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    Philosophy

    The Law & Liberty Podcast

    Law & Liberty contributing editor James Patterson interviews prominent authors and thinkers. A production of Liberty Fund, Inc.

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    Latest Episodes:
    The Constitutional Pivot Jul 13, 2022
    Show notes

    Over the last few weeks of the recently-concluded term, the Supreme Court handed down one blockbuster decision after another on issues including religious liberty, guns, the limits of the administrative state, and of course abortion. The decisions have sent shockwaves through the political system, and many are saying that this term will go down as one of the most important turning points in the history of the Court, as it shifts sharply in a more originalist direction.

    John McGinnis joins Liberty Law Talk to discuss the monumental decisions in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, NY State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Carson v. Makin, Kennedy v. Bremerton, and West Virginia v. EPA.


    Rebuilding a Culture of Academic Freedom Jun 16, 2022
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m Richard Reinsch. Today, we’re talking with Keith Whittington of our new organization he is the chair of, called the Academic Freedom Alliance. Keith Whittington has been on Liberty Law Talk on a number of occasions. He’s also contributed to Law & Liberty. He is the William Nelson Cromwell professor of politics at Princeton University. His scholarship record is incredibly impressive. He’s the author most recently of Repugnant Laws: Judicial Review of Acts of Congress from Founding to the Present, which won the Thomas Cooley Book Prize. He’s also the author and ties into our podcast I think, of Speak Freely: Why Universities Must Defend Free Speech, and is the author, a co-author, and editor of a number of other publications. Keith, welcome to the program. Keith Whittington (01:05): Thanks for having me. I appreciate it. Richard Reinsch (01:06): So this new organization, the Academic Freedom Alliance that you’re the chair of, tell us about it, what its work is, what it’s doing, and what sparked it? Keith Whittington (01:16): Yeah. So at heart, this is a faculty-led organization committed to defending academic freedom and free speech rights of faculty at American universities. Our concern over the last several years has been free speech on campus is under threat from lots of directions that affects lots of members of the campus community, including students and others. I’ve had conversations for some time now about the kinds of problems we’re seeing on college campuses, the growing dispute about whether or not free speech is actually valuable on college campuses and what the scope of it ought to be. It’s partially through that kind of concern and those conversations I wound up wanting to write the book, Speak Freely. Then, more recently, a series of conversations led to thinking about, “Well, what else could we be doing that might help advance these principles and secure them more effectively?” The opportunity rose to try to launch an organization like this. So, it’s essentially committed to, as I said, defending academic freedom principles and doing so in part by intervening in particular disputes that arise between faculty and their employers over things that the faculty member has said. Often, professors that find themselves in the midst of these free speech controversies feel very isolated and alone and don’t really know what they ought to be doing under these circumstances. So, partially we want to emphasize to people that they’re not alone. We want to emphasize to the university administration that the faculty member is not alone, that we want to help inform people of what their rights are and help them navigate that situation, try to bring attention and public pressure when appropriate on universities to actually live up to their commitments on free speech. We want to provide legal assistance to faculty in those situations and so we have funds to provide something of a legal defense fund for individuals who find themselves in these situations. I think it’s crucial when faculty find themselves under investigation, under threat or sanctioned by their university, that they have good legal advice that can help them navigate through often a maze of internal disciplinary proceedings and if necessary, that they be prepared and able to defend themselves in court and vindicate their rights against the university if it turns out the university has behaved badly. Richard Reinsch (03:40): So the Academic Freedom Alliance primarily is going to be working with academics? Keith Whittington (03:44): It is. That’s the primary goal. Richard Reinsch (03:46): So what are academics facing? We know what students go through, I think, fairly well in terms of problems they face. So academics are actually experiencing more censorious conduct as well? Keith Whittington (04:00): Professors are facing it as well, so it is certainly true that a lot of the free speech controversies involving students get a fair amount of attention, that those are real and the problems facing students are quite real. There are some very good organizations, including the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education that spend a lot of resources and time trying to defend students who find themselves in these situations and there’s important work that needs to be done there. But it’s also true that professors find themselves in these situations as well. Sometimes those become very public controversies and they do get a fair amount of attention, but a tremendous number of times, they get no attention at all. They’re really local conflicts that don’t attract any media attention, but nonetheless, faculty find themselves facing sanction from their employers for something they said and it can involve a wide range of situations. So we’ve seen lots of examples and they’re often very public examples in some ways. Part of what I think we need to be doing is making sure universities are aware that there are costs to doing that, that the path of least resistance is not necessarily to undermine faculty free speech rights, but instead, sometimes to actually live up to those rights is also the easier thing for universities to be doing, but that requires putting public pressure on universities. It requires making them aware there’s a cost to be paid for not living up to their commitments. We literally see them they are more transparent of a professor saying something controversial in public and then there’s reaction to it that calls on universities to fire those faculty members for saying something controversial. So the rise of social media, because it really made a big difference in this regard, it’s allowed faculty to reach a much broader audience in expressing their views than might, otherwise, have been the case. When you reach a much wider audience, that means there’s a lot more people that can potentially be offended and it’s, unfortunately we’re living in an environment where people, when they are offended or upset, want to organize themselves to try to punish the person that’s offended them or upset them. It means that a lot of people are now exposed to the unfiltered opinions of professors sometimes those are fairly inflammatory and controversial and so we do see public reactions that occur to those kinds of public statements. But there’s also lots of instances of faculty saying something in the classroom, saying something on campus that upsets other members of the campus community, in particular, that leads to complaints against them and then the university’s investigating them. We still see examples of faculty being attacked because of their scholarship and things that they have published. Unfortunately, a lot of those attacks results in things like journals retracting journal articles. I think that’s, unfortunately, not as easily remedied because it’s not as if you have any kind of legal rights normally to those publications. But when employers get involved and universities started threatening employment sanctions on individuals for their scholarship, then that’s a serious issue and one that people do, in fact, generally have rights that prevent universities from doing that. We’re concerned, we’re trying to vindicate those rights. Richard Reinsch (06:39): My understanding on faculty speech is a number of precedents from the early Cold War period where professors who are accused of Communist or accused of traitorous conduct on behalf of the Soviet Union litigated claims and they were, ultimately, vindicated in federal court. So is this just a matter of getting people to sue, getting people to stand up and getting these in the federal courts and you have a really good chance of prevailing? Keith Whittington (07:06): Well, it’s more of a mixed bag of that, but it is true that, in general, I think American academics are fairly well situated in this regard, partially as a consequence of a lot of efforts by professors and their allies in the early 20th century. So the American Association of University Professors was founded in the early days of the 20th century in order to advance the principle of academic freedom in the United States. It was a principle that was really first advanced in Europe and was being brought into the United States in the context in which American universities simply didn’t recognize those kinds of principles. At the same time, they were encouraging universities to adopt a system to tenure, to protect faculty from being fired in the midst of these controversies. It took a lot of effort, but they were very successful in convincing American universities to build into their own governing documents, protections for academic freedom for faculty, as well as adopt tenure systems, although those have generally been eroded over time. So on the one hand, a lot of American universities have fairly robust protections for faculty speech built into their employment contracts, built into their governing documents and the key is to make them live up to those commitments. Then, it’s also true for public universities you have a further backstop of The First Amendment. It is true that the U.S. Supreme court issued some opinions in the mid-20th century, mostly involving Communists and arguments surrounding any Communist efforts in the education environment, in which the court recognized that there were some First Amendment protections for faculty and the kinds of speech they engaged in, in public universities, but the Supreme Court has mostly stepped out of that. A lot of the subsequent cases dealing with those kinds of controversies have been handled in the circuit courts and it is a bit of a mixed bag. The court sent somewhat unclear signals about how to think about those protections, how exactly individual faculty members are protected by the First Amendment and in what context and certain courts, I think, have struggled to some degree with those protections. So in a public university context, there are some First Amendment backstops, but I think even in those contexts, faculty would better off so they have a robust protections for academic freedom built into their employment relations with their universities. That’s also, of course, true in the private university context where the First Amendment generally is not applicable. Richard Reinsch (09:26): Do you see the Academic Freedom Alliance assuming a major public role in its efforts, or is it just going to be their word-of-mouth, people know it’s there and it’s a formal organization with principles and procedures and things it’s going to do, or do you see the organization becoming an advocate as well? Keith Whittington (09:45): I think it would be both. I think part of our hope is to be advocating for these principles in public. I do think that we’re in a situation where people don’t really appreciate the value of academic freedom principles or even understand them very well. I think we’re in a context in which there’s a fair amount of concentration over whether or not we should want those kinds of principles and we ought to continue them to the future. So one reason why I’m very interested in organization like this is precisely because I think we need to be continually reaffirming the importance of these principles, thinking about how they apply in new and evolving contexts. So a certain amount of public advocacy needs to be done on behalf of these values because we live in a world in which these values are not taken for granted and there are people pushing in the other direction. So in the long-term, I think there’s a battle for hearts and minds that has to occur surrounding free speech principles in general and in this specific context. It’s also true that I think you, sometimes, can bring public pressure on universities in ways that will lead them to do the right thing in the midst of these controversies. Often, the way free speech controversies play out now is the people that want somebody fired get a lot of attention. They make a lot of noise. Universities feel under a lot of pressure from one side in these disputes and so the path of least resistance, the universities often just give in to those demands and throw the faculty member under the bus. Part of what I think we need to be doing is making sure universities are aware that there are costs to doing that, that the path of least resistance is not necessarily to undermine faculty free speech rights, but instead, sometimes to actually live up to those rights is also the easier thing for universities to be doing, but that requires putting public pressure on universities. It requires making them aware there’s a cost to be paid for not living up to their commitments. It’s also true I think we’re going to have to do a lot of behind-the-scenes work as well, so especially when these kinds of controversies arise in a way that’s not very public when faculty members find themselves under attack, but this is not drawing media attention. The professors involved would often prefer that it remained quiet. They think it would damage their professional reputation if the controversy became more public. They’d prefer, simply, to have this resolved as quickly and quietly as possible, but they need to help in doing that. So we want to be sensitive to that. We want to help people in the situations they’re in and try to make things better for them. Sometimes that will mean trying to work behind the scenes to help persuade university officials to live up to their own commitments and particular cases. Hopefully, a fair number of those situations can be resolved without having to draw regular public attention to what universities are doing. Richard Reinsch (12:18): Well, I thought as well, the presence in higher education of a large number of non-tenured faculty, of adjuncts, and their situation, obviously, much more delicate than a tenured professor. So I imagine they would be reluctant to press their claims, but it seems to be that’s where the Academic Freedom Alliance and building culture rules and institutions better, the thinking about academic freedom could really help them in a way that they might be reluctant to press a claim on their behalf because they would worry about getting renewed. Keith Whittington (12:50): I think that’s absolutely right. When individuals find themselves in individual controversies, they need help and we want to provide help to them. But often, that’s a worst-case scenario, right? You’re already in trouble at that stage and we’d be far better off, if we can build a better culture, build better institutions, build better rules that are more protective of academic freedom in general, so that we don’t find ourselves having to fight each one of these individual battles and one of those really important institutions, from this perspective, is tenure. So as I noted in the early 20th century, American universities didn’t even have tenure systems. They built them up over the course of decades. Though, we’ve seen over recent years is an erosion of those tenure protections, in some cases, because universities are actively trying to get rid of or undermine tenure protections, but in lots of cases, simply by hiring faculty outside the tenure track and so hiring faculty who were going to be doing teaching and research on the campus, but have no hope of getting protected by tenure rules and that’s just extraordinarily damaging to the intellectual environment on those campuses. In the long run, it’s certainly the case that reversing this trend toward having more contingent faculty who are on these semester- by-semester or class-by-class contracts is really important because one thing that we find in these kinds of controversies involving speech of faculty members is that if somebody has tenure protections, it’s not that they have more academic freedom. All those professors are entitled to academic freedom, whether they’re tenured or not tenured, but those who are tenured ha…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Studying Patton Apr 15, 2022
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch: (00:18)Today, we’re talking with Furman Daniel about his new book, Patton: Battling with History. Furman Daniel is an assistant professor in the College of Security and Intelligence at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He’s the editor of 21st Century Patton and he’s the co-author of The First Space War, which sounds interesting. Furman, glad to have you to talk about Patton. Furman Daniel: (00:50)Richard, it’s great to be here. Richard Reinsch: (00:52)What got you interested in General George S. Patton? Furman Daniel: (01:03)I was lucky to have parents that introduced me to reading and military history and trips to military museums since I was a little, tiny kid. So, some of it is I’ve just been interested in these types of topics for a long time, but kind of like you said, he’s one of these figures that if you’re going to read about World War II or if you’re going to talk to veterans or learn about this kind of stuff, it’s hard to escape him. Because he has this larger than life persona, because he has the 1970 George C. Scott biopic and because he’s always the person that people like to tell stories about, like to talk about, like to read and write books about, it kind of seemed like a natural thing, even as a little kid, to read books about him, read his own works, and the fabulous Martin Blumenson volumes, The Patton Papers. And then when I got a little bit older, when I got to be a professor, actually be privileged to write in books about him. Richard Reinsch: (02:02)And you’ve written extensively about Patton. You confront this early in the book. There’s this Patton that’s been presented maybe in popular culture primarily, but also, sort of part of the mythos even that he wanted to create about himself of the natural warrior, sort of a pagan spiritual warrior who in his soul touched a thread of military greatness perhaps and many Americans certainly know the movie Patton and just think of him as our great general. How do you think about him in relationship to America as a whole? Furman Daniel: (02:35)I think you put your finger on something really important, that separating out the popular George C. Scott mythos from who he actually was is really important. I often say that the biopic with George C. Scott is both a blessing and a curse. It’s largely accurate and it shows lots of his exploits and keeps the memory of that alive. The George C. Scott portrayal is fantastic, with a couple of few small things, but it actually comes at a cost. It obscures the fact that he was a very complex person. He had a much more interesting and developed background than even the three-and-a-half-hour movie had time to go into and unfortunately, because movies are so vibrant, because that kind of popular mythos is so easy to digest and understand and enjoy, often that takes over. I’m reminded about the line from The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, “When the truth becomes legend.” With George Patton, the legend has been printed and put on film and put in popular media in a way that I think now, even 75 years after his death, it’s time to go back and say who was he really? And I think when you do that, when you actually say what was he really like and how was he different from the movie, it actually gives you a more interesting view on the man and a more interesting view on his success. The movie, the one thing it gets very, very, very wrong is the voice. So Patton’s voice basically sounded like Mickey Mouse. It was high and squeaky and nasally and very different from George C. Scott’s gravely, rough, kind of inspiring voice. It’s very interesting when I give talks on Patton. A lot of times, I’ll lead with an audio clip of Patton and it just blows people’s minds because they have this popular view of George C. Scott standing in front of the American flag, big gravely, inspiring voice, “no bastard ever won a war by dying for his country,” when in fact, George Patton actually kind of sounds like Mickey Mouse. It’s one of many examples of the truth is actually in certain ways more interesting. Richard Reinsch: (04:48)My references here might be kind of weak. Do Americans still revere Patton in that manner of George C. Scott? I was thinking of popular culture references recently. I don’t know if this is recent, I guess these came out about 20 years ago. Band of Brothers in the Bastogne episode, it’s a very derogatory reference to Patton. They didn’t need him to rescue them. They were fine. They just sort of put him down. And then the film Ike, which I guess now is also about 20 years old, which featured Tom Selleck playing Dwight Eisenhower in the planning phase of D-Day and right up to the moment when the troops launch. There’s very derogatory reference that Ike is actually in the film because the justification of why Patton is going to be a decoy for the German Army. Where they positioned him is explained, but it’s explained as sort of a punishment in the film because Patton is a racist, Patton is a hot head, he’s arrogant and foolish. And I’ve wondered has that now become more of the Patton Americans think of? Furman Daniel: (05:49)I think Americans want the sanitized heroic version of Patton. I’ve been giving talks on him for five or six years now and sometimes, when I bring up his less savory side, the fact that he, like you said, was a hot head, that was a racist, an anti-Semite who at times, gambled with the lives with his men and did things that certainly would not fly today and really didn’t even fly then, people push back. When I talk to audiences, they’re like, “No. That can’t be right.” They’re arguing with the historian that has written two books on it, telling me why the movie is right and my book is wrong. At first, I was shocked by that and then the more I’ve thought about it, I think people want that simple narrative. They want the narrative of World War II was the good war, George Patton was this kind of maverick who understood it and understood how to win and was willing to do whatever it took to win and that he rode in on a white horse, defeated the Nazis and then disappeared from the scene. And I think some of that is just people want clean narratives of history, even when history itself is rarely that clean narrative in reality. Some of that, I think, is the popular effect of books like The Greatest Generation by Tom Brokaw that again tells this sanitized version of history and then again, Movies like George C. Scott. So I wish people would get into historiography. The college professor part of me would love that, but I think people like their history to be a morality tale. They like it to be simple and Patton kind of fits into that nicely in a way. Richard Reinsch: (07:24)Some of the things I was reading in your book I’m now thinking about identity politics and critical race theory on campus, how long until Patton is canceled. It’s something that a lot of figures might fall into that one, too, fall into that role. But I thought Patton, we’ll see how long he holds out. So what’s the truth about Patton? Was he the natural warrior with the soul of a general or was he something else? Furman Daniel: (07:47)The answer is yes, he was a natural warrior and yes, he was something else. So he had a lot of talent, just natural talent. He could shoot a gun. He could ride a horse. He could read and write. He could quickly analyze an unfolding battlefield situation. He was naturally talented