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    Philosophy

    The Law & Liberty Podcast

    Law & Liberty contributing editor James Patterson interviews prominent authors and thinkers. A production of Liberty Fund, Inc.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Understanding Lee Dec 02, 2021
    Show notes

    Hello, and welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m your host Richard Reinsch. Liberty Law Talk is featured at the online journal, Law & Liberty, which is available at lawliberty.org. Richard Reinsch (00:19): Welcome to Liberty Law Talk today, I’m talking with Allen Guelzo about his new book, Robert E. Lee: A Life. Allen Guelzo is one of our great American historians of the Civil War, of Abraham Lincoln, of slavery, of reconstruction. It’s an honor for him to join us today. I mentioned the subjects he’s published on. He’s published numerous books in those areas, also books that are award-winning, including Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, which spent eight weeks on The New York Times Best Sellers list, won the Guggenheim-Lehrman Prize in Military History, the Fletcher Pratt Award of the New York City Roundtable, and the Richard Harwell Award of the Atlanta Civil War Roundtable. Recently published a book, Redeeming the Great Emancipator with Harvard University Press, and Reconstruction: A Concise History with Oxford University Press. Allen, we’re glad to have you on the program and we’re thankful also for the contributions you’ve made to Law & Liberty over the years. Allen Guelzo (01:20): Richard, thank you for the invitation. I’m glad to be here, glad to be able to speak to the Law & Liberty audience, and especially be able to talk about this new book on what is really something, I guess, of an unusual subject for me to be handling. Richard Reinsch (01:34): Yeah, and I mentioned to our audience, I couldn’t go through all of your publication achievements, because there’s so many, but as I said, they include Lincoln. They include slavery, the Civil War, and you are not shy about the side that you take. And I think about you, Allen, I think about not only your historical work, but I think of you as a man firmly dedicated to natural rights, to the Declaration of Independence, and firmly to the American Constitutional Project. And so that leads me to ask you this question. What got you interested in writing about Robert E. Lee? Allen Guelzo (02:13): It might have been a certain perverseness or at least the perverseness of curiosity. I have spent a lot of time writing about the Civil War. I spent a lot of time writing about Abraham Lincoln, in particular. And you might say that in 2013, after I’d finished work on the Gettysburg book, the question that came to my mind was, what next, and the thought that came in accompaniment with that was, what would it be like to look at this Civil War from the other end of the telescope? Now, I’m a Yankee from Yankee land, no question about it. And I was always raised at my grandmother’s knee with a sense of the righteousness of the Union cause. She had been a school girl in Philadelphia at the turn of the last century. And at that time there were still old union veterans who would make a point of coming to her school, the George Clymer School on what they then called Decoration day. We call it Memorial Day. And they would come and they would talk about the real meaning of the war and the real meaning of the war was not what those horrible, treasonous Johnny Rebs were telling people way down below the Mason Dixon line. So she imbibed early on the Union cause, and I learned that from her and that for me was the default position. So that it was always a curiosity for me growing up to find people who would display the Confederate flag. What are you doing that for? That sets the flag of the enemies of the country. And people who glorified Robert E. Lee, I’d go, wait a minute, the man committed treason. So I thought in 2013 and into 2014, what would it be like if I was on the other end of the telescope, what would the Civil War look like? And in particular, I was intrigued by a question I just sort of barely alluded to. And that is, how do you write the biography of someone who commits treason? That’s an interesting point of view because it’s easy to write biography of people you can admire. If not entirely without any qualification, I don’t think you can do that for anyone. But certainly, to write about people whose basic achievements are things that we admire today and take strength and take consolation from, Robert E. Lee is different because he did commit treason and I don’t use the word lightly either. Some people throw that around as a negative term that they would hang on someone like said, you are ugly. Treason has a very specific meaning for me. My father was a career army officer. He took the oath that all army officers take. My son is, United States Army and he took the oath. I took the oath when I became a member of the National Council of the Humanities when I was appointed there by President Bush in 2006, and I take that seriously. It was an oath to defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. And Lee fought against that oath. He turned his back on an oath he had sworn and he raised his hand against the flag and the Constitution that I and my family had taken an oath to defend. So when I looked at the man, my most general sense was, I am looking at a face of a man who committed treason. How do you write the biography of someone like that? That’s a challenge. And the challenge, well, the challenge appealed to me, I guess in the same way that Mount Everest appealed to Mallory. When people ask him, why do you want to climb Mount Everest? And you know, he responded “because it’s there.” So to Robert E. Lee I went, and what we have now is the result of seven years worth of work on Robert E Lee. Richard Reinsch (06:19): Trying to think about the treason point, trying to walk in Lee’s shoes and think about the world as he did as best we can do that, just for even trying to do that on this treason point. And you can probably reproduce the quote word for word. It’s something like “I’m a citizen of America, but I’m a citizen of Virginia first.” Why didn’t he think he was committing treason? Allen Guelzo (06:45): He wouldn’t even talk in terms quite that specific. When he makes his decision in April of 1861, it’s really a series of decisions. It’s a decision first to turn down an offer that comes to him from Abraham Lincoln through an intermediary, the old Washington political hands, Francis Preston Blair. And Blair and Lee meet at the home of Blair’s son, Montgomery, on Pennsylvania Avenue. That’s Blair House, literally, that’s where they met. And there, Lee declines the offer that is made to him to take command of any federal forces that are going to be used to suppress the Southern rebellion. He then goes and resigns his commission in the United States Army. He was at that moment, colonel of the First United States Cavalry, resigns that commission, then he goes back home to Arlington and he makes a third decision. And that is to leave for Richmond and to accept an invitation from the governor of Virginia to take charge of Virginia’s state forces. That’s really three decisions that happen in sequence, but they are decisions that take him, each one of them, a step further and further away from his original allegiance. And the one thing which runs as a common thread through all of those decisions is this insistence, I cannot, I cannot draw my sword against my native state. Now, people have interpreted that as saying, well, this is because in Lee’s day, people understood their citizenship in their states to be on an equal plane with, or maybe even superior to that of their citizenship in the nation. I think that’s questionable. I think that’s questionable in 1861. So what exactly is he referring to when he says I can’t draw my sword against my native state? I think what he is really talking about is this vast network of kin. And I think he’s also talking about protecting the property that he was charged with passing on to his children, and especially the property that today we identify as Arlington. Richard Reinsch (08:42): Yeah. Allen Guelzo (08:43): Yes, there was some constitutional uncertainty that’s not actually clarified finally and utterly until the 14th amendment, but I don’t think there’s a whole lot in the way of Lee’s decision making that was bound up with technicalities like that. I think for him, when he says he can’t draw his sword against Virginia, what he’s really talking about is the vast network of his kin folk and his family. Richard Reinsch (09:07): Okay. Allen Guelzo (09:08): Because many of the members of that family are people who came to the rescue of Robert E. Lee and his siblings and his mother when they were pretty well left on their own in Alexandria before Lee went off to West Point and he was thinking about the debts and the obligations he owed to this vast network of kin. And that was an important consideration for him. Richard Reinsch (09:32): So as I listen to you and I want to talk about that Lee in Virginia too, because that is new to me, this difficult childhood he had and being abandoned by his father, his father being “Light-Horse” Harry Lee, a famous man. Allen Guelzo (09:47): Oh yes. Richard Reinsch (09:49): And so one question, and maybe you’ve answered that. Lee is a political thinker. You don’t at all think perhaps what was in the air was the compact theory of union, of Calhoun, other Southern thinkers that had become certainly part of the discourse, that somehow that legitimated what he did. To me, I listen to you and I think, well, this is home and men just don’t turn against their home. Allen Guelzo (10:18): For Lee, the notion of the union as being a compact theory was nonsense. And he said as much in letters that he wrote during the secession crisis. For Lee, the United States as a nation had the primary authority. And he dismissed argument in favor of secession as being nothing but revolution. And we might say, well, what’s the difference between secession and revolution? Actually, there’s a big difference. secession is, technically speaking, a peaceable process of separation. It involves legal and constitutional niceties, but it’s the kind of things that happen when two particular groups of people within a single nation state decide that they really, for a variety of reasons, want to go their separate ways. And you had secessions like this take place within Lee’s lifetime. For instance, Belgium is a secession from the Netherlands. And then later on after the of the 20th century, Norway. Norway as an independent nation is a secession from what had been the dual kingdom of Norway and Sweden. That’s a secession, but a revolution is different. A