The High Court Report - SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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**The High Court Report – SCOTUS Oral Arguments**

The High Court Report makes Supreme Court decisions accessible to everyone.
We deliver comprehensive SCOTUS coverage without the legal jargon or partisan spin—just clear analysis that explains how these cases affect your life, business, and community.

What you get: Case previews and breakdowns, raw oral argument audio, curated key exchanges, detailed opinion analysis, and expert commentary from a practicing attorney who’s spent 12 years in courtrooms arguing the same types of cases the Supreme Court hears.

Why it works: Whether you need a focused 10-minute update or a deep constitutional dive, episodes are designed for busy professionals, engaged citizens, and anyone who wants to understand how the Court shapes America.

When we publish: 3-5 episodes weekly during the Court’s October-June term, with summer coverage of emergency orders and retrospective analysis.

Growing archive: Oral arguments back to 2020 and expanding, so you can hear how landmark cases unfolded and track the Court’s evolution.
Your direct line to understanding the Supreme Court—accessible, thorough, and grounded in real legal expertise.**

Latest Episodes:

Oral Argument: Monsanto Co. v. Durnell Apr 27, 2026

Show notes

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Monsanto): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy
Respondent (Durnell): Ashley C. Keller of Keller Postman
Amicus Curiae (United States): Sarah M. Harris of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts a state failure-to-warn claim when EPA approved the pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning.

Overview: John Durnell sprayed Roundup for over two decades before a cancer diagnosis. EPA approved Roundup's label with no cancer warning for fifty years. The Court must decide whether that federal approval shields Monsanto from a $1.25 million Missouri jury verdict.

Posture: Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed jury verdict; Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer; cert granted.

Main Arguments:

• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's pesticide-specific registration imposes binding federal labeling requirements that preempt conflicting state tort duties; (2) Missouri's failure-to-warn standard diverges from FIFRA's mandatory cost-benefit analysis; (3) Federal law forbade unilateral label changes, making simultaneous compliance with state and federal law impossible.

• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA delegates to courts and juries — not EPA — the final word on whether a label violates the misbranding prohibition; (2) Missouri law mirrors FIFRA's misbranding standards and runs parallel, not in conflict; (3) Monsanto could add a cancer warning unilaterally, as Bayer proved in 2012 with a different pesticide.

Implications: A Monsanto victory extinguishes over 100,000 Roundup cancer lawsuits nationwide and establishes that EPA registration conclusively insulates pesticide manufacturers from state tort liability — a rule that extends to every federally registered pesticide. A Durnell victory preserves state-court accountability for pesticide warnings and confirms that juries, not EPA, hold final authority over whether a label misled consumers. Durnell's victory also subjects every pesticide manufacturer to potentially inconsistent verdicts across fifty states, and risks removing critical agricultural chemicals from commerce through cascading liability.

The Fine Print:

7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."
7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter."

Primary Cases:

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn law targeting false or misleading pesticide labels survives FIFRA preemption when it mirrors the federal misbranding standard; preemption applies only where state requirements actually differ from federal requirements.
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011): Impossibility preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims when federal law prevents manufacturers from independently making the label change state law requires.

Timestamps:

[Sorry, come back later for timestamps!]

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Enbridge v. Nessel | Deadline Drama and Treaty Tensions Apr 26, 2026

Show notes

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here | Decided: 4/22/26

Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.

Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.

Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.

Holding: Because 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal of the case to federal court outside the statute’s 30-day deadline was untimely.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion. No Justice authored a separate opinion.

Result: Affirmed. Nessel wins.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Statutory exceptions throughout removal law demonstrate Congress rejected general equitable tolling; (2) Mandatory language requires strict deadline enforcement; (3) Efficiency concerns counsel against case-by-case deadline extensions through judicial discretion.

Implications: Companies lose flexibility to move cases to federal court after missing statutory deadlines. State courts retain jurisdiction over environmental and regulatory disputes even when federal issues arise later. Forum selection becomes permanent within thirty days of service regardless of extraordinary circumstances.

Main Arguments:

• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances

• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstances

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"

• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Brockamp (1997): Explicit statutory exceptions strongly indicate Congress rejected additional implied exceptions through judicial interpretation

• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise

• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.
For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.

