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    Philosophy

    The Law & Liberty Podcast

    Law & Liberty contributing editor James Patterson interviews prominent authors and thinkers. A production of Liberty Fund, Inc.

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    Is the Future Postliberal? Jun 12, 2020
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch:Hello and welcome to Liberty law talk. I’m your host, Richard Reinsch today. We’re talking with Fr. Robert Sirico, founder and president of the Acton Institute. The Acton Institute is in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Fr. Sirico is also a pastor at Sacred Heart Parish, also in Grand Rapids. Fr. Sirico widely commentates on political, social, religious, economic issues, so we’re glad to have him on the program. Thank you for being here. Fr. Robert Sirico:I’m delighted to be with you, Richard. Thanks for having me. Richard Reinsch:Fr. Sirico, question for you, as you watch the unrest, the violence, it almost seems like an insurrection inside major American cities, ranging from the looting that happened on Tuesday night in New York City and Midtown Manhattan, is the long line of elegant shops there, and if you’ve walked past, were universally broken into and looted Tuesday night. Police officers were standing by, nothing. They didn’t do anything. This has happened in dozens and dozens of American cities. What comes to your mind as you watch these scenes unfold? Fr. Robert Sirico:Well, I think I’m like a lot of Americans. There are a whole bunch of things that come to my mind, and I think where it begins is, of course, with the scar at the founding of the United States. The American founding was basically a set of ideas that are rooted in human liberty. They’re ideas derived from the natural law. They’re not inventions of Americans, but they are something encoded in all human beings. And that is the notion of liberty, of equal dignity, of all human beings. And somehow with our founding, and I understand the historical precedent that slavery was a part of human society for eons before the American experiment; but nonetheless, in this new experiment, we had it. And I think that has left a horrendous legacy, more cultural perhaps now than legal and structural. I know that’s a point of real debate with a lot of people, but I insist that it is cultural prejudice that people have, and I think that’s manifested in what happened to Mr. Floyd and a whole list of other people, particularly black men, but also other minorities. I think in order to understand the riots, you have to kind of back up and see that these actions on the part, not just the police but on the part of our culture, give some semblance of justification for the protest. They in no way give… and for the same reasons by the way, no way give justification for the kind of violence and looting and destruction of property that we have seen in the last few days. We have to hold both of these things in tension with each other and see the common base of them, that is the violation of human rights, human dignity, and the property that you hold. Having said all of that, and I know we are just in the midst of it right now, I am very suspicious that there is a disciplined, organized group of ideologues, probably many of whom are not African American, who are exploiting this circumstance. I think we’ve seen some evidence of that already emerging thanks to the iPhone culture that we live in. I should also just mention that even here in Grand Rapids, which is relatively harmonious community, this kind of violence and the Acton Institute was in the middle of a lot of impact. They tried to break our windows. They broke windows on either side of us. They weren’t able to because our windows are pretty sturdy. We’ve seen it even locally. Richard Reinsch:I’ve read about the violence in Grand Rapids as well. Indianapolis, where we are, faced a severe bit as well. Let me respond though. We had riots. As you recall, in 1968, I think went into 1969, in major American cities, this coming after the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Great Society. These riots happened. The Watts riots in LA, where there were active attempts to bring, particularly young black men into the economy, teenagers even into the economy. Fifty years later, we’re kind of still here with this sort of… I mean your answer sort of surprised me in a way, because I guess my thinking is at what point is this no longer a reality in America given everything that’s been done or attempted to be done? And one of the things that I note that sticks out in my mind now, Minneapolis where this started, is a progressive city. It has an incredibly progressive leadership class. It has been run by Democrats for decades, all proclaiming that they’re going to do good things, and they’ve tried to do good things. And yet, this problem happened, the riots happened. Do you ever wonder that yourself? When is enough, enough? Fr. Robert Sirico:Well, I think this is a complex topic, just trying to tease out some of the elements of it. I think the origin to the civil rights movement, going back well before ’64, emblemized to my mind by the Letter from the Birmingham Jail, Dr. King’s letter from Birmingham Jail, the religious leadership of the civil rights group, the call at that time of human dignity, the commitment to peaceful protest. One of the most powerful of the demonstrations of that era was a boycott, an economic withdrawal of economic power against businesses, from thinking of the buses in Memphis and the withdrawal of economic power to show that we can remove our economic support. All of these were free actions of people protesting the prejudice. What happens after that? I think ’64, ’68, even before then really, is an institutionalization of a different vision of society. And the fact that many of the civil rights leaders themselves transformed into the acceptance of this notion, that is a more state-oriented resolution to social issues rather than a harmonious economic-free resolution of these issues. I think that institutionalization, that progressive approach, which then more sent to the Saul Alinsky, even more radical forms of leftist resolution to these things, this exacerbates the problem. It sets up class warfare, racial warfare as the solution. It becomes rather than a win-win game, it’s a win-lose game. And it’s political and not religious in its orientation, not moral, now it becomes political. And that transformation, I don’t think enough people have really thought about enough to see, how that has produced what we’re seeing here and now. There could have been an ongoing resolution to this that was impeded by the interventionist state. Richard Reinsch:I was reading yesterday 300 black men died violent deaths in the city of Chicago in 2019 at the hands of other… They had black assailants who killed them. Which dwarfs, by orders of magnitude, those who died at the hands of Chicago Police Department, and dwarfs by orders of magnitude, those who were even unarmed, and we don’t know the facts there. We don’t protest those deaths. We don’t even mention them. But George Floyd’s death, horrific as it is in the video, and I understand the media, but that becomes everything. We have these nationwide protests… There are protests in Canada. I’m reading there’s a protest in Amsterdam today that drew thousands of people. This all, to my mind, speaks of, but now we want to use a new language, 1619 Project, intersectionality, systemic racism. That’s a term I’ve heard dozens of times in two days. And it’s almost as if, and now we’re going to remake institutions like the police a traditional institution, hierarchical institution of its very nature into what we want it to be. That concerns me going forward. I mean, I’m very concerned right now about the unrest. But when the unrest ends, and now the progressive, political, bureaucratic legal class turns the wrench even more because of systemic racism. Fr. Robert Sirico:I agree with you completely that all of this is the result of that kind of status presumption. What I think is very important is that believers in the free society, conservatives if you will, classical liberals, begin with the acknowledgement of the reality of racism. It seems to me that that is a given. The reality of racism isn’t lessened by the fact that blacks die at higher rates at the hands of other blacks. It doesn’t take away from the reality, the broader reality of racism in society. In fact, it may be a part of that, the erosion of the culture, particularly the culture of the family, the absence of fathers in the homes that produce all of this kind of thing. But I think we need to be the leaders in calling for the proper resolution to this, rather than leaving it at the hands of progressive who are going to only exacerbate and extend this. Because there’s a great interest on the part of politicians to have this kind of friction and this kind of division, because then they can justify the programs, the political power. And look at how they have, in effect, seduced religious leaders into becoming politicians. I mean, Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton, they are classic examples of men who begin as ministers and end up as politicians. This is civil society versus political society. Richard Reinsch:Question for you. 2020 has been an interesting year, not a year that any of us I think will recall fondly. Fr. Robert Sirico:Lord hope. Richard Reinsch:We start the year with an impeachment. We then end impeachment and we go right into the corona crisis. Now the corona crisis, as far as I can tell, has been placed on the back burner, and we’re in the midst of civil insurrection. And through it all, our country is extremely divided. In fact, it, at times, seems like we cannot even speak to one another, speak to those we disagree with. Impeachment, you might expect that. That’s going to be bitter no matter what. Not so much in a pandemic. You should think we would know. We would kind of coalesce around a set of policies and approaches. And then now you would think, okay, an insurrection, we’ll call it, in major American cities, you should know what to do. You put it down. And yet, we don’t seem to know what to do or agree on what to do. And we’re divided over that now. At what point is the question, are we just two different nations in a forced marriage? Is that a question that we should ask, entertain? Fr. Robert Sirico:Well, it is. More than ask it, we need to answer it. We need to understand why. And it goes back well before 2020. It goes back well before the impeachment. The impeachment, the response to the pandemic, and now the civil unrest, are all extensions of a division that really is the result of that win-lose mentality that I was talking about. That is the increased politicization of society. I mean, why in the world would the threat of contagion result in political divides? I mean, when we should just kind of come together. Richard Reinsch:Exactly, yeah. Fr. Robert Sirico:But it has because our institutions of healthcare, our institutions of civil government, our institutions of medical research and the production and all of the regulation that’s attached to things like the production of masks or sanitizers, all of this has been politicized, regulated down to the minute details. Of course, you’re going to have divisions because society itself that has been eroded and the political apparatus has taken over. We think that everything that needs to be done socially has to be done through the agency of the state. And this produces more and more division because it is, what I said earlier, a win-lose situation rather than the market which is a win-win situation, where you persuade people to engage with you economically, rather than force them, coerce them, regulate them to do so. Richard Reinsch:Yeah. Well, I suppose maybe a more positive way of looking at this is, those of us who do believe in markets or in a freer society are posing those arguments in a powerful way such that we’re having this divide. I think in a way that there is still something in America kicking and pushing against this project that’s ongoing. It prompts a question. I know throughout your career, you’ve had involvement with American liberalism. How do you see it changing? How has it stayed the same since it really emerged as the new left in the late 1960s? What do you see as its goals now? Fr. Robert Sirico:I think that they have made great strides in society. I think the movements that I was involved with, and when I was involved with them, were marginal at the time. It wasn’t a step up in social status to be involved in the left-wing movements that I was associated with. It is now. They’re well-funded, well-organized. They have people well-placed throughout government. But I think- Richard Reinsch:Corporations even. Fr. Robert Sirico:… And corporations have been in quite… I mean, you have this- Richard Reinsch:Competing. Fr. Robert Sirico:Phenomenon of “woke capitalism”. Richard Reinsch:Yeah. Fr. Robert Sirico:Yes. I mean, it’s all over the place. My solution to that is education. It’s helping people to understand that these well-intended…. Because I do believe that a lot of these people, even the kids on the street, I’m not talking about the media logs who are there to intentionally create pilots who come armed and ready for it, but the kids who want to be supportive, these white kids from the suburbs who come in and break windows. That if you get into their heart, and now maybe this was a pastor speaking, they don’t want to see people discriminated against. They don’t want to see people marginalized, disrespected, but they haven’t been prepared intellectually to understand how you bring about harmony in society. They think the only way to do it is to rip everything down. That’s the easiest in the world to do. To rip things down is easy. To create… The other thing, let me say, I alluded to the violence in Grand Rapids. One of the things I don’t think has been highlighted at all in Grand Rapids at least. The riots took place last Saturday night, as we were speaking. Sunday morning, I knew that this was going on right around the Acton Institute building. Before I celebrated mass, I went downtown and surveyed the downtown area and wanted to see the Acton building, to see what had happened. As I said, the Action building really wasn’t hit very much. But you know what I saw on the streets? Hundreds, hundreds of people sweeping things up, bringing coffee, bringing pizza, taking shards of glass and throwing them in canisters and dumpsters and stuff; and that was spontaneous, that wasn’t organized. It was just a cultural sense of this city. We will function. We will clean up the mess you guys have made. And that’s the culture that we have to build once again. That’s what made America great. That’s what makes any civilization great is this unified culture where people are winning and winning together. Richard Reinsch:Yeah, it seems as well, there’s now a very aggressive attempt. Although, this has been a part of progressivism going back to its fathers in the late 19th and early 20th century. Woodrow Wilson obviously comes to mind. And what I mean here is this attempt to remove us or to disestablish the American founding on its own terms and to give it new terms, or evolutionary terms, progressive terms. And that now has reached to a very popular pitch in the 1619 Project. We’ve run, I mean a lot of publications like Law & Liberty have had authors comment on it. It’s been universally panned by well-regarded historians, Gordon Wood, James McPherson at Princeton. I mean, they’ve really just pulled this apart. Economists have pulled it apart and some of its claims. But the root argument is we’re built on slavery and we’re built on racism, and our economy grew so fast because of slavery. Now, this is just part of the American Project is oppression. This is sort of becoming a mainstream view, and it just sort of sparks to my mind the question of this is its own virus. And we can do our patient work at Liberty Fund at the Acton Institute, other institutions come to mind. But now, major cities are taking the 1619 Project and putting it directly into their curriculum. Of course, they have declining student enrollment, but th…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Bureaucracy, Regulation, and the Unmanly Contempt for the Constitution Jun 04, 2020
    Show notes

    Editor’s note: This podcast was originally published on January 16, 2019. Richard ReinschToday we’re talking with John Marini about his new book, Unmasking the Administrative State. John Marini is professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Reno. He is a Senior Fellow of the Claremont Institute in California, and is the author and editor of a number of books on the administrative state, including The Politics of Budget Control, The Imperial Congress, and The Progressive Revolution and Politics and Political Science. John Marini, glad to have you on the program. John Marini:Thank you, Richard. Happy to be here. Richard Reinsch:So John, I think I’ve been hearing you talk about the administrative state and reading your work about the administrative state for over a decade. So this book is, in some sense, a recapitulation of what I’ve learned from you but also I think some new thoughts and ideas as well. The title of your book is interesting, Unmasking the Administrative State. How does one unmask it? Is it not evident in Washington? We mock it, we refer to it derisively, we know its operations, and yet, it needs to be unmasked. How do we do that? John Marini:Well, I think the reason it’s difficult to see is because it’s so pervasive, it permeates almost every aspect of our lives. And so, the administrative state is not merely a thing, the bureaucracy, it’s a form of authority as well. It’s rational authority and it permeates not only the public sector but the large private corporations as well in the way in which organized intelligence establishes knowledge about what it is that needs to be done.And of course in the private sector, the economic sector, those structures and the bureaucratic structures that operate essentially in the same way as the public structures, when those two come together, in other words, when the private and the public sector become enmeshed in the way in which the modern administrative state has worked itself out over the last several decades, it’s very difficult to establish what is genuinely public and what is private. What is a thing that should be political and what should be a responsibility of the private world, the civil society, the institutions that were social institutions that established how it is that human beings accommodated themselves to the social problems of families, communities, associations. All of those were ways that are not political ways but ways that have established a kind of moral conditioning of human beings within those social structures. And the administrative state has undermined the authority of those social structures all the way down to the family. So it’s to- It’s not merely that the administrative state is these particular agencies, this part of the government that is unelected. It has permeated the social, the political. It has centralized almost every interest that exists in human life from the cultural, the religious, the scientific, the educational. All of these things now are part of the modern, rational state I think is a better term. I think Hegel’s a regional term for it. is a better way of describing what we’re up against than the administrative state. Because administration is just one part of what is done. Richard Reinsch:Talk about Hegel’s term and what he was trying to encapsulate with it. John Marini:Well, in terms of Hegel’s understanding of the modern rational state, it was going to be the rule of organized intelligence, of organized knowledge. It was the view, his view was, of course, that the rational was going to replace the natural. The end of history really meant the end of politics and the end of those things that had