revolution is when you cut the ties, you create discontinuity, you do what we did in our American Revolution. That’s why we call it the American Revolution or revolution. We didn’t secede from the British Empire, we had a revolution because we not only cut our ties to Great Britain, we actually got rid of the entire notion of monarchy, hierarchy, British law, everything that connected us in any real way to the British past. All of those things were thrown overboard and we created an entirely new nation, a Republic, based on entirely different principles than the British Empire had been built upon. That’s a revolution. Lee looked at what Southerners were trying to do, and he was scornful when they tried to use the term, secession. He says, this is not a secession. This is a revolution. And if you take him on those terms, then you scratch your head and you wonder, well, if he understood what all this argument about secession and compact theory and so on like that was just a massive donkey’s kidneys, then you wonder why did he do what he did. And I think the answer is bound up with questions about family and questions about family property. After all, Lee, although Lee is born in Virginia in 1807 at Stratford Hall on the Northern Neck, he actually does not live most of his life in Virginia. When his mother decides that they’re going to pick up from Stratford and move to Alexandria when Lee is less than 10 years old, Alexandria was not part of Virginia then. Alexandria was then part of the District of Columbia. Alexandria and that part of Virginia on the Potomac shore is not retro-ceded to Virginia until the 1830s when Lee is long gone. So Lee grows up in the District of Columbia, not Virginia. Then he goes to school at West Point in New York. His first assignment as a graduate of West Point is to Georgia. He works on saving the waterfront at St. Louis in Missouri. He has a brief assignment at Fortress Monroe that does take him back to Virginia, but then he is assigned to Fort Hamilton in New York. He serves a spell as Superintendent of West Point, again, New York. And he’s assigned to coastal fortification construction in Baltimore Harbor. Look, you take all that together, the man actually spent more consistent time living in the state of New York than he did in the state of Virginia. So what exactly is he referring to when he says I can’t draw my sword against my native state? I think what he is really talking about is this vast network of kin. And I think he’s also talking about protecting the property that he was charged with passing on to his children, and especially the property that today we identify as Arlington. We think of it as Arlington National Cemetery, but before it became a national cemetery, Arlington was the estate of Lee’s father-in-law, George Washington Parke Custis. And Lee felt a particular responsibility as the executor of Custis’s will to make sure that that property got passed on appropriately to Lee’s own children. When Lee talks about his native state, I think he’s very largely talking about protecting family and protecting family property more than anything else. Richard Reinsch (15:02): It’s almost like a deep, very deep Burkean sense of social responsibility, family responsibility. Allen Guelzo (15:10): Yes, but it’s also connected because I don’t think he would’ve, if we had quoted Edmund Burke to him, I don’t think he would’ve even necessarily recognize who we were quoting. I think what it really goes back to is the experience of his own father. Light-Horse Harry Lee was a great hero of the American Revolution. He had come into the Revolution as a young man, fresh out of college. He shows a remarkable talent right away for command of horse soldiers. And he becomes part of that circle of young men whom Washington virtually adopts as his surrogate sons, people like Alexander Hamilton, people like John Lawrence, people like Marquis de Lafayette. And Light-Horse Harry, he acquired that big name from his talent at command of cavalry. He becomes part of that circle and he’s very successful during the Revolution. The problem is that after the Revolution, that was when the success dried up. Like many veterans of the Continental Army, he looked to make a fortune in investing in Western land, lands of the upper end of the Potomac River, lands in Western Virginia, which they hoped would be developed with a view towards establishing a water connection between the Potomac estuary and the Ohio River. And beyond that, of course, the Mississippi. That never ever practically panned out. And Light-Horse Harry Lee lost money, hand over fist. He married his cousin, Matilda Lee, that made him the master of Stratford Hall, but he burned through her cash. When she died, he remarried, this time to her Virginia Carter and he burned through her cash too, so much so that he ends up in debtor prison. And not only does he make one catastrophic economic decision after another, he makes catastrophic political decisions. In Jeffersonian Virginia, he identifies as a Federalist and in the early months of the War of 1812 finds himself mobbed by a pro-war of 1812 mob in Baltimore and is beaten within an inch of his life. And after that, he decides it’s time to go someplace else. So he decamps for the West Indies. And although he makes a brief effort to return to the United States, he makes landfall on Cumberland Islands on the Georgia coast, he’s dying of cancer…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Industrial Policy Dreams Perpetually Deferred Dec 01, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch: Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. Today we’re with Scott Lincicome senior fellow in economic studies at the Cato Institute about industrial policy, its prospects, what it means, and what its consequences would be if we had something like that fully implemented. Scott, as I mentioned is at the Cato Institute in economic studies, he writes on international and domestic economic issues, including trade subsidies, industrial policy, global supply chains, all the things that are in the news, we’re discussing. Scott, glad to have you on the program. Scott Lincicome: Thanks for having me. Good to be here. Richard Reinsch: Thinking about industrial policy and I’ve read a lot of your work on it. What is industrial policy? Scott Lincicome: Great question, because it’s funny to start there, but it’s really necessary because so often you hear, especially from industrial policy advocates it is anything and everything. It is what gave us the iPhone and COVID vaccines and everything in between, you name it. If it is a technological marble of any sort, you will hear that it was a result of industrial policy. The reality is as you and surprisingly, listeners might find out is far different. And that’s because if you look back at the history of industrial policy and we have a lot of it, in not just the United States, but around the world. If you go back to the Hamiltonian report on manufacturers, surely there was some industrial policy baked into that. The question is whether that actually first of all, was fully implemented. The history shows that it really wasn’t. But second, is, was that really effective? Did it actually achieve outcomes that were better than what the market would’ve done and that’s where I think, especially in that Hamiltonian high tariff, industrial intervention era of the 19th century, you really see that at least the scholarship on the issue says that, you know what, it really didn’t work as well as people will claim. Experts tend to coalesce around a few really essential defining characteristics of what is industrial policy. First, you need a national strategy or a plan of some sort. This isn’t just government funding for basic research, for example, where, you give a bunch of smart people grants to do some research, and they might stumble upon some amazing thing while they’re doing their work at some university. You need a national strategy and a plan to achieve some sort of objective. The next thing is you need to then pursue into that strategy. You’re going to have a targeted microeconomic meaning company, industry, firm, specific stuff. Microeconomic policies, things like tariffs or subsidies or localization mandates or the rest. And those policies are going to be intended to achieve specific market beating commercial outcomes. Making that really simple, this isn’t like building a fighter jet, and it’s not just simply to try to achieve some objective that the market could achieve. It’s essentially saying, look, no, the market has failed, and in order to achieve our national strategy, we have to intervene in the market. We have to beat the market. Because there is apparently this market failure. And then the last part is there has to be an element of nationalism in all of this. This is not just simply establishing a prize and saying anybody who can deliver an amazing technology to us gets the prize. We don’t care where you’re from. We don’t care how you do it. This is far different. This is really the government saying, we want this on national soil. We want it to use American workers, American manufacturing. That’s the only way you can qualify for any of these goodies that we just talked about. Richard Reinsch: As I think about things that I hear when I’m out there regarding industrial policy something that frequently gets trotted out and seems to be received with nods by a lot of people in the room. What is said is the internet is the outcome of industrial policy. COVID vaccine strategy, Operation Warp Speed proves industrial policy. Is there ever a need for industrial policy? And is there ever an argument for it? And I think, so another thing you hear is Alexander Hamilton in the famous report are manufacturers. America itself from our founding, some would say is rooted in industrial policy, is comfortable with it. Scott Lincicome: Yeah. And I think that, look, if you go back to Hamiltonian report on manufacturers, surely there was some industrial policy baked into that. The question is whether that actually first of all, was fully implemented. The history shows that it really wasn’t. But second, is, was that really effective? Did it actually achieve outcomes that were better than what the market would’ve done and that’s where I think, especially in that Hamiltonian high tariff, industrial intervention era of the 19th century, you really see that at least the scholarship on the issue says that, you know what, it really didn’t work as well as people will claim. That in fact, it was things like rapid demographic expansion and a lot of other factors that drove America’s rise in the late 19th century. It wasn’t really about industrial policy or trade protectionism. Now, the internet one is a great example of what I was just talking about. If you actually look in