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    Government

    So Ordered

    AI-narrated readings of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions. Each episode pairs the Court’s syllabus with a reading of the majority opinion, lightly adapted for listening and voiced by a synthesized voice styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice.

    AI DISCLOSURE: The voices in this podcast are AI-generated. The narration is produced by a machine-learning voice synthesis model. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to any individual. The text being read is the majority opinion as published by the Supreme Court of the United States with light adaptations to improve readability.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Rico v. United States Oct 12, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1056_qn12.pdf

    Case background

    Isabel Rico pleaded guilty to federal drug trafficking charges and, after violating the conditions of her supervised release, was sent back to prison and ordered to serve a new 42-month term of supervised release set to expire in June 2021. After her second release, she changed her residence without notifying her probation officer. A warrant issued for her arrest, but federal authorities did not locate her until January 2023. While she was absconding, Ms. Rico committed a state drug offense in January 2022, which resulted in a conviction. Back in federal district court, the judge treated that drug offense as a Grade A violation of her supervised release and sentenced her to 16 months of incarceration followed by two more years of supervised release. Ms. Rico appealed, arguing that the offense occurred after her term had expired. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that her abscondment “tolled” the clock so that her term kept running until authorities caught up with her. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

    Holding

    The Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize a rule automatically extending a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant absconds. The Act sets when supervised release begins and its maximum length, lets courts revoke release and impose more prison and supervised release for violations, and contains narrow extension and tolling rules with their own limits, including the warrant-or-summons requirement of Section 3583(i). The absence of anything like the Ninth Circuit’s automatic extension rule among those detailed instructions is telling. The government’s arguments from the statutory text, from Mont v. United States and United States v. Johnson, from the common-law rule for escaped prisoners, and from policy all fail to fill that gap. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed and the case remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Rico v. United States, written by Justice Gorsuch.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Gorsuch. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Olivier v. City of Brandon Oct 12, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r20_h315.pdf

    Case background

    Gabriel Olivier is a street preacher in Mississippi who sometimes preached on the sidewalks near an amphitheater in the City of Brandon. In 2019, the City adopted an ordinance requiring anyone engaging in “protests” or “demonstrations” around event times to stay within a “designated protest area.” In 2021, Olivier was arrested for violating the ordinance; he pleaded no contest in municipal court and received a $304 fine, a year of probation, and a suspended jail term. He did not appeal, paid the fine, and served no prison time. Wanting to keep preaching near the amphitheater, he sued the City in federal court under § 1983, alleging that the ordinance violates the Free Speech Clause and seeking only a declaration and an injunction against future enforcement. The District Court held the suit barred by Heck v. Humphrey, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the same reasoning.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether, as the Fifth Circuit holds in conflict with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, this Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars § 1983 claims seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional.

    (2) Whether, as the Fifth Circuit and at least four others hold in conflict with five other circuits, Heck v. Humphrey bars § 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they never had access to federal habeas relief.

    Holding

    Olivier’s suit seeking purely prospective relief, an injunction stopping officials from enforcing the ordinance in the future, can proceed notwithstanding his prior conviction for violating that ordinance; Heck does not hold otherwise. Under Wooley v. Maynard, a plaintiff previously convicted under a law may bring a § 1983 suit to prevent its future enforcement. Heck bars § 1983 suits that are really collateral attacks on a prior conviction, and, as in Edwards v. Balisok and Wilkinson v. Dotson, a claim for forward-looking relief falls outside habeas’s core and Heck’s concerns. The Court did not reach the second question, whether Heck applies to plaintiffs who never had access to federal habeas relief. Reversed and remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Olivier v. City of Brandon, written by Justice Kagan.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kagan. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. Oct 02, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r18_d18f.pdf

    Case background

    In 1979, the New Jersey Legislature created the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) as a “body corporate and politic with corporate succession” and an “instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental functions,” independent of any supervision or control by the State’s Department of Transportation. The State gave NJ Transit broad corporate powers, including the power to sue and be sued, make contracts, acquire property, and raise funds, and its organic statute provides that its debts and liabilities are not debts or liabilities of the State. The Governor may remove Board members and veto Board actions. In 2017, Jeffrey Colt was struck by an NJ Transit bus in Midtown Manhattan; a year later, Cedric Galette was injured when an NJ Transit bus crashed into the car he was riding in in Philadelphia. Both sued NJ Transit for negligence in their home state courts, and NJ Transit moved to dismiss, arguing that it is an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals held that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the opposite. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases to resolve the conflict.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes.

