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    Philosophy

    The Law & Liberty Podcast

    Law & Liberty contributing editor James Patterson interviews prominent authors and thinkers. A production of Liberty Fund, Inc.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Conservatism's Lamentable Drift Apr 20, 2026
    Show notes

    There is enormous pressure today for traditional conservatives (or anyone critical of progressivism) to write their names in the black book of the New Right and acquiesce to a politics of populist rage and federal overreach. Elizabeth Corey explains to James Patterson why she will instead engage in the quieter, more respectable task of cultural transmission and tending to her little platoon. Related Links “A Quiet Refusal to Compromise,” by Elizabeth Corey, Law & Liberty“Beautiful Losers,” by Elizabeth Corey, Public Discourse“Interpreting the New Right,” by John Grove, Law & Liberty Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring series commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, informed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Today, my guest is Elizabeth Corey. She is a professor of political science at Baylor University, where she’s also the director of their honors program. Her area of specialization is conservative political philosophy, especially the work of Michael Oakeshott. She has published widely, and today we will be talking about two of her more recent essays. The first is “A Quiet Refusal to Compromise,” for us here at Law & Liberty that she published this past February, and more recently a piece named “Beautiful Losers” for Public Discourse. (01:18): Dr. Corey, welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Elizabeth Corey (01:21): Thank you, James. It’s great to be here. James Patterson (01:23): So let’s start with the slightly older essay, “A Quiet Refusal to Compromise.” You describe in its opening paragraph a sense of amazement and dismay when beholding the changes of American conservatism this past decade. And you also describe how you had a particular point of view or a privileged vantage point. So tell me about this experience and why amazement and dismay. Elizabeth Corey (01:50): Well, I think let me start with the other part of your question, which is the privileged vantage point, which is that I’ve been around this world for a really long time, more and less engaged. My dad has been involved in intellectual conservatism since the 1950s. And so it’s been in the water really for me for these last 50 years. And so I would go to Philadelphia Society meetings and work at Heritage. And so I’ve had a lot of experience in these institutions and understood them to be more or less a kind of unified front. And what I’ve seen in the last 10 years or so is a real change there from a kind of intellectually focused conservatism toward a much more activist conservatism, which as an Oakeshottian, as I proudly claim to be, is not at all what I understand conservatism as consisting in. (02:44): So there was this turn, obviously in the Trump years, you will know this very well. And the first Trump term and then the rise of these new institutions. And I just thought this is a very different vision of conservatism than the one I’ve grown up with. And it is, in a way, I think a certain kind of betrayal of the essence of what conservatism was prior to say about 2015. James Patterson (03:07): You mentioned at the beginning of the essay, a book I don’t think we’ve talked about on the podcast, but we reviewed, John Grove wrote the review of Furious Minds by Laura Field. I wrote a review for Civitas. I think I was more favorably inclined. What is it that you noted about what Field described? What is it that she observed? And maybe what were your disagreements or agreements with her? Elizabeth Corey (03:31): Field’s book is interesting. I actually didn’t read it. I listened to her read it on an Audible. James Patterson (03:36): Wow. She did the audio? Elizabeth Corey (03:38): She did do the audio. James Patterson (03:39): Oh, that’s a lot of work. Elizabeth Corey (03:40): It’s a lot of work. But it was interesting to me because what was conveyed in the Audible book was a lot of tone that didn’t maybe necessarily come through in the book itself. I mean, it was very clear to me that she was disdainful toward the people she was talking about. She had a lot of sort of political differences with them from the very beginning. She’s quite progressive. She thought the conservatives … She was interested in the conservative world. Obviously, she went to UT Austin and was around the Straussian conservative world. So she had a privileged place to look at that world, but nevertheless, it was clear to me that she was critical from the outset. So I was interested in that, and I noticed the tone, but it didn’t make me think everything she was saying was wrong. So took it with a grain of salt. (04:31): I mean, a lot of the things she described were things that did happen over the past 10 years. And so it was a kind of report with an agenda. And John Grove did a great job of laying that out in a much more careful way than I can here. But it was a way of bringing to the fore, okay, here’s what’s happened over these past 10 years. And that’s what got me thinking, okay, well, most of what she reported did happen. And it’s why I and many other traditional conservatives feel ourselves a bit alienated from the contemporary conservative movement. James Patterson (05:07): Yeah. I suppose I appreciated it just for the creation of a sense of network and bringing together different groups that people maybe didn’t understand to be so affiliated, but it definitely has a point of view. That is definitely true. There’s a passage in the essay that I was not prepared for. And it is a passage you quote from William Hazlitt’s “On the Pleasure of Hating.” So you already know from that it’s going to be good. And this is the passage: “There is a secret affinity, a hankering after evil in the human mind,” he writes. “Which takes a perverse, but a fortunate delight in mischief since it is a never failing source of satisfaction. Life would turn to a stagnant pool where it not ruffled by the jarring interests, the unruly passions of men, the white streak and our own fortunes is brightened or just rendered visible by making all around it as dark as possible.” How do you see this passage playing a role in understanding contemporary conservative changes? Elizabeth Corey (06:16): That passage spoke to me because it seems to me what I often read in contemporary conservatives now is a kind of anger, a kind of willingness to call out enemies, really just an adversarial posture that Hazlitt names. And let’s be clear, there’s something absolutely right about what he says. It’s wonderful to be on the right side of something with a tribe who agrees with you. And so to have somebody or to have a set of institutions that you can say, “Well, these are worthy of hate or worthy of disdain,” is a kind of bonding in a strange way for the people who are on the right side. So when I especially read things written by a lot of people from Claremont, I just think there is such a vitriol there. And that was what got me thinking about the Hazlitt essay, that there’s a kind of energy that this vitriol gives, this being on the right side of the culture wars. (07:18): And I think that does explain some of the energy on the right, that it’s not so much about this constructive vision of conservatism, which I would like to put forward, but it’s hating the right people in the right way. And I get that. I mean, I understand there are things that we ought to oppose and to resist for sure, but I don’t think that is the essence or the core of a conservative disposition. Or if it is, that’s not a conservatism that I want to be part of. James Patterson (07:45): A friend of mine who is admittedly on the left summed it up as “To own the libs shall be the whole of the law.” Elizabeth Corey (07:52): Exactly. James Patterson (07:53): Yeah. So what is this participating in the permanent and stable, intrinsic goods you described? This is the conservatism you believe in. So what does that look like? Elizabeth Corey (08:02): Well, for me as a university professor, it’s pretty clear. It is a kind of cultural transmission of all that’s good to the young. I mean, in a way, I know that sounds a little bit idealistic, but there’s a wonderful book I’ve recently read by Roger Scruton. It’s called Culture Counts. And he’s essentially making an argument that our job as conservatives is to preserve and to share a cultural tradition that consists in things like literature, art, poetry, philosophy, music. I mean, all of these things which are in danger of being overlooked by contemporary culture. And that to me is the essence of this conservative disposition. I mean, I could say more about that with respect to Oakeshott, who’s also very good on these things, but this kind of Scruton-Oakeshott vision of culture is at the center of conservatism is really a vision I think needs to be expressed and also put into practice. James Patterson (09:02): You actually make reference also to the great Josef Pieper on the idea of leisure. So actually, please do go into detail about what you think this looks like. What is it that’s outside of the world of friends and enemies that we can engage in a form of a leisurely development of traditions or even of the perfection of the human intellect? Elizabeth Corey (09:26): Yeah. I mean, it’s absolutely outside the world of friends and enemies, but it’s also outside the world of work and practical achievement. I mean, this is perhaps the Oakeshottian in me, but there’s this notion, especially with people like Oakeshott and Scruton, that there’s a realm of experience that doesn’t fall into the friends and enemies dichotomy, that it is somehow outside of all the practical things we ordinarily do. I mean, Oakeshott’s great on this in particular in so far as he has this idea that experience takes place in certain modes. So most of the time we’re involved in the practical mode of getting things done, doing things that need to be taken care of, doing politics—politics falls into practice. But I think Pieper, Oakeshott, and Scruton would all say, well, there’s this other realm of, as Pieper would call it, leisure, which is where culture takes place, which is where reading and philosophy and thinking and conversation and friendship and all these intrinsically good activities take place. (10:27): And that is not the world of friends and enemies, and that’s also not the world of total work. So these men are sort of charting out an area of life that escapes the practical and the political. And that’s actually, I think, the job of the university to preserve, although even the universities are dragged into this in all kinds of ways that we’ve seen over the past 20 years. James Patterson (10:50): Yeah. The conservatism that was regnant before this kind of fighting, bristling, frothing kind of conservatism was the conservatism of Mitt Romney firing people, everyone an entrepreneur, and a lot of green eyeshade talk. And that was as much of a problem as the kind that we’re dealing with now because leisure looks like a waste, no? Elizabeth Corey (11:18): Exactly. Yeah. I mean, there are lots of ways I think conservatism can go wrong. I mean, one is focusing solely on economics, although we can never ignore economics, but the other is focusing solely on war and friends and enemies and culture war. Part of this, James, comes from my own family experience of realizing that if I am to go forward in life as a happy person, I’m going to have to deal with people who are very different from me and have very different visions of a flourishing life. And as conservative as I may be, I’ve got to be frankly pluralist in understanding that not everyone is like me. And that’s where I think a lot of contemporary conservatism goes wrong, that you need to be like me and know if you’re not, I will also force you to be. So that’s where, I mean, Laura Field takes that to an extreme vision, but I think she’s not wrong in saying there’s a lack of understanding of what pluralism means in this new conservatism. James Patterson (12:21): Yeah. In fact, your account of amazement and dismay has been pretty much my own. That’s actually how I opened my review of her book was that what made me so sympathetic to the voice in which she gave the book was my own feeling over the last 10 years of what is going on. I can’t believe this is happening. But for me, and this is an interview of Elizabeth Corey, not of me, so I will not carry on about post-liberalism too much. But for me, that strikes me as not even really conservativism anymore. It’s a kind of like right-wing social engineering to quote … What was that? Who said that in the presidential nomination? Was that a … Elizabeth Corey (13:02): I can’t remember, but … James Patterson (13:03): It was Newt Gingrich. Elizabeth Corey (13:04): Yeah. James Patterson (13:05): And so can we even call some of this conservatism anymore? Elizabeth Corey (13:10): Well, it seems to me to be something more like … I mean, it has new names now. I mean, it is post-liberalism. It is national conservatism. And I’ll be completely straight with you, James. I don’t follow the details and the intricacies of all those movements. I do to some extent, but I couldn’t have an interview with you about them. I assure you know them much better than I do, but I do know … James Patterson (13:34): It’s good for your mental health that you preoccupy yourself with the better things in life. Elizabeth Corey (13:39): Well, I mean, I think again, that the essence of … And then this is where the piece ends up in the “Quiet Refusal to Compromise” peace ends up, which is to say that the truly important things in life are these kind of conservative activities of love and friendship and family and civic institutions. And that’s something I think that’s being overlooked in the contemporary talk about conservatives. Everything is national. Everything is about President Trump and do we like what he’s doing or do we not like what he’s doing? But I mean, I would turn our eyes back to the local and to say, look, there’s a ton of stuff to be done here in our own little platoon, I mean, to use a familiar phrase. I mean, there are church vestries and civic institutions and school boards, all this sort of thing that if we get caught up in the national vision of politics as the most important, then we’re not going to be thinking about those things and those things need attending to. James Patterson (14:34): A big part of, I think what contributes to the demand for the national is to direct attention constantly to the content that these people are generating. So it’s like and subscribe, hit the bell icon, here’s a link to my Patreon, please purchase my Patriot merch. It’s elements to all of this that I think a lot of people overlook that there’s a certain degree of mercenary quality to this where it’s a business too. Elizabeth Corey (15:04): Absolutely. It’s interesting to me because that has infiltrated not only the political realm, but also the academic realm. There’s this sense, and I’ve talked about this a little bit before, that what our job is now as university professors is to make a name for ourselves and to put ourselves out there and to brand ourselves in a certain way, which to me is really repellent. I mean, not that you don’t want to be out saying things and doing things and writing things, but this notion that you yourself are the focus is a kind of weird perversion of the academic life. It’s like if you imagine a priest doing that, you would think that’s not the nature of the priesthood to do this kind of self-promotion and this branding. But increasingly, it does look to me like that’s what we’re supposed to be doing or that somehow the social media ecosystem pushes us toward that. James Patterson (15:56): I’ve actually not th…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Mercy from on High Apr 06, 2026
    Show notes