Opinion Summary: Enbridge v. Nessel | Deadline Drama Diffused Apr 25, 2026

Show notes

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here | Decided: 4/22/26

Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.

Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion. No Justice authored a separate opinion.

Result: Affirmed. Nessel wins.

Opinion: Here

Main Arguments:

The Fine Print:

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Brockamp (1997): Explicit statutory exceptions strongly indicate Congress rejected additional implied exceptions through judicial interpretation

• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise

• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.
For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.

Case Preview: Mullin v. Doe | Judicial Check or Unreviewable Executive Power? Apr 24, 2026

Show notes

Mullin v. Doe | 25-1083 | Docket Link: Here

Consolidated with Trump v. Miot 25-1084 | Docket Link: Here

Argument Date: 4/29/2026

Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)'s judicial review bar precludes APA challenges to the Secretary's termination of Syria's Temporary Protected Status designation, and if reviewable, whether the termination violated the APA.

Overview: Emergency stay application challenges Secretary Mullin's termination of Temporary Protected Status for 6,132 Syrian nationals. Central questions: whether courts may review TPS termination decisions at all, and whether the Secretary followed required consultation and country-conditions procedures.

Posture: S.D.N.Y. postponed Syria's TPS termination; Second Circuit denied stay; government now seeks Supreme Court intervention.

Main Arguments:

Government (Applicant): (1) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all APA challenges to TPS terminations; (2) Secretary validly consulted agencies and invoked national interest; (3) Courts cannot brand a new administration's policy priorities as pretext
Syrian TPS Holders (Respondents): (1) Judicial review bar covers country-conditions determinations only, not procedural violations; (2) Secretary never genuinely consulted agencies and invoked an extra-statutory factor; (3) Concrete harms to 6,132 Syrians facing deportation to an active war zone favor denial

Implications:

(A) Government victory:

The judicial review bar broadly strips courts of authority to review all TPS termination decisions
Clear path for DHS Secretary to implement terminations across all thirteen countries — potentially stripping hundreds of thousands of TPS holders of legal status with no judicial recourse.
TPS becomes a pure presidential foreign-policy tool.

(B) TPS holders victory:

Courts retain authority to enforce TPS's procedural requirements;
The Secretary must genuinely consult agencies and review actual country conditions;
6,132 Syrians retain lawful status while the Second Circuit completes full appellate review.

The Fine Print:

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection."
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A): "[A]fter consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government," the Secretary "shall review the conditions in the foreign state . . . and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation . . . continue to be met."

Primary Cases:

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (1991): A comparable immigration statute's reference to "a determination" described a single act — the denial of an individual application — and did not bar general collateral challenges to unconstitutional agency practices and policies; the central precedent for the TPS holders' jurisdictional argument.
Noem v. NTPSA, 145 S. Ct. 2728 (2025) (NTPSA I) & 146 S. Ct. 23 (2025) (NTPSA II): Supreme Court stayed two district court orders blocking Venezuela's TPS termination without written explanation; the government argues these orders "inform" the equitable analysis here and reflect prior acceptance of its likelihood-of-success argument.

Opinion Summary: Chevron v. Plaquemines | WWII Avgas Flies Chevron's Case to Federal Court Apr 23, 2026

Show notes

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | Case No. 24-813 | Decided: April 17, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether a state environmental lawsuit challenging a WWII military contractor's crude oil production "relates to" its federal avgas refining contract under the federal officer removal statute.

Overview: Louisiana parishes sued Chevron over World War II oil production damage. Chevron invoked the federal officer removal statute, arguing its wartime crude oil production closely related to its military contract to refine aviation gasoline for the U.S. military.

Posture: District Court and Fifth Circuit both denied removal; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Holding: Chevron plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal aviation gas refining duties and therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal officer removal statute.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas authored the majority, joined by six Justices. Justice Jackson authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito did not participate in the case.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) "Relating to" under the federal officer removal statute requires a close — not tenuous, remote, or peripheral — connection between challenged conduct and federal duties; no explicit contractual directive needed; (2) Chevron's crude oil production closely related to its federal avgas refining — wartime drilling practices directly enabled military fuel output; (3) The P.A.W.'s role allocating crude oil among refineries as an intermediary did not sever the production-refining relationship.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Jackson (concurring in judgment): Agreed Chevron satisfies the removal requirements but argued the 2011 "or relating to" amendment preserved the prior causal-nexus test rather than replacing it with a looser indirect-relationship standard; Chevron satisfies both tests.