established the enmities that existed that prevented human beings from having and exercising what is essentially a common will, a will that establishes the moral authority of a regime. And of course, from the point of view of the state itself, the state is a rational organization, but it is also a moral organism. He called it an organism because it’s a growing thing. What it is… It adapts human beings to time or change or progress. So you could say is that the rational state is an organism for the administration of progress. The knowledge that’s necessary to establish the solutions to the problems that human beings face was not yet manufactured in Hegel’s time. He said that he had what he thought was civil service, in other words, the knowledge workers, that class that would accommodate and provide, establish the organized intelligence to conduct the public affairs. He named that at the civil service. The term bureaucracy was not yet in use even in Germany really fully, certainly not in the way in which it has come to be understood. From Hegel’s point of view, the rule of organized knowledge means then that there are those whose purpose is to provide the knowledge on behalf of the State, and therefore must be paid by the state, and that they will seek knowledge and not power. In other words, just to give a juxtapose, say the Hegelian view with James Madison’s view of administration. Madison would never admit that it’s possible for human beings as individuals to separate their self-interest from the other elements that animates human beings desire for power or ambition or whatever. So, Madison would have been skeptical that any people, any part of a government should be given the autonomy and the power to seek solutions to problems that are unrelated to a check upon that power on behalf of political control. Richard Reinsch:It sounds like what you’re articulating is something that we say and sort of a common view that the experts, the scientific expertise that they have to, as you say, manufacture knowledge and find solutions, Hegel is articulating this at a fundamental level. John Marini:Yeah, he is, and what he’s doing and what took time before we developed let’s say a method by which that becomes institutionalized because Hegel established the ground of the necessity for an applied science, practical science of politics. But he didn’t provide a method of how to generate it. That came about within the next, well, almost, about the time when Hegel was dying, Auguste Comte in France was giving a series of lectures from about 1829 to about 1840 that established the method of the social sciences, that detail how it is that human beings can establish a method, an empirical method whereby they can generate meaningful knowledge that is not knowledge that’s associated with metaphysical or theological knowledge. And therefore, is genuine knowledge, in other words, not subjective knowledge. That required of course, the separation of knowledge that is empirical or factual from the opinions that are primarily values. And of course, the only meaningful knowledge and the knowledge that is genuine or objective knowledge is going to be derived from the empirical method. And of course, Comte had established what he called the queen of the sciences for human beings. He called it first social physics, subsequently called it sociology, which was going to be really the science of society. So, rather than politics being the highest sciences as in Aristotle, or in Madison or the founders, of course, what is going to be the directing science of course is the science of society itself, sociology. So, once Comte showed how it is that knowledge of the human mind goes through these various stages, first, the theological, then the metaphysical, and finally, the positive stage of understanding, positivism becomes the method of all knowledge generated in modernity, including the law. So, positivism ultimately establishes the authority of the law, which means that science has replaced both metaphysical knowledge or philosophic knowledge derived from theoretical metaphysics, and religious knowledge. So, one could say, by the end of the 19th century, the authority of religion and philosophy waned and the authority of science waxed. It established the public meaning of everything that was going to be meaningful. Richard Reinsch:Let me ask you this. What you are articulating then is this rational control of society through expertise, through the ability to generate so called solutions to social problems, to the social questions. This replaces politics. Let me sort of bring it down maybe to more of a pragmatic American level. Is the administrative state, though, not really, is it not an inevitability within a modern society of so many interests, needs, desires. There has to be a way to meet those in some way through some sort of, rational body of people providing licenses, certifications, things like that. I mean, are these two, so, yeah. John Marini:I think that there were always ways. Administration is as old as government. Every kind of government in all times has the problem of establishing an administrative apparatus. The question of administration, of course, is what establishes its authority and what’s its relationship to politics? In the American founding, just read Federalist number 72 or read Federalist number 68, where Hamilton or, particularly Hamilton talks about administration. Administration is always understood in terms of what they would have considered the faculty of practical reason or prudence. You’re asking a question that presupposes that technical knowledge is required for the things that we do. But why is that the case? You’ve always had social institutions in which those activities were always done in an orderly way. I’m not saying that we’re not required to use human reason, we’re just required to use practical reason rather than theoretical reason. The problem with the applied sciences that becomes the social sciences, those are a form of abstract theoretical reasoning that try to provide solutions to problems that are practical problems and are intelligible in a common-sensical way or a reasonable way prudentially. What social science and what Comte did, and what the Hegelian thought has done, his philosophy of history has done, has destroyed the element of prudence in modern political life. What is the role of prudence? I don’t blame Hegel, I think Comte is really to blame for this. That’s another more theoretical question. Let me put it this way, because I think I always find, my students have a hard time understanding this too. They think that rationality, when they speak about rationality, they think of rationality oftentimes in the way that we would think about reason. The human capacity for reason or rationality is a natural human faculty, if we are to believe the philosophic tradition of the West. And so, reason and intellection is a part of human nature. And of course, it’s something that human beings have and have always utilized ever since they were capable of intellecting and establishing ideas, whether metaphysically through a metaphysical reason or theoretical reason, or in terms of practical reason, that is trying to accommodate how it is that we understand the abstract ideas in terms of concrete situations, because the abstractions Of course, have to be accommodated or approximated, and they have to be understood. So, always you had a problem of accommodating ideas in a way that required practical reason or prudence. I’ll give you one example. When Lincoln dealt with the problem of slavery during the Civil War, unlike the abolitionists who understood slavery in Comtean ways, in a Comtean way, as if that moral evil established the practical way of dealing with it. And Lincoln knew that was not the way you could possibly deal with slavery in America. And his prudential way of understanding slavery, of course, was trying to make the principle of equality intelligible, as the ground by which to condemn slavery and make that possible politically, which required of course getting the consent of the governed. So, Lincoln’s use of prudence is a perfect example of practical reason in operation that made it possible to actually deal with slavery in a way that had the abolitionist view that moral indignation that was established without the necessity of thinking about this politically and prudentially would probably never have been able to succeed in America. I think that we have in the 20th century, turned over much of our judgment about politics to those who have purported knowledge that derives from abstractions, from theories that are- … that are unrelated really to whether or not these things work practically. That’s why it’s so hard to ever find social science theories that the theorists themselves condemn as saying, well, no, it doesn’t work. Because the beauty of it is always in the theory. They always have an excuse as to why it doesn’t work. Well, we didn’t get enough money or this or that or whatever. Richard Reinsch:You say social science replaces practical reason. By social science, you mean that there is, those who espouse it say, there is a technique in this time, in these circumstances that could solve this problem, if we have the right people, the right amount of resources, etc, etc? John Marini:The social sciences establish a method by which to generate knowledge. That knowledge is the empirical method of establishing a hypothesis and testing it scientifically. The hypotheses that they create, of course, then, the truth of a proposition, the truth of the method is established in the way in which the hypothesis is established and whether or not it can be falsified or not. In other words, it’s the method itself that reveals the reality of what it is that one is trying to study. The empirical method, in other words, says that the only genuine or meaningful knowledge is knowledge derived from this scientific method. It can’t be knowledge derived from the abstractions of philosophy or religion, which had for so many thousands of years tried to deal with these moral problems that they had understood as moral problems, and never were able to solve. Because when you think about what the social sciences in their origins purported to be able to do is to solve every human problem through the use of science in a manner in which it could never have been done through philosophy or religion. Richard Reinsch:You’re suggesting or arguing the way we should think about the administrative state in terms of [crosstalk 00:19:20] they can’t achieve? John Marini:Yeah. I think what you have to understand is, so much of our educated class that comes to become part of the administrative state, their knowledge is derived from a specialized area of study. And not from the practical activity of the things that actually, or the experience of the things that actually, that they have to deal with. Let’s take foreign policy. When somebody is dealing in the area of foreign policy and has a great deal of experience, practical experience in it, that’s a form of knowledge that’s very useful in understanding that problem. Yet you have, when you study that in the university, you’ll also get a way of thinking about these things, these things abstractly. It’s not developed through the experience of it, but through the way in which the theoretical character of the phenomenon is revealed as the reality of it. My question about the modern administrative state is whether or not the method of science actually makes it possible to discern reality or whether it distorts reality. The goal I think of understanding something is to understand the reality of it. And the way in which humans normally understand reality is through the senses that they have, of which of course the sense that makes sense of the senses is the common sense. What experience does is related to how the older view of prudence would suggest that if you want somebody to help you understand this problem, you should get somebody that has had a long experience of dealing with that particular problem. But you notice how many of the young people that go to Washington, all they have is the knowledge they got from their university education. And yet, their e…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    America in the Dock May 15, 2020
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch:Welcome to Liberty Law Talk, I’m your host Richard Reinsch. Today, we’re talking with a special guest who’s returning to Liberty Law Talk, Robert Reilly. Robert Reilly is a man of many talents, many interests, he’s done a lot of wonderful things. He’s served in government for over two decades, special assistant to the President, and director of the Voice of America. He was senior advisor for information strategy to the Secretary of Defense, and he’s taught at the National Defense University. He’s the author of a number of books and essays, including the award-winning book, The Closing of the Muslim Mind. He is also a Viennese Waltzer. And, he told me one time in his earlier life, he was a stage actor. Was it a Shakespearean stage actor, I think? So Robert, we are glad to welcome you. Last time, we discussed the end of ISIS. Now, we will talk about your new book, America on Trial: A Defense of the Founding. Welcome. Robert Reilly:Great, Richard. Thank you for doing this. Richard Reinsch:So Robert, thinking about the title of this book, America on Trial. America has been on trial throughout it’s history, it’s particularly been on trial the last 50 years with the new left, rejecting its claims, and recently with the 1619 Project, insisting that all of America is just a footnote to slavery, so this has been going on for quite a while. Why, specifically, did you write this book? What are the charges you see being leveled against the American founding? Robert Reilly:Well, I wrote this book because the very people who should be defending the principles of the American founding are attacking it. And some of those people might be known as conservative Christians, Catholics, and so forth, who should be the new Michael Novaks, who should be praising the principles of the American founding within the context of Judaeo-Christian civilization, Greek philosophy, and its noble lineage. I believe it’s the dimensions of the catastrophe today that lead people, almost desperately, in search of a cause of it. Who did this to us, who’s responsible for it? They’ve arrived at this peculiar notion that the American founding did it to us, that it was a poison pill with a time release formula. They’re not doing that, and the reason I think they’re not is because they need to answer the question, whose responsible? Who put us in the degraded moral condition in which the United States exists today, with widespread pornography, a flood of drugs, the dissolution of the family, same sex marriage? Now, the transgender nonsense. But, where has this come from, and why have we so largely succumbed to it? To the point that we’ve had Supreme Court decisions saying some of these things are guaranteed by the Constitution? Richard Reinsch:Guaranteed by the word liberty, in the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, specifically. Robert Reilly:Well, and of course, by what Justice Anthony Kennedy called the autonomy of the individual, which is not something that is found in any of our founding documents, but fabricated by him. And then, of course for the legalization of same sex marriages. Now, the critics of the American founding on the Christian right are, basically, agreeing with Justice Kennedy, saying he’s right, the American founding was the product of a radical enlightenment thinking about the autonomy of the individual, and the perfectibility of the human being. Both of which notions are inimical to Christianity as it was practiced at that time, in the 18th Century, and indeed, is inimical to it today. I believe it’s the dimensions of the catastrophe today that lead people, almost desperately, in search of a cause of it. Who did this to us, who’s responsible for it? They’ve arrived at this peculiar notion that the American founding did it to us, that it was a poison pill with a time release formula. And, as we become less and less a Christian country, we conform more and more to these principles of radical enlightenment ideology. Richard Reinsch:What specifically is their claim, that in the American founding there are these principles of an unencumbered individualism? What do they cite, what do they list for that evidence? Robert Reilly:Well, that’s one of the interesting things. When I read their arguments in order to rebut them, they have very little to offer in textual evidence from the founding. The way they read the Declaration of Independence, and the way they read parts of the Federalist Papers are, I tried to show, completely wrongheaded. They misunderstand these texts, they get it wrong. Now, why do they do that so consistently? It’s because they’re looking through the wrong prism, and therefore they see the wrong thing. The prism is, basically, Hobbes, it’s a Hobbesian founding, and it is in this way. They take John Locke to be the primary influence on the founding, and of course, Locke was a big influence, and was mentioned from the pulpit in the state legislatures with frequency, he was broadly read. Now, they contend that John Locke was simply Thomas Hobbes with a smiley face. He was just a nicer version of Hobbes, with the same Hobbesian principles obtained in him, and therefore, leeched into the American founding through John Locke, and that’s why we are approximating a Hobbesian state today Richard Reinsch:When you say Hobbes with a smiley face, can you describe that more for us? Robert Reilly:Well, it’s that they would say the idea of a contract to which man consents in the foundation of a similar political order is based on nothing other than his will. Richard Reinsch:Okay. Robert Reilly:That it makes the will primary in political order, and it is not geared to any natural law or natural right. Even though those terms are used, they’re evacuated of their meaning. If you just strip those away, you see what’s really there, which is the Primacy of the Will. What I try to show in my book is that those statements of Locke are grounded in a great tradition. The first tradition in which it’s grounded most immediately is the thought of Thomas Hooker, and his laws of ecclesiastical policy. Hooker, as you know, was a powerful 16th Century thinker, he was a priest, and he was the first theologian of the Anglican church. What Hooker was facing was the radical Puritan thought at the time, which was against human laws, thought that the laws on England should be abolished, and we should be ruled only by the Bible. By the way, when you translate the Primacy of the Will politically, you ineluctably get Hobbes’ Leviathan. That’s what Hobbes does, he shows us what that means in a political order of absolute power of the Leviathan. But, that’s not what you get from Locke, you get an entirely different kind of democratic Constitutional order, based on the equality of all men, representation, the requirement of consent, and the right to revolution, the right to tyrannicide. All of these things, of course, aren’t present in Hobbes. Richard Reinsch:You also make the point in the book … I mean, I can find certain disturbing passages in Locke, that I think are nominalist, or seem to be admitting of, let’s say, certain individualistic tendencies. But, you make the point, which I think is well taken, that the founders read and used Locke as statesmen, themselves. They used him in a political constitutional sense of independence and limited government, not in a full anthropological, theological, epistemological manner that is alleged by thinkers like Michael Hanby or Patrick Deneen. Robert Reilly:That’s right. This was not an adoption of Locke’s epistemology and his letter on human understanding, it’s his second discourse on government. They took from Locke his very powerful arguments against the divine right of kings, and the absolute state. What I try to show in my book is that those