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    Volts

    Volts is a podcast about leaving fossil fuels behind. I’ve been reporting on and explaining clean-energy topics for almost 20 years, and I love talking to politicians, analysts, innovators, and activists about the latest progress in the world’s most important fight. (Volts is entirely subscriber-supported. Sign up!)

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    Copyright: © David Roberts

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    Latest Episodes:
    Volts podcast: the challenges of building transmission in the US, and how to overcome them, with Liza Reed Aug 10, 2023
    Show notes

    The US is nowhere close to being able to build the amount of long-distance power lines it will need for a clean energy transition. In this episode, electricity transmission expert Liza Reed breaks down the many problems with the current dysfunctional system, and what it will take to build up the needed infrastructure. (PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsElectricity transmission has been having a moment lately, getting more attention from analysts and policymakers than it has in … well, at least in my lifetime. There's good reason for this: every single model of deep decarbonization shows that, to get there, the US will need lots, lots more long-distance high-voltage power lines, to carry renewable energy from the remote areas where it is concentrated to the urban load centers where it is needed. The problem is, the current system for planning and building those long-distance power lines is utterly dysfunctional, at every level, which means they aren't getting built. The US will not decarbonize on time or on budget unless it can figure this out.It's a thorny, complicated subject — not just understanding all the flaws in the current process, but figuring out how to move forward with solutions. Loyal Volts subscribers will recall that I wrote a five-part series on these issues earlier this year, but if you're looking for a more compact & polished version, I highly recommend a newly released report, jointly produced by the Niskanen Center & the Clean Air Task Force, called, "How are we going to build all that clean energy infrastructure?" The report emerged from a workshop held with a variety of professionals across the industry and serves as a plain-language summary of the problems facing transmission in the US today and the candidate solutions. It's remarkably readable, even for non-nerds — I recommend checking it out.To walk through those problems and possible solutions, I'm excited to have as my guest today Liza Reed, the Research Manager for Low Carbon Technology Policy at Niskanen. Reed completed and defended a dissertation on these issues just a few years ago and has been a crucial help to me in parsing through them, so I'm thrilled she's joining me today, so that Volts listeners can also benefit. Liza Reed, welcome to Volts.Liza ReedThank you so much. It's wonderful to be here.David RobertsSo the Niskanen Center has just come out with this report about transmission and its many challenges. So I thought the best way to structure the conversation would be to kind of walk through the report a little bit. But first, sort of by way of context, tell us, what is the transmission challenge in the United States? What are the decarbonization models telling us about what we need?Liza ReedThe challenge is that we don't have enough transmission and that we need more transmission.David RobertsPretty simple.Liza ReedYep, it's that simple.Liza ReedAnd we don't have the right mechanisms in place to get the kind of transmission that we need.David RobertsBut when we say need more relative to what we have, are we talking like a 20% increase, doubling, tripling? Give us a ballpark figure.Liza ReedThere's sort of a range of estimates that come out of reports, but generally in the double to triple in the capacity is what we're seeing coming out of these decarbonization reports. So that's in the gigawatt miles, is sort of the metric.David RobertsAnd we're not building anywhere close to that pace.Liza ReedExactly. Not at the speed we need and particularly not at the type that we need because transmission is being built. And this is one of the challenges when we talk about this decarbonization challenge, is that there is transmission being built. But transmission is generally defined as anything over 100 kilovolts. And the type of transmission that is going to move a lot of power quickly and over long distances is 500 kilovolts on that high range. So there's a ton of gigawatt miles being built between 100 kilovolts and sort of 345 kilovolts compared to what we're getting at these higher voltages that can transfer a lot more power, go a lot longer distances that provide a different kind of resilience and access to different power in different geographic regions.David RobertsRight. So the ones that are getting built are generally, I guess local is not quite the right word, but sort of like a utility will build a line within its territory to connect or strengthen two of it's —Liza ReedExactly.David RobertsAnd what we need are these longer ones between territories, between regions, possibly national. So we're nowhere close on track. And so let's go through — the way you structure the report is around the five P's of transmission. So I thought we would walk through the P's. And what's going wrong with them currently. The first one is planning. So as I understand it, basically utilities have their own planning processes and that's basically what they use to decide on transmission.But then there are other entities also planning and then there are other entities jumping into the system without planning at all. So tell us what's going on with planning right now.Liza ReedYeah, absolutely.Liza ReedSo there is planning at different scales. You're correct. And the largest scale on which planning occurs is within what's called a regional transmission organization. An RTO or an ISO. An Independent System operator.David RobertsYeah. Let me pause you there because just in case there are a few people listening who are not yet total energy nerds, we need to start with a quick distinction. There are two sort of general kinds of utility areas. One is with the fully vertically integrated utility is what it's called. They own the generation, the transmission, the interface with the households. They own everything. And then there are these other areas which I think cover about two thirds of customers where the generation has been broken off into an independent business. The utilities are just there to deliver the power to the households.And then you have these regional transmission organizations that kind of oversee these areas and try to coordinate them. That's a little bit of basic boring background for anybody who's not clued into that.Liza ReedThat's absolutely perfect. And they are member organizations, which I think is also important. Right. They are organizations of utilities for the most part.David RobertsRight. As opposed to outside authorities that might have contrary interests or be able to impose contrary interests.Liza ReedRight. And they're not building it themselves. Right. I mean, they are bringing those stakeholders together in pursuit of particular goals, which are largely established by FERC about what these regional RTOs or ISOs should be doing. But they are member organizations, right. So they are conveners and collaborators and they are managing this transmission planning process. But at the end of the day, it is still those members and those utilities who have to build the transmission.David RobertsSo is it the case that then the RTO brings all its member utilities together and makes something like a regional transmission plan, but then all the individual utilities also have their individual plans?Liza ReedI think that's right. It's sort of challenging when we talk about transmission. And why I say I think that's right is that if you and I each put our finger on different points in the United States, the system would be different there.David RobertsAll right.Liza ReedAnd I'm jumping ahead to the P for process.David RobertsIt's the overriding P, so it applies to all of these.Liza ReedThat's correct. That's correct, but right. For the most part that's true. And that's where what you mentioned earlier, these local reliability projects, which is often what they're called, that is often more of an internal to a utility approach. And then these larger planning approaches, again required by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are about how the utilities plan on how they work together and what they might need across the system. But that still has a boundary. Right. So we have utility boundaries. We have these RTO boundaries. And then inter-RTO planning or inter-ISO planning happens in theory and I mean technically happens in reality.David RobertsAnd it happens by the two RTOs getting together in a room somewhere.Liza ReedThere was actually a great post just earlier this week about two RTOs. I believe it was Mid-Continent ISO, I believe it was MISO and PJM. And it's a single slide that says: Interregional planning approach. This year we decided we don't need anything. There's really nothing that we both need.David RobertsWe're good.Liza ReedSo we're moving on. But that's the problem. If you have to plan everything within your footprint and they do, right? They do all this planning within their footprint with their own set of metrics and their own priorities. Yeah, I can imagine that you get together and you're like, "Well, I figured myself out and you figured yourself out," right. Like you and your neighbor have a fence between your yards. You're not co-planting a tree.David RobertsRight. So you have planning taking place at regional transmission organizations, which in theory should at least get you to regional planning. Right. I mean, at least it's bigger than a single utility territory, but it doesn't seem to actually result in regional lines.Liza ReedBecause there's a lot of barriers to regional planning and there's the technical aspect of regional planning and then there's the what do we call it implementation aspect where the entire electricity system is an engineering solution. Right? And one of the most important facets, I think, of engineering is that there's lots of ways to get to the end state that you need. And so you can do it with large interregional lines. Interutility lines. I mean, this is, again, what the studies have shown that is currently projected to be the least expensive way to reach the ends that we need. There are more expensive ways to reach the ends that we need. And some of those are more attractive to certain stakeholders because there's an onus of control there. There's a clarity. Right.I know that every dollar I invest is resulting in benefits to my system. And when we have to share a project, do I feel like I'm getting proportionally the benefits that I'm paying for? And that's where a lot of these lines fall apart before they can be completed or even before the plan can be finished, right. You look at the system, you identify potential areas, but then you also identify potential solutions. And then you've got to pick amongst those solutions about what member organizations are interested in. And it can be very difficult to get these projects agreed upon if member entities feel like they have to pay for something that they're not getting a benefit from.David RobertsRight. In a curveball and all this. There are what are called merchant lines, which are not planned or built by utilities, but are being planned and built by sort of external market participants, which then aren't part of the utility planning or the RTO planning. As I understand it, they just kind of get bolted on if they can pass the test. So how does that work? I guess two questions here, sort of for my own background. What sort of percentage of transmission lines are merchant lines? Like, how big of a presence are independent transmission builders in this whole process?And then B, like, how do they fit in the planning?Liza ReedYeah, that's a great question. And when we think about these independent lines that aren't part of the process, because there are some transmission organizations, there are some developers that build transmission, but they are within the process. It's part of sort of a competitive bidding process. But outside of the process of that traditional planning process, merchant lines are an incredibly small, I mean, approaching zero.David RobertsOh, really?Liza ReedWell, because it's so difficult to get these lines built, right? Because of all of these barriers to being outside of the process. You said bolted on. That's actually quite a barrier. Getting bolted onto the system is no small piece of the puzzle.David RobertsRight? So you got planning. The term you used in the report is balkanized. You got sort of multiple entities planning. It's sort of like two problems. One, there's a bunch of different entities planning. But then two, there's no sort of integrative process that brings all these plans together and makes sense of them. So you end up with balkanized planning, but then also balkanized building. You just get these sort of little regional or even like local lines, but very few of the longer ones we need.Liza ReedRight. And the boundaries are also a challenge because utility boundaries often do not fall within a state. Right. They are often crossing state lines. And so the utility's perspective versus the state regulator's perspective on what the benefits are —David RobertsRight. So you could see something that would be benefiting a state but not the utility, and vice versa in some cases. So planning is a mess. That's the first P. The second P is even more of a mess. It's permitting. And then here also, this is like I struggle to describe this to people because it's so crazy, but basically any jurisdiction you cross over, or any entity you cross over, if you're proposing building a line, you need to get a permit. And that can be true at the state level, the county level, there could be private landowners level.There's just a million levels of permits. So describe the thicket to us. Sort of like who all do I have to get a permit from if I want to go across like three states and whatever, 100 theoretically privately owned pieces of land.Liza ReedSo in some states it's at the state level. You go to the State Commission and they give you the certificate and has the Siting Board and those together, the certificate of CPCN is the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. And then the Siting is what determines the line. Right. The Siting is where the line is actually going to go. The certificate is essentially the right to build and with the certificate comes the ability to exercise eminent domain if necessary. Right. If that route that is selected, if the developer is not able to enter into private agreements with the landowners along that route, then they can exercise eminent domain through holding this certificate from —And just pausing here, let's explain imminent domain. It basically just means you can take it the land and they can't stop you, right? Is it that simple?Just compensation. Right. You have to give them some just compensation, but the land can be taken by the state for this purpose.David RobertsBut then there are other entities involved in permitting it in other states.Liza ReedSo state level is the best case scenario. And even that is if every state you cross needs to — so your best case scenario right now is that you are crossing two states where both states have state level siting and state level permitting. And both states are getting enough benefit from this line that it passes their metrics for allowing the line to be built.David RobertsRight. Because each of them are thinking, when they're making their permitting decision, are just thinking about what does it do for our state? Statutorily, I think they're sort of often that confined to thinking about specifically what does this do for our state?Liza Reed…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Volts podcast: the good news about clean energy, with Kingsmill Bond Oct 11, 2021
    Show notes

