The High Court Report - SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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Interview: Marc Blubaugh about Montgomery v. Caribe | Can Car Crash Victims Sue Trucking Brokers? Mar 12, 2026

Show notes

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport reaches far beyond one truck accident. The Supreme Court must answer a fundamental question: Does federal law shield freight brokers from state tort claims when they select a motor carrier that causes a catastrophic crash?

Marc S. Blubaugh joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Marc serves as Partner at Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP and Counsel of Record for the Transportation Intermediaries Association — the trade group representing over 1,700 freight brokerage companies. He wrote the amicus brief Justice Kavanaugh cited by name and page number during oral argument.

Marc explains the legal framework, then pulls back to reveal the full picture. The $343 billion freight brokerage industry operates on the premise that federal law — not state juries — determines which motor carriers may operate on America's roads. But plaintiffs' lawyers now name brokers in virtually every major truck accident case, threatening to reshape who enters the market and how efficiently America's supply chain runs.

The stakes cut both directions. Injured parties deserve recourse when dangerous carriers cause catastrophic accidents. Marc walks through why petitioner's counsel argues an 80,000-pound truck sits at the center of every negligent hiring claim — and why the safety exception exists precisely to preserve that theory.

A broker victory brings certainty and supply chain efficiency. A petitioner victory turns brokers into federal safety inspectors without the tools to do the job. The Court's reasoning will define preemption fights in the transportation industry for years.

Listen to the full March 4, 2026 oral argument: Here.

Listen to The High Court Report case preview: Here.

Connect with Marc Blubaugh on LinkedIn: Here.

Connect with Marc Blubaugh at Benesch Law: Here.

Fine Print

• §14501(c)(1): Preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service" of interstate brokers

• §14501(c)(2)(A): Preserves state authority to regulate safety "with respect to motor vehicles"

• §14501(b)(1): Preempts state laws "relating to intrastate rates, routes, or services" of brokers

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Episode Preview

[00:00:40] Guest Introduction

[00:01:57] 60 Second Takeaway from Oral Arguments

[00:09:04] Logistics Ecosystem

[00:10:35] What Brokers Do

[00:10:53] Broker Licensing Basics

[00:11:04] Motor Carriers Explained

[00:11:27] Drivers and Authority

[00:11:54] Consignee at Delivery

[00:14:29] Legal Battle Over Liability

[00:18:43] How the Arguments Unfolded at Oral Arguments

[00:30:08] What Happens if Montgomery Wins? If the Brokers Win?

[00:33:26] Wrap Up

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Asylum Showdown over Cartels and Court Deference Mar 10, 2026

Show notes

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Date Decided: 3/4/26 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.

Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.

Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.

The Fine Print:

8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.

Primary Cases:

INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.
Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

Oral Argument Re-Listen: CSX Galette versus New Jersey Transit | Sovereign Immunity Shell Game Mar 09, 2026

Show notes

CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.

Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court

Majority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.

Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"

• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"

Primary Cases:

• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive

• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

Opinion Summary: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Asylum Showdown over Cartels and Court Deference Mar 08, 2026

Show notes

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Date Decided: 3/4/26 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.

The Fine Print:

8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.

Primary Cases:

INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.
Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

Opinion Summary: CSX Galette versus New Jersey Transit | Sovereign Immunity Shell Game Mar 07, 2026

Show notes

CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court

Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

Primary Cases:

Interview Re-Listen: How Adam Feldman Predicted the Trump Tariff Cases Ruling Mar 06, 2026

Show notes

Dr. Adam Feldman called it before the Court released it. His 25-year dataset — 1,700+ cases — flagged the timing before anyone else caught on. The High Court Report sits down with Dr. Feldman to break down exactly what the numbers revealed.

In this episode:

Why 107 days and six separate opinions directly predict each other — and what that pattern means for the 48 cases still ahead.

How one dataset predicted the Trump Tariff ruling's timing, complexity, and doctrinal fractures before the Court said a word.

Why the Court now pushes more than half its rulings into June — and what Trump's emergency application surge does to that trend.

Whether the Court's faster pace this term marks real change — or a one-year blip.

About Dr. Adam Feldman:

Founder of Empirical SCOTUS. Statistics Editor at SCOTUSblog. Head of legal analytics firm Empirilaw. J.D., UC Berkeley. Ph.D. in Political Science, USC. Post-doctoral fellow, Columbia Law School. Author of 15 peer-reviewed articles. Former trial lawyer.

Reach Adam Feldman via:

LinkedIn: Here;
Empirical SCOTUS: Here;
Legalytics: Here;
Empirilaw: Here.

