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    Philosophy

    The Law & Liberty Podcast

    Law & Liberty contributing editor James Patterson interviews prominent authors and thinkers. A production of Liberty Fund, Inc.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Decline and Fall? Nov 03, 2025
    Show notes

    For most of the twentieth century, conservatives argued for a strong Congress whose closer connection to voters could check the grand delusions of presidential administrations. Now, however, everyone seems to have opted for Wilsonian, top-down executive leadership. Philip Wallach explains how we got here, why Congress remains indispensable for republican self-government, and what sort of structural reforms could help it reclaim its place in our constitutional system. Related Links Philip Wallach, Why Congress (2023)Philip Wallach, “Choosing Congressional Irrelevance,” Law & Liberty Yuval Levin, “Congress Is Weak Because Its Members Want It to Be Weak,” Commentary (2018) Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, informed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty in this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, contributing editor and associate professor of public affairs at the Institute of American Civics at the University of Tennessee. I’m here in person—this is a rare treat for me—with Phil Wallach, who’s his senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. We’re going to be talking about his latest book, Why Congress, which is published in 2023 with Oxford University Press. Dr. Wallach, welcome to the Law & Liberty podcast. Philip Wallach (01:13): So good to be with you. James Patterson (01:14): So the great thing about your book is that it gave me my first question, which is “why Congress?” But of course, the thing about Congress is that it hasn’t gotten a lot of conservative attention, and this is strange. Conservatives are very interested in the Supreme Court and federal courts and interpretation in the judiciary and we’ve had a very strong interest in the presidency and things like maybe the limitation of the imperial presidency, but also the unitary executive theory. There are these really big ideas there. So is Congress sort of the left out branch here for the right? Philip Wallach (01:53): I think if you go back to the time of Franklin Roosevelt, conservatives were very interested in Congress and very pro-Congress. They believed Congress was a kind of earthy bulwark that really was connected to the public, to the people close to the ground. And the classic statement of this is Wilmore Kendall’s essay that he is still writing at the end of the 1950s, talking about the two majorities. But he really portrays the congressional majority as embodying this sort of home-spun wisdom as opposed to the utopian, quixotic tendencies of the presidency, which tends to appeal to people’s grand aspirations and engage in world changing projects. And that’s also representing a real tendency that Americans had. But the way of representing the other thing in Congress was he thought as a very important counterpoint. And so there was that time when conservatives and you saw James Burnham write a book around the same time really appreciating the same sort of thing about Congress, but then you see Democrats control the majorities in the House of Representatives from 1955 until 1995—four solid decades. (03:18): Of course the Republicans do control the Senate from 1981 to 1986, but Congress just comes to be thought of as a democratic institution first. Of course, Democrats were half a conservative party at the beginning of that period, but by the end of that period, Democrats are a liberal party and they’re very much in control of the Congress. And so the modern conservative movement of the 1970s and eighties defines itself in opposition to Congress. They think of Congress as a corrupt liberal place and the emblematic figure of that is Newt Gingrich, who comes in, from the very first time he starts campaigning, talking about how awful and corrupt Congress is and how we can’t work with this congressional majority—we Republicans need to find ways of throwing it out. They eventually do, they succeed at that, but in that course of those decades, they’ve really sort of lost the sense of what it is a Congress is supposed to be for. (04:17): I would argue that conservatives came to adopt a much more leader-centric, Wilsonian model of what politics looks like, including Newt himself. And so in some ways, Congress is sort of without its ideological support from the right for many decades now. And you saw maybe a little bit of efforts to rediscover it around the Tea Party time and when people thought Hillary Clinton was going to be a president, but that’s not what happened. And so conservatives have mostly gone off in a very different direction and don’t genuinely have a lot of use for Congress these days. James Patterson (04:57): So there’s been a kind of great forgetting among conservatives and, to a lesser extent, among Republicans about the operations of Congress. Is there also maybe also a kind of change to the institution of Congress itself? Centralization under leaders, for example; it’s not as deliberative as it used to be. That’s led Congress to become less of an object of study. Philip Wallach (05:24): Well, it goes along together for sure. If you think of members of Congress, first and foremost, the most important thing they can be is members of the team, good foot soldiers for the party, then you don’t have a whole lot of use for deliberation. The deliberations should sort of happen elsewhere, and then Congress should put through the conservative agenda. I argue in the book that not deliberating well actually handicaps the Republican Revolution to some extent in the mid-nineties, that they sort of don’t actually have a good sense of where they can succeed and where they can’t. And so they make some real missteps because of that. But yeah, generally I’d say this comfort, including amongst members themselves, with the idea that the institution should reorganize itself on a purely partisan basis and that the main thing is teamsmanship in that environment. And of course, if you’re setting things up in that way, then leaders at the top and organizing sort of discipline followership is what matters. James Patterson (06:37): I’m remembering one of my favorite sketches in the history of SNL was on Newt Gingrich becoming Speaker. Do you remember this? It is actually kind of hard to find. I’m not sure why, but I had wanted to find it so I could use it in class and I only found an edited version of it, but it’s Chris Farley as Newt Gingrich and he’s becoming increasingly frantic as he’s gaveling in all of these Contract with America ambitions and by the end of it he’s just screaming and hammering on the dais. And that does sort of point to, I thin,k the way that Republicans understood their position in Congress when they finally attained a majority. What do members of Congress do? Do they legislate? Do they fundraise? Do they go on to television shows? It’s sometimes hard for people to pin down because it isn’t abundantly clear that Congress does anything. Philip Wallach (07:34): It’s definitely possible to overstate the point, and I think if you literally imagine members of Congress as a bunch of lazy bums, you are seriously deceiving yourself. They are very hustling people. They’re going from one thing to another all the time. A lot of that is to try to maintain organic connections with their constituents. They spend a lot of time trying to be at events in their home district, get out, shake hands, listen to people—that hasn’t gone away. It’s hard to represent a congressional district of 750,000 people, which is around the average today, or most senators, of course, have states considerably bigger than that. (08:21): And so they do spend a lot of time on that. And of course, the fundraising part of it also does create connections with the district, but it also creates connections with all kinds of elements of the donor class that might be sympathetic to them, which is not always so geographically oriented, but they spend a lot of time cultivating connections with donors. And legislating is really a reduced part of the portfolio. It hasn’t gone away. There are still quite a few earnest legislators on Capitol Hill. But yeah, I’d say it used to be the case that if you wanted to have a chance to exercise legislative power, there was more of a clear sense that you put in your time over the years on your committee, you prove your worth by making yourself an expert in these matters and showing your colleagues that you know what you’re talking about. (09:13): And after a while, once you’ve proved your bona fides there, you get to write the legislation, and the legislation will then get considered and given its chance to become actual on the law books. I think people are much less confident in that path these days. They think if they put in all that time investing and making themselves an expert, it’s likely to go nowhere, that it’s likely to just be a waste of their time. And so I do think a lot of the more ambitious members have reacted to what they see as the incentives showing them. They think actually the way I’m going to get ahead and become a powerful person is by cultivating my national public profile by attending to the new media in all the different forms that takes James Patterson (09:59): The way Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez does Instagram live? Philip Wallach (10:02): Yes. She’s obviously one of the most successful at sort of taking her position in Congress and turning it into a platform for her to become a major political celebrity who people talk about becoming the president, and it is funny in how many members that is the goal that’s animating them. Maybe that’s not such a new feature of today, but the sort of clarity that the path to getting there is through media celebrity rather than legislative accomplishment is distinctive to our moment. James Patterson (10:37): So no doubt. We’ve talked a little bit about the things in your book, Why Congress, but why don’t you give us the elevator pitch, the summary statement that we have so far missed? Philip Wallach (10:50): Well, the title of the book is Why Congress, no punctuation. It’s meant to imply that there is an answer, and so the book is an apology for having a strong Congress as the center of our constitutional order because, the way I see it, having this body which is defined by its multiplicity is actually more capable of representing the diverse interests that make up America than a system in which we let everything collapse into this sort of Manichean war between one side and the other. And when we sort of collapse everything into presidential politics, that becomes the natural tendency of our system is to just make every single presidential election seem like this existential conflict. You get people putting their great hopes in their leader as somehow going to redeem the American soul one way or the other. James Patterson (11:50): I don’t think that’s in the enumerated authority of the president in the Constitution. Philip Wallach (11:55): Fair. It’s really not, but that’s sort of so Why Congress is trying to explain, well, when we had a functioning pluralistic Congress back in the day, what did that get us? My contention is that it better legitimized the federal government than what we’ve got today. What we’ve got today is a lot of people imagining that whenever they lose, it’s the end of the world almost literally in those words, people are willing to make the argument and they’re taken seriously and that’s not healthy. That’s not a way—its’ not been working. We haven’t seen Trump or Biden become a wildly popular figure with the majority of the country. They sort of do their shtick and find it difficult to tread water even. So I don’t think that we have a successful alternative to Congress. We’ve let Congress atrophy and that’s in my view, a much larger part of the story of why our politics are so deranged in the 2020s than people realize. I think people don’t even bother thinking about Congress much anymore. James Patterson (13:08): Another figure who really has done a lot to return our attention to Congress is Yuval Levin. He wrote the very important essay in Commentary magazine. I think it’s “Congress is Weak Because Its Members Want It to Be Weak” or something like that. Is there something you would add to the argument that he makes, and what is the argument that he makes? Philip Wallach (13:28): Well, that metaphor of using Congress as a platform that I already spoke out before comes directly from that piece from Yuval. It’s, it’s a very powerful metaphor that he develops in his book, A Time to Build. Also, we have a whole lot of institutions without institutional loyalties and without a sense that institutions are supposed to shape people. Instead, we have people who come to sort of inhabit the institutions but use them as a platform again to launch themselves as personal brands in the larger sort of media ecosystem. And you see that not just in Congress, but in a number of walks of life, and Yuval is a real believer in sort of the integrity of institution-specific ethics, role moralities, right? If you’re a judge, you’re supposed to act like a judge. You’re not supposed to act like an op-ed writer. If you’re doing that, you’ve lost the plot in some very important way, and he looks around at a lot of different institutions in American life and sees people having basically disregarded the idea of that sort of role specific morality and instead just sort of throwing themselves into the big culture war that preoccupies so much of us in so many ways, and for Congress specifically, again, that makes Congress a less interesting place. (14:59): It means that really Republicans and Democrats feel like they can’t have anything interesting to say to each other, or sympathies to build across the aisle because well, “if you’re on the other side of all that stuff, we must be enemies. Our leadership tells us don’t work with those people because you might give them comfort, you might give the enemy comfort and we don’t want that.” So Congress becomes less interesting. It sort of desiccates our politics, and Yuval and I would like to see some people pushing against that. It’s a hard thing to turn it around. We’re kind of in an equilibrium now. It’s not easy for one person to just break out of it because it’s a coordination problem, but we have to sort of at least start to build the awareness that something has really gone wrong here and that Congress can be a big part of the answer if its members are willing to try to take this leap. Our pitch is, “this isn’t pie in the sky because we have seen this institution operate in this way before. It really is a choice of the members should they decide that they want to take it.” James Patterson (16:12): How much of this is structural? How much of this is the result of changes to congressional authority, especially in the way they’ve delegated it either to the bureaucracy or to directly to the president? Philip Wallach (16:32): I think that a lot of what makes the teamsmanship work as opposed to having to reconcile with the other side and figure out how to do bipartisan lawmaking, is our willingness to circumvent Congress and to make policy through the executive branch. And you’ve seen this in case after case in the last 20 years, where first the president says, “Oh, I can’t do this all by myself. I need to go through Congress.” And then he gets frustrated with Congress not doing what he wants, and they said, “Oh, actually, it turns out I can do this.” James Patterson (17:08): Everyone discovers their pen and their phone. Philip Wallach (17:10): Yes, so I mean certainly thinking back to Obama and the DACA program, the immigration program that he fashioned for people who were brought to America ille…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Byzantines, Bishops, and Bolsheviks Oct 20, 2025
    Show notes