statements of Locke are grounded in a great tradition. The first tradition in which it’s grounded most immediately is the thought of Thomas Hooker, and his laws of ecclesiastical policy. Hooker, as you know, was a powerful 16th Century thinker, he was a priest, and he was the first theologian of the Anglican church. What Hooker was facing was the radical Puritan thought at the time, which was against human laws, thought that the laws on England should be abolished, and we should be ruled only by the Bible. Everything else was superfluous He wrote against this, quite powerfully, and did so by resuscitating both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, particularly the Medieval articulation of the limits of political power, and the equality of men has a right to consent in representation, et cetera., and the respective spiritual and political realms, which are not coterminous. It’s hearkening back to the two swords teaching, that you give to feast the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s, which had been instantiated so completely in the Middle Ages. So, Hooker saved those things, let’s say he saved the reformation from itself by using Aristotle and Aquinas against the radical Puritan thinking. Locke quoted Hooker more often than anyone, regarding these basic things. Richard Reinsch:You note in the book, too, you said on this constitutional thinking, saying constitutional in a capacious sense, across the centuries of unwritten tradition that forms the American founding. You situate Locke, Hooker, Robert Bellarmine, 16th Century Jesuit, Francisco Suarez, another 16th Century Jesuit. These are thinkers who are, in many ways, in touch with a tradition that stretches across the centuries, urging the King is under law, basic notions of political consent, ideas of right of revolution, potentially. You show that this actually forms, or is recovered by, the American founding. The American founding is not, as you say, Hobbes with a smiley face, or individualism run amok, it’s a part of a grand tradition. Robert Reilly:Yes, absolutely. You will find articulations of these basic principles in those thinkers, that they come right out of the American founding. Richard Reinsch:You listed them. You have pages where you list parts of the Declaration, and how they mirror things in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and how they mirror what Bellarmine, and Suarez, and Hooker were saying earlier. I mean, I thought that was incredible. Robert Reilly:Yes. They sound like paraphrases of each other, don’t they? Richard Reinsch:Yes, definitely. Robert Reilly:Then, also let’s not forget Algernon Sidney, and his discourses on government. He, too, relied on Hooker a great deal, but he also acknowledged Suarez and Bellarmine. The reason he, more or less, had to do that is that the book defending the divine right of kings, written by Robert Filmer called Patriarcha, was basically addressed to the arguments made by Bellarmine and Suarez, and it was an attempt at refutation of them. Filmer was an honest enough writer that he would take large chunks out of Bellarmine and say, “Here’s what the schoolmen say, the scholastics. And, here’s what I say, and here’s what Suarez says.” He quotes Bellarmine the most, Suarez the second. When Sydney’s writing his refutation of Patriarcha, he grudgingly acknowledges Bellarmine, a hard thing for a Protestant to say, “This Catholic Cardinal’s got it right.” And he says, “But Bellarmine really is doing nothing but expressing the commonsense of mankind.” Which is no slight on Bellarmine, because that’s what Bellarmine himself says he’s doing. Because they’re all appealing to the same tradition of natural law as against the supremacy, the absolute supremacy of the state, whether it’s articulated in a totally secular way, as it was with Locke, or in the Divine Right of Kings way, as it was by James the First, or Robert Filmer. The thing is, the absolute state as it appeared in the 17th Century, was something new. It was totally alien to the entire Medieval mindset, as it denied all the basic constitutional principles which had been developed at that time. As you just mentioned a little earlier, Richard, indeed my book makes the case that the American founding is a return to those principles, it’s a restoration of them. So, you can’t see it just simply as a creature of the radical enlightenment, when it is grounded in this great tradition. What are the ideas that make the American founding conceivable, and from where did they come? What ideas do you need to have to conceive of such a thing, a political enterprise such as the American founding? That’s what I tried to trace. It, of course, predates Locke by millennia. Richard Reinsch:You know, a lot of people, I think, would say you seem to be switching categories, or switching received wisdom here. Isn’t it the Medieval period that’s the problem, and the enlightenment is a solution? When we say there’s a recovery here, of Medieval principles, what are specifically … maybe we can talk a bit about those Medieval principles. And, are we talking about England, primarily? Robert Reilly:Well, England, no, no we’re not except later on. Richard Reinsch:But, that’s what’s going to be most important, immediately. Robert Reilly:Yeah, but England withstood some of the absolute trends and tendencies that took over on the continent, which were under Roman law, and England chose not to go with Roman law which is one reason why freedom was preserved there, to a greater extent. Let me just give a little larger perspective of the book, Richard. The question the book asks is, what are the ideas that make the American founding conceivable, and from where did they come? What ideas do you need to have to conceive of such a thing, a political enterprise such as the American founding? That’s what I tried to trace. It, of course, predates Locke by millennia. As you know, I start in pre-philosophic man, to show what that looked like, and we go through the significance of the discovery of Greek philosophy, of universal truths and principles, the revolutionary revelation of Israel, of monotheism, of a transcendent God who creates ex nihilo, and makes man in his own image and likeness, extraordinary in the sea of polytheism that the Jewish people adhered to, this teaching that there is only one God. The significance of that, with Greek philosophy, as both came to be assimilated in Christianity, is extraordinary. And, as I talked about Greek philosophy, as you know, including the pre-Socractics, they wondered … First of all, we observed that there is an order in creation, there’s an order in nature. It’s a rational order, and with our reason we seem able to apprehend it. Now, where did this rational order come from? The speculation is there must be a divine intelligence behind it, it must be a manifestation of a divine intelligence. Richard Reinsch:Plato reaches that verdict. Robert Reilly:Plato reaches that, but before him, Heraclitus does, too. Because I believe it’s Heraclitus or Anaximander who first uses the word logos to describe this divine intelligence that is responsible for the rational order in creation and for man’s reason. Logos, of course, as you know, the Greek word for reason, or speech. Or, that’s the way they spoke of it, which makes intelligible the gospel of Saint John, when he says, “In the beginning, was logos. In the beginning was the word, and the logos was with God, and the word was God, and all things are made through Him as logos.” Which means that now we know why we have a rational creation, because the creator is, Himself, this reason logos. With the added astonishment, can you imagine if Heraclitus, having speculated on logos, met Him coming through the door? Then, indeed is Christ, entering his creation. But, this logos is not simply logos, the mystery of man, who we know is made in the image and likeness of God, the mystery of man is revealed in the infinite love of Christ. I would say our civilization is based on Genesis, that man is made in the image and likeness of God. That is the source of our conception of human rights. Richard Reinsch:Yeah. It’s difficult to argue ho…

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    How the Academics Made Progressivism All-American May 01, 2020
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    Richard Reinsch: Today we’re talking with Brad Watson about his new book, Progressivism: The Strange History of a Radical Idea. Brad is a professor of politics at St. Vincent College. He’s the author and editor of many books. I’ll mention one that I’ve read. It came out in 2009, Living Constitution, Dying Faith. Brad is also a reformed Canadian patriot. He told me about some quality time he spent this past summer at the US/Canadian border. Not because of Trump’s fascist America but, I think, of incompetence of border officials. Brad’s also the Sage of Latrobe, Pennsylvania. It’s not Arnold Palmer, it’s Brad. Welcome to the program. Brad Watson: Well, thank you, Richard, for that introduction and thank you for having me. Richard Reinsch: So, thinking about progressivism and maybe, just for the benefit of our listeners, maybe catch us up to speed a bit on progressivism. Give us a working definition of what it is and what it aims to do. Brad Watson: The definition that I use in this book, just to kind of set the table for what I’m talking about, which is how historians over the course of the 20th century systematically distorted the idea of progressivism. Progressivism, as I define it, is the idea that the principled American constitutionalism of fixed natural rights and limited and dispersed powers has to be overturned and replaced by an organic evolutionary model of the Constitution that facilitates the authority of experts dedicated to the expansion of the public sphere, the expansion of political control and especially at the national level. Liberalism has never really had an honest conversation with itself about this because the liberal historians who define the progressive narratives in the 20th century didn’t really come clean. The progressives in the late part of the 19th century, early part of the 20th century, were very suspicious of the Founders’ Constitution as limiting the power of the state, all the things that progressives want to do. So the story of my book is really the story of the academic biases and blind spots of professional academics, especially historians, who simply do not tell this story either honestly or completely. They make this what I claim is a radical progressive idea, hostility to the Founders’ Constitution. They try to domesticate it, to make it non-threatening and therefore, I think, forward to this book, friend Charles Kesler said liberalism has never really had an honest conversation with itself about this because the liberal historians who define the progressive narratives in the 20th century didn’t really come clean. Sometimes I think they were willfully blind to these things and sometimes inadvertently blind. Richard Reinsch: What composes progressivism? The critique you present, I think, is well known or that they are at odds with the American Founders with the limited Constitution. But what are they drawing from? Where are they getting this? Brad Watson: Yeah. The progressives in the early going drew from a number of intellectual currents that were floating around, really, in America, and in Europe to a certain extent almost immediately after the age of Lincoln. So I trace the origins of progressivism to two or three distinct strains of thoughts but sort of related strains of thought. One is social Darwinism. With the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, Darwinian concepts were just in the water, as it were, among the intellectual classes. Darwinism, of course, insists that evolution, change, growth, is always and everywhere good, a sign of strength. And stasis, or fixity, including the fixity of the Founders’ natural rights Constitution will get in the way of necessarily organic evolutionary growth. Overlaid on top of that, where it was the philosophy of pragmatism, which was really a distinctly American philosophy, if there is a philosophy that owes its origins to Americans, it’s probably pragmatism. Which suggests that experimental methods and means are likely to prove the situation, anything that gets in the way of constant experimentation, again, and the fixed Constitution does that to a certain degree of political sphere. Anything that gets in the way of that kind of experimentation is dangerous. And then, finally, some American progressives are influenced by categories of German idealism, a kind of worship of the state, the confidence that history is moving toward a concentrated, rational state and we shouldn’t get in the way of that inexorable political movement. All of these things cut against the old Founders’ Constitution view that certain things are fixed. The Constitution fixes the leaps and bounds of our common life together. And the way we effect change is through the consent of a republican people. The progressives always want to displace the consent of the informed people with reported expertise, the people who understand the dynamic of history, the people in the tweed jackets who sit around academic offices and government offices, really understand where history is going. So social Darwinism, pragmatism, and German ideals put together form a potent intellectual cocktail which morphs into, by the early 20th century, into what we have come to see as intellectual progressivism and eventually that, of course, the father of modern liberalism, New Deal Liberalism, Great Society Liberalism. Richard Reinsch: Thinking about progressivism, I want to get more into your book on how the historians and other academics have told the history of progressivism. But you would be a part of the notion that progressivism is a foreign import to these shores, Germany being a primary place where it starts. And American academics go to German universities and learn things and those ideas are then brought back to America universities, most notably John Hopkins, the University of Wisconsin. Brad Watson: Right. Hopkins, Wisconsin. I talk about these places a little bit in my book, and some of the people who were there. In terms of it being a foreign import to American shores, yes and no. There are certainly strains of, as I say, there’s this German idealism among some of the progressives. But others I would say are picking up on more what I would characterize as indigenously American intellectual phenomena, such as pragmatism, social Darwinism. In some ways, social Darwinism had its most prominent adherence in the late 19th century in the United States. So you can’t simply ascribe it to a kind of foreign virus infecting America or something like that. Richard Reinsch: The German invasion. Brad Watson: The German invasion, right. I don’t want to overstate the German invasion. I know some people broadly on my side of things want to attribute all of this progressive phenomenon to the German invasion but there’s a good deal of, I think, indigenous roots to this, too. Richard Reinsch: On this point of the German invasion, I guess I ask that question because I agree with you. I think there’s an indigenous part of this. There’s also Americans writing much sooner than the later, than the last quarter of the 19th century. One that sticks out in my mind is Orestes Brownson, who was a major public figure, writer, in the 19th century in America who, in the 1820s, in the 1830s, is sort of channeling a lot of liberation theology, a lot of humanism. He’s a disciple of Kant at one point in his career and, I know, broadly articulates a progressive approach, a very muscular, progressive approach to government and sort of a rejection, in his writings, of how American government is understood at that time and the way he interprets the Declaration of Independence as being not necessarily about natural rights but about some sort of broad humanitarian emancipation. So I agree with you there. I’m thinking the ideas do seem to come together in a very powerful way, though, with academic learning from Germans. So here’s my question. Why have they been… Or I don’t know if you agree with this. They seem to have been very successful in the academy, in American universities in the 20th century, and very successful politically. Not yet having remade our Constitution into their image but, at times it seems, getting closer and closer and closer. Brad Watson: Yes. The academy, I think we all know, has long been dominated by what many of us would call liberals or even radicals, in some cases. But, really, the origins of modern American academic disciplines, I’m thinking now about political science. I’m a political scientist. I’m thinking also about history, and in this book I’m dealing mostly with historians. I like to say I’m not a historian but I play one for the purposes of this book. I’m really dissecting and deconstructing the peripheral or progressive historian’s approach to things. These disciplines were really founded, invented, the Modern American Political Science Association, the American Historical Association. These were founded in the late 19th or early 20th century as adjuncts of ways of channeling progressive ideologies, specifically into the American academies. So in a way it’s not accidental. The progressives were there at the foundation of modern American academic disciplines. The disciplines, primarily among the academic disciplines that really try to transmit the American story, history political science. So in a way it’s not something accidental that so many liberals inhabit these disciplines because the disciplines were set up precisely to channel progressive ideology, at least in the United States. In Teddy Roosevelt you see this interesting mixture of progressive elements with, to a certain extent, the old language of American politics. Richard Reinsch: On the point of just the success of progressivism politically, one thought that I’ve had, and I’m interested to hear your thoughts, it arises in the, politically, as we’ve been discussing, turn of the 20th century, later part of the 19th, and then sort of explodes. Teddy Roosevelt referred to it as Hegel on horseback. Woodrow Wilson. And then we have the 1920s where the brakes get put on. Is there something quintessentially American about progressivism in the sense of a people who settle a continent, who set up commerce throughout the continent, who build railroads, who settle it, who have experienced amazing gains in wealth in industry and technology and the whole American settlement story? Is it not then the case that you would then take, “And we can do this in government,” or, “We can improve government. We can make it stronger, more precise. We can make it do more.” What do you think of that? Brad Watson: Yeah. Well, I’ll say something about Teddy Roosevelt. It’s not quite as poetic as Hegel on horseback, but he’s really more of a kind of social Darwinist/pragmatist on horseback, I think, than Hegel. Now, Woodrow Wilson is a progressive successor. He’s more influenced by Hegel, I think. But in Teddy Roosevelt you see this interesting mixture of progressive elements with, to a certain extent, the old language of American politics, which I think you’re alluding to, which is a kind of sense of the possibilities, the fluidity of American society and the openness of the frontier, the striving that defines Americans. So the question really becomes if these old categories are close or not to the new progressive categories. And I don’t think they are that close because progressivism as it comes down to us really embodies not just good old fashioned American striving or desire for economic improvement, advancement, the settlement of the frontier, whatever. But, really, a philosophy of history. A belief that history is unfolding inexorably and inevitably in a certain direction and it requires expert superintendents in order to get it there. The older language of American politics had, I think, a more bottom-up flavor, a self-governing people striving for greatness, as