The High Court Report - SCOTUS Oral Arguments

Latest Episodes:

Oral Argument Re-Listen: First Choice v. Davenport | What Happens When State Subpoenas Silence Speech? May 07, 2026

Show notes

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport | Case No. 24-781 | Decided: 4/29/26 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: New Jersey's Attorney General (Platkin) demanded a pro-life nonprofit's donor records despite receiving zero public complaints. The Court unanimously ruled the subpoena inflicted a present First Amendment injury, opening the federal courthouse door immediately.

Question Presented: Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas demanding donor identities before state courts enforce those subpoenas.

Posture: Third Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing; Supreme Court reversed unanimously.

Holding: First Choice established a present injury to its First Amendment associational rights sufficient for Article III standing.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Government demands for donor information inevitably deter First Amendment associational rights — an injury beginning when the demand arrives and persisting as long as it remains outstanding; (2) The subpoena's "non-self-executing" nature carried no constitutional significance — the "sword of Damocles" chilled association regardless of enforcement status; (3) Confidentiality promises, narrowed demands, and prospective protective orders cannot cure the First Amendment injury a donor-information subpoena inflicts.

Separate Opinions: None. The Court ruled unanimously without concurrences or dissents.

Implications: Every nonprofit, charity, and advocacy organization now holds clear authority to challenge government demands for donor records in federal court immediately under Section 1983 — without exhausting state remedies first. The ruling forecloses the "preclusion trap" that would permanently bar federal review after a state-court loss. Attorneys general nationwide must now account for immediate federal scrutiny before issuing investigatory subpoenas targeting donor rolls. The Court left the merits question open — whether this particular subpoena violated the First Amendment — sending that fight back to the lower courts on remand.

The Fine Print:

First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
42 U.S.C. §1983: Authorizes suits against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal constitutional rights — enacted by Congress specifically to guarantee a federal forum when state officials violate constitutional protections.

Primary Cases:

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958): Government demands for private membership rolls burden First Amendment associational rights; the "vital relationship" between privacy in association and freedom to associate requires the "closest scrutiny" of compelled disclosure.
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (2021): State demands for charitable donor information "chill" protected associational rights even when the government promises confidentiality; such demands must overcome heightened First Amendment scrutiny.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (First Choice Women's Resource): Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.
For United States as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (New Jersey): Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, Trenton, N.J.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:32] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:50] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:55] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:19:27] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

[00:24:43] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

[00:25:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

[00:35:30] Amicus Curiae Round Robin Questions

[00:38:09] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:40:30] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:08:31] Respondent Round Robin Questions

[01:20:41] Petitioner Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: First Choice v. Davenport | What Happens When State Subpoenas Silence Speech? May 06, 2026

Show notes

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport | Case No. 24-781 | Decided: 4/29/26 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas demanding donor identities before state courts enforce those subpoenas.

Posture: Third Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing; Supreme Court reversed unanimously.

Holding: First Choice established a present injury to its First Amendment associational rights sufficient for Article III standing.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion.

Separate Opinions: None. The Court ruled unanimously without concurrences or dissents.

The Fine Print:

First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
42 U.S.C. §1983: Authorizes suits against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal constitutional rights — enacted by Congress specifically to guarantee a federal forum when state officials violate constitutional protections.

Primary Cases:

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958): Government demands for private membership rolls burden First Amendment associational rights; the "vital relationship" between privacy in association and freedom to associate requires the "closest scrutiny" of compelled disclosure.
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (2021): State demands for charitable donor information "chill" protected associational rights even when the government promises confidentiality; such demands must overcome heightened First Amendment scrutiny.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (First Choice Women's Resource): Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.
For United States as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (New Jersey): Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, Trenton, N.J.

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Louisiana v. Callais | SCOTUS Writes a New Voting Rights Playbook May 05, 2026

Show notes

Louisiana v. Callais and Robinson v. Callais | Case Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 | Oral Argument: 10/15/25 | Decided: April 29, 2026 | Docket Link: Here and Here

Overview: On 4/29/26, the Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's second majority-Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, overhauled the 40-year-old Gingles framework for vote-dilution claims, and reinterpreted Section 2 to demand a strong inference of intentional discrimination.

Question Presented: Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required Louisiana to create a second majority-minority congressional district, justifying race-based redistricting under strict scrutiny.

Posture: Three-judge district court struck down SB8; direct appeal to Supreme Court affirmed 6-3.