    Many are familiar with Catholic and Protestant flavors of Christian social thought, but little is known about Orthodox iterations. Dylan Pahman joins the podcast to talk about his book The Kingdom of God and the Common Good, which aims to fill that gap. In it, he explores both the thought of Orthodox theologians and social thinkers less-known in the West and explains how the rise of Communism delayed the development of social thought in the Orthodox world. Related Links The Kingdom of God and the Common Good by Dylan Pahman Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, informed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty in this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson. Today with me is Dylan Pahman at the Acton Institute. Dylan has written a tremendous compendium of Orthodox social teaching, especially on economics. It’s titled Kingdom of God and the Common Good. Is it “in the Common Good” or “in Common Good”? Dylan Pahman (01:07): The Kingdom of God and the Common Good. James Patterson (01:09): Okay. My PDF has a slightly abridged title up here. So … Dylan Pahman (01:14): Sequel will be Two Kingdom God, two, common Good, and so on. We’ll drop the the’s at some point and be a new title. James Patterson (01:21): Please tell me that this is the first time you’ve used that joke. Okay. As some listeners know, when I interview people who are my friends, things tend to be a little bit looser. Dylan and I have known each other for many years and I’m very excited about this project because it is something that I never thought of, but rather than having me explain it, how about we’ll have Dylan. So Dylan, tell us about what inspired you to write this project to maybe give us the elevator pitch for the listeners. Dylan Pahman (01:54): Yeah, definitely. So I’ve been working here at Acton for 14 years as a research fellow and as an editor of our academic journal. And I got all my degrees are in theology, so all the economics and political theory I’ve learned on the job. And part of that was reading a lot of great scholarship and hearing a lot of great lectures of people talking about Roman Catholic social thought and Calvinist social thought, and even some Lutherans and other people. And I am Greek Orthodox, and I kept thinking, well, “what’s our perspective on all those stuff?” And for those unfamiliar, the term “Christian social thought” refers to the problem of the working poor in the industrial era and then further issues, social and economic issues beyond that. So it begins in the Roman Catholic tradition with the encyclical Rerum Novarum by Pope Leo XIII. And that was “On the New Things” is literally what it means or on revolutionary change. (02:50): So he is looking at the problems of social unrest and the rise of socialism, and he’s trying to come at it from the wealth of, at that point, 1,900 years of Christian tradition while also admitting that the world was very different and trying to engage that. And so that was the, inspiration is I really felt like my tradition needed something like that too. I think there’s a lot we can learn from other traditions and in fact, the first part–the book’s in five parts–the first part is just a survey of here’s what the other Christians are doing. Orthodox tend to like to be special sometimes, and we are special, but we also need to be part of the broader conversation. And I really don’t think we’ll know what our unique contribution is until we’ve actually surveyed, well, here’s what the other Christians are doing, here’s what the common ground is, and here’s maybe some areas of dissonance. (03:38): So the goal is to research and figure out what are orthodox principles for engaging our modern world and our modern economies and questions of wealth and poverty today, all the complexities of wages and lending and monetary policy and all that kind of stuff. And so what I wrote was basically the book I wished existed 14 years ago that didn’t exist. It’s a book that walks readers through contemporary Christian social thought, biblical teaching on wealth, poverty and society, orthodox church history, and then a survey of modern economics, which I actually look at historically. So my goal is that each chapter is very short, 2,000 to 3,000 words, like Law & Liberty essay length and people can maybe read one a day, that sort of thing and work their way through the book. And instead of bombarding people with terms, I take this more historical approach where I tell the story of Orthodox social thought and I tell the story of modern economics. (04:35): So we get a sense of who were the people; who was Adam Smith; who were the classical political economists; what were they dealing with; what motivated the rise of socialism and Marxism and what was the difference with Christian socialism and social activism and that kind of stuff. And then I finally take readers to contemporary Orthodox contributions, which there have been some, but part of the problem is that history that with the Russian revolution, you have atheistic, militaristic communism, just sweep across Eastern Europe and Russia and other traditionally Orthodox land had for a long time been under the Ottoman Empire and you just don’t really have a space for Orthodox to think freely about this stuff. The thinkers who did escape, and many of them were exiled from Russia, suddenly they find themselves with a very different set of questions that they concern themselves with. So they are wondering, well, how do we be faithful to our Eastern Orthodox tradition while living in the West? (05:31): And they start focusing on questions of ecumenism. And those are very good things, but it’s very distant from that question of, well, how do I be a good Orthodox Christian banker or whatever? How do I live in our modern economy as a faithful orthodox Christian? So that’s the goal of the book, is to walk people through that so that they know the story, they know our tradition and they know something of how modern economies work to prevent the kind of unfortunate and sometimes embarrassing statements that you can find on blogs and unfortunately sometimes even in unofficial church documents about the nature of wealth and poverty in our economies today. James Patterson (06:10): So I was actually about to ask you about the intervention of Soviet communism because I know a lot of listeners, their probably biggest association with Orthodoxy is going to be Russian Orthodoxy. So what happened with the encounter, not just of Russian Orthodoxy, but of Eastern Orthodox in general with communism? How did they respond to it in their social thought? Dylan Pahman (06:42): Yeah, so you can find writings actually as early as Vladimir Solovyov, who is a nineteenth century Russian Orthodox philosopher. He died in 1900. His first book is very metaphysical, but it begins with a critique of socialism. So he’s already seeing it in the kind of mid- to late-nineteenth century. His last book, The Justification of the Good, has a whole section on economics, and again, he sees this kind of danger. And then even more so in the early twentieth century, there’s an excellent volume that I recommend. I think you can find the PDF on archive.org. It’s called Vekhi, which is Russian for landmarks. And it was a collection of authors. It’s probably the most successful edited volume of scholars that I’ve ever heard about because usually they get published and never read, but it brought together, let’s see, S. L. Frank Nikolai Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov, somewhat recognizable names, but they were critiquing the Russian intelligentsia in 1909, so eight years before the revolution. Dylan Pahman (07:43): At that time there were storm clouds on the horizon. And there had been a failed revolution, actually. So they were almost taking a victory lab. These were all intellectuals who had had a religious turn in their thought and had realized that the kind of nihilistic and Marxist fervor was very, very much mistaken. And so they were critiquing their peers, their former peers at least. And as you might imagine, it was not well received. There was a huge blowup about this. Even people, Bulgakov was a cadet. He was basically the closest you could find to a liberal at that time. And he was part of the second Duma in Russia and the Russian Empire. But even people in his party didn’t like it, probably most notably Vladimir Lenin wrote a response to it. I mean, it really had that level of impact. And they talk about things that would be very recognizable to readers of Law & Liberty, the importance of rule of law and order and religious and moral culture, all that sort of stuff. (08:43): You see these thinkers really wrestling with these issues. And like you said, they kind of see the storm clouds on the horizon. And unfortunately you have this conflict. And that’s part of what I try to answer in the course of the book is to say, “well, what happened?” I mean, the Russian Empire is a mess in a lot of ways, but there’s nothing inevitable about history despite what Marxists will tell you, no un-combatable historical dialectic that we’re all just at the mercy of. People have free will. And why did a nation like that go in that direction? You see, in the early twentieth century, they were moving towards having a constitution with recognizable liberal human rights protections and things like that. But you had just this building and building and building of this class that had been about a hundred years before disenchanted with their role in society. (09:40): So the intelligentsia were basically aristocratic young men who ordinarily would’ve entered the civil service. And for the first half of the Russian Empire, there was a liberalizing trend, and it was not without problems from an Orthodox perspective, but it wasn’t all uncritical either. Their interaction with Western ideas and they were moving towards probably having a constitution. But then you get, I believe Czar Nicholas I and things changed upon his succession. You have the Decemberists uprising, the Decemberists murder the Czars negotiator, which was a very bad idea. I think they shot him in the back. They were the moderates as well, among people who wanted a constitution. The Decemberists, the moderates shoot the czars negotiator in the back. And so the czar commands his troops to turn his cannons on the crowd. And that’s kind of the end of that liberalizing trend in the Russian. That’s Russian, James Patterson (10:34): Russian politics in 30 seconds right there. Dylan Pahman (10:36): And so you have people, if you read Pushkin’s, Eugene Onegin, it’s all about this guy. You get this character in Russian literature called “the superfluous man,” and it’s this disenchanted young aristocrat, and it comes up again and again because it was a common phenomenon of people who thought their role was to reform Russian society and to lift up the former serfs and whatnot. And then they just kind of find themselves listless and directionless. And if they can, they get their hands on books. In fact, one of the reasons you find a lot of people coming out of seminaries being so radical in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov, it’s the seminarian who’s the most nihilistic and terrible character in almost the most in the book. And that’s because seminaries were one place where they could still have books that were banned elsewhere. The church was actually trying to protect freedom of speech, but unfortunately that meant there was books like Karl Marx where in the libraries, Joseph Stalin was like a Georgian seminarian as a youth. (11:40): And you see that sort of a trend. And so you end up, and then in the midst of all that, the last czar completely bungled military policy in World War I and economic policy at home; people are just losing their jobs standing in long breadlines an absolute disaster, and it’s just ripe for revolution. So you get this conflict, and I mean, frankly, many people at the time, and from an orthodox point of view will also say, and the devil, I mean, read Russian literature. It’s unusual for someone not to have a conversation with the devil at some point. And Bulgakov called it a black miracle that you have this society that is a thoroughly Christian society, has its issues and problems, but it’s moving in this recognizable direction. And then just the most terrible thing happens. I mean, conservative estimates count something like a million people martyred, more liberal ones would be up to 10 million by the Bolsheviks. (12:44): So it’s a really, really terrible time. Most of the bishops of the church are replaced by atheist agents of the church or of the state. All but one monastery was completely shut down, turned into a museum or labor camps. So really, really awful thing. And it’s something that you can only understand in part by understanding the history of economics. You have to understand, well, what is it about Marxism that captures people’s imagination? And I talk about that. There’s two chapters in my book where I deal specifically with Marxism, and one, I look at it as a worldview. So Marxism is sort of like the ultimate conspiracy theory. It’s something wrong in your life. Well, here’s the answer: you’re oppressed and there’s an oppressor. And yeah, he’s the bourgeois, but in other ages he would’ve been, there’s again this historical dialectic that suddenly can help people make sense of their reality. (13:38): I don’t think it correctly does, but you can see the appeal, right? You’re struggling. You know what? It isn’t your fault. And sometimes it’s not people’s fault, but it’s just this story that suddenly they can, this meta narrative that they can hang in all of their problems, all the problems they see in society and make sense of it all. And we are storytelling people as human beings. We want a story to hang everything on, and Marxism provides that for one and it provides a very powerful one. Yeah, the Communist Manifesto says the history of all societies is the history of class struggle, which I think from a historical perspective is the most ridiculous historical statement I’ve ever read. They say everyone is conspiring this, including Pope and Czar, never mind that the Pope condemned the czar for forcibly converting Catholics to Orthodoxy at the same time. No, they’re conspiring together. James Patterson (14:31): That’s right. Dylan Pahman (14:31): For the sake of capital. But the reason that works from a Marxist perspective is well, they all have a false consciousness. They all are under the sway of these social forces because it’s ultimately material. There’s no place for human persons in Marxism, for that inherent dignity and freedom. We are the product of a historical equation, even to the point where Engels says the same about Marx, that he discovered this great material, historical, social dialectic. But you know what? The time was right. It was bound to be discovered. If not Marx, someone else. He says this, this is his friend. He gives his friend no credit for his own intellectual achievement. He ultimately kind of worships this as something in the place of God. And that’s a critique you find from Father Sergei Bolgakov, which I draw upon in that chapter. It says, ultimately this is a religious movement and it’s trying to stand in the place of religion for people. (15:30): And what does religion do? Among many other things, it gives people a narrative, a meta narrative to make sense of their world. And so that’s the power of Marxism. And then the other side that I look at is the economic analysis of Marxism and why that doesn’t work, why the marginal revolution ended up becoming the mains…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    The Unfree Press Oct 08, 2025
    Show notes