it we’re, whereas the progressive vision is bound up with this philosophy of history and this top-down model. TR is interesting because he’s kind of a transitional figure between these two worlds, the old language of American politics and the new, whereas Woodrow Wilson is more explicitly the new language of the enlightened administration. Richard Reinsch: On the enlightened administration point, do we still believe in that? We have the sort of inertia of massive bureaucracy and administration and we have, as I ask you that question, no small amount of ink is spilled on, including in Law & Liberty, on the decline of self government, the decline of Congress. And yet do Americans really believe in rule by experts or the best and the brightest? Isn’t that a point of mockery now? Is that aspect of progressivism still alive? Brad Watson: Yeah. This is interesting. Functionally, of course, we’re stuck with this legacy of progressivism. But one of the interesting things about the United States, I think, compared to, frankly, most other advanced liberal democracies, which you’re aware I’m originally a native of Canada, as you mentioned. It seems to me there is less resistance among the people in most advanced liberal democracies to this idea of expert rule, top-down rule. They’re more complacent. But the Americans are less complacent. So that raises the question, what accounts for our, at least residual, distrust of expertise? I think, at least relative to other countries. And I think part of the answer to that is simply the enduring power of the American Founders’ Constitution, the enduring power of republican ideas, the enduring power of American imagery linked to the Founders’ notions of a self-governing people who take responsibility for their own affairs. I think whether America has become a fully progressive nation, it kind of depends I think on where you’re coming from. When I first moved to the United States I used to say to some of my lamenting conservative friends who always think the American cup is half empty. Coming from Canada, I think it’s half full. Americans are not quite as comfortable with this model of top-down government that some other people are. So there’s a battle for the American soul, I think, still going on. In broad terms you can describe it as the Founders’ America versus progressive America. We’ve moved a lot in the direction of progressive America, toward a vision of expert rule, but we’re not fully there yet. There’s a lot of Americans who still resent it or are still willing to fight against it. To some extent I think the Trump phenomenon is a reflection of this, right? The peasants are out and they have their pitchforks. They’re as mad as hell and they’re not going to take it anymore, even if it’s a little bit inchoate in some instances. It’s there. It runs through and through, I think, American politics and always has. Although recently we’re told by our betters that we have to behave ourselves and, in some respect, our betters are now on the Supreme Court and we just have to accept whatever these experts hand down to us. A lot of Americans still don’t buy it, so it’s a complicated question. Richard Reinsch: Yeah, I know. And a part of that, too, I think is the institutions progressives have built increasingly don’t look so lovely and don’t seem to have- Brad Watson: Exactly. They’re not working. Richard Reinsch: Yeah, they’re not working very well. They don’t seem to have, I don’t know, inspiration, imagination, a hold on people. Particularly higher education, I think a lot about you’re obviously invested in greatly. And even if we think about the most progressive states in this country, the moving van test, which way are the moving vans pointed. They’re pointed towards the benighted conservative red states. There’s where most economic growth and population growth is happening in this country, including for our left-wing millennials. They’re moving to these states, also, to find a job. So I think that all should be said. Now, tell the story or help us understand how academics wrote about the progressive emergence. Brad Watson: Y…

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    Rumors of the Death of the American Dream Are Greatly Exaggerated Apr 15, 2020
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch:Hello and welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Michael Strain, author of the new book, The American Dream Is Not Dead: (But Populism Could Kill It). Michael Strain is an economist. He is resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he is the Director of Economic Policy Studies. You will know him, as I do, as a long time contributor to public debates and discussions from an economics perspective. He’s a regular columnist at Bloomberg, and is someone that I have found very useful in thinking about all of these issues surrounding debates about wage growth, labor productivity, unemployment statistics, and just sort of the general matter of discussion these days on economic questions. Richard Reinsch:Michael, welcome to the program. Michael Strain:Thanks so much for having me on. It’s great to be here. Richard Reinsch:So thinking about your book, now, you address the American Dream, the question of the American Dream, from an economics perspective. How are you defining the American Dream and why is it not dead? I focus on that economic component and I look at some very standard economic questions. “Are wages stagnant?” “Do workers see the fruits of their labor rewarded?” “Do the gains from the economy only accrue to the top?” “Has quality of life improved?” “Has household income gone up?” “Have the forces of creative destruction created economic opportunities for middle-class American?” “And is America still upwardly mobile?” Michael Strain:So I think about the American Dream of being an amorphous kind of thing that encapsulates many things. People think about strong communities, people think about home ownership, and people think about strong families and things of that nature. I think central to anyone’s definition of the American Dream is a large economic component. The idea that hard work will pay off, the idea that you can better your economic situation and see your wages and income go up, and especially the idea that your children will do better economically than you. So in the book, I focus on that economic component and I look at some very standard economic questions. “Are wages stagnant?” “Do workers see the fruits of their labor rewarded?” “Do the gains from the economy only accrue to the top?” “Has quality of life improved?” “Has household income gone up?” “Have the forces of creative destruction created economic opportunities for middle-class American?” “And is America still upwardly mobile?” I define in part, the standard questions that people ask. “Do kids grow up to do better than their parents?” I look at all those. And I walk away with the conclusion that the American Dream is alive and well. Now, that’s not to say that we should be satisfied. Of course, we can always have even faster wage growth, even faster income growth, even more upward mobility. And it’s not to deny any of the real challenges that are facing American workers in American households. Most notably the coronavirus spread, which materialized after the book was published. But at least to say that when you kind of look over the long sweep, when you look over a 30-year period, a three-decade period, you see substantial economic progress. The progress is not uninterrupted. There are of course challenges and setbacks that occur along the way, and right now we’re facing a serious challenge with coronavirus. But the long story is the story of economic progress. Richard Reinsch:I want to get into the book. Real quick, as an economist looking at the recent stimulus bill that was passed and how the federal government is managing the situation, do you see troubling long-term trends that could develop from this? Or is it as many would say, the government is reacting to this unprecedented crisis in a novel way, but things can hopefully be put back together again once it’s over? Michael Strain:Yeah, I think the government’s response has been about right. The scale of this crisis and the suddenness with which it hit the economy are unprecedented. Right now, there are something like 250 million Americans being told to stay at home, over three-quarters of the people who live in this country. Over 30 states have lock-down orders. Well over a dozen cities have lock-down orders, and Washington DC is locked down as well. Just this morning we learned that in the two week period that ended on March 28th, 10 million people filed for unemployment insurance benefits for the first time. That dwarfs by a factor of 10 any previous weekly increase in unemployment insurance claims. Richard Reinsch:Yeah, that’s a massive number. Michael Strain:It’s a massive number. I mean, obviously it’s very hard to forecast, but we could easily end up with annualized quarterly GDP growth of negative 30% or higher for the current quarter. We can end up with a 10% or 15% unemployment rate as peak. I mean, this could be a really, really bad economic situation. And so, I think Congress was right to act very quickly and aggressively, and I think the program they put together has a lot of really good components to it. The million dollar question is, of course, how aggressive will this virus be? And we don’t know. We don’t know that. If the virus, if it’s on a more aggressive side, we may need even more. If it’s on the less aggressive side, then we will be back open in the late spring or early summer and things may be relatively normal. And so I think it’s just very hard to know. Richard Reinsch:Do you see anything bothering you though? Things that I’ve read, the extent of Treasury having something like a $500 billion portfolio to loan out money to businesses. And then of course, it seems what I’ve read, a new step of Treasury taking ownership stakes and companies that were buying bonds, corporate bonds, commercial paper, things like that to float companies forward. I understand that, but sort of making our economy more centralized and more brittle long term. Michael Strain:I’m worried about the potential downsides of that $500 billion fund, for sure. I think that there will be some extraordinary and unusual things that the government is going to do. I don’t expect any of those things to be permanent. I mean, the government took an ownership stake in some companies 12 years ago with TARP. TARP ended up making money for the taxpayer, and the government no longer owns car companies or owns any stakes in car companies, or things of that nature. So I think everybody recognizes that extraordinary measures have been taken, but that they’re emergency measures that won’t last. Giving that much money to Treasury to allocate as it sees fit is something that raises an eyebrow, and we’ll see how they do with that. Hopefully everything with that works out reasonably well. That’s one part of the larger package. I mean, the total amount of money that’s been spent on this is $2 trillion, $2.2 trillion, something like that. And for that, $500 billion is kind of a minority part of the whole package. Richard Reinsch:Yeah. Thinking about your book then, or returning to the American Dream, you have an opening passage that I wanted to read and then I’ll ask you a question and get your comment. You say, “The American Dream is not dead. It is surprising that such a sentence would be so controversial, but it is. If you’re looking for bipartisan consensus, start here. Leading politicians and presidential candidates from both parties have voiced agreement on these points: America is no longer an upwardly mobile society.” And then a couple of lines down, “The game is rigged for everyone but those at the top.” Why is that sentiment so pervasive? And I’ll say 2016, 2017, that’s actually how I came across your work. I started to think maybe my own thinking about the free market and the American story, that I had missed a lot of facts to have the political situation turn out the way it had. And so I was willing to question a lot of my prior beliefs and did a lot of my own research. And of course, it’s not something that’s gone away. It’s been a part of the Democratic primary contest, and it’s sort of become the lingua franca of a lot of particularly younger conservatives as they think about politics. Michael Strain:Yeah. I mean, I think it’s a combination of things. I think one factor, and I talk about this in the book, is that we do have real challenges. If you’re an adult male worker without a high school degree, you have a hard time. Now, that’s a very small share of the overall population, but that’s a serious concern to be sure. There are some towns that have been left behind by technological automation. Again, it’s a very small minority of towns. It’s even a minority of towns that back in the ’70s were manufacturing centers. But those problems do exist. The opioid epidemic was a real thing, is a real thing, excuse me. We have seen a very troubling increase in the number of suicides. And I could go on as well. So there are real pockets of problems in American society and in the American economy. I think we focus so much on those pockets of problems that we miss the broader story. So what I wanted to do was zoom out to the 30,000 foot level and say, okay, yes, there are problems. There are challenges. There’s no question about it. Don’t want to deny those, don’t want to minimize them. But most people are not residents of a failing town. Most people are not 50 year old men without a high school diploma trying to make it in today’s labor market. I wanted to characterize what is the experience for typical Americans in typical situations. What does the economy look like at the 30,000 foot level for most people. And so that’s the purpose of the book. I mean, there are other reasons too, I think, that this narrative is so common. One reason is that bad news sells, and if you’re an aspiring politician trying to get people to vote for you, you need a rallying cry. And often that rallying cry is more successful if it focuses on bad news rather than good news. Another reason I think this narrative is so prevalent, it’s the Great Recession. And the Great Recession was really, really bad. And millions and millions of workers and households were hit so hard financially and economically from the recession. And until three weeks ago we were, economically speaking, we had recovered from the Great Recession. But we had not like psychologically recovered from that. And I think it still lingered quite a bit in people’s minds. So there are a bunch of reasons of why I think the narrative is so prevalent. But, I also think the narrative is wrong, and that’s what I tried to demonstrate in my book. Richard Reinsch:You talk about isolated cases and maybe things that aren’t so representative. Many though point to just generally say, “Well, wages haven’t gone up for people in the 50th percentile, much less people in the 20th percentile, 30th percentile of income, their wages have been stagnant. That’s constant.” And I think I’ve heard that for going back since I was a college student, I remember people saying this or reading this, that’s not necessarily new, but it’s sort of the way we think about the economy now. And this is sort of the support for increasing the minimum wage or having the government be more involved in healthcare, things like that. People on, not just on the left, but also traditionally conservative minded people like an Oren Cass have argued this should bring us back to an industrial policy because what’s missing are the evaporation of industrial jobs, only to free trade and some do automation, although it’s more automation than free trade. But, we should bring these things back and this would help get wages up. This would help get men back into the workforce. This would solidify families, small towns and these are, I think they would argue more general things, not just isolated things. How do you respond to that? Michael Strain:So, I question the premise. In the book I share a bit, if you look over the last 30 years at average wages for production and nonsupervisory workers. That is average wages for workers who are production workers in manufacturing and construction workers in construction or workers who aren’t managers in the services sector. That’s about 80% of all workers. You can think of those as workers, not bosses. Average wages for that group have gone up by a third over the last three decades. I show that median wages have gone up. I showed the wages at the 20th and 10th percentile have actually gone up faster than the median over the last three decades. I showed that income, which includes wages, but also includes other extremes of financial resources, has gone up even more over the past three decades. So the first thing I would do is just dispute the premise. When you mentioned that you heard that when you were a college student, the data shows that average wages for a typical worker did stagnate or decline from say the early 1970s to the early 1990s. So if you were hearing this, as a lot of people were when Bill Clinton was running for President, the message was true at that time. And a lot of people are still kind of stuck there. So it’s not to say that there’s nothing to this story, but if you go back over 30 years, if you go back from 1990 to 2020, what you actually see is the stagnation story is just not right. It’s just not accurate. It was accurate for the ’70s and ’80s, it’s not accurate for 1990 to the present. And that I think is … it’s something that has just been missing from the debate. Richard Reinsch:Something that I’ve found, and I’d like to get your comment maybe just broadly on this, because I know you’ve encountered this in doing research as an economist. And I’m a non-economist, I’m a lawyer by training. But when I read studies of income growth, I am whipsawed by how many different conclusions people come to, or I say how many different, but different stories we might say of decline, of stagnation or of growth. I mean just help people, when people see these studies, measuring, comparing incomes, what’s generally your approach to thinking about that? What are people doing when we see consistently incomes decline? And one of the things you talk about in the book is which deflator do you use? I’ve noticed Oren Cass, who someone who is claiming that wages have stagnated or declined, always uses CPI, but you make a claim, Scott Winship, another person who argues wages have increased, insist on using the PCE deflator, which seems to be a better way to account for how people actually navigate in the marketplace with prices. Could you talk about that some and just the difficulty of measuring income? Michael Strain:Yeah, it’s very difficult. I mean you have to, the first thing you have to do is define income. So what counts as income? Do you include wages? Yes. I think everybody agrees that you should include wages. What about non-wage benefits like health insurance, things of that nature? Do you include that? Do you make allowances for taxes? Do you subtract tax payments from people’s wages to compute their income? Do you add in government transfer payments? Some of those payments take the form of cash. Some of them don’t. Do you, for example, include Medicaid benefits in people’s wages? If you do, how do you value and how do you assign a dollar value to Medicaid benefits? So you have to define income. Then you have to define whose income. Are you talking about individual workers? Are you talking about households? If you’re talking about households, how do you adjust for the fact that household size has changed so much? The third thing you have to do is account for inflation. As you mentioned, there are different ways of accounting for inflation over time. And another thing you have to do is figure out over what time period you’re interested in making the comparison. So I think you’re right that a lot of this debate among analysts comes down to this question of how do you account for price changes? That’s…