Holding: Because the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq., did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district, no compelling interest justified the State’s use of race in creating SB8, and that map is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

Result: Affirmed and Remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New York
For Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Missouri
For United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:00] Argument Begins

[00:01:09] Appellant Press Robinson Opening Statement

[00:03:32] Appellant Press Robinson Free for All Questions

[00:26:15] Appellant Press Robinson Sequential Questions

[00:47:32] Appellant Louisiana Opening Statement

[00:49:02] Appellant Louisiana Free for All Questions

[00:57:59] Appellant Louisiana Sequential Questions

[01:20:21] Callais Appellees Opening Statement

[01:21:47] Callais Appellees Free for All Questions

[01:31:11] Callais Appellees Sequential Questions

[01:40:35] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

[01:41:42] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

[01:51:08] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

[02:25:32] Appellant Press Robinson Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: Louisiana v. Callais | SCOTUS Writes a New Voting Rights Playbook May 04, 2026

Show notes

Louisiana v. Callais and Robinson v. Callais | Case Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 | Decided April 29, 2026 | Docket Link: Here and Here

Overview: The Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's second majority-Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, overhauled the 40-year-old Gingles framework for vote-dilution claims, and reinterpreted Section 2 to demand a strong inference of intentional discrimination.

Posture: Three-judge district court struck down SB8; direct appeal to Supreme Court affirmed 6-3.

Result: Affirmed and Remanded.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 2's "less opportunity" language entitles minority voters only to whatever chance any voter receives under the State's permissible nonracial criteria — nothing more; (2) The Fifteenth Amendment bars only intentional discrimination, so Section 2 imposes liability only upon a strong inference of intentional discrimination; (3) Updated Gingles preconditions now require plaintiffs' maps to match all State objectives including partisan goals, polarization evidence to control for party affiliation, and totality analysis to focus on present-day intentional discrimination.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Thomas (concurring): Joined the majority in full but argued Section 2 should never apply to redistricting. The statutory terms reach only ballot-access rules, making the Court's 40-year application to districting a "disastrous misadventure."

Justice Kagan (dissenting): Argued the majority converted Section 2 from the effects test Congress adopted in 1982 back into the intent test Congress rejected, calling the new framework "Bolden redux" and predicting severe reductions in minority representation nationwide.

Implications: State legislatures now possess a powerful defense against Section 2 challenges: any map defended on partisan grounds enjoys strong immunity wherever race and party preference correlate. Vote-dilution plaintiffs now carry far heavier burdens — producing alternative maps matching every State objective, controlling polarization evidence for partisanship, and proving present-day intentional discrimination. Existing majority-minority districts now stand at legislative discretion. Thomas's concurrence signals two Justices want to eliminate Section 2 redistricting claims entirely, keeping that question alive. Lower courts must now determine what evidence satisfies the new "strong inference" standard.

The Fine Print:

Section 2(b), Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §10301(b): "A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
Fifteenth Amendment, Section 1: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

Primary Cases:

Thornburg v. Gingles (1986): Established the three-precondition framework for Section 2 vote-dilution claims — requiring a sufficiently large and compact minority group, politically cohesive minority voting, and majority bloc voting that usually defeats minority-preferred candidates.
Allen v. Milligan (2023): Reaffirmed Gingles and upheld Alabama's obligation to create a second majority-Black congressional district under Section 2, rejecting Alabama's proposed "race-neutral benchmark" test.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New York
For Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Missouri
For United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Hencely v. Fluor | Orders Ignored, Immunity Denied? May 01, 2026

Show notes

Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Decided April 22, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether federal law preempts state tort claims against military contractors for unauthorized conduct violating military instructions.

Overview: Supreme Court narrows military contractor immunity, ruling contractors face state tort liability when they violate rather than follow government orders during wartime operations.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for contractor based on federal preemption.

Holding: The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in finding Winston Hencely’s state-law tort claims preempted where the Federal Government neither ordered nor authorized Fluor Corporation’s challenged conduct.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3 decision vacated Fourth Circuit judgment. Justice Thomas authored majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Neither Constitution nor federal statute expressly preempts tort suits against contractors who violate military instructions; (2) Boyle doctrine protects contractors only when they conform to government specifications, not when they breach obligations; (3) Federal preemption requires actual conflict with federal law, not judicial speculation about federal interests.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Alito (dissenting, joined by Roberts and Kavanaugh): Constitution's war powers exclusively assign military authority to federal government; state regulation of combat zone security arrangements violates structural separation of powers and encroaches on federal military domain.

