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    Volts

    Volts is a podcast about leaving fossil fuels behind. I’ve been reporting on and explaining clean-energy topics for almost 20 years, and I love talking to politicians, analysts, innovators, and activists about the latest progress in the world’s most important fight. (Volts is entirely subscriber-supported. Sign up!)

    www.volts.wtf

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    Copyright: © David Roberts

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    Latest Episodes:
    Discussing disinformation and media with Matt Sheffield Aug 30, 2023
    Show notes

    In this episode, right-wing media critic Matt Sheffield and I discuss the disinformation crisis and the climate change crisis, and how they are deeply intertwined.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsMatt Sheffield started his first conservative media website, bashing news anchor Dan Rather for liberal bias, way back in 2000, and in subsequent years became a key figure in right-wing media criticism. But the rise of Trump left him disillusioned and he has since become a prominent critic of right-wing media. He now runs a site called Flux dedicated to accurate, inclusive journalism.Last week, Matt and I got together on one of these live Twitter Spaces things — a glorified conference call, basically, to which people can tune in and ask questions — and had a wide-ranging conversation about the disinformation crisis, how it manifested in climate change, and what can be done about it. The audio was archived, available exclusively to Flux and Volts subscribers. I hope you enjoy it.Matt SheffieldWe're doing a space tonight to discuss climate change and the birth of the disinformation economy. And David has been a longtime climate change correspondent and environmental columnist for a while, and he's also the proprietor and publisher, writer, et cetera, of Volts, a newsletter, which he started one year ago today, which he was just recounting that for our previous space, which I accidentally ended somehow. So your experience overall has been pretty good, you were saying? And I think I ended the space inadvertently right after you said you work better alone.David RobertsYes —Matt SheffieldI inadvertently proved your point, I think.David RobertsYes. This is why I don't talk to people. Yeah, it's been going great. I have found that readers are excited to go deeper and wonkier and share my obsessions. I'm sure different writers have different opinions about this, but I much prefer it over writing for a general interest publication.Matt SheffieldAnd you wrote a retrospective on your site today that — one of the things you said is that you appreciated not having to reintroduce topics over and over again in terms of — you assume that your current readers actually know who you are and something about the material, I guess.David RobertsRight, yes. It's the famed return to blogging. It is a persistent audience who will follow me over time and thus who I don't have to explain that climate change is bad in every post anymore.Matt SheffieldYeah. And I guess it's a way of trying to have a continued conversation rather than one that starts over de novo every time. Right?David RobertsYes. And it's explicitly I mean, I did it knowing that I would be writing for a much smaller audience. It's not a mass audience play. It's very much for a self-selecting group of people who are more than average interested in my subject matter. So I think it can still have influence because I think the people who do read it are sprinkled throughout the world, the energy world, in high places. But I've basically transitioned away from mass writing, I guess is what I'd say.Matt SheffieldSo now, before you were doing just for those again who hadn't seen what you were doing before you were working at Vox and then before that you were working at Grist, which is a website that's still out there doing climate coverage. How is it different now compared to your Grist days would you say?David RobertsOh goodness. Well for one thing I didn't know what the hell I was doing back in my Grist days. I was hired at Grist as an editorial assistant in I think like 2004 with no background in journalism and no real background in environmentalism which is what Grist was supposedly about and knowing nothing at all about climate change or anything really. So the ten years I spent at Grist were in retrospect it's something I think journalists don't really get anymore these days, which was it was a place where I could labor in obscurity while I learned what the hell I was doing.Matt SheffieldYeah. And I think that's an interesting observation you make there because that is one of the things that's definitely very different about media now is that you and I are both Gen Xers in our forties and in the old days, the media industry was very sort of anti young people in terms of letting them have public facing work to a large degree. And so basically they had people work as research assistants or as publicists or something like that —David RobertsOr come up through local papers. I'm old enough to remember when the way you came up through the reporting game is through local papers. And it's interesting if you go through that route you're taught a certain set of skills and rules and norms but I wasn't taught those at all. I had never had any experience in that world at all. So all I was reacting to and sort of shaping myself around was what do readers like? What is helpful to readers? And if you just follow that string you don't end up in the model of the inverted pyramid, daily objective third voice — information is relevant.You know what I mean? There's no spine to your research. You don't know what you're looking for. And this is the sort of feeling I get from reading lots of objective news stories. It's like a grab bag of facts. It's like a grab bag of true things. They're all true. But how do they hang together? What do they all mean? That's what's missing. And once you approach it that way, what is sort of my narrative here? What kinds of things am I researching? What kinds of arguments am I trying to make that helps you know where to dig and doing that over time informs you more fully I think, than you get informed doing objective style reporting.Matt SheffieldTraditional training with journalism has also it made it to the point of the topic today about climate change and disinformation. It made them very basically totally unprepared to understand how a gaslighting campaign was being built right in front of their eyes. They couldn't even see it happening. And you could argue that this was something that probably was first done by the tobacco industry in the 1950s and 60s when they did research that figured out that smoking causes cancer and how do we keep the public from knowing that? But basically that information, understanding how that happened and why it happened, it never really filtered down into elite journalism, I would say.And climate change was kind of the next area where this —David RobertsIt happens again and again and it happens — these critiques of the flaws of this style of journalism are things people have been saying for decades now. When I first started in this whole game in the early 2000s, it was sort of the rise of the net roots and the sort of famous like, oh, the bastions of the mainstream media are being stormed by these outsiders, all this blah blah, all this sort of utopian talk. But all these critiques of media that we're talking about here were around then the both sides saying, the sort of fetishizing of moderate being whatever happens to be wherever the two is between, where the two parties are.David RobertsAll this kind of stuff has been around so long now that I've come to find it very difficult to believe that the people involved don't understand these critiques or don't know what's happening. They get it yelled — if nothing else, every time they go out on Twitter, that people yell it at them. So they've definitely heard it. The thing is, you have know, economists annoy me in a lot of ways, but one thing I sort of have picked up from economists is, it's helpful — one helpful lens on any situation is what is the incentive structure? What are people incentivized, what are people rewarded and punished for?And you can do that sort of brain-dead, both sides, journalism forever. And there's never a penalty, there's never a downside. Like, you might have people like me yelling at you on Twitter, but in the world of media professionals, that will never count against you. Whereas if you betray an opinion or know, like we saw it during the Trump years, like, sometimes journalists would get really worked up and they'd be like, "I think taking kids from their parents at the border when they're seeking asylum and holding them in cages without telling them where their parents are is bad" and you know, the whole right would just jump on it.They'd be like, "Oh, there's a biased anti-Trump reporter." And then of course, that would cause the editors and everyone to retreat, duly retreat, like they do every time. And just that cycle over and over again, over time means as a professional reporter in DC, as a professional politics reporter, doing the brain-dead objective, both sides, horse race, blah blah, blah, is without downsides. You can get ahead doing that. There's no risk to it. So unless they're sort of like gripped by a civic spirit or whatever, why would they stop?Matt SheffieldYeah, no, I think that's right. And then besides, from what you're calling effectively market incentives, there —David RobertsThere are social and reputational incentives too.Matt SheffieldYeah. No, I agree. And the other thing is that just in terms of how being a journalist works in the print business for a long time, there was this term that people use that "I have to fill the news hole." That was how they thought about making their product. But in retrospect, when you think about that phrasing, it's just basically you're going to fill it with what? By shoveling s**t down the hole?David RobertsWell, imagine there being any space without news already in it anymore. Show me a news hole in the universe.Matt SheffieldYeah, no, that's fair. And yeah, like a lot of this stuff though. Yeah, you're right that those critiques have always been there, and I'd say they're still certainly relevant. I mean, just yesterday, Politico ran an article in which they criticized Vice President Kamala Harris for being Bluetooth phobic. Because she was concerned that Bluetooth has some security risks as a wireless technology. It actually does.David RobertsThis is the nonsense things about that. You could go on forever. But just one note, like note that the whole critique from people like us of the mainstream political media in 2006 can be boiled down to two words: Her emails. Right. They spent an absurd amount of time on that ridiculous non-story, and that has become shorthand for the whole critique of mainstream media. So for them to go after Kamala Harris for information security specifically, not for breaching it, but for being too concerned about it, it's hard to interpret that as anything but a deliberate "F**k you" to every media critic of the last five years.Right? I mean, it's not just any shallow, stupid story. It's very specifically a shallow, stupid story that is the opposite they attacked the last woman for just as though to say as though to flag, "Yes, hell yes, we're going to do this again. Hell yes, we are."Matt SheffieldYeah, well, and it's the opposite. Her behavior is the literal opposite of Trump because when Trump was the president, he had a standard issue iPhone that he was tweeting on and his Twitter account had I think the password was "Make America Great Again." So his Twitter account got hacked twice while he was the president.David RobertsThe whole four years was among all the other things, it was one long series of sort of horrendous information security stories, leaks and breaches and like emails being Cc'd here and there and emails from illegal accounts. The media didn't give a s**t because they never gave a s**t about infosecurity. That's never what it was about. It was always retrofit from the narrative they wanted to tell.Matt SheffieldYeah, well, and I think the other thing is that there's this sort of desperate, rote idea of making — our job is to hold public officials accountable. And so they think, obviously that is a journalist job. But on the other hand, that shouldn't be the number one principle because otherwise you just end up with these ridiculous stories. So in other words, like the Harris Bluetooth story, basically our vice president is taking too much security. That makes no sense in any possible world except under the rubric of, well, our job is to criticize public officials.David RobertsWell, this is what accountability has become, right? It's shrunk to this ridiculous sort of brain-dead version of itself where these reporters just feel like I need to write negative stories about the administration. That's what tough journalism is. That's what real journalism is, just negative stories. And notice if you're not allowed to have any opinions about policy, or about whether it's good to jail children or about morality or about anything, you're not allowed to make any moral or ethical judgments. That means you can't hold a president or vice president responsible in those terms. Right? So the only terms you have to quote, unquote, hold them responsible are just these sort of shallow, like "Yesterday you said one thing and today you said something that sounds slightly different" or like "Oh, in the campaign you said you were going to unite people, but oh, look, people are still fighting" just the most sort of goofy, brain-dead versions of accountability you could imagine. To truly hold the president accountable means you got to care about something and understand something and desire one outcome over another, you know what I mean? And they're just not allowed to do any of that. So what there is of accountability ends up just being these sort of shallow gotcha gimmicky stories.Matt SheffieldYeah, no, exactly. And it is a very big contributor to how we got to this present situation where you have one party that has basically decided that if we lose elections, then we will end democracy. That's our belief now. And if moderation is simply splitting the difference between the two parties, well, then I guess that means ending democracy isn't good. But maybe just trimming it around the edges and curtailing it is okay.David RobertsSome Democrats say that democracy is good, critics argue otherwise.Matt SheffieldYeah, exactly.David RobertsWell, what I've seen happen is, and we saw this forecast a long time ago in the climate change space, is the thinking is basically what is good for us, our tribe, which is white Christian, rural and ex-urban conservatives, basically the Republican party has become quite monolithic in that respect. So what's good for our tribe? That determines not only what's politically good, that determines what's true. So everything else becomes subordinate to that. Including facts, including democracy, including truth. Everything has become subordinate to what it is in the immediate interests of our tribe. That's what I think you see reaching its sort of absurd reductio ad absurdum results before us now is right-wing media is just "What is true, is what is good for us." So what is good for us? That's what we're going to write. The whole notion of any metric of truth or even any conception of truth, that transcends tribe, that transcends partisanship has just completely fallen out of the picture now. It's just like, what do we need to believe? That is what we shall believe. It's frictionless.Matt SheffieldAnd as somebody who worked in that world for a number of years, all Republican operatives pretty much have this idea that everything is debatable, everything is subject to opinion. It's just a matter…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Don't Look Up: the first good movie about climate change Dec 10, 2021
    Show notes

    One of the most devilish aspects of climate change is that it resists good art. But Adam McKay, director first of comedies like Anchorman and later of more serious fare like The Big Short, has cracked the code. Don’t Look Up (in theaters today; coming to Netflix on Dec. 24) is the first climate movie — the first work of art about climate change of any kind — to hold my rapt attention from start to finish. It is fantastic.