Adam Feldman's Work:

The Supreme Court’s Vanishing Fall Docket: How Decision Timing Has Transformed Since 2000 (Jan. 26, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-supreme-courts-vanishing-fall?utm_source=publication-search
The $133 Billion Question: Inside the Supreme Court’s Historic Tariff Case (Feb. 6, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-133-billion-question-inside-the?utm_source=publication-search

Oral Argument: Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II | Can Truck Brokers Dodge Crash Lawsuits? Mar 04, 2026

Show notes

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Oral Argument: 3/4/2026 | Case No. 24-1238 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts state common-law tort claims against brokers for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers whose vehicles subsequently cause accidents.

Overview: Trucking broker liability case determines whether federal deregulation law blocks state tort claims for negligent hiring practices that result in highway accidents with severe injuries.

Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed preemption; Ninth Circuit rejected preemption; circuit split.

Main Arguments:

• Montgomery (Petitioner): (1) Federal safety exception explicitly preserves state tort claims against broker negligent selection; (2) Fair interpretation requires consistent broad reading of both preemption provision and safety exception; (3) Longstanding common law negligent hiring claims predate federal trucking regulation

• C.H. Robinson/Caribe (Respondents): (1) Federal law preempts broadly any state regulation of broker services and selection decisions; (2) Safety exception applies narrowly only to direct motor vehicle operation regulation; (3) Comprehensive federal regulatory scheme provides adequate safety oversight

Implications: Montgomery victory preserves state tort accountability for broker hiring decisions, incentivizing highway safety through market liability. Respondent victory eliminates broker accountability for negligent selection, potentially reducing safety screening while limiting victim compensation options for trucking accidents.

The Fine Print:

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1): states may not enforce laws "related to a price, route, or service" of brokers "with respect to the transportation of property"
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A): the preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles"
49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1): states may not enforce laws "relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services" of brokers

Primary Cases:

• Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey (2013): Phrase "with respect to the transportation of property" in FAAAA preemption provision "massively limits" federal preemption scope, requiring direct connection to transportation services

• Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (9th Cir. 2020): State negligent hiring claims against motor carrier brokers fall within FAAAA safety exception because they represent state authority to regulate safety through common-law tort claims

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (Montgomery): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Petitioner Montgomery.
For Respondents (C.H. Robinson and Caribe Transport): Ted Boutrous of Gibson Dunn.
For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Caribe): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:00:53] Oral Advocates

[00:01:09] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:17] Montgomery Opening Statement

[00:03:15] Montgomery Free for All Questions

[00:26:20] Montgomery Round Robin Questions

[00:44:00] Caribe and Robinson Opening Statement

[00:46:15] Caribe and Robinson Free for All Questions

[01:04:17] Caribe and Robinson Round Robin Questions

[01:09:37] United States Opening Statement

[01:11:07] United States Free for All Questions

[01:20:35] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:36:19] Montgomery Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Hunter v. United States | Can Plea Waivers Block Unconstitutional Sentences? Mar 03, 2026

Show notes

Hunter v. United States | Oral Argument: 3/3/2026 | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: Criminal defendant challenges mandatory medication condition after judge told him he could appeal despite signed appeal waiver, creating fundamental questions about plea agreement enforcement and judicial authority

Question Presented: Whether appeal waivers in plea agreements can only include exceptions for ineffective assistance claims and sentences exceeding statutory maximums, and whether judicial statements about appeal rights override written waivers

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.
For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed appeal citing two-exception rule; Supreme Court granted certiorari

Main Arguments:

• Hunter (Petitioner): (1) Contract law requires broader exceptions protecting reasonable expectations beyond two rigid categories; (2) Other circuits successfully recognize additional exceptions without creating chaos; (3) Judicial statements about appeal rights combined with government silence modify plea agreements

• United States (Respondent): (1) Appeal waivers constitute binding contracts requiring enforcement according to written terms; (2) Appeal rights remain statutory rather than constitutional making waivers more enforceable; (3) Post-plea judicial misstatements cannot undermine knowing and voluntary waivers

Implications: Hunter victory creates safety valve for extreme sentences but weakens prosecutorial bargaining power and plea agreement finality. Government victory cements nationwide enforcement of broad appeal waivers while potentially allowing constitutional violations without appellate oversight.