Opinion: Here

Implications: Military contractors lose blanket wartime immunity and face state tort liability when violating military instructions. Military families gain clearer accountability paths through state courts. Contractors must strengthen compliance with military supervision requirements to avoid potential liability. Decision reinforces targeted conflict preemption over broad field preemption doctrine.

The Fine Print:

Federal Tort Claims Act § 2680(j): Preserves government immunity for "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"
Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2: Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute "the supreme Law of the Land" requiring state law to yield when conflicting with federal directives

Primary Cases:

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988): Federal preemption protects military contractors only when they conform to government specifications and follow precise government directions
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. (1940): Contractors receive constitutional immunity only when sued precisely for accomplishing what Federal Government requested under valid authority

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Hencely): Frank H. Chang, Arlington, Virginia argues for Petitioner Hencely.
For Respondent (Fluor): Mark W. Mosier, Washington, D.C.
For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Opinion Summary: Hencely v. Fluor | Orders Ignored, Immunity Denied Apr 30, 2026

Show notes

Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Decided April 22, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether federal law preempts state tort claims against military contractors for unauthorized conduct violating military instructions.

Overview: Supreme Court narrows military contractor immunity, ruling contractors face state tort liability when they violate rather than follow government orders during wartime operations.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for contractor based on federal preemption.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3 decision vacated Fourth Circuit judgment. Justice Thomas authored majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Alito (dissenting, joined by Roberts and Kavanaugh): Constitution's war powers exclusively assign military authority to federal government; state regulation of combat zone security arrangements violates structural separation of powers and encroaches on federal military domain.

Opinion: Here

The Fine Print:

Federal Tort Claims Act § 2680(j): Preserves government immunity for "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"
Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2: Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute "the supreme Law of the Land" requiring state law to yield when conflicting with federal directives

Primary Cases:

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988): Federal preemption protects military contractors only when they conform to government specifications and follow precise government directions
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. (1940): Contractors receive constitutional immunity only when sued precisely for accomplishing what Federal Government requested under valid authority

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Hencely): Frank H. Chang, Arlington, Virginia argues for Petitioner Hencely.
For Respondent (Fluor): Mark W. Mosier, Washington, D.C.
For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Hikma v. Amarin Apr 29, 2026

Show notes

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Hikma): Charles B. Klein of Winston & Strawn LLP
Amicus Curiae (United States): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice
Respondents (Amarin Pharma): Michael R. Huston of Perkins Coie LLP

Question Presented: Whether a generic drugmaker that fully carves patented uses from its label actively induces patent infringement through investor press releases and website statements that do not mention, encourage, or instruct the patented use

Overview: Generic drugmaker Hikma followed federal skinny-label law but called its product "generic Vascepa" and touted Vascepa's total sales. Brand manufacturer Amarin claims those statements actively induced doctors to prescribe the generic for a patented cardiovascular use worth over $900 million annually.

Posture: District court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 2026.

Main Arguments:

• Hikma (Petitioner): (1) "Actively" induces requires affirmative steps encouraging infringement — none of Hikma's statements mention or instruct the patented use; (2) Amarin's theory of liability imputes inferences physicians might draw, not active steps Hikma took; (3) The Federal Circuit's decision effectively nullifies the section viii skinny-label pathway Congress created to speed generic competition

• Amarin (Respondent): (1) Hikma advertised its generic for "Hypertriglyceridemia" — a category encompassing the patented cardiovascular use — going beyond compliant labeling; (2) Press releases calling the product "generic Vascepa" and touting $919 million to $1.1 billion in total Vascepa sales plausibly encouraged prescribers to use the generic for all of Vascepa's indications; (3) Seven other generic manufacturers selling identical skinny-label products avoided suit by accurately limiting their marketing — proving that compliant speech and section viii coexist

Implications: Hikma victory establishes that skinny-label compliance shields generic manufacturers from inducement liability for accurate commercial descriptions, protecting the section viii pathway that delivers billions in consumer drug savings annually. Amarin victory confirms that post-label marketing conduct — even investor communications — can cross the line into active patent infringement inducement, preserving incentives for brand manufacturers to invest hundreds of millions in discovering new therapeutic uses. The Court's answer defines the legal boundary between ordinary commerce and unlawful inducement for the entire pharmaceutical industry.

