The High Court Report - SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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Case Preview: Cisco Systems v. Doe I | Complicity or Commerce? Can U.S. Courts Hold Tech Giants Liable for Foreign Torture? Apr 18, 2026

Show notes

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company for facilitating a foreign government's torture of a religious minority.

Overview: Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco for building custom surveillance technology the Chinese government used to identify, arrest, and torture them. The case tests whether two federal statutes allow courts to impose civil liability on corporate enablers of foreign atrocity.

Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Federal courts lack authority to create any new ATS causes of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory authorization; (3) The TVPA's verb "subjects" covers command responsibility, not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or control of victims.
Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondent): (1) Aiding-and-abetting liability existed under the law of nations at the Founding and the First Congress intended ATS coverage to reach accessories; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both the ATS and TVPA support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) The TVPA's deliberate choice of the broad verb "subjects" — rather than the narrower "commits" used in criminal statutes — reflects congressional intent to reach secondary actors, confirmed by legislative history stating liability extends to those who "ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture."

Implications: A Cisco victory ends this case and signals that American companies face no civil ATS or TVPA exposure for knowingly supplying technology used by foreign governments to commit atrocities — leaving accountability to the political branches alone. A Falun Gong victory exposes U.S. companies and executives to civil liability for their role in foreign human-rights abuses, creating significant legal risk across global supply chains, technology exports, and international business dealings with authoritarian states.

The Fine Print:

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."

Primary Cases:

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain limited authority to recognize ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step test of specificity and judicial discretion, but must proceed with great caution.
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability does not exist under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provides for it; statutory silence does not imply it.

Case Preview: Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | The Roundup Reckoning: The $7 Billion Battle Over Pesticide Labels Apr 17, 2026

Show notes

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts a state failure-to-warn claim when EPA approved the pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning.

Overview: John Durnell sprayed Roundup for over two decades before a cancer diagnosis. EPA approved Roundup's label with no cancer warning for fifty years. The Court must decide whether that federal approval shields Monsanto from a $1.25 million Missouri jury verdict.

Posture: Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed jury verdict; Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer; cert granted.

Main Arguments:

• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's pesticide-specific registration imposes binding federal labeling requirements that preempt conflicting state tort duties; (2) Missouri's failure-to-warn standard diverges from FIFRA's mandatory cost-benefit analysis; (3) Federal law forbade unilateral label changes, making simultaneous compliance with state and federal law impossible.

• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA delegates to courts and juries — not EPA — the final word on whether a label violates the misbranding prohibition; (2) Missouri law mirrors FIFRA's misbranding standards and runs parallel, not in conflict; (3) Monsanto could add a cancer warning unilaterally, as Bayer proved in 2012 with a different pesticide.

Implications: A Monsanto victory extinguishes over 100,000 Roundup cancer lawsuits nationwide and establishes that EPA registration conclusively insulates pesticide manufacturers from state tort liability — a rule that extends to every federally registered pesticide. A Durnell victory preserves state-court accountability for pesticide warnings and confirms that juries, not EPA, hold final authority over whether a label misled consumers. Durnell's victory also subjects every pesticide manufacturer to potentially inconsistent verdicts across fifty states, and risks removing critical agricultural chemicals from commerce through cascading liability.

The Fine Print:

7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."
7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter."

Primary Cases:

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn law targeting false or misleading pesticide labels survives FIFRA preemption when it mirrors the federal misbranding standard; preemption applies only where state requirements actually differ from federal requirements.
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011): Impossibility preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims when federal law prevents manufacturers from independently making the label change state law requires.

Case Preview: Chatrie v. United States | Digital Dragnet Dilemma: Can a Warrant Search Everyone to Find Anyone? Apr 16, 2026

Show notes

Chatrie v. United States | Case No. 25-112 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the execution of a geofence warrant — compelling Google to search the location data of all users to identify devices near a crime scene — violated the Fourth Amendment.

Overview: Police ordered Google to scan hundreds of millions of users' private location records to catch a bank robber, without naming any suspect. The Court now decides whether geofence warrants survive the Fourth Amendment's ban on general searches.

Posture: Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed denial of suppression in a single-sentence per curiam opinion.

