 million people who were working a year ago who are not working today? I mean, it’s actually, there are many different people, many people got in jobs who didn’t have them before many people lost jobs, but did have them, but on net 10 million people not working. That’s an entrepreneurial opportunity to find something useful for them to do. But that means you have to encourage entrepreneurship. And under the Obama administration, you had discouraging entrepreneurship because they kept piling on regulation. And one of the quiet things that the Trump administration has done is to loosen those regulations so that entrepreneurs could work more quickly. But the current situation is so extreme in terms of the reconfigurations that are needed, that you need just an awful lot of entrepreneurial activity, and it’s going to take a long time for entrepreneurs to figure out how to use these extra 10 million or so people. Richard Reinsch (12:27): You write about that, the government in 2008 responded with a lot of stimulus and also the Federal Reserve engaged in quantitative easing, trying to take on productive assets off of financial balance sheets and putting it on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. And then now in this crisis, a much larger stimulus package was passed over 3 trillion. And the Federal Reserve, to a lot of people’s thinking, has sort of crossed a new line and is now lending directly to businesses. Talk about that. How does that relate to sort of this macro economic thinking. Arnold Kling (13:02): It’s really odd. It’s based on this old paradigm. In the GDP factory paradigm has something called a supply shock where the factory has to shut down because it can’t get new parts or a machine breaks down or something. And even a conventional macro economist would look at what’s going on and saying that has elements of a supply shock in it. That the economy isn’t supplying the stuff that people want in the current environment. And the cost of supplying things has gone up. You could see that in terms of like schools having to reconfigure themselves and come up with new equipment to open. So there’s a supply shock, but the way the policymakers respond is entirely trying to boost demand, which is really strange. If you think about it, the government shoving money at people and then saying, but don’t go to restaurants, we’re going to close them down. Don’t go to small business, we’re going to close them down. It’s really kind of feudal. What needs to happen is there needs to be some reconfiguration. Again, if fears of the virus decline, which is probably the best thing the government could do is sort of take steps to reduce people’s fears of the virus. Then some of the other activities will come back, but then a lot of activities left to be reconfigured. Maybe people have been projecting for a long time, that education could be reconfigured, sort of some different combination of in-person and remote learning. The value of putting a thousand kids in a lecture hall just can’t be compared to giving that same information online. There may be other things that are much more valuable in person, but it’s time for higher education to figure that out. Things like business conferences, again, will be reconfigured. So the longterm changes, they’re not affected by stimulus measures, they’re affected by people in business and in these institutions figuring out how best to do things. Richard Reinsch (15:14): How would you advise, I mean, to me the stimulus was sort of this democratic process where something had to be done, something large had to be done. Because the government had shut down so many businesses, state governments, local governments. The government had to act in some way to compensate people for those losses. But how would you prescribe, if we could follow what you’re saying, what would be measures to take? Arnold Kling (15:39): Okay. The first thing that comes to mind is some kind of employment subsidy. So you’re giving employers reason to hire people. You could just have a one year or two year moratorium on the payroll tax, for example, would give employers more reason to hire people, that would be one. Richard Reinsch (16:03): Make business startups easier. Make it easier to form and start new businesses. Arnold Kling (16:09): Yeah. And any kind of deregulation on those lines and things like clearly reducing business liability for people getting COVID when they go to work or go to an event. And as long as the business isn’t sort of unreasonable and forcing people in close quarters or whatever. Richard Reinsch (16:33): We are likely though to just continue to bail out these different parts of our economy, hotels, airlines. One can see higher ed getting a bailout. We haven’t even touched a lot of the states that are way over their heads here. I see that as a possibility. Arnold Kling (16:51): And that’s something where you wish that there were some thought going into it, as opposed to just who’s got political power. But if you think about it, the political power will be, people have businesses in every congressional district. So if the real estate industry were in trouble, which is not, you would get a big bailout. But it did in 2008, things like auto dealers will probably get whatever they ask for and higher education will get whatever they ask for, you’ve got institutions everywhere. And it’s a very powerful lobby. A real challenge is what to do with small businesses. What I proposed months ago was to have a gene…

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