    One reason it’s so good is that it isn’t really about climate change at all. It’s about a pair of scientists, played by Leo DiCaprio and Jennifer Lawrence, who discover that a large comet is heading directly toward Earth and will strike, and wipe out all life on the planet, in just over six months. They try to tell people. It does not go well.

    Don’t Look Up attempts to capture, not so much climate change itself, but one of the most vertiginously weird aspects of understanding climate change: you know this terrible thing is coming and yet … no one’s acting like it. You end up feeling like the ranting guy on the street corner waving a sign about how the end is nigh.

    The movie is about having knowledge but being unable to make the knowledge matter, being unable to make anyone hear or act on it. By compressing the timeline to six months and making the threat a singular force, visible in the sky, it brings the absurdity of the situation to the surface. It’s hilarious, and if you’ve spent years banging your head against a wall trying to get people to pay attention to climate change, you will find a great deal of catharsis in the laughter.

    Before we get to the movie, a word on climate and art.

    Climate change makes for bad art

    By its very nature, climate change is abstract, the sum of millions of observations and long chains of reasoning. It unfolds slowly, over the course of decades and centuries. Its effects are felt incrementally, across the globe, in disparate ways.

    In short, climate change isn’t a good villain. It has no plans or intentions. It’s not even a singular force, it is simply the descriptor we apply to the panoply of changes happening around us.

    The magic trick of good art is that it uses specificity — particular people, places, and relationships — to evoke universal human feelings. We have been designed by evolution to feel most intensely about things that are close to us, within spatial and temporal boundaries that are legible to us. We’re not designed to feel anything about a projected 50-year change in global average temperature.

    We can know and understand that forecast in an intellectual way, but to really feel it, to integrate it into one’s basic narratives and worldview, requires conscious cultivation. It does not come naturally; it is not universal.

    That makes climate change a lousy subject for art. Over the years that I have been writing about it I have been exposed to many, many songs, poems, documentaries, short stories, and novels about it. They are all like vegan food: the intentions are commendable, the spirit is good, it even looks on the outside like normal food, but the taste … let’s just say, it feels like I’m supposed to be eating it, and if I weren’t supposed to, I’d be eating something else that tastes better.

    (Vegans: I love you. Please do not write me angry emails.)

    So too with climate art. It runs into one or more of four main dangers.

    One, it can be treacly. This is most climate documentaries: swelling orchestral music beneath shot after shot of Natural Beauty Under Threat.

    Two, in order to compress climate change into something dramatic on a human time scale, it can mangle the science, as in 2004’s The Day After Tomorrow, wherein a key scene finds our heroes fleeing from an oncoming wall of, uh, freezing. It’s not that I’m a stickler for strict scientific accuracy in art, but once you make climate change into a disaster fit for a disaster movie, you’ve changed all the structural features that make the climate crisis what it is. You’re not illuminating anything about the reality.

    Three, it can be overly oblique, a metaphor for climate change that is so generic — “nature is good” (Avatar); “dystopia is bad” (Snowpiercer) — as to say nothing about climate change in particular.

    Fourth, it can end up being didactic or educational. Though it is by all accounts informed and magisterial, I could could not get through Kim Stanley Robinson’s The Ministry for the Future. After an intense first chapter, it became a series of white papers teaching me stuff I already know. If I wanted to read PDFs I’d just read PDFs.

    Climate is perilous territory for art. That brings us to Don’t Look Up.

    Don’t Look Up defies the trend

    I went into this film with extremely low expectations. I’ve seen the subject of climate change humble too many eager artists and storytellers to have much faith that anyone in Hollywood would get it right.

    When I heard the basic setup — an analogy that everyone in the climate world has pondered at some point — my expectations did not rise. There are so many ways a story like that could go wrong. It could be broad or ham-handed; it could be overly clever; it could be didactic and preachy.

    But somehow it’s great. I suppose that’s what happens when you get this idea in the hands of smart writers (politics’ own David Sirota helped with the story; McKay wrote the screenplay) and an unbelievably stacked cast.

    DiCaprio and Lawerence convincingly shrink into nebbishy scientists, he with a middle-aged gut, she with unfortunate bangs. The MAGA president and the boozy cable news host could easily have been caricatures, but Meryl Streep and Cate Blanchett are incapable of a false note. Every role down to the most incidental is played by marquee performers who fill their screen time with thoughtful choices. Every performance lands, keeping the proceedings grounded even as they grow more ridiculous.

    It’s extremely funny, but not with rat-a-tat jokes. These are recognizably human characters, not broad types, stuck in absurd situations; the laughs arise out of the structure. There’s an editing technique used again and again: just as a scene is in the midst of its manic peak, there will be a hard cut to a new, quiet scene, often characters trying to process what happened. It made me laugh every time. (Credit to the venerable Hank Corwin for editing.)

    Though it flirts with it at times, it never descends into farce. It’s just that everyone finds themselves lost in the same disorienting information environment, unable to connect.

    Also? About two-thirds of the way through the movie, Timothée Chalamet wanders in as a character with no obvious connection to the plot and no clear reason to be there, but who is nonetheless an absolute delight for every second he’s on screen.

    The film manages to be funny and allegorical and human all at once. But I think long-time climate hawks will take special pleasure in it.

    So many climate feels, captured for the first time

    I have no idea how normal people — people who haven’t spent most of their adult lives immersed in the subject of climate change — will process this movie. Will they see the climate analogy at all? It could just as easily be read as an analogy for Covid, or biodiversity loss, or nuclear war.

    But if you’re a climate hawk, there’s no mistaking it: McKay has clearly been involved in this subject for a while. He captures a whole series of feelings and experiences that are painfully familiar.

    There’s the feeling of telling the government about a threat and having it shrugged off. There’s the feeling of telling the press about the threat and having it subsumed and lost in the flattening stream of 24-hour content. There’s the feeling of being mocked and memed for being alarmed. There’s the feeling of needing to prove people wrong on the internet.

    There’s the feeling of watching a body of science become the target of wild conspiracy theories and a partisan culture war. There’s the feeling of seeing the most obvious solutions to the problem delayed and deferred over corporate profits. There’s the feeling of seeing people jump straight from denial to nihilism, without any being-helpful stage in the middle. There’s the sinking feeling of watching people who have accepted the threat turning to glittery promises of future high-tech solutions.

    There’s the feeling — which DiCaprio captures in a mid-movie rant that I, at least, found incredibly emotional — of hoping against hope that someone in charge, despite all the appearance of venality and stupidity, knows what they’re doing, has a handle on this thing.

    And perhaps most acute of all, there’s the feeling that we simply can’t communicate any more, that there’s no way to establish a shared reality or shared priorities. Everything is absorbed by the information/media/entertainment machine, blasted out at the same volume as dozens of other daily clickbait outrages, and soon forgotten, like all the rest. Nothing lands, nothing sticks. There’s no way to cut through the noise.

    “If we can’t all agree at the bare minimum that a giant comet the size of Mt. Everest hurtling its way toward planet Earth is not a f*****g good thing,” DiCaprio cries, his voice cracking, “then what the hell happened to us? I mean, my God, how do we even talk to each other? What have we done to ourselves? How do we fix it?”

    The movie does not offer answers to these questions. Without any spoilers, I can say it’s a pretty pessimistic take on our capacity for collective action. But I found it incredibly cathartic just to see my specific brand of anguish portrayed with such insight, more than I ever expected from a big-budget Hollywood movie.

    Back here in the real world, climate remains stubbornly uncathartic. It has no six-month deadline; it will play out slowly over our whole lives and beyond. There will be no final moment of recognition and no clear line between success and failure. The result will be an unsatisfying muddle at every stage, with more suffering than there should have been but less than there could have been.

    Still, we know that, in some sense, the comet has already begun striking. We’ve already lost some stability, some biodiversity, some lands and lives, and we will lose more, no matter what we do. It’s baked in at this point. We are living in the most stable climate we will ever experience. Every decade from now on will get warmer — more of the comet will strike. We can only control the scale of the damage.

    After I watched Don’t Look Up (thank you Netflix), as I was eating dinner with my family, I couldn’t stop thinking about DiCaprio’s final words in the movie, as he is surrounded at the dinner table by family and friends: “We really did have everything, didn’t we?”


    This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.volts.wtf/subscribe

    Volts one-year anniversary: a letter to readers Dec 07, 2021
    Show notes

    On Dec. 7, 2020, one year ago, I sent out the first Volts post. At the time, I was extremely nervous. I had left behind a stable job at Vox and had no idea if a newsletter dedicated to clean energy and politics would find any readers, much less readers who would pay.

    Over the last year I dug into carbon markets, transmission systems, lithium-ion batteries, and 24/7 carbon-free energy. I profiled new clean-energy legislation in Washington state, Colorado, and Illinois. There was a little philosophy and a lot of politics and policy. For the podcast, I talked to researchers, analysts, activists, and politicians.

    I have reason to believe Volts has reached the corridors of power, though Joe Manchin has by all accounts remained immune to its charms.

    I have a long list of topics for next year: clean-energy materials and recycling, embodied carbon, hydropower, hydrogen, and the possibilities for political progress under a dysfunctional (and possibly soon fascist) national government.

    Anyway, one year in is probably too soon to draw any definitive conclusions, but from what I can tell, it’s working. I am absurdly grateful.

    I try not to indulge in too much navel-gazing — mostly I keep that stuff confined to my neurotic inner monologue — but in this post I want to reflect a little bit on why I started Volts and what to expect from it in the coming year.

    And I want to ask you, if you haven’t already, to sign up for a paid subscription — or, if you have a subscription already, to purchase one for someone else, perhaps as a holiday gift.

    So: why did I start Volts? Two basic reasons.

    Writing for my people …

    One, although Vox gave me tons of latitude, there are limits to what you can do at a general-interest, ad-supported publication. You have to aim wide, to try to snare as many people as possible. Readers are likely to encounter your headline floating on Twitter or in their Facebook news feeds — you can not assume they know anything about you, your past work, or your subject matter.

    So every new piece has to be an introduction. You can’t use any allusions to your previous work. You can’t reference any inside jokes. You can’t take anything for granted. (I can’t count how any times I had to explain that renewable energy is good because it reduces carbon emissions, which is good because it slows climate change, which is bad.)