the history of the United States government’s involvement in the internet, what you see is that very little of those necessary conditions I just said really apply because certainly there was government involvement. You look back at the creation of certain parts of the network and what became potentially modern email and all these things, but you see that a lot of these things were discovered by happenstance. You had a government contractor working on a different project and needed to develop a certain amount of technology or needed a messaging system through the department of defense, they needed to contact each other. The government wasn’t saying, “We want the internet.” They just, again, these researchers are very smart people on a contract and they stumbled upon it. That’s not industrial strategy. That’s simply, there’s just a government touching the thing. You see that a lot in what we hear are industrial policy victories are oftentimes things that, again, people just stumbled upon and the COVID vaccines, I think are another really great example of where industrial policy gets credited for things that really weren’t a lot of industrial policy. Starting with mRNA research. Well, that was first of all, a basic research grant. The researchers were not trying to achieve some amazing market beating vaccine. But beyond that, you actually see that there’s been some great work looking back at the scientist Katalin Kariko, Drew Weissman who actually weren’t primarily being funded for mRNA research. In fact, his grant was on a totally different subject and they really came into their own when they left the government research apparatus and moved to Moderna and BioNTech the German company that brought it forth. And then with respect to the COVID vaccines themselves, one of the great things about the vaccines is that they really show us what a private market alternative would be. And that’s very rare, because when the government gets involved in something, it’s going to tend to crowd out alternatives and then aha if there’s a success, then that was clearly an industrial policy success. But here, we actually had a really excellent contrast because the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine was almost entirely a private endeavor. The only thing the US government did, well, two things. First, is they eased regulatory constraints. Richard Reinsch: That was nice of them. Scott Lincicome: Exactly. Allowing vaccine production to go in tandem with testing and all that stuff. Typically, they do those things sequentially. They were allowed to do this all at once, and then the other thing is they said, “We’ll pay you for finished doses.” Now, this is essentially a prize format. If you look into the contract of the Pfizer vaccine with the United States government, there’s an entire section that says that the United States government will have no control over the supply chain. Will have no control over the manufacturing process. We will essentially just bring you on a vaccine and if it gets by the FDA, then you’re going to pay us. That is, again, there’s very little micromanagement and in fact, Pfizer used its own resources, its own manufacturing plant, BioNTech used its own research as well. The government only came in really at the end of the process. People talk about BioNTech got money from the German government, but again, that was after the vaccine had been created. And if Pfizer’s executives before Operation Warp Speed ever even existed were predicting, so in say April of 2020, they were predicting have finished doses by December like they did. And so, you contrast that with a much more government centric approach. And here, in fact, we just had headlines today about Emergent BioSolutions. Emergent BioSolutions has been involved with the US government for about a decade or so. They were a plant in Maryland that was specifically funded by the US government to produce vaccines in time of a pandemic, produce medication. Well, Emergent has produced almost none, almost no… At least in no significant commercial quantities vaccines and the government just canceled their contract because they’ve been having tons of problems in the manufacturing facilities in Maryland and J&J was contract the government arranged for Johnson & Johnson to work with Emergent and early on in the pandemic, you heard from a lot of industrial policy advocates that Emergent, that was it. Clearly, this is going to be the success. And now of course they’re quietly… All of those comments have quietly disappeared. And when you actually look into the history of Emergent, you see that it’s connections with the government, it’s federal contracting and the rest were a problem that they spent a lot of money on lobbying. They spent a lot of money on winning government contracts, but they weren’t so great when it came to actually producing results. And again, in the vaccines, we see that. You have a much more market-oriented vaccine in the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, and then you have a much more government-oriented approach in the J&J Emergent. And I think that that provides us really with this incredible contrast that we don’t normally have. And so, I think that’s the type of counter factual we really need to apply to industrial policy supposed successes. Because look, the government’s not going to go all for infinity. There’s going to be some successes in there. And the question though, is were those successes really something that beat the market, that the market could not achieve in the absence of government intervention? [And again, I think the vaccines give us a really excellent teachable moment in that regard. Richard Reinsch: Yeah. And on that point, thinking about the internet, it is the case that government researchers and DARPA stumble onto the technology, create a form of it. But it’s corporations in a market that develop a technology and make it a commercial product that changed the way we all live, basically. Scott Lincicome: Exactly. And that goes for the iPhone too. There’s certainly parts of the iPhone. If you hang out on the internet enough and you are into industrial policy- Richard Reinsch: And I do. Scott Lincicome: …you’re going to run into this meme or picture or whatever that essentially says everything in the iPhone is coming from the government. The government invented the iPhone, right? Richard Reinsch: Yeah. Scott Lincicome: When you dig into that, unfortunately, some researchers have, I wrote about it in my paper, what you see is that certainly, there were some government… A couple guys on a government grant who developed the, I think it was the LCD screen, but they weren’t even trying to develop that technology. They were working on a totally different project, but they needed this tech for what they were doing. But more than that, you look at Taiwan’s economic makeup overall and you see that they are heavily, heavily leveraged in one industry, semiconductors. That’s great when you’re talking about semiconductors, but when you’re talking about biotech and let’s use pharmaceuticals, for example, not so much, they’re laggards. And so, even where you admit there are successes, do you want the government to have that much… Do you want to have an economy that is that unbalanced, that the chances of having bigger problems for not having a more diverse economy are really rather substantial? They stumbled upon it. But the bigger deal is that it took private, took apple and Steve jobs to package all of these different technologies into the iPhone and to develop a manufacturing strategy that involved a lot of globalization and offshoring and all of those nasty things that industrial policy folks, don’t like to achieve a product that would be a success in the commercial market and thus, get consumers to buy it. And that led to all the wonderful upgrades and adaptations and really, the amazing technology that well, I have in my hand right now. And it’s that type of direction or whatever that is really rare in the industrial policy successes, you hear so much about. It’s much more, there are a few things that people stumble upon but then it’s the private actors that create the modern technological miracles. Richard Reinsch: There’s two directions I want to go in. I want to talk about, because I think that brings up just the idea of the knowledge problem, inherent and industrial policy planning, and also I want to talk about other nations in particular Asian nations that we frequently hear about our successes in this regard, but one, just thinking about Steve Jobs’ example and bringing together all these technologies. That’s about specialized knowledge that he in some great way was able to combine along with the people around him and all of the record they had in their industry of thinking about what could actually work and what could we actually build upon and creating this new product. And that gets the famous essay by Friedrich Hayek it was 1948, The Problem of Knowledge and what would a government bureaucrat have to know? When would they have to know it? How would they apply it? What incentive would they have to get it right? And of course, and you’ve been saying this versus, and then compared to what? And is really the thing that they’re trying to do to achieve a political objective on behalf of an ideology or on behalf of a turf battle inside their agency or on behalf of Congress, congressional representative supporting them. All of those things factor in and it just seems like the comparisons ultimately [00:15:00] mean that a government official getting it right is really spectacular. Scott Lincicome: Yeah. And like you were saying, having the specialized knowledge needed to achieve these things is something that requires not only a ton of input from all sorts of different actors. It also requires a willingness and ability to change course quite quickly to admit failure and to then adapt accordingly. Steve Jobs has had some failures too. It wasn’t just all iPhones, iPads and the rest. Richard Reinsch: Yeah. Well, he was fired at one time. Right? And he came back. Scott Lincicome: Right. And so, it’s the willingness to fail that is I think quite often missing from, and again, that’s part of the knowledge process and something that government actors are rarely willing to do. It took Emergent BioSolutions, going back to that company, it took years of failure before the government finally pulled the plug. And thank goodness we had alternative vaccines, because just imagine, if our entire vaccine production was on that model and reliant on the millions of doses that have never left that factory. Think of the damage that that could cause. And so, that gets, I…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    History of Violence: A Conversation with Barry Latzer Nov 11, 2021
    Show notes