The Fine Print:

• 35 U.S.C. § 271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer"

• 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii): Permits a generic manufacturer to file a statement seeking approval only for uses not covered by the brand manufacturer's listed method-of-use patents, allowing the generic to carry a "skinny label" that carves out still-patented uses

Primary Cases:

• Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Inducement liability requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement" — mere knowledge that a product may reach infringing uses does not suffice; liability demands "statements or actions directed to promoting infringement"

• Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S (2012): Congress designed the section viii skinny-label mechanism to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones," expediting generic competition as soon as patents allow

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:41] Oral Advocates

[00:01:58] Argument Begins

[00:02:06] Hikma Opening Statement

[00:04:13] Hikma Free for All Questions

[00:12:50] Hikma Round Robin Questions

[00:13:17] United States Opening Statement

[00:14:29] United States Free for All Questions

[00:24:44] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:30:09] Amarin Opening Statement

[00:32:34] Amarin Free for All Questions

[00:58:56] Amarin Round Robin Questions

[00:59:06] Hikma Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Mullin v. Doe Apr 29, 2026

Show notes

Mullin v. Doe | 25-1083 | Docket Link: Here

Consolidated with Trump v. Miot 25-1084 | Docket Link: Here

Argument Date: 4/29/2026

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (United States): D. John Sauer, United States’ Solicitor General
Respondents (Doe): Ahilan T. Arulanantham of UCLA School of Law
Respondents (Miot): Geoffrey M. Pipoly of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP

Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)'s judicial review bar precludes APA challenges to the Secretary's termination of Syria's Temporary Protected Status designation, and if reviewable, whether the termination violated the APA.

Overview: Emergency stay application challenges Secretary Mullin's termination of Temporary Protected Status for 6,132 Syrian nationals. Central questions: whether courts may review TPS termination decisions at all, and whether the Secretary followed required consultation and country-conditions procedures.

Posture: S.D.N.Y. postponed Syria's TPS termination; Second Circuit denied stay; government now seeks Supreme Court intervention.

Main Arguments:

Government (Applicant): (1) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all APA challenges to TPS terminations; (2) Secretary validly consulted agencies and invoked national interest; (3) Courts cannot brand a new administration's policy priorities as pretext
Syrian TPS Holders (Respondents): (1) Judicial review bar covers country-conditions determinations only, not procedural violations; (2) Secretary never genuinely consulted agencies and invoked an extra-statutory factor; (3) Concrete harms to 6,132 Syrians facing deportation to an active war zone favor denial

Implications:

(A) Government victory:

The judicial review bar broadly strips courts of authority to review all TPS termination decisions
Clear path for DHS Secretary to implement terminations across all thirteen countries — potentially stripping hundreds of thousands of TPS holders of legal status with no judicial recourse.
TPS becomes a pure presidential foreign-policy tool.

(B) TPS holders victory:

Courts retain authority to enforce TPS's procedural requirements;
The Secretary must genuinely consult agencies and review actual country conditions;
6,132 Syrians retain lawful status while the Second Circuit completes full appellate review.

The Fine Print:

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection."
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A): "[A]fter consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government," the Secretary "shall review the conditions in the foreign state . . . and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation . . . continue to be met."

Primary Cases:

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (1991): A comparable immigration statute's reference to "a determination" described a single act — the denial of an individual application — and did not bar general collateral challenges to unconstitutional agency practices and policies; the central precedent for the TPS holders' jurisdictional argument.
Noem v. NTPSA, 145 S. Ct. 2728 (2025) (NTPSA I) & 146 S. Ct. 23 (2025) (NTPSA II): Supreme Court stayed two district court orders blocking Venezuela's TPS termination without written explanation; the government argues these orders "inform" the equitable analysis here and reflect prior acceptance of its likelihood-of-success argument.

Timestamps:

[00:01:50] Oral Advocates

[00:02:08] Argument Begins

[00:02:17] United States Opening Statement

[00:04:14] United States Free for All Questions

[00:37:20] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:46:13] Doe Opening Statement

[00:48:56] Doe Free for All Questions

[01:06:24] Doe Round Robin Questions

[01:26:28] Miot Opening Statement

[01:28:06] Miot Free for All Questions

[01:43:40] Miot Round Robin Questions

[01:45:22] United States Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Cisco Systems v. Doe I Apr 28, 2026

Show notes

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
Respondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP
Amicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company for facilitating a foreign government's torture of a religious minority.