    And you can’t be too weird or idiosyncratic. Ultimately, though it is much more flexible than many publications, Vox needs every piece to be, at a basic level, a Vox piece. It has to represent the brand. That’s true for any publication or institution.

    There’s nothing wrong with that — Vox has a great brand! If you visit, as I regularly do, you’re guaranteed to find a bunch of good Voxy pieces.

    But I got tired of writing for everyone and no one in particular. I was ready to write for my people, to gather them up and take them with me so that we could learn together, follow ongoing themes and narratives, develop some in jokes, and shower the appropriate amount of love and attention on my dogs.

    I’m well aware that I reached more people at Vox than I ever will at Volts. My gamble was simply that there would be enough of my people, and that they would be generous enough, that I could make a living writing for them — just them, not any “average reader” or editor or boss or publication.

    I wanted to strip everything else away — the pressure to please higher-ups, the imperatives of attention-hunting in modern mass media — and focus purely on adding value, being of use.

    … rather than The Man

    The second reason I started Volts is that I am, at heart, a child of Gen X: I don’t want to work for The Man. I don’t want to make money for Comcast, or any giant media company, or any company at all, really. I don’t want to feel beholden to any advertiser or sponsor. I don’t want to be a representative of any faction or institution.

    At Volts, I have only one incentive: to provide a service that you, my readers, find valuable enough to pay for. There’s no one here but you and me.

    That feels like an honest living. It feels like something solid I can hang on to in increasingly turbulent times.

    Volts survives entirely through subscriptions

    I am editor-at-large for Canary Media, a relationship that allows my posts to be reprinted and reach more readers. But I live or die through paid subscriptions to Volts.

    There are certain things I could do to boost my revenue that I’m not willing to do. I don’t want to put content behind a paywall — I want to be as useful as possible to as many readers as possible, even those who can’t afford a paid subscription. And I don’t want to hassle my mailing list with reminders and special offers and fundraising drives and bonus content. That stuff feels squicky to me.

    But I do need to make enough money to live. And I’d like to make enough to be able to expand Volts and bring on new features and guest writers.

    So I’m asking you, if you value what I do here and are in a financial position to do so, to sign up for a paid subscription or buy one for someone else.

    For a year, you’ll pay about what you’d pay for one solo night out at a decent restaurant. You will get the ability to comment on posts and discussion threads, to be a part of the growing (and incredibly sharp and helpful) Volts community, but more than that, you will make it possible for me to keep doing this, to continue being of use.

    Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

    I’ll do this as long as I can survive doing it. I hope it’s of service to you and you’ll support it.


    This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.volts.wtf/subscribe

    24/7 carbon-free energy: everything in one place Nov 29, 2021
    Show notes

    When I first started looking into 24/7 carbon-free energy (CFE) — a company or city matching its electricity consumption with clean electricity production on an hourly basis, throughout the year — I intended to write a single post on it. That worked out about as well as usual.

    Below are summaries of and links to each of the 24/7 CFE posts. Above is a 24/7 CFE mega-pod, with the last three pods strung together into one podcast.

    * An introduction to energy's hottest new trend: 24/7 carbon-free electricityWhat it would mean to supply a company or city with clean energy for every hour of its electricity consumption, every day of the year; why a company or city would want to do that; what kind of technology could do it; what market reforms are required to enable it.

    * Is 24/7 carbon-free energy the right goal?Critics say that companies would be better off focusing solely on reductions in carbon emissions — after all, from the atmosphere’s perspective, no company’s emissions are more significant than any other’s. But proponents say 24/7 CFE accomplishes things beyond reducing carbon emissions.

    * The long-term promise of 24/7 carbon-free electricitySome new modeling of 24/7 procurement out of Princeton reveals what it will do to carbon emissions, how much more it will cost, and the innovation and development it could spark in clean energy.

    Volts is free of ads or sponsorships; it runs entirely on reader subscriptions. If you value this kind of explanatory journalism, please consider becoming a paid subscriber to Volts, or giving someone you know a subscription as a gift. I appreciate you all.


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    The long-term promise of 24/7 carbon-free electricity Nov 24, 2021
    Show notes

    Over the course of the last few days … [checks calendar] … er, month, I’ve been digging into the new trend in voluntary climate action: procuring 24/7 carbon-free electricity (CFE), matching consumption with production every hour of every day.

    In my first post, I introduced the idea and explained what motivates it and what it entails. In my second, I puzzled through the biggest controversy around it, which is about whether it’s the right goal at all — whether companies and cities ought instead to focus solely on reducing emissions (with no regard to who produced them, or where).

    This post will make a great deal more sense to you if you’ve read those.

    Today, in the final post in this series (promise), we’re going to look at some new modeling of 24/7 procurement from Princeton’s ZERO Lab and see if it can shed some light on the trade-offs among different procurement strategies. Then we’ll wrap up with some provisional conclusions.

    The model

    ZERO Lab models three scenarios for voluntary corporate clean-energy procurement, with 10 percent participation from the commercial and industrial (C&I) sector: no procurement (as a baseline), procuring for 100 percent annual match on a volumetric basis, and procuring for 24/7 match.

    Each scenario is run in two separate markets, California and the PJM Interconnection (an electricity balancing area that covers 13 Northeastern states and DC). Modeling in two markets helps tease out how 24/7 could unfold differently depending on how clean a grid is to begin with — high penetration of variable renewables in California vs. a relatively dirty grid in the Northeast.

    The model is premised on the idea that participating C&I customers aggregate their demand and pool their purchasing power, effectively acting as a miniature balancing authority. This may or may not be how things play out in the real world. Customers could act on their own, disaggregated and uncoordinated. The lab’s going to model that kind of scenario soon.

    Note: The lab did not model a procurement strategy optimized to reduce maximum carbon emissions. (Jesse Jenkins, who leads the lab, refuses to use the word “emissionality.” He insists on “carbon-optimized procurement.” Don’t worry, he’ll crack like the rest of us.) Modeling carbon-optimized procurement would have been a lot of extra work and the funder of the research, Google, did not ask or pay them to do it, so if you’re a wealthy corporate or philanthropy out there reading this, pay the lab to model it!

    Let’s look at a few of the findings.

    24/7 procurement reduces the carbon intensity of a company’s energy portfolio

    As companies push their CFE scores higher — meaning, as they match more and more of their hourly consumption with hourly production of CFE — they reduce the carbon intensity of their portfolio. At a certain level of CFE, they reduce it beyond what they would accomplish with 100 percent annual matching.

    Take California. It already has a fairly clean grid — every company starts with a minimum CFE score of 64 percent, just by being located there. If a company procures the cheapest clean energy to match 100 percent of its annual consumption, its CFE score gets to 75 percent. There are still 25 percent of hours in which it is drawing on at least some fossil energy.

    As a company’s CFE scores rise beyond 75 percent, the emissions rate of its portfolio falls further, steadily to zero at a CFE score of 100 percent.

    (Another note here: “Current technologies” means wind, solar, batteries, and, at least in California, conventional geothermal. “Advanced technologies, no combustion” includes advanced geothermal and nuclear, along with long-duration energy storage. “Advanced technologies, full portfolio” includes all of the above, plus natural gas with carbon capture and sequestration [CCS] and combustion turbines running on zero-carbon hydrogen fuels. The reason the green bar never fully reaches a zero emissions rate is that there are residual emissions associated with natural gas and CCS.)

    PJM is a different story. It’s pretty dirty — participants there start with a baseline CFE score of just 22 percent. So a simple strategy of 100 percent annual matching results in a huge drop in emissions rate, though it only gets participants to a CFE score of 62 percent. Once again, as participants raise their CFE scores beyond that, the emission rate declines to zero.

    However, 24/7 procurement does not just reduce participants’ own emissions rates.

    24/7 procurement drives more system-level carbon reductions

    In California, if 10 percent of the C&I sector participates, 24/7 procurement would reduce more system-level (as opposed to participant-level) emissions than a 100 percent annual matching strategy, starting at a collective CFE score of 88 percent.

    There are two explanations for this. The first is a volume effect — participants doing 24/7 matching simply have to buy more CFE, and with more CFE, more fossil generation is displaced. The second is a timing effect — participants doing 24/7 matching procure resources that better match demand patterns, thus displacing more fossil generation.

    Here’s PJM:

    PJM starts out with much less solar and wind. That means that, while the volume effect does advantage 24/7 once CFE scores reach 90 percent, the timing effect isn’t very pronounced (the marginal generator is basically always fossil), and the net difference doesn’t amount to much.

    So 24/7 procurement reduces more system-level emissions than 100 percent annual matching, but only at relatively high CFE scores and not by a huge amount.

    24/7 procurement comes at a relatively steep cost premium

    There’s no two ways about it: 24/7 procurement costs more. And the costs rise as CFE scores get closer to 100 percent, especially if only current technologies are available.

    Here’s California.

    Note that covering that last 10 percent, getting from 90 to 100 percent CFE, sees costs rapidly escalate, especially for the last 2 percent.

    If only commercially available technologies are put to use, 24/7 CFE is 64 percent more expensive than 100 percent annual matching. If a full portfolio of technologies is available, it’s only 39 percent more expensive.

    The current technology costs are easy to explain: it’s extremely expensive to cover the last 10 percent of consumption with only wind, solar, batteries, and conventional geothermal. But why is the green line so much lower than the blue line?

    The difference between blue and green comes down to which clean-firm sources are available. The “no combustion” set — long-duration energy storage, advanced geothermal, and advanced nuclear — has high fixed costs (labor and construction) and low variable costs (operation and maintenance).

    But the “full portfolio” set includes combustion-based sources like natural gas with CCS and turbines running hydrogen fuels, which have lower fixed costs but higher variable costs, and that turns out to be much cheaper when the sources are run at low utilization rates, as these will be.

    In PJM, the cost differential is even greater:

    With only currently available technologies — which, remember, do not include geothermal in PJM — the cost of 24/7 procurement is 139 percent higher than the cost of 100 percent annual matching. Yikes.

    But with the full portfolio, 24/7 is only 54 percent more expensive. In PJM, “procuring clean firm generation or long duration energy storage technologies can significantly lower marginal abatement costs, particularly at higher CFE scores.” It really helps, on a dirty grid, to have some clean-firm sources that cover the last few percent.

    OK, let’s pause here and assess what we’ve learned. We know that 24/7 procurement can reduce and eventually zero out the carbon intensity of a participant’s own portfolio, though of course, from a climate perspective, that’s basically irrelevant. In system terms, 24/7 procurement reduces emissions more than 100 percent annual matching, but only a modest amount — and that modest amount comes at a substantial cost premium.

    Here the emissionality perspective taps us on the shoulder. It points out that, in either case (100 percent annual or 24/7) companies could reduce more emissions with the same amount of money by directing that money to dirtier grids. Companies are spending extra money to reduce “their own” emissions when the atmosphere doesn’t care whose emissions are whose.

    Emissionaries (ha ha, another new word!) might ask, what’s so great about 24/7 over and above 100 percent annual matching? Why are the companies procuring for 24/7 willing to spend so much more money for so little additional emission reduction? Why don’t they spend that money on dirty grids where it will reduce more emissions?

