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    Government

    So Ordered

    AI-narrated readings of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions. Each episode pairs the Court’s syllabus with a reading of the majority opinion, lightly adapted for listening and voiced by a synthesized voice styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice.

    AI DISCLOSURE: The voices in this podcast are AI-generated. The narration is produced by a machine-learning voice synthesis model. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to any individual. The text being read is the majority opinion as published by the Supreme Court of the United States with light adaptations to improve readability.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Case v. Montana Jun 22, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r06_19m1.pdf

    Case background

    Montana police officers responded to the home of petitioner William Case after his ex-girlfriend called 9-1-1 to report that he was threatening suicide and may have shot himself. The officers knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window but got no response; they could see an empty handgun holster and something that looked like a suicide note inside, and they ultimately decided to enter the home to render emergency aid. When one officer approached a bedroom closet in which Case was hiding, Case threw open the closet curtain while holding an object that looked like a gun, and, fearing that he was about to be shot, the officer shot and injured Case. Officers later found a handgun next to where Case had stood. Case was charged with assaulting a police officer and moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the home entry, arguing that the police violated the Fourth Amendment by entering without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, a jury found Case guilty, and a divided Montana Supreme Court upheld the officers’ entry as lawful under Montana’s caretaker doctrine, rejecting the contention that an officer must have probable cause to believe that an occupant needs emergency aid.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

    Holding

    Brigham City’s objective-reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss, and it was satisfied in this case. The probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and derives its meaning from, the criminal-investigation context, and the Court declined to transplant it onto the emergency-aid exception. Officers may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. The information the officers obtained from Case’s ex-girlfriend, combined with their observations at the scene, gave them just such a basis to believe that Case may already have shot himself or would do so absent intervention, so the Court affirmed the judgment — though not all the reasoning — of the Montana Supreme Court.

    The Court

    Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Gorsuch each filed concurring opinions.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Case v. Montana, written by Justice Kagan.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kagan. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    United States v. Hemani Jun 19, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1234_g2bh.pdf

    Case background

    Ali Hemani is a dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan who was born in Texas and has spent most of his life in the Dallas area, living with his parents and working a stable job. Suspecting Mr. Hemani and his family of terrorism-related activities, the government searched the family home in 2022. Mr. Hemani cooperated throughout: he surrendered a gun he kept in the house, pointed agents to some marijuana on the property, and, in an interview, told law enforcement that he used marijuana about every other day. More than six months later, relying solely on that admitted marijuana use, the government prosecuted Mr. Hemani under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(3) for knowingly possessing a gun in his home while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance. He moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of the Second Amendment; the district court granted the motion, and after the government’s unsuccessful appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent.

    Holding

    The government’s prosecution of Mr. Hemani under § 922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. To overcome the presumption that the Second Amendment protects his conduct, the government had to show its regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, and it rested entirely on an analogy to historical “habitual drunkard” laws — vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws. That analogy fails on every metric the government invited the Court to consider: those laws targeted people whose drinking left them practically incapacitated rather than anyone who merely used an intoxicant, they served purposes other than protecting the public from unusually dangerous persons, and they generally provided some process before a person lost his liberties, whereas § 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with no pre-deprivation process. Taken cumulatively, these differences are fatal to the prosecution. The decision is narrow: it does not address banning addicts or the presently intoxicated, other prophylactic laws Congress might adopt, the felon-in-possession provision, or a prosecution backed by individualized proof of dangerousness.

    The Court

    Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, writing separately to urge that § 922(g) be revisited as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, reiterating her view that Bruen’s history-and-tradition test is unworkable. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan joined, agreeing the historical analogues were not relevantly similar but preferring to affirm on a narrower ground.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in United States v. Hemani, written by Justice Gorsuch.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Gorsuch. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Bowe v. United States Jun 18, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r04_n7ip.pdf

    Case background

    Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year federal sentence after pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c). The firearm conviction carried a mandatory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence for the robbery offenses, and that conviction was valid only if at least one predicate offense qualified as a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)’s elements clause or residual clause. Years after Bowe was sentenced, this Court held in United States v. Davis that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, and in United States v. Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the elements clause — decisions that call his Section 924(c) conviction into question.