    Especially since the controversies of 2020, the commanding heights of American culture have been dominated by a kind of left-wing moral panic. In his new book, Adam Szetela analyzes this toxic mentality’s influence on the publishing industry specifically. Many writers are either drafted into ideological crusades—or else become their victims. In this episode of the Law & Liberty Podcast, Szetela joins James Patterson to discuss his book and the sorry state of American literature. Related Links This Book Is Dangerous! by Adam SzetelaPublishing Prejudices by Theodore Dalrymple Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, informed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty in this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson. I am contributing editor to Law & Liberty. Our author today is Adam Szetela. He earned his PhD in English in the Department of Literature at Cornell University. Before that, he was a visiting fellow in the Department of History at Harvard University. He’s written for The Washington Post, The Guardian, Newsweek, and other such publications. Today we’re going to be talking about his new book, That Book is Dangerous: How Moral Panic, Social Media, and the Culture Wars Are Remaking Publishing. It’s from MIT Press. Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Adam Szetela (01:21): Hey, thanks for having me, James. Appreciate it. James Patterson (01:24): So I just want to start off by saying that when I was carrying this book around at my office at the University of Tennessee, it got a lot of attention. People were very excited, and then when I told them about it, it got even more exciting. People were very thrilled to hear that someone had written this book. But before we get started talking about the details of this book, why don’t you give us an outline of what you argue in it? Adam Szetela (01:49): Yeah, so basically, so for context, I started noticing kind of in the early 2010s, this period that now hopefully in hindsight we’re referring to as the “Great Awokening” and sort of the birth of cancel culture, however you want to describe it. So there was a lot of attention around that time, rightfully going to universities for example, and sort of how they were shutting down speakers and you had these high profile cases of Charles Murray and Brett Weinstein and all these other folks. But around that time I noticed there was something similar happening in publishing. And every now and then a story would end up at The New York Times or The Washington Post that a book had been canceled before publication, and I don’t use that term metaphorically, I’m talking literally canceled before publication because someone had said it was racist or sexist or transphobic or homophobic. (02:43): And then sort of around the George Floyd “Summer of Love,” those cancellations really amped up a lot and I was seeing them more and more. And it was extending from picture books to journalism to scholarship to adult novels to memoirs. Really no corner of literary culture had been untouched by this climate of social media cancel campaigns. So basically I started with the question of if this is what I know about as someone who does not work in publishing, then surely this culture is affecting decisions that are being made behind closed doors. So I spent a few years interviewing people in all corners of publishing. So people who are presidents and vice presidents at the Big Five publishers, places like Penguin Random House, Harper Collins, Hachette, et cetera, to editors, to people who work in the marketing departments, to people at indie presses to directors of public library systems. And I even interviewed more than one person who is part of this growing career field of “sensitivity readers,” people being brought into edit manuscripts for potentially insensitive material. And these folks have now edited everything from a children’s picture book to there’s even scholarly journals that hire sensitivity readers now. So the book itself is really in many ways an exposé of this new historical moment in literary culture. James Patterson (04:15): The publishing industry, I don’t think, is something a lot of people know much about, but in particular you spend time talking about YA novels or young adult novels. And this is an area of publishing that really started to blow up as a result, I guess, of Harry Potter. So there’s a lot of details about the publication of young adult literature that I don’t know if people necessarily know. What is a “sensitivity reader,” how do they affect what’s published? And most of all, what is this whole concept of the moral panic? How does it play into all of that? Adam Szetela (04:54): Yeah, so the way I use moral panic in my book comes out of the sociological tradition called the “sociology of moral panic.” So these are folks who have studied everything from the Salem Witch trials to the hysteria over rock music at the end of the twentieth century. And basically a moral panic is a disproportionate response to a perceived threat. So the folks that I focus on in my book, and these folks in publishing, these folks on social media, who are getting books canceled and whatnot, they’re not people who are just like, “Oh, I think this book is not very good. I think it could be more well written.” These are folks who are associating books with violent crime. There’s someone I quote in my book who is actually head of an imprint who said, “Trayvon Martin might be alive right now if his killer had read better books as a kid.” These are folks who are comparing books to cars without seat belts. And in their minds, they think that the way you’re going to get rid of racism, sexism, transphobia, homophobia, and ultimately, people who voted for Trump, is to control publishing and control what people read, especially young people. So children, young adults, and they’re waging this crusade from their perspective to be on the right side of history, and they’re more than willing to get books removed from bookstores and to outright stop the publication of books before they even hit bookstores. James Patterson (06:29): Yeah, an element of the sensitivity era in which we use these sensitivity readers, you describe as a kind of reintroduction of race essentialism, and on page 58, a discussion of “racial mysticism.” How is it that these sensitivity readers that are attempting to kind of engage in some kind of filtering or refining of racial representation ends up ironically reproducing the very bias they’re trying to prevent? Adam Szetela (07:01): Yeah, it’s a great question. So basically to be a sensitivity reader, you do not go to college to be a sensitivity reader. You don’t complete any sort of course to become a sensitivity reader. All a sensitivity reader is, is someone who shares an identity with a character in a fictional book or the topic of a nonfiction book. So if I’m a black guy, I could be a reader, a sensitivity reader for say a nonfiction book written by a white guy that is in some way, shape or form about black people. I could be a sensitivity reader for a white guy who has a black character in his novel. And it’s premised on this idea that as a black person, I can speak to the needs, interests, values, et cetera of the “black community.” So what the way this sort of manifests in practice, and I try to offer a lot of empirical examples from the sensitivity readers themselves about what they actually do, but in practice, it sort of recreates the idea that people who share these demographic characteristics think the same, that they eat the same, that they have the same views of politics and things like that. (08:10): So there’ll be a sensitivity reader who’s like, “Hey, if there’s a black character in your book, I want to know what that character is eating for dinner.” That’s literally one example I quote, and it’s premised on this idea that black people in the US are supposed to be eating certain kinds of foods, talking a certain way, and ultimately the expectations for what they should be eating and how they should be talking actually are sort of the very stereotypes that they’re ostensibly sort of trying to correct in publishing. So an “authentic black meal” would be collard greens, something like that. Now, in reality, and one of the reasons that writers of color who I interviewed for my book who identify as being on the Left find these people so infuriating is because we’re now in a moment where a black novelist trying to get a book published is being told that their book is not “black enough” to be published. And essentially what the publisher means is we need more slang vernacular, we need more collard greens, we need more hip hop, things like that. And so that’s the short answer to your question. And a lot of this is being betrust by certain incentive structures in publishing. So right now, all the publishers are aware of the controversies. They don’t want their book to be called racist or sexist or whatever. So the sensitivity readers have created a market for their services, for their racial expertise and their expertise of these “communities”. James Patterson (09:40): There appears to be professional incentives within the industry to get ahead of a lot of the trends. In fact, I use the term “Get ahead” because I was just looking on page 62, probably one of the moments in the book where I had to stand up and walk around, I couldn’t believe what I was reading. It said there was a Filipino author who was talking to a white editor and upon the white editor discovering that the Filipino author is not black, he says, “Hey, you’re not black, you’re Filipino. Oh my God, we got to get ahead of this. We got to get ahead of this. You’re going to face a—” and then we’re not allowed to swear on this podcast. And the author, recounting this event to you, says, “The agent is telling me, ‘Hey, we got to swap some races around.’ We need to get a Filipino in this book somehow because so far it’s all black. I mean, there’s some mixed race people, but they’re black.” So what is it on earth is driving this white editor into such a panic that he thinks he’s about to lose his livelihood? Adam Szetela (10:46): Yeah. So especially around 2020, there was this emergent but now institutionalized idea that writers should “stay in their lane” when they’re writing. So if you’re a Filipino author, you shouldn’t be writing from the perspective of a black character or what have you. So in that case, this gentleman’s agent thought he himself was black and he turned out to not to be. So he was like, we need to, in his words, “swap some races around and get more people in this book who look like you, because I don’t want to take this to a publisher.” And the publisher realizes the author is not black, because they’re going to see that as potentially becoming the next target of these folks online who will be very quick to go after you if you’re writing outside your own identity. James Patterson (11:34): So there’s a particular book that becomes a kind of paradigm case, and this is the book Blood Heir. What is this book and what happens with this book? Adam Szetela (11:46): So this one’s wild, but is in many ways just representative of other incidents. So this is early 2019, there was a young adult author named Amélie Wen Zhao. This was her debut book. It from my understanding, got a good advance. It was getting hyped up. It’s a fantasy novel, set in a fantastical world. And in the months leading up to publication, people had started posting screenshots of the book’s description. So not even the book itself. And in the book’s description, they say this is a novel set in a fantastical world where there is slavery, but the slavery is not based off skin color. And people started saying that this was appropriating African American slavery, that this was “whitewashing” slavery. And for someone like myself who doesn’t have cognitive deficiencies, it’s obviously like a preposterous claim at face value, the idea that any book with slavery in it is speaking to African American slavery or taking something from that tradition. (12:54): From my understanding, the author was actually writing about sort of indentured servitude back in China, her home country. But anyways, so this reached a crescendo and the publisher, Penguin Random House actually canceled the publication of the book, sent the book to sensitivity readers for editing, and eventually it came out. Now, one of the things that’s most striking about this example is that there was someone, another author who led the charge in this cancellation campaign. He himself also, he was about to have his debut book come out. He’s an author of color as far as I can understand. He is on the far left. And a few months later, the same thing happened to his book. People went after him, said his book was, if I recall correctly, Islamophobic, because he had a villain in his book who was Muslim, and this guy, his book got canceled, it never got published, and he himself is a sensitivity reader. So when I was watching this, I was kind of like, if this guy cannot “get it right,” what hope do the rest of us have? This is a sensitivity reader for Big Five publishers who is heavily active in these cancellation campaigns, and even he himself cannot prevent himself from getting canceled. James Patterson (14:15): “Above all,” this is page 105, “above all, moral crusades tend to become more extreme. As they become more extreme, they lose sympathizers.” And you talk about how this was the case for the comic book crusade, and now it’s the case over why literature moving in the same direction, and it’s, like many revolutions, a revolution that is eating itself. But a part of this story about Blood Heir is the rise of social media. One of these social media sites, I think is going to be one that may not be familiar to many listeners to this podcast, maybe some, and that’s Goodreads. What on earth is Goodreads doing to authors, especially in YA? Adam Szetela (14:55): Yeah. So Goodreads is a platform where anyone can write a review of a book even if the book has not come out yet. So these folks who are involved in these cancellation campaigns, these are not what I will, for lack of a better word, called normal readers. These are very left-of-center people who spend a lot of time online, so not just on Twitter, not just on Facebook, but a big platform for them is Goodreads. So you’ll come across people on Goodreads who are not authors, who aren’t professional reviewers, but they have hundreds of posts, hundreds of ratings. They sort of see themselves as the de facto gatekeepers of literary culture and sort of the moralness of literary culture. So what happened was they started using this tactic that we call the “Goodreads review bomb.” So the way this works is let’s say you James have a book coming out in a few months, I get wind of it, maybe I get an advanced reading copy, or maybe as in the case of Amélie Wen Zhao, I just read the book description and I don’t like it. (16:02): I find it problematic. I can start sharing screenshots, posting on Twitter, things like that. But when you put in a book’s title on Google, Goodreads can be one of the first sites that come up, especially if you’re a new author and you don’t have a huge platform. So what these people realized is that working together, they could totally tank a book’s rating on Goodreads in a way that it won’t recover, and they can post comments that are like, “this book is racist, this book is sexist.” “This book is,” as my own title suggests, “this book is dangerous”. So some of these controversies, ones that eventually get covered in places l…

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    Ho, Hey! Western Civ Is Here to Stay Sep 22, 2025
    Show notes