    The main answer from proponents is that 24/7 procurement will do more to prepare the way for, and reduce the cost of, full grid decarbonization. It is playing the long game.

    24/7 procurement drives early deployment of clean-firm sources

    While procuring for 100 percent annual matching generally means buying only wind and solar, procuring for 24/7 matching will necessarily include, depending on local prices and technology availability, not only batteries but “conventional and advanced geothermal, advanced nuclear, natural gas power plants with CCS, gas plants using zero-carbon fuels, and/or long duration energy storage.”

    Here’s 24/7 procurement in California with 10 percent C&I participation in 2030 with current tech, advanced tech with no combustion, and the full portfolio:

    In the first and second cases, the story is about solar, geothermal, and batteries. But with the full portfolio, geothermal drops out almost entirely, replaced by natural gas with CCS (and a few zero-carbon-fuel turbines), which will be considerably cheaper.

    This is not likely to be a popular result — I can’t say I like it — but it looks like, on grids with high penetration of variable renewables that need some low-utilization clean-firm generation to fill the gaps, natural gas with CCS may be the cheapest option.

    Here’s PJM:

    In the current-technologies case, it’s all about solar and batteries — and as we saw above, it’s expensive AF. In the advanced-tech-no-combustion case, advanced nuclear steps in and vastly reduces the total amount of CFE required, thus shaving off a big chunk of the cost.

    In the full-portfolio case, natural gas with CCS once again replaces most other clean-firm generation, including nuclear, reducing costs further.

    Summing up: “If 10% of C&I customers participate and reach 100% CFE, 1.9-2.3 GW of clean firm generation and long-duration storage capacity is deployed in California and 5.9-7.1 GW in PJM by 2030.”

    That’s a lot! Enough to kickstart those markets.

    “Just as 100% annual matching helped transform wind and solar PV from expensive ‘alternative energy sources’ to mainstream, affordable options for the world,” the report says, “24/7 procurement is likely to have similar transformative impacts on clean firm resources.”

    Here’s a chart of what different procurement strategies can accomplish:

    What’s the right time horizon for voluntary climate policy?

    So where does this leave us on the debate between 24/7 and emissionality? Should companies reduce their own hour-to-hour emissions or should they just reduce the most emissions they can, regardless of location and timing?

    Of course, there’s no real reason to pit them against one another. Companies can do one or the other or a mix, depending on their particular values. Nonetheless, it’s an intriguing question, and I admit to remaining torn.

    I frequently argue that post-2030 decarbonization is, if anything, drawing too much attention from policymakers, corporates, and tech types, at least relative to the prime directive of climate policy: rapidly reducing emissions in the coming decade by driving fossil fuel power plants off the grid with cheap wind and solar.

    That core task is by no means accomplished. Most grids in the US remain much dirtier than California’s, with plenty of room for more wind and solar. Before they get too excited about advanced nuclear and CCS, everyone needs to make sure that wind and solar are growing fast enough to mostly decarbonize the grid by 2030.

    I worry that 24/7 procurement is part of this trend: turning our eyes to the 2040-2050 horizon, the last 10 to 20 percent of grid decarbonization, before we have the first 80 percent locked in.

    That said, I don’t worry about that too much. Getting to 24/7 CFE will involve buying plenty of wind and solar along the way. Long-term power purchase agreements will remain the gold standard; hourly trading of renewable energy certificates will be used to fill in the gaps with balancing resources. And all the companies pursuing 24/7 procurement will be invested in their local grids building more wind and solar — it raises their CFE baseline.

    What’s more, I think the socio-technological process of stimulating innovation and development in these gap-filling clean-energy technologies is going to turn over all kinds of rocks and uncover all kinds of insights. We’re still somewhat guessing about which technologies will best play the clean-firm role. Reality could surprise us. The sooner we run that investigation, the sooner we’ll have a better grasp of exactly what we need and how to craft policy around it.

    So for now, I remain excited about 24/7 CFE and I can’t wait to see more companies and cities jump on the bandwagon. People are beginning to think about full decarbonization now. The engineers and accountants are running the numbers. We’re going to see some really cool stuff happen soon.


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    Is 24/7 carbon-free energy the right goal? Nov 19, 2021
    Show notes

    Last week, I wrote an introduction to the hot new trend in energy: 24/7 carbon-free energy (CFE), i.e., matching a company or city’s power consumption with production of clean electricity throughout the day, every hour of every day. If you haven’t read it yet, you’ll want to check it out before reading this post.Today, I want to talk about a big debate around 24/7 CFE, regarding whether it’s the right goal for companies and cities to adopt at all. Exploring that debate will help us get our heads around what 24/7 CFE can and can’t accomplish.But first, a quick refresher. Here’s the idea: right now, in addition to generating electricity, renewable energy projects generate renewable energy certificates (RECs), one for each megawatt-hour. They can sell the RECs to any entity looking to buy renewable energy. For instance, a company or city that wants to go “100 percent renewable” can simply buy enough RECs to cover its yearly electricity consumption.At least two changes would be required to make 24/7 CFE possible. First, “renewable energy” would expand to “carbon-free energy.” Any generator putting out electrons without carbon emissions, including nuclear or natural gas with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), would qualify. And second, RECs, rather than coming in month- or year-long chunks, would be issued in time-stamped increments of an hour, so that buyers could target procurement at the particular hours of the day when they need CFE. Eventually, each hourly REC would contain information about avoided carbon emissions, so buyers could tally up the carbon impact of their purchases. That’s the vision.In this post, I’m going to discuss an objection to 24/7 and some counter-arguments to the objection. Then, in my next post (yes, this is turning into 24/7 Month), I’ll look at some new modeling of the impact of 24/7 procurement and try to draw some conclusions. We’re going to have a good time.Measuring carbon is mostly doableAn intrinsic part of the 24/7 CFE vision is that each hourly REC will be tagged with a certain amount of avoided carbon. This will allow buyers to make procurement decisions that take emissions into account.There are some issues and controversies around calculating avoided carbon, though they’re not the ones I’m going to focus on today. Some carbon counters have proprietary formulas (like WattTime) and some are trying to develop open-source methods (like EnergyTag). The numbers they produce are not radically different, but they do differ. They vary in how they calculate the marginal (most expensive) energy source on the grid at a given moment — the marginal generator is the one that will spin down to make room when the CFE is produced. They differ in how to draw the geographic boundary of analysis, which can affect results. And other stuff like that. “To go from the generation data to the local carbon emissions data is not trivial,” says Toby Ferenczi, founder of EnergyTag, “because you're trying to model the flow of electrons. Until you can track a single electron through the system, there will always be different types of approximations.” There’s also the question of how distributed energy resources (DERs) are treated. Right now, grid operators tend to have little visibility into or control over DERs; energy generated locally, on a distribution grid, is viewed by grid operators as reduced demand on that grid. Bringing DERs more fully into the picture as deployable resources is an important long-term challenge.There are data issues too. If you look at electricityMap, which seeks to track the carbon intensity of every grid in the world, at every hour, you will see that there are still big holes, areas where utilities have not made the data public. New regulations and laws requiring grid operators to make these numbers available is another priority.Anyway, I’m not going to dig into these technical issues. I have faith that, if an hourly REC market gets going, these kinds of questions will be ironed out. The general sentiment is that it is more important to have a common set of numbers than it is for those numbers to be accurate down to the decimal. Instead, let’s turn to the more fundamental challenge to 24/7 CFE.24/7 vs. emissionalityUnlike air pollution, which concentrates where it is emitted, carbon dioxide diffuses completely into the atmosphere. It doesn’t matter where it is emitted; all tons are the same, from a climate perspective. One company or city’s emissions are no different than any others. There’s nothing about your hourly emissions that make them special.It follows that, if you’re a company that wants to reduce carbon emissions, the thing to do is buy clean energy on the dirtiest grid possible, wherever it will displace the most carbon-intensive energy and thus prevent the most emissions. If you take an international perspective, that will probably be somewhere overseas, in Asia or Africa; if you take a US perspective, it will be in states like West Virginia, Wyoming, and Kentucky.The best way to do this is with bundled RECS — RECs purchased together with the energy that produced them, through long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) — because that’s the approach most likely to actually lead to new clean energy projects being built. But “most organizations are not in a position to sign long term PPAs,” says Ferenczi. “All they know is: I want to buy good electricity, not bad electricity.” For them, unbundled RECs are the only option.Either way, if you want to reduce emissions with your CFE procurement, it must be guided not only by what’s most likely to lead to new projects (“additionality”), but also by what will reduce the most emissions (“emissionality”). This word emissionality is a terrible neologism — the latest of many out of the energy world — but I’m living with it, because it’s a helpful way to refer to the quantification of carbon emission reductions.Now, take note: optimizing your clean-energy procurement for emissionality is different from optimizing it for your own 24/7 consumption. The former strategy maximizes emission reductions. The latter does not. In some cases, optimizing around your own consumption could fail to reduce emissions or even increase net emissions, despite increasing your share of CFE. One simple example: imagine one company has signed a bunch of solar PPAs and thus has more hourly RECs during the day than it needs to cover its consumption, but it has a shortage at night; another company has signed a bunch of wind PPAs and thus has excess hourly RECs at night, but a shortage during the day. The companies can simply trade hourly RECs. Each has increased its CFE score, but no new clean energy was built and no carbon emissions were reduced. Another example is how companies choose to deploy batteries. Mark Dyson, an energy analyst at RMI, explained it to me this way:A battery optimized for 24/7 would charge when a buyer has procured “excess” renewable energy in a particular hour, but in most grids, for the foreseeable future, a fossil generator will usually be the marginal unit at the system level — so charging storage increases carbon emissions in that hour. Discharging the battery later would offset generation from another fossil generator and reduce emissions, but there’s no guarantee the difference in efficiency of those power plants is greater than the round-trip-efficiency penalty of using the battery, and thus total emissions can actually increase.In other words, optimizing battery deployment to cover 24/7 consumption will be different from, in some cases contrary to, deploying them to optimize emission reductions. Nobody has yet modeled exactly how much these two strategies would diverge, or how frequent cases like the ones above might be, but no one disputes that they would diverge. A strategy built around emissionality would, by definition, reduce more emissions than any alternative strategy built around any other goal.And this is the critique of 24/7 CFE: emissions are emissions. Reducing any one company’s emissions is of no particular benefit to the climate. Just reduce emissions wherever you can — that’s the climate imperative.This same debate expresses itself in several different forms. One way to think of the distinction is between “attributional” and “consequential” carbon accounting. Critics (see, e.g., this paper from WattTime) say attributional accounting — purchasing energy with a REC attached — is fine for statutory or voluntary clean-energy requirements. But when it comes to reducing carbon emissions, companies should use consequential accounting, i.e., purchasing energy that has the most short-term emission-reduction impact. The same debate crops up again between “hourly average” and “marginal” carbon measurement. One can either assess a unit of CFE based on its effect on the hourly average emissions on the grid in the hour it is produced or based on the carbon intensity of the marginal generator it displaces. Hourly averages are, for a variety of reasons, easier to determine, and can be used to boost your own CFE score, but a marginal approach (measuring “nodal marginal emissions”) will tell you which energy purchase will maximize short-term emission reductions.All these debates are forms of the same question: why not focus on carbon emissions? As Henry Richardson of WattTime put it to me, “measure emissions, not megawatt hours.”The emissionality critique — that emissions, not any company’s particular emissions, are the proper target for procurement strategies — is worth taking seriously. Everyone in the space has wrestled with it. Let’s run through a few possible responses and counter-arguments.Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Industrial policy vs. carbon policyWhen I talked to Princeton energy modeler Jesse Jenkins — who contributed to the modeling of 24/7 CFE we’ll look at in the next post — he suggested a helpful analogy to the debate between emissionality and 24/7: the debate between a carbon tax and more sector-specific standards and investments, i.e., industrial policy.A carbon tax is the most economically efficient way to reduce emissions — it will go after the cheapest emissions first. But by doing so, it will leave untouched many sectors of the economy that we will eventually need to decarbonize to get to 100 percent net-zero.If we leave them untouched for too long, we’ll run into a wall. “We need to be thinking about the total solution,” says Melissa Lott, research director at the Center on Global Energy Policy. “Otherwise we're going to get halfway down the road, have to take a hard left, and it's going to be painful and expensive.”The emissionality vs. 24/7 debate takes the same form. An emissionality approach would reduce emissions at a lower per-ton cost — it would go after the cheapest reductions first, usually by adding wind and solar to dirty grids. But a 24/7 approach will direct investment toward technologies that fill the gaps left by wind and solar. “And there are gaps,” says Lott. “These gaps aren't eight or even 100 hours, which can be solved with different battery technologies. They're eight to 14 days.”To cover those gaps will require “clean firm” generation, many sources of which are still in nascent forms of development. The pursuit of 24/7 CFE will stimulate innovation and growth in the entire suite of technologies needed to smooth out variable renewables — sources all grids will eventually need and many already do. (California power providers are already putting out solicitations for clean-firm projects.) In fact, says Brian Janous, Microsoft’s director of energy and renewables, even the early talk of 24/7 CFE has gotten people thinking about solutions. “We're seeing more and more utilities, and more and more energy service providers, come to us and say, hey, we think we can solve this problem for you,” he says.Companies pursuing 24/7 CFE are undertaking voluntary industrial policy, channeling attention and investment to gaps in current clean-energy technology, bringing down the costs so that other companies can use them more easily. That could have impacts well beyond their own emissions. Here’s how Jenkins put it to me:The heart of 24/7 carbon-free procurement is the pursuit of transformative impact on electricity systems via accelerated innovation. Think about the indirect emissions impacts from helping accelerate the time to maturity (or enable in the first place) one or more clean firm technologies or long-duration energy storage technologies that can go on to widespread adoption and make reaching 100 percent carbon-free electricity easier for the world. Leadership isn't just about doing one's part. It is about making it easier for others to follow. For a company, even one as large as Google, this impact is likely to far outpace any direct emissions reductions they achieve via procurement.24/7 CFE needs to be seen in its full contextNone of the entities pursuing 24/7 CFE today see their own achievement of 24/7 CFE as the ultimate end goal. The goal is grid decarbonization.“We break it into three pillars,” says Michael Terrell, Google’s director of energy. “First is transacting,” i.e., contracting with developers to ensure Google’s own 24/7 supply of CFE. “Second is advancing technology, both on the demand side and the supply side,” i.e., the industrial-policy piece. “Lastly is policy and grid decarbonization,” i.e., advocating for clean-energy policies before state public utility commissions (PUCs) and legislatures, to hasten decarbonization of the grids in which it operates.“For us, it's not a win if the only way we get to 24/7 in each place is by transacting,” he says. “We want to get the grids moving in that direction, too.”When it comes to the standard way of getting to “100 percent clean energy,” companies can just buy cheap RECs from distant grids. They don’t need to get involved beyond that. “That was a concern of ours,” Terrell says. “Companies were getting to 100 percent without having to consider the future of the grids where they were operating or do any policy.” In contrast, if a company is trying to cobble together a 24/7 supply of CFE on its local grid, it becomes much more invested in the state of that grid. The more CFE is on the grid, the higher the baseline from which it begins transacting for its own CFE. That will get companies involved in pushing utilities to make clean-energy commitments, pushing PUCs to clear away anachronistic regulations, and pushing legislatures to pass clean-energy policy.“We are trying to drive massive system change well beyond Google,” says Terrell. “The idea behind 24/7 is, you want corporates to have a stake in every grid where they operate. You want them to be banging the table, driving system change on these grids, getting these grids to carbon-free as fast as possible.”Janous says that Microsoft also wrestled with the 24/7 vs. emissionality debate as it determined its next steps. “Ultimately, we determined that local influence is still important,” he says. “Our ability to influence PUCs and local utilities, and do that worldwide across dozens and dozens of different markets, was more important than taking a pure-play emissionality approach in one market.”Time will tell how strong that local influence proves to be. What happens if progress on local grids is slow? Lott thinks the pursuit of 24/7 will move forward some tough calls. Entities pursuing 24/7 “are going to have to make a decision here in the next few years,” she says. “Do we keep our data center in this location where we don't see a clear path to [24/7], or do we move it? Do we shift investment somewhere else? This is going to be an interesting tension that will play out around 2025, ‘26.”This is an aspect I think critics of 24/7 CFE tend to miss: the social dynamics. If it becomes the new standard for climate-conscious…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Don't get too bummed out about COP26 Nov 15, 2021
    Show notes