    A comprehensive statutory scheme governs when prisoners may seek postconviction relief, and under AEDPA a second or successive effort first requires a prisoner to obtain authorization from a court of appeals. Bowe repeatedly asked the Eleventh Circuit for permission to file a second or successive motion under Section 2255, but his requests were denied; among other things, a panel applied Section 2244(b)(1)’s “old-claim” bar to dismiss the portion of his request that had been raised in a prior application. Bowe sought certiorari, noting a Circuit split — six Circuits apply the old-claim bar to federal prisoners while three do not — and the Court granted review.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

    (2) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

    Holding

    First, the Court has jurisdiction. Section 2244(b)(3)(E) — which bars certiorari review of the denial of an authorization to file a second or successive “application” — does not apply to federal prisoners. It is housed within Section 2244, which imposes requirements that apply only to state prisoners, and it speaks only to “applications,” whereas federal prisoners file “motions.” Nor does Section 2255(h)’s narrow cross-reference to Section 2244 supply the clear indication needed to strip the Court of its broad certiorari jurisdiction; that cross-reference incorporates only the procedures for how a panel certifies a filing, not the certiorari bar.

    Second, Section 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar does not apply to second or successive motions filed by federal prisoners under Section 2255(h). By its plain terms it governs claims “presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254,” and state prisoners alone file Section 2254 applications. Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference incorporates Section 2244’s procedures only as they relate to how a panel certifies a filing, not the old-claim content bar. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is vacated and the case remanded for it to determine in the first instance whether Bowe should receive authorization under the correct standard.

    The Court

    Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part I.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Bowe v. United States, written by Justice Sotomayor.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Sotomayor. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. Jun 17, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-6_d1o2.pdf

    Case background

    Thomas Keathley and his wife filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in December 2019. The Bankruptcy Code requires debtors to file schedules listing their property, including claims against third parties, and to swear under penalty of perjury that the information is true and correct. Based on the Keathleys’ disclosures, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed an amended plan in April 2020 providing for interest-free repayment of 100% of creditors’ claims over five years. In August 2021, while the bankruptcy case remained open, Keathley was involved in a car accident in Mississippi with a driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. He retained a personal-injury attorney and told his bankruptcy counsel that he intended to sue, but neither disclosed the potential claim to the Bankruptcy Court, and in December 2021 Keathley filed a negligence action in federal district court without notifying that court. After Buddy Ayers Construction moved for summary judgment on grounds of judicial estoppel, Keathley amended his schedules and submitted affidavits explaining that the omission had been inadvertent. The District Court, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, found that Keathley knew the facts underlying his claims and hypothetically had a motive to conceal them, held that the omission was therefore not inadvertent or a mistake, and entered summary judgment for the company. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, with one judge concurring but expressing doubt that judicial estoppel’s goals were served by applying it given evidence the omission was an “honest mistake.”

    Questions Presented

    1. Whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith.

    Holding

    To determine whether an omission of a claim in the bankruptcy context was inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel, courts should look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the omission. The Fifth Circuit erred by artificially narrowing its inquiry to whether the debtor had knowledge of the underlying facts or a potential motive to conceal the claim — a rule that is at once too rigid, because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “eschews mechanical rules” and depends on a case-by-case weighing of all relevant facts and circumstances, and too broad, because a debtor will almost always know the underlying facts and stand to benefit from nondisclosure. Vacated and remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc., written by Justice Jackson.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Abouammo v. United States Jun 16, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-5146_e29f.pdf

    Case background

    While employed by Twitter at its San Francisco office, petitioner Ahmad Abouammo provided confidential information to a high-level Saudi official about Saudi dissidents posting on the company’s platform; in exchange, the official wired Abouammo $300,000. Around the same time, Abouammo left Twitter and relocated to Seattle, where he started a social-media consulting business. Two San Francisco-based FBI agents who were investigating unauthorized disclosures of Twitter account information flew to Seattle to interview Abouammo at his home. During the interview, Abouammo denied giving the Saudi official confidential information and claimed the payments were for consulting work; when the agents asked for supporting documentation, he went upstairs, created a fake invoice, and emailed it to one of the agents. Back in San Francisco, the agents discovered from the document’s date-and-time metadata what Abouammo had done. He was indicted in the Northern District of California for falsifying a record under § 1519 and moved to dismiss the charge for improper venue, arguing he could be tried only where the alleged falsification occurred. The District Court denied the motion, finding venue also proper where the FBI investigation was located, and a jury convicted Abouammo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that § 1519’s intent requirement made the “contemplated effects” of the falsification part of the “essential conduct” of the offense, permitting trial where the investigation the defendant intended to stymie was ongoing or contemplated.