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    Crisis of the Roberts Court Apr 01, 2020
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    Richard Reinsch: Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. I’m your host, Richard Reinsch. Today we’re talking with Michael Greve about his new essay in National Affairs entitled “Is the Roberts Court Legitimate?” Listeners of Liberty Law Talk and readers of Law & Liberty will know Michael Greve well. He’s been with us from the beginning, since 2012. He was one of the first podcasts on his book The Upside-Down Constitution. Greve is professor at the Antonin Scalia Law School, author and editor of a number of books, and a great writer and someone who can make you laugh while also making you think. I’ve appreciated his contributions over the years. Mike, welcome to the program. Michael Greve:Thanks Richard. Richard Reinsch:Mr. Greve, the title, “Is the Roberts Court Legitimate?”. Now, apart from protestors dressed as Handmaid’s Tale actresses shrieking in front of the courts in Washington in protest, Justice Kavanaugh, et cetera, who says the Roberts Court might not be legitimate? Michael Greve:The first thing, and you’ll forgive me, but those crazies, the slightly more unhinged members of our public discourse, they in fact have champions in the legal academy as well. Richard Reinsch:Names available upon request or … Michael Greve:Don’t get me into trouble here. Some of the attacks in the blogosphere and even in law reviews have been dismayingly vehement and slightly unhinged. Michael Greve:Underneath that, it seems to me there is a real question about the public credibility of the court at large. Both Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts as well as a large number of appellate judges have begun to worry about the talk and the atmosphere and the public debate that has begun to surround the court and the federal judiciary in general to the effect that more and more people believe that the federal judiciary is just one more combatant in the political debate as distinct from, well, an independent judiciary that protects and safeguards the Constitution. All that stuff has become corrosive. There are legitimate worries about what Richard Fallon, for example, a highly regarded professor at Harvard, has called the sociological legitimacy of the Supreme Court. That is to say its public acceptance and credibility. That’s what most of the essay is actually about. It’s not the crazed attacks. Richard Reinsch:On this point, the Roberts Court, I remember just in my lifetime, criticisms of the court are frequently said to be questioning its legitimacy. One thinks of Bush v. Gore and the aftermath of that. I think about Justice Sandra Day O’Connor trying to respond to criticisms of the court and implying they were questioning the court’s legitimacy. This isn’t exactly new, as you know. Many listeners will say we’ve been wondering about the court for a long time, particularly conservatives, particularly on rights claims where any rights claim that’s been accepted by the intelligentsia, it’s preordained, the outcome when it comes before the Supreme Court no matter how many appointed Republican appointed justices are on the court. When you say Roberts Court, what is it about this court that people are questioning? Michael Greve:First of all, that’s a terrific point. I am actually somewhat critical of the high-mindedness or of an attitude that says any criticism of the court runs the risk of undermining its legitimacy. At some level it’s good to have public criticism of the Supreme Court. What strikes me as new and a little bit worrisome is several things. First of all is just the vehemence and the personal nature of the attacks on individual justices. Again, that is not completely new. We’ve had these episodes before but it’s reached levels that, I think, are troublesome. The second thing is that a lot of the critiques of the court that are now being brought forth have no constitutional or legal reference point at all. It’s just whose ox is being gored. While that is always an undercurrent in the debate, the complete disconnect from any kind of serious or halfway serious legal argument, that worries me as well. The third thing is simply something that has nothing to do with the court per se. It’s just the deep division and polarization of our politics in general. That makes the whole debate more corrosive and troublesome. It increases the difficulties for the court now and going forward, it seems to me. Richard Reinsch:Is much of this about Donald Trump, the Kavanaugh appointment, the Kavanaugh battle, the desire to de-legitimize what could be years and years of rule by a conservative majority on the Supreme Court that has not been seen in quite some time and the desire to lessen legitimacy coming from that, particularly on these questions of abortion, religious freedom? Perhaps we see the court for the first time since Roe v. Wade not expanding individual rights every term in some way. All of that strikes me as part of this. Michael Greve:Yeah. I think there’s a great deal to that. My sense is that we would have had that problem even with a president who is somewhat more within ordinary American politics and standards of political decorum. Any conservative president would have appointed justices who are very much like Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch. I don’t think there’s any doubt about it. The more structural, serious issue, which you alluded to is, and this is something that is rather unprecedented I think in American politics, you are looking at a court that will have a conservative majority very likely for quite some time in a very, very divided country that is divided, so a 50/50 where either party may gain control of the White House and of the Congress at one time or another. It’s a court that has an identifiable political coloration in a very divided country. That’s something new and something worth thinking about. I’m sure that that is on the justices minds for much of the time. Richard Reinsch:You have this term you use in the essay, “the court’s latent legitimacy.” Talk about that and perhaps the waning of that latent legitimacy. Michael Greve:I didn’t make that up. It’s the political scientists. Richard Reinsch:So they made it up. Michael Greve:They made it up, yeah. What they mean by that is if you look at public opinion polls, Gallup polls and a lot of other polls, approval of the court, confidence in the court correlates, obviously, at some level quite highly with partisan affiliation. Currently, Republicans are very high on the court and have a lot of confidence in it, and Democrats not so much. What political scientists mean by latent legitimacy is an undercurrent of public sentiment that yeah, we trust that these guys and gals on the court will by and large try to do the right thing and enforce the law as they see it even if we don’t agree with this, that or the other decision that comes along so that the court doesn’t constantly have to look to the partisan implications of whatever cases before them but can have reasonable confidence that its rulings will be accepted as lawful, conscientious, and legitimate. Richard Reinsch:Something I kept looking for in your essays, I think John McGinness has written about on Law & Liberty a few times is how much of the court’s work isn’t really traceable to partisanship in a wide number of areas where it’s really hard for someone to look at this and think there’s an ideological outcome, that there is, in fact, real judicial craftsmanship going on. You talk about that some later on in some cases. Do you see that, that there’s a huge mis-story here and what we really just see are a couple of opinions in June every year? Michael Greve:Yes. That’s my strong opinion. Justice Gorsuch has made this point repeatedly and it’s a terrific point, it seems to me. The indeterminacy in the law and the extent to which law is or can be driven by the justice’s ideological intonations is grossly overstated. There are hundreds of thousands of cases rattling around in the federal judiciary. Relatively few of them are appealed to Courts of Appeal. When they are, even those decisions are mostly unanimous. When they get to the Supreme Court, which due to its discretionary dockets, picks cases where lower courts have disagreed or cases that are genuinely difficult, even then you get a ton of unanimous or near unanimous rulings, cases in which the justices don’t vote or rule in an expected way. It’s only a relative handful of highly visible cases over really incendiary issues where those kinds of things break down. When you look at the tragedy, so to speak, of our immobilized political discourses, of course, people then focus on those particular cases and that drives public perceptions of what law and the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary are all about. That’s a gross and wild misperception, and it’s hard to counteract Richard Reinsch:I suppose the exceptions prove the rule because the nature of politics is to rule, to command, to order, and reshape a society. Some of these opinions do do that, particularly over time. They shape the way we think, live, talk, what we think we can say, what we think we can’t say, think. All these sorts of things come out. I suppose in a way it’s a small part but it’s really the biggest part, it seems to me. Michael Greve:Yeah. I don’t deny that at all. Richard Reinsch:You make that point at one point in your addressing Richard Fallon. You’ve already mentioned the Harvard Law professor who wants to lessen the power of the court but except not over rights cases. Michael Greve:That’s one major or one theme of this essay. What the Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence over the past several decades has done is simply turn rights into trumps and instruments of interest group and identity politics. There’s no easy way out of that. My advice to the court if it wants it and even if it doesn’t want it is to tread lightly in those domains. As an initial matter, for example, you can have all sorts of opinions about same sex marriage but that’s mostly water under the bridge. It seems to me a huge reliance interests at stake now. It would be not a good thing for the country, let’s put it that way, if the court or somebody else were to reopen that particular can of worms. This is true of rights, debates, wherever you look. They’re mostly zero sum games. They’re so now intermingled and so closely connected to identity politics and interest group politics that the Supreme Court is just superintending compromises among those groups. That’s by and large not a good thing. It’s a very, very difficult arena where I think the court ought to tread lightly. What I have in mind is, and what makes me a little more hopeful is that I think the predominant theme of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence now and going forward is the courts and the judiciaries relation to the executive. That is an area where it’s not zero sum and where interest group coalitions and constellations are a lot more fluid, where there’s a lot more room to do productive work in the sense of reconstitutionalizing American politics to some extent. Richard Reinsch:I want to get to that. I want to get to that in a minute because there’s a lot there. I also want to think; one, about Congress and the court. You’ve written on that. And also this term you introduced and maybe we’ve been talking about it, “constitutional rot.” Are we in danger of constitutional rot? Michael Greve:Yeah. There has been a lot of agitation. We’re having a constitutional crisis. You read the newspapers, and this has come up. Lots of people, law professors and politicians and bloggers and pundits … Richard Reinsch:Whose ox is getting gored? We’re having a constitutional crisis. Michael Greve:The various fears and I fear this will come up again in this presidential election. The country is coming apart and it’s a constitutional crisis. I want to resist that a little. To me a constitutional crisis is tanks on Pennsylvania Avenue and we’re not remotely there. What I think is worrisome and worth thinking about this gradual disintegration of constitutional norms that were once taken for granted by and large observed by partisans on both sides because they figure, look, one of these days we may lose an election and then we’d want our opponents to treat us with respect. There’s some value in having those constitutional norms obeyed and preserved. A lot of those unwritten small c-constitutional norms have I think eroded over the past decades and that’s not a good thing. That’s what I’m a little bit nervous about. Richard Reinsch:The constitutional rot question. Let’s talk about Congress and how that affects your analysis. Michael Greve:To borrow a phrase from Yuval Levin, Congress is a platform, not an institution. It consists of 535 political entrepreneurs. It has become immobilized to a dismaying extent. There are lots of examples of this. The president’s tariffs. Everybody understands that the unbelievable amount of discretion that the president enjoys in imposing tariffs on just about anything and anyone for any reason he sees fit- Richard Reinsch:And statutorily … Michael Greve:You ought to be able to cobble together some bipartisan coalition that says, “No, wait a minute. This is not a good idea. We ought to put some limits on it.” Apparently, it can’t be done. That stuff is being litigated. The same is true over the diversion of funds or whatever you want to call it, the reallocation of funds for building a wall and on and on and on. While the executive motors on, Congress sits on the sidelines, and that’s not a good thing. Richard Reinsch:You mentioned a case that was a big deal and still is from, what, six years ago, King v. Burwell, five years ago, on the creation of these healthcare networks which by statute could only be created by the states but were created by the federal government and the Supreme Court blessed it. Very strange opinion. You note that one of the assumptions you could say that the court had there was this is a mistake, but the Congress wouldn’t fix it so they had to. Michael Greve:Right. That’s a good example. Look, during the oral argument, this came up. General Don Verrilli, who was then the solicitor general, was faced with questions along the lines of, look, if the statute is misshapen, it’s not our job [to have] Justice Scalia fix it. I think Congress might want to fix this. General Verrilli says, “Yeah, well, this Congress.” The courtroom laughed. That included a number of illustrious senators and congressmen and congresswomen who were in the audience there. I didn’t find it amusing at all quite frankly. That’s a breakdown of the system. We used to have this image of the relation between Congress and the court. It’s a dialogue. The court interprets statutes as written. If it gets it wrong or Congress thinks it gets it wrong or sees some reason to fix it, Congress will come back and will, in fact, fix it. It’s very hard to have a dialogue with an actor that’s mute. That puts enormous pressure on the court, it seems to me. There’s so much at stake in every single statutory case. Not cases that involve grand constitutional questions. Those have a different configuration, but statutory cases where the court is increasingly tempted to sort of say, “Let’s rewrite this statute. Let’s fix it on our own because Congress can’t be trusted to do anything about it.” Richard Reinsch:One, to state the obvious, the separation of powers idea from the founders assumed a certain amount of competition and pushing among the branches, between the branches. If one isn’t pushing or competing, then the other two branches can also see, not just a, “We have to step in and correct this” but “We must” and it’s good that we have to do it. You see those dynamics get altered in a negative way. Michael Greve:Look, that’s obviously a very central problem of American politics, probably the central institutional problem. Lots of smart people have begun to pay attention to it. That’s all to the good. But everybody realizes that that is a…

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    Liberalism and the Death Penalty Mar 31, 2020
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    Is the abolition of the death penalty in most western countries an unmitigated good? Craig Lerner, Professor of Law at George Mason’s Scalia Law School, discusses this question and the willingness of liberal societies to defend law and order. Richard Reinsch: Today we’re talking with Craig Lerner, Professor of Law at George Mason’s Antonin Scalia Law School, about the moral and political meaning of the death penalty and if its demise is, as we are frequently told, imminent. Professor Lerner, you recently wrote an essay on the death penalty called “Is the Death Penalty Dead?” in the most recent issue of the Claremont Review of Books, which I read and thought significant. You analyzed this punishment through several different ways: political, philosophical, and also a geographical survey of jurisdictions around the world, civilizations around the world, and how they treat the death penalty. Before we get into your essay, maybe just an obvious question here, one that I think any enlightened, certainly liberal arts professor would ask: Is it not an unmitigated blessing that the Western world has basically abolished the death penalty, America excepted? Craig Lerner: Well, I would say no. Or, I would say that it’s at least a question whether the impulse to abolish the death penalty is unambiguously good, or whether it reflects a diminishing impulse to justice and a sense of a community that demands justice that is not unambiguously good. I would say certainly there’s a narrative that the decline of the death penalty in the West is an attempt to support higher principles of the enlightenment. And that the impulse to retain the death penalty is atavistic urge to pursue vengeance, which we should welcome its demise. But I think there’s a legitimate argument on their side that has been articulated many times over the centuries, and I think still has some viability today. Richard Reinsch: What does it mean? What does it exactly mean to abolish the death penalty? Is it in fact an unwillingness, or even not an unwillingness but just a sheepishness about imposing justice on those who commit heinous crimes? A lot of people remarked the Norwegian shooter who murdered 70 teenagers on an island in Norway was a political assassination. Obviously a deranged person. But the most he could receive for that crime, I read, was 20 years in jail. Of course, in America you would probably receive the death penalty. I mean, that sort of I think maybe illustrates your point. Craig Lerner: Right, and a similar case when the bombings in Madrid in Spain. Richard Reinsch: In 2005. Craig Lerner: Right. 