    Hey y’all, just a quick thing today (as I work on my follow-up to Friday’s post).

    I was on Pod Save America last week:

    One of the things I talked about is the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland, which wrapped up last week with a final agreement that … say it with me … represented real progress but fell short of what’s needed. Just like all the other COP agreements.

    I had a pretty deflationary take on the whole thing on the pod. Given the melodramatic rhetoric around COP26 — the same rhetoric that attends every international climate summit — I thought I’d briefly explain why I don’t think COP26 is worth getting down about.

    By way of background, remember that there were effectively two climate events at the COP, as there always are. One was the COP itself, the business of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The other was a kind of climate festival-cum-trade-show, featuring governments, nonprofits, and private-sector actors announcing all kinds of new campaigns and initiatives alongside the UNFCCC process — and protestors marching outside.

    First event first.

    The Paris Agreement continues to play out

    The actual business of COP26 mostly involved negotiators from various countries in cramped conference rooms hashing out technical details of elements of the Paris Agreement — about monitoring and verification, about who is contributing how much to the climate fund for poorer countries, about how often countries will report new targets, and so forth.

    None of that stuff was particularly dramatic; it was all the usual incremental, too-slow movement forward. There was some drama at the last minute when India — which had started COP26 with a bang, promising to hit net-zero emissions by 2070 — demanded that a provision on a global coal “phase-out” be rewritten to say “phase-down.” (This was disappointing, but keep in mind this is the first time fossil fuels have been specifically mentioned in a COP agreement at all.)

    Much was made of this and other shortcomings of the final agreement, but there’s a weird kind of disconnect around this commentary. What people seem to forget is that the UNFCCC has no real power to enforce anything and there isn’t the unity needed among participating countries to create a binding target with real consequences.

    This was the origin of the Paris Agreement: the realization that the best the UNFCCC could do is structure and publicize voluntary national goals and commitments. The idea was to do with transparency and peer pressure what decades of adversarial negotiations couldn’t: steadily increase ambition.

    A shorter way of saying this is that a COP agreement can’t make a country do anything. Whether and how fast India phases out coal has nothing at all to do with what its diplomat says in Glasgow and everything to do with domestic Indian politics, which have their own logic and are only faintly affected by international politics.

    The utility of the Paris process is that every few years it provides the equivalent of a giant camera flash, revealing where everyone stands. That is useful. International transparency and peer pressure can sometimes move national governments. But it is a mistake to invest any particular hopes for change in the UNFCCC process — it can’t really do anything. It can only illuminate what is being done.

    What is being done

    The good news is, we’re making progress. A decade ago, we were on track for 4° to 6° Celsius average warming by the end of the century, which would have been species-threatening.

    As this report from Climate Action Tracker shows, thanks to actions taken by national governments since then, we have “bent the curve” on climate change, as it were, and brought the average expected warming down to 2.7°C.

    That would still be devastating. But we’re not going to stop there. Progress is only accelerating. If every country that has submitted a 2030 carbon target in the Paris process — an NDC, or nationally determined contribution — hits that target, average warming will be 2.4°C.

    If all short- and long-term targets submitted thus far are achieved, it’s down to 2.1°C. In CAT’s “optimistic scenario” — in which all targets announced by anyone anywhere are met — the average is 1.8°C.

    As the CAT report emphasizes, that’s still short of the Paris goal. There’s still a credibility gap between what countries say they want to achieve and what they are willing to offer. There’s certainly no reason for complacency.

    But the trajectory is in the right direction. There’s still plenty of reason to fear where we are currently headed, but at the same time, there’s no reason to think that five years from now, at the next major Paris “stocktake,” we’ll still be headed there.

    We’re bending the curve and lots of forces and institutions are lining up behind the effort. Speaking of which …

    Climate Woodstock

    Alongside every official COP is a kind of international festival where everyone who’s doing anything on climate goes to talk about it. Bi- and multi-lateral coalitions, states, cities, nonprofits, corporations — everyone gravitates to the moment when media attention will be most intense.

    There was a bit of a sour taste at the festival this year, given that fossil fuels were abundantly represented and the poorest and most vulnerable were, thanks to Covid, unusually under-represented.

    Nonetheless, amidst the unsavory optics came all kinds of heartening news. There was a global treaty on methane, brokered by the US and the UK, which has been signed by more than 100 countries. A group of renewable energy players created the 24/7 Carbon-free Energy Compact in partnership with Sustainable Energy for All and UN Energy (see my explainer on 24/7 clean energy).

    A group of governments and private funders pledged to spend a total of $1.7 billion on Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) protecting local biodiversity. Over 100 countries pledged to stop deforestation by 2030.

    A group of philanthropic and development organizations and governments called the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP) pledged $10.5 billion toward helping emerging economies transition from fossil fuels. Similarly, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) pledged over $130 trillion of private capital to the energy transition.

    And so on. What this shows is an immense amount of will in the world to address this problem, struggling to organize. There’s so much going on.

    Another thing I said on Pod Save America is that national governments are often going to be in the caboose of this train — civic groups, the private sector, and subnational governments are leading the way. That’s distributed all over the world, less easy to see and sum up, but it shows that the caution and intransigence of national governments are not the whole story.

    COP26 was a snapshot of a world — agonizingly slowly but with gathering speed — moving to address a crisis. There’s no reason for anyone to stop pushing, but there’s also nothing wrong with acknowledging and celebrating the progress that’s been achieved by all the pushing so far.

    Things are moving!


