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    Government

    So Ordered

    AI-narrated readings of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions. Each episode pairs the Court’s syllabus with a reading of the majority opinion, lightly adapted for listening and voiced by a synthesized voice styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice.

    AI DISCLOSURE: The voices in this podcast are AI-generated. The narration is produced by a machine-learning voice synthesis model. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to any individual. The text being read is the majority opinion as published by the Supreme Court of the United States with light adaptations to improve readability.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. Oct 02, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r18_d18f.pdf

    Case background

    In 1979, the New Jersey Legislature created the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) as a “body corporate and politic with corporate succession” and an “instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental functions,” independent of any supervision or control by the State’s Department of Transportation. The State gave NJ Transit broad corporate powers, including the power to sue and be sued, make contracts, acquire property, and raise funds, and its organic statute provides that its debts and liabilities are not debts or liabilities of the State. The Governor may remove Board members and veto Board actions. In 2017, Jeffrey Colt was struck by an NJ Transit bus in Midtown Manhattan; a year later, Cedric Galette was injured when an NJ Transit bus crashed into the car he was riding in in Philadelphia. Both sued NJ Transit for negligence in their home state courts, and NJ Transit moved to dismiss, arguing that it is an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals held that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the opposite. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases to resolve the conflict.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes.

    Holding

    NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is personal to the State and extends only to arms of the State itself, not to legally independent entities the State creates. The Court’s precedents ask chiefly whether the State structured the entity as legally separate, with the corporate form the clearest evidence, and whether the State is formally liable for the entity’s judgments; control is considered only with caution. New Jersey created NJ Transit as a body corporate with typical corporate powers, the State is not formally liable for its debts, and the State’s control over it does not meaningfully affect that status. The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is affirmed, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is reversed, and both cases are remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp., written by Justice Sotomayor.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Sotomayor. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal Sep 29, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r15_bqmc.pdf

    Case background

    GEO Group operates a private detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, under a contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Alejandro Menocal, a former detainee at the facility, brought a class action alleging that GEO’s work policies for detainees violated a federal bar on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on unjust enrichment. GEO argued that the suit had to be dismissed under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., which held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct the Government has lawfully “authorized and directed” it to perform, because ICE had authorized and directed the challenged policies. The District Court did not read GEO’s contract to instruct it to adopt those policies, concluded that Yearsley did not relieve GEO of legal responsibility, and held that a trial would be necessary. GEO immediately appealed, and the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order denying Yearsley protection does not qualify for interlocutory review under the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such “collateral orders” include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity. The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.

    Holding

    Because Yearsley provides federal contractors a potential merits defense rather than an immunity from suit, a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable. Under the collateral-order doctrine, a non-final order is appealable only if it would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The right not to stand trial that an immunity confers is irretrievably lost once trial occurs, but the right to a finding of non-liability that a merits defense affords can be vindicated by reversing an adverse final judgment. Yearsley protects a contractor only when it has acted lawfully, and sovereign immunity does not transfer to government agents or contractors, so a Yearsley denial must await final judgment under § 1291. The Tenth Circuit’s judgment was affirmed and the case remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I and III. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal, written by Justice Kagan.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kagan. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Villarreal v. Texas Sep 29, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r16_869c.pdf

    Case background

    David Villarreal’s murder trial culminated with his own testimony. That testimony was interrupted by a 24-hour overnight recess, during which the trial judge instructed Villarreal’s attorneys not to “manage his testimony.” The judge clarified, however, that Villarreal was not prohibited from talking to his attorneys and recognized his constitutional right to confer about certain topics, such as possible sentencing issues. Villarreal resumed his testimony 24 hours later and was convicted of murder. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the order was a permissible exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether a trial court abridges the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight recess.

    Holding

    A qualified conferral order that prohibits only discussion of the defendant’s testimony for its own sake during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the burden of offering unaltered trial testimony and does not violate the Constitution. The line between Geders v. United States and Perry v. Leeke is substantive, not merely temporal: a testifying defendant retains a protected right to discuss matters such as trial tactics, other witnesses, and a possible plea bargain, even where that discussion incidentally touches his testimony, but consultation about the testimony itself sheds its constitutional protection while he is on the stand. The trial judge’s order barring counsel from “managing” Villarreal’s ongoing testimony fell on the permissible side of that line, and the Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule forbidding all overnight restrictions.