    Why do presidents have the power to pardon, and how is it typically used and abused? Sai Prakash and James Patterson discuss the pardon power’s origins in British law, its usefulness in ending rebellions, and the unfortunate tendency of more recent presidents to use the pardon power to reward friends and donors, protect underlings, or generate political support. Related Links The Presidential Pardon by Sai Prakash“The Personal Pardon Power” by Philip Hamburger, Law & Liberty“Is It Too Late to Recover the Founders’ Presidency?” by Gary L. Gregg II, Law & Liberty Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello, and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, contributing editor to Law & Liberty. With me today is Sai Prakash. He is the James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, where he teaches Constitutional law, foreign relations law, and presidential powers. Today, we will be talking about The Presidential Pardon: The Short Clause with a Long Troubled History. It’s a recent publication on Harvard University Press, just came out. And when I was speaking to John Grove about possible subjects, this is the one that reached right to the top for me. (01:21): So Professor Prakash, welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Sai Prakash (01:24): It’s great to be here with you and your listeners, James. James Patterson (01:28): All right. Well, where did the pardoning power for the president come from? What’s its origins for presidential use? Sai Prakash (01:38): James, every society has some method of mitigating punishments, either by forgiving the punishment or commuting the sentence. And so, you know, this goes back to Israel and India and Islam, but the immediate precursor is obviously Great Britain. The Crown and Great Britain had a pardon power that had exercised quite vigorously in response to many different stimuli. And then the colonial governors had it in America and then state executives had some authority in Revolutionary America. And so this was just something that they expected to be part of the system, either to be exercised by the executive or the legislature or the executive subject to some check. James Patterson (02:23): So is the pardoning power as unconstrained as it appears to be in the Constitution? There’s no advised consent constraint. There’s no judicial review of it. It’s really just out and out an executive prerogative, isn’t it? Sai Prakash (02:39): Yes. The Constitution does implicitly limit the pardon power in several respects. It can’t be for state offenses. It’s got to be an offense against the United States, and that’s always been understood to be a federal offense passed by Congress. It doesn’t cover impeachment, so the president can’t protect people from being impeached by the House or removed by the Senate. It doesn’t permit the president to pardon people in advance of the offense. That is to say, the president can’t say to you, James, “I’m giving you a pardon and it means that you can’t be prosecuted for any offense that you commit going forward after the pardon.” That’s a constraint. And it can’t be used for continuing offenses. If you are continually polluting contrary to federal law, the president can’t give you a right to continually pollute by virtue of the pardon power. So those are constraints, but within the pardon power, as you said, it’s very broad. (03:30): It covers all federal offenses and there’s no Senate check, there’s no House check, there’s no court check, and it’s all within the discretion of the president. And so unlike some of the other important powers, it is unchecked in that sense. James Patterson (03:46): You mentioned, and one of the ways that the pardon can’t function is that you can’t give someone a pardon for an ongoing offense. So at what point does a pardon become the refusal to enforce a law? Sai Prakash (04:00): Well, I think this is a deeply interesting question. I think there’s a sense in which, unless you’re pardoning people that you think are actually innocent, there is a sense in which a pardon always undoes a law, at least as applied to the person. So suppose I’m the president and I pardon someone who’s facing a 10-year sentence and I give them a two-month sentence. Well, the law provides a punishment. The judge has imposed the punishment. I am changing the punishment. It might well be that the statute that Congress wrote provided an 8 to 10-year punishment, I’m now making it two months. That is, in a sense, not carrying out the law. So unless you think the pardon is only there for innocent people, which no one thinks, the pardon is essentially undoing what the statute provides in some sense. So I think it’s one of the interesting questions about the pardon power. (04:54): How does it fit with the Take Care Clause obligation? The president has a power to issue reprieves and pardons against offenses against United States. That’s the pardon clause. And then it also says later in the Constitution that the president shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. How do you square those two clauses? And the way we do for the most part is to say, well, the president doesn’t have to faithfully execute the law when he issues a pardon. The person has been convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to a punishment and the president doesn’t have to execute the punishment, even if the president admits that the person’s guilty. So there’s a fundamental tension there that the Constitution doesn’t resolve, but it’s a fundamental tension that goes back to Great Britain, that the Crown had a duty to execute the law, but it also had this pardon power. James Patterson (05:40): This might be a little historical, more than legal or constitutional, but were there Anti-Federalist critics of the pardoning power during the debate over ratification? Sai Prakash (05:50): Of course. The pardon power was contested at the Philadelphia Convention. The Philadelphia Convention is the convention of delegates from the states that drafts the Constitution. And there were people there saying we shouldn’t be giving this broad power to the president. They’re not Anti-Federalists at this stage, they’re just people who don’t like this particular feature of it. There are even proponents of a strong president that want to limit it. Alexander Hamilton does not want the pardon power to cover treason, but the clause that makes its way into the Constitution is not restrained in these ways because I think the majority of the convention believes that it’s more useful to have a broad pardon power, one not constrained by the Senate or by other limitations because they think it’s sometimes necessary for there to be quick, broad pardons and only the president they think is structurally capable of doing that. (06:39): Congress can’t issue broad pardons quickly. It’s not always in session and it’s a big ponderous and lumbering body. It’s just hard for them to act quickly. The president is constituted to do that. So they decide not to put constraints on it. When it gets sent to the states, plenty of Anti-Federalists say there’s a problem with this. They say that there’s no constraint on the pardon power. The president might try to subvert the Constitution, might get people to help him. He then might pardon them, and we might not ever know that he was involved in this conspiracy. So they have dark ideas of what a president might do with the pardon power, and they voice these over and over again. And the Federalists, the folks who support the Constitution, don’t say that this is all nonsense and we have nothing to worry about. They know that a pardon power can be abused because they have a sense that all powers can be abused. (07:28): But their view is that on balance, it’s better the way it is than with restraints. And so that they’re not denying that there are issues with it. They’re just denying that they should be corrected because the pluses outweigh the minuses, so to speak, of a pardon power. And because the Constitution, as your readers, your listeners know, is an all or nothing proposition, it’s treated that way by conventions. States aren’t allowed to say, “We’ll adopt the Constitution only if you change the pardon power.” They adopt the Constitution and just propose amendments, many states propose amendments, but their ratification of the Constitution is not premised on the adoption of those amendments. And so there are some amendments proposed, but they never make it into our Constitution. Neither James Madison nor the Congress proposes amendments limiting the pardon power in the Bill of Rights that go to the states. James Patterson (08:20): So early in the history of the United States, we find use of the pardon power pretty liberally by George Washington, who essentially, like so many other things that he does while president sets up a kind of expectation or a custom. And so what was this major event that led him to use the pardon power so liberally? Sai Prakash (08:40): So he’s president for eight years. He’s issued pardons for some of those years, and he’s very careful and very deliberate about using it. He always seeks the advice of many people. And he always publicly declares what his reasons are for the pardon. And he means for the public to know that it’s not just arbitrary power. There’s always a reason behind it. The event that you’re talking about is the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania, where Congress has enacted an excise tax on whiskey. Western farmers are rather upset about it. They don’t want to pay the tax. Obviously, it’s going to make it more difficult to sell the whiskey if there’s an excise tax on it. And so they start obstructing the enforcement of the whiskey excise tax and they kind of interfere with the marshal and they interfere with the tax collector. And the administration decides to send the militia to quell this incipient rebellion or this rebellion. (09:37): And Washington heads out with the militia to a certain point in Pennsylvania, and then he hands over a command to Henry Lee, the governor of Virginia, who’s been summoned, and he tells Henry Lee the issue to make promises of pardons as a means of conciliating those rebels. Every government faces rebellions from time to time, and one way to quell them is to offer them a pardon if they lay down their arms. And so this is commonly done in England. It was done in Shays’ Rebellion, and it’s done now in the Whiskey Rebellion, of course, will be done in the Civil War as well. So he offers pardons, Lee grants pardons, Washington grants further pardons. And it’s all … The idea is, look, let’s make up with each other. You reconcile yourself to federal authority. We don’t prosecute you, and we go back to a peaceable, loving relationship with you. (10:30): And we know that if we don’t do that, your option is all or nothing. You’re just going to fight to the death because if we don’t give you a pardon, you might well be executed if we catch you. So the pardon is a powerful tool meant in part to end rebellions, and it serves something like that function in the Whiskey Rebellion. And it is a broad pardon to all those people who participated in those tumults and disturbances. James Patterson (10:55): And then on a scale that’s really even beyond the Whiskey Rebellion or the conditional amnesties of Abraham Lincoln. I mean, this is the kind of thing that was in the nightmares with the most paranoid Anti-Federalist, right? Sai Prakash (11:07): It’s hard to figure out how many people were benefited by the pardon because no one at the time is going around to people asking them, “Did you do this? And therefore, did you benefit from the pardon?” It’s possible that some people are benefiting from the pardon whom the authorities don’t know participated in these activities, but if you’re not prosecuted, you don’t even need the pardon, right? It’s only if you’re about to be prosecutor, you’ve been convicted that you need to pull out the pardon. But it’s certainly a broad thing and it sets the stage for the pardons that follow. I think probably the pardons by Lincoln and Johnson are broader because there’s more people by the time of the Civil War. And there’s certainly lots of officers who are participating in the Civil War, both civil and military in the South, and obviously some people involved in rebellion who are in the military who are involved. So I don’t know what the largest amnesty was, but I would suspect it’s the combined effects of the Lincoln and Johnson pardons. James Patterson (12:04): But I mean, what other choice did they have? As you point out in the case of Washington, otherwise you would’ve been forced to have to deal with maybe guerrilla war or mass executions. As bad as it seems, this is really the least bad option. Sai Prakash (12:19): I agree with that completely, James. I will say that during the next rebellion in the Adams administration, the Fries’s Rebellion, which is another rebellion over tax. Americans don’t like taxes, right? There’s the Tea Party and then there’s these two rebellions about taxes. John Adams says that George Washington shouldn’t have pardoned those people. And his thought at the time is, “Well, if you keep on pardoning rebels, there’ll be more rebellions because they win either way. If they prevail in the rebellion, they get what they want. And if they fail, they get pardoned.” So there are people who are saying that you can’t pardon everybody in a rebellion. It’s a function of whether you think you can militarily subdue them and whether you want to. So I think in the context of the Whiskey Rebellion, Washington could have militarily subdued the folks who were engaged in it, but he thought it was better not to. He had some mercy in him, and that’s why he did it. (13:16): But from the perspective of John Adams four years later, he’s thinking not of that moment. He’s thinking, well, what signal does this send to rebels that they always might think they would get a pardon and therefore they’re more willing to engage in a rebellion because they expect a pardon. And I’m not saying he’s right, but you could see why there would be critics of a mass pardon. There were a lot of critics of Lincoln and Johnson in the Civil War because some people wanted the rebels to be hanged and they weren’t going to be hanged if they got a pardon from the president. James Patterson (13:49): Yeah. It’s hard to read newspapers with fatalities in them and then want to give the people that caused these fatalities clemency. Sai Prakash (13:57): Oh, of course. Yes. And so many Americans died in that conflict. And if you’re from the North, you might think it’s because these guys were traitors to the Constitution and they should be punished, not merely legislatively, but criminally in some way. James Patterson (14:12): At the end of Chapter Five titled “A Tale of Two Clemencies,” you refer to the, I think it’s the Biden and Trump pardons. You say that one set of pardons would block future prosecutions, the other set overturned existing convictions. Each side pointed a finger at the other. Truth be told, both sides had a point. What point is that? Sai Prakash (14:32): Maybe it’s too subtle because you’re asking the question, but I do think that both sides are weaponizing prosecutions and are being perceived as doing so. So I think the Biden folks think that they prevented Trump from prosecuting these folks because they were fearful that Trump would weaponize prosecutions. I think that there’s some reason to think that is what’s going on. It’s a bad look for the president to talk abou…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Democracy's Patrons Mar 17, 2026