at best. But he also worked exceptionally hard to make that natural talent better. I have often used the analogy of nobody gets to the major leagues or the NFL without a fair amount of talent. But they don’t get there either if they don’t work pretty hard. There’s lots of talented people, there’s lots of hard working people. To really excel at that highest level, you have to be both. And as I talk about in the book, he really spent his entire adult and much of his childhood life reading, writing, practicing military art and thinking about how he’d fit into this larger picture. And then once he made history, actually manipulating the historical record so that he appeared even greater than he was. So yes, he was a natural and yes, he also worked very, very hard to build on those natural talents. Richard Reinsch: (09:03)Something that stands out in your book is it seems as a child growing up, his imagination was formed around being a warrior. Furman Daniel: (09:11)Mm-hmm (affirmative). And his parents encouraged that. Richard Reinsch: (09:14)It was part of his ancestral line, as well. Two men died in the Civil War, fighting in the Army of Northern Virginia that were directly related to him. Furman Daniel: (09:22)And his bedtime stories were about his relatives and about the American Civil War and also, about stories from primarily the Old Testament in the Bible. So it’s this odd, I mean actually kind of similar to my childhood, but stories about your relatives, stories about the Civil War, stories from the Old Testament. It was this odd mix of destiny and a morality tale and a you are part of this continuous line going back to King David of brave and virtuous warriors who made a difference. And it worked out for Patton, but in retrospect, it actually seemed kind of odd that at a very young age, you would tell kids this kind of stuff. And kind of anachronistic, as well, particularly the family’s worship of their Confederate ancestors and their glorification of The Lost Cause mythos. But yeah, it’s one of those things he was born into. He was told he was special and different from a very early age. Richard Reinsch: (10:22)The story of he’s attacking on… When he’s turned into an armored wagon, he loses control of the wagon and it kills some of the family’s chickens. They lived on a large ranch in California and he justified himself to his father, I think he said he was on a military attack and it just got out of control. Furman Daniel: (10:40)So the story is, he built a wagon into a war cart and to test out the war cart, he crashed it into his family’s chicken coop, killed a bunch of the chickens. A couple of them also ran off. He got in trouble or at least initially. His parents were about to punish him, but they asked him as good parents do before they punished him, “Why did you do this?” And he said, “Well, I was reenacting John the Blind of Bohemia’s war carts from several hundred years ago.” And they were like, “Okay. How do you know about John the Blind?” And he said, “Well I thought it was John the Blind.” And this is a very young kid, probably 5 or 6 or 7 years old. The sourcing doesn’t say his exact dates, but very young kid. I actually see this as a really interesting example. You can over-interpret it, but the example is he had already been studying military history to know who John the Blind was. He was putting it into practice by building this war cart and crashing it into the chicken coop. He got in trouble and then manipulated the historical record and created this mythical version of who he was and what he was doing to get out of trouble. And I think you see this again and again and again in his career. He worked very hard. He tried very hard. He had this natural talent and then he manipulated the historical record to make himself appear better than he was or to get himself out of trouble. So excellent that you brought that example up. Richard Reinsch: (12:05)It’s interesting. A lot of your book is about Patton the intellectual historian and not an amateur intellectual historian. This is someone who read widely, particularly in military history. You report he reads the Quran on the boat that is taking him to Operation Torch, it was the invasion of North Africa. Because he was going to be dealing with a large Muslim population, he wanted to get a sense of Islam for himself. He published widely in military journals and that’s one question I have for you is was that exceptional to repeatedly publish or was that expected of officers? But he did not do well at West Point. In fact, they held him back a year. He didn’t get into West Point initially. He had to go to the Virginia Military Institute. And you say at one point, a lot of people think he may have been dyslexic. So how does all of that work? Furman Daniel: (12:59)I in the book, like you said, I document his early academic struggle and I address this question of dyslexia. So the real answer is nobody knows. And all of the doctors and people that are credible experts say you can never diagnose somebody, a patient that you haven’t actually seen. So I purposely try to avoid making the diagnosis. My two cents, however, is he probably was not dyslexic. He probably suffered from having inadequate schooling as a child. He bounced around to a bunch of schools in California that were not particularly good. And where he struggled was in issues of foreign language and mathematics, which these school curriculums, some of the historians had gone back and looked at these elementary schools that he went to curriculums say they didn’t really teach. So no wonder he struggled when he went to a US Military Academy, which was at the time primarily an engineering school with also a very heavy requirement for the French language so that he could read Napoleon and Jomini in the original. So I think some of his academic struggles are actually just a lack of preparation. It’s just as valid an example of an explanation of this as dyslexia. So the second par of what you said, though, was he a lifelong reader? Yes. Absolutely. He loved reading. He loved writing and that to me does not seem like somebody who’s a dyslexic. He also like you said, read things like the Quran with an eye for “what’s the practical value?” I’m about to go into North Africa and deal with potentially millions of North African Muslim as the human terrain that I’m about to go into, so I’d better learn something about it. And so he, again, on his own initiative, read the Quran on the boat to North Africa. That was very unusual and the army in the 1910s and ’20s and the inter-war period after World War I and before World War II, was not a particularly intellectual organization. It had some very intellectual people, Patton being one of them, but overall, it was not an organization that rewarded original thought, that rewarded deep study or rewarded publication in journals like Patton did. It rewarded seniority, it rewarded spit and polish, it rewarded marksmanship, lots of other things other than brain power. So Patton was pretty unusual there, as well. Richard Reinsch: (15:35)You write about throughout the book his publications in military journals. But he also seems to take it upon himself at no one’s request, just on his own initiative to write long, we would say memos, about an issue and how he sees it or how he thinks the military should develop on this front based on his experience and his research. That is, to my mind, this is someone actively engaged in what he’s doing and wants to come to terms with it in the written word and then spread that to others. So this is an intellectual man wanting to communicate ideas. Furman Daniel: (16:18)I think that’s exactly right. The one thing I would add to that is there was a self-serving element of it. The self-serving element was “let me bring a solution to the Department of the Army so that they can see how brilliant I am.” I see that as yes, he was genuinely curious and yes, he really thought he would have an opportunity to put it into practice at some future date, absolutely. But he was also trying to show off and basically show how smart he was by solving a problem or bringing forward a solution that nobody was asking about. Patton was interesting in that way because he was practical and romantic at the same time. He loved horses. He was one of the best riders in the United States Military and after World War I, he actually went back to the Horse Cavalry, but at the same time, he loved automobiles and he understood that automobiles and later ta…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Can the Postmodern Natural Law Remedy Our Failing Humanism? Apr 12, 2022
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch:Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. Today we’re talking with long-time Law & Liberty contributor Graham McAleer about the natural law. He’s the author of a new book, called Erich Przywara and Postmodern Natural Law. We’ll talk about who that thinker is and also postmodern natural law in this discussion. Graham has contributed dozens of pieces to Law & Liberty over the past few years on the ethics of fashion. He’s written on burkinis, he’s written on offshore trusts and family values, the Scottish Enlightenment. He’s explored the nature of classical liberalism, and defended it on the site. And has also written on numerous thinkers that you wouldn’t necessarily think could be conservative or have a classical liberal connection, like Lacan. But Graham’s done it and he’s done it very well. Glad to have you for the first time on Liberty Law Talk. Graham McAleer:Great. Thank you, Richard. Thank you so much. Richard Reinsch:And our listeners, I know many of them have thought about and read about natural law. In the title, as I said, Erich Przywara and Postmodern Natural Law, what is postmodern natural law? Graham McAleer:Well, if we begin with postmodern, so postmodernism more or less grows up in the 1960s. It’s incubating before that, but it’s a reaction to the failing, it’s a very much a European, originally a European movement reacting to the failings of the European ideas. Obviously, not only with Nazis, but with the communists. So many people on left and right, have the sense that not all is well with the world. Not all is well with modernity and, most glaringly, the promise of the Enlightenment, right? The Enlightenment was supposed to make us more calm, more generous, more thoughtful. But the 20th century was a certain kind of repudiation of that idea. So postmodernism begins more or less in the 60s, and is a whole bunch of things, especially in France. They’re trying to work out what went wrong and what the future might look like. But at the same time, they’re not nostalgic. They’re not believers. They don’t want to go back to the middle ages. They’re not Christian, so they want, without a return to God, they want to try to find what is still good about the human being after the atrocities of the 20th century. So postmodernism, it’s a whole bunch of different thinkers. It sometimes gets very complex, sometimes they’re very interested in psychoanalysis, sometimes in the nature of language. But it all sort of boils down to an effort to try to think about how to have good communities, good politics, in the light of what happened in the 20th century. Richard Reinsch:But now postmodern natural law, because it is an interesting idea, I think of another close friend of mine who passed away, Peter Lawler in 2017, who had this idea of postmodern conservatism. Peter’s idea was that postmodernism signaled the end of the modern world and all of its aspirations and hopes of making us at home within the world and that its techniques and concepts had failed, as you’ve articulated. And that conservatism or the ability to look back to the full breadth of the humanistic tradition, including religion in the West, was needed. So your idea of postmodern natural law, I guess let’s talk about how does that alter natural law and maybe we need just a baseline. Natural law itself is very complex and rich. But maybe talk more about that. Graham McAleer:So natural law, it’s primarily associated with St. Thomas Aquinas in the high Middle Ages. He died around 1274, he taught primarily in Paris. So it’s a kind of a culmination. It had been a long time gestating, but it was culminating in the high Middle Ages. The idea of natural law is that the law is in its rudiments trans-political. So it was an effort not to get caught up in national passion. Now, from Thomas Aquinas you can see, of course, he’s a priest, he’s a monk. He, of course, favored the Catholic Church, and the Catholic Church, of course, was in a struggle with the Holy Roman Emperor, with national kings. It was all about power, assertions of power. So natural law came to be this idea about how to think about the law in isolation simply from national passion. Then later on, the natural world became very important with the Age of Discovery. When the Europeans started to move out into the world, they encountered radically different kinds of lifestyles, politics, and this really sends through the shock waves. So then it became natural law was a way to have a communication among very different people when important things were at stake. Not only things like property, but things like human sacrifice. So natural law was an effort to think about what is it that humans are obligated to living in common, but also to try to generate a great deal of flexibility. To take seriously the idea of different geographical, cultural, historical dispositions. My own idea of the postmodern, and a little bit maybe like Lawler, was to then try to think about, well, how to update an idea that when most people think of natural law, they think of something very medieval, very old-fashioned. They think of it as very constraining. They think of it as very, to use a word from this guy Przywara that I’m interested in, very univocal. That it’s one size fits all. That’s often the worry in the modern legal academy of natural law is its extremely dogmatic and tending toward some sort of tyranny. But there’s a way, I think, to think about natural law. Natural law concerns our basic appetites and it posits this idea. Aquinas says there are four things basically going on with humans. We want to preserve our existence. We want to continue in existence. We want to have family. We want to enjoy society. And then there is also the problem of God, that there are no civilizations that haven’t grown up in and around the problem of God, the afterlife. If you even look at the most early human burial sites that we have, dating back 35,000- 40,000 years ago, people are buried with grave goods, with beautiful ornamented spears, necklaces. So there’s something weird about us, says Aquinas, right? That there’s always this problem of God that has to be confronted. Those are the basic dynamics of the human being and those need to be articulated more, and they are, if you just think about what is it that legislatures dwell on. Well, they dwell on problems of self-care, how to raise children, how to protect children, what are the conditions for good human community, how to avoid hatred. Of course, but maybe more controversially, the problem of God is always do you exclude God, do you include God? How do you keep God contained in some way or do you become a kind of theocratic Iran? I mean, Aquinas, I think, is quite astute when he thinks about what is it that politics is about. It appears to revolve around these four basic dynamics. Richard Reinsch:Because you said we want to preserve our existence. I’m thinking about the modern West. Is there any country in what we would think is in the modern West that even has a reproduction birth rate above or even with what’s called a stable population rate rather than a declining rate or an increasing population rate? I don’t think there is. What do you think of that? You say in the first chapter that natural law can remedy our failing humanism. Is that evidence of a failing humanism that we need to remedy? Graham McAleer:I mean, as you probably know, there’s certain European states which are offering tax incentives to have children. France, famously is doing this because rates are becoming very low, right? Which if you’re not replicating, you don’t actually have a good, dynamic economy. So you see those arguing about why Japan is so advanced on robotics is that they have one of the worst birth rates on the planet. Indeed there are these, and I’m no expert on Japan, but you see these reports where there’s huge numbers of young adults who have never even been on a date with somebody of the opposite sex, right? There seems to be this weird, almost death spiral fascination that’s going on. But natural law would say, well, look, the law here can be a remedy. So if the law insists that you do need to replicate and even Darwinism would be making this argument, then actually you can do things around the nature of law that’s going to encourage it. Now, because, of course, can nations go off the boil, so to speak? Can they depart? This is kind of what happened with the Age of Discovery, right? The Europeans go out and they discover cultures which seem so very different, so seemingly strange. So the idea was to try to find all of these underlying dynamics thatI mean, could one correct a culture? Could one correct a civilization? It’s actually pretty interesting. People like Francisco di Vitoria, who was a Thomist around the 1500s, he was the first person to articulate the idea of regime change on the basis of natural law. He said you could meet a population that was so departed from natural law that for their own good, you could actually change their rulers. This actually is an argument that he had for the Spanish defeating the Aztecs. Now, of course, there’s all sorts of controversies and historical problems with that. But the idea that nations can go off the rails, well, we know their records. We know that’s what happened also in the 20th century. So natural law in this case then, would be a kind of an educational model in some sense, a way to help us get back to what is the highest good of a human being. Richard Reinsch:Thinking about this failing humanism problem. Is the failing humanism that we don’t actually take ourselves seriously as embodied creatures? Or take nature seriously? You have a interesting discussion about metaphysics and decapitation. It makes me wonder, is it the case that late-modern man or post-modern man or however you want to characterize this, that we don’t, in fact, take nature seriously? I mean, we’re all about the environment and nature and all that. I understand. But that we don’t think through the complexity of who we are as human beings, because I think that you think we’re kind of lost in that regard. Maybe that’s a reason why we have birth rates of 1.2, and are, as Pierre Manent would say, post-familial, post-religious, and post-political. Graham McAleer:I would say that we, and I do get from this Jesuit theologian, Erich Przywara, we also struggle between thinking of ourselves as mere bodies and at other times as angels. So it’s extremely common. In fact, one even might say a standard person deeply interested in environmentalism is also somebody who wants a radical assertion of their own autonomy. So on the one hand, the very same person who’s deeply interested in environmental stewardship might also be a big, big fan of trangenderism, which seems to be a contradiction. That a deep respect for the nature that we are gifted with versus then a sort of radical assertion of autonomy and technological transformation. This would be what I call decapitation. Sometimes we think of ourselves as angels. Richard Reinsch:Would another instance of that be the same people will tell you, “I’m an autonomous individual with natural rights, or I have so many rights, rights everywhere. But I’m fully explainable by evolution.” I’m a materialistic being. That’s who I am, a clever animal. That’s it, and then not really thinking through how does that all work. Graham McAleer: And that’s the other side of it, right? So you hear all the time people say that you shouldn’t go around repressing. What’s the problem with morality? What’s the problem with moral earnestness? Well, it’s just a repression of the powerful desires that you had better let release, otherwise you’ll become perverted and twisted. It’s a kind of a classic argument against the Catholic priesthood, that it’s ignoring this radical vitalism. So sometimes we’re these angel beings and sometimes we’re these thoroughly materialistic beings. The weird thing is, says Przywara, is that we flit rapidly between the two. So we’re not consistently one or the other. This then leads to this idea of mistaking what’s in the middle, this idea that we are bodies that can be articulated through civilization or values. Richard Reinsch:So the body is, I guess, maybe help us understand the unifying aspect there. That would help us make sense of this wild metaphysical … How should we approach that? Graham McAleer:Well, so in a classical, Aristotelian ethics, you have your desires and you need the virtues. You need the virtues to perfect your desires. For example, the problem of fear. Fear is natural enough. But there’s a right time to be fearful and there’s a wrong time to be fearful. You can overly compensate by becoming reckless. This is highly dangerous, both to yourself and to people around you. Or, of course, you can sort of undercook it and you can indeed exhibit a kind of cowardice when, in fact, you need to be strong for others. This is, for example, very frequent, we found, in the problem of parenting. Sometimes you have to be the strong one to say to the family, to a child, “Look, this just is not okay. This is going to be damaging.” A lot a parents, obviously, and especially in a more liberal society, can often evade those responsibilities. So we have this idea, inherited at least from Aristotle and also found in natural law, that we need a rational, virtuous articulation of our appetites and our bodily inclinations. Inclinations for food, safety, security, et cetera. In the book, I talk about this strange idea we find with our relationship to the embryo. On the one hand, the embryo is seen as a source of great medical potential. But on the other hand, it’s seen as something that we can be completely cavalier about. So we have this weird, schizophrenic relationship to early life. Sometimes it’s the most valuable thing in the world, so you think about all the parties celebrating the pregnancy. And sometimes it’s a thing most casually cast off and put into laboratories and spliced and diced. So sometimes the baby is sort of angelic and sometimes it’s a kind of resource. That’s even the way that people often think about their own children. The way they think about the way that sometimes parents will foster a certain kind of attitude in their children, which is that demanding of them is just far too much. We kind of ricochet between these two options of what Przywara calls vitalism on the one hand, connected with the body, and angelism, connected with the mind. But what you need to do is somehow try to hold the two in tension. Richard Reinsch:On that analogy, you have this idea, liturgy of morals and value tones as well. I want to talk about that through this great example you give, which I think our listeners will enjoy, of James Bond. How does James Bond help us understand those concepts and explicate for us post-modern natural law? Graham McAleer:Yeah, so Bond, I think, is an interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, it is a huge marketing, economic business. And if we think a little bit about, well, what is James Bond? Well, he’s a kind of powerful human physique wedded to very strong sense of justice, care of the other. Of course, this is then fed through ideas of the British establishment. He is for Queen and country. But this is the thing that I was interested in, was trying to find examples where the body is linked to establishment, where the body is linked to civilizational values. You see this, right? You see this with the way that Bond dresses, his interest in clothes, his interest in sports, his interest in cars, and, of course, his interest in games. So one of the ideas that I had was to try to think about how the natural law is linked to games and the liturgies in games. On the one hand, you hear people say, “Look, cultural relativism goes all the way down. Humans are just radically different from one another by history and by civilization.” This isn’t quite true, because one of the assured things…