Main Arguments:

Chatrie (Petitioner): (1) Location History data constitutes Chatrie's property, making government access a trespass; (2) The warrant operated as an unconstitutional general warrant by compelling Google to search all users without individualized probable cause; (3) Each warrant step independently failed particularity and probable cause requirements
Government (Respondent): (1) Chatrie voluntarily opted into Location History, triggering the third-party doctrine and forfeiting any privacy claim in two hours of public movements; (2) Chatrie's property theory was forfeited below and lacks any foundation in American law; (3) The magistrate-issued warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, and the good-faith exception independently bars suppression

Implications: A Chatrie victory likely ends geofence warrants as currently used — law enforcement would need to identify specific accounts before any search, fundamentally limiting their ability to identify unknown suspects through third-party tech platforms. It could also extend Fourth Amendment property protection to cloud-stored data broadly. A government victory grants constitutional clearance for geofence warrants and reaffirms the third-party doctrine against digital location data, exposing every opted-in user's movements to law enforcement access whenever a crime occurs nearby — including near places of worship, political gatherings, or medical facilities.

The Fine Print:

Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Stored Communications Act): Requires a warrant for the government to compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications stored for 180 days or fewer — a provision Chatrie argues supports a broader Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for location data.

Primary Cases:

Carpenter v. United States (2018): The Court held that seven or more days of cell-site location information triggers Fourth Amendment protection, declining to apply the third-party doctrine where data reveals the intimate patterns of daily life — Chatrie's central precedent
Smith v. Maryland (1979): Established the third-party doctrine — a person who voluntarily shares information with a third party "assumes the risk" of disclosure to law enforcement and forfeits Fourth Amendment protection — the government's bedrock authority

Case Preview: T.M. v. UMD Medical System | Federalism or Federal Lockout: Who Controls the Courthouse Doors? Apr 15, 2026

Show notes

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — which blocks federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments — can apply when the state-court decision remains subject to further appeal in state court.

Overview: A Maryland woman who signed a consent order to secure her release from involuntary psychiatric commitment challenges a federal doctrine that slammed the federal courthouse door before her state-court appeal concluded — dividing the federal circuits.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rooker-Feldman; expressly split from majority of circuits.

Main Arguments:

• T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending to non-final judgments; (3) Preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without a jurisdictional bar

• UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-part test contains no finality requirement; (2) District courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments regardless of pending review; (3) T.M.'s rule would produce gamesmanship, parallel duplicative litigation, and profound federalism harm

Implications: A T.M. victory gives any state-court loser who raises a constitutional claim an open path to federal district court while state appeals remain pending — broadening federal access but triggering parallel proceedings across two court systems. A UMD victory preserves the rule that state-court losers must exhaust state remedies before federal district courts intervene, reinforcing comity but potentially denying urgent federal relief before the state appellate process concludes. Either outcome reshapes how hundreds of thousands of civil litigants navigate federal courthouse access every year.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."

• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Primary Cases:

• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claim supports their position.

• Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack power to reverse or modify state-court judgments — one of only two cases where the Supreme Court ever applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss a federal suit for lack of jurisdiction, and the doctrine's namesake.

Case Preview: Blanche v. Lau | Passport, Parole, and Proof: When Does a Green-Card Holder Get Admitted? Apr 14, 2026

Show notes

Bondi v. Lau (formerly named Bondi v. Lau) | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the government, to remove a lawful permanent resident as inadmissible after paroling him into the United States, must prove it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the disqualifying offense at the time of reentry.

Overview: A green-card holder returns from a brief trip abroad facing only unproven criminal charges. The government paroles him in, waits for his conviction, then invokes the inadmissibility track. The Supreme Court now decides whether that sequence respects the INA's plain text.

Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

Government (Petitioner): (1) Courts lack jurisdiction to review discretionary parole decisions; (2) The INA requires proof of the offense at the removal hearing, not at the border; (3) Requiring border officers to weigh clear-and-convincing evidence before paroling LPRs would nullify decades of lawful practice
Lau (Respondent): (1) The INA's plain text requires the government to establish the statutory exception at the time of reentry; (2) Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether DHS held authority to parole at all; (3) The government retains ample deportation authority under § 1227 and faces no operational hardship

Implications (90 words max): A government victory preserves DHS's ability to parole returning green-card holders facing criminal charges, use later convictions to justify the parole decision, and invoke the inadmissibility track — where the noncitizen bears the burden of proof. A Lau victory forces the government onto the deportation track for any LPR admitted without sufficient border-time evidence, shifting the burden of proof to the government. Millions of permanent residents who travel abroad while facing pending charges would gain a clearer procedural protection against the inadmissibility framework.