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    Law & Liberty senior writer John O. McGinnis joins the podcast this week to discuss his new book, Why Democracy Needs the Rich. Although they may be the focus of populist ire from the left and right alike, McGinnis contends that wealthy Americans play a vital role in counterbalancing majoritarian excess and serving as entrepreneurial “social prospectors” who can revitalize civil society. Related Links Why Democracy Needs the Rich by John O. McGinnis“Blessed Are the Rich,” book review by James E. Hartley, Law & Liberty“Liquidate the Rich?” by John O. McGinnis“Mother’s Milk of the Revolution” by John O. McGinnis Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty in this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, senior editor to Law & Liberty. With me today is John O. McGinnis. He is the George C. Dix professor in Constitutional Law at the Pritzker School of Law at Northwestern University, also a contributing editor to Law & Liberty. And we will be discussing his book, Why Democracy Needs the Rich, recently published at Encounter Books. Professor McGinnis, welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. John O. McGinnis (01:10): Delighted to be here with you again. James Patterson (01:14): This is quite a provocative title and the title is also the book’s thesis. So tell me, why does democracy need the rich? John O. McGinnis (01:22): The argument is that the rich play a very important sort of Madisonian counterbalance role. That’s the first important role they play in democracy. So the complaint, you have to understand the premise of attacks on the rich in democracy have been that they have more influence than the average citizen. And I can see that, but note that there are a lot of groups that have more influence than the average citizen, the media, entertainers, academics, bureaucrats. They all are very important in shaping our public policy much more than the average citizen. And this was recognized from very early on. In fact, the name was given by Samuel Coleridge to this group called “the clerisy.” And their views all move in essentially one direction today. For reasons we can explain to the left, the rich have a much wider range of views. And so they actually act as a kind of counterbalance in a representative democracy. (02:27): It’s hopeless in a representative democracy to think that everyone’s going to have equal influence because many people aren’t interested and representatives have the opportunity to choose whose views they’re going to take seriously between elections. So we’re going to have differential influence, and what’s important is to have a plurality of views, and the rich really contribute to that. So that’s one of their important roles in democracy. There are others, but maybe we should begin with that one. James Patterson (02:57): Yeah. So you do talk about the clerisy at the beginning of the book, and they’re really like a combination, as you say, of bureaucrats, journalists, and academics. They have a major advantage in an American democracy that the rich don’t have. So why don’t you tell me about what you just assessed that advantage to be and how the rich counteract? John O. McGinnis (03:17): Well, their advantage is it’s their job to influence public opinion. That’s what they do. And that’s not what the rich do. What the rich have that the average citizen does not, they have both the resources and the independence to have some influence. So the independence is that many of them, most of them really aren’t very dependent on anyone else for their next dollar, except maybe consumers who aren’t that interested in their views, so long as they’re getting something for their money. And they also then have the resources and networks to shape views. And we see that in a variety of ways, both in their spending at election time, but also they’re setting up counter-infrastructures at universities through groups like the Federalist Society that inject a greater plurality of opinion because anyone like me who’s within a university recognizes how very strikingly homogeneous are the views. (04:24): And they’re all to the left. And in the law school world, which is what I know best, that actually leads to a lot of distortion. I mean, we want to have all views represented to get the best public policy. And organizations like the Federalist Society funded almost entirely by wealthy foundations and wealthy individuals are essential to ensuring the plurality of opinions that’s necessary for a democratically functioning society. So the rich turn out not to distort democracy as so much to correct distortions because it’s always been understood. The clerisy was thought to be a group that was necessary to lead democracy, but it’s always been understood by well-informed observers of democracy, that there are going to be some people who are going to have more power to shape it because the average citizen isn’t going to participate at least and think deeply about the issues before society. (05:26): They may vote and that will have an influence as well, but they’re not going to come up with the infrastructure of policy. And that’s one of the things that the rich help do by funding alternative centers of power. James Patterson (05:40): So not only do the chattering classes have a disproportionate influence on American democracy, so do interest groups. And the reason is that these organizations are especially mobilized to secure advantages from the government, such as subsidies or regulatory carve-outs. Are these not bastions of the rich? And if not, how do the rich differ from them in trying to pursue these efforts? John O. McGinnis (06:05): Well, the rich do. So I’m clear in the book that there are corporate interests that are special interests. So let me begin with the proposition that you began with, which I think is one of the most accepted propositions of political scientists that concentrated interest groups like unions, corporations, have differential power in the political process because they’re very focused on a few issues. They can raise money to get representatives interested in these issues and bring information to the fore. And the diffuse people, consumers, taxpayers, they have a collective action problem in combating these issues because often the special interests are against the interest of the diffuse interests. They like subsidies, they like regulations that will harm taxpayers and consumers. So the rich are able to counteract that again by their independence. They are not dependent on these interest groups. Moreover, they have the resources and then they have a kind of ideological interest. (07:14): They have perspectives on the world that are against some of the perspectives that the interest groups come up with. And we see that today. You might say the most important issue always for democracy is educating the next generation. And there, there are interest groups, the bureaucracies within K-12 education, the teachers, unions. I’m not saying that they don’t have some public spiritedness, but they obviously are shaped by their own interests. And that what the rich do is they offer a broad range of opportunities and perspectives, and they put their money behind it. So they’ve been behind charter schools, school vouchers. But interestingly, they’ve also, some of the more liberal-leaning rich people have tried to improve public schools from within. So they’re given a menu of options that we don’t see coming out of the interest group world, and that’s the way democracy can improve. (08:14): One point I make is that democracy improves by trial and error. Special interest groups are not actually so interested in trial and error because, of course, sometimes the trials are going to lead to results that aren’t congruent with their interest. They can’t predict exactly what’s going to happen, but the rich are able to do that. And one other thing they do, I think that comes from their entrepreneurial background today, is they’re very interested in funding professors and other social scientists to evaluate the results of these experiments, to see what happens with vouchers or extra money for smaller class size at public schools. And we have some results from them. And that’s again, the way democracy improves. And it wouldn’t improve as quickly if we just had the menus served up by, or at least shaped very heavily by the special interests in an area like education. James Patterson (09:08): Yeah. I just was flipping through trying to find, but I couldn’t, but, the section where you talk about Mark Zuckerberg donating a just eye-popping amount of money to a public school system with the impact being the sort of rearing back of declining test scores. And in this way, he’s operating kind of contrary to the instincts of, say, the teacher’s union, which is more about protecting teacher benefits. John O. McGinnis (09:36): Right. He’s doing that and he does it through public schools. And it does seem to help with math a bit. It just doesn’t seem to help that much with reading. And you then can compare it with other ideas of creating charter schools. He did it within New Jersey. I think it was like $200 million. It was a very large amount. I’m not sure how successful that turned out to be. I think it had some success, but one of the points I make in the book is not every intervention by the rich in public policy will be wise or will be successful, but that’s not the real point. The real point is they give a greater variety of interventions. And then particularly in our more empirically oriented world, and often funded by the rich themselves, we can evaluate the results of the experiments. And that’s one way democracy moves forward. (10:28): So even if Mark Zuckerberg didn’t completely succeed, the idea of putting different ideas on the table is an important one, and the rich are able to do that. James Patterson (10:39): So you describe in Why Democracy Needs the Rich the United States as a commercial republic, both in its founding and its operation after the founding. So how did the founders incorporate the rich into the regime and what role do you think they play in preserving a commercial republic? John O. McGinnis (10:56): Well, the rich were important. And one of the points I make, which I really hadn’t thought about is they’re important to the existence of the United States. I don’t think it’s sufficiently understood how the American Revolution depended in many ways on the wealthy John Hancock. We know, of course, from a signature on the Declaration… James Patterson (11:17): Haym Salomon. Yeah, there were tons of them. John O. McGinnis (11:19): They were crucial. We didn’t really have a Navy. It was really the rich people who actually created vessels as essentially entrepreneurship trying to capture British ships. So they’ve been very important since the beginning of the Republic. And moreover, it was the thought at the time, commerce was understood to have wide advantages over just actually creating wealth, which was also thought to be obviously advantageous in shaping the manners and making the manners of people better when they don’t have to worry putting about food on the table every day. That was thought to be an important way of improving society. But also by creating commerce, people are put in relations with one another of markets, so they really realize they have to do things for one another. And that’s a unifying aspect of society. And then even there was thought that we have commercial relations with other nations that created opportunities for peace and lessen the opportunity for war. (12:28): So commerce was thought to be an extremely valuable aspect of any society. And if you look at the US Constitution, a lot of it is about making a commercial Republic. Of course, the Commerce Clause allows Congress to get rid of state restrictions on commerce. And that’s really the concern. One of the greatest concerns about the Constitution was to do that. So at the very beginning, commerce was thought to be an ideal, was actually thought to promote some of the virtues of democracy, the manners of the people, the connections of the people in democracy, and the Constitution was structured to promote Congress. So very early on, commerce has been important. And it remains, I think, a mainstay of America today. It’s why America continues to be the innovator in the world. If you look, for instance, at issues of AI or the internet, it’s been essentially the United States that has created all of these essential enterprises that other nations in some sense free ride on our innovations. (13:46): It’s also true that in healthcare, the United States through its biomedical infrastructure is by far the leader in innovation and other countries help themselves to our discovery. So the idea of commerce was important to the Early Republic, and it continues to have benefits not only to the United States, but to the world as a whole. And so that’s the essential aspect of the United States as a commercial republic. James Patterson (14:15): I find that students are often unaware of some of those passages in the Constitution because they’re just so routinely followed. And one of them being the free trade among the states. This is something that was maybe not as obvious at the time of framing the Constitution, and we sort of reaped those benefits without thinking much about them. John O. McGinnis (14:36): That’s right. There’s no doubt that that was one of the motivations for the Constitution. And sometimes we don’t think that it’s the non-controversial aspects of the Constitution that really are our foundation. It’s not what we’re debating about the hard issues in the Constitution, but the consensus that everyone accepts on which our society is founded and is prospered. And the Commerce Clause is certainly, I think, foremost among those provisions. James Patterson (15:08): So the common view, this is maybe not the prevailing view, but it is a common view that the rich primarily used their wealth to engage in elaborate forms of consumption, like enormous yachts docked at Monaco or flying private jets to avoid a traffic jam. It’s sort of like the Taylor Swift, sort of … she takes a 20-minute flight to Burbank instead of driving. What do the rich do in markets that do not only satisfy their own needs, but improve the lives of everyone? We sort of already touched on this a little bit. John O. McGinnis (15:41): Well, it’s no doubt that some rich people spend a lot of money on conspicuous consumption. There’s absolutely no doubt about that, but there are two points I would make about that. First of all, it’s a very small proportion of the benefits they give every one of us. I mean, Jeff Bezos has a big yacht, but almost everyone today has the benefit of his daily deliveries that he experimented with. He created this economy that allowed people to get all sorts of goods delivered to their door, and that’s a huge benefit to people. So that’s one point I would make. Another one I would make is as well, the long-term trend of the rich, even despite their continuous conspicuous consumption, I think has been to equalize the actual living experience of middle-class people and the rich. Now, I leave the poor out of it for a moment. (16:40): We can come back to that, who I think is a problem of lack of skills and participation in the economy. But I compare myself, for instance, a professor to Peter Thiel and compare the closeness of experience, our relative closeness of experience to some duke in the seventeenth century and some don at Oxford. The world that Thiel…

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    Boomer Entitlement? Mar 04, 2026
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    Young Americans, and especially young men, are feeling economically disenchanted. As the national debt soars and interest rates remain high, the prospect of providing for a family (let alone buying a home) seems impossibly far off. Russ Greene explains part of the problem: “Total Boomer Luxury Communism,” or a host of policies at all levels of government that generously provide for senior citizens while leaving the youth to pick up the tab. Greene talks about how we got here, what’s needed to give Millennials and Gen Z a chance, and why there’s reason to be optimistic. Related Links “What Is Total Boomer Luxury Communism?” by Russ Greene (The American Mind)“Debt Politics” with Mitch Daniels (Law & Liberty Podcast)“What Social Security Should Do—and What It Shouldn’t” by Sita Slavov (Law & Liberty)“Slashing Tax Rates and Cutting Loopholes” by Adam N. Michel (Cato Institute) Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, informed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson. I’m contributing editor to Law & Liberty, as well as associate professor of Public Affairs at the Institute for American Civics at the University of Tennessee. With us today as a guest is Russ Greene. He is the executive director of the Prime Mover Institute and the author of “What Is Total Boomer Luxury Communism?” I guess Russ, we should start with the answer to your question, so go ahead and hit us with it. Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Russ Greene (01:16): Yes, thank you, James. I’m glad to be here. “Total boomer luxury communism” refers to a suite of government policies at the local, state, and federal level that has the effect of transferring wealth at a massive multi-trillion dollar scale each year from younger people to older people. And I can break down each word in that phrase. It has a particular meaning. The luxury part though is probably the one that’s most important because Boomer, that’s pretty obvious. We’re mainly talking about senior citizens. That’s Baby Boomers right now for the most part. The luxury part though, really denotes how these programs are not just about keeping seniors out of poverty. They’re often justified that way, but if you actually look at how they work, they far exceed that level. So Social Security benefits reach past $60,000 a year per individual. So for a couple maxing them out. You could be looking at up to $125,000 a year. (02:28): That’s pretty significant. And then Medicare Advantage programs, at least as of last year, some of them were covering greens fees at golf courses, golf balls, tennis lessons, horseback riding lessons, ski trips, et cetera. Again, all funded by the taxpayer. So total boomer luxury communism is just a way to sort of label this massive wealth transfer scheme from younger people to older people, which also, as I mentioned, has local and state policy elements, which really is mainly about how a lot of taxation schemes are designed to lower the tax burden on older people and concentrate more of it on younger people. James Patterson (03:15): How did we get here? Originally, the idea was to provide retirement and medical benefits to seniors when they may not even have the resources to stay in the homes they already own. How do you move from the Social Security of the New Deal to paying one’s golf course fees? Russ Greene (03:37): Yeah, many different things happened at once. Obviously America changed a lot during that time period in about 90 years. One is life expectancy. So even though life expectancy actually declined for several consecutive years over the past decade, it’s still much higher now. I think it’s around 80, right? I mean, when Social Security was passed into law, it was around 64. The other thing is just demographics. So the dependency ratio, so the ratio of people working and therefore contributing payroll taxes to fund these programs relative to the beneficiaries, it’s just plummeted, right? So in 1950 it was about 16 workers for every beneficiary, every one beneficiary, 16.5 to one. Now it’s below three to one. It’s heading towards 2.3 to one by 2035. So in other words, we have way fewer workers to support every retiree. And the other significant change is these benefits, due to actions, first actions by Congress and then due to inaction by Congress, have just become much more generous over time. (04:54): Initially, for example, Social Security benefits had to be adjusted directly by Congress in the 1970s through a series of laws. They basically put them on autopilot. As a result, Social Security benefits, especially for high income people have rapidly risen since then. So the median benefit that she’ll get in 2025 is about 30 to 35% more than it would’ve been in the year 2000, for example. And then on the Medicare side, in the healthcare side, there’s a series of changes. One of them is there’s just an epidemic of overpayments in the Medicare Advantage Program, which these are the privately administered programs, so that’s Medicare part C, and that is what enables all these excesses like Medicare Advantage covering meals and transportation and country clubs and such. And then also Medicaid also has been so means testing for Medicaid programs such as the long-term care, it often overlooks the major assets that seniors do have, such as overlooking up to nearly 1.1 million in home equity. So you can be impoverished as a senior and be a millionaire in the government’s eyes. James Patterson (06:18): So when I lived in South Florida, I had this experience of getting a haircut at a joint barber salon sort of thing, and the woman across business was getting her hair done and was talking about taking her Social Security check to the casino and gambling it away. And I told the story—somewhat scandalized—to my parents, and one of my parents said, well, it’s her money, right? She paid into Social Security when she worked. Is that true? Is that how Social Security works? You pay in and then you receive benefits that match what you paid in? Russ Greene (06:58): No. Was this a setup question? So a lot of times when I propose reforming Social Security, someone will say, you just want to turn it into a welfare program. And the response to that is, “It already is a welfare program.” Social Security beneficiaries in the bottom four quintiles get back from Social Security benefits far more than they contributed through payroll taxes into the program over their lifetimes. It’s true that for the top quintile, they generally get matching benefits in part because they paid in so much more. So there is a progressive benefit formula already. It’s 90%, 32%, and then 15%. So essentially what that means is you get 90% back of the first chunk of your average income over your lifetime, but then past that threshold—I think it’s about $2,000, I forget where exactly it is—you only get 32% back and then past another threshold, you only get 15% back. So there already is a progressive formula for this, but in Medicare, it’s even worse. People are getting back in terms of Medicare benefits many times what they ever contributed in the form of payroll taxes. James Patterson (08:22): So does this have a distortion effect on the American budget in terms of mandatory versus discretionary spending? I, of course, had to teach this class to my students, and I mentioned that I was interviewing you and brought you up in class, so hopefully if they’re listening, they’ll get to hear you tell me how right I was. I’m guessing that these expenditures, they eat up most of the budget. Russ Greene (08:45): Yeah. So-called mandatory programs, or I prefer the term autopilot, because they’re not mandatory. Congress if it chose to could change them at any time. James Patterson (08:57): Mandatory for them for reasons we might talk about … Russ Greene (09:00): Right. I think the preferred framing, like the technical language, is direct versus indirect expenditures. I prefer colloquially to call it autopilot spending. So that’s basically the major entitlement programs, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, plus interest payments on the debt because that’s not really optional, that is kind of mandatory. You got to pay that. You add all that together, the entitlement programs and the interest payments, that’s 74% of the federal budget. James Patterson (09:29): Not good. Russ Greene (09:30): So if you look at recent CBO projections, that’s just going up, up, up, up and up. For example, Medicare is going to double over the next 10 years. Just think about that. Social Security, according to the latest CBO projections, it’s looking like 74% increase during that time. Social Security already costs us about 1.6 trillion a year. It’s the largest single category of expenditures. And there’s also sort of a more political or constitutional issue with this, which is that pretty simple. What is Congress’s job? Why does it have authority? It has the power of the purse, right? It’s supposed to review and approve spending and revenue, right? It doesn’t do that mainly because of these autopilot entitlement spending programs. So if once something becomes an autopilot program, Congress doesn’t review and approve it every year the way it does, for example, for defense spending, that has to be negotiated and approved by Congress every single year. (10:38): And that’s a good thing. If we are going to spend a trillion dollars on something like we do on defense, there should be a robust debate and discussion about it in Congress. That does not happen for these entitlement programs. And I think that that’s really distorted our politics at the national level, but also there’s a downstream consequence of it, which is the lack of political debate in DC means that the general public has no idea what’s going on with these programs. There are a few politicians who are brave enough to talk about it like Representative David Schweikert, but no one really knows some very salient facts about these programs. One is very few Americans, according to polling from Cato, are able to identify how high Social Security benefits can go. They don’t realize that they can exceed for single individual $60,000 a year. And another thing is there’s almost no discussion, or at least at the popular level about the fact that the trust funds for these programs, the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and the Social Security Trust Fund, they’re running out in six to seven years. So people don’t know that. And as a result, there’s no real public awareness of the need to reform these programs. James Patterson (12:03): The populist insurgency we’ve seen both on the left and the right often would complain about the uniparty, right? The uniparty about, say, interventions abroad or open borders when it comes to immigration, but these were their targets. But in the process of targeting these ideas, they formed their own uniparty, and it appears to be on these benefits that the Republicans used to have a lot more people that talked about this. And the outcome was Paul Ryan running as vice president under Mitt Romney, the depiction of him hurling an old woman off of a cliff from a wheelchair in a campaign ad. And the lesson that a lot of Republicans learn from that is accept total boomer luxury communism and even campaign to preserve it. So isn’t this partly a response to the pressures that the elderly put on elected officials given they vote in their interests, and the last time the Republicans tried to run against this, they got their clocks clean? Russ Greene (13:13): Yes, all that. I mean, Matt Yglesias has a fairly provocative take on Donald Trump, which I think has some truth to it, which is that he’s the great moderator. He forced the Republican party establishment to move closer to the median voter. The issues where it was furthest away from them, one of them would be normal social conservative issues like abortion, for example. Obviously, yes, he appointed the Supreme Court justices that overturn Roe to his credit, in my opinion. But also if you look since then on IVF or on funding of Planned Parenthood or on FDA approval of abortion drugs, the Republican or on gay marriage for that matter, the Republican party is really moderated on traditional social conservative issues under Donald Trump. For better or for worse, it’s gained politically due to that, but it’s also had to make some sacrifices on issues that were very important to traditional social conservatives. (14:17): A similar change happened on federal spending and on entitlement programs where the party has really moved to the center unfortunately on spending and on Social Security and Medicare, where you’re right, Romney and Ryan really wanted to do something about these programs. I think they were going about it kind of in the wrong way, both rhetorically and practically, but nonetheless, it was something that they were talking about and planning to act on and George W. Bush before them, but now that’s almost completely gone, but not for long because these trust funds are running out. I will say to Donald Trump’s credit, and I’m really excited about this, it does look like they’re going to do something about Medicare Advantage, which is the program that I identified in my piece in December, just these egregious examples of horseback riding lessons and tennis and golf, all due to over a trillion dollars in Medicare Advantage overpayments by taxpayers. (15:17): Over 10 years, the CMS has put out a proposal to really tackle this issue, and as a result in January, I was very happy to see that stocks of major insurance companies, such as UnitedHealth Group, plummeted on the news. So that was very encouraging because a lot of people will say what you said, that they’ll be doomers about this because we’ll say you can’t do anything. Seniors are too powerful. And I’m not sure that’s true for a number of reasons. One is that things are happening right now. That was a politically bold move by the Trump administration to do, but they were willing to do it. I’m not sure exactly what the calculus was there, but it was the right decision. And the other thing is that this is really about cost and benefits. It’s absolutely true that there’s a political cost to doing anything about an entitlement program that will cut the amount of money that taxpayers are sending out every month. (16:13): On the other hand, the costs of inaction are high as well. So the cost of inaction are a higher risk of inflation. The national debt goes up, higher risk of a debt crisis, higher interest payments, and ultimately, most likely pretty significant tax hikes, which are both politically unpopular and economically harmful. So at some point, my prediction is that basically the cost of inaction are going to significantly outweigh the cost of action on these programs. The other thing I’d say, and this is one of the things that I’m most excited about with this total boomer luxury communism stuff, is that the younger generation of MAGA people actually cares about these issues, at least when I’ve been able to speak to them about this. In part because I’m not explaining it using the normal libertarian talking points. I’m speaking to it in terms of like, this is bad for workers, it’s bad for families, it’s unjust, it harms the common good using that language, all of which is true by the way, and not purely economic or financial or quantitative language that speaks to them. And it also sort of addresses the issues they care about most, which is why is living a dignified life in America, why is starting a family as a younger person in America, why is that so difficult? Ap…

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    A Forgotten Freedom? Feb 14, 2026
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    Law & Liberty is pleased to welcome our newest contributing editor, Luke C. Sheahan. To mark the occasion, Sheahan joined L&L editor John Grove to talk about the central theme of his work: the freedom of association. They discuss the thought of Robert Nisbet, the relationship between civil society and the state, and the way the Supreme Court has treated association over the years. Related Links “The West’s Quest,” Law & Liberty Podcast with Luke Sheahan“The Failure of Political Community” by Luke SheahanTwilight of Authority by Robert NisbetThe University BookmanWhy Associations Matter by Luke SheahanFreedom of Association, Vol. I: In Theory, ed. by Luke C. Sheahan and Kenneth B. McIntyreFreedom of Association, Vol . II: Applied, ed. by Luke C. Sheahan and Kenneth B. McIntyre Transcript James M. Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty in this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. John Grove (00:39): Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m John Grove, the editor of Law & Liberty. I’m filling in this episode for our regular host, James Patterson. I’m pleased today to be joined by a familiar guest, Professor Luke Sheahan. Professor Sheahan is an associate professor of political science at Duquesne University. He’s a senior affiliate in the program for research on religion and urban civil society at the University of Pennsylvania, and he is the editor of the University Bookman, published by the Russell Kirk Center. He’s also the author and editor of several books, including Why Associations Matter, and recently edited a new edition of Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, which we had the pleasure of speaking about six months ago here on the Law & Liberty Podcast. And I am particularly excited to have Luke on today because we are going to be welcoming him as a new contributing editor to Law & Liberty. So we look forward to being able to hear more from Luke on a regular basis over the next coming months and years. So Luke, thanks for joining us. Luke Sheahan (01:40): Thank you for having me. John Grove (01:42): Well, we spoke a few months ago about Robert Nisbet. That episode is called “The West’s Quest,” if anybody wants to look that up, where we talked about the social philosophers and that book in particular. But I thought we might start with Nisbet again for this episode because Nisbet has been an important influence for you, an inspiration for you, and also an inspiration for me. And Nisbet is a sort of distinct voice in American conservatism, and particularly for the moment we find ourselves in right now, I think what Nisbet has to say is getting lost in the mayhem of political conservatism in America. So why don’t you say a little bit about how Nisbet has inspired your work, what you find valuable in him and maybe what he has to say to the present moment in American conservatives. Luke Sheahan (02:31): My introduction to Nisbet was through one of those lists where you’re supposed to … [a] list of conservative books you’re supposed to read. So I read Quest for Community and it was great, but it didn’t quite resonate with me what Nisbet was actually getting at. So I read it again while reading Supreme Court case law on freedom of association, and I wondered why freedom of association had risen the way that it did and Supreme Court case law and then been sidelined in recent decades. And I thought Nisbet was the key there. So Nisbet’s thesis and quest is that the decline of intermediate associations is caused by the rise of the political state. He says this is the most significant thing in recent centuries in terms of understanding economic and social change and development. And I thought, well, in the microcosm that might be true and Supreme Court case law and wrote a book about it. (03:34): And I think Nisbet gave this incredible insight of when you look at civil society associations construed broadly, their struggle, their existence, their rise and fall might have to do with the interactions with political power in important ways. And so Nisbet really hones in on that and gives us tools to identify that. And he does so in a way that very few others do with his clarity and historical breadth and theoretical penetration. And so reading Nisbet gives this perspective on the social realm that is distinct from what Libertarians contribute with their focus on the individual and their concern over state power and more conventional conservatives who might be a little more prone to recognize the legitimacy of some exercise of political power, but not recognizing that even when political power seems to be working at the behest of or on behalf of social institutions, they in fact undermine them. So there’s something unique about the exercise of political power that might work always in everywhere to the detriment of these social groups. John Grove (04:52): You and I were talking about this a few days ago as we were discussing this podcast and we talked about how nobody really knows how to categorize Nisbet today if they go back and read him. And it’s sort of interesting, I was thinking about this later, that today, right now, the fault line of conservatism seems to be presented