    From colonial times through the twentieth century, Western civilization became America’s own cultural heritage, and it was always taught in schools and universities. Then, in the later part of the twentieth century, Americans turned on Western Civ. Why did that happen? What are the consequences for our culture today? What can we do now to recover that heritage? Professor James Hankins joins John Grove, editor of Law & Liberty, to discuss these questions in connection with his new book, The Golden Thread: A History of the Western Tradition. Related Links The Golden Thread, by James Hankins and Allen C. Guelzo“Reviving the Study of Western Civilization,” by James Hankins, Law & Liberty“The Right Standards for American Schools,” by James Hankins, Law & Liberty“The Origins of the West,” by Max Skjönsberg, Law & Liberty Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. John Grove (00:39): Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m John Grove, the editor of Law & Liberty. I’m filling in this episode for our regular host, James Patterson. Pleased today to be joined once again by Professor James Hankins. Professor Hankins is professor of history at Harvard University and a senior writer for Law & Liberty. He’ll be joining the Hamilton School of Classical and Civic Education at the University of Florida for the 2026 academic year, and he is the author of several books including Virtue Politics and Political Meritocracy in Renaissance Italy. And most recently he has written with Allen Guelzo, The Golden Thread: A History of the Western Tradition, and that is what we’re going to be talking about today. Volume one was released last month, and volume two is scheduled to be out by the end of the year. So Jim, thanks a lot for joining me again. James Hankins (01:28): It’s a great pleasure to join you. John Grove (01:30): So before we get into the book itself, I thought we would talk a little bit about the project and where it came from and a little bit about Western civilization and the study of Western Civilization. So I understand you and Allen Guelzo have a relationship that goes way back, far beyond the writing of this book. So tell us a little bit about how you two know each other and where this project came from. James Hankins (01:54): Okay. Well, Allen is my oldest friend in academia. We went to junior high school (middle school, they call it now) and high school together. We were in the marching band together, but we’ve been close friends for about 55 years now. And we always kept up our friendship and met, and we’ve been talking about Western Civ and other topics for many, many years. We didn’t actually come up with the idea of doing Golden Thread. This was a proposal to us by Encounter Books. They knew of our relationship and they were looking for someone to write a Western Civ book. Encounter is involved in a massive project to reform and revive the study of American history and Western history in a way that is appropriate to our time. As you know, people have taught Western history to educated people for hundreds of years in America. (02:54): It’s been called Western Civ since, let’s say, the late nineteenth century. But if you went to school in America in the eighteenth century, you would learn about the Greeks and the Romans. You would learn about medieval civilization, you would study history of Europe, all of this. This is standard fare for educated persons in the West since the Renaissance, really. And this stopped rather suddenly about 40 years ago. The educational establishment decided that they wanted to go global. There was discussion of this in an article in Law & Liberty published this week that talked about why it was put down, and how no one gave a thought to what the long-term effects were going to be of not teaching our own tradition. So now we find ourselves in a clash of civilizations—and we do have a clash of civilizations—but the West has unilaterally disarmed itself. We don’t know anything about our own civilization. And believe me, I know this, I teach at Harvard. I teach what are supposed to be the best students in the country and the level of civilizational ignorance is just astonishing. (04:12): They’re smart kids and they’ve learned what they can learn in high schools, but high schools simply aren’t teaching Western Civ anymore. That stopped also 40 years ago. K12 education gave it up. I once went through the social studies standards for all 50 states, when I wrote another article for Law & Liberty, and it’s just not there anymore. They’re teaching global history now. Anecdotally, I have three nephews who teach in public school system and what they’re teaching as history these days is just completely disengaged from any narrative of the West. And this is a terrible thing for us. As I said before, we’re unilaterally disarming ourselves in the clash of civilization. John Grove (04:58): Before we go on, why is that? What was happening? Obviously, we know about the radicalism of the ’60s, but what was the rationale? Why were so many people convinced to give up the study of Western Civ? James Hankins (05:11): Well, it’s partly the Vietnam generation, which didn’t like Western Civ. They thought of it as a Cold War historical phenomenon. This is incorrect, right? Max Skjönsberg published an excellent article recently, John Grove (05:29): I was going to mention that too. James Hankins (05:32): … reviewing a book that shows that Western Civ has always been taught. I knew this already because I do Renaissance history. It’s just not true that Western Civ is an artifact of the Cold War, but that’s how the Vietnam generation saw it. And so they didn’t want to teach it anymore. They had a very negative view, not just of the United States, but the whole west. So there’s that element. But I think even more powerful, in the 1980s and ’90s when this was done, was that the universities and colleges in America aspired to globalize themselves. This was a big project at Harvard in 1980s. Derek Bok wanted to make Harvard an international institution. They wanted to found branches in India and there was going to be a Harvard Law School in India, this center and that center. And they were also taking in lots more foreign students than they used to take in. (06:32): So the population of the university changed. There were fewer people who were native speakers of English. There were fewer people who had any background in Western Civ. And those people had to be educated. And also the professors didn’t want to teach it. Professors never want to teach required courses. They want to teach their research, and in places like Harvard and the Ivies that was going on. People were teaching narrower and narrower things; they didn’t want to teach a big narrative anymore. So that’s part of it. It was the globalization project of the 90s. And that wasn’t necessarily coming from the left either. It was coming from conservatives as well who just wanted a university that was more globe spanning. John Grove (07:18): It was interesting. Prepping for this, I looked up that phrase, because I knew that phrase, right? “Hey ho, Western Civ has got to go.” And I was surprised to find that they started doing in the ’80s. That was an ’80s slogan. I was expecting to find it in like ‘66 or ‘67, but it was in the ’80s that people did that. And so that’s interesting background about what was going on in the ’80s at that time. How do you respond to that? It sounds like a related issue. How do you respond to that idea that focusing on Western Civ is a sort of cultural chauvinism or western chauvinism or something like that. And how does the focus on Western Civ relate to this idea that, well, we also want to study the world and study other cultures. Other cultures are always represented as good. So how do you respond to that? James Hankins (08:03): Well, I think the real problem is not cultural chauvinism—what the left at the time labelled Eurocentrism—but cultural self-hatred right now. I mean, the best taught subject at Harvard is the history of China. And I say this with admiration because the people who teach Chinese history have done a great job of covering the entire spectrum of Chinese history and having somebody to cover every era and teaching a survey course every year and having upper-level courses that people can study after they get interested. They do a fabulous job on that. And they also teach Islamic civilization. But Western civilization, no. Harvard last hired a senior faculty member to teach any Western subject, ancient, medieval, and modern, in 2007. And we have lost eight senior historians through death, departure or retirement or since 2007. So it’s actually neglected. There are so many things you can’t study at Harvard now. John Grove (09:04): That includes any faculty member that has just an expertise that happens to be Western, not necessarily somebody that committed to Western Civ as a whole? That’s any faculty member who has a specialty that’s western focused since 2007? James Hankins (09:18): Anybody. I’m talking only about the history department, okay? I’m not talking about the other departments, but in our department, there have been no new hires in ancient history, in medieval history, and European history since the Renaissance. That’s the whole of Western Civ. And we haven’t hired anybody. And this year I’m the only person at Harvard University teaching ancient philosophy. So once I retire, who’s going to teach Plato and Aristotle, and the ancient philosophical schools, and Augustine and authors like that? I don’t know. They might be able to get an Augustine course in their religion department, I don’t know. But that philosophy department used to have course called Philosophy 10. It was taught every year since the time of William James. And they introduced people to ancient philosophy because they thought that was important for people to know. And they have a guy they brought in from Munich to teach Stoic ethics or something this year. But that’s really it. And in the gov department, they have a course where they teach a few texts, political philosophy. It’s very sketchy. They’re well-taught courses, but they’re not really survey courses of Western political philosophy. John Grove (10:35): Okay. Yeah. So you mentioned this idea of just self-hatred or sort of self-loathing. Roger Scruton always used the phrase oikophobia. And I know at times he sort of presented that as a Western phenomenon, that it’s something that seems to have really taken root in Western countries. And so there’s just an interesting dynamic there. What is it about Western civilization, about the train of Western thought, that somehow led us to that desire to just turn our back on and hate our own tradition and thoughts and ideas? Do you have any thoughts on that? James Hankins (11:14): Yes. Well, I spent a lot of time in China, and I studied Chinese history because of a comparative history project that I’m involved in. And China went through this whole period of self-hatred from the time the Marxist took over in ‘49 down to quite recently. But at some point the Chinese decided, oh, we can’t really hate on Imperial China. We can’t suppress the history of it. We have to turn it into something that’s positive. So if you go to China today and study Imperial China, they’re very positive about their own history, but we have not had that turn. I think it’s basically coming out of the post-colonial studies people, a trend that has not been that strong in the US until recently. Post-colonialism dominates historical study in Europe, especially England. We have a very strong strand of it here in the US now, [particularly in indigenous studies and Middle Eastern studies], and I think those are the people who are demanding that (12:06): …we hate on the West. They feel that the West has been responsible for the state of post-colonial Africa and post-colonial Middle East. And it’s a way of shifting blame for them. They don’t want to take any responsibility for their own problems. So they blame everything on the West. But that has been picked up: I mean, this is what’s behind the endorsement of the Palestinian cause. And we have to side with the victim. So the West is strong, the West is wealthy, powerful. So we are the victimizers and we should be ashamed of that fact, [they say]. And in the US of course, the big issue is slavery. People have been taught nothing about Western civilization except that it had slavery. So we’re supposed to hate on the West because of its history of slavery. But of course, all civilizations have had forms of unfree labor, sometimes chattel slavery, sometimes forced labor regimes that you get in China. It’s just the fact that anytime a society is strong, it attracts labor from foreign countries that are not doing so well. And those people sometimes sell themselves into slavery, or sometimes they’re captured in war, but this happens in all civilizations. And Islamic civilization, I think, had a much more serious slave regime than anything in the recent Western history. But that’s forgotten. John Grove (13:44): I’ve often thought there is, to get back to that phrase like Western chauvinism, there’s a kind of Western chauvinism I think that holds Western civilization to this much higher standard. So the things that have happened all throughout the world, well, Western civilization is guilty of them and the others really aren’t. There’s a sort of implicit sense of superiority there, that we are more morally elevated and therefore have responsibility for these things. James Hankins (14:10): But John, it’s tunnel vision, right? Because the West has fantastic civilizational achievements, and this super negative history is just totally blind to all the great things that happened in the West, such as the invention of democracy, the invention of experimental science, the invention of theoretical applications to medicine and mathematics. And you can go on. In fact, if you look at our book that we just published, Allen and I published, it’s a kind of treasure trove for all of the achievements of the West. And that is its goal in large part, to remind people of all the wonderful things that the West has produced, not just in political theory, but also in the arts and in music and in architecture. The West has had an extraordinarily rich civilization. And unfortunately, one result of hating on the West is that people don’t learn that anymore. So we have a generation that’s growing up that doesn’t know the names of Michelangelo or J. S. Bach. They don’t know who they are. They don’t know who Thomas Aquinas is. They don’t know anything about anything. And it’s impoverishing. They’ve lost the golden thread, as we call our book. They’ve impoverished themselves with all this hatred. And that’s why we really feel it’s important to start studying Western Civ again, but in a way that’s appropriate for our time. John Grove (15:41): That’s a great segue. So let’s get more, talk more specifically about the book. I’ll note, first off, that it is a beautiful book. It reminded me, going back to when I was in college, how you went to the bookstore and got your books, and you could tell which courses were going to grab you and which ones weren’t. And this was the sort of textbook that says, yeah, this is going to going to be a good course. It’s beautiful, it’s well designed. It’s also very large. So anybody who’s picking it up outside of a course better prepare yourself. You’re going to want to plan accordingly. That’ll take a while. So looking at the substance of the book tho…

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    Inventing American Constitutionalism Sep 18, 2025
    Show notes

    Brian Smith: Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. My name is Brian Smith. I am the editor of Law and Liberty. With me today, I am very pleased to have Gordon Wood, who is the Alva O. Way University professor, and professor of History Emeritus at Brown University. The author of 10 books, including most recently, Power and Liberty: Constitutionalism in the American Revolution. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Pulitzer and Bancroft Prizes, as well as the National Humanities Medal. Gordon, thank you for joining me. Gordon Wood: My pleasure. Brian Smith: So, I wanted to have you on the podcast today, specifically to talk about Power and Liberty, which as I understand it began as a lecture you gave at Northwestern’s Law School. So, I wanted to ask, how did the themes of that lecture inspire the book? And what was your aim in writing it? Gordon Wood: Actually, it was a series of lectures, a half dozen lectures that I gave at a school, I think, in the fall of 2019. And as we got into the COVID period, I had these lectures, and I thought maybe I should try to publish them. And so, that’s what led to the publication. I hadn’t really thought about that when I was giving the lectures, but it worked out nicely. Brian Smith: So, what was your goal in presenting a condensed version of your entire sweep of scholarship about constitutionalism? What were the key things that you thought needed recapitulation right now, that you were aiming to give your audience? Gordon Wood: Well, although the lectures pretty much summed up my thinking over the past half century on the constitutional issues, I hadn’t actually put them into this form, in print, at least. So, I thought that this was a good way of conveying my thinking, starting with the imperial crisis, going on to the constitution making at the state level, which is what they aim for. The United States, literally was 13 states at the outset in 1776, and each of those states wrote its own constitution. And then, having to explain the origins of the federal constitution, which [inaudible 00:02:39] granted, but they certainly hadn’t anticipated. I ended with the issue of private versus public, which helps explain the beginnings of the corporation. And then, I had a final epilogue on Rhode Island, my own home state, which suggested the middle class world that emerged following the revolution. So, all of that fit together, and it was what I wanted to say coming up my career. Brian Smith: So, I really specifically wanted to ask you about Rhode Island. It was a very striking epilogue, and I think a very surprising one. So, what was really special about Rhode Island at the founding? What made them stand out and can you say more about that analog between their middle class world and ours? Gordon Wood: That’s exactly right. They were a middle class society that probably of all the states, certainly the most middle class, that is to say they had the weakest aristocracy. And right from the beginning, they never were able to establish even a semblance of an aristocracy in their state. And as a consequence, they were very entrepreneurial minded, go looking for the fast money. And they were involved, of course, in slave trade, drum making, and all of that. But I think it’s the middle class nature of the society that… And of course, they were involved in paper money, which is, they had 11 issues, I think, of paper money as a colony. And this was far in excessive what any other colony did. And that paper money was capital, if you will. And they continued that after the revolution. They were the only state that refused to attend the Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. So for a host of reasons, Rhode Island was interesting. James Madison, in his small little essay that he wrote, a working paper for his ideas about the new Federal Constitution, isolated only one state that he complained about. And that, of course, was Rhode Island, mainly for its issuing of paper money which created inflation and hurt creditors. And Madison’s whole structure was designed to protect minorities from majority overreach, or majority tyranny. And Rhode Island was the example that he used of this democracy run wild. So, for a host of reasons, Rhode Island was interesting. And, of course, Rhode Island went on in the nineteenth century to become an economic powerhouse. By the end of the century, they had five leading manufacturing firms in the world, were located in this tiny little state. So, there’s a host of reasons why they picked Rhode Island as an example of the middle class society that really came to dominate the north. Brian Smith: Yeah, it was a fascinating example of how banking and credit have these long-tailed effects that you- Gordon Wood: And, of course, it was not at all anticipated by the founders. Brian Smith: Exactly. And as you say, none of them really understood how complex and rich that network of commercial exchanges really were, or how they depended upon the relatively easy money that paper notes allowed. Gordon Wood: None of the founders really, except for Hamilton, understood what a bank was anyhow. Adams never did. Jefferson never did. But Hamilton knew what a bank was, but he was unusual. But what Madison wanted in constitution was a veto given to the Congress over all state legislation. That’s so impractical. Can you imagine if they had stayed in all bills that the states wanted to pass would have to be sent to Washington, and having hearings, and the Congress would have to approve them? Well, that was Madison’s proposal. He was so frightened at what the states were doing. Well, that was so impractical that they mentioned, threw it out, and had substituted Article one Section 10 of the Constitution, which lists a number of prohibitions on what the states can do. Namely, they cannot print paper money. Well, if that had been enforced rigidly, it would’ve stifled the antebellum economy. States get around that by chartering banks, which in turn issued the paper money. And, of course, there were probably hundreds of banks. And by the eve of the Civil War there were 10,000, probably 10,000 different paper currencies. It was just chaos. And of course the Civil War ended all that. The federal government shoot its own greenbacks, as we do today, and taxed the state banks out of business. But up to that time there was just these state banks issuing currency, and it must have been intolerable as a businessman to deal with this. You’re in Providence, in Rhode Island, and you get a bank note from the first Bank of Nashville, Tennessee. What do you do? Well, probably if you wanted to take it, you’d probably discount it because it’s so far away. The bank note would say, “We, the Bank of Nashville promise to pay the bearer $100 in gold or silver,” but you’re not going to go to Nashville. So you take the note, discount it, give the person $90 worth of goods, and then hope you can pass it on to somebody else. That’s the way it worked. It must have been very chaotic. Brian Smith: So, I wonder if we can rewind a bit though. I jumped the gun a bit, just out of excitement because I wanted to hear more about Rhode Island. But I wonder if we could go back to the beginning, and talk a bit about sovereignty. So, you say that defining who was sovereign was the issue that finally broke up the empire in the… Can you explain that a bit? Gordon Wood: Yes. Well, the imperial debate started over an issue of representation, where the parliament issued a stamp tax. Parliament said, “You can’t tax us. We didn’t give consent to that.” And the British responded by saying, “Oh yes, you were. You were virtually represented in the House of Commons.” And the Americans said, “We don’t like this virtual representation, we’ll have none of it.” But the issue then moved to the issue of sovereignty, which was something that the English and Blackstone, the great legal jurist had worked out. Although he didn’t invent it, he put it into his book published in 1765, that there must be in every state, one final supreme lawmaking authority. And in the British constitution, that authority rests in parliament, and there can be no deviation from that. There has to be that final authority. And the Americans kept saying, “Well, no, we want to divide authority. You have some authority over us, yes, for trade purposes and so on, but we don’t want you to have the right to access.” And the British responded in the following fashion. They said, “If you deny parliament’s authority in one aspect, you have to deny it entirely. You have to accept parliament’s authority, it’s final authority.” And when confronted with that choice, by the end of the 1760s, 1770, the columnist responded to say, “Well, if that’s the case, we’re independent of parliament, and we’re tied only to the king.” And they worked out in a series of pamphlets written by all of the major founders, Jeff Adams, all wrote pamphlets saying, creating what I would currently called the Commonwealth theory of the Empire, similar to the modern Commonwealth, that is to say Canada, Australia, New Zealand, are tied to the British nation by the Crown only. And each of their parliaments are independent. Something worked out in the twentieth century, 1931. So, that’s the position the colonists are forced into by the early 70s, that they are tied only to the Crown. And of course by English standards, this was just, because we, Americans, can’t fully appreciate it. But Parliament represented such a liberty loving, it was the source of English liberty. It was the bastion of freedom against the Crown. The Crown was the source of tyranny. And through history, especially from the seventeenth century on, parliament had come to the side, or to rescue the people from the tyranny of the Crown. So, for the colonists to take on parliament, was to create a confusing situation for the British. They thought the Americans must be Tories. That is to say not good wigs. Wigs being the people who support parliament and support liberty, support all of the things that parliament did, especially the glorious revolution of 1608. So, the Americans are forced into a very peculiar position, in terms of fish culture, where they’re opposing the bastion freedom that is parliament, and are tying themselves to the Crown, which is the source of purity. And from the British point of view, it was totally confusing. North said, “They’re just a bunch of Tories, these Americans, what are they doing?” Brian Smith: But at some point though, in this narrative, a concept of sovereignty resting in the people emerges to replace the sovereignty of the king. When did that happen? Gordon Wood: Well, you see, when we get to the Federal Constitution, there’s opposition from the anti-federalists, and large opposition. The country was really divided. In fact, if they’d been a poll taken, the Constitution needed. It was an unusual situation. This was an unanticipated creation, this federal government. And the anti-federalists raised the issue of sovereignty. They said, “Look, sovereignty says, the doctrine says, there must be in every state, one final supreme lawmaking authority. And we can look at this constitution and its supremacy clause, that’s going to be the Federal Congress, and our states, which will be reduced to nothing, to measuring the height of fence posts and laying out roads. And that’s all states will have to do. This is intolerable for us.” And it was a very embarrassing argument for the Federalists, which is the name that the supporters of the Constitution took. They were awkward. They said, “Well no, we’re going to divide power. Some power’s going to be given to the federal government, some powers will remain with the states.” But the anti-federalists, just the way the British had, just came back over and over again, so there must be in every state. And they invoked this doctrine of sovereignty. And it’s James Wilson, who is, I think, relatively unrecognized founder, very smart Scotsman, who had immigrated to the colonies as a young man. He was a graduate of St. Andrews in Scotland. He comes up with a solution. He says, “We’re going to relocate sovereignty in the people.” Now, this isn’t just meaning that powers all derive from the people. And all good wigs in England believe that, saying that this actual law making authority, final supreme power, rests in the people. And they’re doling out bits and pieces of it to the different agents, some to the federal government agents, and some to the states. And once that idea, he did it in a lecture he gave out of doors, and then also repeated it in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention. And once Madison and others heard this, they said, “Ah, that’s all we need. That solves all of our problems, all of our intellectual problems, this doctrine of sovereignty resting in the people.” And so, that’s the origins of it. Brian Smith: So, that’s really interesting. But prior to this, you say that one of the other great innovations in the Americas, is the move to written constitutionalism. And while these don’t exactly evolve in parallel, it is this very unprecedented move, which you’re right to point out. What do you think drove this desire to move away from the unwritten English Constitution and into a written series of documents that we could use to understand our political process and its parameters? Gordon Wood: Well, it’s true. The English did not have a written constitution, and still don’t have. It’s very unusual. I guess Israel’s the only other state with England that doesn’t have a… But England did have a lot of written documents, and starting with Magna Carta in the thirteenth century, and all the way up through the Bill for Habeas Corpus, and then of course the Bill of Rights of 1688, ’89, those were all written documents. You write things down when you’re not sure that when you want to make them clear, and assert their strength by writing them down. That’s why we have written contracts. And so, that’s what they thought they were doing. And of course, England briefly had a written constitution in the middle with the Cromwell, and the little experiment in Republicanism that England had. But there was nothing like what took place in 1776. Each of those states wrote its constitution. And it’s hard for us to understand, but the states were independent. They had a significance for each [inaudible 00:18:29], the people who lived in the states, that’s difficult for us to appreciate. We think of the states more as ministry of units. But think back, Massachusetts had a hundred and some years, 50 years of history. Virginia had the same thing. So, when Jefferson said, “My country,” he didn’t think of the United States as his country. It was Virginia. And when John Adams said, “My country,” he meant Massachusetts. So, you have to think of the articles of consideration, which is the first treaty that holds these states together, like the EU today. We know there’s an EU, but how much do people think of themselves as Europeans? Frenchmen think of themselves as French, and the Germans say, “Well, we’re Germans.” But there is this thing called the EU, and to some extent they are aware of a Europeanness, and that’s a best way of understanding how Americans thought of themselves. They did talk about themselves as Americans, but they also knew that they were the citizens of Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania, or Virginia. And so that first tree, like the EU, the articles were based on a treaty of these 13 states coming together. And each of them had its own constitution. So, moving to the Federal Constitution 10 years later, was something nobody anticipated, 1776, not a single person even raised the idea of such a strong federal or national government in 1776. Brian Smith: No, you do a really interesting presentation in the book of how surprised everyone was that it didn’t come out of imminent crisis, that we built this new constitution. It wasn’t quite accidental the way you present…