Implications: Military contractors and other companies that performed federal government work during wartime now carry stronger arguments to move state environmental and other lawsuits into federal court. The ruling clarifies that a close relationship between challenged conduct and federal duties suffices — no explicit contractual directive required. Jackson's concurrence signals future courts may apply a stricter causal-nexus test when facts run thinner. Louisiana parishes pursuing decades-old coastal damage claims against other wartime oil companies face the same federal-forum question across 41 remaining lawsuits.

The Fine Print:

28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1): "[A] civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to . . . [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office."
Louisiana Coastal Resources Management Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49:214.34(C)(2): "Individual specific uses legally commenced or established prior to the effective date of the coastal use permit program."

Primary Cases:

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992): "Relating to" encompasses indirect connections; state advertising rules related to airline rates even where consumer decisions intervened as intermediaries in the causal chain.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon (1990): A law "relates to" something even when lawmakers never specifically designed it to affect that subject; explicit direction unnecessary to establish a cognizable relationship.

Oral Argument: Blanche v. Lau Apr 22, 2026

Show notes

Blanche v. Lau (formerly named Bondi v. Lau) | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (United States): Sopan Joshi of the Department of Justice
Respondent (Muk Choi Lau): Shay Dvoretzky of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Question Presented: Whether the government, to remove a lawful permanent resident as inadmissible after paroling him into the United States, must prove it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the disqualifying offense at the time of reentry.

Overview: A green-card holder returns from a brief trip abroad facing only unproven criminal charges. The government paroles him in, waits for his conviction, then invokes the inadmissibility track. The Supreme Court now decides whether that sequence respects the INA's plain text.

Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

Government (Petitioner): (1) Courts lack jurisdiction to review discretionary parole decisions; (2) The INA requires proof of the offense at the removal hearing, not at the border; (3) Requiring border officers to weigh clear-and-convincing evidence before paroling LPRs would nullify decades of lawful practice
Lau (Respondent): (1) The INA's plain text requires the government to establish the statutory exception at the time of reentry; (2) Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether DHS held authority to parole at all; (3) The government retains ample deportation authority under § 1227 and faces no operational hardship

Implications (90 words max): A government victory preserves DHS's ability to parole returning green-card holders facing criminal charges, use later convictions to justify the parole decision, and invoke the inadmissibility track — where the noncitizen bears the burden of proof. A Lau victory forces the government onto the deportation track for any LPR admitted without sufficient border-time evidence, shifting the burden of proof to the government. Millions of permanent residents who travel abroad while facing pending charges would gain a clearer procedural protection against the inadmissibility framework.

The Fine Print:

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien — … (v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title…"
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A): "The Secretary of Homeland Security may … in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily … only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien…"

Primary Cases:

Wilkinson v. Garland (2024): Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether a noncitizen met the statutory eligibility requirements for a discretionary immigration decision — even where the ultimate exercise of discretion sits beyond judicial review
Vartelas v. Holder (2012): A lawful permanent resident who committed a crime involving moral turpitude before a 1996 statutory change could not retroactively lose the right to travel abroad and return; the Court acknowledged in dicta that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) appears to require conviction or admission of the offense

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:22] Oral Advocates

[00:01:33] Argument Begins

[00:01:38] United States Opening Statement

[00:03:42] United States Free for All Questions

[00:26:57] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:51:52] Lau Opening Statement

[00:54:15] Lau Free for All Questions

[01:22:24] Lau Round Robin Questions

[01:25:46] United States Rebuttal

Oral Argument: FCC v. AT&T Apr 21, 2026

Show notes

FCC v. AT&T, Inc., consolidated with Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.): Jeffrey B. Wall of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Respondents (FCC): Vivek Suri of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the Communications Act violates the Seventh Amendment and Article III by authorizing the FCC to order payment of monetary penalties for failing to safeguard customer data, without guaranteeing carriers a jury trial.