as national conservatism versus fusion Reagan’s conservatism. And when you go back and read Nisbet in the eighties about fusion Reagan conservatism, his critiques basically sound like the critiques that they make against national conservatism today. So it struck me that Nisbet would be sort of surprised to hear that however many years after his death now that fusionist Reagan conservatism is being pitted against something called national conservatism, because he thought they were already pretty nationalist at that time. So what is it about nationalism and national populism, I guess that Nisbet saw as uniquely dangerous, especially in the United States context, where sort of nationalist sentiments is this sort of centralizing force over and against localities and state governments and constitutional limits? What was so dangerous for him about that when it comes its relationship to civil society, relationship between government and civil society. Luke Sheahan (06:16): So he saw nationalism as dangerous because had been fused with the nation-state. So the idea being that the real locus where the action’s at is at the national state level. So your local affiliations and loyalties and relationships are simply unimportant in comparison to national politics. The problem is, is that it’s impossible to have the sort of relationships and affinities and loyalties that are concrete and even limited by in the local sense. So at the national level, it really is an abstraction and there’s a lot to defend. We will get into it of the place of the nation-state and all the and Nisbet’s conception, and I think he has a place for it and an important one, but to place your primary loyalty there or to make it the overriding force in society and politics is dangerous because it inherently undermines those more local authorities. (07:13): And the problem is individuals need those local authorities just in terms of fundamental identity and relationships. And so one of his big insights is that when you see a growth of political power at the national level and the decrease of local authorities and civil society authorities, individuals don’t just shift allegiances and loyalties and kind of finds the meaning in their life from the nation-state in front of the local instead of the local community or religion or whatever else it had before. Rather the individual becomes alienated. So you’ll see a rise of ideological fanaticism, for example. If you don’t have a local loyalty that grounds you end up leaping into the individual leaps into abstractions, into ideological fanaticism. He’s explaining the rise of right wing and left wing fanaticism, mostly fanaticism coming out of that alienation. So he said it’s dangerous because you end up alienating your whole populace and it lays the groundwork for a rise of even ever stronger, more authoritarian or even totalitarian political state. And the trajectory is one that’s hard to reverse. Once you undermine those local authorities and affiliations, it’s really hard to get ’em back. So he’s worried about kind of a one-way ratchet and that the political state isn’t just an exchange. We’re not Pennsylvanians and Virginians anymore and Somerset, that’s okay, we’re just Americans and that’s what we are. Well, the problem is that doesn’t really work in the same way. John Grove (08:52): What do you see as his understanding of the legitimate purpose and the legitimate function of the nation-state? Because you brought that up a minute ago there, and sometimes when you read him, it does kind of come across as almost heavy, especially when he’s talking about the centralized state. It comes across as very libertarian sounding, just this is just something, it comes out of military society, it comes from domination, it’s all force and power. But he is in this tradition of conservatism of people who see a legitimate role for the state. But that also warn you to be highly skeptical about the stories that the state tells about itself and don’t buy into the sort of mythologies of the state. But what do you see as his, or I should say, what did Nisbet see as the legitimate role of the nation-state? Luke Sheahan (09:49): Yeah, so the way to understand it, he’s highly critical of the nation-state and what he’s getting at is exactly what you said, the story the state is told about itself. It is the great liberator and the great protector. And so it came in and freed all of the individuals from the terrible oppressions of society and offered them all sorts of rights that he never would’ve had otherwise. We can talk about the expansion of rights and that sort of thing. What you should be suspicious of is that it was, that’s actually how it played out. So he has this dichotomy between monism and pluralism and a monistic understanding of politics and a pluralistic understanding of politics. So a monist nation-state would be one that sees itself as precisely as the center of authority and patriotism in all of that. And so it’s there to undermine and suppress local authorities, whether it’s the states, towns, religious parishes, all these sorts of things, or to be undermined and suppressed on behalf of the primary identity of the nation-state. (10:47): But there’s a conception of the nation-state, and one could argue this is precisely what the American conception is, that it is the overall complete community, an Aristotle sense. So it’s the complete community. So it’s going to cover national security and most economic exchange and kind of contain all the other communities within it. But precisely in the very nature and conception of his existence is those other associations. So if there’s to be a utilitarian understanding of any of these communities, it’s the political state that’s the utilitarian one. So the monist conception even sometimes is drawn by some conservatives is that why do we need the family? Well, the family does a very good job of making productive economic actors who are good citizens, and it does, but is that all the family exists for or is it the other way around? The state takes as the plural state takes as its core to its existence that the families exist, that they are at the core and foundation of it, not that we’ll let them exist insofar as they produce good citizens. (11:46): For us, the state says we exist insofar as we make the complete community possible. So these families and local communities and states and religious associations can thrive. So the very core, when he’s listing off the values of the plural community, the very first value or the very first element of it is plurality. It’s based precisely on their being plural, a plurality of communities. So our constitutional order, for example, our constitution mentioned states something like 50 times. But the idea there are states, there are real things and those legislatures are there, they’re not going away. We have provisions that say the states cannot lose their senators, the states will sit as equals in the Senate, and that is a given. They will not lose their territory either by being combined with other states or being split up. That is core to the foundation. It’s in the document, the nation-state, the United States only exists insofar as the states exist. (12:37): And I take that a little further, and I say in my work, I’m trying to kind of delineate how it goes further than that. It’s not just the states that’s focused on because of the very nature of the United States Constitution is a document, but the First Amendment is getting at this plural community and extending it or insinuating that it extends out just what we call civil society. Now that language doesn’t really get going and really differentiated into the nineteenth century, but that it’s implicit and sometimes maybe even more than implicit and much of what is said in the Bill of Rights and taken for granted among the founders when they’re thinking about the state constitutional order and the federal constitutional order and what religion is and what families are. And in some ways they’re not articulating it fully, that full articulation comes later. But you get John Quincy Adams, for example, giving us as famous Lyceum address on the family in the Constitution of Massachusetts. But he says, we never said anything about the family, but that’s what we meant. In fact, nothing we did even made sense unless you realize that we were thinking in terms of the family’s legal unit. John Grove (13:46): So that transitions as well to, I think the next topic we want to talk about, which is how the freedom of association has fit in the American constitutional order and free association is an important, and it’s kind of a difficult concept too, if you’re following you, and I did a conference a few years ago where we were looking at some eighteenth, nineteenth century writings that Nisbet was influenced by. And one of the themes that I continue to recall from that conference was Nisbet, he liked the medieval world, he liked certain elements of the medieval world because you had this sort of social pluralism, but he also seemed to recognize that that was gone for what it was. And he also at times acknowledges too, there were severe limits to that where you have these guilds and other powers that exercised extreme amount of authority over people maybe too much. (14:45): So as you mentioned, the nation-state rises in part as sort of the liberator from all those things, but then it goes too far. And so one of the themes I remember thinking about a lot from that conference was how in this modern world where those authorities are still around, but they’re certainly not the same type of authority as they were in the medieval world. Things like church and family and things like that. And is that in the modern world, the sort of pluralism that Nisbet has in mind is coming about through free association. Right? So Tocqueville, what Tocqueville is describing isn’t exactly the medieval world, but it’s sort of the closest thing that the modern world has to offer. And so that makes the freedom of association essential to this vision in the sort of modern constitutional state. And so in the United States, we don’t have the phrase freedom of association in the Constitution. Exactly. But you were hinting at I think the ways in which our entire political order maybe just takes for granted the freedom of association. I know you have at least one thesis on the idea that the people sort of means associations in a certai…

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    From Communist to Conservative Feb 03, 2026
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    Frank Meyer was the father of fusionism and one of the key builders of the conservative movement in the mid-twentieth century. That’s despite spending his early years as a serious communist agitator. James Patterson and Daniel Flynn discuss the evolution of Meyer’s thought and the impact of his legacy. Flynn’s book synthesizes a large quantity of recently-uncovered material on Meyer, offering a more complete and nuanced picture than has been available heretofore. What lessons does Meyer’s life and career offer for the conservative movement today? Related Links The Man Who Invented Conservatism by Daniel J. Flynn“A Soldier for Synthesis” by Rachel Lu (Law & Liberty book review)“Fusionism: The Only Game in Town” by Alexander William Salter“Conservative Fusion,” a Law & Liberty Podcast episode featuring Charles C. W. Cooke, Samuel Goldman, and Stephanie Slade, hosted by James Patterson Transcript James Patterson: Hello and welcome to the Law and Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, Contributing Editor to Law & Liberty and Associate Professor of Public Affairs at the Institute of American Civics at the University of Tennessee. Today with me is our guest, Daniel J. Flynn. He’s an author and columnist, Senior Editor at the American Spectator, and he’s written for the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe, New York Post, City Journal, and National Review. He lives in Massachusetts and is a former US Marine Reservist, and has recently launched a new YouTube channel called Right-Wing Wilderness. So once you have completely listened to this podcast, go subscribe to his YouTube channel and like all of the videos that are up there. So Mr. Flynn, thank you for coming onto the Law & Liberty Podcast. Daniel J. Flynn: Appreciate you having me. James Patterson: Okay, so this is about your book, The Man Who Invented Conservatism, and that man is Frank Meyer. Mr. Flynn, why is it not Edmund Burke? Daniel J. Flynn: Well, I don’t think anyone invented conservatism, and the title is sort of a joke. I think a lot of the reviewers sort of miss that “don’t judge a book by its cover” admonition. And I guess I’m to blame for that because I did put that on the cover, so I can’t complain too much. What I explained in the book is that Frank Meyer was coming over from communism, being sort of a heavy hitter in the Communist Party. When he came over to conservatism, he thought, well, it takes a system to beat a system. Why don’t these people on the right have their act together, and why don’t they have a system? And that missed the point, sort of a category mistake. Conservatism is sort of an anti-system. It’s something that developed organically; it didn’t spin out of some theorist’s mind. And so, when there are reviewers and others saying, “Well, he’s wrong. It wasn’t Meyer who invented conservatism, it was Edmund Burke or Bill Buckley.” I think all those people miss something, and that conservatism is not something that was invented. It’s something that develops. And I think that’s what Meyer figured out over the course of the last 20 or so years of his life in pursuing what he’s known for, which is fusionism. In pursuing fusionism, rooting that in the American tradition, in the American founding, he realized that conservatism wasn’t a system. It was something had to be rooted to something. And in America, the natural place to root conservatism would be the American founding James Patterson: Yeah, the Law & Liberty audience is probably more familiar with the Frank Meyer of the second half of the book. So before we get to that, let’s talk about the first half of the book. So what was Frank Meyer’s childhood like, and what accounts for this rather dramatic shift once he becomes a young man and becomes interested in Marxism? Daniel J. Flynn: Frank Meyer was born in 1909 in Newark, New Jersey to a very wealthy family. The father was an industrialist. The mother was sort of a Jewish do-gooder. So he had these two poles on him, one was the temple and the other was his father’s capitalism. He goes to the Newark Academy, and the earliest writing I have of him was when he’s 14. And it’s a real spirited defense of Judaism and saying, how does anyone say that Judaism is sort of losing its followers? Come into the temple on the holy days. You’ll see for yourself there’s a lot of enthusiasm there. Well, that was when he was 14, and that’s for the temple newspaper. And when he’s 16, he’s writing an article, an award-winning article, for the Newark Academy, defending Bolsheviks and toying with atheism. Something happens to him in his early years, like I think a lot of things happen to people in those years. When he goes to Princeton, initially, he’s denied entry to Princeton, and I have the letters from the director of admissions there. He says, Frank Meyer doesn’t strike me even as a Hebrew of the better type. Can’t we steer him to some other college? There are plenty of fine, clean-cut Christians that we should have a place for, and Frank Meyer will just take a place from one of those people away. Now Frank didn’t see that, he stayed at it, he wins admission to Princeton in his next year, and when he is at Princeton, he encounters a student body of those fine clean-cut Christian Americans that the director of admissions was talking about, and he’s left out. Psychologically, he’s in a bad spot and he finds an attraction to Milton’s Satan. He starts writing poems about Satan, poems about young women. There was a woman in Newark, Dorothy Canning Miller, who later becomes a huge figure in American art, the curator at the Museum of Modern Art. When Frank is about 20 years old, he loses his virginity to Dorothy Canning Miller, an older woman. And here goes a pattern. Frank is pursuing these pleasurable aspects of life, particularly women. He starts writing poetry about women. He starts writing poetry about Satan. And it’s not too much of a jump in the alphabet from Satan to Stalin, and I don’t think it’s too much of a jump otherwise. And so Frank starts toying with the idea of communism. By the time he gets to Oxford (he drops out of Princeton and he goes to Oxford), in his later time at Oxford where it’s a much more welcoming environment than Princeton was for him, he found something called the October Club, which is still around, which is a Marxist, explicitly Marxist, organization. And he marches his friends to the Communist Party of Great Britain’s headquarters in London, with a guy named Prince Mirsky (who in a few years dies