    This podcast with criminologist Barry Latzer focuses on the surprising findings in his latest book, The Rise and Fall of Violent Crime in America. Latzer discusses the violent crime wave that began in the mid 1960’s and how its sharp fall in the mid 90s has recast urban life in America. However, Latzer urges humility in understanding the rise and fall of violent crime, pointing to an array of social, economic, and demographic factors as likely reasons for the good news about the downturn in violent crime in the last two decades. While not dismissing recent calls for sentencing reform and a relaxation of aggressive law enforcement, Latzer argues for caution and notes that we remain a violent society as measured by arrests, convictions, and national crime surveys.


    Abusing the Power of the Purse Oct 15, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Today we’re talking with Philip Hamburger about his new book, Purchasing Submission: Conditions, Power and Freedom. We’re glad to welcome Philip Hamburger back to Liberty Law Talk. We featured his work extensively here, including his wonderful book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? He’s also the author of earlier studies, Law and Judicial Duty and Separation of Church and State. Philip Hamburger (01:15): Well, thank you. It’s great to be here with you. I love these podcasts and everything you all already do, so it’s an honor to be here. Richard Reinsch (01:21): Thank you. Philip Hamburger (01:22): Really appreciate it. Richard Reinsch (01:23): So tell us about this book, Purchasing Submission. Who is purchasing submission? Philip Hamburger (01:30): Right. The government. It’s, of course- Richard Reinsch (01:37): Aren’t they always. Philip Hamburger (01:38): They collect our money and use our own money in a sense to suborn us and to purchase our freedom. And they do it in more interesting ways than I think is commonly recognized. So when the government gives one money or it gives one some other privilege like a license, they often attach a condition to it. You can get a license as long as you let us use a piece of your land, or you can be a lawyer subject to the following conditions, or we’re going to give you research grants, but you have to do the following. And these conditions are widely recognized by scholars of constitutional law and the sort of technical legal question, a technical question as to when conditions violate constitutional rights because, ordinarily a right is violated when some sort of coercion is supplied, some sort of force of law of bought. And so when you’re simply asked, well, how have you done X, Y, and Z, and if so, we’ll give you money. It doesn’t seem terribly pressured and coercive. And as a result, it seems a technical problem, when did these conditions actually violate one’s rights and when do they not, and this whole literature on this. But it’s not just that literature I think is incomplete, I think this fails to recognize what’s actually going on, this much bigger problem. It’s not just the threat to rights. There’s a purchase of consent to a whole new mode of governance, an alternative mode of control. And so when you step back and see that, conditions are no longer a technical problem, that’s actually a profound question of political theory and law. Richard Reinsch (03:12): Thinking about these conditions, which you kind of go through a range of different types of conditions that seem to be attached to privilege as the government is offering you. Do you see yourself as sort of, is this sort of groundbreaking in the sense of people have noticed this, talked about it, there’ve been some judicial notice of it, although I take it from the book, not enough. And you see yourself with this book trying to call our attention to this way the government is increasingly operating by sort of stripping us of rights and offering for porridge. And we give that because we want that. Philip Hamburger (03:55): So I hesitate to say anything I do is groundbreaking, but I do think it is new to see the breadth of the problem and there are two layers to the problem, to the difficulty. One, as we discussed is the threat to rights. They give you money in exchange for giving up some of your speech, for example, which is very common I’m afraid, but it’s a much broader problem in the sense that it’s a new mode of governance. One’s giving up, not just our rights, but one’s freedom of self-government. One way of thinking about it is it’s a new irregular pathway of power. So we’re all familiar with a regular avenue of power through acts of Congress and the courts. And you can get that from School House Rock, or you can get that from the Federalist Papers and the Constitution. Then there’s an alternative pathway of power, an irregular path, which is through administrative rules and adjudications where you’re commanded, do this, don’t do that. And if you violate that, we’re going to bring you in front of the administrative law judge to punish you, make you pay a fine. And that imitates the regular avenue of power in creating binding rules and binding adjudications, but not in our institutions. Those are the constitution, but new institutions that have an unelected law makers, the bureaucrats and judges who aren’t really independent. And that dichotomy between the regular and irregular path between the acts of Congress and administrative rules is quite familiar, but it turns out that’s another irregular path. There are a host of these, but the main one that’s been missed is this purchase of submission because sometimes the government, when it cannot get something through Congress, or doesn’t think it will, and it cannot get an administrative rule because it might be unconstitutional or politically unpalatable, it then will turn to another irregular path, not an agency rule that purports to bind, but rather a condition on the receipt of money. And what’s interesting about these conditions is they do not purport to bind. In fact, the whole point is they’re not binding. They don’t really restrict one, so theory goes because they’re just conditions on the money and that liberates the government to do all sorts of things that never otherwise could have done, things that would have been impossible even to administrative power. So it’s an additional irregular path and therefore profoundly dangerous. Because if you think about this as evasion as a cascade of evasions, you first evade the Constitution through administrative power, and then you evade it yet again through purchasing submission. So it’s moving ever further away from law. Richard Reinsch (06:24): Listening to you now, as I was reading this book, I thought I was reading this book with your other book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, in mind. And you’ve been talking about this. There you argued, you weren’t so much concerned with constitutional law regarding the administrative state, what you wanted to show is how the administrative state operates outside the bounds of constitutional norms, basic structural powers and responsibilities and accountability. And as I read this book, I thought, well, he’s done something like that here, too. Philip Hamburger (07:00): I beg to differ. Richard Reinsch (07:01): Yes, sure. Philip Hamburger (07:02): I actually, in the administrative law book, I actually was making a constitutional argument, but it wasn’t the conventional one in case of the doctrines. But rather by showing that there was a danger out there of this irregular power, which was familiar to the framers of the constitution and so we shouldn’t assume that administrative law is something new and unattended to by the constitution. Here, there is some parallel you’re absolutely right, that this is similarly a study of an irregular path of power, but this was actually much worse. If you thought administrative law was bad, worry about conditions. And if you think administrative power is actually okay, just need little trimming at the edges, you shouldn’t be complacent about the next irregular pathway, conditions, because this subverts our rights and undermines our self-governance in a way that administrative power does not. You at least had administrative rule, as published, we all know what it is. And it goes through a process. Conditions don’t have to do that. And many of them are private. Richard Reinsch (08:10): Help us help listeners understand maybe more concretely what you’re describing here. What are prominent instances of conditions that the government uses? Philip Hamburger (08:20): Well, Joe Biden, our president, helps people understand this. And so in that sense, the book is unexpectedly relevant. When the administration tells states, we’re going to give you money for Medicaid and Medicare, but only if you make certain requirements regarding vaccines, what they’re doing is regulating the states and the people within the states through purchase of compliance. When the government gives money to let’s say, Columbia University for research and says, here’s money for research, but the way, though, you have to first assure us that you have institutional review boards, which will censor what one can read and what one can say and what one can publish. What it’s doing is it’s paying these institutions to regulate people like me. It’s a regulatory condition and it’s doubly bad because it works for a private institution. So what we have are a lot of, not just unconstitutional conditions, that violate rights, but conditions that are regulatory, that are substitutes for the command of a statute or the command of an administrative rule. The book actually begins with an explanation of how it happened, an after dinner conversation. I was having a very nice dinner with wonderful friends. And after dinner I offered the foolish question: ‘Why haven’t you published an article that you were circulating in draft?’ And indeed it circulated like samizdat only in manuscript, quite widely read, but not published. He said, oh, I can’t publish it. The IRB won’t let me. Richard Reinsch (09:34): As I was reading your book, one thing that comes to mind is sort of a prior choice, a decision that’s been made that the spending power, that there is sort of a standalone spending power the federal government possesses, and can do whatever it wants, like build a sidewalk for fitness reasons in towns across America, fund that, or be heavily involved in education or things like that, where you say, well, why does the federal government have this power? Well, as I was taught in law school, it’s the spending power. And how do you think about that problem? Philip Hamburger (10:11): It’s funny. I was also taught that, but the difficulty is to find that spending power, I thumbed through the constitution, where is it? Is it on page one, page two? You read through it. It was found there. Article one, section eight gives the power to lay and collect taxes, duties and so forth. And there’s a limit on that power to collect taxes, which, and that limit is you can collect these taxes to pay the debts and provide the common defense, general welfare of the United States. What we’ve done is we’ve replaced the comma after exercises is an inserted, a semi-colon. And in fact, Gouverneur Morris drafting, the constitution tried to do this. And then the convention said, no, no, no, no. This is one clause. You’re not splitting into two, but by interpretation, we’ve created a general spending power. So where it’s spending had to go through individual enumerated powers and that’s what’s limited in subject matter. It now just can be done, is not limited. And so conditions on spending are unlimited, which means you can regulate through conditions in ways that you could not regulate even with the expense of reading of congressional power. It gets worse than this, of course, because the so-called spending power or the limit on the taxing power, has to be for the common defense, general welfare of the United States, which if it means anything is, it doesn’t go to or for the states. So in fact, all the spending and aid to the states is unconstitutional, but the courts have just ignored this. And with that spending to and for the states, a lot can be extorted from them. Richard Reinsch (11:49): And then you couple that with, as I was thinking about it, the ability of the federal government to borrow unlimited amounts of money, and also having vast revenue as well, coming in. It’s an unlimited source of power. And there’s also this aspect of, John Diulio has written about this acronym called, BIGPAP and the idea being that the federal government is able to use states, nonprofits, all sorts of other agencies to in effect, regulate the country without actually doing it itself, but doing it through partnerships. And I was reading your book, I thought, well, so Professor Hamburger has uncovered yet another, is bringing to our attention in a dramatic way, this new mode of power. So how does one go about, I’m just sort of thinking practically here, because you say these are sort of, I mean, one is old Medicare. I mean, that’s obvious but constraints on Medicare, but you said these are a lot of just almost private deals because I read it and I thought, well, this is just another mode of administrative power. Philip Hamburger (12:54): It’s done by the same people, it’s usually done by the agencies, but the agencies don’t just have administrative power, which the power to make rules or edicts or expectations that functions rules. They also can dangle some money in front of you or a privilege like licensing and then say, but we’re only giving this to you after you’ve done something, X, Y, or Z, seeking so-called assurances about what you’ve done. And that’s the mode of control that’s quite profound. They can do almost anything that way. So an agency may pass regulation, continues conditions. So HHS has regulations stipulating the conditions on which universities get research funding and requires establishment of review boards and the like, but much of the conditioning that’s regulatory comes in site visits, private conversations, or just letters. Because these are private deals essentially, all sorts of bad things happen. For one thing, you don’t know whom it applies because only those who consent are subject to it. So in really rare cases, do we know who has submitted to the conditions. You don’t know who has, who hasn’t. What’s more, additional conditions are added in an informal way. And when there’s no way of knowing what these are, even within one’s own institution, because these things are often kept private even within the effected institutions. And this happens to banks and universities. And if it happens to banks and universities, which have so much power, what’s the fate of individual? Richard Reinsch (14:28): As I was also thinking about your book, you think about the administrative state and and it has sort of official legal channels by which it’s supposed to operate in terms of proposing a rule and debating it, implementing it. But then increasingly we know it operates outside of those rules and does a lot of unofficial things. Like say a Dear colleague letter to every university in America, if you want federal funding, you will basically wipe away protections for those accused of sexual assault, longstanding protections. So is that unofficial? Do you see that as, is that conditioning as well? Philip Hamburger (15:04): That’s right. And Title IX has the sex discrimination condition on federal funds to educational institutions. But of course what’s happened is then that gets interpreted in semiformal and then less formal ways. And of course, ultimately it may depend on private conversations. And just to give you an example, Congress hands off regulatory power to the Securities Exchange Commission, hands off power to private regulatory groups and the like, or the exchanges. And they in turn regulate their members, but they regulate their members in ways that are overseen by the SEC. So you’ve essentially privatized regulation under the oversight of the federal government. Now this is highly advantageous, of course, for the federal government. For one thing, they say, we’re not forcing you to do anything, it’s just a private matter. So they can escape any accountability, again, much of it often for that to be private in conversation. And then of course, when rights are violated and there has to be an adjudication, well, there’s no violation of rights, it was just a private organization so no state action. And what’s more, when this adjudication, not only do you not get a jury, you don’t even get an administrative hearing because these are private institutions that can handle it as they wish. So this is complete degradation of our regular system of government through statutes and…

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    The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly Oct 13, 2021
    Show notes

    In this episode of Liberty Law Talk, I discuss with Professor John Inazu his new book Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly. Inazu offers his thoughts on resurrecting this most important constitutional doctrine from the doldrums where it languishes as a result of Court rulings. Consequently, Inazu argues that the freedom of assembly is now unable to offer the full scope of protection to group autonomy that it once did and the harmful affects to associational liberty are increasingly being experienced. He also provides a constitutional and moral argument for a return to this most important of liberties.

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    Anthony Deardurff reviews Liberty’s Refuge.