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    The Spiritual Quest of Identity Politics Apr 12, 2022
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    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Today we’re talking with Joshua Mitchell about his latest book, American Awakening: Identity Politics and Other Afflictions of Our Time. It’s my honor to welcome Josh Mitchell to the program. He’s one of our best thinkers and writers about politics. In the academic discipline of political theory, he’s the author of a number of books and numerous essays and reviews, including Tocqueville in Arabia, which I reviewed at Law & Liberty, which was an account Mitchell provided of his teaching of Tocqueville’s democracy in America to students largely from the Middle East when he was at Georgetown’s campus, I think it was in Doha. Josh, we’re glad to welcome you to the program and to discuss American Awakening. Joshua Mitchell (01:04): My pleasure. I’m really looking forward to our conversation. Richard Reinsch (01:08): A basic question here at the beginning, what has woken up in America? Joshua Mitchell (01:12): Periodically, America has religious renewals, Tocquesville observed this, we know this from history. What has happened is that the left has decided that we have to have a different kind of accounting system. What we need to measure is transgression and innocence and there’s a whole scale that you can use to assess who you are. I think one of the big mistakes that people make is they say, “Oh, identity. I have an identity. Identity is just this kind or that kind.” Lebanese or French, whatever it happens to be, black or white. Identity politics is about the kind that you are. When we say I have an identity these days, we mean something more than time. We mean the group of which we’re a member that has a certain status in the great continuum of innocence and transgression. What I’m suggesting is that’s a colloquial use, but it’s not an adequate use. What identity politics is trying to do is to measure relationships between groups, not a person, groups that individuals are instances of that have a certain victim score, or transgressor score. There’s a whole hierarchy here. They’re literally trying to build a world where we look at each other in terms of our identity score, whether we’re a transgressor or whether we’re a member of the innocent group. That’s a profound taxology. What I do in the book is I set up what I call becoming identity politics of innocence, versus what I call the liberal politics of competence. Richard Reinsch (02:40): When you say identity, can we talk more about that? What does it mean to say I have an identity, in your account? Joshua Mitchell (02:49): Most people will say of course we have an identity, but I’m old enough to remember when we didn’t even use the word. This is the latest intellectual fashion. When I was growing up I would say I’m an American, I’m a man, but we would never use the word identity. Somehow, I think starting in the ’90s, maybe a little earlier, I don’t want to nitpick on dates here, some time along in the last 30 years we started saying things like, “I have an American identity. My identity is this. My identity is that.” It’s very curious, surely on the basis of intellectual history, why would we need to add the thing when we used to say, “I’m an American.” That’s the kind I am. I’m an American, I’m French, whatever it happens to be. I think identity doesn’t mean just kind, I think people are invoking it to signal something. I make very clear in the book that I think we have to stop using the term virtue signaling. Virtue is a Greek thing. Innocence is a biblical thing. I think because we’re involved in a pseudo religious awakening, people who want to call this out have to start using the term innocence signaling. When we say I have an identity these days, we mean something more than time. We mean the group of which we’re a member that has a certain status in the great continuum of innocence and transgression. As I say in the book, the prime transgressor who is blamed for everything and all that he does is the White, heterosexual male. I said, to be clear right at the outset, I have no interest whatsoever in defending White nationalism or whatever you want to call it. My point is that the White heterosexual man now has a kind of symbolic standing as the cause of all the transgressions in the world. As I say in the book, every single major party platform idea in the Democratic Party can be linked to this idea that the things that White heterosexual men have brought a problem. Capitalism, burning fossil fuels, the nation state, the heteronormative family, Christian religion, every single one of these things is traceable to the idea that there is a stain in the world and that is the White, heterosexual male and, in order for us, the innocent to be liberated, he must be purged. That is a profound distortion, in my view, of Christianity. Richard Reinsch (05:18): Now your book is an exploration of identity politics as a spiritual, religious manifestation into our politics that has taken over our politics, but maybe we can get into it this way more specifically. You use this term towards the beginning of the book, you talk about the “invisible economy of man.” What is that? Why does that matter for identity politics? Joshua Mitchell (05:45): I would give the left some credit on this. I think the deepest theological insight we have from the Hebrews and from Christians is that there is in fact two economies. I make mention of a couple of these things in the preface to the book. I note, for example, one of the gospels, the opening passage, or one of the opening passages, Joseph and Mary had to go back to their place of birth because all the world was to be taxed. The way I characterize this is one of the gospels opens up with the idea that there is this thing called a world of payment, dollars and cents and taxes. Everything gets accounted for in the ledger book. Everything visible can be accounted for in the ledger book. The gospel is very clear, they don’t stay at the inn, they stay in probably a cave, Jesus is put into an animal feed trough, it’s completely off the ledger books of the world of visible payment. I think that’s what the gospel writer is trying to say. Christ came into the world not to address the visible world of payment, but the invisible economy of transgression and stain and to offer redemption in that way. Then I think the more glaring example of this, the most beautiful example of this is Judas. It’s very clear that Judas, he praised Christ because he is thinking of this visible economy. Oil is poured down onto his head, think of the money that was worth. He feels like Christ is not being the revolutionary in the visible economy to help the poor. Christ says the poor will always be with us and it means any number of things, but among other things, it means that there’s something deeper going on here in the world than just this visible economy. He comes to offer relief from the transgression that no world of payment can understand. This is the deepest Christian insight, it’s a profound insight. I give the left credit for that, or the identity politics credit for that. It’s announcing, saying a more profound economy than the world of payment. I’m not saying it’s one that has to be replaced, we have to live with both economies, this is the problem. We have to pay our taxes and yet there’s something deeper going on in the human soul than just the payment of taxes. That’s the credit I give to identity politics. The problem is that it wants to think that problem through now, think that issue through now in the world of politics and replace the world of payment, capitalism, et cetera, with this new economy that’s concerned only with innocence. That’s why, by the way, AOC and others can offer a new green deal and they don’t care if it costs 50 trillion dollars, because the more important economy is the invisible economy. I’m saying the invisible economy is more important, but we can’t live without the visible economy and the place where this invisible economy has to be wrestled through is in the churches and the synagogues, this is where we have to wrestle through this. It’s not an accident, in my view, that the collapse of the mainline churches in the aftermath of the Vietnam war didn’t put an end to the category of transgression and stain. It shifted. The Pew Charitable Trust poll indicates that a larger and larger number of Americans are among this group called the none, they have no religious affiliation. I’m saying that’s not true, they have a profound religious affiliation. They are addressing the problem of transgression and stain, but they’re just not doing it in the churches, because they have a new place and a new way to do it and it’s called identity politics. We’re still desperately looking for atonement, this is a human thing, but when you only have the longing for atonement but no longer have the old mechanism for doing so, you’ll come up with all sorts of new modes of atonement that you think will solve your problem of guilt Richard Reinsch (09:21): Your account of the invisible economy of AOC, or of the woke and conflating that or trying to infuse that into the world, another manifestation would be defund the police, I think. Joshua Mitchell (09:35): Yeah, yeah, exactly. Richard Reinsch (09:37): The quarterback, the woke quarterback, although he’s not really playing anymore, Colin Kaepernick called recently, I think over the weekend, to abolish prisons in America. You mentioned the Green New Deal. I mean it was basically a draft proposal someone had dashed off that they released to the public. I mean everything from flights to killing the cows in America was contemplated as a level of control there. I guess an older idiom of thinking about this, also somewhat spiritual, would be Voegelin’s idea, well-known idea of immanentizing the eschaton. That is the perfectionist impulse of the woke and trying to make that our politics. Your account is sort of like that, sort of different. Joshua Mitchell (10:21): Yeah. I do think it’s embedded to Christian categories. I mean I do agree with most of Voegelin on this. It’s embedded to Christian categories, but it’s a kind of … well, it’s an end of history scenario. We’re going to finally get away with all the filth in the world, get rid of dirty, fossil fuels, we’re going to get rid of all the dirty things. There’s going to be an accounting at the end of … we are at the end of history, this is the most important thing, we are at the end of history. We have the task of all that came before us that’s implicated and stained and, to use the passage from Isaiah that I think is most apt, the lion has to now lay down with the lamb. We’re at the end of history in toto. The only thing left is that there has to be a complete accounting of all the stains and transgressions that history has provided for us. In Europe, I’m very worried about what’s happening in Europe, you’ve got a post-Christian Christian region where … what I mean by that is people aren’t going to church, but they’re still haunted, haunted by the transgression of history, notably two world wars and colonialism. The deal that the European elite are cutting here, you are indelibly stained because of your history, especially the Germans. There is no theological mechanism for you to atone and to begin anew, because God’s forgiveness doesn’t give us a way forward to have a new day, because we’re always haunted by guilt we can never expunge. The deal that the left is offering, and in America, the only way that you can disburden yourself from your guilt is to renounce your history and to renounce your nation. That is now the reason why the European Union is pushing back against the very idea of nations. It’s a religious attempt to find relief from stain and impurity, but without the religious mechanism of doing so. That’s why in Eastern Europe, where you still have a strong Catholic church, people don’t fall for this. Yeah, sure, bad things have happened, but we know where stain is gotten rid of, it’s called at the altar before Christ in the churches. In Eastern Europe, terrible things have happened there, but they’re not going to fall for what Western Europe is falling for, namely that there’s no Church left, so the only way that we can atone is by renouncing those sites, mainly the family, the nation state with rule of law, the nation state itself, that’s the deal that you have to cut. We’re still desperately looking for atonement, this is a human thing, but when you only have the longing for atonement but no longer have the old mechanism for doing so, you’ll come up with all sorts of new modes of atonement that you think will solve your problem of guilt, well nothing will solve your problem of guilt outside the Church, but you’re going to try everything. You’re going to purge the White people, you’re going to get rid of the nation. It’s a desperate and sick attempt to find a way towards cleanliness. That’s what’s happening here at the end of time. The immanentization of the eschaton in the sense it’s the end of time, but we’re looking for atonement, it’s a deep, personal thing too. That’s the crisis of our moment. Richard Reinsch (13:40): You have in the book a line that wokism introduces … well, it doesn’t introduce, it changes the meaning of the traditional Protestant, or I’ll say Christian theological concept of original sin. There’s no original sin in wokism, but there’s an original sinner. Also you express this idea that there’s also no forgiveness. Ultimately there’s no possibility of atonement. Those who are the transgressor, right now the transgressor is the White, heterosexual male, and of course we can talk about and I’d like a discussion of how a parade of transgressors will follow but kind of beg for sufferance from those he has oppressed. I think a number of us have seen this, certainly these videos and displays throughout the summer of people, particularly Whites in these protests kneeling down in front of minorities. I’ve seen kissing the boots, things like this, to try to show an attempt to atone or seek absolution for the crimes of their race or gender overall. Joshua Mitchell (14:42): Yeah. I think we have to make an important distinction. I think, as Americans, we have collective responsibility to heal wounds, but not collective fault. I mean my family, at least a large half of it came over in the 1890s from what’s now Lebanon. How am I implicated in slavery? There’s a desperate attempt to find atonement. My point about original sin is that what it means is that deeper than your lineage, deeper than the fact that I might be part Lebanese and part Welsh, deeper than that is something that is always already there. It’s original to the human condition. The absolutely profound insight that Christianity gives us is that you can’t solve the stain that’s always already there by looking for a mortal solution to it. You can’t look at that other group and say, “If I can just scapegoat them and purge them, then everything’s going to be fine.” The problem is deeper than any inheritance you have or they have. This is so unbelievably profound. Rousseau saw this. Rousseau’s a nut, but he saw some amazing things, he understands some amazing things. He said this is what changes when you move from Pagan politics to Christian politics, because in Paganism you really did think that by purging that other nation with other Gods through cathartic rage that you could purify yourself. The Christian claim was no, the problem of stain is so deep it goes back to Adam and your inheritance, whether you’re Lebanese or French or whatever and that other person with some other inheritance, you can’t solve your problem of stain by purging another group. The problem is original. It’s always already there. We’re always … I mean I’m haunted by Genesis four through seven, Adam and Eve sinned, there’s a transgression there and Eve says, “The serpent made me do it,” and Adam says, “The woman who you gave me, it’s your fault, God.…