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    An introduction to energy's hottest new trend: 24/7 carbon-free electricity Nov 12, 2021
    Show notes

    When a company or city claims to be “100 percent powered by clean energy,” what it typically means is that it has tallied up its electricity consumption, purchased an equal amount of carbon-free energy (CFE), and called it even.That’s fine, as far as it goes. But now, the next horizon of voluntary climate action has come into view: a brave few companies and cities aspire, not just to offset their consumption with CFE on a yearly basis, but to match their consumption with CFE production every hour of every day, all year long. Running on clean energy 24/7 — that’s new hotness. The list of entities in the US that have committed to 24/7 CFE is short: Peninsula Clean Energy (a community choice aggregator in California) has committed to it by 2025; Google, Microsoft, and the Sacramento Municipal Utility District have targeted 2030; the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and, somewhat anomalously for this California-heavy list, the city of Des Moines, Iowa, have targeted 2035. Ithaca, New York, is rumored to be contemplating something similar.That’s it for now. But the idea is catching on quickly and drawing tons of attention. In September, a broad international group of more than 40 energy suppliers, buyers, and governments launched the 24/7 Carbon-free Energy Compact, “a set of principles and actions that stakeholders across the energy ecosystem can commit to in order to drive systemic change.” Biden’s original American Jobs Plan contained a promise to pursue “24/7 clean power for federal buildings.” That language has fallen out of the Build Back Better budget reconciliation bill in Congress, but rumor has it Biden may issue an executive order on the subject soon.There are already efforts afoot to standardize hourly tracking of clean energy and build it into markets, as well as numerous active discussions about how to update markets and policy to accommodate it. Anyway, it’s getting to be a big deal. It’s time to wrap our heads around what’s going on. Happily, it turns out to be a fascinating story with all kinds of twists and turns. Let’s dive in!A history of “powered by clean energy”To understand what “100 percent powered by clean electricity” has meant to date, you have to understand at least the basics of renewable energy certificates, or RECs.Originally, RECs were a mechanism that utilities used to comply with statutory requirements for deploying renewable energy. A wind or solar farm that generated 1 megawatt-hour of renewable energy also generated 1 REC, which was submitted to regulators as proof of compliance. Then voluntary REC markets came along. In a voluntary REC market, a power generator can “unbundle” its REC from the megawatt-hour of energy it generates and sell it into a market where it could be traded numerous times before being retired, or taken off the market. (For accounting purposes, whoever retires the REC gets to claim the environmental benefits.) Corporate, institutional, and government entities could purchase, trade, and retire RECS. The idea was that the ability to sell RECs as a second income stream would induce developers to build more clean energy projects. And it worked for a while, as long as solar and wind came at a cost premium and RECS were relatively expensive.But then, wind and solar started getting super-cheap: the cost of an unbundled REC went from $5 in 2008 to under $1 in 2010 (where it stayed through 2019, though it has risen back up to $3-$5 in the last couple years). Voluntary REC markets became quite robust but it became clear at a certain point that all these unbundled RECs were not actually driving many new renewable energy projects. A 2013 study found that “the investment decisions of wind power project developers in the United States are unlikely to have been altered by the voluntary REC market.” To their credit, corporate and industrial (C&I) buyers took notice. In 2014, Walmart stated that it would no longer offset its energy use with unbundled RECs, and many other buyers followed suit. The market began to trend toward long-term contracts — power purchase agreements (PPAs) — through which a buyer pledged to buy both the energy and the RECs (“bundled” RECs) from a prospective project for 10 to 25 years. That gave developers more confidence and has prompted a surge of building of clean energy projects. In 2020 alone, C&I buyers in the US procured 10.6 gigawatts of renewable energy, which represents a third of all renewables capacity added in the country. Voluntary procurement by the C&I sector has become a major driver of the energy transition.There are still plenty of entities buying cheap unbundled RECs and claiming carbon neutrality, but the leaders in the space are generally bundling them under PPAs. But there is still a problem with RECs, even the good ones.Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.The problem with RECSWhen a C&I buyer purchases a REC, whether bundled or unbundled, it knows how much renewable energy was generated (a megawatt-hour), but not when it was generated. But it turns out that, when it comes to energy sources that come and go with the weather like wind and solar, the timing of generation matters quite a bit. If participants in voluntary REC markets continue to buy the cheapest wind and solar RECs, sooner or later, the grid will become imbalanced. During periods of high sunlight or heavy wind, there will be too much renewable energy, pushing prices down. But in periods when the sun is down or the wind flags, there isn’t enough renewable energy, so demand must be covered by expensive natural gas peaker plants. Prices and supplies swing wildly. Markets don’t like it. And more wind and solar only exacerbate the effect.What’s needed is CFE that’s available when sun and wind fall short. A megawatt-hour of additional CFE is much more valuable during those times than it is during times of high solar and wind output. The timing matters.But right now, RECs contain no information about the time of generation. It is impossible for buyers to know if any particular generator covered or will cover any particular hour of consumption. Buyers have no way of buying CFE specifically in the hours that they most need it. Think of a monthly REC as an extremely low-resolution image of renewable energy production. In temporal terms, it’s one giant month-sized pixel. C&I buyers purchase these low-resolution images, overlay them on their consumption, and hope for the best.But when you look at a higher resolution image of renewable energy production, one with hour-sized pixels, you see that it does not overlap perfectly with consumption. Not even close. The mismatch between “100% CFE” and “100% CFE 24/7”Google broke ground in this area with a 2018 white paper called “The Internet is 24x7. Carbon-free energy should be too.” (See also this 2020 white paper and this April blog post from Google CEO Sundar Pichai.) It has produced some visuals that allow us to clearly see the mismatch between renewable energy supply and demand.Google has dozens of data centers. It tracks energy supply and demand by the hour and gives each data center a CFE score: how many hours of its operations were powered, in real time, by renewable energy. A quick word about how the CFE score is calculated. For each hour, the baseline CFE score is the grid mix. So if the data center is drawing on a grid with 20 percent CFE (wind, solar, nuclear, whatever) and 80 percent fossil, it begins with a CFE score of 20 percent for that hour. Google then adds any energy being produced during that hour by projects with which it has signed PPAs on the same grid. That can push the CFE score up, theoretically to 100 percent. Anyway, with that in mind, let’s check out some data centers and their CFE scores. The first is from the company’s data center in Iowa. Google buys more than enough wind power in Iowa to offset the data center’s consumption in volumetric terms. But is the data center actually running on wind power, from hour to hour? Not entirely. To be precise, 74 percent of its demand was matched, on an hourly basis, by CFE. It has a CFE score of 74. Below is a stripe representing the data center’s consumption for every hour of the year. Each column is a day (there are 365). Each row is an hour, beginning with midnight at the top. The shade of the square represents the amount of CFE powering it during that hour.In most hours, there’s enough Google-contracted wind power coming onto the Iowa grid to cover the data center’s consumption. However, for a period in late summer, wind speeds decline, wind power drops, and fossil fuels step in to provide the power. How can Google get this data center’s CFE score up to 100 percent? The first thing to note is that it can not simply buy more Iowa wind power. It is already getting all it can get out of wind. It doesn’t matter how many wind farms it has contracted with if the wind isn’t blowing in a given hour. In Iowa, Google is going to have to procure something else — something that can fill in the gaps left by wind.One way to do that is by buying both wind and solar, which tend to have complementary profiles. Below is a similar stripe representing Google’s Netherlands data center. On July 1, a bunch of new Google-contracted solar came online; from that point on, the middle of the stripe — daytime — is much greener. Solar fills in some of the gaps left by wind. Unfortunately, solar leaves gaps too. It doesn’t matter how many solar farms you’ve contracted with if the sun is behind clouds or, you know, down. In the Netherlands, Google is going to have to procure something else — something to fill the remaining gaps left by solar and wind. In some sense, these are nice problems to have. Here’s the Taiwan data center:Oof. What little CFE there is on Taiwan’s grid comes from nuclear power plants — when they go out, it’s all fossils.Google has given all of its data centers CFE scores (which was no mean feat, since in many cases this data was not easily available). Here they are:These graphics help illustrate Google’s 24/7 CFE challenge, which isn’t just one challenge but a slightly different challenge in each of the dozens of grids in which it operates. At each of those data centers (except maybe Oklahoma and Oregon) it needs to buy a bunch more wind and solar. But it will also need to buy something else — something to fill the gaps.What might that something else be? The technology needed to fill the gapsPart of the great promise of the movement to 24/7 CFE is it will draw attention and investment to all those things needed to balance out cheap wind and solar. For big consumers like Google, there are, roughly speaking, three ways to smooth out the fluctuations in wind and solar and maintain a steady hourly supply of CFE. They are, from least to most expensive: demand management, energy storage, and clean-firm generation. Demand managementDemand management begins with load reduction through efficiency. Google has aggressively pursued energy efficiency at its data centers, with dramatic results: “Compared with five years ago,” the company said in 2018, “we now deliver more than 3.5 times as much computing power with the same amount of electrical power.”After load reduction comes load shaping — managing daily operations to push more consumption into high-CFE hours — and load shifting, which refers to moving consumption around in smaller increments, responding to hour-to-hour fluctuations in CFE. “We got our start by looking out over a 24-hour period, getting a forecast of what the grid CFE would be, and then shifting compute loads back in time during that period, things like feature upgrades or backups,” Michael Terrell, Google’s director of energy (and the author of the 2018 white paper), told me. “Now what we started doing is shifting loads spatially, from one data center to the other. Theoretically you could envision compute following the sun [around the globe], if you took it all the way.”Adapting demand to supply rather than vice versa — load reduction, shaping, and shifting — is almost always the least expensive way of accommodating variable renewables. There is still a ton of innovation to come in this area. “It's a space where we haven't even really gotten started,” Terrell says. Energy storageStorage, currently dominated by lithium-ion batteries, is great for smoothing out the day-to-day supply curve, taking some excess wind from windy hours and saving it for lulls, or saving excess solar from the daytime for nighttime. However, while batteries are a good balance for renewables’ variability, their hour-to-hour fluctuations, they aren’t as good for balancing its intermittency, the occasional days, weeks, months, even years of unusually low wind or sunlight. Germans call a period like this a Dunkelflaute. It is extremely difficult and expensive to cover one with only batteries to supplement wind and solar. Clean-firm generationThe third option is “clean firm” generation, i.e., energy sources that can be turned on at will and run for days or weeks on end, but emit no carbon. The two big conventional examples here are hydro and nuclear power, but there isn’t a ton of new hydro available to most buyers and new nuclear (at least in the absence of next-gen nuclear tech) is prohibitively expensive.There’s also geothermal, which (as I wrote here) is getting a lot of interest and active development. The first bit of clean-firm that Google plans to acquire is geothermal, from a company called Fervo. For now, affordable geothermal is only available in certain areas of the country, but technological advances are close to changing that.Other clean-firm sources include:* long-duration energy storage, which is technically a form of storage, but competes directly with other clean-firm sources;* advanced nuclear, which has been just over the horizon for years but might finally be getting close;* biomass, some versions of which may qualify as zero-carbon; * power plants running on hydrogen (or hydrogen-based fuels), which are currently being tested in the UK and elsewhere; and* natural gas plants with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), which are currently both nonexistent and wildly expensive, but may (with the help of a boosted 45Q tax rebate in the Build Back Better bill) become more cost-effective soon. One reason energy nerds are excited about the 24/7 trend is that it’s going to pull forward in time a bunch of questions (and investment decisions) that were going to face grids trying to reach 100 percent CFE anyway. Perhaps the biggest and most important of those questions is: how far will we be able to get with demand response and batteries? How much clean-firm will we need in the end? With a bunch of companies and cities competing to reach 24/7 CFE, we’ll find out sooner than we otherwise would have. And the clean-firm sources that are necessary will receive much-needed investment, bringing their costs down and benefiting other decarbonizing grids across the world.The market products needed to fill the gapsIf companies and cities want to fill in their hourly gaps, they need access to time-stamped CFE. As previously mentioned, current RECs only come in low-resolution form, in chunks of a month or year. They aren’t precise enough to target specific hours. The answer — simple to propose but devilishly difficult in practice — is to supplement and eventually replace current RECs with some kind of hourly RECs. As it happens, there’s a bunch of work going on to figure out how that would work. If you’re interested, the place to begin exploring is this white paper from M-RETS, a nonprofit organization devoted to the tracking and trading of renewable energy.Working with Google, M-RETS is pioneering and testing a product called Time-based Energy Attribute Certificates (T-EACs), which are effectively hourly RECs. One monthly REC would be replaced (for…