200 people died. I think that in that case, I forget exactly what the punishment was, but it was comparable. Again, a mass murder and a Western European nation imposing something not simply less than death, but just less than life. And the question is if that’s something that we should applaud as a sense that these nations have ascended to a respect for human rights? Or is it something to be concerned about that a nation will tolerate this grievous harm to the community and not have the conviction to exact a far more serious punishment? Richard Reinsch: Now, thinking about your essay. You do something interesting in it. In this, you review three books, The End of History and The Last Man by Francis Fukuyama. Famous book, obviously. And also another famous book, The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order. Also, a third consideration is the late Walter Berns’s book on capital punishment, Crime and the Morality of the Death Penalty. How do these works illustrate the way you write about the death penalty and what it means for nations? Craig Lerner: Well, the two books have been often paired because they present these very competing frameworks for viewing the world and predicting its trajectory. Fukuyama’s book, which to some extent has been caricatured, because I think his thesis is more nuanced than it’s sometimes made out to be. But at some level it is this idea that the principles in the Western enlightenment are being adopted throughout the world. And this is somehow an inevitable ascent of almost a Hegelian necessity. In this view, the world is ascending to a particular world view that will have universal adoption. And then Huntington two years later counters with a different framework that suggested that he saw that the world was divided now and would, at least as far as we could see into the future, would continue to be divided into these different civilizations that are rooted in different histories and at some very high level value different things, and that this will continue. Richard Reinsch: Thinking about Fukuyama, who I think is also a student of Alexander Kojeve, that some other future would be a universal homogenous state, more or less. I mean, that’s a simplification of Fukuyama’s thesis, but a liberal democratic world order in which, what? What would that mean though for how we defend that position? Or would it need a defense so much as just verbal articulation and defense that way because its gifts would just be so manifestly good. What would that mean for punishment? What would that mean for how one would defend these orders? Or would they need to be defended because they’re just good in themselves and that would just be realized? Yeah. Craig Lerner: It was a small part of Fukuyama’s book, a very small part. I don’t want to make it out to be a crucial part of it, but I was struck that at one point he suggested modern liberal societies would have a decreasing tolerance for violence. He predicted that the spread of compassion, the sense that it’s simply wrong to punish people would gain in wider and wider acceptance. He thought that that would correspond to a decrease in support for the death penalty. And, as a description and as a prediction, that seems to have been correct, in the Western world at least. Richard Reinsch: The exception of America. Craig Lerner: And then even in America, sorry. Richard Reinsch: But, I think also here, you quote as a response, I mean he wasn’t responding to Fukuyama. The book was published in 1979. But Walter Berns’s book for capital punishment. Let me read you a quote from that book and get your reaction. “There is a point in the history of society when it becomes so pathologically soft and tender that among other things it sides even with those who harm it, criminals, and does this quite seriously and honestly.” Craig Lerner: Actually this sort of situates that book in a particular time in American history. It’s actually quite interesting. There was a Supreme Court opinion in 1972 which had the effect of imposing a moratorium on capital punishment. Richard Reinsch: Furman vs Georgia. Craig Lerner: 1976 there was another opinion that essentially said that with amendments that capital punishment could continue. But at the time that Berns wrote the book, and there were very, very few if any, I think, executions. It is interesting that he wrote at a time in which it seemed as if capital punishment was, if not exactly dead, in its death throes. What’s interesting is that in the years that followed Berns’ book is capital punishment did make a significant return. And actually the number of executions in America increased over the next 20 years, reaching its height around the year 2000 at around 100. Actually, it is interesting that these things go in cycles and so it did reach a low point in 1979, but it returned and I think we’re actually retreating again. Richard Reinsch: The perception in the ’70s and ’80s was, rightly so I think, of a crime wave in this country, particularly in urban areas. The death penalty became a response of what the revenge, blood lust of Americans had returned. You note in the book that after this Supreme Court opinion in Furman vs Warren, Furman vs Georgia, 35 states reenacted death penalty statutes. What do you attribute that to? And maybe now it’s this perception that the war on crime has been won in a big way. We hear the stories of large cities, New York, Chicago, other places where crime is greatly declined. Although recent upsurge in the last few years I’m told and so similarly does that explain a falling off the death penalty? Craig Lerner: Well, it is true that there was the crime wave in the ’80s and you can explain in some sense that the increase in executions by that, although I think that it was interesting after Furman that this, I’m not sure how high the crime rates were in the ’70s. I think what was striking to me when I researched this in the early ’70s you had the justices, apparently some of them amongst themselves, they’re wondering whether it is even necessary to abolish the death penalty because in their view, the support of the death penalty was declining and it would evaporate even without any elitist intervention. And it was so striking that immediately after Furman was decided, you had this overwhelming number of states saying, no, we want the death penalty. To me that was just part of an interesting kind of narrative in which elitist opinion or elite opinion consistently underestimates the depth of the support for capital punishment. And I don’t think that support is simply a matter of assessing crime waves. I think it goes to something deeper about what people think is just. Richard Reinsch: That would be sort of the elite read of opinion regarding the death penalty that it’s sort of blood lust and that’s about it. Craig Lerner: And in recent years, the number of executions has gone down actually about 20 or so this year so far, 25 last year, which is again down from the peak around 1999, 2000. But, and even more dramatic, the number of death sentences has declined. I would wonder, I’ll just say one quick thing. I would wonder whether that represents a really significant decline in support for the death penalty or just the incredible number of legal hurdles that are now necessary to be surmounted before a death sentence could be imposed? Richard Reinsch: In 2015, Supreme Court justices, Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and you used a quote, “The death penalty is dying away and majority of Americans reject capital punishment.” Justice Antonin Scalia astutely responded, “Welcome to Groundhog day.” Craig Lerner: And the very next year, as I pointed out, as many people have pointed out, there were these state referenda in Oklahoma, Nebraska, and California about the death penalty and the ones in Oklahoma and Nebraska, the death penalty one by two to one or 60% but it will seem even more striking in California. There were two referendum and each one with respect to the death penalty won narrowly. I don’t want to make it out to be overwhelming. But, even in California. So in the last few months, the Governor of California commuted the sentences, which was totally unnecessary because none of the people on California’s death row are going to be executed. But it was a symbolic gesture. It was noteworthy. It’s still the governor doing it because it couldn’t prevail or didn’t prevail in the referendum. Richard Reinsch: But that sort of prompts a question and you ask it in your piece. Why does America bother to retain the death penalty? I mean one answer would be, we have an incredibly secure criminal justice system. We can warehouse these people, criminals for the rest of their lives. They’re not a danger to the community. It’s not a question of resources allocation really. So why retain it? Why do we retain it? Craig Lerner: I don’t want to suggest that there’s not a good argument for abolishing the death penalty in the quite peaceful and orderly conditions of the West. So there are strong abolition arguments. My point is that there are also very strong arguments on the other side. And actually it does seem as if the arguments that have been raised for millennia by virtually every political philosopher who thought about the issue until, Cesare Beccaria, the Italian criminologist in the 18th century. But I mean sort of the monolithic Western tradition on this has been support for the death penalty until 1800 or so. The founders all thought it was morally justified with just one minor exception. Benjamin Rush. So Abraham Lincoln thought it was morally justified, Immanuel Kant thought it was morally justified. So I mean it’s not like these are odd creatures who we can regard as morally debased. If you put Abraham Lincoln and Immanual Kant on one side and you’re on the other side, if you were in favor of abolishing the death penalty. So I guess the question is who bears the burden here? If I’m supporting the death penalty, I have Immanual Kant and Abraham Lincoln. You have Benjamin Rush and Cesare Beccaria. So who’s the weightier figure? So I mean, I would just say that this is one way of approaching this, but I would say with respect to why America retains the death penalty is that there are certain crimes that just seem to call for the greatest punishment because the harm to the community was so grievous that anything less than that would somehow be disproportionate and unjust. At least that’s a sentiment that many people have. And I think the criminal justice system to some extent has to reflect the views of the community. Richard Reinsch: Moral retribution. Would be a philosophy that would support the death penalty, I think. How difficult is it to execute someone inside the United States? Craig Lerner: Well, it’s extraordinarily difficult. After Furman vs Georgia, there’s a 1976 opinion that essentially said that states could have a death penalty under certain conditions. And over the past 40 years, there’ve been just dozens of precedents and some would say that ever changing goalposts as to what the states must do in order to achieve a death sentence. And you know, actually, first of all, you could say in response, well, it should be very hard. And I don’t question that. It should be very hard. First of all, we are in a criminal justice system in which it’s established that before you can even get a conviction, the state has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime. So it is difficult and it should be difficult. and it should be difficult then to get a death sentence. And the way it operates today is there’s a completely separate penalty phase in which you have the state introduce aggravating factors and the defendant has an opportunity to raise mitigating factors. And at this point, although it’s never been healthy, constitutionally required, in every state, there needs to be a unanimous and the federal system, that unanimous jury verdict in favor of the death penalty. So only one juror can dissent and could prevent the death sentence. So there’s simply that mechanism that it’s very hard to secure a death sentence. And then even if a death sentence is secured, then you’re talking about decades of appeals and in many jurisdictions in America today, it’s extraordinarily difficult to prevail in affirming that death sentence. Richard Reinsch: Also we were discussing Western nations and the abolition of the death penalty almost. It seems also what’s lurking in here though is secularism, progressivism, and individualism, sort of a loss of belief and injustice or truth, accountability for one’s actions. This seems to me, what I think about the West and I kind of situate this within the Roman Catholic church’s response to the death penalty from Saint John Paul the Second forward, which has been at least up until Pope Francis that it was justified, but prudentially unwise, or it shouldn’t be done really anymore in the West. Of course, he didn’t limit it to the West, but as I thought about that, and the support for the death penalty, it seems to me more of a, I’ll say extension of the enlightenment more than anything else for the retraction of support for the death penalty. Craig Lerner: Yeah, I agree completely and actually Justice Scalia made this point, various points and he’s not the only one that the de…

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    America, Land of Deformed Institutions Mar 31, 2020
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    Yuval Levin returns to Liberty Law Talk to discuss his new book, A Time to Build. He makes the case for rebuilding the key institutions of American life, which have changed from frameworks that molded our character to platforms that allow us to project ourselves. Richard Reinsch: We’re talking with Yuval Levin about his new book, A Time To Build. I’m glad to welcome Yuval back to Liberty Law Talk. He has appeared on the show to discuss The Great Debate and The Fractured Republic. Maybe this book is the completion, it seems of a system, a tripartite system of books here. Yuval Levin is the editor of National Affairs and is the Director of the Social Cultural & Constitutional Studies Project at the American Enterprise Institute. He also worked in the George W. Bush White House. Yuval, welcome back. Yuval Levin: Thanks very much Richard. Richard Reinsch: So the book, A Time To Build. Now I’ll read the full subtitle. Yuval Levin: It’ll take a while. Richard Reinsch: From Family and Community to Congress and the Campus, How Recommitting to Our Institutions Can Revive the American Dream. Now that sort of answers this question, what are we supposed to build, Yuval? Yuval Levin: So in a way the reason the book is called A Time To Build is because it feels a lot of the time like we are living in a moment that sees itself as a time to tear down. Our politics is really focused on the work of demolition, some of which is necessary work of demolition. But a sense that what’s required now is draining the swamp or clearing the field. And there is some of that necessary. But I think that we too rarely see that what we really need in this kind of moment is to build and rebuild institutions, there’s a lot of the social crisis that we’re living through in America is a function of weakened and deformed institutions. And that requires more than demolition, that really does require some construction. Richard Reinsch: I want to read from the beginning of your book, page two, and maybe get your comment here because I thought it expresses well what you’re saying, “we are not only restless amid plenty” and I think that’s important. And it’s something as I’ve been engaging in this area of industrial policy, now here we are in the midst of economic plenty, in the midst of a growing economy for a decade and yet we’re sort of in this problem of deaths of despair, of opioid problems, of drug abuse, suicides of youths rising. You note that in the book and the question becomes, why are we in this situation? You go on to say: [W]e are also awfully daunted by what on the surface seem like readily surmountable obstacles to our thriving together. This is in part because we underestimate our strengths, but we underestimate and misconstrue the problems we face. We lack the grammar and vocabulary to talk about what is breaking down so we can’t even begin to do something about it. We look for diagnoses in the realms made visible to us by our sciences of society, but the troubles we find there are not sufficient to justify our despondent mood. Something has gone wrong somewhere else in some invisible realm. And we have been straining to perceive and describe what it might be. So what do you perceive? Yuval Levin: Yeah, I mean the book really begins with that kind of mystery where I think the reigning mood of our politics is darker than you would think it ought to be if you look at the normal measures of wellbeing, like economic wellbeing, and health and safety and the sorts of things that we might first look to if we want to ask ourselves, “Why do Americans feel as though things are going in the wrong direction?” And I think once you explore those, it looks like the problem is something that we don’t see so easily. And I turn to the question of institutions because I think institutions are a kind of invisible infrastructure that underlie our social life. They make it all possible, but one of the reasons that we enjoy our freedom, the way we do in our country is that we often don’t see institutions, don’t think about what it is they do, especially the formative work that they do. And that’s great when they’re strong, it means that we feel even more free than we are. But when they break down, we have real trouble knowing where to go to fix things. And one of the things that this book tries to do is to make those institutions more visible, to articulate what it is they do, and therefore what might be going wrong in this moment in ways that are not obvious from the usual kinds of social science statistics and economic data. Richard Reinsch: So what is an institution and why do they matter? Something you note in the book, I think was right on. Institutions are frequently depicted as our enemy, as things that constrain those things that we need to be redeemed from, to come out of and be who we are. So what are they and this isn’t really a political book. Maybe, we could say it’s a work of political thought, but it’s not really a political book, you’re talking about a lot of institutions. We’ll try and go through those in the interview. Yuval Levin: I mean I think the resistance to institutions, the sense that we don’t need them is a long running thread in American social, cultural, and political life. American culture is rooted in a certain kind of individualistic protestantism that wants to deny the need for mediation and for formative institutions. But ultimately I’d describe institutions as the durable forms of our common life, the shapes, the structures of the things we do together. And we tend not to see them because we have a very individualistic understanding of ourselves, and our culture, and our society and institutions are not individualistic. They’re precisely the things we do together. And they’re the ways in which we give shape and form to what we do together. So they do become very difficult for us to see. But ultimately they’re central and unavoidable, they’re the ways that our social life actually happens. And so in a moment like this one, they seem to be in trouble. It’s particularly important to think about what they are, what they do, and the ways in which they offer us something that I think is ironic if not paradoxical, which is they offer us a liberating and empowering form of constraint. They give us specific roles in places. They tell us what to do and what not to do in those situations. And by doing that, they give us a kind of shape or form that lets us be effective in various ways in different parts of our lives. And it’s important to appreciate that because it doesn’t come easy in the language of our kind of easygoing individualism. Richard Reinsch: So the institutions, they aim at practical results, consequences. And maybe we can get more specific here about the types of institutions, but there’s a form, there’s a purpose to the institutions themselves as to what they provide or I guess you’ve been sort of talking about that formation, restraint, integrity and purpose and those who participate in them. So that explains the situation we’re in now. The emptying out of that, how precisely? Yuval Levin: I mean each institution, of course, in our society does something that we value, right? It might educate our children, or enforce the law, or protect the country, or just provide us with a good or a service that we value. But as it does that, each institution also forms the people within it to do that in a way that takes integrity seriously, that it follows a certain code and that therefore makes those people trustworthy as providers of that service for our society. And so to trust an institution is really to believe that, that institution fosters an internal ethic that makes the people trustworthy. One of the things we do know about institutions now in American life is that we’re losing trust in them. There are decades of data that show us that American confidence in institutions has