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    Will We Be Sino-formed? Apr 05, 2022
    Show notes

    Hello, and welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with David Goldman about his new book, You Will Be Assimilated: China’s Plan to Sino-form the World. David Goldman is the author of the widely read Spengler column for the Asia Times. He’s an award-winning Wall Street strategist. He’s worked for Credit Suisse. He was the head of global trading research for Bank of America. And he was an investment banker for a Hong Kong boutique called Reorient, which was purchased by Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba. He also is widely read and published in foreign policy and national security. He’s advised the US National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and institutional investors globally. He’s the author of a number books, including most recently, How Civilizations Die. David Goldman, welcome to Liberty Law Talk. David Goldman: Thank you so much for inviting me, Richard. Richard Reinsch: David, on your book, two items from China everyone is discussing, and I know that they in some way feature into what you’ve written. First, China’s move to encroach upon, if not eliminate, the semi-autonomous zone of freedom given to Hong Kong. Recently, the British government has offered to every Hong Kong citizen, I’ve read, a passport or some sort of regularized status in the United Kingdom. Your thoughts on what China is doing there? David Goldman: Hong Kong has never been a Chinese city. It was a British city. It was founded by the British at the beginning of the opium trade. The majority of its population never wanted to be Chinese. So I think the biggest mistake Margaret Thatcher made in her glorious career was to cede Hong Kong and Kowloon to China when she didn’t have to. Most of the Chinese population hasn’t liked this. There is a significant independence movement in Hong Kong. From the Chinese standpoint, China’s like a Roach Motel. Once you go in, you don’t get out. The Chinese are always terrified that if one rebel province can secede, they’ll all secede. So they will use whatever measures they need to prevent that. Their solution to this long term is going to be a population tragedy. A lot of the Hong Kongers who don’t like living under Chinese rule will leave. They’ll go to Taiwan, Britain, Canada, some to the United States. More and more people will migrate to Hong Kong from the mainland, and eventually it will become a Chinese city. Richard Reinsch: So your thinking there, what China stands to gain is really consolidation. They’re worried about the sinner pulling away from the country in some way, or people seeing Hong Kong be successful, operate on its own, without Chinese authority or control. David Goldman: Well, it’s worried about secession. There is a significant secession movement. And the most important thing that’s happened with the new national security law is that it has become illegal, seditious to talk about secession. So a lot of the pro-Taiwan, anti-Beijing protestors have simply left the island and will never come back. Remember, China is not a country. We tend to think of it as a country. It is a heterogeneous empire with 200 languages spoken in 90 major ethnic groups, and always at risk of falling apart. The Chinese Empire, whoever runs it, whether it’s called an Imperial Dynasty or a Communist Party, lives in terror of a rebel province that will encourage other rebel provinces. So that’s why China will go to war over Taiwan. It will never allow Taiwan independence without a real fight. It has a good deal to do with why China is being so aggressive in the South China Sea. Xi Jinping told this to Barack Obama during the APEC summit in 2015. There’s an old Chinese proverb: kill the chicken while the monkey watches. Well, the South China Sea is the chicken, and Taiwan is the monkey here. China is saying, “We’re willing to go to war over a bunch of empty atolls based on some glorious old map. Think of what we’ll do with Taiwan. Think of what we’ll do with Hong Kong.” So that’s China’s method of governance going back thousands of years. Sadly, there’s a continuity between what was always a very heterogeneous set of men who has a very cruel empire and what the Chinese are doing today. This is based on traditional Chinese governance. It’s not per se a function of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The West has underestimated Asians for the past century and change. The Russians underestimated the Japanese during the 1905 war. The British underestimated the Japanese at Singapore. The French underestimated the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. And I think we can say fairly that the American military in the ’60s underestimated the North Vietnamese Army. We simply have difficulty believing that a culture so different from ours, and one that was so impoverished and humiliated for such a long period of time could come back so quickly. Richard Reinsch: On another front, something else people are discussing widely right now is a video purporting to show Uighur Muslims, who have been persecuted by the Chinese government for years, being loaded onto train cars to be sent to concentration camps. That’s widely believed. There was a fascinating segment the other night on BBC, where the BBC commentator presented this video to the Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who was literally speechless and had nothing to say. I mean, it was sort of a fascinating interview. What’s going on here from the Chinese standpoint, and what they’re doing to this population? David Goldman: Every Chinese I’ve talked to, ranging from senior officials of the Foreign Ministry to taxi drivers, when asked, “What are you going to do about the Uighur problem,” has said, “We’re going to kill them all.” China has had a policy of exterminating what it considers unruly barbarians on its borders for a very long time. Their attitude towards the Uighurs is that they don’t want to assimilate into China. You get the traditional Chinese choice, which is column A, you become Chinese, column B, we kill you all, and there isn’t anything on the menu. I don’t have detailed information about what’s happening in Xinjiang Province to the Uighurs. It’s impossible to get reporters in. The Asia Times is not able to send correspondents in like the rest of the world press. However, the suppression of the Uighurs through forced sterilization, forced use of birth control, cultural suppression amounts to a slow motion ethnocide. In other words, an attempt to extirpate this culture entirely. So putting Uighurs in concentration camps would not surprise me. They’ve already put between one and two million Uighurs through reeducation camps. From a Western standpoint, this is repugnant and brutal. From the standpoint of the vast majority of Chinese, it’s business as usual. Richard Reinsch: That’s incredible. You write about the transformation, the economic transformation that has happened in China. I welcome you to talk more about that. The way they’ve brought hundreds of millions of people from the rural countryside into their cities, the tremendous growth of Chinese cities, and their economy, their technological transformation. Why did American policymakers for so long underestimate China? David Goldman: The West has underestimated Asians for the past century and change. The Russians underestimated the Japanese during the 1905 war. The British underestimated the Japanese at Singapore. The French underestimated the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. And I think we can say fairly that the American military in the ’60s underestimated the North Vietnamese Army. We simply have difficulty believing that a culture so different from ours, and one that was so impoverished and humiliated for such a long period of time could come back so quickly. But you look at the economic miracle of South Korea, you look at the transformation of Japan from a rural society in the 1860s to a major industrial power by the beginning of the 20th century. China’s rise is not at all without precedent. We saw the same kind of thing in Japan and Korea before. The difference is that China has 1.4 billion people. As you mentioned, they’ve moved in the past 35 years nearly 600 million people from countryside to city. That’s the equivalent of the whole of Europe from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean. Imagine building a new Glasgow, a new Rome, a new Lisbon, a new Helsinki. Build every city in Europe to accommodate that many people. That’s the biggest economic transformation in history. I don’t know if it’s the fastest. But I calculate that per capita household consumption in China has risen nine times, 900% in the past 30 years. That’s one generation. When you talk to Chinese, they’ll tell you, “Well, I grew up with a dirt floor and an outhouse and an outside pump. Now, my kids have indoor plumbing and central heating and a car.” It’s a completely different kind of world. So however brutal and repugnant the Communist Party of China has been, the economic accomplishments of China are real. Walk around Chinese cities. I urge people to just go onto YouTube and look at tours of Chinese cities that you’ve never heard of: Chengdu, Chongqing, Hefei. Names that you don’t know. These are cities of 30 million people that look like science fiction movie sets that were third-world backwaters just 20 years ago. This is an incredible transformation, and the energy and intelligence of the Chinese people is impressive. I am not a panda hugger. I’m not a Sinophile. I don’t like Chinese culture. I find it brutal, and from a Western standpoint, in many ways repugnant. But it’s nonetheless impressive, and underestimating it would be a terrible error. Richard Reinsch: Yeah. So if we think about the standard post-Cold War view of our elites, bipartisan, that has this middle class forum which you’ve just described, as the wealth grew, there would be this just natural desire for democracy or some sort of civil society rule of law to form. That hasn’t formed. It’s evident, as you know, that we’re moving from that post-Cold War view. Help us think more about … Help us understand China. Help us understand maybe their thinking about who the human person is. Because that seems to me interesting alone in how this has not produced any sort of desire for more freedom. So the Chinese have no experience of self-governance. In place of democratic governance, you have a selection of supposedly the smartest people, or at least the best exam takers in the country. Imagine if the United States were ruled by a committee of National Merit Scholars, that was a self-perpetuating elite run by exams. David Goldman: Well, there are three things to understand about China, what makes China China, that go back literally 5,000 years. One is its enormous wealth and population are based on fertilized river valleys which could produce eight times the caloric content per acre with rice that Western European or Middle Eastern cultures could produce with wheat. So enormous wealth, but also enormous susceptibility to flooding and famine. So massive infrastructure to control floods has been the foundation of the Chinese Empire. When we look at things like the $2 trillion Belt and Road Initiative where China proposed to build infrastructure all across the Eurasian continent and basically lock it in to the Chinese Empire, that is the old Chinese imperial model extended into an external policy. The second thing to understand about China is imperial bureaucracy. For thousands of years, the smartest kids in the provinces that sat and taken an examination to become government officials, used to be called the mandarin system. You can see pictures from over 2,000 years ago of young Chinese sitting in an examination hold taking the mandarin exam. This is now the university entrance exam, the Gaokao, which is taken by nearly 10 million Chinese every year. About six out of 10 of whom get to go to university. If you look at the math questions on that, I doubt one in 500 American high school seniors could answer them. I know a little math, and they made me sweat. The third thing to understand is family. Chinese society is based on the extended family. It’s hierarchical. The emperor is like the big pater familias of the nation, and he has smaller pater familiases under him. The foundation of the Chinese economy has always been an extended family farm led by one pater familias. So you’ve never had a civil society where people have peers. No Chinese has ever sat on a school board or a little league committee. Everything’s always come top down. There’s no sense of rights and obligations as we have under Roman law, no sense of the divine spark of the individual as we have under ancient Hebrew law. What you have is a set of loyalties to hierarchy. That, in a thumbnail, is what Confucianism is about. So the Chinese have no experience of self-governance. In place of democratic governance, you have a selection of supposedly the smartest people, or at least the best exam takers in the country. Imagine if the United States were ruled by a committee of National Merit Scholars, that was a self-perpetuating elite run by exams. They’re awfully smart. The system is in many ways awfully inefficient. But they’re not stupid, and they’re incredibly ambitious. They’ve never liked their emperor. The emperor in China is just the capo di tutti i capi. He’s the guy who’s there to prevent the underbosses from killing each other. That’s exactly what they do when there isn’t a strong emperor. So the Chinese tend to like having a strong emperor because in their experience, when you don’t have one you have civil war, war widows, and you lose 10 or 20% of the population. Richard Reinsch: You said something in the book that stuck with me, and I wonder if you can elaborate on it. You’re touching on it here. The Chinese don’t have friends. David Goldman: Well, they don’t have friends in Aristotle’s sense of political friendship where you have a peer group that governs a city, and you have to form friendships in order to solve governance problems and advance policies. Everything in China comes from the top, so the Chinese tend to kiss up and kick down. You don’t question the order that comes down from the top because it’s bad for your health. You could become a kidney donor real fast. And the people below you, you simply tell them what to do. You’re the pater familias. They owe you loyalty. You’re supposed to be benevolent under Confucian philosophy. But in fact, you have absolute control. As I’ve said, there is no subsidiarity. There is no civil society structure. Everything is up and down as opposed to parallel. So the Western concept of political friendship, which was first enunciated by Aristotle, is something which the Chinese simply have never experienced. It’s also a winner-take-all system. There are only a certain number of places. So you have to look to your left and right when you’re in second grade, and decide who you’re going to step over to get ahead. Richard Reinsch: So listening to you describe China, it’s almost as if our foreign policy consensus in the post-Cold War period was at odds with reality, at odds with their cultural, economic, political reality. I mean, it sounds absurd that we thought this. David Goldman: Richard, I agree with you. The whole idea that China was going to evolve into a Western style democracy simply because they got more prosperous ignores the fact that this is a culture that’s been around for 5,000 years, which operated radically differently from Judeo-Christian cultures. This is the purest form of paganism. Richard Reinsch: Yeah, it’s incredible. David Goldman: It is. Well, the Chinese are probably the least spiritual people in the world. They believe in fate and themselves. When you say, “Well, what’s Chinese religion?” Well, you can say that there’s Buddhism, there’s some Daoism, there’s some household gods. But the Chinese really are down-to-earth pragmatic. How do I advance my family? How do I get rich? Richard Reinsch: On this…