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    The West's Quest Sep 08, 2025
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    Robert Nisbet is best known for his books The Quest for Community and The Twilight of Authority. Luke Sheahan joins the podcast to discuss a new edition of Nisbet’s lesser-known but perhaps most important book The Social Philosophers, a sweeping account of the history of community and its treatment by Western political philosophers. Related Links The Social Philosophers, by Robert Nisbet, foreword by Luke SheahanQuest for Revolutionary Community by Luke Sheahan, Law & LibertyRevolutionary Degradation by Luke Sheahan, Law & LibertyWhy Associations Matter by Luke Sheahan Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. John Grove (00:39): Hello and welcome to this episode of the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m John Grove, the editor of Law & Liberty, filling in this time for our regular host James Patterson. I’m pleased today to be joined by Luke Sheahan. Luke is associate professor of political science at Duquesne University. He is a senior affiliate in the Program for Research on Religion and Urban Civil Society at the University of Pennsylvania. He’s the editor of The University Bookman, and he’s the author of Why Associations Matter: The Case for First Amendment Pluralism. And most recently, he’s brought back a new edition of Robert Nisbet’s book, The Social Philosophers, and he’s written a new foreword for that book, and that’s what we’re going to talk about today. So Luke, thanks for joining me. Luke Sheahan (01:23): Thank you for having me. John Grove (01:24): So let’s talk a little bit first about Nisbet himself and his place in the intellectual landscape of the twentieth century. Most of our listeners will probably be familiar with his book, The Quest for Community. I personally feel like that book is often cited but not necessarily appreciated in its fullness, to say nothing of the rest of Nisbet’s corpus. So I think there are a lot of intellectual conservatives out there who probably haven’t read a lot beyond Quest for Community and maybe not The Social Philosophers. So tell us a little bit about Nisbet and his importance before we get into this particular book. Luke Sheahan (01:59): So Robert Nisbet was a significant figure in the twentieth century. So he’s one of the few leading lights of the conservative movement who spent his entire career in academia. So he started off at the University of California–Berkeley, and he ended his career at Columbia University, holding the Albert Schweitzer chair, and retired from teaching in 1978, and commenced with teaching in 1939. So long career, very storied. He gave the Jefferson Lecture, which is the highest honor given by the federal government in the humanities. So a very significant figure. He’s most famous for his book, The Quest for Community. So that book was published in 1953. He was 40 years old, came out with Oxford University Press. It still was, as you indicated, it’s read or at least cited all the time. And there he makes the arguments that communities, real concrete communities, have been in decline for some centuries, largely due to the ideas of the state, the state being the most cohesive and important community and the state being composed of individuals. (03:21): So this kind of individual-state dyad has grown at the expense of communities by which he means families, local communities, professional associations, religion, and religious organizations. All of these things have been squished in the middle between the individual and the state. Now that argument he carried on throughout the rest of his career. It was the main aspect of his scholarship and popular writing. Now what people don’t quite realize is that when you read Quest for Community, sometimes you’re left with questions. Sometimes I wish it was twice as long, so there are certain things, I just want to hear more about this, what do you mean? And if you ever think that reading Quest almost certainly, he did go more in depth elsewhere. He wrote another 20 books or thereabout where he really digs into some of these issues. So the book we’re going to talk about today, The Social Philosophers was published in 1973. (04:27): So 20 years after Quest. He goes much deeper into his concept of community. What exactly is he talking about when he says these communities? What is a community? What he means is not a statistical aggregate. So it means people who identify psychologically as the same thing. They’re are community and it endures through time. We are the same thing. We rely on each other, we’re going to help each other, and we are devoted some higher cause or purpose, the community itself. That could be—and he says we can form communities around all sorts of things—politics, we’ve done that for a long time; war, we’ve done that for a long time. The family can be a community of course, and has been for many millennia. And religion is another one. And these are really four types of communities that have been the ones that have been with us the longest—kinship, obviously for tens of thousands of years, but most recently and as the subject of social philosophy, war, politics, and religion. He says these three have really dominated over the last couple of millennia and always at the expense of kinship. They always came into being in conflict with the clans and tribes and patriarchal family. John Grove (05:48): I want to get into most of what we’re going to talk about. We’ll be talking about some of these particular forms of community and how he approaches them, but I think you’ve already started to introduce us to The Social Philosophers and what that book is. But just tell us a little bit before we get into the details about where this book fits in Nisbet’s Corpus and what value somebody who’s studying Nisbet, what value they get, particularly from The Social Philosophers, because a sweeping book, very, very wide scope, broad take on Western history and social thought. Is this the pinnacle of his scholarship? Is this sort of the central book to read? Luke Sheahan (06:28): Yeah, so his kind of three most popular books are The Quest for Community (1953), Twilight of Authority (1975), and The Present Age, which is his Jefferson lectures from the 1980s. So those three [are] his most popular. They’re most accessible to the public, so they’re not too long by any means. They’re written as lectures or adapted from popular writings, scholarly based upon his scholarship, but accessible. So he publishes his first book, 1953. He actually doesn’t publish a whole lot in the coming decade because he’s dean of the University of California at Riverside. And then at the age of 50 or thereabouts, he goes back to teaching and he starts to really publish. Interestingly enough, he starts to really publish in earnest really in the 1960s. So in his fifties and sixties is really when he gets, kind of hits his stride interestingly enough. So The Social Philosophers comes in 1973. He’s 60 years old. And it is you might say, his magnum opus, what he really has to say about community all comes together in that book. So if you’re willing to invest in the 400 pages, that’s really what it is. And so it’s basically a textbook in some ways. It’s very sweeping in terms of both temporally, chronologically, he’s going through everyone. And also in terms of the breadth. So it’s not just political philosophers, it’s social philosophers as the title indicates he gets into economic thinkers. I mean Marx is in there, Adam Smith is in there, Plato’s in there, Aristotle’s in there, Burke’s in there, Proudhon’s in there, Tocqueville’s in there. It’s Althusius, it’s everyone. John Grove (08:13): I remember the first time I ran across this book back when you had to go hunt for it on 8 books somewhere for the original edition, and it was just really eye-opening. I had no idea that Nisbet had written this stuff on Plato and Aristotle. He’s not somebody you immediately think of as writing on the entire scope of the history of political philosophy. So it was a very exciting find when I first discovered, when I first discovered this book. So I think a lot of people who study twentieth-century conservatism will like it and people who are more interested in that broad sweep of political philosophy will use it. I know I really focused on his discussion of community and how it was being replaced in Greece in the century just before Plato and Aristotle. I use that a lot in the last time I taught a classical political thought class. (09:08): It’s useful to a lot of people. I will note before we get into some of the specifics, it does seem to me that when he talks about The Social Philosophers and political thinkers, he is pretty historically grounded in them in that he’s very interested in understanding how they are responding to the crises of their time. So he’s not somebody who’s kind of goes back and just finds ideas sort of in a vacuum and kind puts them in conversation together as if they’re speaking the exact same language. He’s very historically focused. And in some ways, it seems to me that it’s a book that when you’re looking back at the scope of Western, the Western tradition in general, he sort of punctures the idea that you should go back there looking for some time when everything was just right. He really presents it as a continual history of tension and crisis and conflict. And most of the great political thinkers are the ones who are trying to understand that conflict. Some of them definitively taking a side on the conflict. Others, especially when you get to the plural community, are trying to figure out how these various tensions between kinship, politics, war, how they can all be made to fit into the broader scope of human life. But he is pretty historically focused. Is that right? Luke Sheahan (10:32): That’s right. And so interestingly enough, he was responsible for the kind of importation of history into the discipline of sociology. So he wrote a lot on the historical grounding of the sociological tradition and sociology as a discipline. And he held joint appointments between history departments and sociology departments at the University of Arizona and at Columbia. So it’s very historically grounded and it was very much for him, a matter of the discipline that this is how you did things. John Grove (11:02): Okay, well, let’s get into some of the specifics in the book. You’ve already set the stage for this a little bit, but the book is divided up into different forms of community that he says, even though they take very different forms and different historical times, you can sort of trace throughout the Western tradition different types of community that people are building around and starting to understand themselves as within. The one that’s in the background. It doesn’t get its own chapter, and I was kind of wondering why it doesn’t have its own chapter, but it’s sort of in the background of all of it is kinship community. So it starts with family ties and for the most part with kinship community, he’s talking about more traditional societies where the family is the absolute centerpiece of human life and then everything else he sort of presents as a response to kinship community. So just tell us a little bit about the importance he places on kinship community and what caused that to break down. Why is it because for the most part, kinship community is sort of spoken of as in the past. There are little remnants of it that sort of remain in various parts of history, but what launched the attack on kinship community? Luke Sheahan (12:23): So kinship for him is the background of everything. As far as we know, human beings have spent most of our history and kinship groups, clans, tribes, these sorts of things. As far as we know, thousands and thousands of years, that’s how we lived. And obviously the kinship community is very important for procreation. You have to have some sort of coupling as far as we can tell, you need to be raised by your own parents or something close to it. Human beings even today are continued to come into existence and to be raised in that way. John Grove (12:55): Give us another 15 or 20 years and we’ll see. Luke Sheahan (12:59): Yes, but this is how it’s done. And so everything is in that. That’s the backdrop for everything. And authority structures in these places are fairly sophisticated, grounded, and shaped the human brain in terms of just how we are, but it doesn’t handle certain crises. So these kinship groups run into a sort of crisis, usually a crisis of war. There’s some sort of conflict. And it turns out the kinship group good for all sorts of things, existed for tens of thousands of years, not so great at winning wars. So just because your grandpa is your grandpa doesn’t mean he’s good at military strategy. Doesn’t mean he’s good with a sword or an ax. So an individual who is good with the sword and ax and is good at commanding on the battlefield presents a conflict, a challenge to the authority of the kinship structure. And so you have this war community is what he calls it. (13:59): You get a crisis of war of some sort, the general rises and he wins. But how does he win? He has to exercise absolute authority over the individuals, probably young men under his command, which means he has to break the kinship tie. They are not under their fathers and grandfathers, they’re under him. And his authority has to be absolute. So that means it has to trump the kinship group. So it creates that challenge. And then once that challenge is put into place and it’s successful, you end up with a permanent tension between the kinship group and the military community. Now some places, Rome kind of famously negotiated that for a number of centuries. So when the general returned to Rome, all the soldiers across the Rubicon, everything’s different. Not Caesar, but previous generals, when they crossed it was different. So you cross over, the soldiers are now under the authority of their fathers and grandfathers again, their complete authority. Whatever booty they had, they have to turn over to their family. All those rules apply. The general’s no longer the general in Rome, but that of course falls apart later when Caesar crosses, he remains the general, the individuals remain under his command. And that’s the crisis of Rome. John Grove (15:17): Importantly in Greece particularly, he says in Greece you didn’t have as much of that negotiation. It was more of a continual assault of the military and then the political community against those kinship bonds. Luke Sheahan (15:33): So Nisbet sees this as the rise of Cleisthenes in Athens. So he comes in, Solon had already tried some rearranging, it didn’t really last. Cleisthenes comes in and what he does is definitively breaks the power of the Athenian tribe. He utterly annihilates them. And so all of your identity is in your quote tribe, but it was a political identity. It was not a kinship identity. And that just changes everything. John Grove (15:59): It reminds of French Revolution sort of stuff. The way it describes it, right? It is you have these divisions that are just random divisions. You’re put in a group that that’s your group and it had nothing to do with your background, with your previous life. And so Burke’s line about nobody being committed to a square mile of territory or something like that where he says nobody feels commitment to be part of a zip code basically. And that was kind of the point for Cleisthenes. So that was the whole point. He doesn’t want people to be committed to those local because he wants all of their commitment to be focused at the polis level. So we’re already kind of gett…