    In this episode, longtime carbon market analyst and strategist Kingsmill Bond explains why he is so optimistic about the future of renewable energy. Though it remains a small portion of total global energy, its rate of growth and declining costs indicate that it is on the precipice of enormous, rapid expansion. Markets and geopolitics will be transformed by it. (There is also an abridged version of our conversation available on Canary.) Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Kingsmill Bond, October 11, 2021(PDF version)David Roberts:It seems like good news is difficult to come by in the US these days, what with democracy on the verge of crumbling and the last big chance to address climate change held in the fickle and ill-informed hands of the Senate’s most conservative Democrat, who lives on a yacht and literally makes money off of coal plants. As it happens, I have a stash of good news I’ve holding in reserve — a guest I’ve been meaning to talk to forever, but have been treating like a break-glass-in-case-of-emergency thing. I felt grim enough this week that I finally called him up.His name is Bond. Kingsmill Bond. (Sorry, had to do it.) He’s an energy strategist at the think tank Carbon Tracker, where he arrived after decades of doing market analysis and strategy for big financial institutions like Deutsche Bank and Citibank. Bond’s experience and research have led him to the conclusion that the shift to clean energy has become unstoppable and that it will be the dominant force shaping financial markets and geopolitics in the 21st century. He argues that we are on the front end of a massive, precipitous wave of change to rival the industrial revolution — one that will unfold even if policy support is weak and erratic, purely on the strengths of economics and innovation.We need to update our mental model of climate mitigation, he says. It’s not about pain, about how to distribute extra costs and who will be the most altruistic. It’s about gain, about which countries will benefit most and fastest from the tapping of almost limitless new markets and opportunities for growth. There are no fundamental limits to the spread of zero-carbon energy. There’s more than enough renewable energy, accessible with today’s technology, to supply the world’s energy needs. Not only do we know how to get there, it is where we are headed, based on current market and technology trends. The key to succeeding on climate change is simply accelerating what is already underway, pushing a rolling boulder a little faster. Like I said, I’m in need of good news like this, so I was excited to talk to Bond about the cost of renewable energy, the peak in fossil fuel demand, and the inevitability of a 100 percent clean-energy system.Without further ado, Kingsmill Bond, welcome to Volts.Kingsmill Bond: Thank you for having me on the show, David.David Roberts: Kingsmill, I've been following you for years and you've been a reliable source of good news. You recently published an article arguing that we need to flip our story on climate change mitigation: It's not one of pain, about distributing costs and sacrifice and who's going to be more altruistic; it's about gain, about who's going to claim the giant rewards that are waiting. So before we dive into the specifics, give me the elevator-pitch version of why people confronting the daunting task of addressing climate change should feel better than they generally do.Kingsmill Bond: Well, thanks very much for putting it in those terms. The point here simply is that we have got this new, enormous, cheap energy resource in solar and wind that we've unlocked with technology, and we're just starting to be able to apply it. As we apply it, it gets cheaper, because it's on learning curves. Therefore, we've unlocked an enormous cheap source of energy that can be used to provide all of our current energy demands and, indeed, the energy demands of those who have very limited amounts of energy. It's an exciting opportunity and moment to do that.David Roberts: The center of that story is the learning curves for renewable energy. You single out four different technologies on steep learning curves that, if we project them continuing, bear all kinds of good news. Tell us what those technologies are and what the curves look like right now.Kingsmill Bond: The four most clear technologies which are on established learning curves are solar PV for producing electricity; wind for producing electricity; batteries for storage; and electrolyzers to convert that electricity into hydrogen. All four of them have been the subject of a recent paper by Oxford University looking at their learning curves, that is to say, the amount that their costs drop for every doubling in deployment. All of their learning curves are between 16 and 34 percent, which was already fairly well known. But the additional point that's being made by this paper is that when technologies get onto learning curves, they tend to stay on them for very long periods. When you're trying to project future costs of these technologies, the most logical assumption is that those learning curves will continue. This is extremely significant, because we all know that they are growing very quickly, and if you assume that that growth continues — and there's no reason why it shouldn't — these technologies will get incredibly cheap. This is kind of an academic debate, because you're already getting solar PV being produced between $10 and $20 per megawatt hour in certain favored locations, so it is, in fact, already incredibly cheap. That cheap energy source is a) going to get cheaper, b) going to spread globally, and then c) be followed up by these other technologies, also on learning curves, which will then provide us with the energy that we need at much lower cost.David Roberts: The electrolyzers seem like the newest of those four technologies. Solar and wind and batteries are pretty established, but electrolyzers have just recently come in for a lot of innovation. How confident are we in that particular learning curve? What's the state of our knowledge there?Kingsmill Bond: In the paper that the Oxford team did, they looked at about 500 or 600 different technologies over long periods and they noted that, actually, very few of them get onto learning curves. As you say, the electrolyzer data set is shorter, but it still goes back a couple of decades, I believe. This is, from their analysis, another technology also on learning curves, and it seems to be already exhibiting the same learning characteristics that we've witnessed in solar, wind, and batteries. First of all, in order to make green hydrogen, you need solar or wind electricity, so half the story is already on learning curves. Then the question simply is, can you get the electrolyzer itself onto learning curves? What's special about this technology is that it's also what they call granular and discrete. That is to say, you can have very small pieces of equipment, they're easily replicated, and they can be built at any size. Many people can innovate, and that's indeed what they're now doing, as we now see huge amounts of capital flowing into hydrogen strategies across the world, from Chile to China to Morocco to the United States. It seems extremely reasonable to imagine that the costs of electrolyzers will also continue to fall.David Roberts: As a snapshot of the present, where is clean energy relative to fossil fuels? Is it still too glib to say clean energy is cheaper than fossil fuels? How nuanced is that story right now?Kingsmill Bond: The debate goes like this: Advocates of clean energy such as myself say, look, it's incredibly cheap, its price is down to $10 or $20 per megawatt hour; the global average, depending how you calculate, is between $40 and $50. This is the LCOE we're talking about. And this is a great story. The counterargument is, people say, well, you're only talking about the LCOE, you’re not thinking about intermittency. OK, it's cheap in certain locations, but there are other locations, most notably parts of sub-Saharan Africa, where it remains extremely expensive, because the cost of capital is high. Therefore it's not a fair comparison and it's not a substitute for fossil fuels. The way to reconcile those two perspectives, I would suggest, is this point about learning curves. As the costs get lower and lower, this debate kind of fades away. It is fair to say that LCOE is not necessarily the best way to calculate costs, and there are other issues to account for in intermittency, but when costs get incredibly low and you can overbuild, then that debate becomes much less significant. Furthermore, as this Oxford paper points out, the country on the 10th percentile of cost today — that is to say, the most expensive countries today — will have the same price solar and wind electricity as the cheapest countries today in 10 years, because they're on these learning curves. So I would suggest that these learning curves solve the problem.David Roberts: They brute force it, in other words. It gets so cheap that you can start being profligate with it.Kingsmill Bond: You can be profligate with it, but in fairness, there are also other solutions. There are certain countries and regions which today have penetration of variable renewables of over 50 percent — most notably Denmark, South Australia, and northern Germany — and are aspiring, as in the case of California, to 100 percent renewable energy-based systems. What's been notable throughout this debate, for the last 20 years, is that the ceiling of the possible is constantly rising. If you go back to how the debate was being held about 20 years ago, you'll see these very fancy letters from the Irish and German grid operators saying that variable renewables could never be more than 2 percent of the system, for a whole series of technical reasons which are beyond me. But what's happened continuously is that people have come up with new solutions, be they demand-side management, supply-side management, bigger grids, batteries, interconnectors, better software, digitalization, smart meters, so on and so forth. There have been a whole series of different solutions. The point we really want to make is that that ceiling is a rising ceiling.David Roberts: Intermittency is the number one mental block people have about this, in my experience. So you're right: one obvious point is that the amount we're allegedly going to be able to integrate onto the grid keeps rising. People set these very confident limits, and the limits get busted through. But looking out, the conventional wisdom is that the closer you get to variable energy providing the majority of your energy, the higher the cost of that variability, and the more difficult it is to address. How confident are you that that gap from 80 to 100 percent is bridgeable at reasonable cost?Kingsmill Bond: There are two answers to this. The first is that this is an absolutely academic debate, because today, solar and wind are 10 percent of the global electricity supply. To worry in 2021 about how we go from 80 percent to 100 percent is completely academic. I often use the analogy that it's like sending my daughter to kindergarten, aged five, and worrying about how she's going to pass her university maths finals. Sure, she's going to have to get there eventually, but there's an awfully long way between now and then. History suggests that we will keep on coming up with ways of solving this. So I think the first answer is, it's not a fair question. The second point is that, if you assume these learning curves continue and we do get incredibly cheap sources of renewable electricity, then it's absolutely inevitable that we will find ways of using it. Perhaps I can step back for a second. It's often worthwhile going back a century and asking yourself: Had you been trying to think about the future in 1921, when we were on the cusp of a quadrupling of global population and a 10-fold increase in energy development and so on and so forth, could you ever have predicted all of the new technology innovation that was going to come? People sit in darkened rooms in Paris in 2021 and seriously think they can forecast the innovation genius.David Roberts: But in fairness, we're a lot farther away from 1920 than 2050 is from us. We definitely need to compress the amount of time in which we have to do this. You might say that the solutions ought to at least be visible by now. Kingsmill Bond: Actually, that’s the point: the solutions are visible. You do have detailed plans being made in Australia and California, in Northern Europe, for electricity systems based on 100 percent renewable electricity. You also have work done by people like the great Mark Jacobson: he's basically tried to figure out the solution for every single country in the world. So it's not like there are no solutions ahead of us; there are plenty of solutions, at different levels of granularity.David Roberts: This story depends on the cost curves continuing, as you’ve said. On the one hand, you can look at history and say, cost curves tend to continue once they start. But you can come up with all kinds of stories about things that might impede or slow these cost curves: materials shortages, lithium becoming problematic, mining becoming more problematic, supply chain problems (maybe even caused by climate change), space constraints, NIMBYs who want to stop construction. How confident are you that none of those will gain enough purchase to slow things on a macro level?Kingsmill Bond: I always smile when people talk to me about limits to growth, because renewable energies are essentially, by definition, limitless, absolutely enormous. The real limits to growth are to the fossil fuel system, which is constrained in terms of the amount that we have, and incredibly constrained in terms of our capacity to burn it. So it's worth standing back for a moment and recognizing that the real limits to growth are with the current system, not with the new system. The second question is, well, are there limits that are insurmountable, that the talent and capital of the world cannot handle? I think the answer to that one is absolutely, obviously no, because we have continuously solved each of these problems as we have encountered them. Then, if I can answer this very specific question about mineral shortage: it's an absolutely bogus problem. You need, for example, 200 kilograms extra of minerals in order to have an electric vehicle, which is more than an ICE car. That sounds quite scary until you think, well actually, an average ICE car uses 15,000 kilograms of oil over its lifetime. Those 200 kilograms extra that you require of minerals by definition can be recycled, whilst fossil fuels, obviously, you burn them once and you never use them again. Let me give you a couple more stats. There is enough lithium, for example, in known reserves today to be able to satisfy more than a century of current demand. There's enough cobalt in the world for 1,000 million cars. If the answer is, that's really scary because we might need 2,000 million cars, then again, it’s an absolutely fake debate. First of all, we can and are engineering technologies to reduce cobalt, as Elon Musk is doing. But even if we weren't, we build the mines as demand increases. Prices go up a bit and people build new mines and reserves increase. These are absolutely fake problems.David Roberts: Are there no social or moral aspects to this, though, in expansion of mining?Kingsmill Bond: Undoubtedly. This is why people are saying, I think quite rightly, that we shouldn't make the same mistakes this time as we made last time. In our expansion of these mines t…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    A rant about economist pundits, and other things, but mostly economist pundits Oct 08, 2021
    Show notes