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    Conservative Nationalism and American Statecraft Mar 15, 2022
    Show notes

    What does conservative nationalism mean for American foreign policy, immigration, trade, and other international commitments? Colin Dueck, author of the new book, Age of Iron, discusses these questions in this edition of Liberty Law Talk. Richard Reinsch: Today we’re talking with Colin Dueck about his new book, Age of Iron: On Conservative Nationalism. Colin is professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. He has worked as a foreign policy advisor on several Republican presidential campaigns. He’s been a consultant for the State Department and Defense Department. He’s also the author of a number of other books including Reluctant Crusaders, Hard Line, and The Obama Doctrine. Professor Dueck, welcome. Colin Dueck: Thank you, Richard. Richard Reinsch: So thinking about this book, Age of Iron. I thought it was an interesting title, because of what we commonly associate, another phrase, blood and iron, or iron and blood to a nationalist of sorts, German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck who said that blood and iron would displace parliaments and parliamentary procedures. The title of your book, Age of Iron, I don’t think was meant to recall that. Colin Dueck: Well that’s right. Even though I often do ask myself what Bismarck would do in any given situation. But the term age of iron is from an ancient Greek myth that suggests that history can go down rather than up. In other words, you can have decline or decay over time. And so the reason I chose it is that I do think there was actually a kind of golden age of liberal internationalism, but that was a long time ago now, that was in the 1940s in my opinion. And so it’s been generations since that time. And so in a way, Trump, I think the Trump phenomenon is kind of an effect more than it is a cause of a number of long-term problems, or conditions including, for example, frustrations over globalization, and whether they benefit working Americans. Frustrations over military interventions that don’t seem to have successful and conclusive endings. Frustration over national sovereignty that seem to leave decision making further and further out of touch. So I think these are some of the trends that fed into the Trump phenomenon back in 2016. Richard Reinsch: So Age of Iron in a way, just kind of thinking about your answer, you’re challenging standard ways we as Westerners, as Americans, think about the future, as you call it, Whig theory of history, or a progressive theory of history that history changes, but is always in ascent upwards in the realm of greater individualism, greater material security, greater prosperity, all of these things we associate. You’re perhaps suggesting, well, maybe that’s not the case, or if it is the case, it’s not that we’re going to necessarily proceed as we’ve done in the past. We might have to do things differently than we’ve done in the past, say 50 or 60 years. But that’s okay, and you go on to make an argument in the book for conservative nationalism. Maybe talk about that. What is conservative nationalism? Colin Dueck: Sure. So your first point, I think you got it exactly right, which is that the liberal, or the progressive view of international relations is that it’s kind of this long-term upward trend where we sort of transcend power politics through multilateral organization, interdependence, cultural exchange, human rights promotion. And I actually think that some of the central features of world politics haven’t really changed that much over time. I mean, there has been some progress, but power politics is a reality. So just denying it in a sort of a furious way doesn’t really get us very far. In fact, it leaves us actually at the mercy of our adversaries overseas. Richard Reinsch: What would you say is the biggest embodiment of liberal internationalism today? I mean, what are you sort of pushing against? Colin Dueck: The biggest flaw, is that it? Richard Reinsch: Or embodiment. Institutional representation of say liberal or progressive, and maybe I guess liberal internationalism isn’t necessarily progressive trans-nationalism but I also, I think about those in conjunction as the latter being a goal of the former, maybe. Colin Dueck: Sure. Well I think there’s the liberal internationalist tradition and there’s some variety within it, too. There’s people that are more hawkish people and more dovish, but you have a variety of think tanks, you have journals, you have leading newspapers. I mean, for the most part kind of the center left establishment really in DC and around the country, and certainly in Western Europe, I mean these are assumptions that are just taken for granted. I think that in the Democratic party, I mean if I had to name an institutional embodiment, I would say the Democratic party is dominated by liberal internationalists. And then you have interesting debate going on where progressive’s like Bernie Sanders, they don’t really argue with the liberal element, but they think that the US should be less interventionist militarily overseas. So that’s an interesting debate that’s going on right now on the left. But there’s really no debate over whether the core kind of left liberal progressive assumptions are true. I mean, if anything they are furiously offended by any suggestion that they’re not. But your question, I think the second part of the question was what is conservative nationalism. Richard Reinsch: What is conservative nationalism? Colin Dueck: In the American case, one of the points of the book is to point out that there are different versions internationally. So I’m not denying that there are versions of nationalism around the world that really are authoritarian. I mean, we’ve seen that over the past century, and beyond. But I think in the American case, there is a kind of core American nationalism that is benign, actually. I mean foreign policy, which is the main topic of the book, I really trace it back to George Washington in his Farewell Address where he said that the US should have no binding political commitments of a permanent nature. That it could be engaged and friendly with a wide variety of regimes, but that it should avoid those kinds of permanent alliance commitments. Colin Dueck: And so that was really the dominant strain well into the 20th century, and it was Woodrow Wilson who broke that, or challenged it by suggesting that the US could best serve and promote its interest and its values overseas through a set of global multi-lateral binding commitments as embodied in the League of Nations. And even though he’s failed in the short term, I think he had a lot of success ideologically in the long-term, because eventually that’s where mainstream US foreign policy elite sort of landed in a more practical way with FDR and Truman in the forties. So Republicans and conservatives for their part could never really figure out exactly how to handle Wilson. I mean, they knew they didn’t like him, but they had a lot of disagreement amongst themselves, and I traced those disagreements in the different factions. There’s a more non-interventionist faction that is very skeptical of any military engagement overseas. And then there are others that are more muscular, robust and those coalitions have formed and reformed over time, particularly when conservators are convinced if some concrete security challenge, whether it’s Soviet communism, or Al-Qaeda. But I think most conservatives, at the grassroots level, never really bought into the most ambitious Wilsonian vision for what the US should do overseas, and so eventually what you get after the frustrations of Iraq, and after Bush 43 has left office, you get this rethinking of what are we doing here? And Trump, in a way, tapped into that, and expressed at least one side of it very forcefully. And I see him as a resurgence of traditional American nationalism in foreign affairs. Not because I’m suggesting that he’s gone back and he’s possibly read these documents, but because he does have a point of view that he’s expressed pretty consistently for more than 30 years. He thinks that US allies are free-riders, that they free-ride off of the US economically, militarily, and otherwise, and that the US should assert itself, and assert its freedom of action, not only against adversaries, but actually against its own allies. So for better or worse, that that is his point of view. And it is a more traditional American nationalist foreign policy. And it’s the most dramatic such shift, I think, since really before World War II. I mean, who doesn’t take it for granted that liberal international model should be dominant. In fact, I don’t think he has much use for it, and he says so. Richard Reinsch: Well, let’s talk about nationalism just a little bit more here because as you know, and I certainly know people hear the word nationalism and they lose their breakfast, they get upset. There’s a fear that individual liberty will be swallowed up by a comprehensive government defining unilaterally what it means to be an American nationalist, or something like that, or pick the country. You said that’s benign just now, that nationalism in America has a benign tradition. And I wondered if we could talk more about that. In the book, you argue there’s a civic nationalism at the core here, and that’s also important because if we’re going to pursue this strategy you say was the mainstream tradition in American foreign policy thinking before Woodrow Wilson that also applies they’re acting on behalf of a certain understanding of America. I wonder if you could talk about those things. Colin Dueck: Sure. Yeah, that’s a good point. So I do think, and I say in the book that there is a kind of civic American creed which has these classical liberal elements well beyond foreign policy, and that it is fundamental to the founding, and it’s no coincidence that Jefferson writes into the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal, and that’s going to have foreign policy implications as well. So there is a kind of classical liberal element in the founding from the beginning, it is a civic form of nationalism, rightly understood, and in America at its best, which much of the time I think has tried to work toward that. Now, the implication for foreign policy is not that you have to intervene militarily all over the place, all the time. I mean, you’re hoping that eventually this order, this republican form of self government spreads, right, as the founder’s hoped, but they never dreamed that you could do this by force on all fronts at once. In fact, they took it for granted. You would have to have normal diplomatic relations, and even sometimes alliances with undemocratic regimes in order to promote US national interests so they could be quite hard nosed about that and that’s a lesson that’s useful as well. Richard Reinsch: Thinking about just the civic nationalism component, is there a sense in which that becomes a forward doctrine, that people want to use it to project American power abroad to make other people like us? Is that so illogical? Colin Dueck: It certainly has been used that way and it can be a problem. So when you have this tradition that says that we have our own civic creed, and we really believe it, and it says that all men are created equal, it might create the impression, for example, that you then have an obligation to spread democracy, for example, in a country that isn’t particularly ready for it. I mean, so we’ve seen this more than once. I mean one of the lessons that some drew in the United States after the end of the Cold War is that the experience of Eastern Europe could be transferred to other parts of the world, like the Middle East. As it turns out, Iraq for example, was not as ready for democracy as Poland. So if every foreign policy debate is just an attempt to project ourselves, or what we think it means to be an American onto other countries, that can actually be misleading. It’s not always very helpful, because you can get yourself into trouble when you’re talking about other parts of the world that are just very different in terms of their own political cultures. So I think it’s useful to always be very careful. We want to stick to our core principles. We have our own civic traditions, but what that means for a foreign policy is something we need to be very careful about. Richard Reinsch: You referenced George Washington as being a great representative, and our first president acting on behalf of American nationalism, and you referenced the Farewell Address and that phrase entangling alliances, avoid entangling alliances. Also, though, throughout the 19th century, and I’m just sort of thinking about your argument here, there’s also, though, a growing sense of American national power and one way that expresses itself as the continent is ours, the famous manifest destiny understanding. I guess one question for you is, how does conservative nationalism deal with hubris, or arrogance, or assertions of power on behalf of this growing 19th century reservoir of power America had, which has now made us this incredible nation? How does one deal with that? So I guess I’m also thinking what is a statesman trying to achieve with foreign policy, or an American statesman, I should say, particularly. Colin Dueck: Well, so, right. I think that’s right. In the 19th century, there is this growing sense of American power. And so as US statesmen are sticking to this model of no entangling alliances, they are at the same time expanding American influence, and trade dramatically. They’re expanding American territory across the continent. They are debating with each other what is right and what is appropriate. I mean, in fact, factions at that time often hurled the most violent nations against one another. So, apparently this isn’t entirely new to our era, but if you look at the Mexican war and other cases, both sides typically thought of themselves as being more true to the original tradition, but the overall pattern in 1800s is clearly an expansion of American power. And I think that in the end though, Washington’s foreign policy model continues to reign right into the 20th century. Now your question was about arrogance or hubris, are you thinking about at that time, or today? Richard Reinsch: Well, in any anytime really, I mean, but in particular because I think Washington, while I admire his statecraft, but Washington has a pretty weak country, and he’s got a lot of difficulty. So one can see circumstantially the need to be a great steward of that, and to be very protective and humble in how you approach the world. But what do you do in your post-Civil War Woodrow Wilson, you’ve got this industrial capitalist state which Woodrow Wilson possessed that could be marshaled into a war machine. Challenges like that. Challenges post-World War II you face international communism, international aggression, you’ve got an incredibly weak Europe that you’ve got to rebuild. I mean, all these sorts of things coming to play as well here and I guess what I’m asking you is, is there a philosophical core here to what you’re describing that would help us think about the use of power? Colin Dueck: Right. And so I think for conservatives throughout the 20th century, there was a constant wrestling with, on the one hand you don’t want to go all the way that Wilson has gone in arguing for this kind of dramatic handing over of US sovereignty. I mean, that was something all Republicans agreed during the Treaty of Versailles debate, even though Henry Cabot Lodge on the one hand is pretty hawkish against the Germans, agrees that the League of Nations goes too far. So the core principle there is it is not appropriate to hand over US national sovereignty to this multilateral organization. It should be the United States that preserves the right to choose war or peace for its own interests, and for the security and prosperity of the citizens. Now, over time even…

