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    Government

    So Ordered

    AI-narrated readings of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions. Each episode pairs the Court’s syllabus with a reading of the majority opinion, lightly adapted for listening and voiced by a synthesized voice styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice.

    AI DISCLOSURE: The voices in this podcast are AI-generated. The narration is produced by a machine-learning voice synthesis model. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to any individual. The text being read is the majority opinion as published by the Supreme Court of the United States with light adaptations to improve readability.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Trump v. Slaughter Jul 10, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-332_qn12.pdf

    Case background

    The Federal Trade Commission is a regulatory agency with vast rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers under more than eighty federal statutes. Its five Commissioners serve seven-year terms and may be removed by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Shortly after beginning his second term in January 2025, President Trump fired the FTC’s two remaining Democratic Commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya, without citing any statutory cause. He told them their continued service was “inconsistent with his Administration’s priorities” and that they were removed pursuant to his authority under Article II of the Constitution. Slaughter filed suit seeking reinstatement, arguing her removal was ultra vires, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated the Constitution. The District Court for the District of Columbia granted Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment, declaring the removal unlawful and issuing a permanent injunction. A divided Court of Appeals denied the Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s order and granted certiorari before judgment.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), should be overruled.

    (2) Whether a federal court may prevent a person’s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law.

    Holding

    The FTC’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitution vests the executive power in the President and requires that he be able to remove officers who exercise executive power on his behalf. The FTC unquestionably exercises executive power — through substantive rulemaking, in-house enforcement adjudications, and civil suits in federal court — and must therefore be subject to the President’s control. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, to the extent it stands for anything beyond the proposition that an agency exercising no executive power may be structured independently of the President, is overruled. Because the FTC’s activities fall well within the heartland of executive power, the President was entitled to remove Commissioner Slaughter at will. Reversed and remanded.

    The Court

    Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, and joined by Justice Thomas as to all but Part III-B. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Trump v. Slaughter, written by Justice Roberts.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Trump v. Barbara Jun 30, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-365_4hdj.pdf

    Case background

    On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14160, titled Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship. The Order provides that children born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present here are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, and thus do not qualify for citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause or the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which uses the same language. Several parents filed suit, some in the name of their children, arguing that the Executive Order violates both the Fourteenth Amendment and the INA. The District Court agreed, provisionally certified a nationwide class of children who would be denied citizenship by the Order, and preliminarily enjoined the Order’s enforcement. This Court granted certiorari before judgment.

    Questions Presented

    (1) The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause.

    Holding

    Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. The Clause mirrors the common law’s criteria for citizenship: a child born on American soil and subject to American law is a citizen, subject only to the narrow exceptions recognized at common law — such as the children of foreign ministers and members of Indian tribes — none of which applies to the children of parents unlawfully or temporarily present. The Court’s precedent in United States v. Wong Kim Ark confirms this rule, and arguments for limiting birthright citizenship to the children of those domiciled in the United States find scant support in the text or history of the Clause. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

    The Court

    Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to the introduction and Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch each filed dissenting opinions.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Trump v. Barbara, written by Justice Roberts.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Trump v. Cook Jun 30, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a312_5468.pdf

    Case background

    In August 2025, President Trump purported to fire Lisa Cook, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — the first Governor ever removed in the central bank’s 111-year history. The move followed a social-media letter from the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency accusing Cook of mortgage fraud in connection with loans she had obtained before joining the Board. In his removal letter, the President stated that he had “reason to believe” Cook “may have made false statements on one or more mortgage agreements” and that he lacked “confidence in [her] integrity.” Cook promptly sued, alleging that the removal was not “for cause” as required by the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U. S. C. § 242, and that the President had in any event failed to provide the pretermination notice and opportunity to respond demanded by the statute and the Constitution. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing her removal, the Court of Appeals declined to stay the injunction, and the Government applied to the Supreme Court for a stay.

    Questions Presented

    (1) This case came to the Court on the Government’s emergency application to stay the District Court’s injunction, not on a petition for certiorari, so no question was formally presented. The application asked whether the Government was entitled to a stay — in particular, whether it was likely to succeed in showing that the President could remove Cook and that she should not remain in office while the litigation continued.