    The Collapse of American Legal Authority Oct 01, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:19): Hello, I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Steven Smith about his new book, Fictions, Lies, and the Authority of Law. Steven Smith is the Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, at the University of San Diego. He’s the author of numerous books, including The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom, Law’s Quandary, and, he’s been on this podcast… I think this is your third appearance, Steven, so we’re glad that you’re- Steven Smith (00:47): I think I might be. Richard Reinsch (00:48): … a repeat offender. It was Pagans and Christians in the City, I think was the most recent appearance. Steven Smith (00:53): I think we did have a conversation about that one, yes. Richard Reinsch (00:56): It’s great to have you back, and you’ve written another provocative book here, Fictions, Lies, and the Authority of Law. So tell us, what’s going on? Steven Smith (01:04): Well, the book combines some things I wanted to write about various subjects that are all connected, I think, by the problem of authority and questions of authority. I tried to have a lead into that by quoting Hannah Arendt’s, I think, very intriguing claim that she made about the middle of the last century that authority has disappeared from the modern world. We no longer know what it is. In losing authority, she said, “We have lost the groundwork of the world.” So that’s pretty provocative, but also puzzling and raises lots of questions. So I used that as the way to get into some of these various questions. Some of them are more standard law professor type questions about constitutional interpretation and statutory interpretation, and so forth. Some of them are more straight jurisprudence questions that legal philosophers like H. L. A. Hart and so forth have dealt with. Some of them have to do with things that I think are really on the minds of and kind of worrisome to a lot of people today about cancel culture, living with lies, that sort of stuff, is also the subject of one of the chapters. Richard Reinsch (02:13): Yeah. I’ll confess this. So coming to your book, before I started reading it, what got me interested in it and thinking that this could be an interesting interview is just looking at contemporary America right now. We’ve got this heavy movement, we’ve covered it extensively at Law & Liberty, that insists basically America is founded on a fraud. It goes beyond even the old progressive claim that we’re ill-founded, but that we’re just founded on something like slavery and racism, and the perpetuation of that through our institutions. Then, of course, the way in which political claims are debated, or rather not debated, in many respects, in our country and how we label one another as not just wrong, but people we struggle to even dialogue with. Just thinking about right now, this question about masks reemerging with the Delta Variant in certain states, and are masks going to be required and how we deal with people who don’t want to wear masks and vice versa. All of this, I mean, the general tenor of our politics makes me think there is nothing in our constitutional order that we see as transcending heated contemporary differences. Do you see it that way and has that led into what you’re doing in the book? Steven Smith (03:29): Yes and no. I think, actually, it’s turned out, with all of the anti-racism concerns and the COVID restrictions and so forth, that there are a lot of ways that the book has immediate applications. More than I thought it would have as I was doing it or even when I was pretty much finished with it, which was I finished writing it really almost a couple years ago, before a lot of this happened. You know it takes a while to get something published. In the meantime, it’s been gratifying and alarming to see that I think there are quite a lot of applications to some of our on the ground current practical concerns. One way to get into that, I suppose, would be to say that our system of government is based on the idea that government has to come from the consent of the governed. That’s a foundational proposition. It’s in the Declaration of Independence. It’s been recited innumerable times over the course of our history. That’s kind of axiomatic in many ways. It’s also a privilege familiar, and lots of people have written about this, that that’s a problematic idea. Do we really have the consent of the governed? I deal with that in what I think is a little different way saying, well, in a certain sense, no, it’s a fiction to say that we have the consent of the governed, but we can have accounts of authority, I think, that can be based on fictions if the fictions are widely believed. I try to combine the consent of the governed idea with the idea that people like John Finnis, but other people have developed a coordination account of authority. You know that authority comes from the need for coordination, not just punishing offenders and so forth and anti-social criminals and so forth, but coordination that’ll allow us to coordinate for the public good a lot of our projects that we have. So that we have a need for that and the ability, as Finnis and others say, of some group or institution to provide that coordination is the foundation of authority. I find that to be quite a plausible account, but it creates a question of where do people get or where do some person or institution get that ability to provide coordination. The answer, I think, is, at least in part, they get it because we think they have authority. In our system, we think they have authority goes back to the consent of the governed. So the consent of the governed does sort of figure in authority, even if it is, to some extent, a fiction, I think. If it’s a fiction that’s widely believed and beneficial, I think it can be the basis of actual authority. But if the fiction becomes frayed and so forth, there’s discussion, then the authority can disappear. I think we’re seeing real concerns about that just over the last couple of years. Richard Reinsch (06:24): What do you think Hannah Arendt meant by the modern world faces the evacuation of authority? What did she mean by that? Steven Smith (06:34): She has a long answer on that that traces this back to Roman ideas and so forth. To be honest, I don’t really go into that much because she’s not the only person who has claimed that. I quote several other people who have also said… Søren Kierkegaard for example, and other more recent observers who say that authority has disappeared from the modern world or that it’s very problematic or that we don’t understand what it is. So I say upfront that this isn’t going to be an exegetical sort of work trying to figure out what any person in particular had in mind. But I admit, I use it more as a point of departure to explore. I keep coming back to Arendt’s claim, but I’m still using it less to figure out what exactly she meant and more as a point of departure to consider a lot of things that I mention. Richard Reinsch (07:25): I haven’t read or written a lot, but that ground work of the world. I mean, is this some sort of classical- Steven Smith (07:35): I doubt she meant what I end up- Richard Reinsch (07:37): … classical political philosophy account of reason and politics? I don’t know. Question on consent of the governed though. My understanding, the root of that concept from Harold Berman’s Law and Revolution is monastical reform in the early Medieval Period. The principle being within monasteries, voting amongst the monks on who would be your abbot, what would be the rules that would govern, and the idea being what touches all concerns all and therefore, should receive consent by all. In my understanding, that’s like a natural law root of that, taking man as a dignified being created by God seriously and His reason seriously, therefore, is consent as to what touches him and law. I’ve always thought that’s not someone trying to articulate a fictional account, but maybe a truthful account of who man is and how he should be governed, and then that spreads one account. As Berman documents, that makes its way through a lot of Western legal thinking, in particular in the English Medieval law. Then it comes out in what I would think of as the good Liberalism and the American founding, as… Then it becomes a more general political teaching. So, I guess, when you describe the consent of the governed maybe as a youthful fiction, I think, or it’s a better fiction than other fictions, but what do you make of that? Then also, a consent of the governed, but in American context would be Republican or representative consent. Not consent of each and every person, but of those who have appointed, so necessarily that’s why the Philadelphia Convention wants state ratifying conventions, not just the state legislatures, because it wants that approval apart just from state authorities. So what do you make of all that? Steven Smith (09:38): Good question. A couple points here. One is as far as the genealogy of the concept, I don’t really try to trace that through here. I mean, to the extent, I rely on historical work in this book, it’s more on Edmund Morgan’s, I think, really good book on Inventing the People. He talks about the idea of the people and consent and so forth. But he’s starting with the English Civil Wars in the 17th century, I think, is what he’s mostly talking about and that’s as far back as I go here. But I’m sure the idea does go farther back. Berman’s book, one I’ve relied a lot on for other purposes, but I haven’t really focused on it for this purpose. I do quite a bit of work in the area of religious freedom, and other people do, and trace, you might say, very related ideas way back to Tertullian and so forth, that religion has to be consensual. Those things are not unrelated, I think, to this idea that authority needs to be accepted by… It can’t just be coercively imposed and so forth. So the fundamental idea probably has a lot of roots. It’s also one that I don’t in any way mean to disparage it. I mean, I think it’s a very valuable, and for lots of purposes, it contains real truth. But just in a couple steps, I mean, the most common objection, I think, though to this as an account of the authority of, say, modern governments like ours is that most of us never really did have an opportunity to consent. No one ever sat us down and said, “Do you consent to be governed by this regime? If so, initial here.” We just didn’t. Theorists who try to make up for that with theories of implied consent or constrictive consent say some good things, and I think even relevant and valuable things, but don’t really supply actual consent by most of us. So that’s why I argue that it’s a fiction. But in explaining how a fiction works, I do say that a fiction will work… It needs to satisfy a couple of conditions. One is plausibility. It doesn’t need to be true, but it needs to be true-ish. You can’t really work with a fiction, even a movie or a book and a big political fiction like this unless it is true-ish. The fiction of the consent of the governed, I think, is quite true-ish for our system, but its plausibility does hinge on things like voting rights and freedom of speech. These are all, I think, very valuable things. So it’s a fiction that, though it is partly fictional, that’s had, I think, very beneficial effects. It’s an ennobling fiction, you might say, and one that works to make government, I would say, better, more enlightened, and so forth than it would be coming from some other fiction. For example, the parties for the vanguard of the Proletariat, for example, and it’s going to lead us to the revolution. So it’s a very valuable fiction in that sense. Again, by fiction, I try to carefully distinguish between a fiction and a lie. I mean, those blur together at some point, but they’re not the same thing, I think. In saying that this is a fiction, I don’t mean to be saying it’s our system is based on lies. I think it’s based on things that are partly fictional, but valuable, ennobling fictions in so far as we act on them. Richard Reinsch (12:59): So you’ve used, you said, true-ish, truthful fiction. Is there a truthful account of legal authority and how would we know it? Steven Smith (13:09): Yeah, well, towards the end of the book, I try to get into that because the first chapters are mostly trying to expound the idea that authority can be based on a fiction… what we call authority, the functions of authority can be based on a fiction, but that one of the consequences of that is that is that there are a lot of questions that we perpetually debate, seemingly never reach answers and that one of the reasons for that is that we’re treating what’s at bottom of fiction as if it were a fact, as if there were some fact of the matter that could settle what the Constitution means, for example, for some particular thing or what a statute means. To the extent that those things are based on fictions, there’s not going to be any fact of the matter that can settle a lot of those debates. So I think that helps to explain why we never do reach any sort of real answers and we probably never will, because it’s not the kind of thing that could yield those kinds of answers. But that’s still dealing with, we call it authority, I call it authority in the first part of the book, but later I suggest this might be a faux authority. So if you ask, as you just did, is there any sort of true authority, could there be? The latter chapters, the last two chapters and the epilogue, try to address that question more directly. I might mention the evolution here. Some of this is based on an article I did about 10 years ago which suggested that no, there couldn’t really be true authority. Even God’s authority is not exactly true authority. But reflecting on that in the intervening period, I’ve come to the idea that no, that’s a mistake. I think our modern commitment to autonomy and equality is so emphatic that I think it makes it very difficult for us to recognize what true authority would be. But I argue in the last chapter and the epilogue that, for example, in a Christian perspective, I think there’s, in some ways, a standard answer to this, although one that probably most, even Christians, today no longer think in these terms. That is, yeah, there is a true authority. The king of kings, the early governments that we respect have a kind of authority, but it’s a shadow of the true authority that is there and someday will actually be more operative. I try to explain how that kind of authority could satisfy the conditions of real authority in a way that Earthly governments just really can’t. Richard Reinsch (15:46): Something you also write about in the book is anthropology and the significance of who we think man is, what do we make of ourselves, what are we for, as getting at this question of legal authority. So, as you were saying, the dominant understanding, I think, particularly amongst elite classes, is we’re autonomous, we give the law to ourselves from deep within our conscience, which we conceive of in a very subjective way. Who the human person is is growing in sophistication with his own law giving or her law giving. The other conception of that is, I think you used this term, which I like that term, is that we’re deeply relational and we’re not autonomous. We’re dependent on others for everything, and that’s a recognition of wisdom there, that we need other people not just for contracts, but in deeply embedded ways. But, I guess, my question to you is, and that’s the position you side with, I largely agree with that position, what does that mean though for law and for government? Might that give us a way for thinking about it that moves it beyond a fiction? Even the noble fiction you describe. I say that our system has been based on a fiction, but that’s not the same as a lie. One of the ways of distinguishing is to say, “Is this a proposition that people are willin…