    Holding

    NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is personal to the State and extends only to arms of the State itself, not to legally independent entities the State creates. The Court’s precedents ask chiefly whether the State structured the entity as legally separate, with the corporate form the clearest evidence, and whether the State is formally liable for the entity’s judgments; control is considered only with caution. New Jersey created NJ Transit as a body corporate with typical corporate powers, the State is not formally liable for its debts, and the State’s control over it does not meaningfully affect that status. The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is affirmed, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is reversed, and both cases are remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp., written by Justice Sotomayor.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Sotomayor. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal Sep 29, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r15_bqmc.pdf

    Case background

    GEO Group operates a private detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, under a contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Alejandro Menocal, a former detainee at the facility, brought a class action alleging that GEO’s work policies for detainees violated a federal bar on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on unjust enrichment. GEO argued that the suit had to be dismissed under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., which held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct the Government has lawfully “authorized and directed” it to perform, because ICE had authorized and directed the challenged policies. The District Court did not read GEO’s contract to instruct it to adopt those policies, concluded that Yearsley did not relieve GEO of legal responsibility, and held that a trial would be necessary. GEO immediately appealed, and the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order denying Yearsley protection does not qualify for interlocutory review under the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such “collateral orders” include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity. The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.

    Holding

    Because Yearsley provides federal contractors a potential merits defense rather than an immunity from suit, a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable. Under the collateral-order doctrine, a non-final order is appealable only if it would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The right not to stand trial that an immunity confers is irretrievably lost once trial occurs, but the right to a finding of non-liability that a merits defense affords can be vindicated by reversing an adverse final judgment. Yearsley protects a contractor only when it has acted lawfully, and sovereign immunity does not transfer to government agents or contractors, so a Yearsley denial must await final judgment under § 1291. The Tenth Circuit’s judgment was affirmed and the case remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I and III. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal, written by Justice Kagan.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kagan. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Villarreal v. Texas Sep 29, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r16_869c.pdf

    Case background

    David Villarreal’s murder trial culminated with his own testimony. That testimony was interrupted by a 24-hour overnight recess, during which the trial judge instructed Villarreal’s attorneys not to “manage his testimony.” The judge clarified, however, that Villarreal was not prohibited from talking to his attorneys and recognized his constitutional right to confer about certain topics, such as possible sentencing issues. Villarreal resumed his testimony 24 hours later and was convicted of murder. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the order was a permissible exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether a trial court abridges the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight recess.

    Holding

    A qualified conferral order that prohibits only discussion of the defendant’s testimony for its own sake during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the burden of offering unaltered trial testimony and does not violate the Constitution. The line between Geders v. United States and Perry v. Leeke is substantive, not merely temporal: a testifying defendant retains a protected right to discuss matters such as trial tactics, other witnesses, and a possible plea bargain, even where that discussion incidentally touches his testimony, but consultation about the testimony itself sheds its constitutional protection while he is on the stand. The trial judge’s order barring counsel from “managing” Villarreal’s ongoing testimony fell on the permissible side of that line, and the Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule forbidding all overnight restrictions.

    The Court

    Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Villarreal v. Texas, written by Justice Jackson.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters Sep 25, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/26a308_pok0.pdf

    Case background

    Since 1986, the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program has let federal, state, and local agencies verify the citizenship and immigration status of noncitizens applying for public benefits. In March 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14248 directing DHS to let state and local authorities verify the citizenship of registered voters, and directing the Social Security Administration to make its records available for that purpose. DHS then launched a modified SAVE program that checks against SSA records, including Social Security numbers, and allows bulk searches of many individuals at once. The League of Women Voters, its local affiliates, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center sued, alleging that the modifications violated the Social Security Act’s confidentiality provision, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court for the District of Columbia agreed, vacated the modified program, and denied a stay pending appeal; a divided D.C. Circuit panel also denied a stay, with Judge Katsas dissenting.

    Questions Presented

    This case came to the Court on the Government’s emergency application to stay the District Court’s order, not on a petition for certiorari, so no question was formally presented.

    Holding

    The application for a stay is granted. The plaintiff organizations likely have standing, but their claims likely lack merit: 8 U.S.C. § 1373 bars any law or official from restricting the sharing of citizenship information with DHS “notwithstanding any other provision” of law, and requires DHS to answer state and local verification requests, so it likely supersedes the disclosure limits in the Social Security Act and Privacy Act. The Government is likely to suffer irreparable harm because the order below blocks the program it has chosen to answer election officials’ citizenship inquiries ahead of the midterm elections. The District Court’s June 22, 2026 order is stayed pending appeal and any timely petition for certiorari.

    The Court

    The Court issued its opinion per curiam. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the unsigned (per curiam) opinion of the Court in Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters. It also includes Justice Jackson’s dissent, read in the same voice.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a standard synthesized voice that is not modeled on any justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to any member of the Court. The text being read is the Court’s published opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba) Sep 25, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-699_f204.pdf

    Case background

    In 1960, after Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, the Cuban Government confiscated many foreign-owned assets, including Exxon’s oil refinery, terminals, packaging plants, and more than a hundred service stations. Since then, two Cuban government-owned companies, Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) and Corporación CIMEX, S. A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), have operated and profited from Exxon’s expropriated assets. In 1996, Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action for U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban Government against “any person” that “traffics in” the confiscated property, with “person” defined to include “any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” Exxon sued CUPET, CIMEX, and later CIMEX’s Panamanian alter ego under the Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking more than $1 billion in damages. The companies moved to dismiss, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA); Exxon countered that the Helms-Burton Act itself waived their immunity. The District Court sided with the Cuban government defendants, and a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

    Holding

    The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue them under the Act need not also satisfy one of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions. Four features, taken together, make the waiver clearly discernible: the Act’s cause of action expressly runs against agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state; applying the FSIA would largely negate that cause of action, since the Act’s own embargo makes the commercial-activity and expropriation exceptions nearly impossible to meet; the Act places these suits under federal-question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) rather than the FSIA’s § 1330; and the Act gives the President gatekeeping power to suspend suits, echoing the pre-FSIA regime of executive immunity decisions. Congress need not use magic words to abrogate sovereign immunity.