    Over the years, readers, I have had numerous occasions to be irritated with economists, particularly economists acting as political pundits. I thought today I would explain why. There are those in climate circles who lay most of the blame for the failure of climate action to date at the feet of economists. I’m not one of those people. I just lay … some of the blame at their feet. The fact is, rapidly transforming the entire industrial base of every country on earth was always going to be difficult — lots of extremely powerful interests stand to lose a great deal of money and power — and was probably going to go slowly no matter what economists did.Nonetheless, I think there’s a good argument to be made that, when it comes to the interface of economics and politics, climate economics and climate economists have blown it pretty comprehensively — and have not necessarily learned all the lessons they should have learned. I’ll start by recounting a notable episode and then contemplate two sorts of lessons that might be learned from it, one of which seems like it’s sinking in and and one of which … less so.The case of carbon pricingThis is a familiar story, so I’ll keep it short.The theoretical benefits of carbon pricing, as explored ad nauseam by economics over the last several decades, are well-understood. If you have all the stocks and flows of an economy in a giant spreadsheet, and you tweak the “price of carbon” variable, changes cascade throughout the spreadsheet. Every column in which carbon plays a part (which is almost every part of the US economy) adjusts.Modern neoliberal economics tends to seek the optimally efficient policy, and on that score — maximum results from minimum intervention in the economy — a price on carbon is the winner. It’s one variable you can adjust to optimize your whole spreadsheet. These arguments on behalf of carbon pricing are, I hasten to emphasize, valid. In a spreadsheet economy, turning the carbon-price knob is the most efficient way to reduce carbon emissions.But the economy isn’t a spreadsheet and carbon pricing isn’t just another knob on some policy console. Carbon pricing faces political-economy problems that are, at this point, almost as well-understood (at least by those who have been paying attention) as its theoretical merits. In fact, the closer a carbon price gets to the economist’s ideal — pegged to the social cost of carbon, equal across sectors, covering the whole economy — the more political-economy problems it faces. Its efficiency varies in inverse proportion to its feasibility.The more sectors are roped in under the carbon price, the more simultaneous enemies the policy makes. Different industries have different levels of power and influence and need to be compensated in different ways for their political acquiescence, but a carbon price applies to all industries equally, so it can not compensate any of them in particular. Thus, it has no friends (except economists).Carbon pricing policies can be and have been tweaked to overcome these difficulties, but with every tweak, optimal efficiency recedes in the rearview mirror. For one thing, pretty much every extant carbon price is the world is too low, well beneath the social cost of carbon. In the real world, other sector-specific industrial policies that are more politically manageable, like feed-in tariffs and renewable energy standards, have prevented far more emissions.Anyway, I won’t rehearse all these arguments again. If you want to read up, start with this piece I did for Vox, this piece from Jesse Jenkins, or this three-part interview I did with David Victor and Danny Cullenward, who wrote a whole book on the subject. For years, economists acted like serious grappling with political-economy constraints was beneath them, and they bullied big environmental groups into becoming economist wannabes, preaching their “market-friendly” gospel. The entire decade of the 2000s was spent preparing for a national climate-pricing push in 2008 that ended up producing precisely nothing. It wasn’t until 2020 that another shot came around at the federal level — thankfully, Dems aren’t repeating their mistake (at least that mistake).The capture of the climate policy debate by carbon-price-obsessed economists in the late 20th century helped send national and international climate policy down a multi-decade cul-de-sac in which very little was accomplished and much precious time was wasted. So what can be learned from that experience? I think there are two broad lessons, the first about the substance of climate economics and the second about the political behavior of economists. Conventional economics has mostly gotten climate change wrongPart of what prompted me to write this post in the first place is this piece by economist Daron Acemoglu about the failures of economics on climate change and some longstanding assumptions that need to be updated. It’s a smart, approachable distillation of some critiques that will be familiar to policy nerds:* Economists have dramatically underestimated the cost of climate damages.* They have treated technology as an exogenous variable, something external that just happens, applied to models at a set rate; models with “endogenous and directed technological change,” which reflects our ability to shape and focus technology development through policy, reveal that much more dramatic emission cuts are affordable. * They have used “discount rates” familiar in short-term market contexts to calculate the value of inter-generational goods. * They have failed to account properly for risk and uncertainty, especially for “long-tail risks,” i.e., low-probability but disastrous outcomes. * They have assessed the costs and benefits of wholesale sociotechnical transformation using utility functions designed to model changes at the margins of existing systems. * They have obsessed over optimally efficient policy in a way that ignores other values and trade-offs. (See Noah Smith and Tom Brookes and Gernot Wagner for other recent fulsome critiques of climate economics.) All these mistakes point in the same basic direction: economists have dramatically underestimated the scale and speed of action needed to address climate change.It’s worth pointing out that, ahem, Not All Economists. There are critiques of climate economics along these same lines that go back decades, from within basic confines of the mainstream — and other critiques from ecological economists and feminist economists and development economists and so on and so forth. Economics is not a monolith. It’s not all or even necessarily most economists that have made these mistakes and arguably the rising vanguard of the profession is busy correcting them.Nonetheless, bad climate economics has reigned for quite a while, long enough that it has developed into a kind of folk wisdom among the US chattering classes, who are convinced that climate change is a problem, but don’t understand how vast the costs of inaction are compared to the costs of action. It will take time to root out all the lingering fallacies and myths in the body politic, and for that, economists share some blame. These failures of economics have created a deficit of trust among climate hawks. Advocates have spent years pushing against economists in pursuit of ambitious industrial policy. That trust deficit is relevant as we contemplate how economists approach current political debates. Policies aren’t abstractions, they are embedded in contexts The other lesson to learn from the carbon pricing experience is that in the unending struggle among rival interests that is politics, optimal efficiency is only one of many valid considerations. One might also hope for a policy to build resiliency and redundancy into important systems, or to be politically durable, or to channel benefits to marginalized communities, or to fit well with the enforcement capabilities of existing institutions.Most of all, in the political realm, the “best” policy is feasible, given the current array of interests — businesses, nonprofit groups, political factions, and others. There are sometimes reasons to push policies that are impossible under the current regime, if only as aspirational targets, but not at the expense of policies that are feasible, certainly not in those rare moments when policy is actually being made. Of course, feasibility is not a binary, it’s a fuzzy judgment, a complex calculation. But for just that reason, to know what the optimum policy is for a particular polity in a particular time and place, one must understand the sociopolitical dynamics of that particular context. Policies are not free-floating conceptual structures that can be compared and ranked in the abstract; they are embedded in social, institutional, and economic relationships among actual, situated people with particular cultures, histories, and habits. A recent paper by UCLA law professor William Boyd, published in the Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, discusses the “instrument choice debate” in Western economics and how it took shape. The paper describes a kind of technocratic turn in economics in the last quarter of the 20th century, during which economists abstracted further and further away from lived examples and histories, increasingly conceiving of policy as a choice of instruments, policy tools, which were characterized according to their abstract design and theoretical merits. It is as though policymakers are surgeons, scrubbed into a cleanroom, choosing which sterilized tool best suits their needs. Viewing the policy space this way has “constrained our conceptions of the regulatory state and its capacity for climate action in jurisdictions around the world,” Boyd writes, and “led to a sharply diminished view of public engagement and government problem solving.”The truth is, policies are not discrete tools in a toolbox, equally at hand. To choose a policy is not to execute an equation in a spreadsheet, it is to invoke a whole skein of institutions, habits, norms, economic interests and counter-interests, and social narratives. We are not in a cleanroom; we are in the opposite. Doing politics, advancing the public welfare, is ultimately a utilitarian game. You are trying to maximize outcomes, to achieve the strongest and most effective policy results possible within a particular set of social and political constraints. In that context, a policy that maximizes spreadsheet results but can not get past the constraints is not “better” than a more limited policy that can pass. The best policy is not the economically optimal policy, it’s the most effective policy that can be implemented and enforced. No specialist expertise can substitute for wisdomIn my experience, climate policy debates frequently find people with technical expertise in a particular area — the hard sciences, say, or engineering, or most often of all, economics — confidently making policy recommendations based on their narrow expertise.When challenged on the political economy of particular policies, they retreat to their credentials: “I’m no expert on politics, I’m just a scientist/engineer/economist.” But here’s the thing. If you’re calculating the optimally efficient policy, you’re an economist; once you go out in public and argue, “legislators should pass this policy,” you’re no longer acting purely as an economist, you’re acting as a citizen, an advocate. You’re no longer merely saying, “this is the optimally efficient policy on paper,” you’re saying, “this is the right policy to push, all things considered.” Economist pundits spent years conflating those two in climate policy, and they’ve inspired a lot of other people to conflate them as well. When you enter the realm of politics and make political arguments and recommendations, you ought to be cognizant of, not merely the likely economic effects of a policy if it is passed and enforced, but the political dynamics that determine its feasibility, the likelihood that it will stay in place if passed, the state’s ability to enforce it, what social and economic interests will gain and lose from it, how equitable its distribution of costs and benefits may be, and how all of it might shape the space of political possibilities in the future. You ought to be cognizant of and feel responsible for the political effects of your intervention — what interests and factions you are strengthening and which you are weakening, where your argument weighs in the current moment, how your words are likely to be used, and by whom. Those are all difficult things to know! And the truth is difficult to glean from the ungainly morass of political journalism and commentary. Unlike disciplines with some academic or professional standards of rigor, political punditry and advocacy are a veritable festival of gut instincts, guesses, bad logic, bad faith, and confirmation bias. Pundits rarely offer empirical evidence; they rarely assess the accuracy of their prior predictions; they rarely change their minds. It drives scientists, economists, and, uh, ex-philosophy students out of their heads. It is tempting to try to claim some authority, to claim that a background in economics (or some other technical field) confers the status of referee, making the final calls on the merits of various policies. But it doesn’t. There are no real “experts” in politics, despite many claims to the contrary. The best we can hope for is to develop a few empirically informed heuristics (including those from economics), to remain open and alive to new evidence, to find trustworthy guides to the current political economy, and to strive toward, for lack of a better word, wisdom. Technical training and specialist knowledge are valuable. Those involved in political analysis and advocacy ought to pull in more from economics, political science, sociology, and ecology, among other disciplines. But those who have technical training should never mistake it for wisdom. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.volts.wtf/subscribe

