The High Court Report - SCOTUS Oral Arguments

Latest Episodes:

Oral Argument: Pitchford v. Cain | Blocked, Then Blamed: Jury Selection Bind Apr 01, 2026

Show notes

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.

Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.

Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Main Arguments:

Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.
Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.

Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;
(2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;
(3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.

Implications:

Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.
Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.

The Fine Print:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Primary Cases:

Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.
Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips Black
Respondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor General
United States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:07] Oral Advocates

[00:01:21] Argument Begins

[00:01:29] Pitchford Opening Statement

[00:03:49] Pitchford Free for All Questions

[00:28:09] Pitchford Round Robin Questions

[00:54:35] Cain Opening Statement

[00:56:46] Cain Free for All Questions

[01:15:43] Cain Round Robin Questions

[01:34:48] United States Opening Statement

[01:35:51] United States Free for All Questions

[01:45:22] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:48:42] Pitchford Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Paused for Arbitration — Does the Court Stay in Charge?? Mar 30, 2026

Show notes

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/26

Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.

Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.

Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.

Main Arguments:

Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of court
Balazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsed

Implications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.

The Fine Print:

FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"

Primary Cases:

Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basis
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award

Oral Advocates:

Jules (Petitioner): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner and Block.
Andre Balazs (Respondents): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone, LLP

Timestamps:

[00:01:25] Argument Begins

[00:01:32] Jules Opening Statement

[00:03:03] Jules Free for All Questions

[00:26:40] Jules Round Robin Questions

[00:32:42] Balazs Opening Statement

[00:34:05] Balazs Free for All Questions

[00:51:56] Balazs Round Robin Questions

[00:52:08] Jules Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Abouammo v. United States | Where's Your Trial, Home Turf or Government's Pick? Mar 30, 2026

Show notes

Abouammo v. United States | Case No. 25-5146 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/36

Question Presented: Whether venue lies in a district where no offense conduct occurred, so long as the statute's intent element contemplates effects that could occur there.

Overview: Ahmad Abouammo created a fake invoice in his Seattle home during an FBI interview, then emailed it to San Francisco agents. The Court now decides whether prosecutors can try document falsification where the targeted investigation sits, not where the defendant acted.

Posture: Ninth Circuit upheld Northern District of California venue; Supreme Court granted certiorari December 2025.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley Austin
Respondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Main Arguments:

Abouammo:

(1) Venue tracks the offense's essential conduct elements — falsification occurred entirely in Seattle;
(2) Intent elements cannot anchor venue because mental state does not constitute conduct;
(3) The Founders embedded the vicinage right twice in the Constitution specifically to reject effects-based prosecution

United States:

(1) The Constitution permits venue where a crime's effects are intentionally directed and felt, not just where the defendant stood;
(2) Section 1519 defines an inchoate offense — like conspiracy — and the targeted investigation's location forms part of the crime's commission;
(3) Even under Abouammo's own theory, emailing the fake PDF to San Francisco created a duplicate falsified record there, independently satisfying venue

Implications: Abouammo victory anchors venue to a person's physical location, giving protection against distant prosecution. On the other hand, it hamstrings prosecutors from bringing digital obstruction crimes that reflects today's technology realities. Government victory allows prosecution in the district of any targeted investigation, giving federal prosecutors broad forum-selection power for any obstruction-related offense nationwide.

The Fine Print:

18 U.S.C. § 1519: "Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
U.S. Const. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."

Primary Cases:

United States v. Cabrales (1998): Venue tracks the location of the specific prohibited conduct — not collateral circumstances; money laundering in Florida could not face trial in Missouri simply because the underlying drug proceeds originated there.
Ford v. United States (1927): Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it warrant prosecuting the defendant as if present at the effect — the foundational intent-and-effects venue principle.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:12] Argument Begins

[00:01:21] Abouammo Opening Statement

[00:03:30] Abouammo Free for All Questions

[00:26:27] Abouammo Round Robin Questions

[00:33:40] United States Opening Statement

[00:35:54] United States Free for All Questions

[01:04:34] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:13:58] Abouammo Rebuttal

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Rico v. United States | Disappearing Defedant Dilemma Mar 29, 2026

Show notes

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Argument: 11/3/25 | Decided: 3/25/26

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.

Overview: Federal courts split on whether a defendant's disappearance during supervised release automatically pushes back the expiration date — a question affecting thousands of federal defendants nationwide.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.

Holding: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize courts to automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release simply because the defendant runs away. The law sets firm end dates for supervision. Congress must amend the law before courts can extend deadlines if a defendant runs away.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Majority Reasoning: (1) The Sentencing Reform Act sets firm start and end dates for supervised release and supplies no automatic extension rule if a defendant runs away (i.e. absconds); (2) Congress already equipped courts with specific tools to address absconders — revocation, re-imprisonment, and post-expiration revocation via warrant — making the omission of automatic extension intentional; (3) The Act's only true tolling rule pauses supervised release during incarceration of 30 or more consecutive days, and courts cannot invent a second one.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Alito (dissenting): The majority never needed to reach the tolling question. The district court could lawfully consider Rico's January 2022 drug offense as a Section 3553(a) sentencing factor — rendering any Guidelines-range error harmless. No error occurred.