    The Court

    Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba), written by Justice Kavanaugh.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kavanaugh. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM Nat. Pension Fund Sep 25, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/23-1209_i3kn.pdf

    Case background

    Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), an employer that stops participating in an underfunded multiemployer pension plan must pay “withdrawal liability,” its share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits, calculated “as of” the last day of the plan year preceding the employer’s withdrawal. Valuing those benefits depends on hard data about the plan and on actuarial assumptions about the future, including the discount rate. Petitioners are four employers that withdrew from the IAM National Pension Fund between April and December 2018. The Fund assessed each employer’s liability as of December 31, 2017, applying a 6.50% discount rate it had adopted with its actuarial firm in January 2018, rather than the 7.50% rate it had used before, which sharply increased the amounts owed. In separate arbitrations, the arbitrators held the assessments erroneous and required the Fund to use the assumptions in effect on the measurement date. The District Courts disagreed, the D.C. Circuit affirmed in a consolidated appeal, and its decision conflicted with one from the Second Circuit.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether 29 U.S.C. § 1391’s instruction to compute withdrawal liability “as of the end of the plan year” requires the plan to base the computation on the actuarial assumptions most recently adopted before the end of the year, or allows the plan to use different actuarial assumptions that were adopted after, but based on information available as of, the end of the year.

    Holding

    The provisions of ERISA governing the calculation of withdrawal liability, §§ 1391 and 1393, do not require the actuarial assumptions underlying that calculation to be selected on or before the measurement date. Section 1391’s “as of” language means the hard data feeding the calculation must be fixed on the measurement date, but actuarial assumptions are predictive tools, not facts about the plan. Section 1393 requires only that assumptions be reasonable and reflect the actuary’s best estimate, and it sets no deadline for selecting them. Petitioners’ antiretroactivity and policy arguments do not overcome the absence of a textual deadline.

    The Court

    Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM Nat. Pension Fund, written by Justice Jackson.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Postal Service v. Konan Sep 24, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r13_m64n.pdf

    Case background

    Lebene Konan owns two rental houses a block apart in Euless, Texas, and leases rooms to tenants in both. Beginning in 2020, Konan’s mail carrier repeatedly stopped delivering mail to her properties: changing the listed owner of one house to a tenant’s name, returning mail addressed to Konan and her tenants to senders as undeliverable, and refusing to release held mail without identification for the addressees. Konan’s administrative complaints went nowhere, so in 2022 she sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, bringing state-law claims for nuisance, tortious interference, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court dismissed her complaint under the FTCA’s postal exception, which retains sovereign immunity for claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission” of mail. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the exception’s terms do not cover the intentional act of not delivering mail at all — a ruling that conflicted with the First and Second Circuits, which had read the exception to cover intentional misconduct as well.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether a plaintiff’s claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of “the loss” or “miscarriage” of letters or postal matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).

    Holding

    The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional nondelivery of mail, because both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail. When Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946, both terms ordinarily encompassed failures of mail to arrive caused by intentional misconduct, not merely negligence, and nothing in the statute’s text or structure limits either term to unintentional conduct. The Fifth Circuit’s judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

    The Court

    Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Postal Service v. Konan, written by Justice Thomas.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Thomas. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe Sep 11, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-856_kjfm.pdf

    Case background

    The plaintiffs contend that the Chinese Government persecuted them because of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Systems, Inc. enabled that persecution by developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend them. They allege that Cisco and its executives are liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting violations of international law, and one plaintiff also seeks to hold two Cisco executives liable for aiding and abetting torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, while leaving open a narrow possibility of judicially created causes of action under a two-step framework; since Sosa, the Court has never created one. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding that aiding-and-abetting liability satisfies both steps of the Sosa framework and that the TVPA encompasses claims against those who aid and abet torture.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

    (2) Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

    Holding

    Courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms under the ATS. Judicial authority under Sosa’s second step was narrow at the outset, because ATS cases by their nature implicate foreign policy and the power to create causes of action belongs to Congress, which the Constitution expressly empowers to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.” Since Sosa, the Court has committed to the view that judicially created causes of action offend the separation of powers in almost every circumstance, and in the ATS context there will always be at least one sound reason to defer to Congress. What Sosa made difficult, subsequent legal developments have made impossible, and because courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, there is necessarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations. The TVPA, which provides a cause of action against someone who “subjects” another to torture, likewise does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability: as in Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., the statute’s silence on aiding and abetting settles the issue. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined as to Parts I, II, III, and V.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, written by Justice Barrett.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


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