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    Volts podcast: all about methane, with Sarah Smith of the Clean Air Task Force Sep 29, 2021
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    In this episode, I talk with Sarah Smith of the Clean Air Task Force about methane, the greenhouse gas that falls out of the atmosphere more quickly than carbon dioxide but trap a lot more heat while it’s there. We discuss sources of methane pollution, opportunities for reduction, and recent policy developments. Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Sarah Smith, September 29, 2021(PDF version)David Roberts:Methane is having a moment. Methane — chemical name CH4 — is a fuel. It is the primary ingredient in natural gas, which generates about 40 percent of US electricity and heats about half of US homes. It is also an air pollutant, a precursor to ground-level ozone, which is toxic to humans. And it is also a greenhouse gas, much shorter lived in the atmosphere than CO2, but much more potent while it is there. Methane in the atmosphere comes from leaks along oil and gas infrastructure, from agriculture (primarily cow burps and manure), and from landfills. Rising concern over methane pollution has culminated in the Global Methane Pledge, announced by President Joe Biden’s White House last week, which would have participating countries (which include the EU, the UK, and Mexico) reduce methane emissions at least 30 percent by 2030. This followed the United Nations Environment Program’s Global Methane Assessment in May, which found that substantially and rapidly reducing methane is the only way to meet the international goal of keeping warming under 1.5°C. Clearly, for those of us who haven’t been paying as close attention as we should, it’s time to tune into the methane debate. The Clean Air Task Force has been tracking methane pollution and advocating for reductions for years. So I was eager to talk to Sarah Smith, the head of CATF’s Super Pollutants program, about the basics of methane: where it comes from, how it can be reduced, and the battles over it in US methane policy. (See also: Smith’s op-ed in Canary.)Without further ado, Sarah Smith, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Sarah Smith: Thank you so much for having me, David.David Roberts: For those of us who have not been tracking the details of methane as closely as they might: what exactly is methane? Sarah Smith: Methane is an invisible, odorless gas that is commonly known as the main constituent of natural gas. It has flown under the radar for far too long. It's currently contributing to about half the warming that we're experiencing today.David Roberts: Methane is a greenhouse gas that traps more heat in the atmosphere than CO2, but for a shorter period of time. What is the climate change potential of methane, and how does it differ from CO2?Sarah Smith: Every pound of methane heats the climate more than 80 times as much as a pound of CO2. But methane only lasts for about a decade in the atmosphere, which is a big opportunity, because quickly reducing the amount of methane in the atmosphere would very quickly slow warming, whereas carbon dioxide is slowly building up over time and takes much longer to reduce.David Roberts: I’ve seen it compared to stock vs. flow. With CO2, if you stock it up in the atmosphere it stays, so you have to worry about the total amount. Methane is a flow problem; it's constantly coming out of the atmosphere. Is it fair to say that if we reduced the addition of methane into the atmosphere to the rate at which it was coming out of the atmosphere, we would basically stabilize its temperature effect? In other words, theoretically, there is some level of methane emissions at which you're not making things warmer.Sarah Smith:Exactly, and that's the goal: to get back to those pre-industrial concentrations of methane by ensuring that less methane is being added than removed.David Roberts: It is startling that methane has caused half of historical climate warming thus far. How was that discovered, and how did we not know it for so long?Sarah Smith:I ask myself that question all the time. The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change finally shone a bright light on methane; you saw the CO2 bar next to the methane bar and clearly, methane was causing a substantial amount of the warming, about half as much as CO2. Subsequently, the attention is growing, as it should, and as it has been for years, but finally, we're really reaching a crescendo here.David Roberts:What are the implications for policy? What does this allow us to do if we grab hold of the methane lever?Sarah Smith: A powerful lever it is. We don't have a lot of time left — perhaps 10 to 15 years, maybe less — to bend the warming curve in order to stave off irreversible changes to our climate, including self-reinforcing feedbacks where the world warms itself, like the loss of the remaining reflective sea ice, which would add the equivalent of a trillion tons of CO2 to what's already been added. There's also the Amazon tipping point, where the Amazon could be canceled out as a carbon sink. And many others. So we're in this race now to slow warming, and the biggest lever we can pull, by far, is cutting methane. We have the technology to quickly cut methane by at least 45 percent by 2030, and that would deliver an astonishing 0.3 degrees Celsius of reduced warming, along with a host of other benefits.David Roberts: When you say reduced warming, you mean relative to baseline, right? Sarah Smith: Exactly. Bending the curve down, reducing the rate of warming. We could reduce this 0.3 degrees C by the early 2040s through reducing methane.David Roberts: This is the key thing about methane. You could cut CO2 almost to zero tomorrow and the warming set in motion by the CO2 that's in the atmosphere would continue. Whereas cutting methane gives us this lever where we can promise visible results within a reasonable lifetime.Sarah Smith: Decarbonization is critical for slowing long-term warming, but it doesn't provide any reduction in warming for 20 to 30 years, and we simply can't wait. We have to address methane.David Roberts: Lately, there's been global attention to reducing aerosols and their negative environmental effects. But one of the things aerosols did, perversely, was thicken the atmosphere and shelter us from some warming. There's worry that reducing aerosols globally, while it will have immediate positive environmental effects on ozone, etc., will actually boost short-term warming. So this brings us back to the need to have a short-term tool to fight that effect.Sarah Smith: That's an important insight and one that this latest report from the IPCC finally highlighted in clear terms.David Roberts: Notoriously, there's been a big spike in methane emissions in the last few decades, and it's something of a mystery, as I understand it. Do we know where that methane is coming from? Sarah Smith: We're certain about the spike. But there is a lot of uncertainty around what's driving the spike.David Roberts: Do we have a list of culprits? Sarah Smith: We think fossil is a significant part of the search, but probably not the only contributing factor.David Roberts: In terms of knowing how much methane is in the atmosphere, we've historically relied on self-reporting by companies and countries that maybe can't be fully trusted to do transparent self-reporting. Now, we have satellites that can allegedly detect methane. What are the satellites revealing, and what will they reveal when there are more of them?Sarah Smith: The satellite technology is improving, and it's exciting that several are planned for launch in the next few years. That will give us a much more detailed view from the sky of the emissions all around the world; in the case of the Carbon Mapper satellite constellation, near real-time data for the whole planet. That will revolutionize the policymaking landscape and industry, which will suddenly be on the hook to take this on.David Roberts: Tell me a little bit more about the satellite network.Sarah Smith: There's one called Carbon Mapper that will be a constellation, as I understand it, of more than 20 satellites, circling the globe, and providing data every few days. David Roberts: Is there a third-grade explanation of the science behind how, from space, you can detect a colorless odorless gas being emitted on the ground? Sarah Smith: Sadly, I'm not a satellite expert. But scientists in NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab have been involved in developing this technology, so I am confident in its ability to work.David Roberts: It's like the entire world having a curtain pulled away: every single source of methane will be exposed. Do you have any guesses about what that's going to show? Are there going to be big surprises? What might we find out that we don't know?Sarah Smith: Already, some of the satellites in the sky today — which aren’t as good as what's coming, but give us some early clues — have shown massive plumes of methane coming from oil and gas infrastructure, including pipelines, and have already resulted in some cleanup efforts. So I'm excited about the surprises, and hopeful the big sources will be caught more quickly. What satellites won't be able to do is pinpoint every tiny leak, and we need to try to address those too. But satellites will be able to show us where the bigger emissions are coming from.David Roberts: We keep hearing about giant methane deposits in the Siberian permafrost, in bogs and swamps. There's this constant worry about a tipping point that unleashes giant methane deposits from permafrost. What's the state of science on that? How worried should we be?Sarah Smith: Right now, more than half of methane is coming from human-caused sources. We should address that as quickly as we possibly can, in part to help prevent a rise in methane from these “natural” sources, the leading one being wetlands. Right now, permafrost is not a huge source compared to others globally, but as temperature rises, it could bit by bit become a bigger source. But I don't think people should lose sleep over a one-day sudden surge.David Roberts: You think the chances of a big dramatic release are relatively low?Sarah Smith: Yes, that's what the science seems to be saying.David Roberts:I guess we can take some relief in that.Sarah Smith: We still have a lot of work to do, but that's one bright spot.David Roberts:What are the biggest human-caused sources of methane emission, both globally and in the US?Sarah Smith: Overall, they're fairly similar, with about a third of the emissions coming from the fossil sector, including oil and gas and coal mines; about a third, maybe a little bit more, coming from agriculture, with the main sources being livestock, manure, and rice cultivation; and then the final amount coming from waste, including landfills.David Roberts:I think we have a pretty good understanding of how methane builds up in coal mines and releases. But where in the oil and gas process are these leaks happening?Sarah Smith:The sad thing is that they're happening throughout the whole supply chain, from the well pad, where the gas or oil is being pumped out of the ground, where there are leaks; unloading of liquids along with gas from wells; pneumatic devices, compressors, storage tanks, dehydrators. All through the supply chain, many of these devices also exist: the pneumatics, the compressors, the tanks. Then, of course, you have the pipelines. All the way from the production through processing, transmission and storage, and even distribution portion of the industry.David Roberts: So there's not one big spot to focus on; that's a little disheartening. Are there no junctures or concentrations we could target first, if we're trying to prioritize?Sarah Smith:You're pointing out a big reason why this emission problem still exists. It is dispersed. We are talking about millions of sources that can and must be cleaned up.David Roberts: There has been a long ongoing argument in the climate world over the perennial question of how clean natural gas electricity is compared to coal electricity. Some say that there's so much leakage of methane in the supply chain before you get natural gas electricity that it wipes out any advantage natural gas has over coal; other estimates say no, the leakage rate is low enough that it still has an advantage. How confident are we that we know the leakage rate in this process?Sarah Smith: The leakage of potent methane substantially erodes the climate benefit of gas over coal, and depending on where that gas is produced, how far it's transported, and how it’s transported, the upstream emissions can vary widely. All of that needs to be factored in.But I think comparison to coal is letting us off too easy. It's not the ambitious benchmark that we need, which is near-zero methane emissions. Flaring needs to end, venting needs to end, these super-emitter plumes and leaks have to be found and fixed, and that antiquated equipment that vents methane to the atmosphere as part of its normal operation should be phased out.David Roberts: Can you explain flaring and venting? When I tell people about flaring, they have trouble believing that I'm telling the truth. Sarah Smith: I experience that, too. It is remarkable that billions of dollars worth of gas gets lit on fire every year as a disposal mechanism. It turns out that burning it is better than just releasing it straight into the air, which is venting.David Roberts: Natural gas is valuable, used in a lot of different ways, and we go out to mine it and search for it, but oil wells are throwing tons of it away. What's going on there? Why throw away a valuable resource?Sarah Smith: The oil producers have not yet been forced to capture and utilize or sell the gas.David Roberts: Couldn’t they make money? Why would they have to be forced if they could make money?Sarah Smith: Certainly money could be made. The question is, could more money be made in other ways? That short-term profit is what they’re after.David Roberts:What would be involved in not venting or flaring, but capturing and transporting the gas? Is it additional infrastructure?Sarah Smith: A lot of times it comes down to planning in advance and making sure that before the well is drilled, there's capacity to use or get rid of the gas. There are a wide range of solutions, from using the excess gas to make power on site, or making sure there’s a pipeline and a compressor there to get it to market. But companies aren't doing that without being required to.David Roberts: Liquid natural gas is another big source of controversy. There are people advocating for liquid natural gas export terminals in the US; China is supposedly going to start importing a lot more liquid natural gas. Is liquid natural gas, in terms of the methane leakage in the process of making it, worse than normal natural gas?Sarah Smith: There is energy that needs to be used to compress the gas into LNG and transport it. We're also concerned about emissions during that transportation process: boil-off of gas, leaks, even super-emitter events. We have an optical gas imaging camera that can be used to see the emissions that are normally invisible, and we've taken it to some LNG sites in Europe and seen the pollution. We know it exists, and we're concerned about it. It's an area where little study has been done so far, but all of these emissions do need to be factored in.David Roberts:The US fracking industry is likely to collapse soon, and there are thousands upon thousands of wells all over the place, many of which get abandoned because our laws about holding fossil fuel companies responsible for them are rather weak. Are they a source of methane? How big of a problem are abandoned wells? Sarah Smith: They are another source of methane, and we're especially worried about the ones wher…

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    Taking an Uber or Lyft just makes everything worse Sep 27, 2021
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    Here’s a question: is it better to drive somewhere or to take a ride-hailing service like Uber or Lyft?

    I don’t mean better for you personally — faster or cheaper. I mean better for the world, for society, for the air and atmosphere … better, all things considered.

    A clever new study from researchers at Carnegie Mellon University attempts to answer that question.

    Ride-hailing services carry more external costs than private vehicles

    In the paper, Jacob Ward, Jeremy Michalek, and Constantine Samaras attempt to tally up the relative costs to the environment and society of taking a trip via a privately owned vehicle vs. taking the same trip in what they call a transportation network company (TNC) like Uber or Lyft, in six of the companies’ biggest markets.

    This involves two steps in each market. First, they add up how many miles the respective vehicles travel per trip. Then, they add up the total externalities — in vehicle emissions, congestion, crashes, and noise — represented by each mile traveled. (These externalities, notoriously, are not priced into transportation decisions; thus the name.)

    To understand the results, you have to understand one key fact: TNC vehicles travel more miles per trip. They have to drive between where they drop off one fare and pick up another, which sometimes involves quite a bit of just wandering around. This time spent with no passenger is called “deadheading,” and those miles must be added to their trip miles.

    Here’s a clear visual representation:

    Those dotted black lines on the bottom half? That’s deadheading.

    Those extra miles traveled represent more externalities — more cost to the environment and society. On average, a TNC trip carries 32 to 37 cents more in external costs than a private vehicle trip. (See also this recent MIT study, which found that TNC vehicles increase urban road congestion.)

    There are three countervailing factors, but only the third is big enough to flip the equation enough to give TNCs the advantage in some limited circumstances.

    Ride-hailing services reduce air pollution

    First, though additional miles lead to more greenhouse gas emissions, congestion, crashes, and noise, somewhat counterintuitively, they lead to less air pollution. The secret here is that the bulk of particulate air pollution is generated from “cold starts,” i.e., engines turning over to start up. By contrast, TNC vehicles arrive “hot.” Their engines are already running, so they don’t do cold starts. In addition, TNC vehicles are, on average, newer, and thus cleaner.

    On average, TNC trips represent a 50 to 60 percent decline (9–13¢ per trip) in air pollutants like NOx, PM2.5, and VOCs.

    If TNC vehicles electrify faster than private vehicles, that advantage will grow, because EVs generate no tailpipe pollution. But if private vehicles electrify equally fast, the comparative advantage will stay the same.

    Regardless, the difference is not enough to overcome the other externalities. TNC trips represent a 20 percent increase in costs from greenhouse gas emissions and a 60 percent increase in costs from congestion, crashes, and noise (all told, about 45¢ more per trip).

    Overall, a 9–13¢ decrease and a 45¢ increase add up to 32 to 37 cents more per trip, on average.

    Electric ride-hailing vehicles … are still mostly worse than private vehicles

    The second countervailing factor is vehicle electrification. Doesn’t that reduce externalities? What the researchers found is that a) if the TNC car is electric, while b) the private vehicle alternative is an internal combustion engine car, and c) the TNC car charges entirely with zero-carbon electricity, then the overall environmental and social costs of a TNC trip and a personal vehicle trip are … about the same.

    Of course, those conditions are rarely met. On real-world grids, which are still powered overwhelmingly by fossil fuels, electrification of TNCs reduces the relative advantage of personal vehicle trips by about 16 or 17 percent. It does not eliminate the advantage. And of course, that advantage will shrink as the private vehicle fleet electrifies.

    So what, then, is the third countervailing factor, the one that can actually make a TNC trip better than a personal vehicle trip?

    Shared ride-hailing vehicles are better than private vehicles

    Maybe you’ve already guessed the answer: it’s ride-sharing. Put two people in the TNC car — i.e., have one TNC trip substitute for two personal vehicle trips — and voilà, you flip the script and your TNC trip is a net positive for the world. “When a TNC trip is known to be pooled,” the paper says, “shifting travel from a private vehicle reduces net external costs by a mean value of $0.60/trip.”

    Wow, if you pooled three people you could save even more. Or four people. You could even pool dozens of people on large vehicles that travel on fixed routes and timetables. You could reduce all kinds of externalities! I wonder if anyone has tried that.

    Speaking of which, what if the TNC trip displaced a trip on public transit, where the marginal cost in externalities of an additional passenger is effectively zero? What if it displaced a trip done via walking or biking, where the marginal externalities are, again, zero?

    The study looked at that too: “When TNCs displace transit, walking, or biking, rather than personal vehicles, the increase in externalities is about three times larger (+$1.20/trip).”

    What about avoided vehicle purchases?

    You might think that, with the easy availability of TNCs, it might be possible for fewer people to buy cars, which would count on the positive side of the ledger.

    However, there’s no such comfort. I asked the authors about this and it turns out they did another study (out on Jan. 6, d’oh) which found that the arrival of Uber and Lyft to a market tends to be correlated with a small increase in car ownership, especially in places where car ownership is already high and there’s not much population growth.

    Via email, Michalek adds:

    Even if Uber/Lyft do cause a reduction in vehicle ownership in some cities, I don’t think that alone would change our analysis about the costs and benefits of ridesourcing to society very much, because vehicle production emissions are a small part of overall lifecycle costs. The main costs come from driving.

    What could change our results is if Uber/Lyft enable travelers to walk and use transit more than they would have otherwise. This could be, for example, (1) because Uber/Lyft enable a traveler to get to a transit line (providing a first mile / last mile solution); (2) because Uber/Lyft can fill in gaps in transit services, allowing travelers to take the train out to a nightlife area and take an Uber home after the trains stop running; or (3) because not owning a vehicle forces the traveler to walk, carpool, and use transit more often than they would if they had a convenient personal car option.

    Unfortunately, there’s not a ton of evidence for TNCs enabling more transit trips either. Reviewing the studies done to date on the impact of TNCs on transit, the paper concludes:

    We also find no statistically significant average effect of TNC entry on fuel economy or transit use, but find evidence of heterogeneity in these effects across urban areas, including larger transit ridership reductions after TNC entry in areas with higher income and more childless households.

    There’s no way to avoid the conclusion: in most places, in current circumstances, all things considered, it’s worse to take a TNC ride than to drive a private vehicle.