been declining, and I think the reason for that, or a core reason for that is that we’ve lost this sense that these institutions form people who are trustworthy. And that’s not just because of traditional kinds of corruption where there are always people who try to abuse institutional power. I think it’s also because of a different change that’s really at the heart of this book where our expectations of institutions have changed from thinking that they exist to form people to thinking that they exist to provide people with platforms, with a stage to shine and be seen with prominence and a high profile rather than with a particular kind of form that they have to be given through the institution. So that if you look at our political institutions for example, Congress is a great example of this. A lot of members of Congress now basically think of Congress as a platform for themselves, as a way to get a better time slot on cable news, as a way to be heard on talk radio, as a way to get a bigger Twitter following, and what they do with that is a form of expression and particularly expression of frustration, even frustration with Congress. They don’t think of themselves as insiders operating within the institution and shaped by it, but as outsiders who are just particularly prominent commentators about the institution. That’s how president Trump used the presidency. He will stand on top of it and yell about the government, even though he is the chief executive of the government. And once you notice that, you see it in a lot of our institutions where people who ought to be functioning like insiders are actually functioning like outsiders, and that makes those institutions very hard to trust and take seriously. Richard Reinsch: You’ve run this analysis through politics, Congress most obviously. We talk a lot about that at Law & Liberty, the executive branch, journalism, education, legal professions, legal profession is one, but the professions generally. A question that I have for you, the molds and platforms, the institutions no longer mold us, shape us and just thinking about what you said about, in your chapter on education and universities. No one really thinks—outside of say maybe some of the great books colleges or some of our more religiously Orthodox campuses—that they’re supposed to shape you in some way. The university is there to give you a step up into the next realm of your life, or into a new class, or a profession or something like that. Richard Reinsch: And that the contrast there would be, I thought Calvin Coolidge’s autobiographical account of his time at Amherst College where there was a definite formation process at work, theology, philosophy, history, and this sort of expectation of becoming a man of that college. So we’re not that far removed necessarily from what you’re describing, but we are far removed from it, it seems in the individualism, and the other side of that is the egalitarianism of our culture that we somehow see these things, a formation process really as a threat to us. I don’t know how one overcomes that other than just to say, “Wow, this is just really an unhappy situation.” Maybe I really should look to tradition and the formation across generations that an institution can embody. Yuval Levin: Well, I think that’s quite right. I mean the ways that a lot of these prominent institutions, including educational institutions, which are unavoidably formative in one way or another, the way they understand themselves is often much more expressive and performative. I think of a friend who had a daughter who was at the age of starting to apply to colleges and he showed me a brochure that she got from Brown, which at the very top said in big letters, be yourself. And that’s a strange way for a college to express to a potential student what it’s all about. I think that if you look to the exceptions when it comes to American trust in institutions, ask yourself, what are the institutions we do still have high regard for? This difference becomes even clearer because the most significant exception is the military, which is one institution that Americans have higher regard for now than they did two generations ago. And the military is a formative institution. It is unabashedly formative. It takes a certain kind of human being and produces a different kind of human being who is more inclined to take seriously things like honor and duty and country and we value the military not only because it’s very good at protecting us from our enemies. We value the military because it produces trustworthy people and we end up trusting it for that reason. A lot of our institutions could think of themselves that way and have reason to think of themselves that way, but very few of our institutions actually do think of themselves or present themselves that way to our larger society, and I think that does get to a kind of discomfort with the idea that we even require formation and formative institutions. You say this is not really a political book and I think that’s true, but it is a deeply conservative book in one sense that it assumes an idea of the human person as beginning in a very imperfect form and requiring formation to become really capable of the freedom that we in this free society exercise. The idea of the human person at the heart of this argument is an imperfect fallen creature that requires formation. That’s not the idea of the human person at the heart of a lot of our popular culture now and of our elite culture. We think of the human person more as just requiring a platform, a way to be seen and heard, to have status, to be regarded. And if that’s what you think, then institutions really just ought to be platforms. But if you think we need formation, then a lot of our institutions need to rethink how, what kind of role they play in society. Richard Reinsch: No, I mean there’s a sense in which in your book, I think I mentioned in the beginning, I think your book sort of is the triptych here of what you’ve been doing maybe the past decade because your first book, The Great Debate, the debate being between Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine could evidence this in a foundational sense. Thomas Paine released the shackles of society and let men be free and see what great things they do. Edmund Burke, well, freedom to what end and freedom itself only matters through a process of what we’re describing here of formation and all of the ways in which the various parts of your civilization have contributed and embodied excellence about human nature. Do we form people well? And freedom becomes lovely. And your book in a way could be, is very threatening if it’s described that way, because it does involve these qualities of moral judgment that we seem to be so afraid of now. We struggle even to have a language to describe this. And so this is a difficult thing you’re after in the book. However, some people might describe it as sort of a benign book and in that regard, but it’s not at all. One of the things that’s interesting here as well, it seems, the American military, if you look at public opinion polling in the 1970s, not hard to understand, not nearly as highly regarded as it is now. And maybe coming out of Vietnam and things like this, but it recovers great credibility and is now the most trusted of our governing institutions in the country without parallel. Congress as you know is at 11%. The federal government, when they started asking these sorts of questions of trust and high regard, I think in the early 1970s, 1973, pretty high regard, that’s obviously declined dramatically. I don’t even try and suss out all of the reasons for that. But the military itself is an interesting case and even within higher education, the service academies. Somebody says they went to Harvard, you think, “Oh, you’re really smart. Good for you.” Somebody says they went to West Point and more, we think they’re smart but more qualities naturally flood into our mind about that person. So maybe talk about that. Yuval Levin: And now I think part of th…

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    Did the Civil Rights Constitution Distort American Politics? Mar 31, 2020
    Show notes

    Richard Reinsch:Today we’re talking with Christopher Caldwell, about his new book, The Age of Entitlement: America Since the Sixties. Christopher Caldwell is the contributing editor to the Claremont Review of Books. He’s contributing opinion writer to the New York Times. Many of you will have read him in The Weekly Standard where he was senior editor, and also a columnist for The Financial Times. He’s also the author of a great book on the European situation Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West. Christopher Caldwell, welcome to the program. Christopher Caldwell:Great to be here, Richard. Richard Reinsch:So tell us what is The Age of Entitlement? Christopher Caldwell:Well, as my book has it, it’s basically the period that runs between the Kennedy assassination and the Trump election. And I started on the book because I thought it was kind of a self contained period. I think it’s basically the period of the baby boom, in power. And I traced the line along which the country had changed in over those almost five decades, more than five decades. And focused on gender relations, for one thing, on war, for another, on economics as another, but I think it’s probably the line of thinking that has gripped people most has been the constitutional one, because I do present the changes of the 1960s with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at their heart as being a kind of a new Constitution, which is kind of proved to be in conflict with older constitutional ideas. Richard Reinsch:Now, let’s talk about that, because that’s really the heart of your book is what is inaugurated in American constitutional thinking, political thinking, and social thinking from the Civil Rights Act of 1964, you argue we get a new constitution and I think you’re arguing that it’s virtually or becomes irreconcilable with a previous constitution, that is the Constitution of 1789 and the Constitution of the even though the 14th Amendment. Those are two things that can’t be bridged and produce many divisions, new thought patterns and new ways of being political and constitutional in America, talk more about that, if you would. Christopher Caldwell:Yes, I think that the Civil Rights Act does grow out of the 14th Amendment. So I think that has less of a problem. There’s less of a problem, bridging it there. But, I should be precise here. When I talk about civil rights, the reader should not get the impression that I’m friendly to segregation, or hostile to the civil rights movement as it existed for the whole of the 20th century up until 1964. In fact, I’m very much in sympathy with the claims to an agitation for equal citizenship that went on up till then, but there were problems in the Civil Rights Act that were not evident at first. We should probably start with what the Civil Rights Act did. The problem that faced Americans with segregation in the South, is that segregation in the South seemed to have been implemented through democratic institutions and it kept being ratified by democratic institutions. And what the Civil Rights Act did was, it pretty much declared the democracies of the South illegitimate or at least, not worthy of self determination. They had to be overseen and surveilled by Washington. And so the Civil Rights Act gave Washington powers that it had never had before in peacetime. First of all, it created a lot of crimes related to discrimination, it banned discrimination in voting, public accommodations, and in public facilities. Richard Reinsch:Education. Christopher Caldwell:Created a lot of new authority. Yes, education, yes. It created new authority, Civil Rights Commission, the EEOC, it created offices of civil rights in the different cabinet agencies and these were enormously powerful. They had the power to cut off funding to states and municipalities and to lay down hiring practices for companies that had more than 15 people. The EEOC had the right to file lawsuits and conduct investigation. This was really strong medicine. Now, there were a lot of people who worried about how strong a medicine it was at the time, but Americans didn’t worry about it too much, because the problem that civil rights law aimed to fix was so spectacular and so exceptional that it seems to limit the application of those laws. But in fact, as soon as they were passed, they began to deepen. You got new measures that were meant to aid the cause of desegregation, like affirmative action and busing and most important of all, these laws spread to other areas of American life in a way that I think very few Americans had imagined. So you had the tumble of the 1960s going on, you had women wanting to be promoted up the corporate hierarchy. You had a certain number of immigrants wanting their children to be instructed in their own languages. And when they turned to court and said, “You know what, I don’t want to wait for Congress to vote a law. I want that new system.” When they asked that the court said yes. And so civil rights spread to larger and larger areas of American life and began to crowd out the traditional system. Richard Reinsch:Thinking about the Civil Rights Act itself, my understanding is that title four and title seven of that act, explicitly say that a racial balance is not the goal. That is to say, the goal is neutral principles, neutral principles of law, and justice for all Americans regardless of race. Isn’t it despite what happened, part of as I read your book, it’s the sort of unbridgeable tension between these two constitutions and yet, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one could easily make the case was supposed to be colorblind, and of course as you note, affirmative action comes pretty quickly. We start getting the quotas, we start getting all these other things. I mean, sex is obviously in the Civil Rights Act, that becomes part of the goal, particularly under title nine, very aggressive. You also note something we talk a lot about it on Law & Liberty is the way in which the administrative state was able to act, particularly the Office for Civil Rights notoriously, probably one of the most notorious agencies in the federal bureaucracy for running around the Administrative Procedures Act, and being able to govern just with guidance letters. And that being recognized by the federal judiciary as such. You talk about the origin of busing, nothing was ever passed by Congress to give us mandated busing. It was, in fact, the guidance letter. But as I think about your book, and the Civil Rights Act, what are conservatives to do? Where does this situation leave us? Christopher Caldwell:Well, I think it is, as you say, it is extremely deeply entrenched. And it’s not only deeply entrenched, it has been deeply entrenched for a long time. We’re talking about a system that is now 50 or 60 years old. And it’s worked through a number of different modalities. It’s exactly as you say, there was no mention of resorting to quotas in the Civil Rights Act. But that was the way the offices of civil rights measured educational progress, and they were able to mandate the schools change, including through busing in order to demonstrate progress. I think if I had to identify the problem at the heart of it, the reason it could not be stopped from spreading into every single area of American life is that there was a sort of a short circuit in checks and balances. And this is not an area in which I’m an expert, but there’s some beautiful literature in the kind of James Q. Wilson style on the politics of bureaucracy by Boston College professor, political scientist named Shep Melnick. Richard Reinsch:Yeah, he’s been on this program to talk about that. Christopher Caldwell:Well, he’s an extraordinary analyst of this situation. And what he shows is that there was a kind of a ping ponging back and forth between regulatory agencies and courtrooms, where you could get these programs ratcheting up with incredible speed. They could undergo several escalations in the course of a year, you’d have a classic example that he has studied in detail is bilingual education. There was never a bilingual education law, what you had was a Supreme Court decision that said that there could be a right to bilingual education, and then guidelines written around it and that’s it. And it’s still on the book, actually. So, I think that there are many, many avenues through which this system expanded, but the thing that they all have in common is that they provided a way to short circuit legislative scrutiny. Let’s say that. Richard Reinsch:You talk about, as I was reading your book, there’s something that is a perennial topic amongst conservatives as you know. Yuval Levin is one commentator, Chris DeMuth is another one, and that is the decline and wane of Congress, which you’re just alluding to. And as I read your book, maybe the way in which to think about that is the Civil Rights Act itself, and the way we think about policy became moralized, black and white, and retreated into the judicial and administrative state sectors and there was very little Congress could do about it, or really wanted to do about it in terms of these major issues. You argue that the cost of the Civil Rights Act surpasses any war or effort like the space program or something like that, that the American federal government has attempted. Christopher Caldwell:Yeah. I know that the Vietnam War, which was a relatively very expensive war was not that expensive because the deficit in certain years since has been the equivalent of the entire federal budget at the height of the Vietnam War. We know that when we emerged from World War Two, our debt was not larger than the GDP. So I think this is a long standing program, this commitment to social change that began in 1965. I think that’s pretty clear. Richard Reinsch:A question that comes to my mind, and I just interviewed Amity Shlaes, and in thinking about her book Great Society, because those aren’t just all civil rights programs. And there’s just a lot of social spending in the Great Society at the same time of this period you’re describing, the Kennedy assassination, moving into the 1970s. How does that figure in and in particular to the proper size of the federal government, the spending of the federal government, a lot of problems we’re facing now, just the social spending aspect of this, and the tremendous costs incurred there and the ways in which those costs sort of subsidized and promote I’ll say, lifestyles that aren’t exactly conducive to independent, free citizenship. Christopher Caldwell:Well, that’s an interesting subject, the social consequences of the Great Society, but it’s not really the subject of my book. Richard Reinsch:Well, I guess I asked the question because I take it your book really spins, or you start and talk a lot about how the Civil Rights Act starts this new constitution, and gives us sort of a deformed Republic, in many ways, unintentionally, so but there it is. I asked that question, because I’m thinking through your thesis, but there’s a lot of things going on here. But particularly as we move through, sort of the conservative unrest that you also talked about, and we can get out of some of your political analysis, but the conservative unrest that elects Nixon, that elects Reagan, in the end, you end with, right as Trump is beginning to announce his campaign for 2016. And, it’s part of that turn against the Great Society, it’s not just civil rights. And so I’m just trying to think through all of that, and thinking about just the cost of the Great Society. To what extent is that civil rights, to what extent is that something else that’s happening, social spending, et cetera? Christopher Caldwell:I think it’s very hard to say because at a certain point, the culture of civil rights becomes the official governing culture of society. So I would have a hard time quantifying it. There’s one problem though, there’s one budgetary problem that I think is particularly