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    Understanding Black Lives Matter Oct 01, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:18): Welcome to Liberty Law Talk, I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Mike Gonzalez about his new book, BLM: The Making of a New Marxist Revolution. Mike Gonzalez, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for Foreign Policy. He’s had 20 years of experience as a journalist. He’s been a speechwriter in the Bush administration, and he writes widely on national identity, diversity, multiculturalism, nationalism, and related issues. Mike is also a regular contributor to Law & Liberty. It’s his first time on Liberty Law Talk, we’re glad to have you on the program, Mike. Mike Gonzalez (00:53): The pleasure is all mine, Richard. Thank you very much for having me on, it’s an honor. Richard Reinsch (00:57): So Mike, as you say in the book a couple of times, and I’ll state it here, the book is about Black Lives Matter and is taking you inside the organization, who funds it, what it believes, what its objectives and purposes are, who composes it, who leads it. But in all of that, you are not, and certainly the purpose of this interview is not to dispute the idea that black lives matter, the sentiment or the statement. We are talking about the organization and suite of organizations or allies who are a part of Black Lives Matter, the movement. And so with that said, what are the goals of Black Lives Matter? Or what is it built on? Mike Gonzalez (01:44): Let me actually first make a comment on what you just said, because I believe there are four things here that are really quite distinct. The first one is the concept. Black lives matter. The concept is unimpeachable and I embrace the concept and I actually never say “All lives matter,” I say “Black lives matter.” I’m very proud to say that. And that is because black Americans have gone through incredible hardships that no other American has gone through. I don’t need to… slavery, Jim Crow, segregation, et cetera, and incredible discrimination. So “Black lives matter” is a great slogan. Then there’s the movement, and I’m not sure what that means. I think that means people who turned out to the demonstrations and the marches and were peaceful about it, or who embraced the concept. Then they are the organizations. The organizations are primarily as you very well put, it’s a suite of organizations, but there are two main ones. If you Google Black Lives Matter, Google sends you to the Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation, BLMGNF. That is the premier, the flagship organization, that is itself the coalition. And then there’s the Movement for Black Lives, which is yet another coalition, but very important. It was set up right after Ferguson. And then fourth, there are the founders of these organizations and the founders are all Marxists. They say they’re Marxist, it’s not me saying they’re Marxist. And then we go into your question, what are their goals? Well, if you listen to the founders and if the journalists listen to the founders, they have been very candid. Alicia Garza, one of the three founders said very clearly to a group of Maine Marxists in 2019. So not that long ago, that what she wanted was “the dismantling of the organizing principle of this society.” Quote unquote. That what she wanted was to change how we’re organized as a society. So for those listening at home, that means not just things that are racist in America, it is everything. It’s your son’s little league game, it’s your daughter’s volleyball team, it is your book club. It’s everything, it’s American lives, it’s our way of life. And they’re very clear that they’re Marxist. Patrisse Cullors, a second, also a very important former executive director of BLMGNF, and also a founder of Black Lives Matter. She said very clearly, and she states it all the time that her and Alicia Garza are Marxist, and she actually uses the term trained Marxist. And this is a very recent, there’s a very good reason and why she says trained, that’s because she was recruited by Eric Mann. Now that is his word. Eric Mann said he recruited Patrisse Cullors. Eric Mann is a former member of the Weather Underground. That was an FBI designated terrorist group in the ’60s and ’70s. A lot of the members spent time in prison because they tried to use terrorist tactics to bring revolution to America. Eric Mann spent time in prison. And then he set up the Labor Community Strategy Center in Los Angeles, which recruited Patrisse Cullors and trained her in Marxism. Alicia Garza too, was trained in Marxism-Leninism, she has said this herself. So that is who they are and what they want. They hate capitalism. They say that capitalism is racist and needs to be destroyed and smashed, and they like Marxism-Leninism. So it’s the organizations and the founders, not the concept to which I subscribe. Richard Reinsch (05:19): Talk about the ideological structure here. A term we hear a lot, critical race theory, we also hear the term anti-racism. Talk in depth about critical race theory, what it is, where it comes from. Mike Gonzalez (05:36): So critical race theory is really the academic discipline behind Black Lives Matter. It emerges in law schools in America in the late ’70s, and then really gathers strength in the ’80s. It comes from critical legal theory or critical legal studies, which postulated that American racism was… That the systems of oppression, that the inequality was written into the law, by people with money, by the powerful who wanted to perpetuate their power and they wanted to keep it, and they wrote the American laws to do that. Now, black professors and black law students attending these conferences of critical legal theorists agreed with all that, but then they added, “but all these people are white. And what this is, is just racism. And you’re refusing to deal with that.” So they had incredible arguments, and in 1989, they left, they split, they created their own organization called critical race theory, which is the first time that that term is used. It was at a convent outside Madison, Wisconsin. The organizer was Kimberle Crenshaw, a law professor. Richard Reinsch (06:49): Did you say a convent? Mike Gonzalez (06:49): A convent. Richard Reinsch (06:52): Okay. Mike Gonzalez (06:54): A former convent outside of Madison, Wisconsin. In fact, just a few years later, Richard Delgado, one of the godfathers of CRT, of critical race theory gave an interview in which he said that they were all there, these two dozen law professors, and looking at the crucifixes and looking at the stained glass windows. And he said, “It was an odd place for a bunch of Marxists.” This is Richard Delgado. Indeed, it was an odd place for a bunch of Marxists. So what critical race theory believes is that racism is not individual, it’s not an individual sin that people commit when they refuse to follow Christ’s dictum to love thy neighbor, when they refuse to love their neighbor because of their race. According to critical race theories, it’s nothing to do with an individual, individual practice or individual beliefs or individual sin. It’s a systemic thing that all of American society is suffused with racism, and has been so since the founding. And then they, these law professors kind of took over or in the ’90s, kind of became dominant in the civil rights domain, within the law schools. They evicted their white colleagues because they… the critical legal theorists, they evicted them and they became dominant. But they had very limited impact on public policy for about 20 years. And then in the last 10 years or so, they begin to really grow in K-12. They begin to get its grips on education, primary education, secondary education, but then it really explodes with 2020, with Black Lives Matter, which is the subject of my book, BLM: The Making of a New Marxist Revolution. And then it enters all aspects of our lives. This is why we’re all talking about critical race, why I’m traveling the country from coast to coast, I’ve been to 15 cities in the last three months. I’ll be in another 12 cities in the next three months talking about critical race theory, because Americas are up in arms about what is being taught to their children. Now I should add parenthetically, and maybe you want to ask me more about that. That critical legal theory itself is an outgrowth of critical theory, which was born in Germany, in the ’20s and ’30s. And was again, a Marxist group of scholars who believed that they had to criticize and really ridicule all institutions in society, in order to introduce the idea of revolution. So that in a nutshell, the intellectual pedigree of these disciplines, critical race theory, critical legal theory, and critical theory. Richard Reinsch (09:31): Critical theory come to this country in the 1930s in the forms of intellectuals practicing it. And when you say it’s criticizing every aspect of society, I assume that’s according to Marxism. Mike Gonzalez (09:45): Yeah, no, they- Richard Reinsch (09:46): And one of the things they want to do, it seems from what I’ve read is, they want to take things that Americans take for granted and enjoy like consumer behavior and ridicule that. Mike Gonzalez (09:58): Yeah. They want to denigrate all aspects of our lives. They sit there, they’re very conflicted. And in the early ’20s, they realize that what Marks and Engels had promised, which was revolutions everywhere, the working class, the proletariat rising and overthrowing the capital as the bourgeoisie, it’s just not happening. It failed in Germany, failed in Italy. It only succeeds in a backwater place called Russia, and it succeeds very temporarily in Hungary. So then they begin to ask themselves, all these communists, “Why?” And they ask them in Germany and Italy especially, where revolutions fail in 1919. And they’ll come up with the same answer, whether it’s Antonio Gramsci in Italy or Maxwell Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School in Germany. And that is, they realize that the worker has embraced religion, has embraced God, has embraced the family, has embraced capitalism and has embraced the nation-state. He’s religious, likes his family and he’s patriotic. And so they think that the worker has false consciousness. So as you rightly put it, because of the Third Reich, they come here, Columbia Teachers College offers them a place where they can gather and work. And so people like Maxwell Horkheimer the director of the Institute. We call it the Frankfurt School, but it’s really called the Institute for Social Research. It was first of all going to be called the Institute for Marxism, then they realized that that was too upfront. They really tried to hide their Marxism, but they’re Marxists. If you read Horkheimer and for my sins I do, you realize that they themselves say it, they admired the Soviet Union. So they come to America and they hate America. They hate America even more than they hated the European worker. They think this place that offers them this salvation… But they’re very curious about America, but at the same time, they say, “Well, the Americans are a bunch of boobs. They go to their movies, they’re happy. They have their Hi-Fi sets, and they have this split level homes.” I’m quoting Horkheimer there. And Horkheimer before he dies, by the way, he gives this interview in which he says, “Look, capitalism is better at producing material reward. The material needs of the individual are better taken care of by capitalism. And that’s what makes capitalism so dangerous because it prevents revolution.” And so that is really their work, is to denigrate all the institutions, the family, capitalist system, which they think is irrational, even the nation-state in some ways. They want to get all these out of the way. Richard Reinsch (12:38): It’s critical legal theory itself, I think as you were alluding to. Kind of a straight Marxist critique of the law rooting it in power and wealth, and it’s on behalf of that class, the capitalist class that our laws have been written and enforced. And critical race theory changes that in many respects, not changes it, but inserts race as the explicit motivation. Mike Gonzalez (13:03): Yeah. Right. Richard Reinsch (13:03): And that’s what we’re dealing with now is, race becomes the prism through which we understand all of American life and institutions. Trying to also get a grip on the ideology behind BLM is, to my mind what they do with history. In the sense of, it’s just a battle of narratives. And heard Nikole Hannah-Jones say this about the founding, “We are contesting the dominant narrative with new facts.” But the facts aren’t really facts, they’re interpretive methods to sort of change thinking. So history itself becomes very plastic. Mike Gonzalez (13:38): Yeah, no. They try to undo, and I’m going to paraphrase Aristotle here. Aristotle had this great maxim that says that, “The only thing that’s denied to the gods is to undo what has been done.” Well, they tried to undo that, they tried to do what has been denied to the gods. They tried to say, “No, these facts didn’t happen. Or these facts are going to be interpreted in this other way.” Another old maxim, “He who controls the past controls the future.” So they tried to reinvent history along their lines alone. But when they do that, you mention Nikole Hannah-Jones, they just plainly lie. So when Nikole Hannah-Jones says, “well, the revolution was fought because the colonist feared that the mother country Britain was going to take away the institution of slavery.” That is just an outright lie. She gets that from a court decision, the Somerset decision in London, in the ’70s. In which a slave who had been brought by an American planter to London, is found not to be a slave. But that’s just a minuscule, that did not matter at all. That’s not the reason… It came after the 1760s with John Adams, called The Revolution of the Mind. By that time the wheels are going. So Nikole Hannah-Jones, is a complete fabrication, that this is what motivated the revolution. And yet they say it. The New York Times had to actually retract that part because it was so embarrassing. But you’re quite right when you talk about critical legal theory. What the critical theorists did in the ’60s, is that they strongly influenced the New Left, cap N, cap L, especially Herbert Marcuse. And out of that ferment, grew critical legal theory. In fact, the godfather of critical legal theory, Duncan Kennedy said in an essay quote, “I was very influenced from the beginning by the two strands of confidential thought, the critical theory, the Western Marxist and post Marxist strand, which include Herbert Marcuse” et cetera. So he is a, strongly Duncan Kennedy and the other critical legal theorists, influenced by critical theory, but they just apply it to the law. They say, “Yes, this is super structure,” which is a big thing for the critical theorists. It’s almost like the movie, The Matrix. There’s a super structure that is oppressive, but the critical legal theorists say, “It’s written into the law.” You’re quite right. What the critical race theorist do, their innovation is to say, “It’s race.” And race is the big thing in America, as we know. So they look at everything through that lens. Richard Reinsch (16:13): Give us something else, another term we hear a lot, structural racism, systemic racism. How are they defining those? Mike Gonzalez (16:22): So that is really the apex of critical race theory. As I said, they believe that racism is systemic, structural. It’s built as Richard Delgado says, “Into the little things that we do in everyday life.” And so it’s the little things we do in everyday life that need to be replaced. The power struggle needs to overthrow the way we just organize as a country. That is very similar to what the BLM founder, Alicia Garza says, that we need to get rid of the organizing principle of society. So it’s not just racist laws or racist events, for which we have very strong laws already, by the way. We…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Achieving America's Peace Sep 22, 2021
    Show notes