    What all of this means

    I hope the implications of this research are obvious: ban cars.

    Ha ha, I’m kidding. Kind of. But Uber and Lyft aren’t helping anything. They’re making most things worse. Even if they electrify, they’re still mostly making things worse.

    The most notable finding in this latest study is something we already knew: moving people out of private vehicles (whether they’re driving or not) into walking, biking, and public transit sharply reduces overall costs to society and the environment. The difference that shift makes swamps any differences between the types of private vehicles we choose.

    The basic problem with cars — whether they’re private, TNCs, taxis, flying cars, underground cars, or autonomous Personal Air Land Vehicles (PAL-Vs) with 5G and lasers — is a simple matter of geometry: they take up lots of space.

    You can not have thousands of people living close together, each with their own two-ton vehicle, without congestion, sprawl, noise, crashes, air pollution, climate change, and all the rest of the horrors cars bring. That’s true of big cities, but it’s also true of small towns. If everyone has their own vehicle, there’s going to be traffic congestion or sprawl or both.

    The only way to tackle all of these externalities at once is to get people out of cars. Out of their own cars, out of the Ubers.

    That means prioritizing multimodal transportation in infrastructure and spending decisions. Creating protected walking and biking corridors that connect across town. Reclaiming lanes and whole streets from cars and turning them over to transit or simply to neighborhood walking and gathering. Upzoning and increasing density, especially around transit stops. Subsidizing electric bikes. (Basically, doing what Barcelona and Paris are doing.)

    Electrifying vehicles will help on climate change, especially as the grid gets cleaner, but it’s not a solution to cars. Fancy new kinds of cars, even if they fly or go through tunnels or run on unicorn farts, are not a solution. Apps are not a solution.

    The only solution to the problem of cars is fewer cars. That should be the goal of policy — not just transportation policy, but land-use policy and urban policy and economic policy and climate policy. For those who care about the public good, Uber and Lyft are a distraction.


    This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.volts.wtf/subscribe

    Illinois' brilliant new climate, jobs, and justice bill Sep 22, 2021
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    In 2016, Illinois passed a decent enough energy bill. It shored up the state’s (relatively modest) renewable energy standard and kept its existing nuclear power plants open. It was a compromise among varied interests, signed into law by a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor. At the time, I figured it was the best any state in the coal-heavy Midwest was likely to do.Well, that will teach me to go around figuring. Just five years later, Illinois has raised the bar, passing one of the most environmentally ambitious, worker-friendly, justice-focused energy bills of any state in the country: The Climate and Equitable Jobs Act. Illinois is now the first state in the Midwest to commit to net-zero carbon emissions, joining over a dozen other states across the country. It is also a model for how diverse stakeholders can reach consensus. What’s changed in IllinoisA great deal has changed since that 2016 bill was passed.First and foremost, in 2018, Democrats gained a trifecta in state government, increasing their lead in both houses of the Illinois General Assembly and putting Democrat J.B. Pritzker in the governor’s office. As I have emphasized numerous times now, Democratic control is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for ambitious state energy policy.Soon after the 2018 election, negotiations over a new energy bill began in earnest. The state’s labor community was sensitive to the fact that it had largely been left out of the 2016 bill; the legislation contained no labor standards, and recent years have seen Illinois renewable energy projects importing cheaper out-of-state workforces. Labor didn’t want to get left behind in the state’s energy transition, so it organized a coalition of groups under the banner Climate Jobs Illinois and set about playing an active role in negotiations. Renewable energy developers — cognizant of the fact that Illinois is falling short of its renewable energy goals (it’s at 9 percent; it’s supposed to be at 21) and state funding has dried up for new renewable energy projects — organized as Path to 100. Environmental and climate-justice groups organized as the Illinois Clean Jobs Coalition.All the groups introduced energy bills of their own. And then they spent years banging their heads together.But there was another key difference: this time around, utilities were not at the table. Exelon subsidiary ComEd had been caught up in a bribery scandal that left it disempowered and weak, under a deferred prosecution agreement. The scandal also led to House Speaker Michael Madigan, a reliable utility ally, being removed from his position. Utilities were, to put it crudely, on the s**t list, allowing political leadership to restrain their historic (and largely counterproductive) influence.Nonetheless, by all accounts, negotiations were difficult; the bill was declared dead several times. Senate President Don Harmon (D) said several times that it is the single most complex piece of legislation he’d ever worked on. There were uncertainties and impasses right up through the final week. But they got it done! It passed with bipartisan supermajorities: 83-33 in the House and 37-17 in the Senate. Pritzker signed it on September 15.One crucial piece of the puzzle was new political leadership, from Pritzker on down. Harmon, who became Senate president in 2018, is a longtime champion of renewable energy. In January 2021, Rep. Chris Welch, a widely respected deal-maker, replaced Madigan as House Speaker. Welch pursued what his office calls “distributed, collective leadership” — key members of the House Democratic leadership took responsibility for acting as liaisons to the legislature’s Black caucus, the environmental community, and coal communities.By all accounts, everyone performed their roles ably, holding an unwieldy coalition together through choppy waters. Illinois politics reporter Rich Miller has a nice rundown of the final passage, which he calls “a spectacular victory.”From the beginning, everyone involved was more or less aligned around rapid growth of renewable energy and full decarbonization of the electricity sector by 2045. The most contentious issue proved to be the schedule for decarbonization. The environmentalists in the Clean Jobs Coalition wanted steady 20 percent reductions every five years, starting in 2026. The labor groups in Climate Jobs Illinois were worried that shutting down fossil fuel plants that fast would lead to the state being forced to import fossil fuel power from out of state, sacrificing jobs to no environmental gain.Particularly thorny was a municipally owned coal plant, the 10-year-old Prairie State Energy Campus in southwestern Illinois, which is the state’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter and a horrendous financial boondoggle that costs more to run than its power is worth. Part of the problem is that the plant, owned by a consortium of nine public power agencies, was largely funded by municipal bonds from the communities meant to receive its power; those communities were worried they’d get stiffed if the plant retired early. (Enviros claimed they could close the plant, use the savings to pay off the bonds, and still come out ahead, but that was met with some skepticism.) To make a long story short: first Pritzker wanted the plant’s retirement date at 2035. Then he agree to 2045. Then Senate Democrats voted through a plan that would have let the plant pump out 100 percent of its current emissions through 2045. That was unacceptable to environmentalists and Pritzker, who wanted interim reduction targets. That flummoxed the process for a bit, but in the end, labor agreed to it. Even after that, there was some last-minute drama from the governor’s office, leading to a stalemate with Harmon; finally, they agreed to kick the bill over the House, where Welch dragged it over the finish line.Anyway, that’s probably more process drama than you wanted. Let’s look at what’s in the bill. Clean energy and good wages, justly distributed: the Illinois energy billI’m not going to cover the entire 900-page bill. We’ll just hit the highlights.Emission reductions and clean electricityToday, Illinois gets about 40 percent of its electricity from nuclear power and less than 10 percent from renewable energy. The new renewable portfolio standard (RPS) will raise renewables’ share to 40 percent by 2030 and 50 percent by 2040, with the goal of a zero-carbon electricity sector by 2045 — and beyond that, a net-zero-carbon state economy by 2050. This is extremely ambitious and a new benchmark for the Midwest. Subsidies to renewable energy will roughly double, to around $580 million per year. An additional $317 million the big utilities had previously collected will be spent on clean-energy projects rather than refunded to customers as scheduled. (It’s a long story.)The popular Illinois Solar for All program, which helps get rooftop solar power to low-income renters and homeowners (as well as public buildings and nonprofits serving environmental justice communities), will have its funding increased from $10 million to $50 million a year. Obviously, Illinois will have much more trouble hitting its decarbonization targets if its nuclear power plants shut down, so the bill provides the Byron, Dresden, and Braidwood plants with about $700 million in subsidies over the next five years. (The size of the subsidy, considerably less than the $5 billion Exelon wanted, was informed by an independent analysis commissioned by the governor’s office.)All private coal- and oil-fired power plants must get to zero emissions (i.e., retire) by 2030. Municipally owned coal plants — Prairie State and Dallman Station — must reduce emissions 45 percent by 2035 (which will mean shutting down one of two boilers) and 100 percent by 2045. All private natural gas plants must reach zero emissions — either by retiring or by switching over to hydrogen — by 2045. Until then, their emissions in a given year can not exceed the average of the previous three years, i.e., can not rise. (Plants can stay open if a government assessment finds that they are necessary for grid reliability.)Importantly: fossil fuel plants will be shut down according to their proximity to low-income and marginalized communities, not necessarily according to greenhouse gases or economics. Every five years starting in 2025, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Power Agency, and the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) must produce a report on the state’s progress toward its renewable energy goals. The ICC will also begin developing a renewables access plan to increase electricity transmission throughout the state. For the record: a recent study led by former Illinois Power Agency Director Mark Pruitt found that getting to 40 percent renewable energy by 2030 “would deliver over $1.2 billion in lower total electricity costs for Illinois.” Transportation decarbonizationThe bill establishes the goal of getting a million electric vehicles on Illinois roads by 2030. In part, that will be achieved through a $4,000-per-vehicle rebate for EV customers (which, added to the EV credit in the current federal bill, would mean a combined rebate of $16,500). Electric utilities will be required to submit clean-electrification plans to the ICC, showing how they plan to drive EV adoption.The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency will rebate up to 80 percent of the cost of EV infrastructure projects that pay prevailing wages. Forty-five percent of those rebates will be channeled to projects in low-income and marginalized communities. Labor and equity standardsAll utility-scale renewable energy projects that qualify under the state’s RPS must use project-labor agreements; all non-residential clean-energy projects must pay prevailing wages. All projects must demonstrate through diversity hiring reports that they have recruited qualified BIPOC candidates and apprentices. As far as I know, this gives Illinois the most stringent labor and equity requirements of any state clean energy program. Similar policies tying renewable energy projects to labor standards have passed in Connecticut, New York, and Washington, but no other state’s energy policy has as comprehensive a package of labor, diversity, and equity standards.Workforce development and transition assistanceThe bill will create an $80 million-a-year Clean Jobs Workforce Network Hubs Program, which will create 13 hubs around the state to deliver workforce-development programs to low-income and underserved populations. Resources will be put toward outreach, recruitment, training, and placement. The Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity and the Illinois Department of Employment Security will work together to develop a “displaced worker bill of rights,” with $40 million a year to go toward transition assistance for areas dependent on fossil fuel production or generation. There will be two green bank–style programs. The Clean Energy Jobs and Justice Fund will provide financing and low-interest lending to clean-energy projects in low-income and marginalized communities. The Illinois Finance Authority Climate Bank, more like a conventional green bank, will provide seed funding and develop public-private partnerships to draw more private capital to clean energy projects. A clean energy incubator program will offer support and low-interest capital to small energy businesses and contractors, to the tune of over $35 million a year. There will be a program to train and place soon-to-be-released incarcerated people in clean-energy fields. And there will be a program meant to encourage the development of solar and storage on the site of closed fossil-fuel plants, to help employ laid-off workers.An Energy Transition Workforce Commission will report on the workforce needs of a decarbonizing economy and recommend further changes to workforce policies. The Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity will create a program to reduce energy transition barriers, a grant program to promote economic development in transitioning communities, and a scholarship fund for children in families of laid-off workers. Notably, companies intending to shut down fossil fuel plants will be required to give affected communities two years’ notice, so that such communities can be identified and receive transition assistance.Consumer protectionsFor low-income ratepayers, the bill eliminates deposit requirements and late fees; it eliminates online payment fees for all ratepayers.Utilities will be required to report their monthly shutoffs and reconnections to the ICC, and the ICC will conduct a comprehensive study of the level and design of low-income rates to ensure that they are working effectively. Utilities will be required to fund the participation of nonprofit representatives in ICC proceedings, to increase community participation. Finally, munis and co-ops will be prohibited from charging discriminatory fees to ratepayers that self-generate solar electricity (as investor-owned utilities already are).Utility ethics and rate reformsSome of these details get technical, but the gist is that the bill contains a range of specific ethics reforms — for example, public officials must declare if any of their relatives work for utilities — and creates a Public Utility Ethics and Compliance Monitor to make sure utilities are implementing those reforms. In addition, each utility must appoint a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer who reports to the ICC. ComEd is prohibited from forcing ratepayers to pay any criminal penalties or fines associated with its ongoing federal corruption probe.Excitingly for us utility nerds, the bill will end “formula ratemaking” — an opaque process whereby rates are automatically increased based on how much utilities are spending, with no need for approval from regulators — in favor of “performance-based ratemaking,” which ties utility compensation to a series of performance metrics such as “reliability and resiliency, peak load reductions attributable to demand response programs, supplier diversity expansion, affordability, interconnection response time, and customer service performance.” This is good stuff.An independent auditor will assess the state of the Illinois grid and the money spent on it over the last decade. Utilities will be required to file a Multi-Year Integrated Grid Plan that supports the state’s renewable energy targets. They will undergo yearly performance evaluations to track how well they are meeting their planning goals. Finally, and intriguingly, ICC will create a Division of Integrated Distribution Planning, meant to increase public input in local distribution grid decisions.Illinois is showing how democracy should workOver the last three years, climate hawks, environmental justice advocates, renewable energy developers, and labor gathered around a table and worked through their differences about the future of Illinois’ energy system, freed from the usual odious influence of utilities. It was an anxious, fractious, and often white-knuckle process, right up until the very end. No constituency got everything it wanted; each made sacrifices. I expect there’s still quite a bit of residual frustration and some fresh bruises that will take a while to heal. But to my outside eye, representatives from each of these groups can return to their constituents with heads held high. The bill is a model of non-zero-sum cooperation: every group gave a little to get a lot. A special shout-out goes to the environmental-justice community in Illinois, which used three years of relentless grassroots organizing to build an incredible political force, without which the bill couldn’t have passed and wouldn’t have been as equity-focused.For all the disputes at the margins, the resulting bill is momentous, a historic inflection point for Illinois. The state is now a national leader — and a challenge to the rest of the Midwest — in how to transition to clean energy while creati…