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    Volts podcast: Amy Westervelt on disinformation and propaganda Oct 27, 2021
    Show notes

    In this episode, journalist and researcher Amy Westervelt discusses the history of the public relations industry in the US and the ubiquitous, if largely unacknowledged, role it has played, and still plays, in shaping how Americans think about the environment. Amy has tons of great stories!Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Amy Westervelt, October 27, 2021 (PDF version)David Roberts:In recent years, there’s been a lot of talk about America’s polluted information environment — the ubiquity of disinformation — driven by social media and “fake news.” What is less discussed is that purposefully crafted disinformation designed to shape public opinion to the benefit of the wealthy and powerful is nothing new. In fact, it’s almost as old as the country itself. Amy Westervelt, a long-time, award-winning environmental journalist, has spent her career uncovering disinformation and exposing the methods of those who generate and spread it.She’s perhaps best known as the host of Drilled, a “true-crime podcast about climate change” that has spent six seasons (so far) exposing the propaganda generated and spread by the fossil fuel industry. And she’s editor-in-chief of the Drilled News site.She’s also the founder of Critical Frequency, a woman-run podcast network, as well as the co-host of the climate podcast Hot Take with climate essayist Mary Annaïse Heglar (it’s currently on hiatus; returning next year), the co-host or producer of several other podcasts (including Scene on Radio and Crooked Media’s This Land), and the author of Forget Having It All, a 2018 book on the challenges of motherhood in the US. Now Westervelt has a new project, launching today: Rigged. The foundation of the site is a treasure trove of original documents, some dating back more than a century, about the founding and growth of the modern public relations industry and its development of tools of mass persuasion.Atop that database is a series of pieces charting the landscape, offering a glossary of disinformation techniques, profiles of the (anti-)heroes of the business, and stories on various inglorious chapters in disinformation history, from chemicals to railroads to tobacco to fossil fuels. It is equal parts fascinating and horrifying — fascinating that the tools of disinformation are so well and publicly documented; horrifying that they are still working so effectively. Here’s just one fun fact: Edward Bernays, one of the pioneers of early 20th century opinion shaping, coined the term “public relations” because the Germans, he said, had “given the word propaganda a bad name.” You can also thank Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew, for men wearing wristwatches, women smoking, and bacon being a standard part of American breakfast. These stories are wild.I’ve been admiring Westervelt’s work from afar for years, so I was psyched to talk to her about Rigged, the long history of disinformation, the many ways the fossil fuel industry has shaped public opinion, and why the US left seems so incapable of dealing effectively with disinformation to this day.Amy Westervelt, welcome to Volts.Amy Westervelt: Hi, thanks for having me.David Roberts: Glad you could squeeze me in between your dozens of projects. Let's start with the newest one. Tell me about Rigged: How did you come to be doing this, why are you doing it, and what would you like it to accomplish?Amy Westervelt: A little more than a year ago now I did a season of my other podcast, Drilled, looking at the history of fossil fuel propaganda. When I first started Drilled, I was just going to do one six-part season about the origins of climate denial. Then, in the course of doing that, I started thinking, climate denial is such a dumb tactic; why did it work? It's dumb to just be like, “Nuh-uh.” It's not a genius strategy. Of course, it's telling people what they want to hear, like this problem might not be that bad and maybe we don't need to do anything drastic. But I also felt like there must be more to it. So I started to look at what the industry was doing before; it's not like they just started doing PR when global warming was researched. The more I dug into that, the more I realized that they really spent a lot of time and thought to shape how people view the world in general, and especially how people view environmental issues, for a really long time, before anyone was talking about climate change. That has a lot to do with, once this issue appears, how we actually process and deal with it. But in the course of doing that, I also found all this stuff about what the PR firms and the PR people who were working for Big Oil were doing for all these other industries at the same time, and it seemed important to me for people to understand that this is a longstanding system and set of strategies that really was created to circumvent democracy. The modern PR industry comes about when you have journalists criticizing America's captains of industry for the first time, you have the vote expanding beyond just land-owning white men; this is the late 1800s and early 1900s, the dawn of the 20th century. The US government passes its very first regulation on business in 1887. So there are all these reasons that industry across the board is saying, “Oh, wow, we really need a way to get a handle on this thing that's getting away from us.” I call it “creeping democracy.”A lot of these early PR guys are working for coal and rail and oil and tobacco all at the same time, and then quickly, chemicals joins that list, too. So the reason that we see these strategies replicated in multiple industries is not that an oil executive is studying the moves of a tobacco executive; it's that they're using the same PR firms. In the case of oil and tobacco, John W. Hill was working for the American Petroleum Institute and all the tobacco companies at the same time, and he encouraged them to talk to each other. He got the tobacco guys to join the API. The oil companies were co-defendants of the tobacco companies during the tobacco litigation, because they helped to create the cigarette filter. That was all brokered by their PR and spokespeople. I felt like all this documentation sitting on my desk wasn’t doing anyone any good there. I started to digitize a lot of it, and I thought, DocumentCloud is kind of hard to navigate, so I should put this on a website that guides people through it. Then I thought, there's a significant number of people who, even if they believe we should act on climate, will never listen to a climate podcast, because they have a certain idea in their minds of what that means; so I'm going to do a companion podcast that looks at how disinformation is created and how it became an industry in and of itself in the US, a long time before we started talking about Facebook and Twitter, or climate change and climate denial.David Roberts: When this industry and approach was first coming together, what were some of the early victories that helped put the template in place for what these guys could do for an industry?Amy Westervelt: This is fascinating to me, because they're all these things that people take at face value as just a cultural shift that happened in America. It's really nuts. One of my favorite examples of this is Freud's nephew, Edward Bernays, who integrated a lot of Freud's theories into his work in the 1920s. He lived to be more than 100, so he was working from the 20s through the 70s. He had a watchmaker come to him who was concerned about the fact that, apparently, it was considered feminine to wear a wristwatch, so men were not wearing wristwatches. Real men had pocket watches. So Bernays starts to think about who are the manliest of men, and he lands on soldiers. Bernays was a frequent user of commissioning an expert to do a study; whether or not that study was valid or not is very suspect, but at the time, it was considered an expert study. So he commissioned a study to look at how many soldiers were killed while lighting a match to look at their pocket watch. Then he goes to the Army and says, “you could have a 25 percent reduction in the number of men being killed if you just made wristwatches standard issue.” So they did. He got the Army to make wristwatches standard issue, and that effectively broke this taboo about it being feminine to wear a wristwatch.David Roberts: Clever. He did a reverse thing with women in smoking, which I also found fascinatingly devilish.Amy Westervelt: Yes. In the case of smoking, American Tobacco came to him with a similar kind of gender taboo: it was considered uncouth for women to smoke. So he had this idea to call up some of his friends’ young socialite daughters and have them stage a protest, walking up and down Fifth Avenue smoking, and say that it was a women's empowerment thing. Then he called all of the newspapers and told them about the protest, and they all covered it. It was in all the national papers. He called cigarettes “torches of freedom.” He also really tapped into Freudian stuff about women and penis envy and etc. He was quite a dude. Within six months or so, this taboo had been totally broken down and the tobacco industry had doubled its customer base. I'm sure most people at the time just thought that it was a women's empowerment thing, but it was all manufactured.David Roberts: Another thing that people think of as a modern phenomenon is attacking the media as biased or fake news, or trying to bully the media into doing a both-sides approach of what ought to be a clear issue. Turns out that goes way back too; that's not an invention of modern Republicans.Amy Westervelt: No, it is not. Bernays did a bit of that. Even Ivy Lee, who was the very first modern publicist who worked for Standard Oil, did that. Then in the 60s and 70s, my favorite, Herb Schmertz, the VP of public affairs for Mobil Oil, really hammered that home. He was famous for bullying journalists and threatening them with pulling ads if they didn't cover Mobil’s point of view on things, which he did actually do with the Wall Street Journal for a significant number of years. He even went one step further and refused to give them access to things like quarterly earnings reports.David Roberts: In one of the interesting stories I read on Rigged, someone successfully bullied a journalist into saying “changes” rather than “reforms.” It's amazing how vulnerable to this journalists are and have been.Amy Westervelt: That was Ivy Lee; he shifted the language around railroad labor requirements. Back in the late 1800s, they were wanting to require trains to have additional staff, because they were very negligent and having massive crashes and killing lots of people. They were told, “you guys are understaffing these trains, they need to be properly staffed.” Ivy Lee shifted the language around from it being a minimum number of staff to additional staff, which is a really key thing when you think about it. I was just thinking about that today, with how the oil industry talks about methane. Everything is a methane “leak,” which sounds accidental: oopsie! But you guys are letting it rip constantly, sometimes just because you want to burn off gas. David Roberts: “We've been having this accident happen consistently every day.”Amy Westervelt: Industries of all kinds spend an enormous amount of time and money choosing the exact right wording. They've been doing that forever. A guy named Earl Newsom, who worked for Standard Oil from the late ‘20s to the late ‘60s or ‘70s — also worked for Campbell's Soup, and GM, and Ford, and all the big American companies — was using Elmo Roper to do early polling, in the ‘20s, and then using that to inform his PR plan. I found all of the invoicing documents in his archives and some of these companies were spending millions of dollars on PR in the late ‘20s, already.David Roberts: It seems like, early in the game, when these things were new and no one had any defense mechanisms, they were wildly successful. That's an incredible payoff for a little bit of investment.Amy Westervelt: The very first press release, which Ivy Lee created and sent out to The New York Times, ended up getting printed word for word, because they were so caught off guard by the fact that the company was disclosing all this information.David Roberts: It's easy to condemn the corporate side of that move, but the response of journalists is a little bit more muddy. You can see why it’s effective on journalists, because they do want to be fair. Objectivity has become a parody of itself, but the impulse is real; I understand why, as journalists, we're subject to this.Amy Westervelt: Totally. It effectively weaponized good intentions.David Roberts: How can we harness a basically good impulse to horrible effect?Amy Westervelt: It was very smart. In the early days, part of what they were organizing against was the muckraking journalism that Ida Tarbell and Ida B. Wells and Upton Sinclair and all those folks were doing. Part of the strategy was to paint this picture that those journalists are really activists — they're biased, they have an agenda. You don't want to be that type of journalist. Which I still see today, constantly.David Roberts: One of the most useful things on Rigged is this glossary of techniques that have come into use since the late 1800s. It's a bounded set of techniques that they come to again and again and again. I thought we could look at a couple of them through the lens of fossil fuel companies, because that's my personal obsession. Some of them I think people understand already, like astroturfing: the making of fake grassroots groups. Most people get making up of fake experts, or starting your own think tank, or buying a friggin’ academic department and having them crank out studies for you. But some of these are less obvious. One of the things I found amazing is how involved the fossil fuel companies have been in school curriculum, going way, way back.Amy Westervelt: They started that. They did that before any other industry. Standard Oil put out the very first corporate-sponsored curriculum for schools in 1928. They did these pressed albums that they sent to schools; it was called the Standard School Broadcast. It seemed on the face of it like it had nothing to do with oil. That's the genius thing; they are very good at doing this in a subtle way. This program was music appreciation and history. So on the face of it, seems fine.I actually went on a little bit of a spending spree buying up old vinyl from the Standard School Broadcast. I have one that's all about the Industrial Revolution. It's classic. They do these radio vignette-style stories in between the music, and there's one where they have this very shrill-voiced woman being the consumer protection person. They give her some name that sounds annoying, like Ms. Snap. It’s setting up this whole thing of, well, do you want to give up your car and live like the aboriginals do? This one that I'm referencing in particular came out in the ‘40s. So they've been setting up this idea that anyone who suggests government intervention that would interfere with profits in the name of public safety or the environment or anything like that — that is a backwards thing, it's not sensible.David Roberts: Something the corporates do better than the good guys is, they don't just go in and say “oil is great.” It’s much deeper: corporate capitalism is the nature of the world. It’s propaganda on a deeper level than just their interests. They're trying to convey a worldview.Amy Westervelt: Yes, very much, and when you put that worldview in a classroom or in the mouth of a teacher that young children are taught to trust and believe, that is an insidious form of propaganda that is very hard to shake. It’s wild. I spent the last s…