Overview: A Missouri sheriff exploited AT&T's and Verizon's location-data programs to track hundreds of people without consent. The FCC ordered AT&T to pay $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million — through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in suits at common law.

Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second and D.C. Circuits upheld Verizon's and Sprint's. Supreme Court consolidated and granted cert January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

• AT&T and Verizon: (1) FCC forfeiture proceedings constitute "Suits at common law" demanding a jury before any final liability order enters; (2) The back-end Section 504 jury option fails — no carrier received a jury trial in 47 years under this scheme; (3) The scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury-trial rights on defying a final federal order and risking operating licenses.

• FCC and United States: (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — a carrier may lawfully do nothing after receiving one; (2) The Seventh Amendment right attaches at the collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial under Section 504(a); (3) The Court's 1915 ruling in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad already upheld this exact model, and founding-era practice confirms its validity.

Implications: An AT&T and Verizon victory strips the FCC of its primary enforcement tool, potentially leaving privacy, robocall, and data-security rules unenforced — and destabilizing similar penalty structures across at least five other federal agencies. An FCC and United States victory confirms that agencies may enter nine-figure penalty judgments through in-house proceedings, with regulated businesses' only realistic path running through courts that apply deferential review — not juries.

The Fine Print:

• U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

• 47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States...Provided, That any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."

Primary Cases:

• SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment applies when a federal agency seeks civil penalties through in-house proceedings that parallel common-law suits; Congress cannot remove such claims from jury adjudication by assigning them to an administrative tribunal.

• Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue non-binding monetary awards — enforceable in subsequent civil suits with jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:23] Oral Advocates

[00:01:33] Argument Begins

[00:01:44] AT&T Opening Statement

[00:03:37] AT&T Free for All Questions

[00:28:25] AT&T Round Robin Questions

[00:55:12] FCC Opening Statement

[00:56:56] FCC Free for All Questions

[01:20:27] FCC Round Robin Questions

[01:22:12] AT&T Rebuttal

Oral Argument: T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation Apr 20, 2026

Show notes

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (T.M.): Elizabeth B. Prelogar of Cooley LLP
Respondents (University of Maryland Medical System Corporation): Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP

Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — which blocks federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments — can apply when the state-court decision remains subject to further appeal in state court.

Overview: A Maryland woman who signed a consent order to secure her release from involuntary psychiatric commitment challenges a federal doctrine that slammed the federal courthouse door before her state-court appeal concluded — dividing the federal circuits.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rooker-Feldman; expressly split from majority of circuits.

Main Arguments:

• T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending to non-final judgments; (3) Preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without a jurisdictional bar

• UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-part test contains no finality requirement; (2) District courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments regardless of pending review; (3) T.M.'s rule would produce gamesmanship, parallel duplicative litigation, and profound federalism harm

Implications: A T.M. victory gives any state-court loser who raises a constitutional claim an open path to federal district court while state appeals remain pending — broadening federal access but triggering parallel proceedings across two court systems. A UMD victory preserves the rule that state-court losers must exhaust state remedies before federal district courts intervene, reinforcing comity but potentially denying urgent federal relief before the state appellate process concludes. Either outcome reshapes how hundreds of thousands of civil litigants navigate federal courthouse access every year.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."

• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Primary Cases:

• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claim supports their position.

• Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack power to reverse or modify state-court judgments — one of only two cases where the Supreme Court ever applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss a federal suit for lack of jurisdiction, and the doctrine's namesake.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:15] Oral Advocates

[00:01:27] Argument Begins

[00:01:35] T.M. Opening Statement

[00:03:51] T.M. Free for All Questions

[00:27:56] T.M. Round Robin Questions

[00:42:13] UMD Medical Opening Statement

[00:44:01] UMD Medical Free for All Questions

[00:59:41] UMD Medical Round Robin Questions

[00:59:50] T.M. Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Sripetch v. SEC Apr 19, 2026

Show notes

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLP
Respondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.