The Fine Print:

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien — … (v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title…"
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A): "The Secretary of Homeland Security may … in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily … only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien…"

Primary Cases:

Wilkinson v. Garland (2024): Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether a noncitizen met the statutory eligibility requirements for a discretionary immigration decision — even where the ultimate exercise of discretion sits beyond judicial review
Vartelas v. Holder (2012): A lawful permanent resident who committed a crime involving moral turpitude before a 1996 statutory change could not retroactively lose the right to travel abroad and return; the Court acknowledged in dicta that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) appears to require conviction or admission of the offense

Case Preview: FCC v. AT&T | FCC Forfeiture Fight Over the Future of Administrative Law Apr 13, 2026

Show notes

FCC v. AT&T, Inc., consolidated with Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here

Question Presented: Whether the Communications Act violates the Seventh Amendment and Article III by authorizing the FCC to order payment of monetary penalties for failing to safeguard customer data, without guaranteeing carriers a jury trial.

Overview: A Missouri sheriff exploited AT&T's and Verizon's location-data programs to track hundreds of people without consent. The FCC ordered AT&T to pay $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million — through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in suits at common law.

Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second and D.C. Circuits upheld Verizon's and Sprint's. Supreme Court consolidated and granted cert January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

• AT&T and Verizon: (1) FCC forfeiture proceedings constitute "Suits at common law" demanding a jury before any final liability order enters; (2) The back-end Section 504 jury option fails — no carrier received a jury trial in 47 years under this scheme; (3) The scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury-trial rights on defying a final federal order and risking operating licenses.

• FCC and United States: (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — a carrier may lawfully do nothing after receiving one; (2) The Seventh Amendment right attaches at the collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial under Section 504(a); (3) The Court's 1915 ruling in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad already upheld this exact model, and founding-era practice confirms its validity.

Implications: An AT&T and Verizon victory strips the FCC of its primary enforcement tool, potentially leaving privacy, robocall, and data-security rules unenforced — and destabilizing similar penalty structures across at least five other federal agencies. An FCC and United States victory confirms that agencies may enter nine-figure penalty judgments through in-house proceedings, with regulated businesses' only realistic path running through courts that apply deferential review — not juries.

The Fine Print:

• U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

• 47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States...Provided, That any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."

Primary Cases:

• SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment applies when a federal agency seeks civil penalties through in-house proceedings that parallel common-law suits; Congress cannot remove such claims from jury adjudication by assigning them to an administrative tribunal.

• Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue non-binding monetary awards — enforceable in subsequent civil suits with jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.

Case Preview: Sripetch v. SEC | Can the SEC Take Your Profits When Nobody Lost Money? Apr 12, 2026

Show notes

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.

Overview: Federal securities enforcement showdown asks whether the SEC must prove actual investor money losses before courts order fraudsters to surrender profits — reshaping a $6.1 billion annual enforcement tool.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Second Circuit requires it; Supreme Court granted cert January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

Sripetch (Petitioner): (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's definition of disgorgement, which requires restoring funds to actual victims; (3) Allowing victimless disgorgement creates incoherent statutory anomalies and lets the SEC circumvent procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.
SEC (Respondent): (1) Disgorgement strips wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains rather than compensating victims — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 disgorgement provisions, signaling no pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) The statutory phrase "unjust enrichment" carries a common-law meaning that never required monetary loss.

Implications: Sripetch victory forces the SEC to document specific investor money losses before courts order disgorgement — shrinking the SEC's multibillion-dollar enforcement arsenal and potentially shielding cleverly structured fraud schemes from profit-stripping orders. SEC victory preserves the agency's ability to disgorge profits from any securities violation regardless of whether identifiable investors lost money, keeping market manipulation unprofitable even when individual victims remain unharmed on paper. Lower courts, practitioners, and compliance officers across the securities industry await the Court's answer.

The Fine Print:

15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."