Overview: Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco for building custom surveillance technology the Chinese government used to identify, arrest, and torture them. The case tests whether two federal statutes allow courts to impose civil liability on corporate enablers of foreign atrocity.

Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Federal courts lack authority to create any new ATS causes of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory authorization; (3) The TVPA's verb "subjects" covers command responsibility, not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or control of victims.
Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondent): (1) Aiding-and-abetting liability existed under the law of nations at the Founding and the First Congress intended ATS coverage to reach accessories; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both the ATS and TVPA support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) The TVPA's deliberate choice of the broad verb "subjects" — rather than the narrower "commits" used in criminal statutes — reflects congressional intent to reach secondary actors, confirmed by legislative history stating liability extends to those who "ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture."

Implications: A Cisco victory ends this case and signals that American companies face no civil ATS or TVPA exposure for knowingly supplying technology used by foreign governments to commit atrocities — leaving accountability to the political branches alone. A Falun Gong victory exposes U.S. companies and executives to civil liability for their role in foreign human-rights abuses, creating significant legal risk across global supply chains, technology exports, and international business dealings with authoritarian states.

The Fine Print:

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."

Primary Cases:

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain limited authority to recognize ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step test of specificity and judicial discretion, but must proceed with great caution.
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability does not exist under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provides for it; statutory silence does not imply it.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:31] Oral Advocates

[00:01:52] Argument Begins

[00:01:59] Cisco Opening Statement

[00:04:17] Cisco Free for All Questions

[00:21:49] Cisco Round Robin Questions

[00:38:55] United States Opening Statement

[00:40:05] United States Free for All Questions

[00:50:27] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:19:39] Doe Opening Statement

[01:22:12] Doe Free for All Questions

[01:50:47] Doe Round Robin Questions

[01:55:52] Cisco Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Chatrie v. United States Apr 27, 2026

Show notes

Chatrie v. United States | Case No. 25-112 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Chatrie): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner & Block
Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the execution of a geofence warrant — compelling Google to search the location data of all users to identify devices near a crime scene — violated the Fourth Amendment.

Overview: Police ordered Google to scan hundreds of millions of users' private location records to catch a bank robber, without naming any suspect. The Court now decides whether geofence warrants survive the Fourth Amendment's ban on general searches.

Posture: Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed denial of suppression in a single-sentence per curiam opinion.

Main Arguments:

Chatrie (Petitioner): (1) Location History data constitutes Chatrie's property, making government access a trespass; (2) The warrant operated as an unconstitutional general warrant by compelling Google to search all users without individualized probable cause; (3) Each warrant step independently failed particularity and probable cause requirements
Government (Respondent): (1) Chatrie voluntarily opted into Location History, triggering the third-party doctrine and forfeiting any privacy claim in two hours of public movements; (2) Chatrie's property theory was forfeited below and lacks any foundation in American law; (3) The magistrate-issued warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, and the good-faith exception independently bars suppression

Implications: A Chatrie victory likely ends geofence warrants as currently used — law enforcement would need to identify specific accounts before any search, fundamentally limiting their ability to identify unknown suspects through third-party tech platforms. It could also extend Fourth Amendment property protection to cloud-stored data broadly. A government victory grants constitutional clearance for geofence warrants and reaffirms the third-party doctrine against digital location data, exposing every opted-in user's movements to law enforcement access whenever a crime occurs nearby — including near places of worship, political gatherings, or medical facilities.

The Fine Print:

Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Stored Communications Act): Requires a warrant for the government to compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications stored for 180 days or fewer — a provision Chatrie argues supports a broader Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for location data.

Primary Cases:

Carpenter v. United States (2018): The Court held that seven or more days of cell-site location information triggers Fourth Amendment protection, declining to apply the third-party doctrine where data reveals the intimate patterns of daily life — Chatrie's central precedent
Smith v. Maryland (1979): Established the third-party doctrine — a person who voluntarily shares information with a third party "assumes the risk" of disclosure to law enforcement and forfeits Fourth Amendment protection — the government's bedrock authority

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:21] Oral Advocates

[00:01:29] Argument Begins

[00:01:37] Chatrie Opening Statement

[00:02:55] Chatrie Free for All Questions

[00:26:57] Chatrie Round Robin Questions

[00:58:35] United States Opening Statement

[01:01:05] United States Free for All Questions

[01:28:53] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:56:42] Chatrie Rebuttal