in the Gulag) and they all join the Communist Party of Great Britain. Frank becomes a board member of the party. He’s the leader of the student bureau. And in fact, if you look at the MI five and MI six files of Frank Meyer, they call him the founder of the Student Communist Movement in Great Britain. So it’s unlikely that you’d have an American be the founder of something like this, but that’s what Frank Meyer found himself in the early 1930s. James Patterson: It’s an incredible story because on the one hand, it really does speak to the time where the Ivy Leagues are very concerned about preserving a very specific identity for admissions, when they would place caps on admissions to Jews for example. But on the other hand, it’s a familiar story even now, where you have well-to-do Americans sort of almost rejecting the lives that they’d lived before in favor of some kind of imagined superior alternative. It’s almost like a rejection of his Jewish upper-middle-class upbringing, which is repeated endlessly in not just Jewish but other religious backgrounds. But the young vigor that typifies Frank Meyer is not exclusively limited to Dorothy Canon Miller, is it? Daniel J. Flynn: No, it’s not. And when he’s in Great Britain, he is getting a lot of attention from MI5 in MI6 when he goes abroad and they’re taking notes on him, they take 160 pages of notes, they talk about what tweed he wears, whether he shaved that day, what bars he drinks at. They do a black bag job on his apartment. They put a mail cover on his correspondence. So they note all sorts of very obscure things about him, which is very helpful to a biographer. They leave out, and for reasons that you could probably imagine why they left it out, but they leave out the one glaring aspect of Frank Meyer’s time in Great Britain, and that is this. All that time, he’s calling for the violent overthrow of the government of Prime Minister Ramsey McDonald. And during that time, he is surreptitiously dating Ramsey McDonald’s youngest daughter. I have a letter from Sheila McDonald to Frank Meyer saying, come on over to 10 Downing. The coast is clear. My dad’s gone. We’ll have dinner. Seven o’clock sound good for you? So you pick the person in the history of communism, the romantic figure, Che Guevara, Jack Reed, whoever you want to pick—none of them had the guts to pull off a caper like that. And it shows you Frank Meyer’s confidence, his charisma, but it also shows you his recklessness. The idea that he would be out there, such an upfront figure saying we need to overthrow the government of Great Britain, and at the same time he was secretly dating the Prime Minister’s daughter. I mean that to me, that’s just a wild story and one that I think until this book came out was completely overlooked. James Patterson: So Frank Meyer was a true believer in this stuff, not just a cynical agent, right? Both when he came here, went to Britain, and then came back. Daniel J. Flynn: Correct. He’s an ideologue, he’s a Marxist fanatic, he’s a firebrand. And his dating of Sheila McDonald leads rather predictably to deportation hearings against him. And at that point, he becomes a cause celeb. And even though he’s a Marxist, I think he really liked being sort of the first amongst equals, if you will. All the attention that he was getting in Great Britain, you had Bertrand Russell, the philosopher, and E.M. Forster, who wrote A Passage to India and Howard’s End, signing a petition saying, keep Frank Meyer in the country. Clement Attlee, who would later become the Prime Minister of England, defends Meyer on the floor of the House of Commons. Michael Straight, who later was the publisher of the New Republic, got caught up in Meyer’s charisma and joined the Communist Party, became an agent. Meyer was never an agent, but he became a Soviet agent. He remembers at the time marching around London with the whole mobs of students chanting, “Free Frank Meyer, free Frank Meyer.” So he became really like one of these “free Angela Davis,” “free Mumia” figures in Great Britain. But you know, you can date the Prime Minister’s daughter, or you can call for the Prime Minister’s overthrow. If you do both, you’re not going to last there if you’re not an Englishman. And so he gets deported on June 1st, 1934. And in keeping with the ironies and paradoxes of his life, he immediately goes to work in Paris for a guy named Walter Ulbricht. And Ulbricht was the guy who constructed the Berlin Wall later. At that point, he was sort of an unknown Marxist on the run from Germany because he had killed two policemen. Meyer goes to work for him as a peace activist. They’re engaging in peace activism for Stalin. So here’s a guy like Ulbrich, who is a very stern, rigid figure. I mean, he later becomes the longest-serving dictator of that short-lived country known as East Germany. And there’s Meyer working for him in the summer of 1934, gets kicked back to the United States, and it takes him about 10 years, but he finally regains his spot. He’s at the highest levels of the British Communist Party, and in the American Party, he’s more like a mid-level manager. He’s the director of the Chicago Workers School, but it takes him about 10 years to get back to that level that he was at in Great Britain. And for his final year or so in the party, he’s at that highest level of the party. James Patterson: And probably not dating a member of the Roosevelt family. Daniel J. Flynn: No, he married one of his students at the Chicago Worker School, Elsie Meyer. And when they met, she was married to some other communist, but with the communist morality being what it was, they weren’t going to let that get in the way of the red-hot attraction that they had. And so she dumped him and same week she gets a divorce, she marries Frank Meyer, and they lived happily ever after for the rest of their lives. James Patterson: You have this true believer. And you know what? With true believers, you go one of two ways. Either they self-destruct within their own ideologies, or something about communism starts to bother them, right? Especially when it’s managed by Soviet influence, which is very calculating, very non-ideological in its approach. And this has something to do with Meyer’s experience with the Second World War. Daniel J. Flynn: A lot of it does, definitely. He had a friend in England, his understudy, who was a guy by the name of John Cornford. Meyer later names his son “John Cornford Meyer”; he had that much of an influence on Meyer’s life. Cornford was the great grandson of Charles Darwin, and Meyer ropes him into communism as a teenager, as like a 16, 17-year-old kid. And when Meyer leaves, Cornford takes Meyer’s spot over there. He’s the head of the student bureau. He goes over to Spain and he dies the day after his 21st birthday. And I have to think that Meyer felt great guilt for this. Meyer had also sent men to their deaths as a recruiter for the Spanish Civil War in the United States. So Meyer tries to join up to fight Hitler in World War II. And the Communist Party says, no, I’m sorry, we need you here. And he thinks, this is odd. They’re exhorting everyone else to go and join the fight against Nazism, but they won’t let me go. This goes on for about eight months. And finally in frustration they say, okay, you want to go? Go. He goes, and it’s revelatory. In the squad bay that he’s in, he finally meets the proletariat that he’s been talking about all these years. And they’re not the same people that Marx had described. These are not people that are itching to overthrow the government. They’re just looking to make their lives better. And he’s stunned by this because he had lived a very socially insulated life. He grew up in a hotel, he went to Oxford and Princeton, his family was wealthy. So this is revelatory. He gets injured in Officer Candidate School in Fort Benning, Georgia and it takes him over a year to recoup. He gets surgeries on both of his feet. James Patterson: Yeah, he had some sort of problem with his feet, they had very high arches? I was trying to understand what this is. It was pretty bad-sounding. Daniel J. Flynn: Yeah, something like that. And he’s 33 when he joins the military, so he’s … James Patterson: He’s in trouble. Daniel J. Flynn: Yeah. You’re breaking down. And so he doesn’t go and fight, but he sort of washes out of the military. But that year of recuperation, he’s thinking, and he’s questioning, and questioning and communism do not go together. And in desperation, him and a guy named Louis Budenz, they’re talking in Chicago. Budenz was the editor of a communist paper out there; Meyer had been the head of the Chicago Worker School. And they think, back in the thirties, the heyday of communism, was when they were touting these slogans, like “Communism is 20th century Americanism.” We need to get back to that. And so he writes this letter to Earl Browder that has a dramatic effect, not just on communism but on conservatism. And Meyer couldn’t have foreseen this when he tells Browder that the Communist Party needs to fuse Marxism with the American tradition, and that they need to do this not just on the 4th of July, but every day of the year. And he repeatedly uses a variant of this word “fusion.” So that comes much later. But that idea—Meyer comes to realize, well, Marxism doesn’t fit with the American tradition. He’s a fanatic, but he’s not such a fanatic as to lose hi…

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    Living the Unadjusted Life Jan 19, 2026
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    In his recent book, Religious Freedom: A Conservative Primer, John Wilsey looks back to the writing of Peter Viereck and other great conservative minds to understand what it means to live a worthy life in a culture gone mad. On the Law & Liberty Podcast, he joins James Patterson to discuss the difference between that kind of conservatism and a more reactionary extremism, as well as the centrality of free exercise to the American constitutional tradition. Related Links Religious Freedom: A Conservative Primer by John Wilsey Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, associate professor of public affairs at the Institute of American Civics here at the University of Tennessee and contributing editor to Law & Liberty. My guest today is John D. Wilsey, professor of church history and philosophy, as well as chair of the Department of Church History and Historical Theology at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Dr. Wilsey has a lengthy bio in which he has many, many accolades and many different books published, but we’re going to be talking about the most important one, which is the most recent, the one that we’re trying to sell today, namely Religious Freedom: A Conservative Primer. (01:33): John, welcome to the podcast. John Wilsey (01:36): Well, thank you so much, James. It’s great to be with you, man. James Patterson (01:40): So what is important about religious freedom and why do we need a conservative primer? John Wilsey (01:45): Well, religious freedom is a longstanding American tradition. Religious freedom goes back a long way in the American tradition. It goes back to the colonial period. It’s a central conviction of our founding, our national founding, I should say, our constitutional founding. And it has been consistently a core tenet of American constitutionalism and the American concept of rights and liberties for the entire life of our nation. Have Americans always thought about it rightly? No. Have we always applied it rightly? No. But it’s always been a key American tradition. So it’s important from that perspective. It’s also important because it’s true. The state has no jurisdiction over the religious conscience of its citizens. (02:57): As the very first English Baptist, Thomas Helwys said to King James I in 1607, I believe, in his treatise that he addressed to James. And I’m paraphrasing here. “You’re the king in matters of the state. In temporal matters, you are my sovereign. But with regard to our standing before God, you and I stand on even ground and you have no jurisdiction over me.” That’s an American tradition and it’s also the truth. So it’s important for those two reasons, at least. We could probably talk about a lot of other important reasons why religious freedom is a necessary conviction in American constitutional and civic tradition. And why we need a conservative primer is because, well, there are a couple reasons for that too. I guess we’re going to spend the whole time talking about that, but in short, conservatives conserve. We get the question as conservatives often, what are you conserving? (04:03): We conserve tradition and religious freedom is a core tradition. And we have the blessing of enjoying religious freedom as citizens today. And thus we also have the responsibility to steward that tradition and guard it and hand it down unsullied to the younger generations. James Patterson (04:26): What is it about alternative forms of conservatism that make it so hostile to religious freedom? We have a kind of resurgence of a more continental European vision in which the state operates as a kind of guarantor of the church, and as a result, imposes that church in some way on the public. We see this as in your book with reference to Peter Viereck’s “ottentots.” So maybe move us through that concept to explain how that’s not what we’re conserving in this book and why Americans would regard this not as a conservation, but of a kind of revolutionary act. John Wilsey (05:13): Yeah. Yeah. In the book, I spend a lot of time talking about Peter Viereck and I did a podcast with John Grove on Peter Viereck several months ago. I’m very interested in him. He had a distinction that he made, a very helpful distinction between the Burkean tradition of conservativism and as you said, the European tradition of conservativism. The European tradition he referred to follows Joseph de Maistre, a counter-revolutionary, counter-French revolutionary thinker, ultraroyalist tendency, a reactionary impulse, and also an authoritarian impulse that’s on the right, but not really conservative, but reactionary. Reactionary would be a better description. Conservatism seeks to conserve. It seeks to guard and protect and steward. Reactionary refers to pursuing a rightist political agenda because you’re mad at something, you’re reacting against something. And that’s what I see now. (06:26): That’s what I see from those on the right who are anti-Semitic, who are authoritarian, who want to see establishment, an established church in America and so forth. They’re reacting against revolutionary Marxist and radical leftist agendas and thinking. And to be clear, James, I mean, I think I can speak for you too. I get it. I understand this displeasure at revolutionary leftism. I hate it. I hate it thoroughly. And I’m a dad, and so I want to teach my children how to think critically about a leftist cultural agenda. I get it. But my argument would be that the way to address revolutionary leftism is not to just be aggrieved, to not seek some sort of counter-revolution to overthrow, to not be authoritarian, to not be anti-Semitic, because all those things are right out of the playbook of the left. If we want to fight the left and if we want to come against the left and oppose the left, then why would we want to take a page out of their playbook? (07:52): And that’s exactly what the hard right wants to do. So it seems that the answer forward is to retrieve federalism, retrieve tradition, reinvigorate what it means to be an American, what it’s historically meant to be an American. And that’s the project of the book. James Patterson (08:13): You might get, let’s say, a good faith response from magisterial Protestants or forms of Catholic postliberals that’ll say, “Well, we used to have established religions in the colonies and for a time after the revolution in places like Connecticut and Massachusetts. How are these not as traditional as religious freedom?” John Wilsey (08:39): Yeah. Well, that’s an interesting observation about conservatism. Conservative ideas and positions on various things all started out as being new at some point. So you’re my Catholic friend. In my Protestant and Baptist tradition, we’ve departed from the hymnal and we’ve turned to more contemporary styles. And my joke is to my friends is that I’m not in favor of singing anything in church that is newer than the First Great Awakening. James Patterson (09:25): So if it’s from the- The reformation breaks away from Rome. It always seems to creep back. So you guys dumped the censor with the incense, but you brought it back in the smoke machine. John Wilsey (09:42): That’s a good one. I hadn’t thought of that one. So people always respond to me by saying, “Well, even old hymns were new at some point.” That’s actually the point I’m getting at. (09:53): Capitalism was new at one point and religious freedom or disestablishment, I should say. Religious freedom is not necessarily a new idea. You can trace it all the way back to the New Testament. But disestablishment was new at one point. And just because