    The Court

    Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Villarreal v. Texas, written by Justice Jackson.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters Sep 25, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/26a308_pok0.pdf

    Case background

    Since 1986, the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program has let federal, state, and local agencies verify the citizenship and immigration status of noncitizens applying for public benefits. In March 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14248 directing DHS to let state and local authorities verify the citizenship of registered voters, and directing the Social Security Administration to make its records available for that purpose. DHS then launched a modified SAVE program that checks against SSA records, including Social Security numbers, and allows bulk searches of many individuals at once. The League of Women Voters, its local affiliates, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center sued, alleging that the modifications violated the Social Security Act’s confidentiality provision, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court for the District of Columbia agreed, vacated the modified program, and denied a stay pending appeal; a divided D.C. Circuit panel also denied a stay, with Judge Katsas dissenting.

    Questions Presented

    This case came to the Court on the Government’s emergency application to stay the District Court’s order, not on a petition for certiorari, so no question was formally presented.

    Holding

    The application for a stay is granted. The plaintiff organizations likely have standing, but their claims likely lack merit: 8 U.S.C. § 1373 bars any law or official from restricting the sharing of citizenship information with DHS “notwithstanding any other provision” of law, and requires DHS to answer state and local verification requests, so it likely supersedes the disclosure limits in the Social Security Act and Privacy Act. The Government is likely to suffer irreparable harm because the order below blocks the program it has chosen to answer election officials’ citizenship inquiries ahead of the midterm elections. The District Court’s June 22, 2026 order is stayed pending appeal and any timely petition for certiorari.

    The Court

    The Court issued its opinion per curiam. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the unsigned (per curiam) opinion of the Court in Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters. It also includes Justice Jackson’s dissent, read in the same voice.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a standard synthesized voice that is not modeled on any justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to any member of the Court. The text being read is the Court’s published opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba) Sep 25, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-699_f204.pdf

    Case background

    In 1960, after Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, the Cuban Government confiscated many foreign-owned assets, including Exxon’s oil refinery, terminals, packaging plants, and more than a hundred service stations. Since then, two Cuban government-owned companies, Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) and Corporación CIMEX, S. A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), have operated and profited from Exxon’s expropriated assets. In 1996, Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action for U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban Government against “any person” that “traffics in” the confiscated property, with “person” defined to include “any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” Exxon sued CUPET, CIMEX, and later CIMEX’s Panamanian alter ego under the Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking more than $1 billion in damages. The companies moved to dismiss, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA); Exxon countered that the Helms-Burton Act itself waived their immunity. The District Court sided with the Cuban government defendants, and a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

    Holding

    The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue them under the Act need not also satisfy one of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions. Four features, taken together, make the waiver clearly discernible: the Act’s cause of action expressly runs against agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state; applying the FSIA would largely negate that cause of action, since the Act’s own embargo makes the commercial-activity and expropriation exceptions nearly impossible to meet; the Act places these suits under federal-question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) rather than the FSIA’s § 1330; and the Act gives the President gatekeeping power to suspend suits, echoing the pre-FSIA regime of executive immunity decisions. Congress need not use magic words to abrogate sovereign immunity.

    The Court

    Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba), written by Justice Kavanaugh.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Kavanaugh. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM Nat. Pension Fund Sep 25, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/23-1209_i3kn.pdf

    Case background

    Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), an employer that stops participating in an underfunded multiemployer pension plan must pay “withdrawal liability,” its share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits, calculated “as of” the last day of the plan year preceding the employer’s withdrawal. Valuing those benefits depends on hard data about the plan and on actuarial assumptions about the future, including the discount rate. Petitioners are four employers that withdrew from the IAM National Pension Fund between April and December 2018. The Fund assessed each employer’s liability as of December 31, 2017, applying a 6.50% discount rate it had adopted with its actuarial firm in January 2018, rather than the 7.50% rate it had used before, which sharply increased the amounts owed. In separate arbitrations, the arbitrators held the assessments erroneous and required the Fund to use the assumptions in effect on the measurement date. The District Courts disagreed, the D.C. Circuit affirmed in a consolidated appeal, and its decision conflicted with one from the Second Circuit.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether 29 U.S.C. § 1391’s instruction to compute withdrawal liability “as of the end of the plan year” requires the plan to base the computation on the actuarial assumptions most recently adopted before the end of the year, or allows the plan to use different actuarial assumptions that were adopted after, but based on information available as of, the end of the year.