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    Willmoore Kendall‘s Democratic Faith Jan 31, 2022
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Hello and welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m your host, Richard Reinsch. Liberty Law Talk is featured at the online journal, Law and Liberty, which is available at lawliberty.org. Richard Reinsch (00:19): Hello, I’m Richard Reinsch, and today we’re talking with Christopher Owen about his new biography of the conservative thinker, Willmoore Kendall. The book is titled Heaven Can Indeed Fall. Christopher Owen is Professor of English at Northeastern State University in Oklahoma. Christopher, welcome to the program. Christopher Owen (00:40): Thank you, Richard. I really am excited about being on your program. It is Professor of History instead of English, but other than that everything’s right. Richard Reinsch (00:49): I apologize for that. Christopher Owen (00:51): No problem. Richard Reinsch (00:52): Okay. So who was Willmoore Kendall and why does he matter? Christopher Owen (00:57): Yeah, a great question. Willmoore Kendall was probably best known as being the mentor of William F. Buckley Jr. at Yale, so he was a Professor of Political Science at Yale off and on after World War II. And at Yale, certain talented students fell under his influence. He was a dynamic, colorful personality and really a great teacher. So William F. Buckley and also L. Brent Bozell Jr. were both sort of his mentors, or he was their mentors at Yale. And he had a great influence on their life, and their thought, and their activism, which is important in itself. But I believe, and I argue in the book, that he’s probably most important as a political theorist. So he was a founder of conservatism, one of the co-founders of National Review, for example, but his thought doesn’t really fit neatly into any of the common categories that we think of as contemporary conservatism. So not a neocon, not really a state’s rights guy, not really a theocon, not really a social or religious conservative exactly either. I call him in the book a populist. One might call him in today’s lexicon, I guess one could call him a national conservative. Those were neither terms that he would necessarily have embraced. But when thinking about his ideas and his thought, that’s really where I would put those. I would say that if you look at the early days of National Review for example, his ideas had some importance and resonance that in time kind of faded away, particularly as conservatism came closer to power and liberalism went more on the defensive. Richard Reinsch (02:52): He also worked in the CIA and part of his influence over Buckley was recruiting him to the CIA. Is that right? Christopher Owen (03:01): Sure. That’s right. Buckley, I guess, was recruited by Kendall to serve in the CIA. That was one way he could avoid getting drafted and sent to Korea, I guess, was part of it. There were other people at work in the CIA with National Review, James Burnham, for example. Kendall’s work as an intelligence officer was really important, and he was really good at it, and he was briefly head of what became the CIA for all of Latin America. He was also really important as an intelligence officer during the Korean War. But I think that experience that he had in the bureaucracy of the federal government made him skeptical about the federal bureaucracy and that it should be maybe more controlled by the popular will. Richard Reinsch (03:54): Yeah. That’s interesting in itself, a PhD in political science who had spent some time in academia at that point, then making his way into the CIA. How did that happen? Christopher Owen (04:04): Sure. Well, he really spent most of his entire life really in academia. So he had been in the 30s, Kendall was a man of the left. He was an isolationist. So he was sympathetic, I guess, with Trotskyism, though not so much as James Burnham would’ve been. He sort of, as the war broke out, which he had opposed the U.S. entry into the war, so after Pearl Harbor he had to figure out what to do. And what he ended up doing is falling in with a group that was led by Nelson Rockefeller called the CIAA, which is the committee for—I can’t remember the exact initials, but essentially an intelligence group that where it’s the—The Coordinator for Inner American Affairs is what that stands for. It was basically American intelligence work in Latin America. So Kendall was fluent in French and Spanish and so he put his language skills to work there. Worked in Columbia for a while and was really good at sort of public information, I guess we would call it propaganda, counterintelligence, not covert stuff, not spying so much as public intelligence work. His Spanish also kind of bonded him to Buckley, because I’ve heard that William F. Buckley’s first language was Spanish, and Buckley’s dad made his money in Mexican oil investments. And so that was probably one thing Kendall and Buckley had in common- Richard Reinsch (05:36): Yeah. Christopher Owen (05:36): … was that language. Richard Reinsch (05:38): Thinking here, you mentioned Kendall was at Yale, so very bright obviously. Early on, his career took off academically. You write in the book and maybe help us understand this, he had a way of analyzing texts that was unique amongst political theorists and this seemed to really bring out the brilliance in his work. Talk about that some. Christopher Owen (06:06): Sure. So he had a couple of different influences in that way. He was a Rhodes Scholar and he was a student at Pembroke College in Oxford and was a student there of the philosopher, R.G. Collingwood. And Collingwood was an analyst of the philosophy of history and Collingwood really focused on sort of investigating questions, almost like a detective asking the right questions, trying to carefully, systematically work through your evidence logically to come to a logically coherent answer. That was part of the influence. The other was when Kendall, in the late 30s, taught at LSU, which at that time had a lot of money and was pretty prestigious. And there he became good friends with both Robert Penn Warren and Cleanth Brooks, who were sort of pioneering the new criticism of close reading of texts and they would sort of put historical context aside to really focus in on the text itself. Kendall became, I don’t know of any other political scientists who did this, but he really liked to focus on a specific text and delve into and dig out its deepest meaning and putting aside historical context for the purpose of analysis. And so he was really able to do that with John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government very effectively and kind of come up with some new ways of looking at that key text that others hadn’t really brought out too effectively. Richard Reinsch (07:40): Also, I mean, I think this is sort of key to his unique position in conservatism is an author who’s a foundation for Kendall was Rousseau. So talk about that, because I think that helps us understand his thinking better. Christopher Owen (07:57): Yeah. So Kendall was very sympathetic to Rousseau. He found him first really as a man of the left. A lot of Kendall’s focus was on democracy and so he saw Rousseau as the sort of main theorist of democracy. Most conservatives, Kirk, etc., Russell Kirk, hated Rousseau. In fact, I don’t know of any other conservatives but Kendall who really admired him. I’m sure there are some. Look, so Kendall said, “If we’re going to have democracy, we have to figure out how to maintain it in the large nation state,” which is a reality of the day. So how do you have both a large nation state and democracy? So that, I think, drove Kendall to focus on local government where he believed democracy was more real and so he really, when he got an assignment to do a discussion of local government, he taught classes on local politics at several different universities, but he went to Rousseau to make this not just a mundane routine assignment on the, I don’t know, the commissioner system of elections, but something that was more fundamental to maintaining democracy. And therefore he came to believe, I think, that representatives in Congress and so forth really ought to protect and safeguard the interests of their own local communities, which they represented. And that ultimately was Rousseauian in the way to best preserve democracy in a large state. Richard Reinsch (09:34): So in that regard, it’s interesting just to think about his work on Locke as well. Christopher Owen (09:41): Right. Richard Reinsch (09:41): And his dissertation on Locke, which very well received at the time. Christopher Owen (09:46): Right. Richard Reinsch (09:46): And he does something new with Locke. He says, Locke is a majoritarian theorist. He’s not… To think of him as a proponent defending individual rights doesn’t fully make sense of that. Christopher Owen (09:58): Right. Richard Reinsch (09:59): And talk about that too because that seems like it’s going to play out later in his career, particularly when he turns to writing on politics in the 60s. Christopher Owen (10:08): Sure. So he starts out as, at that point, I call him an absolute majoritarian, Kendall, so the majority had the right to rule, the minority has the duty to obey. So in reading the Second Treatise, instead of relying on what others had said about it, he read it and analyzed it carefully. And one of the things he noted is chapter one focuses on the right of the majority to rule the community and to impose its will up to and including the death penalty for those who step outside of its bounds. And it’s really only in the second chapter when Locke turns to natural rights. So the right of the community to rule as it sees fit is logically and prior to the rights of the individual not to be ruled by this society. So he argued really that there’s a fundamental contradiction, I think, between those two things. That if individuals have natural rights that are not given to them by society and cannot be taken away by society, that seems to contradict the idea that the majority has the right to impose its will on the rest of society. So he sort of saw that seeming contradiction by suggesting that Locke had a tacit understanding that the majority was virtuous enough that it would never take away the rights that individuals deserve. That was his position, at least in 1941. That changed a little later. Richard Reinsch (11:49): He changed later. His thinking changes about Locke as well. I guess we should say Willmoore Kendall found the politics department at the University of Dallas. Christopher Owen (12:02): That’s right. Richard Reinsch (12:03): And towards the end of his career, he dies, I think, in 1966? Christopher Owen (12:09): ’67. Richard Reinsch (12:09): ’67. And he taught at Yale. He had a, shall we say, a difficult personality wherever he went. Christopher Owen (12:17): Right. Richard Reinsch (12:18): I think it was said of Kendall, he never wanted to be on speaking terms with more than two people at the same time. Christopher Owen (12:24): That’s right. Richard Reinsch (12:26): And he was an alcoholic, he was married three times, and very just challenging personal life. But he was also a genius who entered, was it he entered Northwestern at the age of 13 or 14? Christopher Owen (12:41): Right. 13, yeah. Richard Reinsch (12:43): Yeah, and overbearing father, his father was a blind Methodist pastor, a progressive pastor in Oklahoma in the early part of the 20th centuries. So I think that also is obviously a part of Willmoore Kendall’s story. Christopher Owen (13:01): Absolutely. So he certainly had a contentious personality, but I think that was one of those things where it was a thing that also attracted people to him because people never really forgot meeting him when they did meet him. Richard Reinsch (13:18): Yeah. Christopher Owen (13:19): Saul Bellow wrote a short story or a novella really about him called Mosby’s Memoirs. He knew Saul Bellow and he just made a vivid impression on people when he did meet them. So he had a charisma about him, particularly when he was young, that attracted women and young people and his contentiousness was mostly focused on his superiors or his colleagues. He was never brutal or really argumentative with his students. In fact, he was never really ideological with his students, he was able to tolerate people of all sorts of shades of opinion within that. And I do try to… I don’t really connect necessarily all the dots, but… Yeah, so his childhood, he was really rushed into a lot of stuff by his dad as a child prodigy and he had a lot of scars from that I think, and that really came out in his later life. I do mostly in the book try to avoid saying that his father, Reverend Kendall, that it was unfortunate that he did blah or whatever, because kind of my idea was that it is what it is and so the good that was in Kendall and some of the contentious parts all came from that. And he could have been an obscure professor somewhere and nobody would’ve ever heard of him, he might have lived a happier life, but made less impact. So I tried not to make too many judgements on that and just tell the story like it was. Richard Reinsch (14:54): Yeah, Kendall… I mean, if you’re trying to consult him to understand sort of the essence of his thought there’s several books of his that are really collections of his essays. The one that sticks out to me is the Conservative Affirmation and although there’s a collection of contra mundum, but we’ve been talking about this, how would you define his approach to American constitutional thought? Christopher Owen (15:20): Sure. Well, it’s also lined out in his book, Basic Symbols. Richard Reinsch (15:25): Basic Symbols. Christopher Owen (15:27): Really I think for American constitutional thought he really regards himself as a follower. I call him a Madisonian, but Madison himself is all over the place at times. He really calls himself, I think, a follower of Publius, and the Federalist, and the Constitution and the papers that explain the Constitution is really where he came down. And he even comes down with the original Constitution pre Bill of Rights because he believes. He cites Madison at a couple of points that the Bill of Rights are really part, what he calls, parchment barriers, paper that really don’t mean anything unless you have a virtuous people who’s willing to rule with restraint, carefully deliberate its course, and proceed into the future, so that’s really where he lies. And he really puts a lot of emphasis on the Preamble to the Constitution as the purpose of American government, so more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, general welfare, and so forth. So his thought really uplifts the Constitution, the Preamble, the Federalist. He is less enamored with the Declaration of Independence, which he thinks is sort of hastily put together, not well thought through, and less coherent than the Constitution, which was carefully deliberated over months before it became the law of the land. Richard Reinsch (17:08): But you said, Publius mattered. Christopher Owen (17:10): Right. Richard Reinsch (17:11): How did Publius inform his thought and how did he understand Publius? Christopher Owen (17:15): Sure. So he likes to… The Publius of course is John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, the anonymous title, pseudonym, that they wrote the Federalist Papers justifying the Constitution. So Kendall, like his focus on textual analysis, he thought it was less important in trying to determine which of those individuals wrote each, Federalist 51, Federalist 10, or whatever, than to look at the document focusing on the text itself and what it said about the American Republic and how it was supposed to operate. So the Federalist, written by Publius, he thought was the best guide to how the Constitution ought to be understood and interpreted, and really the best guide for how the American system of government was supposed to operate. And that was a defense of the Constitution before the Bill…