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    From Equality to DEI—and Back Again? Aug 18, 2025
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    What is the future of DEI? Does it have at least some laudable goals, and are there better ways to achieve them? What do the American people really want when it comes to tolerance, inclusion, and discrimination law? The Manhattan Institute’s Robert VerBruggen discusses all these questions and more with host James Patterson in this episode of the Law & Liberty Podcast. Related Links “Fight Bias and Legalize Meritocracy,” by Robert VerBruggen Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson, contributing editor to Law & Liberty. Our guest today is Mr. Robert VerBruggen. He is a fellow at Manhattan Institute, where he provides policy research, writes for City Journal, and contributes to special projects and initiatives in the president’s office. And he has served as a deputy managing editor at National Review, managing editor at the American Conservative, and editor at RealClear Policy. And finally, as an assistant book editor at the Washington Times, he publishes on a number of issues and was the 2005 winner of the Chicago Headline Club Peter Lisagor Award. That’s great. And today we’ll be talking about his study at Manhattan Institute titled, “Fight Bias and Legalized Meritocracy, A Unifying Vision for Anti-Discrimination Law.” Mr. VerBruggen, welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Robert VerBruggen (01:38): Great to be here. James Patterson (01:39): Let me give you two accounts of DEI and you tell me where they go wrong and maybe what half-truths they get. So the first is that DEI, which for those six or seven people listening to this podcast who don’t know, stands for diversity, equity, and inclusion, is mandatory for all hiring practices because of the permanently structured white supremacy in American institutions. And without it, we would experience the same levels of discrimination found, say in Jim Crow America. That’s the first version of the story, usually understood to be on the left. And the second version of the story is that DEI policies are a form of counter-discrimination designed to elevate minorities, otherwise incapable of achieving excellence in a competitive environment, and thereby exposing people to all kinds of forms of incompetence. These are the two extremes. It’s more of the right-wing extreme, and your study seems to say, look, let’s take this much more seriously and look at the evidence. What does the evidence tell us about these two positions? Robert VerBruggen (02:54): Well, sure, I think the beautiful and ugly thing about the term DEI is that it’s very vague. It can mean a lot of different things to a lot of different people. I think some people really do mean it just to refer to the concept of being open to people, being inclusive, being willing to hire and consider candidates from all different walks of life, and making efforts to make sure that you’re not overlooking people because of where they come from or who they are. And that’s, of course, entirely laudable, but I think it’s also a euphemism for, as you might say, counter-discrimination, reverse discrimination, whatever you want to call that, discrimination against sort of overrepresented groups or higher performing groups in an effort to hit the correct numbers that you think that a company or a student body should have. And I think that that’s where it runs into problems legally. I think there’s been a lot that’s been going on under the banner of DEI that has always been illegal, and I think that there’s a lot of gray area as well that as what the Trump administration is doing plays out. And as courts hear more of these cases, I think we’re going to have to resolve a lot of that gray area in terms of what exactly is allowed and what is not allowed in these sorts of areas. James Patterson (04:06): So where does the term DEI, or diversity, equity, and inclusion, come from? Does it have the same provenance as something like affirmative action? Does it grow out of affirmative action, or is it its own thing? Robert VerBruggen (04:19): I mean, I think it’s largely used in the same context as affirmative action. We talk about DEI and wokeness. These are sort of new terms or they’re new debates that we’re having, but in a lot of ways, they really just echo the debates about racial preferences and affirmative action that we’ve been having for 50 years or more. So I think in a lot of ways, they refer to ways of trying to diversify a company or a student body typically by taking race into account. And that’s also a problem that we have with the term affirmative action. The original use of it is just take affirmative action to make sure that you’re being fair and not discriminating by race. And it ends up being a euphemism for discriminating by race to get the numbers that you’re trying to get. And I think it’s a similar sort of thing with DEI where it’s just vague enough that a lot of people hear it and think, oh, that sounds nice, but it also turns out to be sort of a cover for some discriminatory and often illegal behavior. James Patterson (05:07): So the policy of DEI, at least as I understand it, is kind of a strange thing to emerge, given that as you put in your study, it actually has its origins originally in an attempt to establish a colorblind law. So how is it that we go from the colorblind objectives of, say, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into at least as it’s been abused, a DEI that creates preferences almost to the point of quotas? Robert VerBruggen (05:45): Yeah. What the original civil rights laws reflected was sort of a consensus in America at that time that things had gone very, very badly under Jim Crow and it was not fair for African Americans to be treated the way they’re being treated and to basically ban discrimination by race. And these were written in very colorblind terms, and it was not only discrimination against certain groups was illegal, and it was okay to discriminate against other groups. It was just colorblind language that said, you’re not allowed to discriminate. But there’s always been a vocal minority in the US, and this is a debate that plenty of other countries have, as well, something Thomas Sowell has written a lot about, there’s always the vocal minority that says, no, we should be making more affirmative efforts. We should be discriminating in favor of the population that’s been discriminated against in the past. And that has very rarely actually been written into the law. It’s been very rare that Congress has put colorblind language into the statute books, but what’s been more common to happen is that courts and executive agencies blur the lines of the law and open the door that you see that with affirmative action in higher education. You see that with affirmative action plans in hiring where essentially courts and executive agencies blessed behavior that was pretty clearly not supposed to be happening under the Civil Rights Act. James Patterson (07:01): So let’s look at some of those laws, or at least what we might consider the sort of the big moments in anti-discrimination. What are they, and maybe how did judicial rulings or bureaucratic enforcement change? Robert VerBruggen (07:20): One of the bigger examples is affirmative action in higher education. The text of the Civil Rights Act says basically you’re not allowed to be denied participation in something that’s funded by the government, which is pretty much all colleges, public and private, on the basis of race. A couple decades or a decade and a half or so later, the Bakke decision comes along and says, well, you can consider race as one factor among many to get the educational benefits of diversity despite the very clear language of the statute that’s on the books. And also the constitutional issue of, especially for public colleges, denying equal protection under the law. It basically says it’s okay to do that. In employment law, you have a few different developments. One is the Griggs decision, which says that the original law had basically said you’re not allowed to intentionally make a test to give to your employees that’s designed to discriminate to weed out certain racial groups. (08:15): But you’re protected if you want to use tests to find the best employees. And the Griggs decision comes along and says, actually, if the test has a disparate impact, we’re going to hold you to a higher standard. We’re going to make you basically presumptively liable for discrimination for using that test unless you can defend it in court with pretty stringent rules and also with affirmative action. In private employment, you have the Weber and Johnson decisions which say, okay, if you’re a private company and you think you have a traditionally segregated job line, you can take race into account. If you have an affirmative action plan documenting what you’re doing, you can have an affirmative action plan to take race into account to some limited extent. And these are all things that are just not in the statutes. These are things that courts later kind of allowed out of the sympathy, frankly, with that vocal minority that wanted to do something that hadn’t been enacted in law. James Patterson (09:11): Yeah, there was a kind of optimism during the 1960s that with correct legislation and maybe with some kind of federal assistance, there would be a rapid evening out of outcomes. And when these don’t surface, there’s increasingly a justification for interventions that come from the courts. The one that seems to be most important, at least in beginning the process, is the Griggs decision in disparate impact. What does that mean? Robert VerBruggen (09:46): Basically, disparate impact means that in the case of an employment test (which is just kind of the textbook example of disparate impact, though the ruling applies to other selection mechanisms too) if you give people a test for the job and one racial group passes it at a significantly higher rate than another racial group that is presumed to be discriminatory, and the employer then has the burden of defending the test, showing that it’s adequately job related, showing that it’s validated. And there’s a whole very technical process that tends to play out in those kinds of cases called a Battle of the Experts, where each side hires testing experts to defend and criticize the test at a very technical level. So it basically says that if you’re going to use tests that have any kind of disparity, they have to be very rigorously vetted, and if you get challenged on them, the judge has to agree with you that they’re appropriate for the job. James Patterson (10:37): And the report on the area of employment, it says by the end of the 1970s, the Supreme Court had thrown out a requirement that Alabama prison guards be at least 5’2″ and 120 pounds, and yet allowed women to be outright excluded from certain roles in maximum security prisons owing to sexual assault fears. In the same decade an appeals court threw out a company’s categorical policy of refusing to hire those with criminal records. But the Supreme Court allowed New York’s transit system to refuse to hire addicts on methadone treatment without making case-by-case distinctions among applicants and job roles. The evaluation of written tests came to involve fact-intensive nitpicking of exactly what skills a test measured. I don’t know about you, if I were five one and 115 pounds, I would definitely not apply for a job as a prison guard, but what explains this battle of the experts? There’s a real aversion to being hauled into court and suddenly having to hire a firm or keep on staff a certain amount of legal expertise. Robert VerBruggen (11:46): Exactly. It’s not just, you can’t just say, okay, look, I’m using this test in good faith. There’s no evidence that I chose it to a certain racial impact. If you look at the test, I can explain to you why the questions on the test relate to things that I want my employees to know. It’s this really intensive process that stems from the EEOC putting out, they’re called the uniform guidelines. It’s a really long document on testing procedures that does not have the force of law, but that courts have really looked to over the years, and it’s just sort of an additional layer of requirement on employers that want to use tests. So when you use a test, you’re taking the risk of being held into court, and even if it’s a good test, you’re going to have to defend it. You’re going to have to go through the expense of defending it, and you’re going to have to hope that the legal process ultimately agrees with you that the test is a good one. So it’s basically an additional layer of risk that people take on when they try to screen their employees. James Patterson (12:40): We have a pretty lengthy history in the United States of what’s called redlining, which were efforts of cities or planners somehow to create housing arrangements in cities that would keep African-Americans out of certain neighborhoods. Do we find DEI as a policy impacting this sort of thing and has it been successful? Robert VerBruggen (13:04): Yeah, I mean, I went into the history of housing discrimination a little bit in the report. That’s an area where there’s been, I think, a lot of progress in a lot of different ways. One exception is that real estate agents do in more recent papers, still seem to just steer people to kind of like neighborhoods. And it not clear the extent to which that is because they’re trying to preserve discrimination, which I think is probably not a major motive these days, or if they’ve come to realize that if you have a majority white neighborhood, a majority black neighborhood, people of that race are going to be more likely to rent there. But that is illegal. You’re not allowed to steer people. So yeah, I think that’s an ongoing concern that there has been discrimination in real estate. There are laws to prevent that I think are good laws. And I think there are still, I think the audit studies do show that there are certain ways that those are still being violated, but there’s also been immense progress. There’s been a pretty big drop in a lot of kinds of bad behavior, like telling people that homes or apartments aren’t available when they are, that sort of thing. James Patterson (14:01): Earlier you mentioned the Bakke decision and its impact on higher education. Bakke comes down in 1978. What is this case and to what extent is it still controlling on issues of admissions to higher educational institutions? Robert VerBruggen (14:19): Sure. Yeah. I guess I forgot to finish my thought. It was the beginning of a very wishy-washy period in jurisprudence over the affirmative action issue. So it was basically, well, you can kind of do it, but you can’t have a quota. You can consider it to increase diversity, but you can’t do it, for example, in the name of social justice. It has to be that you’re trying to get the educational benefits of diversity. And then of course, as the Supreme Court turned back to the right, over the past few years we’ve had the SFFA decision that essentially overruled it without quite coming out and saying that it was overruling. It said that, no, you don’t get this extra sort of broad discretion to discriminate by race just because you’re a college. James Patterson (15:03): Great. And an area that, I guess, doesn’t occur to me that often because I’m not in this world, but there’s a fair amount of discrimination or history of discrimination in government contracting. And so maybe explain to an audience that may not know much about this, why this matters and what happene…