    Holding

    The provisions of ERISA governing the calculation of withdrawal liability, §§ 1391 and 1393, do not require the actuarial assumptions underlying that calculation to be selected on or before the measurement date. Section 1391’s “as of” language means the hard data feeding the calculation must be fixed on the measurement date, but actuarial assumptions are predictive tools, not facts about the plan. Section 1393 requires only that assumptions be reasonable and reflect the actuary’s best estimate, and it sets no deadline for selecting them. Petitioners’ antiretroactivity and policy arguments do not overcome the absence of a textual deadline.

    The Court

    Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM Nat. Pension Fund, written by Justice Jackson.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Jackson. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Postal Service v. Konan Sep 24, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us2r13_m64n.pdf

    Case background

    Lebene Konan owns two rental houses a block apart in Euless, Texas, and leases rooms to tenants in both. Beginning in 2020, Konan’s mail carrier repeatedly stopped delivering mail to her properties: changing the listed owner of one house to a tenant’s name, returning mail addressed to Konan and her tenants to senders as undeliverable, and refusing to release held mail without identification for the addressees. Konan’s administrative complaints went nowhere, so in 2022 she sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, bringing state-law claims for nuisance, tortious interference, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court dismissed her complaint under the FTCA’s postal exception, which retains sovereign immunity for claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission” of mail. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the exception’s terms do not cover the intentional act of not delivering mail at all — a ruling that conflicted with the First and Second Circuits, which had read the exception to cover intentional misconduct as well.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether a plaintiff’s claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of “the loss” or “miscarriage” of letters or postal matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).

    Holding

    The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional nondelivery of mail, because both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail. When Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946, both terms ordinarily encompassed failures of mail to arrive caused by intentional misconduct, not merely negligence, and nothing in the statute’s text or structure limits either term to unintentional conduct. The Fifth Circuit’s judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

    The Court

    Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Postal Service v. Konan, written by Justice Thomas.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Thomas. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe Sep 11, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-856_kjfm.pdf

    Case background

    The plaintiffs contend that the Chinese Government persecuted them because of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Systems, Inc. enabled that persecution by developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend them. They allege that Cisco and its executives are liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting violations of international law, and one plaintiff also seeks to hold two Cisco executives liable for aiding and abetting torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, while leaving open a narrow possibility of judicially created causes of action under a two-step framework; since Sosa, the Court has never created one. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding that aiding-and-abetting liability satisfies both steps of the Sosa framework and that the TVPA encompasses claims against those who aid and abet torture.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

    (2) Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

    Holding

    Courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms under the ATS. Judicial authority under Sosa’s second step was narrow at the outset, because ATS cases by their nature implicate foreign policy and the power to create causes of action belongs to Congress, which the Constitution expressly empowers to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.” Since Sosa, the Court has committed to the view that judicially created causes of action offend the separation of powers in almost every circumstance, and in the ATS context there will always be at least one sound reason to defer to Congress. What Sosa made difficult, subsequent legal developments have made impossible, and because courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, there is necessarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations. The TVPA, which provides a cause of action against someone who “subjects” another to torture, likewise does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability: as in Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., the statute’s silence on aiding and abetting settles the issue. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined as to Parts I, II, III, and V.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, written by Justice Barrett.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties Sep 09, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-83_3e04.pdf

    Case background

    Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. When the hotel ended his employment in March 2020, Jules sued in Federal District Court in New York, alleging that respondents had unlawfully discriminated against him in violation of federal and state law. Citing an arbitration agreement Jules had signed before beginning work at the hotel, respondents moved to stay the federal proceedings pending arbitration under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The District Court held that the agreement covered Jules’s claims and stayed the case.