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    Volts podcast: 20 years of solar advocacy, with Adam Browning of Vote Solar Sep 17, 2021
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    In this episode, veteran solar advocate Adam Browning reflects on 20 years of running campaigns as the founder and leader of Vote Solar, one of the scrappiest and most successful solar advocacy organizations in the US. Browning, who is stepping down from leadership this year, helped grow the group from four people to 40, and along the way he’s learned a few things about how nonprofit campaigns can succeed against better funded opponents. Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Adam Browning, September 17, 2021(PDF version)David Roberts:There aren't a lot of positive, hopeful stories competing for attention in the US these days, but one ray of light — if you'll pardon the pun — comes in the form of solar power. During the 21st century it has plunged in price, to the point that it is the cheapest available source of power in most big energy markets. Though it provides just 3 percent of US electricity today, analysts say it could provide close to half by mid-century. Adam Browning has lived through every stage of this extraordinary ongoing story. He co-founded Vote Solar, a nonprofit that advocates for solar energy at the state level, in 2002, to push for solar on public buildings in San Francisco. Since then, he has helped build a team of 40 people that operates across the country and has led numerous campaigns for state policy and regulatory changes. For as long as I’ve been doing energy journalism, I’ve known Adam and Vote Solar to be reliable sources — smart, practical, and results-oriented. I read all their emails, which regular listeners will know is high praise.Now, after 20 years, Browning is stepping back, shifting to an advisory role and handing off day-to-day leadership of Vote Solar. Given his long experience, I thought it would be interesting to talk to him about what he has learned, how much things have changed for solar, and where solar and climate advocacy need to go next. Adam Browning, welcome to Volts.Adam Browning: Thanks, really pleased to be here.David Roberts: You’ve been at this for 20 years now. Tell me the Adam Browning origin story. How did you gravitate to this particular field? It must have been relatively soon after you were out of college; it must have been one of the first things you did and stuck with it. Tell us how you got into all of this.Adam Browning: You're too kind. My youthful demeanor — I’ll have to tell my stylist. It wasn't quite right out of college. I've never had a plan that I put into place; I've always moved from the thing that seemed really interesting to me at the time, and then was open to that next opportunity. After college, I did Peace Corps in West Africa, which was in many ways an incredibly formative experience, a moveable feast that I continue to look back on and think about, and that experience continues to nourish. After that, I joined EPA in San Francisco, the Region 9 office, and worked there for about eight years. The origin story — not of Adam Browning, but really Vote Solar, which is probably more to the point here — was really born out of spending a good chunk of time with the federal government doing environmental protection. I was doing a lot of enforcement and inspecting smokestacks, and fines were exceeding limits in some ways.David Roberts: This would have been during the Clinton years, yes? Adam Browning: Yes, and then a little bit of the Bush years. So that experience was a wonderful introduction to how environmental protection works and doesn't work in this country. When I was nearly 30, I had a beer with a college buddy, and he was working for then-San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown. This friend, David Hochschild, is now a California energy commissioner, the chair of the Commission. He had just put solar on his roof at home. At the time, solar was really expensive, and there wasn't much of it; it was very much a hippie pipe dream. But he put it on his house and was enthralled by it. And he was like, “Hey man, we should try to put this on City Hall. We need to have governments take the lead.” Through that beer and subsequent napkin diagramming, we came up with the idea of a revenue bond to put solar and energy efficiency on public buildings in San Francisco and then use the avoided energy costs, the energy payments, to pay down the bonds, so you have long-term, low-interest capital. It all penciled out. That turned into first a campaign to get it on the ballot as a ballot initiative, and then a citywide campaign to pass this ballot initiative. That was Prop B. This is back in 2001. That experience was really galvanizing, transformative for me in a couple of different ways. One: this idea of solar as an emission-free technology. I’d been spending all this time trying to control smokestacks; how about if we just didn't have any at all? That really dropped for me. Secondly, we had this campaign where you could actually do solar — then, again, really expensive — but we could do it cost effectively, the way that we'd had this scoped out. That just gripped the imagination. We had legions of volunteers throughout the city; people were really excited to be a part of something larger than themselves. That ballot initiative passed by 73 percent of the vote, which was really high in those days. Then we started getting calls from around the country — how can we do this in our city? — which was when we decided to quit our jobs and take this grassroots campaign to a much larger campaign. We had this theory, we had analyses that showed that the way to get cheap solar was through economies of scale: you needed to buy a lot of expensive solar, you needed to show a long-term market for this technology, in order to induce the manufacturers and would-be manufacturers to invest their capital into scaling up factories and the whole supply chain.David Roberts: Solar has changed so fast: the technology, the prices, the social mores around it, how it's viewed. So take us back to 2002: Was anybody even thinking about solar? Was it viewed as just a hippie affectation? How much did it cost? What was the world of solar like in 2002? Adam Browning: So back then, solar was about $9 a watt.David Roberts: We're closing in on $1 a watt now, is that right? Adam Browning: For the actual panels themselves, you're looking at 25 cents a watt. Utility-scale installations are well under $1. So essentially, nearly an order of magnitude less expensive right now. There was 163 megawatts total installed in the US. So, yeah, back in them old days, people knew of solar; I think it was understood as something that had some degree of promise, but again, the cost put it out of reach for being taken seriously as a long-term, significant portion of our energy resource.David Roberts: So were people planning for it? Like DOE, when they did their projections at the time — were people saying it was going to grow into something big? Or was it viewed as a niche thing for the century? Adam Browning: I would compare it to the algae that you see Exxon always advertising. It was ARCO and Mobil that had these investments in solar; Shell did as well. There were many really wonderful, well-meaning people involved in that, so I don't mean to diminish the seriousness of their efforts. There were a lot of oil majors that were investing in it. DOE was putting money into serious research and development. But it all seemed very far off. It was this thing that did not yet exist, and we all hoped that someday it would. Solar then suffered from the start-stop-start-stop of market incentives. Particularly in the California Central Valley, there were installations around with the large parabolic troughs, SEGS plants that had seemed promising, and as soon as everybody scaled up to respond to the incentives, they were then pulled. You never could take advantage of that momentum. So the early history of solar, again: a lot of research and development, not a lot of smart, long-term market support to bring it to scale. In early years, that underestimation of solar's potential really helped in many ways. Like when you scored the federal investment tax credit, no one thought it would really take off, so it scored really low, and that was actually helpful for it to go through.David Roberts: So you have wildly expensive solar that you can make cost-effective in certain limited applications. You have cheap, patient capital and entities willing to wait for it. I'm sure it was just a series of short-term campaigns at first, but at what point did you have a long-term plan? In retrospect, was your plan as optimistic as reality turned out to be?Adam Browning: I would say no, the plan was not as optimistic as reality turned out to be, although it was very specific and accurate as to what would happen. There are often times when you have policy that promises an outcome and fails to deliver on it; here was something that absolutely, bullseye. We had analyses of comparable technologies. Solar is basically a semiconductor; you had examples of integrated circuits that were developed and funded by the military, who was willing to pay an enormous premium in order to have a technology that was much lighter than the capacitors it replaced, and through that investment really brought down the cost through economies of scale. So we had examples of other technologies. We had this report from KPMG Netherlands that Greenpeace had paid them to analyze; it said, in essence, that if you brought about a global market that could support a factory that would deliver 500 megawatts a year of solar panels, you would be at grid parity. That was directionally accurate, but we now have factories that are much, much larger than that, of course. So the cost drop of solar exceeded expectations, though it was definitely bumpy. Even though we had predicted this effect by virtue of what these policies would do, this whole long-term market demand, at the same time, we didn't really anticipate that we would be passing legislation this quickly that would require 100 percent clean energy. Yesterday, the Illinois House passed, finally, a bill that will require 100 percent clean energy. It's expected to pass through the Senate on Monday. That makes the tenth state; well over 35 percent of the people who live in this country now live in a state where carbon-based electricity is illegal, will be legally mandated to phase out by a certain date. That's on the basis of having this scale availability of cheap, zero-emission power.David Roberts: It was not that long ago that the idea that any governmental entity of any size would target 100 percent clean energy was absolutely out of the universe. Early in my career, I remember projections that solar would catch up around 2070; coal was still expected to dominate well past 2050. The scale of the changes is really hard to cram in your head. But now the energy wonk community has developed a pretty good sense of how you scale up a technology and make it cheaper. There's a more formalized understanding of that; solar is the model now of how you go about doing it. But of course, back in 2002, you didn't know that. So I'm curious, when you were thinking about advocacy, what was your plan? What was your instinct about what kind of policies would be both politically possible and efficacious at scaling this up?Adam Browning: That's a great question. In the beginning, when we first launched, we were like, OK, we’ll do a bunch more of these city-led initiatives: the power of energy democracy to drive choice in energy supply. Solar was this perfect technology because it circumvented the decisionmakers; you could put it on your own roof, you didn't have to wait for the utility to make the right decision. You could take that power and do it yourself. So we initially said, we're going to do a bunch more of these city-led efforts. We got our grant from the Energy Foundation, $50,000, our first grant, and we started looking at some of these other cities, and it was like, oh, wait a minute. Actually, there is state-level policy infrastructure that enables people to be able to install solar upon their own roof and generate their own energy, and those were the preconditions for being able to do a city-led initiative. So that caused us to reevaluate our strategy and really focus on the state-level policy infrastructure. When you're looking at a solar market, you're only as strong as your weakest link. It's never the one thing; it is the four or five things that you have to link together. So one of the key insights that we had early on was that the solution was really at the state level; that was where most energy decisions are made, and you're much closer to democracy there. I don't know how to pass anything through the federal government. I don't know that anybody does. But at the state level, on the legislative side, you are much closer to being able to actually influence the outcome of legislative battles. The other large piece of this, of course, is regulatory, through the public utilities commissions. Our first effort was the California Solar Initiative. This was something that a wonderful advocate, Bernadette Del Chiaro, who headed Environment California then, had been working through the legislature for many years, and it kept not being able to pass. We then, in collaboration with others, worked really hard to get it through the California Public Utilities Commission. So you had then-Governor Schwarzenegger, who really stood out as a strong leader for this, establish a goal for a million solar roofs. It was an ability to get it through the public utilities commission to implement that — that ended up being about a $3 billion effort to incentivize rooftop solar with a really elegant market design through these declining incentives that got you down to grid parity, when you wouldn't need any incentives at all afterwards. David Roberts: When did that pass? What year was that?Adam Browning: It was around 2004, 2005, that we finally got those through. That was then also passed through the legislature afterwards and confirmed, which was quite helpful. But that was a really big eye-opener for policymakers and for energy nerds everywhere. That was a large chunk of money, designed to last over 10 years; that was this signal to the manufacturers of the world, to the installers of the state, that this industry, this market is going to be around. There is a commitment to it, time to scale up, go big. Then once you have the fifth-largest economy in the world commit to it, it no longer seems so esoteric. Both Japan and Germany then also were really strong leaders as well, so it was definitely a global effort. But California really helped catalyze that in the early 2000s with this type of campaign.David Roberts: After California — which in terms of progressive policy, is the low-hanging fruit — did you continue on trying to expand in California, or did you move on to other states? What was the plan of attack?Adam Browning: A little bit of both. There's a story of how you actually run and grow a nonprofit advocacy organization. So you are fundraising; philanthropy is the lifeblood of your efforts, and you have to be able to fundraise in order to feed your ambitions on this. For many years, we were two people, three people, four people. We were very small. It wasn't until 2008 that we were able to open an east coast office.So I would say, over the course of Vote Solar's history, we had a 70/30 split. The majority of our efforts were in places where we thought we could get traction, that there was a political appetite, that we could have a real line of sight to success. Then we spent a non-trivial part of our time in lonely places where there wasn't much going on, but if we didn't help catalyze, if we didn't plant the early seeds, it wasn't going…