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    The Hubris of the Covid Planners Aug 04, 2025
    Show notes

    America is still reeling from the coronavirus pandemic that broke out in 2020. Not only was it one of the most deadly health incidents in our history, but the strategies imposed by central planners to contain its spread also inflicted countless costs on everything from the economy and education to social life itself. Stephen Macedo, an author of a recent book evaluating the pandemic’s aftermath, joins Law & Liberty contributing editor G. Patrick Lynch to discuss the price of the pandemic on this episode of the Law & Liberty Podcast. Related Links In Covid’s Wake by Stephen Macedo and Frances LeeLiberalism vs. Scientism, a book review by Mary Carmen MeadThe Pandemic in Hindsight by Law & Liberty‘s Editors (March forum) Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty in this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. G. Patrick Lynch (00:39): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m G. Patrick Lynch, a senior fellow at Liberty Fund and a contributing editor to Law & Liberty. And for this episode, I’m filling in for James Patterson. Today we are joined by Stephen Macedo, who is the Lawrence S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics in the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. He writes and teaches on political theory, ethics, public policy, and law, especially on topics related to liberalism, democracy and citizenship, diversity and civic education, religion and politics, and the family and sexuality. We will be discussing his latest book In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us, co-authored with his Princeton colleague Frances Lee. Macedo and Lee have appeared in many major media outlets, including The New York Times, CNN, PBS NewsHour, and The Hill, to discuss the book, which has been lauded for its critical review of the political and policy responses to the pandemic. Steve, welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Stephen Macedo (01:36): Thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here. G. Patrick Lynch (01:37): Well, it’s great to have you here. As I mentioned to you before we got started, I think this is a tremendous book and I congratulate you and your co-author, Professor Lee, on it. I want to begin by saying, I know for many of us, looking back on the pandemic is personally difficult because of the challenges we all faced, particularly those of us who lost loved ones. And yet in my view, this book is immensely important because it serves as a sort of a truth commission almost on the Covid response by the government, and it reveals a lot of unpleasant truths about how poorly the public sector performed. The title of your book suggests that the government failed the test of Covid. As a professor, would you have given the government an F for its response on Covid? Stephen Macedo (02:18): Well, thank you for the introduction first of all. I haven’t really sat down to think about that. And I think I would say that actually the scope of the focus of the book is a bit wider than just the government, though public health officials and others obviously played a very important role in a way, the focus of the book is on what we call the” truth-seeking departments of liberal democracy,” journalism, science, public health included in that of course, and universities more broadly. And while it’s true that public officials did, I think in many cases pass the buck and say “follow the science” in a way to avoid taking responsibility for hard decisions themselves, it’s also the case that these other institutions did not ask hard questions and didn’t play their role as well as they should have under the influence, I think, of the polarized environment in which we live, a kind of epistemic tribalism that so deeply affects our politics. (03:20): So we do look back on the record and try to be as accurate as we can. It’s really only the beginning of a reckoning because there’s so much we don’t understand still. I think about what happened and what the results of the policies may have been, but it’s our best shot at doing a first take, fair mindedly, on what happened. And we do emphasize the shortcomings. Part of it is that there were a bunch of pre-Covid pandemic planning documents, which looked at these non-pharmaceutical measures going back to 2005, 2006, and they were skeptical, let’s put it that way. They emphasized the weak evidentiary basis for a lot of those measures that were imposed. And they emphasized the importance of being frank with the public about the weak evidentiary basis and the certainty of costs, considerable costs from imposing these measures. G. Patrick Lynch (04:18): I’m glad you raised that because I think that was one of the most eye-opening parts of the book. I think if you asked the average citizen, if they knew that, in fact, all the pre-pandemic planning had shown that there was skepticism about many of the measures that were pursued, they would be surprised. And I certainly was surprised. Can you explain to our listeners exactly why policy officials in most of these major health organizations in the public health field generally advocated for abandoning most of this planning? What happened? What shifted in their thinking? Stephen Macedo (04:47): Well, let me say a word about those things first. It is remarkable that the planning documents went back early to 2005, 2006. George W. Bush read John Barry’s book on the great influenza of 1918, and he initiated these planning processes. There was always a national security component as well, having to do with bioweapons, but he was concerned about another pandemic. There were mathematical modelers who were optimistic about the effectiveness of these measures, very optimistic. And they wound up playing a leading role as it turned out in shaping some of the discourse. But going back to that era, scientific officials who looked at this, including the Institute of Medicine, as it was called back then, which has issued a report on these measures and said that they found the evidence unconvincing and that there was a lot of uncertainty around these measures. And anyway, in 2019, Johns Hopkins did one of these surveys on all of these non-pharmaceutical measures, social distancing, mask-wearing, school closures, border closures, and so on. (05:49): And emphasized just as you said, the weak basis. And the World Health Organization did one that came out in November 2019. And among the things that said there, again emphasizing uncertainty, weak evidence, was that there were certain measures that were not recommended under any circumstances, including border closures, quarantine of individuals who had been exposed, and contact tracing, and those were not recommended under any circumstances according to the WHO. And those were all implemented in short order during Covid. I think what happened and what shifted the discourse was partly that the World Health Organization sent a team to China in late January 2020 to survey their response. And that team came back after spending about seven or eight days in China in Wuhan, Hubei Province, and proclaimed that the Chinese had solved the problem, that they had defeated the virus, and that every government in the world should follow the Chinese strategy of suppressing the virus, locking down–something that’s never really been attempted in human history before. (06:55): And when you read that report from the World Health Organization, a joint mission that included half Chinese participants, half non-Chinese participants, only a couple of Americans were involved in that, it reads like an award citation, as we say in the book, it’s just uncritically endorses the strategy. So that played a major role. And then there were a couple of other things too. A bombshell report came out of Imperial College London on March 16, which had very impressive graphs. The lead there was Neil M. Ferguson, who’s another mathematical modeler who had been involved in the original 2005, 2006 projections. He said that if we didn’t impose this whole suite of measures, this “Report Nine” from Imperial College said that if we didn’t impose this whole suite of measures by the end of August 2020, we’d have 2.2 million dead Americans. So that report, which was finalized and published on March 16, the Trump administration had gotten an advanced copy of it, that was shown to Donald Trump on March 16. (07:58): And later that day, he had a news conference where it was recommended that places with infections spreading should close bars and close other places and impose lockdowns. By that time, schools had already closed across substantial parts of the country. But so those two things were important, and there were other projections that were made. 3.4 percent death rate was projected by the head of the World Health Organization in, I think it was February, or maybe it was early March. So there was a lot of fear. There was a lot of uncertainty of course, and the original lockdowns were very widespread across the country and across Europe. But I think what’s in a way most important is that the European–well, some countries never closed their schools at all. I don’t think Iceland ever closed at schools. Sweden never closed them for kids under 16. And the Western European countries in general, France and Germany and other places in Europe, reopened their schools at the end of April and May. (09:03): And it was clear, by the middle of May certainly, that schools were not spreaders of Covid and that teachers were not at great risk. And the European health ministers met education ministers, excuse me, met I think it was around May 10 or something, and issued a statement of the education ministers from around Europe saying that it was safe to reopen schools. So there was a lack of learning, especially in Democratic states, which closed down faster and stayed closed much longer than Republican states. It was a partisan pandemic, as we say in one of our chapters, that there was a striking partisan divide on the stringency of all of these measures with democratic states imposing school closures much longer. Republican states were generally reopening their schools in the fall of 2020. Many Democratic school districts were closed through almost the entire 2021 school year. California closed right through March. So the discourse, the narrative, became very rigid and intolerant of dissent. So I would say that a big part of the book focuses on the shortcomings of public deliberation and kind of intolerance of dissent, forgetting the fundamental principles of science and, in a way, classical liberalism: To be open to dissent, to allow criticism, to welcome criticism, and to not close off disagreement prematurely. (10:37): I think one thing that happened, we found is that, about April 2020, once the lockdown strategy had been adopted in, of course, many parts of the country, but there’s the sense of a war mentality that arose. We see this in a report that came out of the Safra Center at Harvard that was endorsed by the Rockefeller Foundation and other foundations including the Niskanen Center, and indeed the American Enterprise Institute put out a Covid planning document or policy statement around that time, April, May 2020, which also endorsed the lockdown strategies to some considerable degree descent, became that this is our chosen strategy and dissent was unwelcome, that we were on a war footing and we needed the equivalent of national unity in the face of a war, in this case, a war on Covid. So as in previous wars, we cracked down on dissent, and that was the big problem. Mistakes get made, but we should have been more open to dissent and disagreement and more ready, prepared to learn over the course of 2020, especially over the summer. G. Patrick Lynch (11:52): So this is one of the questions I wanted to ask you, because I think the emphasis on deliberation, discourse, and exchange of ideas is one of the strengths of the book. You mentioned, for example, the Great Barrington Declaration in the book and talk about it in a way that I think is probably the fairest and most honest assessment of it that I’ve seen because it was such a polarizing document when it first came out. And you also mentioned the example of Sweden. Before we get into the sort of who was right question, can we talk a little bit about the importance of deliberation during these times of crises? I guess I was struck by, on the one hand, the hopefulness that y’all place in the importance of having that deliberation discourse during a crisis, during this war language. But is that too much to ask of democracy? Is it too difficult to believe that during a crisis we can tolerate and have that kind of discourse and exchange? And I think this is obviously critical, looking back on Covid, and potentially even more important for looking forward to whatever the next problem’s going to be. Stephen Macedo (12:53): Yeah, well, it is a very reasonable question, and I don’t have a particularly good answer for it. One thing I would say is that other democracies did a better job. There was more open debate, I think, in the UK, there’s a very good book by Mark Woolhouse called The Year the World Went Mad. He’s obviously very critical of the lockdown strategies, as you can tell from the title of the book, though he supported the first lockdown, though in retrospect, he doesn’t think it did much good because these lockdowns tend to be imposed after the viruses, the horses out of the barn. So the lockdowns tend to get imposed, late viruses tend to come in waves. So oftentimes the rates of infection will drop at some point after, and people assume that’s because of the interventions, but it just turns out there’s not a lot of great evidence for that. (13:39): But they did learn more over the summer in the UK. There was more open debate there. And in Germany and France, I think. So the US is especially polarized by Western standards, and this is a dispiriting picture, a window into the state of our highly polarized political discourse. So I wouldn’t hazard guesses about how well we’ll do in the future, but we do need to think about this. And part of what happened, I think, is, as you’ll recall, 2020 was an election year. Donald Trump was on the ballot. He was associated with the “Let’s reopen the economy as fast as we can” sort of approach. He also, of course, referred to the virus as the “China virus” and so on, kind of unhelpfully actually. But suggesting that the virus might have leaked from the lab was always a plausible hypothesis, which again, should have been entertained and was not particularly, and still not being properly entertained, I think, in the US more so than in Europe. (14:37): So I think that was part of it. And of course finally there is some reckoning going on on other issues on this too, that if Donald Trump said it, that must be the opposite of the truth. And that was one thing to say we should not take him particularly seriously on these particular matters, but it’s another thing to assume that the truth is the opposite of what he says. That was a silly approach as well. But deliberation is important. It proceeded better in other places. We should have paid more attention to the pre-Covid pandemic planning documents. And there were voices. I mean, it’s not as though no one pointed these things out. Emily Oster, an economist at Brown, wrote some very good pieces pointing out the cost of school closures and the safety of reopening them. Graham Allison, who is scholar in crisis decision making, going back to the Kennedy administration, he’s a very senior scholar at Harvard. (15:35): He put out a statement right around the time that Harvard Saffer Center put out its statement, and this…

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    Provoking an Educational Renaissance Jul 24, 2025
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    Today we’re talking with James Hankins about the problems of liberal learning in our current age and all the many facets of that. He is a Senior Writer at Law & Liberty and a Professor of History at Harvard University. He’s one of the world’s experts on the Italian Renaissance and the humanism of the Italian Renaissance and is the author of the much-lauded, highly-reviewed book Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy.