    Questions Presented

    1. Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there.

    Holding

    A defendant charged with violating § 1519 must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred; he cannot be tried in a different district where the investigation was located, because no “conduct constituting the offense” happened there. The Constitution twice safeguards a defendant’s venue right, and courts locate a crime by identifying the conduct that constitutes the offense and where it took place. Section 1519 prohibits only one act — falsifying a record or document with the intent to impede or obstruct a federal investigation — and once a person commits that act with the requisite intent, he need do nothing more to violate the law. The statute’s special-intent provision does not change the analysis: a falsification made with intent to obstruct occurs in the same place as one made without it, and § 1519, unlike laws barring actual obstruction, does not require that the falsification have any impact on an investigation. Section 1519 is therefore a standalone crime, not an inchoate offense tethered to some other obstruction crime, so venue must rest on the conduct § 1519 itself proscribes. Here, that was Seattle — in venue terms, the Western District of Washington. 122 F. 4th 1072, reversed and remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Abouammo v. United States, written by Justice Kagan.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kagan. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Jun 15, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-345_i42k.pdf

    Case background

    The Investment Company Act (ICA) comprehensively regulates investment companies. It designates the Securities and Exchange Commission as its primary enforcer and expressly permits shareholders and issuers of securities to enforce two of its provisions. The petitioners — referred to as the Funds — are investment companies that manage closed-end mutual funds, so called because each contains a fixed number of shares issued at one time whose price is set by trading on the open market. The respondents, Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., and Saba Capital Management, L. P. (collectively, Saba), engage in activist investing: identifying low-performing closed-end funds and buying a large enough stake to alter the funds’ investment strategies. The Funds are incorporated in Maryland, which enacted the Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act (MCSAA), and they adopted resolutions opting into MCSAA provisions that limit voting rights for shareholders holding a disproportionate number of shares — like activist investors — unless other shareholders approve. In June 2023, Saba sued the Funds, alleging that their resolutions violate the ICA’s requirement that every share of stock be voting stock with equal voting rights. Saba’s suit invoked Section 47(b) of the ICA, which provides that “a court may not deny rescission” of contracts that violate the ICA “at the instance of any party” unless doing so would be consistent with equity and the ICA’s goals. The District Court held that Section 47(b) creates an implied private right of action to sue for contract rescission and granted Saba summary judgment, and the Second Circuit summarily affirmed.

    Questions Presented

    1. The question presented is whether Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b), creates an implied private right of action.

    Holding

    Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act. Congress, not the Judiciary, decides who may enforce federal law, and when it creates a private right of action it usually does so expressly. Section 47(b) is a mandate directed to courts rather than a provision that confers a right on a specified class of persons: the key actor is a court, which is told not to deny the remedy of rescission to parties who request it for performed contracts unless the equities and the Act’s goals favor a different result. The statute’s structure points the same way — the Securities and Exchange Commission bears primary responsibility for enforcing the ICA, and Congress’s creation of a comprehensive agency enforcement scheme, together with two expressly provided private rights of action elsewhere in the Act, confirms that private parties generally cannot enforce it. Saba’s reliance on Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (TAMA) is unavailing, because Congress amended Section 47(b) in 1980, deleting the “shall be void” language on which TAMA’s reasoning turned and shifting the focus to a court’s remedial authority.

    The Court

    Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I and II.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., written by Justice Barrett.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections Jun 11, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r05_e2q3.pdf

    Case background

    Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day and received within two weeks of election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates filed a lawsuit claiming that counting ballots received after election day violates federal law. They principally contended that doing so conflicts with 2 U.S.C. § 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1, which set election day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. The district court dismissed the case, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that petitioners lacked standing.

    Questions Presented

    1. Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

    Holding

    As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election. Candidates have a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns — their interest extends to the integrity of the election and the democratic process by which they earn or lose the support of the people they seek to represent. Candidates need not show a substantial risk that a rule will cause them to lose the election or prevent them from achieving a legally significant vote threshold.

    The Court

    Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, written by Justice Roberts.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Urias-Orellana v. Bondi Jun 11, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r19_3e04.pdf

    Case background

    Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child are natives of El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization in 2021. After being placed in removal proceedings, they applied for asylum, and Urias-Orellana testified that he was being targeted by a hitman in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge found his testimony credible but concluded that it did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act, denied the asylum applications, and ordered the family’s removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. On petition for review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also affirmed, holding that, under the substantial-evidence standard of review, the record did not compel a contrary finding.