Overview: Federal securities enforcement showdown asks whether the SEC must prove actual investor money losses before courts order fraudsters to surrender profits — reshaping a $6.1 billion annual enforcement tool.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Second Circuit requires it; Supreme Court granted cert January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

Sripetch (Petitioner): (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's definition of disgorgement, which requires restoring funds to actual victims; (3) Allowing victimless disgorgement creates incoherent statutory anomalies and lets the SEC circumvent procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.
SEC (Respondent): (1) Disgorgement strips wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains rather than compensating victims — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 disgorgement provisions, signaling no pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) The statutory phrase "unjust enrichment" carries a common-law meaning that never required monetary loss.

Implications: Sripetch victory forces the SEC to document specific investor money losses before courts order disgorgement — shrinking the SEC's multibillion-dollar enforcement arsenal and potentially shielding cleverly structured fraud schemes from profit-stripping orders. SEC victory preserves the agency's ability to disgorge profits from any securities violation regardless of whether identifiable investors lost money, keeping market manipulation unprofitable even when individual victims remain unharmed on paper. Lower courts, practitioners, and compliance officers across the securities industry await the Court's answer.

The Fine Print:

15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."

Primary Cases:

Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held that SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must "be awarded for victims" — the foundational ruling both sides now dispute.
SEC v. Govil, 86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit held that disgorgement requires proof of investor pecuniary harm, creating the circuit split that prompted the Supreme Court's cert grant.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:07] Oral Advocates

[00:01:17] Argument Begins

[00:01:26] Sripetch Opening Statement

[00:03:33] Sripetch Free for All Questions

[00:25:18] Sripetch Round Robin Questions

[00:41:42] SEC Opening Statement

[00:44:17] SEC Free for All Questions

[01:08:35] SEC Round Robin Questions

[01:08:48] Sripetch Rebuttal

Case Preview: Hikma v. Amarin | Did Hikma's Sales Pitch Steal Amarin's Patent? Apr 19, 2026

Show notes

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether a generic drugmaker that fully carves patented uses from its label actively induces patent infringement through investor press releases and website statements that do not mention, encourage, or instruct the patented use

Overview: Generic drugmaker Hikma followed federal skinny-label law but called its product "generic Vascepa" and touted Vascepa's total sales. Brand manufacturer Amarin claims those statements actively induced doctors to prescribe the generic for a patented cardiovascular use worth over $900 million annually.

Posture: District court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 2026.

Main Arguments:

• Hikma (Petitioner): (1) "Actively" induces requires affirmative steps encouraging infringement — none of Hikma's statements mention or instruct the patented use; (2) Amarin's theory of liability imputes inferences physicians might draw, not active steps Hikma took; (3) The Federal Circuit's decision effectively nullifies the section viii skinny-label pathway Congress created to speed generic competition

• Amarin (Respondent): (1) Hikma advertised its generic for "Hypertriglyceridemia" — a category encompassing the patented cardiovascular use — going beyond compliant labeling; (2) Press releases calling the product "generic Vascepa" and touting $919 million to $1.1 billion in total Vascepa sales plausibly encouraged prescribers to use the generic for all of Vascepa's indications; (3) Seven other generic manufacturers selling identical skinny-label products avoided suit by accurately limiting their marketing — proving that compliant speech and section viii coexist

Implications: Hikma victory establishes that skinny-label compliance shields generic manufacturers from inducement liability for accurate commercial descriptions, protecting the section viii pathway that delivers billions in consumer drug savings annually. Amarin victory confirms that post-label marketing conduct — even investor communications — can cross the line into active patent infringement inducement, preserving incentives for brand manufacturers to invest hundreds of millions in discovering new therapeutic uses. The Court's answer defines the legal boundary between ordinary commerce and unlawful inducement for the entire pharmaceutical industry.

The Fine Print:

• 35 U.S.C. § 271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer"

• 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii): Permits a generic manufacturer to file a statement seeking approval only for uses not covered by the brand manufacturer's listed method-of-use patents, allowing the generic to carry a "skinny label" that carves out still-patented uses

Primary Cases:

• Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Inducement liability requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement" — mere knowledge that a product may reach infringing uses does not suffice; liability demands "statements or actions directed to promoting infringement"

• Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S (2012): Congress designed the section viii skinny-label mechanism to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones," expediting generic competition as soon as patents allow

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