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    Can the US reach Biden’s climate goal without the CEPP? Oct 20, 2021
    Show notes

    Last week, Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) finally stopped playing games and said that he will not vote for a budget reconciliation bill that contains the Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP).

    You can read my interview with Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN) for more on the CEPP and this post to understand why it is so centrally important to serious climate policy. I won’t get into all those arguments again. Suffice it to say, it’s a good policy and losing it is bummer.

    Insofar as Manchin has offered any reason for killing the CEPP, it is an alleged concern over “using taxpayer dollars to pay private companies to do things they’re already doing.”

    But that is just incorrect.

    Utilities are not “already doing” what the CEPP requires, i.e., increasing their share of clean energy 4 percentage points year-on-year, every year. Only a tiny handful of the nation’s thousands of utilities are on that trajectory.

    The sector as a whole is slowly decarbonizing, but the whole point of the policy is to accelerate the process to meet US carbon targets.

    Manchin knows that. It’s precisely what he’s trying to prevent. He told CNN flat out, “I'm not going to sit back and let anyone accelerate whatever the market's changes are doing.”

    Why not? Well, he wants to keep fossil fuel power plants open, which is incompatible with Biden’s publicly stated goal of 50 to 52 percent carbon reductions from 2005 levels by 2030.

    Manchin is standing up for local fossil fuel interests (including his own) against the president, 49 of his colleagues in the Democratic caucus, a majority of legislators in the House, a majority of voters, and even a majority of West Virginia voters.

    He also wants to slash the child tax credit. He’s just a jerk. It is what it is.

    At this point, it’s unclear what will and won’t survive into the final Build Back Better Act (or whether there will be a final bill at all). Reports are that staffers are scrambling to find ways to make up the lost emission reductions through other policies.

    The question is, how big of a hole are they trying to fill? How big a hit is it to lose the CEPP?

    A few analyses released in the past week are helpful in getting our heads around this.

    Energy Innovation says the loss of CEPP could cost the bill up to 35% of its emission reductions

    The first is from research firm Energy Innovation, which uses its Energy Policy Simulator to determine how much emissions would be reduced by the policies in the House Democrats’ version of the Build Back Better Act and the bipartisan infrastructure bill that was passed by the Senate over the summer.

    Obviously, predicting circumstances a decade hence is a fraught undertaking. Energy Innovation ran four scenarios: a business-as-usual scenario, with only existing policies, and low, moderate, and high emission-reduction scenarios based on different assumptions about the price of energy and the efficacy of various provisions in the bills.

    They didn’t model all the policies in the bills, just the ones that are relatively easy to quantify. Some emission reductions have gone uncounted, so the estimates Energy Innovation produced are almost certainly a lower bound.

    Here are the topline results:

    In the high scenario, clean energy reaches an 85 percent share of US electricity by 2030; in the moderate scenario, it’s 80 percent; in the low scenario, about 70 percent.

    As you can see in the moderate scenario below, by far the biggest tranche of emission reductions (about half) would come from the combination of the CEPP and clean-energy tax credits:

    The good news is that passing both bills could, “with supporting state and regulatory policy,” at the high end of the high emission reduction scenario, just barely get the US to its 2030 target. That’s if everything is included in the bills.

    The question now is, what do those numbers look like without the CEPP?

    Luckily, Energy Innovation ran a couple of variations of its moderate scenario with no CEPP (a high one, which assumes tax credits are maximally effective, and a low one, with lower take-up of tax credits).

    Long story short, “emissions are likely to be 250 to 700 MMT higher per year in 2030” than they would be with the CEPP, “which could eliminate more than a third of the total emissions reductions under the Infrastructure Bills.”

    As the scenarios show, a great deal depends on factors that can’t be precisely predicted: the price of fossil fuels, the cost curves of clean technologies, and the efficacy and impact of the clean-energy tax credits and other BBB policies. The loss of the CEPP could reduce the emissions impact of the bill anywhere from 20 to 35 percent.

    Resources For the Future agrees but says a carbon fee could make up for it

    Energy Innovations’ findings jibe with the second analysis, from Resources for the Future (RFF). RFF modeled three policies, in various combinations:

    * the clean-energy tax credits, which it calls CEAA for the “Clean Energy for America Act,” a bill from Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) that is largely included in the BBB Act;

    * the Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP); and

    * a carbon tax (er, fee) — the “central” carbon fee “starts at 15 $/metric ton and increases gradually to 30 $/metric ton by 2028, followed by a $10 annual increase through the end of the modeling period (2045).”

    The CEAA tax credits alone, without the CEPP, gets the electricity sector to a 69 percent clean energy share by 2030. That is roughly in line with Energy Innovations’ high-end estimation of the tax credits’ impact.

    The CEAA plus the CEPP gets the sector to 78 percent clean energy — a 9 point bump.

    The CEAA, CEPP, and the central carbon fee together get to 91 percent.

    RFF’s model, like Energy Innovations’, shows that the tax credits are doing the bulk of the work. From a baseline (no policy) scenario, the tax credits take the clean-energy share in 2030 from 46 to 69 percent (+23); with the CEPP, it goes from 69 to 78 percent (+9).

    Notably, in RFF’s modeling, the tax credits plus a central carbon fee get the number to 79 percent — in other words, a carbon fee pretty neatly substitutes for the CEPP, emissions-wise.

    Nonetheless, despite some recent chatter, Manchin has already put the kibosh on the prospect of a carbon fee as well.

    Rhodium Group says the US climate target is still within reach

    Can the US get on track to its 2030 target without the CEPP? For some insight on that we turn to the other recently released analysis, from the research firm Rhodium Group.

    It sets out to determine whether the US can hit its target (again, 50 to 52 percent reductions from 2005 levels by 2030) with what it calls a “joint action scenario,” which includes “actions by all key actors in the US federal system, including legislation under construction in Congress, regulations and other actions that can be taken by the Biden administration and key departments, as well as actions by climate-leading states and corporations.”

    Importantly, though it is capacious, the joint action scenario is deliberately conservative about policy out of Congress, given Manchin’s well-known Manchinness: “We include tax credit extensions, clean energy grant programs, and spending on agricultural programs, but do not include a carbon or methane fee or the CEPP [my emphasis].”

    The good news is that the CEPP-less joint action scenario gets the US to its goal, or at least close to it.

    Even without the CEPP, it is the electricity sector that provides most of the reductions:

    One reason there are so many reductions in the electricity sector — and this brings us to what I suppose is the bad news — is that the joint action scenario includes a lot of policies, including standards on new and existing power plants from EPA. Getting to the US target requires all levels of government and the private sector to act with immediate ambition.

    This is the action required by Congress:

    This is the action required by the executive branch:

    And this is what’s required of “subnational groups,” i.e., states, cities, and companies:

    If all of that comes together, then the US can hit its 2030 climate target without the CEPP.

    Rhodium stresses that the joint action scenario is not the only path to that goal — the final section of its analysis suggests a range of other policies that could also help — but any path to the goal involves coordinated action taken on numerous fronts at once … and a lot of luck.

    Where does this leave us?

    For years now, it’s been one of the climate world’s great rituals: after every new setback, delay, or disappointment, there’s a rush of articles and models showing, “We can still do it! It’s not impossible yet!”

    I suppose this is another one of those posts. Even without the CEPP, the two infrastructure bills passed together would reduce emissions considerably. The loss of the CEPP would take a big chunk out of those emission reductions — more than a third, if things go poorly — but there’s a chance some of that can be made up with other policies.

    This is assuming the BBB bill doesn’t get worse. Manchin may not be done screwing it up yet. The top priority now should be protecting the full range of clean-energy tax credits and ensuring that a) they extend at least 10 years and b) they are fully refundable.

    And other policies must be protected as well. Here, according to Energy Innovation, are the next most effective policies after the CEPP + tax credits.

    The second strongest provision is the fee on oil and gas methane emissions, which contributes about 12 percent of total reductions, or 165 MMT in 2030. Incentives for electric vehicles (EVs) and charging equipment are next, at 115 MMT in 2030, or 9 percent of total reductions.

    I tend to doubt Congressional staffers will be able to find anything new that’s big enough to compensate for the loss of the CEPP, but Biden can also gain back some of those reductions through aggressive use of the EPA and other agencies. We’ll see if he has the moxie to do that.

    The US doesn’t need to worry that hitting its target is unaffordable. All three analyses show that decarbonizing the electricity sector will reduce consumer energy costs, and that’s not even including the enormous benefits of reduced air pollution, which themselves would easily pay for the transition.

    Nonetheless, rapid decarbonization is a huge, wrenching socioeconomic transformation. Hitting our target would be a heroic feat. The fastest the US has ever reduced emissions, outside of a recession, is 4.1 percent in 2012. To get to 50 percent reductions by 2030, Rhodium says, “requires a 5.2-5.6 percent year-on-year cut in emissions every year.” We have to go faster than we’ve ever gone, every year from now through 2030.

    And that’s only the first, and arguably easiest, step. The first 50 percent of reductions will be easier than the last 50 percent, which we need to eliminate by 2050. That will require new policies, technologies, and industries.

    In the grand scheme of things, the loss of the CEPP is not the end of the world, as irritating and indefensible as it is. As long as Manchin doesn’t do any more damage, as long as staffers scrabble together a few compensatory policies, as long as Biden uses executive agencies aggressively, as long as states, cities, and businesses continue acting ambitiously … well, as long as all of that happens, we still have a shot.


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