    Holding

    The Government’s application for a stay is denied. The Government has not shown that it is likely to prevail on the legal arguments advanced in its stay application — arguments that, taken together, would transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will employment. The Court resolves the case on the narrow ground that the President failed to afford Cook the procedural protections she was entitled to by statute: before a Governor may be removed for cause, she must receive notice and some opportunity to respond, and Cook received neither. The Court further explains that the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection is consistent with the Constitution, reflecting a long tradition of independent central banking that traces back to the First and Second Banks of the United States. Because Cook did not receive the process she was due, the injunction keeping her in office remains in effect pending the litigation.

    The Court

    Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justices Kavanaugh and Jackson each filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Trump v. Cook, written by Justice Roberts.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Roberts. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Mullin v. Al Otro Lado Jun 29, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-5_86qd.pdf

    Case background

    The Immigration and Nationality Act governs the process by which an alien who “arrives in the United States” is inspected by border officials, is deemed an applicant for admission, and may apply for asylum. In the spring of 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection began experiencing a surge of aliens seeking admission at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border, with numbers sometimes far exceeding safe and secure processing capacity. In November 2016, the Department of Homeland Security responded by adopting a policy of “metering” the number of arriving aliens whom CBP would inspect each day and allow to apply for asylum; to enforce it, officials stood on the U.S. side of the border and prevented aliens from entering beyond the number the port could adequately process. In 2017, asylum seekers and the immigration-advocacy organization Al Otro Lado brought a putative class action against the Government, arguing that CBP’s enforcement of the metering policy unlawfully withheld inspection and asylum processing from aliens who arrive at the border and seek to enter the United States. The District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for it, and a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, holding that an alien “arrives in the United States” — and thus must be inspected and may apply for asylum — when the alien, while standing on the Mexico side of the border, encounters a United States official at the border.

    Questions Presented

    (1) The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., provides that an alien who “arrives in the United States” may apply for asylum and must be inspected by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1225(a)(1) and (3). The question presented is whether an alien who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrives in the United States” within the meaning of those provisions.

    Holding

    An alien standing in Mexico does not “arrive in the United States” by attempting, and failing, to set foot in this country. An alien “arrives in the United States” only when he crosses the border. The INA thus neither entitles an alien standing in Mexico to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him. The phrase “arrives in the United States” carries its ordinary meaning — a person arrives in a place only when he enters it — and that conclusion does not change because someone or something blocks entry. Statutory context, and the presumption against extraterritoriality, both confirm that reading.

    The Court

    Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, written by Justice Alito.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Alito. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Wolford v. Lopez Jun 26, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1046_nmio.pdf

    Case background

    For years, Hawaii made it almost impossible to obtain a license to carry a firearm. After this Court held in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to carry handguns outside the home for self-defense, Hawaii replaced its old carry-permit law with new laws that achieved a similar result. At issue in this case is a Hawaii law that prohibits firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner — flipping the default rule at common law, under which anyone has an implied license to enter property held open to the public unless the owner withdraws consent. Petitioners — three residents of Maui County who possess concealed-carry permits, together with an organizational plaintiff whose members hold such permits — filed suit in federal court seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief, contending that the law violates their constitutional rights. The District Court enjoined enforcement of the law as applied to private property open to the public, but the Ninth Circuit reversed that injunction.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit, that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission to the handgun carrier?

    (2) Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws in applying Bruen’s text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits?

    The petition presented two questions, but the Court granted certiorari limited to the first. The second question — concerning the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on post-Reconstruction-era and later laws — was not taken up.

    Holding

    Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The restrictions fall within the plain text of the Second Amendment, so the law is presumptively unconstitutional, and Hawaii’s shift from the common-law rule imposes a new and significant burden on the right recognized in Bruen. The State’s proffered historical analogues — chiefly colonial and early state laws against unauthorized hunting, an 1893 Oregon armed-trespass statute, and an 1865 Louisiana Black Code provision — do not support the new default rule: the anti-poaching laws applied to land where game could be found rather than the retail establishments residents frequent daily, and the remaining statutes are too late, too isolated, or too tainted to illuminate the original understanding of the right to keep and bear arms.