    Angelo Codevilla comes to Liberty Law Talk to discuss his latest book To Make and Keep Peace Among Ourselves and with All Nations. Our conversation focuses on Codevilla’s main argument that American statesmen increasingly fail to understand the nature and purpose of statecraft: the achievement of peace. So what does it mean to achieve America’s peace? To do so, Codevilla insists, requires concrete evaluation of the means and ends necessary to protect American interests. This requires particular judgments about power, interests, and the practial reality we are confronted with. Our practice, for well nigh a century, has been to speak in glittering generalities about America’s role in the world as a force for democratic and humanitarian progress, refusing to recognize the unwieldy consequences that result from applying abstract ideals in a Hobbesian environment. The refusal to be frank about how military victory must be used to achieve a peace on American terms not only produces unending conflicts with no clear idea of victory, but also leads to deep reverberations in domestic politics as coalitions form around perceived patriotic and traitorous courses of action. Post 9/11 politics, anyone?

    We also explore what Codevilla perceives as the failures of our major schools of foreign policy. The neoconservative believes that an aggressive America must give a shove to the forces of global democratic progress, while the internationalist has a similar end in view but wants to secure it by reducing American power in the world, harnessing and moralizing our power and interests through an array of multilateral institutions and treaties. In a different vein, the realist assumes that all nations have the same kinds of interests and pursue the same goals regardless of the ideological cast of regimes and governments. All three approaches have been tried repeatedly, but, Codevilla argues, America’s interests have not been secured. Even though our nation wins its battles and wars, we lose our peace. Where then to look for wisdom in the practice of successful statecraft? That is where the conversation begins.


    The Revised Version of American Religious Freedom: A Conversation with Steven Smith Sep 13, 2021
    Show notes

    This next episode of Liberty Law Talk is with Steven Smith on his new book The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom. Our conversation explores Smith’s challenge to the dominant academic narrative that the Supreme Court’s mid-twentieth century decisions imposing secular neutrality vindicated the religion clauses of the First Amendment. In this version, their essence was to secure a government free of religion, tout court. But what if the First Amendment’s original public meaning and subsequent practice reflected a very different essence?

    Our conversation begins with the history of the ratification of the First Amendment. What do we make of the fact that the religion clauses were scarcely debated in the Congress that approved them? Smith argues that this should dissolve any notion that a grand constitutional moment occurred and that gave us the religion clauses as “articles of faith” in secularism. We discuss Smith’s view that the lack of debate owed to an existing consensus that wanted to prevent the national government establishing a national church while the states would continue their established churches, in some cases, and other lesser forms of religious influence in their laws. Contrary, Smith argues, to a national standard of religious freedom or secularism, the constitutional course was “contestation” or an ongoing conflict between religious and secular claims. Thus the Court’s separationist jurisprudence of mid twentieth century, Smith discusses, was a departure from an original understanding of religious liberty and its practice for most of our history.

    Smith also discusses and disputes the view that American religious freedom is an outcome of the Enlightenment. His controversial claim is that it is a recovery of a key concept of Western civilization, freedom of the church, and, its later Protestant development, freedom of the “inner church” or conscience. Recovery is here stressed because it was modern political development, Smith notes, that had subordinated the church to the state and stripped it of institutional freedom.