Implications:

Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations.
Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences.
Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases.
Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."

Primary Cases:

Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.
United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:37] Argument Begins

[00:00:45] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:30] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:24:20] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:24:35] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:26:25] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:52:15] Respondent Sequential Questions

[00:52:20] Petitioner Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: Rico v. United States | Disappearing Defendant Dilemma Solved Mar 28, 2026

Show notes

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Argument: 11/3/25 | Decided: 3/25/26

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Separate Opinions:

Implications:

Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations.
Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences.
Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases.
Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."

Primary Cases:

Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.
United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Overview and Holding

[00:00:52] Subscribe and Contact

[00:01:14] Rico's Background and Supervised Release

[00:02:07] Absconding and New Crimes

[00:03:33] Lower Courts and Circuit Split

[00:04:33] Supreme Court Question

[00:05:07] Majority Textual Reasoning

[00:07:03] Government Arguments Rejected

[00:08:22] Decision and Remand

[00:08:38] Alito's Dissent Explained

[00:11:15] Practical Impact Nationwide

[00:13:01] Wrap Up and Outro

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Cox v. Sony | Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle Mar 27, 2026

Show notes

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Date Decided: 3/25/26

Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.

Overview: Major copyright owners sought to hold Cox Communications liable for its subscribers' music piracy after Cox received over 163,000 infringement notices and terminated only 32 subscribers, producing a $1 billion jury verdict.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

Holding: Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Contributory copyright liability requires proof of intent — meaning the provider either actively induced infringement or designed its service specifically for infringing use; (2) mere knowledge that subscribers commit infringement, without inducement or tailored design, cannot establish the required intent; (3) Cox neither promoted infringement nor tailored its internet service exclusively for copyright theft, and internet access plainly serves vast legitimate purposes.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Jackson.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Implications: Internet service providers nationwide no longer face contributory copyright liability merely for serving subscribers they know infringe copyrights. Rights holders lose a major litigation weapon against ISPs and must pursue individual infringers directly or seek legislative reform. ISPs now face no realistic legal pressure to enforce infringement policies. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence preserves a theoretical path for future plaintiffs with specific individual-level infringement evidence under an aiding-and-abetting theory.

The Fine Print:

17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."

Primary Cases:

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.

Timestamps:

[00:00] Oral Argument Introduction

[01:28] Oral Argument Begins

[01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement

[03:37] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[19:25] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

[41:21] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

[42:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

[51:39] Amicus Curaie Round Robin Questions

[01:01:23] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:03:44] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:31:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions

[01:39:19] Petitioner Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: Cox v. Sony | Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle Mar 26, 2026

Show notes

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Date Decided: 3/25/26

Question Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

The Fine Print:

17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."

Primary Cases:

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.

Oral Argument: Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Interstate Worker or Local Laborer? Mar 25, 2026

Show notes

Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 3/25/26

Question Presented: Whether last-mile delivery drivers who never cross state lines qualify as transportation workers "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.

Overview: Flowers Foods required its Colorado bread delivery driver, Angelo Brock, to arbitrate wage disputes. Brock never crossed a state line. The Court must decide whether the 1925 FAA's transportation worker exemption covers last-mile drivers.

Posture: D. Colo. denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; four-circuit split prompted cert grant.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones Day
For Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta Wessler

Main Arguments:

Flowers Foods (Petitioner):

(1) Section 1 covers only workers who directly and actively move goods across state or international borders;
(2) historical 1925 labor schemes excluded purely local intrastate workers;
(3) the Tenth Circuit's multi-factor test turns simple arbitration threshold questions into costly mini-trials

Angelo Brock (Respondent):

(1) century of Supreme Court precedent defined last-mile workers finishing an interstate goods journey as "engaged in interstate commerce";
(2) seamen and railroad employees in 1925 included last-mile workers who never crossed a border;
(3) Flowers argued its last-mile drivers qualify as interstate workers under the Motor Carrier Act — and won — directly contradicting its position here

Implications: A Flowers win strips court access from last-mile drivers at FedEx, UPS, Amazon Logistics, and the U.S. Postal Service — forcing employment disputes into private arbitration and shielding company labor practices from judicial review. A Brock win preserves court access for workers serving more than 170 million delivery addresses and anchors a century of interstate commerce precedent in the modern gig economy.

The Fine Print:

9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any...contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"

Primary Cases:

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): Transportation workers must play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders to qualify for the FAA Section 1 exemption
Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024): Transportation workers need not work for a transportation industry company to qualify for Section 1, but must actively engage in transporting goods across borders

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:02] Argument Begins

[00:01:08] Flowers Food Opening Statement

[00:03:21] Flowers Food Free for All Questions

[00:27:30] Flowers Food Round Robin Questions

[00:32:08] Brock Opening Statement

[00:34:35] Brock Free for All Questions

[01:05:32] Brock Round Robin Questions

[01:14:23] Flowers Food Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Noem v. Al Otro Lado | One Step From America — When Does Arrive Actually Mean Arrive? Mar 24, 2026

Show notes

Noem v. Al Otro Lado | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: Here | Oral Argument: 3/24/26

Question Presented: Whether noncitizens stopped on Mexican soil "arrive in the United States" triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing requirements.