    The Court

    Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Part II-B. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Wolford v. Lopez, written by Justice Alito.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Alito. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Mullin v. Doe Jun 25, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-1083_f204.pdf

    Case background

    Congress created Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1990 to provide short-term humanitarian relief for aliens who cannot safely return to their home countries; although designed to afford temporary relief, TPS designations in practice have often lasted for decades. Syria received a TPS designation in 2012 because of “extraordinary and temporary conditions” related to the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad, and Haiti received one in 2010 after a devastating earthquake. In 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security provided public notice that both designations would terminate. Seven Syrian nationals sued in the Southern District of New York under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the District Court granted interim relief under 5 U. S. C. §705; the Second Circuit denied the Government’s request for a stay. Five Haitian nationals sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia under the APA and also charged that terminating Haiti’s designation violated the constitutional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race; that court granted interim relief, and a divided D. C. Circuit panel declined to issue a stay. The Government sought a stay and a writ of certiorari before judgment in both cases, and this Court granted review, consolidated the cases, and deferred ruling on the stay applications.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the judicial-review bar in the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(5)(A), precludes respondents’ APA claims.

    (2) If reviewable, whether respondents’ APA claims nonetheless fail on the merits.

    Holding

    1. The TPS statute bars judicial review of respondents’ non-constitutional claims. Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) provides that there is no judicial review of any “determination” of the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state. Whether “determination” means an individual decision or the process leading up to a decision, the bar reaches all of respondents' non-constitutional claims, including their APA claims and the subsidiary procedural steps that merge into the final agency action.

    2. The Miot respondents’ equal protection claim — that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of race — is unlikely to succeed. Even assuming heightened scrutiny under Arlington Heights applies, none of the cited statements by the President or the Secretary was overtly racial, and all expressed policy views that could rest on race-neutral justifications; indeed, respondents themselves offer a race-neutral explanation for the Government’s action. Reversed and remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part III–A. The Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined that opinion in full, and Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined except for Part III–A. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Mullin v. Doe, written by Justice Alito.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Alito. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety Jun 24, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/23-1197_h3ci.pdf

    Case background

    The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) was enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause authority and imposes various conditions on federal funds distributed to state prison systems like the Louisiana Department of Corrections (LDOC). One condition requires state prison systems to agree to answer federal suits by private plaintiffs alleging certain substantial burdens on their religious exercises. Damon Landor is a Rastafarian whose religious convictions require him to leave his hair uncut. He alleges that LDOC officers, despite being aware of his religious beliefs, forcibly shaved his head. Relying on RLUIPA, Mr. Landor sued LDOC as well as several of the prison system’s individual officers in their personal capacities, seeking damages from them. The officers moved to dismiss, arguing that while their employer LDOC may have agreed to answer certain private suits under RLUIPA, they were not parties to any such agreement and so could not be sued. The district court dismissed Mr. Landor’s RLUIPA claims against both LDOC and the officers. On appeal, Mr. Landor challenged only the dismissal of his claim against the individual officers, and the Fifth Circuit declined to revive it, holding that RLUIPA does not permit suits against officers in their individual capacities.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

    Holding

    Individuals may not be held liable in their personal capacities under a Spending Clause statute unless those individuals have voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer lawsuits under the statute. Because the individual defendants in this case did not voluntarily and knowingly consent to face RLUIPA liability in an agreement with the federal government, Mr. Landor’s case cannot proceed against them. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.

    The Court

    Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections and Public Safety, written by Justice Gorsuch.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Gorsuch. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Blanche v. Lau Jun 23, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-429_h3ci.pdf

    Case background

    Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Government can remove aliens applying for admission to the country if they are “inadmissible,” and it can remove aliens already admitted if they are “deportable.” Respondent Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. On May 7, 2012, New Jersey charged Lau with trademark counterfeiting, and while awaiting trial he temporarily left the United States for China. Lawful permanent residents generally must be regarded as already admitted and need not reapply for admission when they return from temporary travel, but under an exception the Government may regard such a resident as “seeking an admission” if he “has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2),” including a crime involving moral turpitude. Because of Lau’s pending charge, when he tried to reenter on June 15, 2012, the border officer declined to treat him as already admitted and instead paroled him into the country pending his criminal case. After Lau pleaded guilty in 2013, the Government charged him as an applicant for admission who was inadmissible for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge found him removable and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, but the Second Circuit vacated the removal order, holding that Lau should have been regarded as already admitted unless the border officer had “clear and convincing” evidence that he had committed the crime. Because that decision conflicted with rulings of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Court granted certiorari.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether, to remove a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the LPR’s last reentry into the United States.