    Jules then commenced arbitration. The arbitrator issued a final award ruling against him on all claims and awarding respondents roughly $34,500 in sanctions. Back before the same District Court that had stayed the case, respondents moved to confirm the award under § 9 while Jules cross-moved to vacate it under § 10. Relying on Badgerow v. Walters, Jules argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the § 9 and § 10 motions neither presented a federal question nor satisfied the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed and confirmed the award, and the Second Circuit affirmed, distinguishing Badgerow as a freestanding action and holding that a court with the power to stay an action under § 3 has the further power to confirm any ensuing award. The Fourth Circuit had held otherwise, and this Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.

    Holding

    A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in § 9 and § 10 of the Act. Unlike the freestanding applications in Vaden v. Discover Bank and Badgerow v. Walters, assessing jurisdiction here requires no “looking through” to a controversy outside the court: the District Court had original jurisdiction over Jules’s federal claims under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act stripped that jurisdiction while the parties arbitrated, and jurisdiction to decide a case includes jurisdiction to decide a motion within it. The Act’s structure confirms the result: § 3 requires a stay rather than dismissal precisely so a court can superintend the arbitration through confirmation or vacatur. Nothing in the Act precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction over live claims still pending before a federal court. Affirmed.

    The Court

    Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, written by Justice Sotomayor.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Sotomayor. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


    Berk v. Choy Sep 03, 2026
    Show notes

    Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/607us1r10_5hek.pdf

    Case background

    Delaware law provides that a plaintiff may not sue for medical malpractice unless a medical professional attests to the suit’s merit in an “affidavit of merit” that “accompanie[s]” the plaintiff’s complaint. Del. Code, Tit. 18, § 6853(a)(1). If no affidavit accompanies the complaint and no timely motion for an extension has been filed, the clerk of court must refuse to file the complaint and it is not docketed.

    Petitioner Harold Berk fell out of bed while on a trip to Delaware and was taken to a hospital owned by Beebe Medical Center, Inc., where an X-ray revealed a fractured ankle. Dr. Wilson Choy recommended a protective boot; hospital employees forced Berk’s leg into it, twisting the fractured ankle, and a second X-ray two weeks later showed the ankle was severely deformed and required surgery. Berk sued Dr. Choy and Beebe Medical Center in federal court on diversity jurisdiction for medical malpractice under Delaware law. He obtained an extension of time but could not find a doctor willing to provide the affidavit, and filed his medical records under seal instead.

    Berk argued that § 6853 is not enforceable in federal court because it is displaced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court disagreed and dismissed his lawsuit for failure to comply with Delaware’s affidavit law. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that § 6853 is substantive under the Erie doctrine and so applies in federal court.

    Questions Presented

    (1) Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

    Holding

    Delaware’s affidavit law does not apply in federal court.

    When a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is on point, a federal court bypasses the Erie inquiry: a valid Federal Rule displaces contrary state law even if the state law would qualify as substantive under Erie. Rule 8 answers the disputed question here. It prescribes the information a plaintiff must present about the merits of his claim at the outset of litigation: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” By requiring no more than that, it establishes with unmistakable clarity that evidence of the claim is not required. Rule 12 reinforces the point. Delaware’s law demands more, so the two give different answers to whether Berk’s complaint can be dismissed as insufficient for want of an affidavit. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. does not exempt a broad category of “preconditions to proceeding” from conflict with the Federal Rules, and Rule 11’s proviso concerning affidavits does not reach affidavits from third parties.

    Because Rule 8 and § 6853 answer the same question, Rule 8 governs so long as it is valid under the Rules Enabling Act. It is: Rule 8 “really regulates procedure,” and the substantive nature or purpose of the displaced state law makes no difference to that analysis. Reversed and remanded.

    The Court

    Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the relevant conflicts are with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 12, not Rule 8.

    What this episode contains

    This episode is an AI-narrated reading of the majority opinion in Berk v. Choy, written by Justice Barrett.

    AI disclosure: The voice in this episode is AI-generated, using a machine learning model styled to loosely resemble the authoring justice. Tone, inflection, pacing, and emphasis are artifacts of the model and should not be attributed to Justice Barrett. The text being read is the Court’s published majority opinion, lightly adapted to improve readability for the spoken format.


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