    Supreme Court Roundup 2020-21 Aug 31, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:19): Hello, and welcome to Liberty Law Talk I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with John McGinnis about the recently concluded Supreme Court term of 2020 and 2021. John McGinnis, many of you will know is a contributing editor at Law & Liberty. He’s also the George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law at Northwestern University. He’s the author of a number of books, including Accelerating Democracy, Princeton University Press. He’s co-author with Mike Rappaport of Originalism and The Good Constitution published by Harvard Press. He has published in leading law reviews, Harvard, Chicago, Stanford, Yale, and in many journals of public opinion, National Affairs, National Review, Wall Street Journal, among many others. So John, we’re glad to have you to talk about the Supreme Court term. John McGinnis (01:05): Glad to be here. Richard Reinsch (01:07): So overall, what we should note about this term, all of the cases were heard by teleconference because of the pandemic. We welcomed a new member of the Court Amy Coney Barrett, confirmed before the presidential election, and so in that sense something new. But how would you characterize this term? Any startling developments that you’ve read, John? One way of thinking about Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Roberts is I think they are, people who’re more attuned, more concerned about the political reputational capital of the Court there. John McGinnis (01:28): Well, I do think it is important to understand that this is a new Court. I think it is well said that when always as a new Court, whenever a new justice joins and so the dynamics change. And I think this is the case more so than with other changes, because of course Amy Coney Barrett replaced Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and that is a dramatic change in jurisprudence, ideology. The only a comparable change in modern time, I think is that between Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas. And you might say that this is even greater because this really solidifies, as many have said, a majority of some people would call conservative, other people might call it a more formalist, in jurisprudential terms, majority on the Court. And the reason that’s important, I think going forward in the longterm is I think, the justices particularly someone like John Roberts is very concerned about 5-4 decisions. And I think 6-3 decisions may give them a sense that there’s a little more leeway to rule even the way he would like. And so those are important changes of the Court. With Justice Barrett, I think we saw in the first term, a fairly cautious judge, this is not a surprise. Again, Court watchers think that to get their sea legs justices have to be on the Court for around four, five years, and that’s when one really takes their measure. On the other hand, Justice Barrett, I think has been quite clear in some of her cases that she’s an originalist, at least when there’s no clear precedent online, I think that’s… On the other hand, she’s cautious about changing the Court’s precedent. She’s not going to be someone like, for instance, Justice Thomas, who’s willing to simply throw out precedent when it conflicts with the original meaning, if there has been some precedent. Good example of that is the Fulton case in which he wrote a concurrence suggesting she doesn’t think the famous case of Smith is correctly decided. If you recall that case was one in which Justice Scalia said that, so long as the law was neutral, you really could not have protection under the free exercise clause. She doesn’t think that’s right, but she’s very cautious about throwing it out, which is not to know exactly what’s going to come afterwards. And that’s very much in contrast with not only Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch and in that case, Justice Alito were more willing to overrule precedent. So I do think we see both an originalist and a cautious judge in the newest addition to the Court. Richard Reinsch (04:20): And Barrett’s appointment to the Court also makes you suggest on Law & Liberty, not suggest, but argued, Justice Kavanaugh to be the new median justice on the Court. John McGinnis (04:32): I think that’s right, and that is born out by the statistics. I think I suggested that was likely going in and then at least this is one prediction I think that was right. He was in the majority, I think something on the order of 98% of the time. And that’s a pretty good indication, you’re the median of the Court when you’re at that height of joining the majority. And that’s not a surprise in some sense, I think. One way of thinking about Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Roberts is I think they are, people who’re more attuned, more concerned about the political reputational capital of the Court there. Of course, Washington insiders in a way that the other judges and the conservative majority are not, who spent a good deal of their time outside Washington. And I think people who are in Washington just are necessarily going to be looking out on things, reflect off that small beltway community. Richard Reinsch (05:38): Yeah. Not a problem for Clarence Thomas, even though he did spend a good portion of his career in Washington prior to the Court. John McGinnis (05:44): That’s right, that’s a good distinction. But of course, Clarence Thomas is I think someone who’s very consciously established himself in complete contrast to the establishment, particularly in the area he worked in, civil rights. So I think that makes him a little different showing a kind of willingness to buck the establishment, even at the cost of public perceptions. So I think he’s a little different and I think you’re right about that. But the other judges are sort of quintessential Washington insiders, talking about Roberts and Kavanaugh. Richard Reinsch (06:18): Let me ask you a question from a different angle. Just something that occurred to me thinking about this interview. This is an incredibly contentious period in our nation’s politics, do we find this tumultuous politics in any way finding reflection in the Court’s opinions for this term? John McGinnis (06:34): I think we do. I think we find it most in the voting rights opinion, the case I’d never know quite how- Richard Reinsch (06:41): Brnovich vs. DNC perhaps? John McGinnis (06:44): Brnovich. Richard Reinsch (06:44): Yeah. John McGinnis (06:44): There, I think we see, and voting rights of course has been a fault line between the parties. And that was a very bitter dissent by Kagan, somewhat uncharacteristically. So in my view, so what, I’m happy to go into the facts of that case, if that’s some interest. So this is a voting rights case about a question about a federal statute, whether the federal voting rights statute makes certain laws in Arizona illegal. And Arizona had two kinds of laws. One was a requirement that, if you did in-person voting and Arizona allows quite a bit of in-mail voting, it’s allows early voting. But if you did an in-person voting on election day, you have to vote in the right precinct or your vote won’t be counted. And also it has what is called anti-harvesting provision, suggesting that while you can mail in your own ballot and maybe a family member can, people who are unrelated to you can’t collect a lot of ballots and mail them in. The concern there is not only fraud, but that there can be undue influence exercise too. For people to say, “Well, here’s a ballot, please mark it in the way I’d like.” And that’s a problem. So the question was, the provision of the statute that requires an equal opportunity for all groups to vote. And there was some very small disparate impact on African-Americans, but we’re talking, I think in some cases 10ths of a percentage point, very small disparate impact. And the question was, was that enough to invalidate these laws? Even the Biden administration said, no. The Trump administration had said no, the Biden administration did not change the position. And the question is, how do you interpret what is an equal opportunity? The Senate said, “Well, it’s an effects test.” So essentially you have to have an incredibly strong reason, even if there’s any disparate impact. The majority said, “No, that’s not the right way to read the statute.” And I think the very powerful argument here is, in the House, there was a provision that was like that, an effects test. But when it got to the Senate, the Senate added a lot of language saying, “We’ve got to look at the total circumstances and you just have to make sure everyone has an equal opportunity to vote.” And I think the majority correctly said that was not an attempt to change all of the voting laws to make sure that there were no disparate effects, because that would have made that language rather superfluous given the change from the House. So I think the majority is right there, but not surprisingly given the fault lines we see about Voting Rights Act, I think that was the most divisive issue in the entire Court term. Richard Reinsch (09:37): So that opinion will have consequences rippling out in our politics and future elections. As we see, say Republican state legislatures trying to, I don’t say reduce the number of people that can vote, but putting up just more strictures on voting. Making sure it seems to me, they want to have more in-person voting, but they seem to be, the view is those provisions will be more insulated from legal challenge after this opinion. John McGinnis (10:03): Yes, I think that’s right. And note, a lot of these provisions actually are just going back to what the rules were, not all of them, but a lot of them were going back to what the rules were pre-pandemic. And so if the dissent had been correct, I think even those kind of rules would have been really opened the challenge. But the majority said, “Well, the laws have been around a long time.” The laws for instance were around at the time that this federal statute passed. And there was only a relatively small disparate impact, and there seem to be some reason for them, this does not intend to wipe away those laws. So I think it is an important decision that allows for more state authority to change their election laws. But it’s not a carte blanche by any means, if there’s a substantial disparate impact, if there really don’t are no good reasons, and this is a new kind of law, these laws are still open to challenge other than the majority’s opinion. Richard Reinsch (11:01): So I want to get to ad law and any implications for ad law in this term. But let’s talk Fulton vs. Philadelphia. Another contentious case with connections to our politics, which the Supreme Court ruled that the City of Philadelphia could not prevent Catholic charities from being involved in its adoption programs because even though that agency did not refer adoptions to same-sex couples. I disagree with those who said, that really the majority opinion does not improve the situation for religious believers. In the sense it does, if there’s any kind of administrative exception, you got to make a free exercise challenge. And even if it’s not an exercised administrative exception. John McGinnis (11:29): That’s right. And what distinguishes this case from the Brnovich case is that it’s a… well, not a unanimous opinion, it’s a unanimous result. All of the justices said that what Philadelphia did was illegal, but there were two very different approaches. And they’re kind of characteristic like the approach that came in the majority from the Chief Justice was I think, a really a characteristic kind of a decision. Working within the law to make it more friendly to free exercise. Doctrinally, the concurrence by Judge Alito wanted really to overturn Smith. So beginning with a majority opinion, the majority opinion plays on one aspect of Smith. Smith says that, “The laws to be insulated from challenge under free exercise have to be laws of general applicability.” And the argument was, well, this law that’s saying they could not participate because they wouldn’t refer about same-sex couples was not a law of general applicability, because the law itself permitted administrative exceptions, and that made it not generally applicable. The interesting thing about that was that there hadn’t been any administrative exceptions. So this shows quite a weakening in some sense of general applicability. Even if you have the possibility of administrative exceptions, that means the law is not generally applicable and you can make a free exercise challenges to it. And that’s quite important. Indeed, it suggests that in some ways, state laws are more vulnerable if they have administrative exception which they haven’t used. Because if they do use administrative exceptions, well then you can compare them and say, “Well, is this comparable to the exceptions, the religious organization wants?” But here there was no exception at all, and that made the law vulnerable. So I think it’s an important doctrinal move and so I disagree with those who said, that really the majority opinion does not improve the situation for religious believers. In the sense it does, if there’s any kind of administrative exception, you got to make a free exercise challenge. And even if it’s not an exercised administrative exception. Richard Reinsch (13:51): So you’re saying, just for my clarification, the law at issue in the City of Philadelphia allowed for exceptions to a non-discrimination policy, but those were never actually exercised by the agencies participating in the program. John McGinnis (14:08): That’s correct. Richard Reinsch (14:08): And that’s funny, because I read one of the administrative exceptions was race, that agencies could discriminate on the basis of race. John McGinnis (14:17): Well, they could, but as I understand it, this had not been an exercise exception. In other words, they had not permitted agencies to do that. So I think that is significant that there was no part of the opinion that if indeed an agency had permitted an exception, I think there would have been questions of, “Well, is this comparable? Are there stronger reasons for denying the religious exception than the other exception.” But I think there were no actual exceptions granted, at least in the specific respect that the religious agency was asking for an exception. I think that’s one of the significant aspects of the case myself. Richard Reinsch (15:02): On this, we’re talking about Scalia’s opinion, a famous opinion in the Peyote case, Smith case, whatever you want to call it, in Oregon in the early ’90s. Do you sense in the opinion a desire to overturn that reasoning? John McGinnis (15:22): Well so there are two concurring opinions. One the Alito’s opinion says it should be overturned and goes to a very long historical originalist analysis. Richard Reinsch (15:33): Did you find Alito to be correct in that regard? John McGinnis (15:36): I think that’s a hard question as a scholar, I’d want to study it a longer time. I think he makes some very powerful points. It’s certainly more persuasive than Justice Scalia’s opinion as at least as understood as an originalist opinion. One of the striking things about Smith is for the most famous originalists on the Court, how little originalist analysis there is. And so in that sense, I think just as Alito is pushing against an open door and makes a persuasive case, Justice Barrett I think is persuaded by the textual argument that, the free exercise clause doesn’t seem to be a clause about neutrality and we are actually allowed free speech claims even about laws that would neutrally apply to all speech. So it seems anomalous to understand free exercise in that way, and structural arguments like that, I think our originalist argument. So in that sense, I would say that I am persuaded at the moment at least of Justice Alito is position, but open as always I think an originalist must be, to arguments on the other side based on evidence. Richard Reinsch (16:52): So Barrett’s claim is so…

    Full show notes at the publisher

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