The Fine Print:

• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): Courts may require defendants "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment as specified by the court"

Primary Cases:

• Garza v. Idaho (2019): "No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims" because plea agreements function essentially as contracts subject to traditional defenses

• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Even "most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution" may be waived through knowing and voluntary agreements including plea bargains

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:00] Oral Advocates

[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement

[00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions

[00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions

[00:45:07] United States Opening Statement

[00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions

[01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: Villareal v. Texas | Can judges Police Overnight Attorney-Client Talks? Mar 03, 2026

Show notes

Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Date Decided: 2/25/26

Overview

David Villarreal took the witness stand as the sole defense witness in his Texas murder trial, testifying he stabbed the victim in self-defense.
During his testimony, a scheduling conflict forced a 24-hour recess mid-direct examination.
Before breaking, the trial judge ordered defense counsel not to "manage" Villarreal's ongoing testimony overnight while expressly permitting all other consultation, including strategy, sentencing, and plea discussions.
The jury convicted Villarreal, and he received a 60-year sentence.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the judge's order as a permissible balance between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the truth-seeking function of trial.

Question Presented: Whether a trial judge may order defense counsel not to discuss a testifying defendant's ongoing testimony during a mid testimony overnight recess without violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Holding: A qualified conferral order prohibiting only testimony management during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the truth-seeking function of trial.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Gorsuch.

Result: Affirmed.

Majority's Rationale:

The constitutional line separating Geders and Perry runs on subject matter, not time — testimony coaching loses Sixth Amendment protection once a defendant takes the stand. Courts may restrict discussion of testimony for its own sake while leaving all other attorney-client consultation — strategy, plea negotiations, witness decisions — fully protected. The judge's order targeted only testimony management and left every other protected topic available to Villarreal and his counsel overnight.

Alito Concurrence:

A recess should not alter the baseline rule that juries hear a defendant's testimony in his own words without counsel's real-time coaching. Indirect attempts to shape testimony carry the same constitutional infirmity as direct ones, regardless of strategic framing. Counsel may advise a client to consider a plea because the trial looks rough, but may not tell the client to clean up specific mistakes from the stand.

Thomas Concurrence in Judgment:

The trial judge's order plainly survived under Geders and Perry without any need for new rules or expanded doctrine. The majority announced a new "incidental testimony" carve-out that Perry never recognized and that these facts never required. Perry endorsed orders categorically forbidding testimony discussion — the majority created a protection Perry specifically declined to establish.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal.
For Respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Link to Opinion: Here.

Link to Docket: Here

Preview Episode: Here

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Overview

[00:01:59] Trial Scene Setup

[00:03:15] Geders vs Perry

[00:04:34] Content Based Line

[00:07:36] Applying to Villarreal

[00:08:13] Concurrences Split

[00:08:32] Alito Sharpens Rule

[00:10:34] Thomas Pushes Back

[00:12:24] Nationwide Impact

[00:13:43] Final Takeaways

[00:14:37] Wrap Up and Subscribe

Oral Argument: United States v. Hemani | Guns and Ganja: The Fed Felony Trap Mar 02, 2026

Show notes

United States v. Hemani | Oral Argument: 3/2/2026 | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: Constitutional challenge to federal law criminalizing firearm possession by marijuana users tests Supreme Court's new historical framework for gun regulations after millions potentially face prosecution.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent

Posture: Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance dismissing prosecution; government appeals seeking reversal.

Main Arguments:

• Government (Petitioner): (1) Founding-era laws restricting "habitual drunkards" provide historical precedent supporting marijuana user disarmament; (2) Circuit courts split on constitutional analysis requiring Supreme Court intervention; (3) Section 925(c) relief process addresses constitutional concerns through administrative remedies

• Hemani (Respondent): (1) Government's historical analogues fail Bruen-Rahimi "why" and "how" requirements for constitutional restrictions; (2) No genuine circuit split exists warranting Supreme Court review; (3) Administrative relief cannot cure fundamental constitutional violations

Implications:

Government victory enables continued prosecution of millions combining legal state marijuana use with lawful firearm ownership, expanding congressional power over combined legal activities. Hemani victory requires narrow tailoring of federal gun restrictions, potentially invalidating broad categorical prohibitions lacking specific historical justification and forcing legislative reconsideration of drug user firearm restrictions.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to...possess...any firearm"

• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"

Primary Cases:

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Government must demonstrate historical tradition supporting firearm regulations through relevantly similar "why" and "how" justifications from founding era

• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Historical analogues need not provide "historical twin" but must address comparable problems through similar regulatory approaches under constitutional analysis

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.
For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:08] United States Opening Statement

[00:03:09] United States Free for All Questions

[00:26:14] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:00:32] Hemani Opening Statement

[01:02:37] Hemani Free for All Questions

[01:31:01] Hemani Round Robin Questions

[01:50:46] United States Rebuttal