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    A close look at the clean energy legislation offered by House Democrats Sep 15, 2021
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    After months of anticipation, Democrats have begun to reveal pieces of their upcoming Build Back Better Act (aka the budget reconciliation bill), including the key clean energy provisions. On Monday, the House Energy and Commerce Committee began markup of its full set of recommendations for the bill. Meanwhile, the House Ways and Means Committee released its draft tax package for the bill, including the clean energy tax credits.As negotiations around the reconciliation bill move forward, I’ll have more to say about the politics, economics, and larger implications of all this Democratic energy policy. For now, I just want to get the specifics on the record. For one thing, there’s a lot of policy here, and it will take some time to think it through. For another, it will be important to track what gets added and (more likely) cut when the bill goes to the Senate, so this post can serve as our baseline for comparison.Let’s start with Energy and Commerce and its Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP), arguably the most important single piece of energy policy on offer.E&C: the CEPP and some other good spending (For a quick introduction to the CEPP, see highlights from my interview with Sen. Tina Smith.)The $150 billion CEPP would offer grants to utilities that increase their year-on-year share of clean energy by at least 4 percentage points; it would charge fines to utilities that fall short of that goal. (“Utilities” here includes any and all end-use electricity providers: vertically integrated utilities, investor-owned utilities, co-ops and munis, etc.)For the purposes of the bill, “clean energy” is energy that emits no more than 0.1 tons of CO2-equivalent per megawatt-hour of electricity generated. This 0.1t/MWh threshold is notably stringent — it would exclude all fossil fuels and biomass unless they are equipped with carbon capture and storage.The grants are based on a somewhat complicated formula: $150/MWh x (YoY percentage point increase in clean share - 1.5 percentage point) x total retail sales.Say a utility boosted its year-on-year clean share by 5 percentage points. Five percentage points minus 1.5 percentage points is 3.5 percentage points. So the utility would get a one-time grant of $150/MWh for 3.5 percent of it retail sales that year.The formula for the fines is: $40/MWh x (4 percentage points - YoY percentage point increase in clean share) x total retail sales.Say a utility grew its share 3 percentage points. Four percentage points minus 3 percentage points is 1 percentage point, so it would pay a one-time fine of $40/MWh for 1 percent of its retail sales. (The exception here is utilities with a clean share at 85 percent or above; they are exempt from fines, but still eligible for grants.)A utility is not allowed to fall steadily behind; any shortfall is added to the following year’s target. If it only hits 3 percentage points growth one year, the next year a utility must hit 5 percentage points growth. Utilities can choose to tally up their performance over a two- or three-year period, to smooth over year-to-year spikes or valleys; for instance, if a utility hits 3 percentage points in year one and 3 percentage points in year two but 6 percentage points in year three, it averages out to 4 percentage points a year and it receives the grants.This is all a bit convoluted; it would definitely keep accountants and lawyers busy. There are five things worth noting about the CEPP at this point.First, $150/MWh is real money. Spread out over a 10-year power purchase agreement (PPA), it’s about $15/MWh/year, not that different from (but additive to) the clean-energy tax credits. That, coupled with the tight definition of clean energy, makes this a relatively strong offering, design-wise. Second, a lot of details would be left up to the Department of Energy, which would administer the program, such as how distributed and behind-the-meter resources will be counted, how much compliance can be done through renewable energy credits (RECs), and so forth. There are lots of devils in those details.Third, it is not accurate to say that the CEPP targets, much less guarantees, 80 percent emission reductions in the electricity sector by 2030. That is Biden’s goal, and the aspiration for the full suite of policies Dems are trying to pass, but the CEPP, by design, does not guarantee any particular outcome. How would utilities respond to this level of incentives and fines? We hope to find out! It’s a new program; it’s never been tried before. (It would kick off in 2023.)Fourth, a study by the independent firm Analysis Group found that, through 2031, the CEPP would expand the US workforce by 7.7 million new jobs, add $907 billion to the national economy, raise $154 billion in tax revenue, and lead to over 600 gigawatts of new clean energy. It’s not a cost, it’s an investment.Fifth, there’s no guarantee Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) will let this pass unmolested, or let it pass at all. He chairs the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which will be marking up the energy parts of the bill. He could kill the CEPP. He could weaken the carbon-intensity requirements to allow for dirtier energy; he could lower the required rate of clean energy growth; he could reduce the incentives or the fines. Nobody knows what Manchin will do, or why, so we’ll just have to wait and see.Also! Other items worth noting in the E&C package. * There is $9 billion for home energy retrofits — $2,000 rebates for projects that save 20 percent relative to average energy use, or $4,000 for 35 percent. (Both numbers are doubled for low-income projects.)* There’s another $9 billion for home electrification — $3,000 per heat pump with greater than 27,500 BTU-per-hour capacity and $4,000 if it's cold-climate rated; $6,000/$7,000 for low-income projects. For heat pumps under 27,500 BTU/hour, it’s $1,500/$2,000; $3,000/$3,500 for low-income projects. In that same section are rebates of $1,250 per heat-pump water heater, $3,000 per smart electric panel, and other, smaller grants for electric stoves and dryers.* $13.5 billion for electric vehicle infrastructure, focused on underserved areas.* $5 billion to replace heavy-duty vehicles like fire trucks and school buses with zero-emission vehicles.* $9 billion for electricity transmission, including funds for DOE’s transmission planning and modeling capabilities and for state transmission planning processes.* $17.5 billion for decarbonizing federal buildings and fleets (including, one hopes, the Postal Service fleet).* $27.5 billion for a green bank, which we’re not supposed to call a green bank, but rather “nonprofit, state, and local climate finance institutions that support the rapid deployment of low- and zero-emission technologies.” (40 percent goes to vulnerable communities.)* $2.5 billion for low-income solar.* $5 billion for community-led environmental and climate justice programs.* An unspecified methane fee on leaked methane (which the industry is furiously lobbying against).All these numbers are, based on the need, too small — especially the retrofit and electrification numbers. The heat pump money, for instance, is likely to be used up after a year or two.Nonetheless, with a limited pot of money, E&C Dems have managed to cover quite a few bases. Let’s move on to the Ways and Means tax package.W&M: a bonanza of clean-energy tax creditsThe tax package, which itself only covers a limited subset of policy areas, is a monster; even the section-by-section summary is 41 pages long. The green energy part (subtitle G) starts on page 9. It is basically a long list of technologies and practices that will receive tax credits.Before getting to individual items, it’s worth noting three intriguing provisions that apply to all the credits.First, there are now strong prevailing wage standards built in. To receive the full value of the credit, a project must show that it is paying prevailing wages and using qualified apprentices; without doing so, it can receive only a fifth of the credit value (called the “base rate”). Second, projects that use domestic content — defined as 55 percent of total project cost from made-in-USA components and services — can get another 10 percent on top of the value of the credit.These are important policies for the domestic workforce, drawn from successful states (like Washington), and will increase the amount of credit value that goes to good US jobs and supply chains. Third, the energy tax credits are now “direct pay,” which means projects can get the full value without having to offset it against taxes owed. This opens up the credits to many more projects and eliminates a lot of wasteful lawyerly games around tax equity financing. (Note: the percentage available for direct pay declines over time for projects not using domestic content.)On to some of the individual credits:* The production tax credit (PTC) would be extended through the decade. It would go to qualifying clean electricity sources — wind, solar, geothermal, landfill gas, methane gas with CCS — based on MWhs produced: $25/MWh ($5/MWh base rate). * The investment tax credit (ITC) would also be extended; it would be available to solar and geothermal, and now, as of this bill, energy storage, biogas, microgrid controllers, and, uh, “dynamic glass.” It would cover 30 percent (6 percent base rate) of the cost of a project. (A solar project could choose the PTC or ITC, but couldn’t get both.)* A bonus ITC would be available to projects that locate in a low-income area (additional 10 percent) or are themselves low-income benefit or housing projects (additional 20 percent). This is an excellent way of building environmental justice into the tax system.Note: both the PTC and ITC would be restored to their full original value, higher than any current credit, and extended through the decade. This is a very big deal.* The electric vehicle (EV) tax credit has been revived and expanded. It would now be fully refundable and no longer limited by manufacturer. It starts at $4,000 per vehicle; for vehicles that go into service before 2027, there’s an additional $3,500 (that’s $7,500); for vehicles built at a US assembly plant with a union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement, there’s an additional $4,500 (that’s $12,000); for vehicles assembled at plants that use at least 50 percent domestic content, there’s an additional $500. So, for a domestically manufactured, domestically sourced EV purchased next year, the total available credit is $12,500 (limited to half the vehicle purchase price). That’s huge!Note: The EV tax credit would be available only for vehicles under specific price limits: $55,000 for sedans, $64,000 for vans, $69,000 for SUVs, and $74,000 for pickup trucks. Also, the amount of available credit phases out quickly for joint households above $800,000 income, or single households above $600,000. In short, the credit is meant to be available primarily to middle-class voters buying mid-range EVs.Note 2: Automakers that use non-unionized workforces, like Toyota, Honda, and Tesla, are furious about the union provisions. The awkward truth is that some of the best automakers on EVs have been non-union, while union shops like Ford and GM have been among the worst. It’s a bit of a dilemma for progressives. * There is also a credit for commercial EVs, worth up to 30 percent of vehicle cost.* Happily, there’s a credit for used EVs, ranging from $1,250 to $2,500, depending on battery capacity; the credit would be capped at 30 percent of the sale price, for vehicles costing no more than $25,000 and at least two years old.* Even more happily, there’s a new electric bicycle credit, worth 15 percent of the purchase price. The max available credit is $1,500 (joint filers can use it toward two bikes). The credit starts phasing out at incomes above $75,000; the maximum total price of a qualifying bike is $8,000. Note: Folks are grousing on Twitter about how much more generous the EV credit is than the bicycle credit, and how the bicycle credit should be bigger, and how absurd it is to means-test a friggin’ bicycle credit, and they’re right about all of it. Still, it’s nice e-bikes at least got a nod.* The 45Q tax credit for carbon capture, utilization, and storage has been extended through the decade: $50 per ton for sequestered carbon dioxide; $35 per ton for use of CO2 in products or enhanced oil recovery. * Added to 45Q is a new $180-per-ton credit for direct air capture of CO2.* Hooray, a new investment tax credit for transmission lines! Lines of at least 275 kilovolts, capable of carrying at least 500 megawatts, placed in service before 2032, receive a credit worth 30 percent of project costs. (Read my transmission series to understand why this is a good thing.)* Also worth cheering, though more controversial: a production tax credit for existing nuclear power plants, calculated via a formula I do not pretend to understand.* A new sustainable aviation fuel credit would offer $1.25 per gallon for aviation fuels that cut lifetime GHG emissions (vs. jet fuel) at least 50 percent, with another penny per gallon available for each percentage point above 50. * A new clean hydrogen production tax credit would offer $3 per kilogram to hydrogen with 95 percent fewer lifecycle GHG emissions than hydrogen made through the currently dominant method, steam reforming. That could include hydrogen made through electrolysis driven by renewable energy or through biomass gasification with CCS. Credits of $0.60 to $1.02 would be available to hydrogen with between 40 and 95 percent fewer GHGs, which could include “blue hydrogen” made by steam reforming with CCS. * There are credits for energy-efficient homes, up to $2,500, with a bonus tier of $5,000 for certified zero-energy homes.* The clean manufacturing tax credit (48C) has been extended. It would offer up to 30 percent of the value of investments in clean manufacturing facilities, i.e., facilities manufacturing solar panels, wind turbines, EVs, batteries, etc. $400 million a year of the credit money would be reserved for projects in “automotive communities.”* A credit for environmental justice programs would distribute $1 billion a year, on a competitive basis, to institutions of higher learning that gather data to help improve environmental justice outcomes. Notably missing from this list is any reduction in fossil fuel subsidies. This is frustrating, since less than 24 hours before the package was released, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer was saying, “we need to take away all the subsidies for oil, gas, and coal. We will have that in our bill.” (It’s at minute 26 of this video.) Where did the subsidy cuts go? Who took them out? Anyway, all told, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the Ways and Means tax package would cost $1.2 trillion over 10 years; the “green energy” subtitle would account for $235 billion. Of course, that’s just an estimate — it could be lower or higher in practice, depending on the uptake of the credits and the growth they spur. Now let’s see how much survives the SenateLike I said, there will be more to talk about as the bill is negotiated. For now, I’ll leave you with three observations.First, is this enough? Ha ha, no. No climate policy is ever enough. This is far short of the $10 trillion that would be needed for a true Green New Deal. It’s far short of the $6 trillion bill Sen. Bernie Sanders first proposed, back in June. It is, from a climate perspective, a ludicrously low level of investment and mobilization. Nonetheless, this is what the lamentably small group of climate-focused legislators were able to squeeze from a chaotic process. This is a reflection of the relative weight climate carries in the House. Second, this is the high-water mark, so enjoy it while it lasts. Sens. Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) are going to try to hack down the overall level of spending, and Manchin has already signaled his in…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Volts (guest) podcast: an episode of Know Your Enemy on living with climate change Sep 10, 2021
    Show notes

    As a dog walker and kitchen cleaner, I listen to a lot of podcasts. One that I’ve been enjoying quite a bit lately is Know Your Enemy, which bills itself as “a leftist's guide to the conservative movement.” Sponsored by Dissent Magazine and hosted by Matthew Sitman and Sam Adler-Bell, it typically interviews experts, analysts, and activists about the current (lamentable) state of the US conservative movement. It is unusually smart and thoughtful, offering more illumination than rage bait.