Primary Cases:

Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held that SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must "be awarded for victims" — the foundational ruling both sides now dispute.
SEC v. Govil, 86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit held that disgorgement requires proof of investor pecuniary harm, creating the circuit split that prompted the Supreme Court's cert grant.

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Chiles v. Salazar | Conversion Therapy Talk Therapy Ban Falls Apr 04, 2026

Show notes

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Argued: 10/7/25 | Decided: 3/31/26 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.

Overview: Colorado's conversion therapy ban prohibited licensed counselors from saying anything designed to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity while expressly permitting affirming speech — a textbook viewpoint-based restriction on professional speech.

Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.

Holding: 8-1 decision reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Colorado's law regulated the content of Chiles's speech and discriminated based on viewpoint — permitting affirming speech while forbidding speech designed to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity; (2) licensed professionals retain full First Amendment protection and professional speech does not occupy a lesser-protected constitutional category; (3) Colorado's analogies to licensing, informed-consent, and malpractice traditions failed to establish a historical basis for suppressing professional viewpoints.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Kagan (concurring, joined by Sotomayor): Agreed Colorado's law constituted viewpoint discrimination; reserved for another day whether content-based but viewpoint-neutral laws regulating therapist speech would warrant strict scrutiny, signaling a potential path for states to regulate therapeutic speech without running afoul of the First Amendment.

Justice Jackson (dissenting): Argued Colorado's law incidentally restricted speech as a byproduct of regulating a harmful medical treatment; contended states retain traditional police power to set standards of care for licensed providers even when those standards restrict treatment-related speech, and warned the majority's ruling threatened broad categories of healthcare regulation.

Implications:

Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard.
Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline.
States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open.
The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques.
Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Chiles): James A. Campbell
United States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of Justice
Respondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

The Fine Print:

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."

Primary Cases:

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:00:50] Argument Begins

[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement

[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions

[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: Chiles v. Salazar | Conversion Therapy Talk Therapy Ban Falls Apr 03, 2026

Show notes

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Argued: 10/7/25 | Decided: 3/31/26 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.

Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.

Separate Opinions:

Implications:

Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard.
Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline.
States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open.
The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques.
Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Chiles): James A. Campbell
United States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of Justice
Respondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

The Fine Print:

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."

Primary Cases:

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.

Oral Argument: Trump v. Barbara | Born Here, But Not American? Apr 01, 2026

Show notes

Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 4/1/26

Question Presented: Does the Executive Order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented or temporary-visa mothers comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause?

Overview: President Trump's Executive Order attempts to redefine birthright citizenship, challenging 150 years of constitutional understanding that birth on American soil—with narrow exceptions—creates citizenship.

Posture: District court enjoined Order; First Circuit unanimously affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (United States): D. John Sauer, United States Solicitor General;
Respondent (Barbara): Cecilia Wong, American Civil Liberties Union

Main Arguments:

Government:

(1) "Subject to the jurisdiction" requires complete political allegiance, not mere obedience to law;
(2) Founding-era commentators excluded children of "transient aliens" from birthright citizenship;
(3) Wong Kim Ark addressed only domiciled aliens—temporary visitors and undocumented immigrants fall outside that holding.

Families:

(1) English common law granted citizenship based on birth, not parentage—the Framers enshrined that rule;
(2) Wong Kim Ark specifically rejected any domicile requirement, holding temporary visitors fall under U.S. jurisdiction;
(3) 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) independently guarantees citizenship based on prevailing 1940 understanding.

Implications:

Government victory transforms citizenship from a birthright into a privilege contingent on parental immigration status—potentially questioning the citizenship of millions born to immigrant parents over generations.
Family victory preserves 150-year constitutional bedrock: birth on American soil, with narrow exceptions, makes you American.

The Fine Print:

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Primary Cases:

United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrant parents obtained citizenship at birth; the Citizenship Clause enshrines the common-law rule of birthright citizenship.
Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Tribal Indians born on American soil lacked citizenship because they owed allegiance to their tribes—a sovereign-to-sovereign exception inapplicable to ordinary immigrants.

Timestamps:

00:01:11: United States Opening Statement

00:03:14: United States Free for All Questions

00:27:47: United States Round Robin Questions

01:09:57: Barbara Opening Statement

01:12:46: Barbara Free for All Questions

01:41:51: Barbara Round Robin Questions

02:06:10: United States Rebuttal