something is new at one point doesn’t make it not conservative. At this point, it’s old. And the point about tradition is not that it’s eternal, that its sources are an eternity past. The point about tradition is that you have practices and perspectives and mores that have been around long enough to be tested by a whole range of different challenges, and they have emerged stronger than before. And that’s the point. So the last state church to be disestablished was in Massachusetts, in 1832. And for you kids out there, that’s almost 200 years ago. So I think that disestablishment has proven itself and stood the test of time. (11:00): Now, that’s going to be a red flag in the face of those who favor establishment, but we can talk about that at that point. But the point that I’m making here is that tradition doesn’t have to emerge from the dawn of creation in order for it to be real tradition to be conserved. James Patterson (11:19): Yeah. You start to look at those periods at the end of establishments occurred during the early Republic. And it’s a funny thing where the establishment in Massachusetts broke down because most of the officials that were enshrined in major religious centers in Massachusetts, the congregationalists, had all become Unitarians. And the joke was the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man-hood of man and the neighborhood of Cambridge, right? That’s all the religion belonged to. And so in a way, Madison’s vindicated, his Memorial Remonstrance, that the only thing that establishment did was ensure heterodoxy would emerge by sponsoring one institution over others within one denomination, in this case, Harvard. John Wilsey (12:23): Well, we’ve also always struggled with the challenge of religious diversity in America’s career, both as colonies and as a nation, which is another thing that the far right reacts against. Well, they say, “Oh, well, we need to have a homogenous nation. We need to have a homogenous culture and go back to that. ” And that’s where a lot of the “kinism” and things like that come through. But what they miss is that Americans have always had a very diverse civic life going all the way back. So in the revolutionary period, the 13 states represented that the most culturally diverse, or excuse me, the most religiously diverse polity, if you will, in the West, by far. Now one could say that, well, that diversity was all Christian, and for the most part that would be true. But how did Presbyterians look at Episcopalians and Baptists and Quakers? (13:34): How did they look at Catholics? They saw them as not … I mean, they saw them, they didn’t see them in the same way that Presbyterians see them now. I can have this conversation with you. I’m a Baptist, you’re a Catholic. We wouldn’t be able to sit and have a civil conversation if this were the eighteenth century, James. James Patterson (13:52): No, no. I’d be running for my life, and so would you. John Wilsey (13:57): That’s right. Yeah. If we were in Massachusetts, you’d be running for your life. And if we were in France, I’d be running for my life. So we have to think historically about that period of time, the way that they saw each other was as different faiths. One was right and one was wrong. And so Americans have always dealt with diversity and have always dealt with pluralism in some form, in some sense. It’s true, of course, they didn’t have the diversity and pluralism we have now, but their perspective on pluralism was unique in the West. So this is not something new since 1965. This is something that we’ve always dealt with as Americans. James Patterson (14:49): One of the most notorious Catholic forces in American history was Tammany Hall in New York City, and at its peak was Boss Tweed, who was a descendant of Scottish Quakers and had an Episcopalian funeral. (15:10): So that’s actually something about the “Ottentot” persuasion, which is that what they’re trying to conserve is not a tradition, but a kind of imaginary. Even in the earliest days of colonization, you had Native Americans, of course you had the importation of enslaved Africans, but you also, like in places like New York, you had the Dutch that were already here. There was never really a period of a universal, I guess for some of these people, kind of like Southern English pastoral. And the concern over foreigners not being integrated actually once applied to the Germans, right? Franklin’s nervous that they’re not going to be sufficiently republican in their habits. John Wilsey (16:02): Yeah. That lasted all the way well into the twentieth century, suspicion against the Germans. So yeah, all those things are right. James Patterson (16:13): So the thing about religious freedom is that it’s also very hard. It’s an element of the United States that Tocqueville comes and observes with astonishment that it’s a complimentary institution both in the constitution, but also in the habits of Americans notices that regardless of religious sector denomination, people adhere to it and that this also facilitates greater political liberty. So how does religious freedom and political freedom work together? John Wilsey (16:54): Yeah. Tocqueville has that famous statement where he … I’m going to have to paraphrase it again. You probably have it memorized, but where religion is the first of all political principles in America, that’s not what he said, but I’m talking about that line that he has. He acknowledges the reality of disestablishment and of religious freedom free exercise. But despite that, religion is the first political principle or the first political institution or whatever term that he is. I have to look it up. And from there, he makes the argument that a free people can’t maintain their freedom without religion and without especially the free expression of religion. It’s impossible to do it. And it’s all part of his critique of egalitarianism, the omnipotence of the majority and so forth. All these things that threaten liberty. One of the things that threatens liberty, all forms of liberty in a society is a turn of one’s attention to selfish pursuits, turning away from a civic-mindedness or a care for your neighbors, a care for your locality, your township, and a turn towards just your own personal circle, that is your family or your closest friends. (18:36): You become completely obsessed with your material desires and your own personal pleasure and your own personal agendas, and you don’t care about anybody else. That’s a great threat to liberty because you let go of concern or problems of your town. You let go of concern of what stands in the way of the flourishing of your neighbors, which means that you’re more than happy for the government to come in and take over those things, and that’s how tyranny unfolds. And religion does the same thing. Religion takes your mind off of things that are bigger than you, things that are bigger than your own self and your own interests and your own perspective, things that outlast you. Religion points us to the world to which we are going. Religion reminds us that we’re accountable for our conduct and what we say and what we believe. We’re accountable for those things. (19:42): Those things don’t just concern us. They concern things bigger than us. Religion reminds us of all those things. And so when we have a more eternal perspective and we look to things that are greater than ourselves, then it causes us to think about other people. It sets us on a trajectory towards the true, the good, and the beautiful, the great transcendentals when we’re thinking about that, which is greater than our own concern. And those things contribute to freedom, but materialism, selfishness, turning away from one’s fellows, those things are short-term gains, but long-term losses. So the necessity for religion to freedom is all part of what Tocqueville is saying about problems with equality. Equality has some good things about it, but equality when se…

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    The End of the Eco-Tyrants? Dec 15, 2025
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    When environmental policies were first enacted, they were often supported by staunch conservatives like Richard Nixon and then-governor Ronald Reagan. Why do so many today now view environmental conservation as belonging outside the scope of conservatism? In his recent October forum lead, “A New Environmentalism?” Steven Hayward traces how conservation efforts quickly became hijacked by extremists and what a conservative approach to environmental policy could look like. He joins the podcast to talk about this piece and why he is hopeful for the future. Related Links October forum: “A New Environmentalism?” by Steven F. Hayward Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, informed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. James Patterson (00:39): Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, contributing editor to Law & Liberty and associate professor of public affairs at the Institute for American Civics at the University of Tennessee. With us today is the one and only Steven Hayward. He is a visiting professor at Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy where he runs a new energy and environmental policy lab and as a man in that capacity, a scholar in that capacity, we are going to talk about his forum that he did for Law & Liberty, the first being “A New Environmentalism?” which he published on October 1, and it poses a very provocative series of arguments that I’ll let him explain. Welcome to the podcast, Dr. Hayward. Steven Hayward (01:34): It’s going to be with you. I’ve been on the Law & Liberty Podcast a few times some years ago, but it’s good to be coming back. James Patterson (01:40): Wonderful. So this article may surprise people, right, since when have classical liberals or broadly understood conservatives taken much of an interest in environmentalism, and one of the points you opened with is that they always were. Steven Hayward (01:57): Yeah, I think that’s right. I mean, I went into the history of this once quite a while ago, but it’s always fascinated me. If you go back to the first Earth Day, and really you do sometimes hear people say, well, gosh, conservation is a tradition in America that goes back to Teddy Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot and more than a hundred years ago. And there’s a progressive impulse there, but there’s also a basic “conservation” impulse. And so if you want to just take conservation and conservative and just use conservative broadly, generically speaking, you can see that there’s a harmony there etymologically, if nothing else. And the first Earth Day, I was in the sixth grade, I think growing up in LA where the smog was really bad. I mean lung burning bad, to the point where you couldn’t play outside in the summer afternoon. Anyway, that was an initiative really, it was bipartisan, but Nixon fully embraced it. Steven Hayward (02:45): You saw a lot of conservatives embrace it, including I think most famously in the early ‘70s, James Buckley, Bill Buckley’s brother, who was the senator for New York for one term. He was quite enthusiastic about the major legislation, and we started seeing some major gains. So we could talk about the technical aspects later if you want, because the problem has always been, A, too much bureaucracy that was needlessly expensive early on, and B, a kind of extremism crept in and let’s in the activists behind that. But the bureaucrats are happy to have that kind of backup. They get bigger budgets and more power, and that’s soured the whole project such that by the end of the ‘70s, within a decade, you had a lot of the original sponsors of the early landmark legislation saying, “Hey, wait a minute, we’re having second thoughts. This isn’t quite what we meant with things like NEPA—National Environmental Policy Act—and Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and so forth.” And we’ve then kind of in this gridlock ever since. Anyway, breaking out. That’s not easy though I think we’re seeing signs that we are now turning the page on it. James Patterson (03:44): So we’re not going to see Steve Hayward throwing soup at any works of art, are we? Steven Hayward (03:50): No. My joke is that you know we’re turning the page when people are now stealing from museums like the Louvre instead of throwing soup on the paintings. Yes. James Patterson (04:01): So, okay, there’s a lot of directions to go with this in the essay because of how rich it is and what it details. But maybe let’s start with what the good intentions were behind some of the reforms, especially around the idea of permitting and what the unintended consequences were. I especially like the comments you made about how it actually undermined common law solutions. Steven Hayward (04:23): Yeah, yeah. Let me hold that for the second part. I think because a very important point because it’s larger than just that. I think the first thing that ought to be understood, and actually one of the commenters made the point that what really started modern environmentalism in the ‘60s and early ‘70s was what we now know as the Environmental Kuznets Curve. In other words, the richer a country gets, the more they’re going to demand and have the ability to afford measures to improve environmental quality. So the Kuznets Curve, after Simon Kuznets from the ‘50s, and his original curve was about income inequality and growth, and the Environmental Kuznets Curve, its again is just an inverted “U”: as you get richer, you will pollute more for a time. And that’s the story of every industrial country. Then at a certain point that turns around and income and economies keep growing, but we start devoting resources and having laws and have the technology to reduce air pollution, water pollution, and so forth. Steven Hayward (05:21): So a lot of environmentalists are stuck in the past. I mean, they remind me of the Civil Rights Movement in some respects, or it’s always the Selma Bridge in Alabama from 1963 and the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland is always catching fire like it did in 1969 for something like the eighth time in its history, by the way, that wasn’t a one-off when that happened, but that doesn’t happen anymore. Yeah. Well, that’s actually Jonathan Adler, one of the commenters, wrote a fabulous history of that whole story. We didn’t have time to get into it in our exchange, but he went back and talked about how that river and others had been a muck for a long time. There’s a great passage in Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle about how foul the Chicago River was in downtown Chicago. It had so much, for lack of a better word, crap in it, that you could almost walk across it he said. Steven Hayward (06:10): And, you know, these days people swim in it. We put green food coloring for St. Patrick’s Day and so forth. So there’s a lot of low hanging fruit, which we grabbed, and nowadays we go after more and more marginal threats, but we centralize things. And that’s what leads to the question of common law. It used to be, and back in the nineteenth century, in both here and in England where we had common law traditions, especially on the state level in this country, you could bring a successful nuisance suit against industrial polluter, against somebody who is fouling a stream if you’re downstream in a farming area and so forth. And we preempted all that, starting with the major landmark legislation in the 1970s. And there’s a whole lot of cases about this that were thrown out of court when you suddenly were preempted. And the odd thing is, is that actually in some cases, delayed cleaning up and delayed progress. Steven Hayward (07:01): Again, that’s a long, complicated story. But I think Jonathan Adler agrees with me, and a lot of people do that we ought get back to something like that because what does that involve? It involves, well, to invoke another term that many listeners will know, it involves Coasian bargaining, right? If you have common lawsuits between private parties or even between one public party and a private party, you may settle it in a trial or you may negotiate and you’ll negotiate an optimal settlement between the two that is likely going to be superior and much less costly than something that bureaucrats in Washington will ponder for years before they impose it on you. James Patterson (07:36): Yeah. The problem with the more bureaucratic approach is that it also, where there’s a permit granted, it puts the ordinary citizen not just against the company, but the government. Steven Hayward: Yes. Exactly. James Patterson: And so you end up with problems like with the pollution in Flint, Michigan, right? Where the EPA is standing with the polluter. Steven Hayward (07:57): Right? Because the polluter says, Hey, they waived their permit that they’ve gotten and they’ve done the permit properly and something went wrong. And then they sit around twiddling their fingers, figuring out what to do about it. James Patterson (08:07): And the people working at the EPA, I don’t think