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    Grappling With Logistics Dec 23, 2021
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    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Hello, and welcome to Liberty Law Talk, I’m your host Richard Reinsch. Liberty Law Talk is featured at the online journal Law & Liberty, which is available at lawliberty.org. Richard Reinsch (00:18): Hello, and welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Michael Rentz about all aspects of the supply chain crisis. Mr. Rentz is the chief revenue officer of Gnosis Freight, an international shipping company based in Charleston, South Carolina. He also previously worked for Maersk in their shipping operations, so he knows the industry really well, and has thought a lot about its problems in our current scenario where they stem from, and is here to talk about it with us today. And I think he brings both an interesting perspective, both economically, both theory, and also in the practical problems, and details that he has encountered working in this industry. Michael, welcome to the program. Michael Rentz (01:03): Thank you, Richard. I appreciate you having me. It’s an honor to be on the podcast, and I appreciate the opportunity. So thank you. Richard Reinsch (01:10): Great. So thinking about the supply chain crisis, this thing that has exploded in American life, and has affected everything from new cars, semiconductors, shelves at Target and Walmart, energy. And so we’ve got a lot of things happening that people don’t like and are experiencing, and a lot of fingers are being pointed, and there’s a lot there… As you and I were discussing offline, there are numerous causes contributing to this but maybe before we get into that, just to help us give us the context for the supply chain, international supply chain. I mean, as I was thinking about this, a small business owner has a supply chain. It may just be that all of his products are sourced locally, but he has some sort of supply chain he’s got to do to bring his business together. It’s just that the supply chain crisis we’re discussing is truly international, but help us understand what is the supply chain, and what has it become in American life over the past two decades? Michael Rentz (02:10): Great question. And that’s a great place to start to kind of frame up the fundamentals of what we’re dealing with regards to supply chain. The way I describe it is I tell people it’s a loose collection of a lot of different industries. It’s not one monolithic industry supply chain. Under that umbrella are huge industries in and of itself like ocean carrier industry, ports, warehousing, factories, trucking, air freight, as well as trains… Rail. So a tremendous amount of economic activity under the umbrella of the supply chain. And what that means is it’s a massive problem that deals with how they communicate with one another as they’re passing goods along through the chain. The one ubiquitous part of the entire industry is the container itself, the international shipping container, which revolutionized the industry in the 1950s. And so that’s ironically enough the perspective I take when analyzing the supply chain is that of the container as it goes intermodally, through the entire supply chain. Richard Reinsch (03:15): The container. I’ve read that this is an important factor. How did international shipping happen before the container, and what did it do in terms of volume speed, things like that? Michael Rentz (03:29): Right. So before the container, when it came to moving goods on boats, primarily, I mean, people literally picked them up in rope nets off the docks, and loaded it, floor loaded it onto the vessel. And you could… As many goods as you could fit on the deck of the vessel was about as much goods as you could transport. And it was just a massive bottleneck, and taking it from one mode of transportation to the next. And obviously, the throughput, the amount of goods you could fit through the entire system, was tiny. When they created the container, I think in 1955, it was a uniform point to which every different party involved in moving goods, adjusted to the trucks, the ocean carriers, the rail. And then, in addition, it made it much easier to store those goods on the vessels. So if you look at an image of a vessel, it’s not just the containers you see stacked up on top of the vessel itself. It’s stacked way below deck as well. So it really is almost unmeasurable or incalculable as far as the magnitude of difference that made. Richard Reinsch (04:35): Yeah. Michael Rentz (04:35): To moving goods and really international trades. Richard Reinsch (04:38): So you’re saying the container, it’s not just international shipping on these massive cargo vessels. It’s also, then you unload it, and it can be put on an 18-wheeler. It could be put on rail. Its goods can be easily dispensed with, and then reloaded. It can be shipped back to its point of origin, and then reloaded. It offers an array of uses that makes shipping quicker, stronger, faster, cheaper, all of those things. Michael Rentz (05:05): Exactly. It’s standardized, there’s only a handful of different container sizes and everybody adjusts accordingly. Richard Reinsch (05:11): Question. Just how big is a container. I mean, could you live in it? Michael Rentz (05:14): You could. People do. It’s very trendy right now. The most common size is what’s called a 40-foot container. It’s 40-foot by, I believe, eight foot by eight foot. The other unit, depending on the entity, measures them in 20-foot. But I would say an overwhelming majority of the goods are moved in 40-foot containers. They have, in addition to that, what’s called a 40-foot high cube, which is 45 feet long, and a bit more space you can utilize inside as well as what’s called a 53-foot container, which is oftentimes referred to in this country as a domestic container because the United States is the only country on earth that has the infrastructure large enough to move those 53-foot containers. So you won’t see those going around Europe or Asia. Ironically enough, they’re manufactured in Asia, the 53 footers. And so, a lot of retailers compete to get access to those 53-foot imports. They’ll ship the asset itself with goods inside of it. Then it will live here in the United States for the remaining time. The last point is if you see goods moving in a 20-foot container, it’s usually incredibly heavy stuff. It’s what’s called loaded-out, as opposed to cubed-out, you move light goods in 40-foot containers, and heavy goods in 20-foot containers. Richard Reinsch (06:23): And also, I remember being in a hotel room in Savannah, Georgia a couple of years ago, and I was on the water. And I remember looking out my window, and almost losing my breath as one of these massive cargo ships sailed by. I mean, this largest thing I’ve ever seen, give us a sense of how big these vessels are. Michael Rentz (06:42): The new ones, I think Maersk calls them the Triple E vessel are large enough to put the Empire State Building inside of them. They’re about 20,000- Richard Reinsch (06:49): That’s incredible. Michael Rentz (06:50): 20-foot equivalent to these container ships, which are huge. Richard Reinsch (06:54): Yeah. Michael Rentz (06:55): And some of the largest vessels in the world, those don’t even call the east coast. The infrastructure is not even big enough. So the ones you saw in Savannah are pretty big, but not the biggest in the world. Funny enough. Richard Reinsch (07:07): So thinking about America’s ports, but before we get to that, let’s just think more about… So we talked about sort of the nuts and bolts of how these goods travel. Why did the supply chain come to be so… Such an important part of American commerce? I suppose part of that is the free trade globalism story of the last 20 years, but also, in the search for cheaper costs and the ability to deliver products at that cost to American consumers, there’s also something else which is, they seemed to really make it work and delivered high-quality goods and services that people wanted to buy. Michael Rentz (07:38): That’s right. And I spent a lot of time thinking very deeply about this, and what I can come up with is about 40 years ago, you really start to see offshoring, and the primary objective of that was cost. And the reason they utilized it for cost is because cash became king. Ultimately, I mean the largest export in the United States really today is cash. And that is where most companies make their money is lending their dollars. And so, they wanted to create as much working capital cash-on-hand so they could invest it in the markets to make more money. Walmart, for example, their business model is literally to sell their products on their shelves at a loss. They have incredible terms. They collect on those goods immediately and have 90 or 120-day terms before they have to pay. And they just invested in the markets and take seven, eight, nine percent return. That’s pretty much how they make a lot of their money. So I think that became a structural problem in the economics where everybody was optimizing for cost, as opposed to optimizing for efficiency. And that just kind of perpetuated itself decade over decade. And everybody assumed this is the way you do it. Richard Reinsch (08:43): So are you, and this is interesting, so you work in the international shipping industry, but you’re saying that there’s something structurally wrong with it? Michael Rentz (08:50): Fundamentally yes, I do think there’s something structurally wrong with it. I mean, it’s not just in our industry. If you look at the best and brightest minds are going into financial services, everybody’s trying to optimize cash… I think that’s not a sustainable way to do business ultimately. Richard Reinsch (09:10): Okay. So let’s maybe think more about the supply chain issue here. I mean, cause I guess part of that would be we’re the world’s reserve currency. Michael Rentz (09:16): Right. Richard Reinsch (09:16): And as the world’s reserve currency transactions are going to happen in dollars, they’re going to be pegged to dollars. So foreign companies, foreign investors want dollars in order to engage in those transactions. I mean, part of that’s understandable, and is that actually, most people say that’s actually a benefit to America globally. And also it seems that the search for or lower cost is understandable and also allows for comparative advantage and to develop highest-end uses and the most advanced- Michael Rentz (09:43): Right. Richard Reinsch (09:43): Technology to dominate the American economy. So I understand that, but the supply chain itself becomes sort of, a product of offshoring, but talk about more in depthly about what happens, and we just pick a company, how do they operate? How do they work? How does this come to be? Michael Rentz (10:00): Yeah, great question. So, I think one component to chat about is landed cost, which is actually pretty simple. It’s the cost to make, manufacture, plus the cost to import, your transportation costs. And when initially, globalization offshoring began that landed cost was very low. That’s why it was such a good business objective. But as of recently, for a multitude of reasons, that landed cost has gone up tremendously. And unfortunately, that’s being pushed a little bit to the consumer, and we can chat about that later. But most retailers, it’s a giant pareto distribution. About 10 to 15 companies import an overwhelming majority of the goods. And then there’s a long middle and smaller tail. And most of those companies are set up doing what their main objective is, take a garment importer or a clothing company that sells goods. They’re great at selling shirts. And so their expertise isn’t necessarily in moving goods or getting those goods in. They know what they want and they know who… How to sell it to their customers. So they outsource their logistics to a variety of different players. And here we go with the supply chain. So they have factories primarily in Asia, mainly in China, but some in Southeast Asia as well. And then once they are monitoring those inventory levels to try to sell as many T-shirts as possible, they cut purchase orders. They go to their factories that then start producing to make sure that they don’t stock out on the front end to the customers. The last thing they want is to not have any shirts to sell to their customers and miss out on that opportunity to collect the cash. So the factory will make it. And then those t-shirts that are made, let’s say, China for this example, need to get from the factory to the port. So they’ll dispatch an empty container from the port. A trucker will pick it up, take it to the factory, stuff the container, and then bring it back to the port. Then that container needs to get onto a vessel, traverse across the ocean. While it’s going across the ocean, it needs to clear US customs, which is a very burdensome process in a lot of regards, get off the vessel into a port, and then get from the port onto a truck to a distribution facility, probably from a distribution facility to a retailer. And that’s the simplest way to explain it. So they say on average, a container changes hands 20 times on its journey. Richard Reinsch (12:17): Okay. So talk about one part of this is this idea of the bullwhip effect. And that’s playing out right now in America, where I guess would be where the whip strikes, so to speak, but that’s being delayed. Talk about that. Michael Rentz (12:33): So the bullwhip looks like a bullwhip. It’s the small amplification at the beginning, but at the end of the tail, it’s massive. And so, in that chain, when that retailer cuts those purchase orders, the factory sees a huge order come in. And then that factory places another order to their suppliers for more goods because they’re anticipating that there’s all of a sudden going to be a long sustaining spike in demand. And that just amplifies throughout the entire process where everybody in the chain orders more, and then you get a massive amount of goods trying to flow through the system that may not necessarily truly match the actual demand. And then, from there, everybody’s playing catch-up, and that’s exactly what happened, I think, at the beginning of the pandemic. Richard Reinsch (13:20): So with the bullwhip, but also there’s this idea too, of like a delay results in a huge, huge delay on down the line. Michael Rentz (13:27): Right. Conceptually it’s the same thing. So, everybody’s pretty much operating on a weekly schedule, and maybe like a 10-minute delay, say, in Shanghai, could result in a 10-day delay in Denver, as those delays process through the system, the handovers miss, the windows miss for an opportunity to exchange the container, and it’s pushed off a week, or it’s pushed off a few days until they have the rhythm, the capacity to pick it back up and keep it moving. And, it just throws off the entire system, which is already brittle, to begin with. I mean, it’s really stretched out like a rubber band, again, optimized for cost, not necessarily optimized for efficiency. Richard Reinsch (14:03): Yeah. So efficiency here. That’s something I also want to discuss with you. So we know, I mean, COVID diminishes production across the globe for obvious reasons. Michael Rentz (14:12): Right. Richard Reinsch (14:12): A number of governments, particularly Western governments, the United States, print money, gives it to people in the form of stimulus payments, and then- Michael Rentz (14:21): That’s right. Richard Reinsch (14:21): People spend it, and we’ve got, the money supplies increased dramatically in this country, and people are spending money. And we’ve also got this strange effect no one I think counted on of the workforce diminishing, although that would seem to allow with the incentives of giving people money. And so we’ve got labor shortages, increased cash. And so we’ve got all sorts of problems, and we now have inflation. So we know all that. We know that’s a part of this proble…