    Why We Need to Read Jul 24, 2025
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    Spencer Klavan joins Brian A. Smith to discuss his new book, How to Save the West. Brian Smith: Welcome to Liberty Law Talk. My name is Brian Smith and I am the editor of Law & Liberty. With me today is Spencer Klavan, a prominent podcaster who has a new show with DailyWire+ forthcoming, classicist, magazine editor for the Claremont Review of Books, and the author of the new book, How to Save the West, Ancient Wisdom for Five Modern Crises. And I’m very glad to have Spencer on the show. Spencer Klavan: It’s a delight to be here. Thank you so much for having me, Brian. Brian Smith: So I have a confession to make, which is that when I first saw the title of the book, I thought to myself, “Not another defense of the canon, this just cannot work.” But read the book, refreshingly, and as I got to know you at a conference recently, I realized that can’t be the book, it won’t be the book. And you say so right away in it. Just so we take anyone who has this apprehension and sort of diffuse this so that they go and buy your book, I wanted you to talk about what led you to write it and what makes you and this book different from the rest of the defending the Western canon genre that we’ve seen so many entries in recently. Spencer Klavan: Yeah, I really appreciate your asking that question actually, because it’s sort of like that poem, I too, dislike it. I too, dislike poetry. I too, dislike defenses of the cannon or rather I’m sort of bored with them. And I do say upfront in the book that this is not a defense of the canon, full stop. The other thing I say it’s not is it’s not a survey. It’s not the five books you need to read to get a grasp on the whole of Western literature, it’s not a reading list. There are other good books that deal more comprehensively and at greater length with that sort of issue. I mentioned a couple, Jack Rosen, Harold Bloom. Go read those guys if that’s what you want. But what I would say, this book isn’t a survey, it’s not a defense, it’s an offering. And that comes out of the podcast, Young Heretics, which was sort of my first foray into podcasting. And I kind of began that podcast because it occurred to me that on the right, in the conservative movement, even among well-intentioned liberals who believe in the value of the Western canon, we do a lot of fighting and speaking in defense of the Western canon. “We ought to be teaching Homer. We shouldn’t be scrubbing them from the curriculum. They’re not all just dead white men. Here’s the relevance,” and so forth. And something that I noticed is we spend so much time defending our right to read Homer that we don’t spend all that much time actually reading Homer. It occurred to me the number of people who pound their fists on the table and say, “Oh, the greats of the West, we’ve got to keep them in schools,” I sometimes wonder whether those people are cracking the spines themselves. I mean the point of preserving this stuff is for it to change you, to shape you. Even if it isn’t erased from the internet, even if it isn’t taken out of the school curriculums, none of that will matter if you personally, wherever you’re with your family, in your home, and your community and you aren’t exposing your soul to the forming influence of these great works. I think that’s what they’re for, I think that’s why they endure. They don’t endure because they’re complicated or fancy or elevated. They don’t endure because they furnish material for PhD thesis. They endure because somewhere in them is wisdom about how to be good at being human. And the reason the subtitle of the book is Ancient Wisdom for Five Modern Crises is I think that the moment we’re in, especially the moment that has been kind of accelerated by digital technology as I discuss a lot in the book, is dredging up and presenting us with a lot of fundamental questions about what it is to be a human being and just what is this universe in which we live? And there’s an irony, as I say in the introduction, that the great works of the canon, the intellectual inheritance of Athens and Jerusalem is being most maligned precisely when it’s most needed. This is what these resources exist for. Brian Smith: And by people who should know better. By people who should know the best. Spencer Klavan: In fact, I think in some cases by people who know exactly what they’re doing because of course depriving people of the resources to take a certain degree of ownership over their own spiritual, psychological, political formation is a really good way to present yourself as the savior of the world, right? Brian Smith: Absolutely. Spencer Klavan: And so the reason it’s a how-to, despite the kind of ostensible grandeur of that title, the ambitions of the book are actually much smaller than you might expect upon cracking the spine. People who open this book expecting some political program to “Fix all Problems,” capital F, capital P, right, those people are going to be disappointed because what you’re going to be finding instead is a selection and offering, as I said, of ways of thinking about these fundamental questions, “Who are we? What are we made out of? Where are we going?” That are time tested, rich and for you. And that’s what I’m offering here. Brian Smith: So one thing that really strikes me in what you just said is, maybe giving it to you as an anecdote, so in graduate school, I feel like anytime you’re in graduate school for great books like both of us were, I did political theory, you did classics- Spencer Klavan: Right. Brian Smith: There’s a sense in which you’re surrounded by technicians often. Now I was very fortunate in that I had professors that were not technicians, Patrick Deneen, Josh Mitchell, others, but there’s very much a sense of as you professionalize, you’re going to read these books to understand the discourse around these books and what falls out of that kind of training and education I think quite often is the very thing you’re pointing us toward, which is: How do these books form our souls? How do these books offer that guide to life? How might they simply show us, “Don’t go down that door, that’s the Nietzschean door, [that’s a] bad door,” or things like that. So is there a sense in which any of your graduate school experience or your exposure to the academy before you ran screaming informs this book? I mean you don’t explicitly say this, but I had the suspicion that some of this has to do with the reaction to how academia does things. Spencer Klavan: Yeah. That’s well put. I’m like you in that I had a lucky grad school experience. And I always feel really responsible to say this when I launched my critique of the academy, which is severe and structural because I do believe that in America especially, but in Europe as well, the academy is suffering a real kind of identity crisis and in some ways a kind of an implosion self-destruction. And so I always feel like I need to put the caveat on there that I too had wonderful instructors who didn’t view these texts as kind of objects of power to wield or certain brand mystique that they could attach to their own person, all these ways that you see people misusing, I think, the great works, but that matter of technicity that you identified is so important. And one reason why I did not end up pursuing a career in academia is I feared that the technicity would become the point. For people like you and me who devote lives to the life of the mind, the pleasure of that technical expertise is very great. And indeed the temptation to pride in it is also very great. It becomes very easy to forget, especially if you seal yourself off hermetically in a world of technicians, that all techne, all kind of practices of doing something well and with craft are in service of something. They are handmaidens. They’re not goals. And one thing that immediately became clear to me as I started the podcast and also as I wrote this book, is I got a lot of people who come up to me and say, “Oh, you’re really smart. I’m not that smart.” And by that they didn’t actually mean what they were saying. What they meant is, “You’ve got all these tools in your tool belt.” And that’s actually true. I don’t want to deny that it takes some doing to kind of unpack a paragraph of Aristotle. But if you’re doing that and if you’re devoting your life and investing the kind of human capital that you’ve been given by God as a person, then you ought to be doing it for someone and for something. Brian Smith: Exactly. Spencer Klavan: And that’s what I think is lost in our approach to these books a lot of the time. And in some ways, it’s a way of neutralizing them and diffusing them because what they have to say is so explosive and in some ways so contradictory to the going conventional wisdom of just our modern gurus that if we look at Aristotle as simply a kind of animal in a jar or a bacteria in a Petri dish that we can isolate and study, then we never have to risk exposure to his claim, for instance, that man is a political animal. Imagine if you actually had to consider that as a truth claim that could or could not be true of you, what would that do? Brian Smith: Yes. Well, it becomes news in that regard of sense. Spencer Klavan: Totally. Brian Smith: These are not just sort of scientific claims. The news has arrived and you’ve got to decide how to live with it. Spencer Klavan: Right. Brian Smith: So sometime in graduate school, I remember stumbling on the statistic, it was reported in the Chronicle of Higher Ed that something north of 60 or 70%, depending on the field, of graduate students in the humanities and social sciences would suffer severe depression during the course of their studies. Spencer Klavan: Geez. Yeah. Brian Smith: And at a certain point, just in a PhD program in politics, I started to notice that my colleagues were sort of divided selves fairly often. They wanted to apply these theories in a very tactical way to other people and yet it couldn’t help but infiltrate their life. Spencer Klavan: Yes. Brian Smith: So I’m reminded of this passage in one of J. Budziszewski’s books where he says, “I set out to prove all morality was essentially arbitrary and that our choices were equally arbitrary and that all of our emotional states were equally meaningless. And yet I loved my wife and I loved my children, but this theory couldn’t help but bleed back in to the way in which I treated my wife and my children.” He said that the despair from that was actually the moment that he turned and went in search of something that was better, that he could actually wager his life on. Spencer Klavan: Two passages come to mind, one that you and I just recently shared when we were at that conference on Brothers K. Dostoevsky in that novel has a wonderful moment between Alyosha, the kind of hero, and not his beloved mentor, Father Zosima, but actually a more severe kind of almost administrator in the monastery, Father Paisi, who he thinks doesn’t really like him very much, but he pulls him aside and he says, “Men think that by isolating the technicity of the world, the science of the world, they’ve reduced an objective truth about morality, they’ve reduced virtue to mere fantasy. But the people bear witness to the impossibility of that view and their own hearts bear witness also.” I mean I think this is something very much in evidence and really important, especially in an era where one’s convictions, one’s gut reactions to things, one’s subjective “experiences” of things are written off as totally without worth or merit. You take the true claim, which is that your first impressions of something might need revision, they might need you to step back and consider them and understand them and we’ve advanced that to the claim that actually your loves, your aspirations, your virtue, your attachments, these are illusions. They’re after effects, they’re byproducts of what’s “really going on,” which is matter bouncing off of matter essentially. And since it’s impossible to live that way, you do end up in a situation where your own life kind of bears witness against your philosophy, which is a profoundly neurotic place to be. Brian Smith: Exactly. And you said two passages. Spencer Klavan: Oh you are right. I’m sorry, I got so wrapped up in the Dostoevsky. The other one in C.S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, which is the conclusion of his Space Trilogy, by far my favorite fiction that Lewis ever wrote. I know people know Narnia and love Narnia, but that third installment of the Space Trilogy for me is his master work. It’s basically an artistic enactment of the abolition of man. It’s deals with a lot of these questions of scientism and materialism. But there’s a moment at the end, very small spoiler alert, that one of the guys whose whole project has been to reduce human life to determinism, it’s all kind of neurons firing in the brain and fate just kind of carries us where it will because we’re a machine, he finds himself overtaken at the last moment like one of the denizens of a fairytale city who’s turned to stone by a curse that actually was all real all along. The things he was playing with in his kind of neat syllogisms were deadly serious. I think that’s a situation we find ourselves in a lot as well. Brian Smith: Yes. No, I think those are very apt quotes for this problem and your book is filled with many others, but I want to drag us back to that because we could talk about other stuff like this all day long. Spencer Klavan: Yes. Let’s talk about the book. Brian Smith: So you list five crises and given that you sort of start and end the book by circling around this, I wanted to focus on what I take to be the most foundational one, which is over our sense of reality. What is this crisis? Why do you think it matters? Spencer Klavan: Yeah, one thing I do in the book throughout is you sort of start with a news cycle moment that everybody’s familiar with or remembers from the last couple years. And then I unravel that into, “Well, here’s 10 other news cycle moments you probably forgot about from the last 20 years that all kind of point in this direction. And here in fact is this long history of dealing with this very problem.” And the one that the book starts off with is the Metaverse, virtual reality essentially, immersion into virtual reality, and this way that a lot of our elites have of talking as if the distinction between my actual daily experience of life, which I would think of as reality, and a computer generated simulation that stimulates the brain in such and such a way, that distinction is really quaint and kind of outmoded and superstitious. And so it’s really not to get down on Mark Zuckerberg or on Meta or whatever, Facebook and so forth. It’s rather to use these statements and these product launches as ways of uncovering a real philosophical conviction. Once you see it, it’s like putting on the green glasses, you see the Emerald City, you can see this everywhere. And I think that this speaks to a conviction that some things are very, very true. We have still in our society, because it’s impossible to live any other way, a desire to claim to reality and to truth and also a total lack of grounding of where do we root that. Is reality the images that my neurons cough up on the screen of my eyes? In which case the metaverse is just fine as a substitute for reality. It’s not even a substitute, it’s just an equivalent alternative that I happen to find more pleasurable. Or is reality some other thing? And if it’s some other thing, is it the idea of the good? Is it my physical experience of the world, right? Before even asking the questions, I mean the first section of the book, I don’t even begin to ask the question, “Well, is reality abstract truth or is it emotional truth?” Or whatever, get into that much later. As you say, this question is threaded throughout the whole book, but really the first question and the fundamental question with which western philosophy proper b…

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