    Recently it had a different kind of episode: a pod on climate change. The guests were Daniel Sherrell, an activist and organizer who just released a book called Warmth: Coming of Age at the End of the World, and Dorothy Fortenberry, a playwright and television writer currently working on Extrapolations, an upcoming limited series for Apple TV+ that focuses on climate change.

    I’ll be honest: I don’t typically enjoy climate change content. It’s mostly a bunch stuff I already know, arguments I already agree with, and exhortations I don’t need. But this one was different. Rather than focusing on politics, policy, or science, it’s about, well, living with climate change. How to think about it. How to acknowledge its horror and weight without being crushed and immobilized. How to make fiction about it. How to imagine a future in its shadow. Lots of philosophical and even spiritual stuff that I haven’t focused on much here at Volts.

    Anyway, I asked Matthew and Sam if I could share it with Volts listeners and they were kind enough to say yes. It is long, but rich and full of interesting ideas. I hope you enjoy it. Don’t forget to support Know Your Enemy on Patreon!


    This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.volts.wtf/subscribe

    Volts podcast: Sen. Tina Smith on the promise of a Clean Electricity Payment Program Sep 01, 2021
    Show notes

    In this episode, Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN) discusses a policy that she has proposed in the Senate and is working to get included in the upcoming reconciliation bill: a Clean Electricity Payment Program (CEPP), which would aim to reduce carbon emissions in the US electricity sector 80 percent by 2030. She also shares some excellent thoughts on the filibuster!Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN), September 1, 2021(PDF version)David Roberts:There are lots and lots of policies being discussed for inclusion in the Democrats’ upcoming budget reconciliation bill, from a childcare tax credit to universal pre-K to a wide range of climate and clean-energy measures.According to the office of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), the climate provisions in the bill would collectively reduce total US greenhouse gas emissions 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 — getting us close to America’s Paris agreement pledge. Schumer’s numbers have not yet been backed up by outside analysts, so they should be taken with a grain of salt for now. But what’s clear, and unlikely to change, is that the bulk of the emission reductions will come from the electricity sector — specifically, from the clean-energy tax credits and the Clean Electricity Payment Program. As regular Volts readers know, the Clean Electricity Payment Program is a version of the more familiar Clean Energy Standard that has been modified to fit within the rules of budget reconciliation. It would set up a federal program that would offer utilities financial incentives to increase their proportion of clean energy and levy fines on those that failed to do so. Its goal would be to reduce emissions from the US electricity sector 80 percent by 2030.As Schumer’s graph shows, the Clean Electricity Payment Program, in combination with the extension and expansion of the clean-energy tax credits, would be responsible for almost 42 percent of the bill’s total reductions. To hear more about the program and how it will work, I talked with Minnesota Senator Tina Smith (D), the policy’s sponsor and its greatest champion in the Senate. Smith is one of the handful of senators with in-depth knowledge of the dynamics in the US electricity sector, and she’s deeply involved in budget negotiations, so I was excited to ask her about how the program would work, what kinds of jobs and projects it might produce, how it might affect coal states, and of course, because I am me, what she thinks about the filibuster. Senator Tina Smith, thank you so much for coming on Volts. Sen. Tina Smith:Well, thank you, David. It is terrific to be with you. David Roberts:We're going to talk today about clean electricity policy and the politics of getting it passed, which are two of my very favorite subjects in the world, so let's just dive right in. Senator Smith, I’m pretty confident that Volts listeners are familiar with state-level policies, renewable portfolio standards or clean energy standards at the state level, that mandate that utilities in the state increase their proportion of clean energy. It’s a regulatory mandate passed by the state government; these are familiar, there are dozens of them across the country. The Clean Electricity Payment Program that you have proposed is not quite that. So why don't you start by telling us what it is and how it is similar and different to these more familiar state policies? Sen. Tina Smith: Well, the basic goal is the same. We want to move the power generating sector so that it is adding clean energy. One way of doing that is to have a regulatory framework that says, you will add clean energy, and if you don't, you'll pay a penalty. But another way of achieving that goal of adding clean power is to do what we're doing with the Clean Electricity Payment Program. This is a plan that says: We will provide financial incentives to utilities to add clean power; there'll be a fee if you fail to add clean power; and our goal is to get, on a national average, 80 percent of our power generation from clean energy sources by 2030. So the goal is the same: adding clean power. The mechanism is a little bit different. I think this mechanism has some real advantages, because under a regulatory framework, adding that clean power costs money in the short term (though it saves money in the long term) and often those costs are passed on to ratepayers. With the clean electricity plan that we're proposing, this federal incentive would defray the costs that utility ratepayers would normally pay. That's the real advantage of this approach.David Roberts: It’s worth pointing out something I've heard from a couple of the architects: costs on ratepayers tend to be regressive, whereas federal money comes from more progressive income taxes. So you get a progressivity advantage by drawing the money from the federal pot.Sen. Tina Smith: Absolutely. That's exactly right. We need to be on this path to a clean energy transition, but what you don't want to have happen is for the cost of that transition to be disproportionately borne by people who can least afford it. This is especially important to me, because the costs of the fossil fuel economy have been disproportionately borne — in bad health outcomes and in all sorts of other external costs — by poor people, Black and brown people, people who are sited right next to freeways or right next to that coal-burning power plant.David Roberts:The details of this thing obviously matter. I'm curious, to what extent are the details of the program fixed and in place vs. being negotiated right now? Do we know the size of the payments? Are we sure that the target is going to stay the same through negotiations? What's in place and what's still up in the air?Sen. Tina Smith: Well, of course, everything is in the midst of being negotiated all the time, as you well know. Negotiations will be finalized when the budget reconciliation bill is completed. But for me, there are a couple of key aspects of this. One, the goal of achieving 80 percent clean power in the power sector nationally, on average, is set in stone. That was described in the Democratic budget resolutions that we passed at the end of the last session. That is described as the goal of the president. So to me, that's the starting point. Then there are a couple of other things that are crucial to this. One is that this clean electricity plan is technology neutral, which means we don't say this kind of clean energy is better than that kind of clean energy, or it must be renewables vs. carbon capture, for example. That technology neutrality is clear. Also clear is the core idea that each utility starts from where they are, and they improve from there. This is a big deal, because some utilities and regions are already well along the path of adding clean power, and others are just starting. You don't want to unfairly penalize that utility that maybe is only at 10 percent clean power. David Roberts:Can you expand on that a little bit? Utilities are at very different places — financially, in terms of power mix, etc. How is the plan customized on a per-utility basis? If I'm a coal-heavy utility, what does it look like to me?Sen. Tina Smith:If you are a coal-heavy utility, this is very much in your favor, because you need to figure out how to add clean while you have a lot of assets in coal power. Rather than having your utility ratepayers end up having higher rates in the short term because you're adding new, clean power capital infrastructure, this would help you to add clean. You may be a utility that's only 10 to 20 percent clean; so under our plan, we would still ask you to add clean power every year at a percentage level yet to be negotiated, at a pace that is moving you strongly and speedily in the right direction. But there's no expectation that a utility that starts at, say, a 10 percent clean power percentage must catch up with a utility in the Pacific Northwest that relies heavily on hydropower and may easily get to 85 or 90 percent clean within a 10-year period. At the end of that 10-year period, you're going to have some utilities that are over 80 percent, and some that are below 80 percent. The utilities I speak to that are farther along will probably argue that it's harder for them to add that incremental 20 percent of clean, whereas the utility that’s starting with ample, untapped renewable resources, you could argue that they could add quicker.David Roberts: So there's a national average target, but it's not that each utility has to hit that same target.Sen. Tina Smith:That is exactly right. That's the flexibility. It makes it much more appealing to utilities that are not as far along the curve. David Roberts:This brings up another question. You're trying to figure out from our present vantage point what level of payments and what pace of change would yield 80 percent by 2030. It seems like it's hard to know right now exactly what those numbers are. So if the program is put in place, and payments are at a certain level, and the pace of change is set at a certain level, and it turns out in 2024 we find out we're not on track to hit the national target, are there provisions in place to adjust those numbers as we go?Sen. Tina Smith: That is a great and interesting question. I'm now going to get really wonky into the details about Senate process, because what we're using here is a process called budget reconciliation, which is a budget-driven process. What that means in practical terms is that much of the implementation and the rules around how this plan gets implemented will be left to the Department of Energy. They are writing the rules, because this is a budget process, it's not a regular process. But let me see if I can answer your question a little bit at least. One thing I would point out is that historically, the cost curve of clean power has gone down more quickly than we anticipated. So it seems to me that, particularly for solar, for which we know the cost is going down really dramatically, we are just as likely to see power added more quickly than we originally anticipated as taking longer than we anticipated. The overall question about how the Department of Energy would write the rules to accomplish this would probably end up being addressed in rulemaking. It gets to the question of: what do you anticipate? What do you think is going to happen? The way that we've designed this is based on a ton of modeling from the Department of Energy, and also from outside groups who have expertise in modeling. That gives us a good framework for making some assumptions about how this is going to pan out in the real world.David Roberts:You've said before that you don't actually expect utilities to be fined very often, since they'd be dumb not to take incentives that are on the table. But are there protections written in about where the fines come from? And how the incentive payments are used? How closely is that specified in the bill?Sen. Tina Smith:This gets at a real strength of the policy. First of all, the answer is yes, we want to write into this what are allowable uses for the incentive payments. It could be building out clean resources. It could be deploying carbon capture technology. It could be adding energy efficiency resources to a system, because if you think about it, if you are reducing electricity demand at the same time that you're adding clean, the percentage of clean of your overall system goes up faster. So that would be an allowable use. I speak to utilities and power generators that have coal power plants or natural gas plants that they want to phase out, but they have a stranded asset; you could potentially use these resources to help to retire those resources more quickly. Then, similarly, we need to have rules around who bears the cost of the penalties, in order to protect ratepayers as much as possible. But as I said, this isn't like the old cap-and-trade mentality, where a utility is looking at this and saying, my cost of paying the fee is lower than making the investment — this just isn't set up that way. That's a strength.David Roberts:It's a little bit more transparent than cap-and-trade; the money is more in the headline and less something you have to deduce. How do you pitch this program to a person — say, for instance, a friend of yours named Joe — in a coal-heavy state, with a lot of coal-related jobs? Fossil fuel-heavy states have traditionally been resistant to things like this because they feel like they're starting on the back foot. In terms of both the power mix and the job mix, how do you pitch this program to a coal state?Sen. Tina Smith:It's interesting. I think about answering that question from the perspective of a place in Minnesota that is similar in many ways to parts of West Virginia, which is Minnesota’s Iron Range. This is a part of my state where the bread and butter of the economy, and historically the culture and the source of pride, has been mining iron, and then taconite, and producing the iron that has driven the economy of the United States. There is a real sense in that part of Minnesota, just as I think there is in West Virginia — though Joe Manchin knows way more about West Virginia than anybody — that this economy is getting passed by. There are new opportunities out there, but is it ever going to come to me, to my community, to my world? That is one of the real strengths of this idea. First of all, clean power, including renewable energy, is rural energy. That's where it is most likely developed. In fact, West Virginia has abundant renewable energy assets that are waiting to be developed. If you care about wanting to be a part of this clean-energy transition — which is, by the way, going to happen — the question is: Do you want to lead? Do you want to be in the forefront of that? Or do you want to be behind?The opportunities for West Virginia, and other states that are part of the traditional fossil fuel economy, to seize this moment, to move forward with the kinds of proposals that Joe Manchin has put forward, like the American Jobs in Energy Manufacturing Act, and deploying carbon capture and storage technology, and taking advantage of the skills and expertise of the working folks in West Virginia to drive those innovations — to me, that's all about being in the forefront.In fact, the West Virginia University Law School just put out a really excellent summary of what moving to this clean energy future could mean for West Virginia in terms of increase in employment, growth, and state GDP, opportunity for new investment that creates new jobs. It demonstrates where the opportunity is, in West Virginia and other places.David Roberts:As a matter of fact, I just posted a piece yesterday about West Virginia and that study. One of the interesting things about that study is it shows pretty substantial benefits for West Virginia, but the analysis was done before the Clean Electricity Payment Program was on the table. So the Clean Electricity Payment Program would more than double all those benefits; the amount of money that could flow into the state from federal coffers just through the Clean Electricity Payment Program is pretty enormous.Sen. Tina Smith:It is. It's such a perfect case study of how, the way that this is structured, along with the other clean and renewable energy tax credits, is actually a giant boost to employment and jobs, and not a gloom and doom, “we're going to all have to sacrifice because the climate is warming” mindset that has too often been the way that these issues have been approached.David Roberts: Of course, the question for West Virginia is: compared to what? What is the alternative? Coal is on its way out, according to the markets,…

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