    Holding

    The Immigration and Nationality Act does not require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission. Removing a lawful permanent resident on a charge of inadmissibility involves two steps: at step one, only commission of the crime is required to regard the alien as seeking admission; at step two, a conviction or admission is required to show that the alien is inadmissible. Lau was correctly charged, because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude before reentry and was later convicted of it. Nothing in the statute imposes a clear-and- convincing-evidence burden on the Government at the border; the Board of Immigration Appeals imposes that burden only at the removal hearing, where the Government satisfied it through Lau’s guilty plea. The Court does not decide whether Lau’s crime was one involving moral turpitude and remands for further proceedings.

    The Court

    Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Blanche v. Lau, written by Justice Thomas.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Thomas. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Hunter v. United States Jun 23, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1063new_l5gm.pdf

    Case background

    Munson Hunter III was charged with 10 counts of bank and wire fraud for a years-long scheme that cost various financial institutions about half a million dollars. He entered into a written plea agreement with the Government, pleading guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud in exchange for dismissal of the remaining nine charges and a promise not to prosecute him for the described conduct. The agreement included an appeal waiver covering both his conviction and his sentence, and provided that any modification of its terms had to be in writing and signed by all parties. At sentencing, the District Court imposed 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release, including a condition — over Hunter’s objection — that he take all mental-health medications prescribed by his treating physician. At the close of the hearing the court told Hunter he had “a right to appeal,” and the prosecutor did not object. Hunter appealed the medication condition, and the Government sought dismissal based on the appeal waiver. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that under Circuit precedent appeal waivers are enforceable except in two circumstances: when the waiver was tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel, and when the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

    (2) Whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

    Holding

    An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Because courts must approve and implement appeal waivers, the standard for enforcing them implicates the integrity of the judiciary, not just the interests of the parties. The miscarriage-of-justice limit sets a high bar: the error must be obvious, not one a judge could reasonably make, and of a type that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Ordinary mistakes in applying sentencing law cannot cancel an appeal waiver. The Court declined to decide in the first instance whether Hunter’s challenge to the mandatory-medication condition meets that standard, and vacated and remanded for the Fifth Circuit to decide that question.

    The Court

    Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Hunter v. United States, written by Justice Kagan.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kagan. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist Jun 23, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r14_1a72.pdf

    Case background

    Respondents Sarah and Grant Palmquist fed their child, E. P., baby food made by petitioner Hain Celestial Group, Inc., and purchased from petitioner Whole Foods Market, Inc. When E. P. was 2½ years old, he began exhibiting serious developmental disorders and was diagnosed with conditions that some doctors attributed to heavy-metal poisoning. After a 2021 congressional staff report found that certain baby foods, including Hain’s, contained elevated levels of toxic heavy metals, the Palmquists sued both Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, raising state-law product-liability and negligence claims against Hain and breach-of-warranty and negligence claims against Whole Foods. Hain, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship — but Whole Foods and the Palmquists were all Texas citizens, so the parties were not completely diverse. Hain argued that Whole Foods had been improperly joined and should be dismissed; the District Court agreed, dismissed Whole Foods, denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand, and ultimately granted Hain judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the improper-joinder decision, concluded that restoring Whole Foods destroyed complete diversity, vacated the judgment, and ordered the case remanded to state court. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a divide among the Courts of Appeals over whether vacatur is required in these circumstances.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether a district court’s final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.

    (2) Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.

    Holding

    Because the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when the case was removed to federal court, the Fifth Circuit correctly vacated the judgment in Hain’s favor. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a judgment generally must be vacated when the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case at the time it was filed or removed. A district court may avoid that result by curing a jurisdictional defect before final judgment — as in Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, where a nondiverse party was fully and properly dismissed with all parties’ consent before trial. But Whole Foods’s dismissal was both erroneous and interlocutory, so when the Fifth Circuit reversed it the dismissal merged into the final judgment and was undone, restoring Whole Foods and destroying complete diversity. A district court cannot create jurisdiction through its own mistakes, and considerations of efficiency cannot save a judgment entered without jurisdiction. Nor may Whole Foods be dropped now under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21: unlike in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, where the plaintiff sought the dismissal, here a defendant seeks to dismiss a nondiverse defendant over the plaintiffs’ objection, overriding the Palmquists’ right as masters of their complaint to choose a state forum.

    The Court

    Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas, who joined the Court’s opinion in full, filed a concurring opinion.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist, written by Justice Sotomayor.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Sotomayor. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


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