Overview: Border control challenge determines whether immigration officers can block asylum seekers at ports of entry before statutory protections attach, or whether federal law requires processing anyone who presents themselves at the border.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; fifteen judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Noem, et al.): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
Respondents (Al Otro Lado): Kelsi B. Corkran of the the of Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection

Main Arguments:

Government (Petitioner): (1) Plain meaning of "arrives in" requires physical territorial entry—Greeks outside Troy's walls did not "arrive in" Troy; (2) Section 1225's inspection, detention, and removal procedures require U.S. presence—officers cannot inspect people standing in Mexico; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality and Sale precedent confirm statutes apply only within U.S. territory.
Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in the United States" encompasses presentation at ports of entry to avoid rendering phrase redundant with "physically present"; (2) Congress enacted provisions to implement non-refoulement treaty obligations prohibiting return of refugees to persecution; (3) Government regulations for decades defined "arriving alien" as someone "attempting to come" into the United States at ports of entry.

Implications: Government victory preserves Executive Branch authority to manage border surges through metering, allowing officers to control entry timing at ports during capacity constraints. Asylum seeker victory requires immediate inspection and processing for anyone reaching ports of entry regardless of resources, potentially forcing facility entry to comply with statutory mandates.

The Fine Print:

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States...may apply for asylum"
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and (a)(3): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States...shall be deemed...an applicant for admission" who "shall be inspected by immigration officers"

Primary Cases:

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Presumption against extraterritoriality bars applying immigration statutes to refugees interdicted at sea before reaching U.S. territory; statutes apply only within United States.
DHS v. Thuraissigiam (2020): Arriving aliens physically on U.S. soil remain treated as stopped at the boundary line without having effected entry; arrival and admission constitute distinct legal statuses.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:23] Argument Begins

[00:01:29] United States Opening Statement

[00:02:40] United States Free for All Questions

[00:27:04] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:40:34] Al Otro Lado Opening Statement

[00:42:52] Al Otro Lado Free for All Questions

[01:10:56] Al Otro Lado Round Robin Questions

[01:18:32] United States Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Lost Lawsuit for Mistaken Nondisclosure? Mar 24, 2026

Show notes

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/24/26

Overview: Fifth Circuit's mechanical judicial estoppel rule bars claims entirely when bankruptcy filers fail to timely disclose lawsuits, creating circuit split over whether courts must consider all circumstances or presume bad faith from potential motive alone.

Question Presented: Whether courts can bar a person's lawsuit if that person filed for bankruptcy and forgot to tell the bankruptcy court about the lawsuit?

Posture: Under rigid estoppel rule, district court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's lawsuit.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Keathley): Gregory G. Garre of Latham and Watkins
United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur): Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
Respondent (Buddy Ayers Construction): William M. Jay of Goodwin Proctor

Main Arguments:

Petitioner Keathley:

(1) Courts must examine all circumstances, not presume bad intent automatically
(2) Estoppel punishes deliberate manipulation, not honest mistakes or simple confusion
(3) Rule rewards wrongdoers, harms innocent debtors, contradicts bankruptcy's fresh-start promise

Respondent Ayers Construction:

(1) Estoppel requires objective inconsistency, not proof of subjective bad intent
(2) Mistake exception covers only objective errors, not every non-malicious explanation
(3) Seventeen-factor test creates unworkable trials, eliminates deterrence, guts disclosure requirements

United States (supporting Keathley):

(1) Equity requires holistic assessment including bankruptcy-specific factors, not mechanical presumptions
(2) Bankruptcy courts' firsthand findings deserve weight when assessing debtor intent
(3) Fifth Circuit's restricted inquiry ignores relevant evidence, contradicts equitable principles

Implications:

Keathley victory: courts examine full circumstances before blocking lawsuits. Ayers victory: automatic blocking regardless of honest mistakes or creditor harm.

The Fine Print:

11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i): "The debtor shall file a schedule of assets and liabilities"
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a): "A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed"

Primary Cases:

New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Estoppel targets deliberate manipulation, not inadvertence or honest mistakes
Holland v. Florida (2010): Equity demands flexible judgments, not rigid mechanical rules

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:18] Argument Begins

[00:01:26] Keathley Opening Statement

[00:03:33] Keathley Free for All Questions

[00:18:46] Keathley Round Robin Questions

[00:33:09] United States Opening Statement

[00:34:28] United States Free for All Questions

[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:47:24] Buddy Ayers Opening Statement

[00:49:27] Buddy Ayers Free for All Questions

[01:09:04] Buddy Ayers Round Robin Questions