    Questions Presented

    1. Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA’s judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

    Holding

    The Immigration and Nationality Act requires application of the substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s determination whether a given set of undisputed facts rises to the level of “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Section 1252(b)(4)(B) codified the standard of INS v. Elias-Zacarias: the persecution determination — both the underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings — is conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. The judgment of the First Circuit is affirmed.

    The Court

    Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, written by Justice Jackson.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Fernandez v. United States Jun 09, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-556_8m58.pdf

    Case background

    Joe Fernandez was indicted in 2013 for his role in the assassination of two gang members. The Government’s theory was that a drug ring paid Fernandez to serve as a backup shooter, and that when the primary shooter’s gun jammed, Fernandez fired 14 rounds and killed both victims. Largely on the testimony of his alleged co-conspirator Patrick Darge, a jury convicted Fernandez of murder for hire and a firearms offense, and the District Court imposed two consecutive life sentences. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting both a Brady claim and an insufficiency-of-evidence argument. Fernandez then twice moved for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255; the first motion was deemed “plainly meritless,” and the second succeeded only in vacating his firearms conviction, leaving the murder-for-hire conviction in place. After the District Judge pointedly observed that Fernandez would be released if his remaining life sentence were commuted or held unlawful, Fernandez filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons — above all, his asserted innocence — warranted a sentence reduction. The District Court granted the motion, citing unease about the truthfulness of Darge’s testimony and doubts about the correctness of the verdict, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to the validity of a conviction are not cognizable “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

    Questions Presented

    1. Whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under 28 U. S. C. § 2255.

    Holding

    A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. § 2255, not 18 U. S. C. § 3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release. Section 2255 governs collateral attacks on federal convictions and imposes tight procedural constraints, and the Court’s precedents require that claims close to the core of habeas corpus be brought under the specific federal habeas statute, with other statutes read in harmony with that framework. Allowing a compassionate-release motion to serve as a vehicle for attacking a conviction would let prisoners circumvent § 2255’s exacting requirements, and the text, structure, and regulatory history of § 3582 — which centers on a defendant’s personal circumstances such as age, illness, and rehabilitation — confirm that the invalidity of a conviction is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

    The Court

    Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Fernandez v. United States, written by Justice Barrett.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump Jun 09, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287_new_3135.pdf

    Case background

    Shortly after taking office, President Trump invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to address what he identified as two foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China, and “large and persistent” trade deficits. Declaring a national emergency as to each and deeming the threats “unusual and extraordinary,” the President imposed two sets of tariffs — “drug trafficking” tariffs of 25% on most Canadian and Mexican imports and 10% on most Chinese imports, and “reciprocal” tariffs of at least 10% on imports from all trading partners, with dozens of nations facing higher rates. He then issued numerous further increases, reductions, and modifications.

    Two groups of plaintiffs sued, alleging that IEEPA does not authorize either set of tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs — two small businesses — sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which denied the Government’s motion to transfer the case to the Court of International Trade (CIT) and preliminarily enjoined the tariffs. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs — five small businesses and 12 States — sued in the CIT, which granted them summary judgment. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in relevant part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . . importation” did not authorize the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded in scope, amount, and duration.” The Court granted certiorari — including before judgment in Learning Resources — and consolidated the cases.

    Questions Presented

    1. Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.

    Holding

    IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress alone the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” and the power to impose tariffs is a branch of that taxing power; the Government concedes the President has no inherent peacetime authority to impose them. The President must therefore point to clear congressional authorization, and IEEPA’s authority to “regulate . . . importation” does not supply it: the statute never mentions tariffs or duties, the ordinary power to “regulate” does not include the distinct power to tax, and no President had invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs in the statute’s nearly half-century of existence. The judgment in No. 24-1287 is vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the judgment in No. 25-250 is affirmed.

    The Court

    Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II–A–2 and III, which were joined only by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett. The Court divided 6–3 on the result. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson, agreeing that IEEPA does not authorize the tariffs but concluding that ordinary tools of statutory interpretation — rather than the major questions doctrine — sufficed to decide the case. Justice Jackson also filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, adding that she would consult legislative history. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito. Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in *Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump *, written by Justice Roberts.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


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