salient. That really came to a head in the Reagan years. And that is, Lyndon Johnson built a kind of consensus for civil rights in 1964. But there was never a consensus built for the extension of that regime, that is the regime of regulation and judicial decree into other areas of American life. And so when civil rights started to affect things like immigration law, women’s rights, gay rights and that sort of thing, you had a large agenda that the country was not on board with and would not pay for. So by the late 1970s, there’s something going on, where you had a very expensive and very entrenched new constitution, but a public that was not willing to pay for it, and wanted to go back to the old constitution or so it seemed. And what happened, I think under Reagan, is that Reagan, to a lot of people’s surprise, was not strong enough to overturn some of the newfangled programs that he had campaigned on overturning, I mean, you remember in the late 1970s, Reagan had said he could eliminate affirmative action with the stroke of a pen, he could eliminate the Department of Energy, he could eliminate the Department of Education. None of that happened, the constituencies were too strong. But you still had a public that was not willing to pay for it. And I believe that the deficit, the big deficit, that country began to run in the 1980s as a result of that legitimacy gap in the new system. Richard Reinsch:So let me think about that. I mean, because what are the costs of affirmative action? Or the cost of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or the cost of not getting a job because of affirmative action? Are they truly that weighty? Christopher Caldwell:I have not calculated them economically. I just calculated them constitutionally. Richard Reinsch:Affirmative action, one can make an argument that it’s constitutional. You could also, I think making a reasonable argument that it’s not. Whereas the Civil Rights Act, I think is much stronger ground. Think in this regard the Bakke case you talk about, there’s three opinions in the Bakke case, famous case about a man who had scored in the 97th percentile, I think on the medical college entrance examination was denied entrance to University of California, Davis medical school. And there are three opinions that the Supreme Court gives on his denial. They order him to be accepted, they argue, on one hand, racial quotas are wrong but race can be a factor. That’s ultimately the plurality opinion authored by Powell, race can be a factor in admissions, along the lines of what has now come to be known as a diversity analysis that somehow racially diverse student body is a good thing, which strikes me as inherently a racialist type of an argument. And then there are four members of the court in that opinion that argued for the colorblind constitution. So you had two reasonable positions, I think. You had affirmative action to redress past grievance, then you had the colorblind constitution, then you had this wacky thing I would think, with Justice Powell and the diversity argument, and that comes to be a huge moment in our political constitutional life. Christopher Caldwell:Well, I mean, when you talk about the court, again, I haven’t calculated it, but we have what is called in this country, a diversity industry. And it has, I would say now probably hundreds of thousands if not millions of people employed in it and diversity was pretty much invented in the Bakke case in 1978. What Powell said is a very strange thing in retrospect. He said quotas are bad but there’s a better way of dealing with this, which has been developed at Harvard. It was the Harvard Undergraduate Admissions that had this idea that the Harvard community ought to be diverse. Now, since the problem at the time was trying to find minorities and specifically black people to enter into positions of leadership, you can say that the Harvard undergraduate program probably had an easier time of doing that than any other institution in th…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Stuck With Decadence Mar 31, 2020
    Show notes

    New York Times columnist and commentator extraordinaire Ross Douthat talks about our decadent age with Richard Reinsch. Richard Reinsch:Today we’re talking with Ross Douthat about his new book, The Decadent Society: How We Became the Victims of Our Own Success. Ross Douthat’s name will certainly not sound unfamiliar to our listeners and readers. He’s one of our most cogent cultural and political critics. He writes for the New York Times. He’s the author of a number of books, including most recently, To Change the Church, about the Pope Francis pontificate, which anticipates well, I think, many of the changes Pope Francis has brought. He’s also the author of the book Privilege and Grand New Party, which is a wonderful book that has held up well. Ross is also the film critic for National Review, which I read your pieces many times there. Welcome to the program. Ross Douthat:Thanks so much for having me, Richard. It’s great to be here. Richard Reinsch:Great. So Ross, you’re into decadence. Tell us about the Decadent Society. Ross Douthat:So the Decadent Society is an attempt to, in a certain way, put a name on the weird anxiety that pervades the developed world, the Western world and the United States of America, where we have this combination of tremendous wealth and technological proficiency, which makes some people argue that these are the best times in the history of the world, but at the same time a lot of discontent, anxiety and ennui, which gets manifested in everything from the sort of populist and socialist rebellions in our politics, to rising rate of depression and suicide, and deaths of despair as they get called and so on. And so the argument I make in the book, is basically that we have entered a very particular kind of civilizational state that I’m calling “decadence” and I’m using that term to mean not chocolate dipped strawberries and weekends in Vegas, though those might be part of it, but a kind of stagnation, repetition, and decay at a high level of civilizational development. Richard Reinsch:One of the definitions, to talk about the definition of decadence you give in the book, you build on Jacques Barzun’s book, From Dawn to Decadence, which I think came out in 2000. I remember reading it in 2001 and that book has stuck with me. It’s one of the reasons why I really enjoyed reading your book because building on Barzun’s definition of decadence, Barzun talks about moving in fits and starts, but not really getting anywhere. The Decadent Society sees no path forward and it’s institutions function painfully. Maybe talk more about that because you also dismiss a definition of decadence that on my worst days, I find myself sort of glomming onto which is weak, sort of hedonistic luxuriating, weak and unable to defend ourselves. Unwilling to see the purpose in defending ourselves and so we’ll go into the good night, but maybe talk about that. Ross Douthat:Right. So yeah, I am very directly borrowing from Barzun and you could see this book, in part, as a sequel both to his book and in certain ways to Francis Fukuyama’s famous book, The End of History, which came out 10 years earlier. And the combination of those two arguments basically makes the case that Fukuyama was right, in a sense, not permanently and forever, but right that Western civilization has sort of passed beyond some of its great ideological debates and entered into a period of stability, that was also in danger of becoming a period of boredom and disappointment and sterility. And then Barzun, in a somewhat similar way, made the case that this is something that happens generally to civilizations at a certain point. That they enter into periods where their once vigorous institutions become sclerotic, where their ambitious explorations hit frontiers that they can’t necessarily explore. And for us, I think that’s the most obvious in the demise of the space age basically, that we went from a period where people imagined that the frontier was going to open further into space. And now that’s sort of left to Silicon Valley billionaires to pursue and maybe they’re getting somewhere. But there’s no cultural imagination around space travel the way there was in the 1960s. So frontiers are closed. Institutions don’t work that well anymore. There’s sort of a loss of both pride in the past and confidence in the future and it doesn’t go all the way to the definition that you suggest only because I think that people sometimes underestimate how long a decadence period can last. So there’s an assumption that because you have institutions that don’t work as well anymore because you have a loss of civilizational confidence, there must be a kind of iron logic to history where the barbarians are waiting at the frontier and they’re going to come in and put the palaces to the torch. And of course sometimes that happens. But you can also have empires and cultures go on a long time in periods that are essentially stagnant. The Roman empire goes 400 years from its Caligulan stage to the actual demise of the empire in the West. And in our case, we’re in this sort of unusual, not sort of, this entirely unusual position of being the first true world civilization, even more so than ancient Rome. And we also have a situation where a lot of empires and countries and cultures that might be seen as our rivals maybe are actually converging with us in decadence in different ways. That they aren’t poised to leap past us. And if that’s the case, then you could imagine what I call sustainable decadence as something that lasts if not centuries, at least some generations past our present moment where I’m writing. Richard Reinsch:So you’re saying, American civilization spreads its corruption, it spreads its decadence to others that it touches? Ross Douthat:I’m saying that there isn’t … that’s the darkest way of putting it, I guess. You could also say that the modern world’s experiment has achieved things like near universal literacy and high school education for most people. It runs out of obvious sources of dynamic new growth. And once it achieves a certain level of technological proficiency, it becomes a lot harder to figure out new world changing inventions. It’s hard to come up with the equivalent of the light bulb or indoor plumbing. And so as other societies gain those things, they converge with us. So China gets richer and more educated. India gets richer and more educated, but they end up in the same place that we’ve ended up. There’s no clear line of advanced path, this particular combination of wealth, technology and a slowly aging slightly exhausted culture. Richard Reinsch:I want to go back, and you mentioned it earlier, your take on the end of the Space Age. You have this sentence and I’ll read it, “Since Apollo, we have entered into decadence.” Why do you pin so much on, I guess, the decline of American government’s involvement in space exploration? Ross Douthat:Well, so first because the timing is right, right? So I start the story in 1969, in part because that particular peak of achievement, the leap to the moon also coincided with the moment or the period when the trends that I’m describing as decadence really began in earnest. So it coincides with the slowdown of economic growth that began in the ’70s and has defined the American economy, with a few exceptional periods ever since. It coincides with the first great wave of public disillusionment with government that peaked with the Watergate scandal, but then has sort of defined the country’s relationship to its government ever since. It coincides with the beginning of the birth dearth, with the Baby Boom generation giving way to a period of the low replacement fertility that has again, extended itself across the developed world ever since. So there’s a lot of the, at least somewhat measurable trends, I’m talking about, start in that period. So even if it isn’t directly connected, it’s a good place to start. But I do also argue that there is a direct connection that, and this is of course unprovable, but nonetheless I think it’s true that, the entire spirit of modern civilization and especially the American version of that spirit, has depended on an idea of exploration, going to the frontier as a primary or defining source of meaning. And sometimes this has strong religious overtones, sometimes it’s more secularized. But either way, there has been this sense that human beings have been given a world to explore and our societies thrive by actually exploring it. And so the moment … this is in certain ways a version of Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous frontier thesis about where he argued that the literal closing of the frontier was this signal moment in American history. And I’m suggesting that he was probably right, but in that case, the at least temporary closing of the stellar frontier was also really important. And that the … at least some of the optimism of the post World War II era in the United States was conditioned on the belief that we were … that the frontier wasn’t actually closed that the language of John F. Kennedy, the new frontier, the language of Star Trek, the language of the 60s. The optimistic language assumed a human story that would continue beyond the earth and we haven’t found a way to do it. And then that means that we are stuck here with ourselves having fulfilled the admonition in Genesis, we have filled the earth and we don’t really know what to do next. And in that sense it’s not surprising that there is a sense of futility and stalemate in a lot of human endeavors since. Richard Reinsch:Do you think, when you think about that refusal, or, I say refusal, willingness to continue space exploration, do you attribute that to a failure of imagination, courage, hope, or big government? And one of the things, I was thinking of your book, and you just referenced Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis, I mean the conservative critique of Turner is, what he’s really saying is “Yeah, the frontier is closed and now it’s government’s job to manage us. To make our society a better one, more orderly, more equal.” Those things. Is that what leads us away from the space age and that heroic rambunctious spirit that would have been true in a pre-progressive America? Ross Douthat:I mean, I would like to argue that it’s a failure of nerve and courage and imagination, but you also have to concede that it was just a response to the reality of this space. Which, the reason that Americans went to the frontier in the 19th century, or the reason that Spanish and European explorers crossed the Atlantic was that there were clear political and financial incentives for so doing. And it took the full flower of the Cold War and that spirit of competition to get us to the moon. And then we got there and basically discovered that, while our technology at that moment was equal to that particular task, it wasn’t equal to the kind of things that science fiction authors imagined. You know, mining on the moons of Jupiter, or terraforming Mars or anything like that. So there are ways in which the people who said, “Well we don’t need to pursue the space program because there isn’t anything out there for us,” had a reasonable point. There clearly has to be some further leap of technological progress here on Earth to push us further into the stars. And some of that, I mean, we have made some progress. There’s the Elon Musk, those kinds of projects have improved our space life capacities in certain ways, but they haven’t been that transformational leap. So in that sense, I think it’s more the arrow probably runs the other way, where it’s first, the impediments to space travel become apparent and the view that we’ll be beyond Jupiter by 2001, to take Stanley Kubrick’s and Arthur C. Clarke’s example, once people realized that’s not going to happen, then in turn, diminishes the incentives for daring ambition, rambunctiousness. And you know there was a lively argument, well into the late ’60s about whether the space program itself was a sensible use of resources. And if you watch the … I’m not sure if it’s in the Apollo 11, if it’s not in the Apollo 11 documentary, it might be in the Ryan Gosling movie about Neil Armstrong. They show protestors singing the song Whitey on the Moon. That’s sort of the view. Basically a Great Society view that, as you say, we need to make things equal here on earth before we go to the stars and that view then gets, in some sense, confirmed by the fact that we can’t get to Mars or build a moon base, or have a Mars colony. Richard Reinsch:Well, it seems to me too, supply creates demand in this sense that you give yourself a purpose. Or you give yourself a goal, an objective, a destination as a country, as to what you’re going to do and push for it. And that’s something in your book, resonated with me because I remember growing up in the ’80s and thinking, “Well, we really don’t take this stuff seriously anymore.” I remember going to visit NASA and looking inside a space shuttle and thinking, “This isn’t something we’re really going to do in a way that was true when my parents were growing up.” No one’s going to give Kennedy’s speech at Rice University now. That’s also the Cold War. I mean the Cold War is a part of this as well, but it just seems we did give up. And you know, the technological difficulties are well noted, but you know, as Peter Thiel might say, “Those are things that one could push for and try to solve if there was a will.” Ross Douthat:One could. Although he wrote a very kind review of my book, but he accused me of being too glib in saying that we need to start working on the warp drive because we have to recognize these immense impediments and possible impossibilities of that technology. Which is a fair point. But yeah, I think one of the arguments I try and make in the book, is that decadence as I describe it, is a very entangled phenomenon. So it’s very hard to say, “Here was the one thing that we needed to do differently to avoid ending up where we did.” So, right. Like you could imagine a president, a popular president- Imagine a popular president, a figure like Ronald Reagan, who made a Mars mission as important or central to American government as Kennedy and his successors did with the Moon landing. But could that have succeeded given the greater technological impediments to getting to Mars, the clear absence of short term economic benefits to the mission, and the waning of the Cold War, the disappearance for a time at least of great power competition? I’m not sure. I mean, I think you can look at something like the Challenger explosion as a useful book end. I basically say that the space age runs from Sputnik to the Challenger. I was four or five when the Challenger happened. I actually do remember it as one of my more vivid childhood memories. Richard Reinsch:Yeah, me too. Ross Douthat:But yeah, so you can imagine a counterfactual where the Challenger explosion, nothing happened. Reagan is more invested in the space program. Maybe the Cold War takes a different turn. You can spin those out, but at the same time, there are clearly powerful and sort of interlocking structural forces that have made it hard for us to just sort of go on to the stars as we imagined doing. Richard Reinsch:Returning to terra firma. And in your book, you then turn to the sociology, the economics, the politics of aging societies, which characterize every Western society except for, as you know, Israel. How does that factor in to decadence, the below level birth rates, replacement level birth rates, and in that factoring into who we are? Ross Douthat:So I mean, it’s another case of entanglement, right? Where, well, the birth rate part of it starts with a puzzle that I don’t have a definite solution for. And the puzzle is why have birth rates settled so low in the developed world, not only Europe and the United States, but even more so in the Pacific rim as well? And if you go back 50 years to…

    Full show notes at the publisher

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