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    What's Wrong With America? Dec 15, 2021
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch (00:04): Hello, today we’re talking with Sam Gregg about the question, “What’s wrong with America?” Sam Gregg, many of you know, is a contributing editor at Law & Liberty. He’s also, his day job, he’s a research director at the Acton Institute. He’s the author of numerous books, including, he’s been on this program to discuss Wilhelm Ropke’s Political Economy and Becoming Europe. He’s also the author of the prize-winning book, Reason, Faith, and the Struggle for Western Civilization. He contributes to a number of publications and he is also a visiting scholar at the Feulner Institute at the Heritage Foundation. Sam Gregg, welcome back to Liberty Law Talk. Sam Gregg (00:56): Richard, always good to be with you. Richard Reinsch (00:58): So Sam, this question now “what’s wrong with America?” We can also discuss what’s right with America, sort of inspired by GK. Chesterton’s great book, What’s Wrong with the World? Now we don’t have to be as theological, obviously, as Chesterton, but it is to suggest that, or not to suggest, but to say there’s something wrong with America. Many people sense it. It has many facets to it. You follow political economy, you follow law, constitutional thinking, social thought, just any number of areas you write on. And so, I think you can address this well. There was an essay published this week that a lot of people are talking about. Yuval Levin’s, “The Changing Face of Social Breakdown,” was the title, it was published in The Dispatch earlier this week, this being the third week of November. And Yuval Levin advances something in there that resonated with me. He said in the nineties, and that’s sort of when I was coming of age, that we had this sort of impression of America, still the high crime rate, a lot of anti-social trends, up-ticking, and a lot of just frenetic energy, a lot of chaos in America, a lot of dislocated people who had not been formed well, who had been let down by institutions. And he says in this essay, we may have the opposite of that problem now in America. We may have a lot of passivity on the part of individuals pursuing education, pursuing career, pursuing family formation, having children, we’ve seen a decline in divorce in America, but we’ve also seen decline in marriage in general. We’ve seen a decline in out of wedlock childbirth, but we’ve also seen a lower birth rate. And so, Yuval wondered why is that? And he thinks it, there really are no scripts anymore. And in the absence of scripts for people’s lives, people become inert and passive, and that has its own set of consequences. Let me ask you, I didn’t know if you had a chance to read that, but how do you react to that? Sam Gregg (02:57): Well, I did read the article and there are things that I had thought that Yuval Levin got right and there are things I suspect I’d quibbled with, because I think it’s true to say that the scripts to use his term have broken down to a certain extent. The American story, which maybe because I’m an immigrant, I tend to pay more attention to, but the American story of people coming to the United States or being born in the United States, they’re experiencing a path of upward mobility socially, economically, educationally, that story seems to have broken down. So that narrative, which has informed a lot of American political discourse has informed the way that Americans think about themselves and their country and the history of the United States. I think it’s true to say that there are many Americans who are skeptical about whether it’s even possible to live that story any more. There are some groups, some thinkers in the United States who would argue that it was always a myth and that it’s a myth that has covered up numerous sins on the part of the United States that are being present for a very long period of time, whether it’s the sort of the legacy of slavery or whether it’s the various isms that they say are permeating American society. So there’s lots of different ways of thinking about what’s gone wrong with America. I would say in many respects, that it’s also a question of ideas. And to my mind, there are significant groups of people on the left. And now, by the way, some groups on the right who aren’t just questioning the scripts or the script as it was laid out for so many people coming of age in the 1980s and 1990s, there are people who are fundamentally questioning the founding of the United States, the key thinkers and ideas that have formed the basis of the United States, who are presenting a vision of American history as one of numerous forms of oppression. And many of these people, many of these groups have been very present in some of America’s major culture-forming institutions for quite some time. And I’m not simply thinking about obvious places like the universities, where since the late 19th century, we had many professors often educated in German universities who came back and had a whole vision of essentially dispensing with the founding in many respects and adopting what came to be called the progressive agenda, through federal government, top-down management and administration of society, because bottom-up faith in freedom was messy and disorganized. And so, if you go through the 20th century, that influence has always been there. And I don’t think you can discount the effects of the 1960s and particularly the generation of people that were formed in that period, that the thinking they were exposed to, the ideas that they imbibed. Now, that generation of course is, I guess you could say sort of on its way out in some respects, but their legacy is immense. And it’s a legacy of skepticism, it’s a legacy of distrust of basic institutions of America, a rejection in many respects of the ideas and the figures and the history associated with the founding and the way that that all played out in the 19th century. I would suggest is that if we’re going to identify the boomer generation as being part of the problem in the sense that the legacy that they have bequeathed to the United States is at best a mixed one, there were other things going on, which reflected older forms of what you might call skepticism about the American experiment and ordered liberty. So when a country, especially many of its cultural elites or political elites, legal elites, economic elites, when they start questioning the very experiment in ordered liberty, that’s very dangerous for a country like America, because that’s what defines the country. That’s what makes America different from other countries where they have a history, a long history, they have symbols, they have events, they have even an ethnic dimension, linguistic dimension to their history. And America’s always been different. The historian Gordon Wood makes this point in one of his more recent books. He says, what defines America are these key ideas, these key principles to which lots of Americans continue to refer when they’re thinking about what should the direction of the country be? How do we deal with our problems? We go back to look at these founding documents and principles and ideas. So when all that gets canceled out in some respects or dismissed as the product of late 18th century, white male slave holders, we shouldn’t be surprised a deep doubt starts to enter the body politic and no country can endure that for too long. Richard Reinsch (08:31): A Republic that depends on voluntary associations, voluntary political institutions, people have to want to be a part of them, have to want to run for all office or have to want to serve in various boards or in anything about the vast network of voluntary civil society institutions in American life. All of those depend on people taking part in the American project as a whole, and the inability to transmit your legacy, your memories to the next generation is certainly as you’re saying a major problem. It seems also just thinking about moving, maybe moving over to the right from it, talking about the left, there’s two conservative authors, one from the boomer generation, Mary Eberstadt, but also Helen Andrews, who would be a millennial, both sort of saying, I mean, Mary Eberstadt, if I’ve read her correctly, she wrote a piece recently saying to millennials and gen-Zs, “We robbed you,” talking about the boomer generation, “In terms of the legacy we’ve left you.” Helen Andrews has said, “Basically, more or less, yeah. You did. What we were left with is sort of fool’s gold in terms of the America that we’ve inherited.” What do you make of those, those critiques, which are kind of similar? Sam Gregg (09:48): Well, I think they carry some weight, because let’s think about the boomer generation. So these are the people born after World War II, up until around about 1964. That’s the generational cohort that we’re really talking about. And they grew up in a period of immense American power, economic power, political power, military power, unparalleled, really unparalleled in many respects that put America as the number one country in the world that had slammed the national socialist and fascist colossuses. It had paid for effectively the allied victory in World War II. At the Second World War, the United States accounted to something like 50% of the world’s GDP. The United States essentially saved Western Europe from becoming engulfed by Soviet communism, established bastions of freedom around the world. And I mean, literally bastions. You had American military bases all around the world and America was seen as a citadel, not just of democracy, but also of liberty. So the children, and remember the people who did that, these were the people who had gone through the depression, they had been gone to war, they’d sacrificed immensely. We all know the story and their children of born into this world of immense affluence of security, et cetera. And they reject it, they reject so much of it. And it’s partly, because they were reacting to things like, things they should have been reacting to like the ongoing presence of segregation in the south. They were disturbed and in retrospect, we can say rightly so by the prospect of endless war in Southeast Asia being carried out by the United States. So there were things to critique about the United States, but it’s also very clear that this is a generation that abide ideas and even models of thinking that reflected a lot of what’s often called the hermeneutics of suspicion. So you look around the world and you think behind everything that seemed real and good, not everything is so good. And this is of course, when universities very quickly started the March towards the left. American universities had obviously been mostly progressive up to this point, but that goes in a very radical direction, the radicalization of so much of American higher education and culture. People like Michael Novak, the late Michael Novak used to talk about this, because he was one of them. He was one of the people that were part of this whole generation. And that I think to talk about the boomers in that way, Michael Novak himself wasn’t a boomer, but he was very good at discerning what was going on among that generation of people that he was very much part of. I think there’s a fair amount that we can say yes, that the boomer generation with the skepticism, the hermeneutics of suspicion, and to a certain extent, the hostility that they brought to the public square about certain things that have been seen as always true, whether it’s, America’s understanding of itself, whether it’s things like the place of traditional religion, place of business, the type of economic life that existed in the United States, despite the New Deal, despite The Great Society and all these things. So I think there’s some truth to that, but I think we also need to think about some of the very grave errors, political errors that we were made in this same period, which I’m not sure you can put on the backs of the boomer generation. So we see the Supreme Court, for example, in the 1950s, and this is not populated with boomers adopting a pretty progressive agenda quite deliberately. So you see that is happening. You see the Johnson administration embarking upon what was one of the biggest expansions of government into society and the economy in the 1960s. Again, the people who were in charge were not part of the boomer generation. These are sort of holdovers in the respects from the New Deal and that whole way of thinking about things. So on one level, I think the critique of the boomers is in many respects accurate, but I’m not sure it explains everything. Now, I don’t think that people like Helen Andrews or Mary Eberstadt are claiming that either, all I would suggest is that if we’re going to identify the boomer generation as being part of the problem in the sense that the legacy that they have bequeathed to the United States is at best a mixed one, there were other things going on, which reflected older forms of what you might call skepticism about the American experiment and ordered liberty. Richard Reinsch (14:58): Question that comes to mind and one responsibility. This is what democracies do, but it does seem in the last 10 years, maybe even beyond that, we’ve lost any sense of fiscal responsibility. And thinking about, obviously this is a very, in the headlines right now, in terms of the amount of money that we’re spending, it does seem there’s something in the American psyche right now of the belief that this won’t really hurt us, or that we can just continue to get away with this. Certainly, if you listen to Jay Powell, this is going on this sort of justification, legitimation of a lot of spending. And I just sort of throw that to you, is that also an indication of something profoundly wrong with this country? Sam Gregg (15:43): Well, it’s not the first time the United States has experienced- Richard Reinsch (15:47): Outside of a major war though. I mean, it is quite amazing. Sam Gregg (15:51): Yes. Now I think that’s true that what’s different now compared to say the levels of indebtedness that the United States incurred during the Second World War in particular, we are obviously going heavier and heavier into debt. And as last time I checked, we weren’t in involved in a major war against a major European power, and that hasn’t been the case for a while. So there to be a loss of sense, not just on the left, but among considerable portions of at least the political right, of a sense of fiscal responsibility. Now, so what’s driving this. Well, one, I think is obviously the gap between income and expenditure. And it’s very important to understand that most expenditures, for example, in the federal budget are pretty much fixed. Most of it’s on what are basically, we would call welfare programs and that’s been the case for a while. So the degree of what’s called discretionary spending that Congress authorizes or it’s supposed to authorize every year has actually shrunk significantly in terms of their wiggle room. So one of the ways they deal with that is by going further and further into debt. Now America’s lucky in the sense that it’s the world’s reserve currency, that it’s in a position whereby it can print more dollars, but this catches up. And it’s clearly something that is driving a lot of irresponsible behavior on the part of a lot of the left and much of the right. So there’s a certain detachment from fiscal reality that’s going on. So you even see this, when you hear politicians talk about things like, “Well, we are going to reduce the rate of growth in federal spending.” So they’re not talking about reducing the actual real expenditure, they’re talking about reducing the rate of increases in expenditure. It’s really interesting to listen to that type of language, the notion that you might be actually reducing expenditures in real terms seems very foreign. We spend as much and we borrow as much, but we never actually get back to paying for…

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