they live in Flint, Michigan, so they don’t experience the downside of all of this. So a little bit of the story here that creeps in is that some of the biggest beneficiaries to this legislation during the 1960s are trial lawyers. And so maybe one of the reasons why people are so stuck in the past is that it pays to be stuck in the past. Steven Hayward (08:35): Oh, very much so. Well, so the National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA its called, and then Yellow State Level Ones most famously in California, CEQA—the California Environmental Quality Act. And those, and many other statutes have a provision really borrowed from civil rights law of a private attorney general. Virtually any one of us have standing to bring an environmental lawsuit in court. So in other words, broader standing grounds. And that has simply made it possible to file endless lawsuits against anything involving a permit. So whether it’s to build a house or a housing development to cut down some trees, if you’re a forester, even on private land in many cases, you can tie it up in court for a long, long time. And that’s become a favorite tool of environmentalists. I often joke that I won’t name any particular environmental organizations, but about half their staff is usually lawyers. Steven Hayward (09:29): Some of these are very big organizations that spend a couple hundred million dollars a year in their budget, and so that’s their most prominent tool and their loath to give that up. But as I say this, originally, the original idea both at the federal and state level was the environmental review process was going to be for the federal agency in acts that it was doing, like building a dam, building a highway and so forth, would do an environmental impact review and come up with mitigation for damages they caused. Well, some very early court decisions all over the country said, “well, that applies to anybody applying for a building permit with any state or federal agency.” And we were off to the races after that. So one of the ironies of the present moment is that the California Environmental Quality Act passed in 1970, I think unanimously in the lower house, and with only one no vote in the California State Senate from the last remaining John Birch Society of the Legislature, a guy named H. L. … Yeah, that’s right. Not many listeners remember the name, but it was the guy known as Wild Bill H. L. Richardson. James Patterson (10:34): That sounds like someone who would vote against anything. Steven Hayward (10:38): And he did vote against most everything. Anyway, but then signed into law happily by Governor Ronald Reagan. And Reagan gave all these speeches about the—and Reagan was actually a very pro-environment governor, which even many of his critics will grudgingly acknowledge. Well, here we are four or five months ago, and Gavin Newsom of all people held a gun to the head of the Democratic super majority in the legislature and saying, we have to reform CEQA and reduce the bureaucracy, and he wouldn’t sign the budget until they did and there was lots of resistance. And I thought, that’s an irony. Ronald Reagan signs into this law that everyone agrees. Jerry Brown wanted to fix this 10 years ago and got nowhere. And Gavin Newsom is, I mean, I just savor the phrase, is undoing the environmental legacy of Ronald Reagan and that shows you what a weird world we’re in. James Patterson (11:28): Yeah. I’m looking here at the November 2025, projected electricity rates in California exceeded only by Hawaii at 30.45 cents per kilowatt/hour. Why is it so high? Steven Hayward (11:44): Well, it’s the problem with renewable energy in most states. I say most states, this study came out from some very smart people I know at UC–Berkeley, about three weeks ago. So it was too late for me to put in the articles, and I wasn’t getting electricity rates. But they did one of those fancy deep dive regression analysis of electricity rates all over the country. And one of their conclusions, which they put in typical turgid academic writing, is that wind and solar power don’t necessarily drive up electricity rates except in states that have a mandate to use them. So let that sink in for a minute. So California has had a very aggressive mandate for years, and about 30 other states do too. And essentially they have a gun to the head of the utilities forcing them to install and buy more wind and solar power. And all the things you hear about how wind is cheaper and the sun is free is basically a lie because the sun doesn’t shine at night, the wind doesn’t always blow right, and that’s when you have to have backup ready. Steven Hayward (12:45): You either have to buy it on the market at high marginal prices, or you have to have what’s known as a spinning reserve. So in California, we have a lot of natural gas plants that run all day long but are not connected to the grid because our solar power in the middle of the day just generates a ton of electricity so much that we sometimes pay other states to take it from us. That’s how crazy this is. And so California has been a leader in this madness of mandating an imbalance, electrical energy supply. So I would say all the other states who have these called renewable portfolio standards, if you’re following California, look at California’s electricity rates and you’ll see where you’re headed. James Patterson (13:21): So the reasonable thing to do would be to do what Gavin Newsom did. And in a way, Newsom is kind of well positioned to be able to do that in a way that I guess Jerry Brown wasn’t. But outside of these rather extreme cases, the attempt to do this sort of thing brings about not just a kind of organized resistance you might have among the lawyers and their lobbyists, but also people that lie down in the middle of the road. And so maybe talk a little bit about the movement on the fringes of the environmentalist movement. Steven Hayward (13:53): Yeah, they’re not going away, although I hope we’ll come around to some of the broad currents changing right now. But to stick with California for a minute, Jerry Brown, well, it was announced while Brown was governor that we were going to close down our last nuclear power plant in California, Diablo Canyon. It was at the end of its 40 year, first licensing period. I live near it, by the way. I like to say I get clean electricity because I live near a nuclear power plant. And I remember the protests led by Jane Fonda and others in the ‘70s against completing—they tried to stop it from being completed and it wasn’t. And it finally went online in 1985, I think, and okay, they’re going to close it, and Pacific Gas and Electric, which was the utility that owned it, and they’re a bunch…

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    Israel, America, and the End of the World Dec 03, 2025
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    What is Christian Zionism? Is it, as figures like Tucker Carlson claim, a relatively recent development in America’s cultural history, or does a general support for the Jewish state have a longer history in America? The answer partly depends on how “Christian Zionism” is defined, but in this conversation, Sam Goldman explains to host James Patterson why support for Jewish political aspirations is part of a long tradition of Christian philosemitism that reaches back even to America’s colonial period. Related Links “Tucker Carlson Is Wrong About Christian Zionism,” Compact, Samuel GoldmanGod’s Country by Samuel GoldmanTri-Faith America by Kevin Schultz Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, contributing editor to Law & Liberty and associate professor of public affairs at the Institute of American Civics at the University of Tennessee. With me, again, is my friend, Dr. Samuel Goldman. He is associate professor of humanities at the Hamilton School for Classical and Civic Education at the University of Florida. And today we’re going to be talking about both a newly-in-paperback book of his called God’s Country: Christian Zionism in America. As well as an article he wrote once again for Compact, “Tucker Carlson is Wrong about Christian Zionism.” And this has all been inspired by some of the contretemps of the moment over some of these issues. So we’ll get into those, but also some of the intellectual background that people may not know. Dr. Goldman, welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Sam Goldman (01:37): Always a pleasure to speak, Dr. Patterson. James Patterson (01:42): I always feel a little guilty about being informal on these podcasts, so I’m going by honorifics at least at first. Now, before we started recording, we were just talking about how many people have offered commentary on Tucker Carlson interviewing Nick Fuentes. And your comment was never before in your life have you felt so middle aged. I feel the same way! So we are not going to talk about the ins and outs of all that business. We’re going to be talking about what was motivating them to talk, and that’s this idea of Christian nationalism. I mean Christian Zionism, excuse me, not Christian nationalism. Totally different show. So what is Christian Zionism and what does Tucker Carlson get wrong about it? Sam Goldman (02:28): So Christian Zionism is one of these annoying terms that can be defined in different ways. And one of the frustrating things about the discussion that I entered with my Compact piece and carried on in social media and elsewhere is that people sort of mean different things by “Christian Zionism” and unless you can settle on one definition, it’s hard to have a productive discussion. So I’ll give you two definitions. One is the one that I think Carlson had in mind, which is common and which I think is wrong or at least only partial. And then I’ll give you my correct definition, which is the one that I advance in my book. So one way of understanding Christian Zionism is as the affection of modern Christians, mostly evangelical Protestants, for the current state of Israel, and usually that is associated with a set of eschatological beliefs that involve the return of the Jews to the Biblical Promised Land, the establishment of a state there, increasing turmoil in the region and the world, (03:49): and finally a sort of apocalyptic narrative in which Christ returns to rule in person. That’s a definition that has been common for at least 40 years, and I think it’s probably the one that Carlson has in mind, although it’s not clear that everyone whom he mentioned, George W. Bush among others, is a Christian Zionist in that sense. But my contention in the article and the book is that that’s really just too narrow. I would say that Christian Zionism should be defined as something like the idea that God has a continuing concern for the people and land of Israel, that that concern is reflected perhaps imperfectly or mysteriously in the modern Zionist movement and the state of Israel, and because Christians profess to worship and serve the God of Israel, they have some responsibility for supporting or promoting those goals. That is a much broader definition of what it means to be a Christian Zionist. (05:09): And it’s also one that extends back a lot deeper in history. So Carlson in that show and on other episodes has suggested that Christian Zionism can be derived from the nineteenth century Anglo Irish theologian, John Nelson Darby. I think it really goes quite a long way farther back, really back to the Protestant Reformation. And what I suggest in my book is that this idea was brought to what became the United States by the Puritans. It became a recurring feature of American political and religious life. It was never uncontroversial or unanimously accepted; I wouldn’t suggest that for a moment. But it was a popular and fairly normal idea really throughout both the history of the republic and colonial history. So when people like Carlson said as he did in the interview with Fuentes, that this is a brain virus that’s somehow taken over the Republican party in America as a result of Darby or the so-called Scofield Bible, which included notes that were influenced by Darby’s ideas, I just don’t think that’s true. Christian Zionism in a broad sense is an old and powerful feature of American thought. And when we talk about its influence and value, I think we should approach it on those terms. James Patterson (06:58): During a now leaked video from the Heritage Foundation meeting over some of the fallout from their involvement with Tucker Carlson, one of the participants said that they regarded Christian Zionism as a heresy and they associated this with being either Catholic or Eastern Orthodox. We’re not going to speculate what they mean by that, but there is a kind of odd proximity of Protestantism to Christian Zionism that you don’t find in Catholicism or Orthodoxy. Why is it that Protestantism is so much friendlier to this way of thinking? Sam Goldman (07:44): So Protestantism emerges in part out of the idea that scripture is the ultimate authority for Christians. You know better than I do, as a Catholic, that it’s more complicated than that, and there’s a whole range of arguments, but one of the central ideas in what becomes Protestantism is that if you want to know what God wants, you have to go back to the Bible and you have to read it yourself. Which doesn’t mean that everyone’s interpretation is equally valid; particularly early forms of Protestantism had strong interpretive and theological authorities that were supposed to guide people. But you’re supposed to, you know, you read the book and you see what it says. So what happens if you do that? James Patterson (08:28): I have never read the Bible before, Sam, Sam Goldman (08:31): Well, I’ve seen on Twitter accusations that this is true of all Catholics. So I leave that for others to judge. So you pick up the Bible and what do you find? Well, first of all, you find that it has these two parts: if you are a Christian an Old and New Testament, or for Jews the Hebrew Bible and the other stuff, and then you have to answer the question of what these things have to do with each other. And one of the innovations of Protestant theologians was to say, well, look, when you read the Old Testament as it was for them, you see that it is replete with references to Israel, to the people and land of Israel. And some of those references they suggested are pre-figurations of the Church. They’re metaphors for the community of believers that would be fulfilled in Christ. (09:40): But some of them are references to what was called the seed of Abraham, the descendants of Abraham, and to the Biblical Promised Land. And from this turn to scripture and to the Old Testament, which for them was of equal authority to the New Testament, there developed a sense that God was not finished with the people or land of Israel. And through reading, especially some of the prophecies that occur later in the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament, many Protestants expected that one day in the fullness of time, God would bring together the scattered Jews of the world, would restore them to residence in at least some portion of the Biblical Promised Land, and would set up some kind of political community there. And all of this was vague and argument by way of implication, if not insinuation, but you can see in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries something that looks like a precursor to Zionism emerging not among Jews and not in Eastern and Central Europe, but rather among English speaking Protestants in Britain and then in what would become the United States. James Patterson (11:16): So we see this and contemporary scholarship that’s come up, Eric Nelson’s book, The Hebrew Republic. I know we’re selling your book today, Sam. Sam Goldman (11:27): People should also buy Nelson’s book. James Patterson (11:30): Yeah, God’s Country: Christian Zionism in America of course. And I have this political Hebraism, which is a wonderful compilation. So this is sort of well known in scholarly circles or at least being better established than maybe it was before. And the thing about this political Hebraism is that it was not unfamiliar to the American Founders at the time of the founding of the colonies, or to the framers of the Constitution. So how is it that Christian Zionism makes its way to the US? Sam Goldman (12:10): Well, it becomes embedded in the religious traditions that shape the political culture of the founding period. Not equally or to the same degree everywhere, so one sort of current, where it’s especially powerful is the Puritan traditions that then become congregationalism in the eighteenth, late seventeenth and eighteenth century. Presbyterians have a strong tradition of this. It’s especially the religious communities that are influenced by Calvinism that seem to have this affinity. And that then gets picked up by many founders and framers, I think not in a sort of fully committed and explicit way. There are figures who did that; I talk in the book about a guy named Elias Buodinot who served as president of the Continental Congress and was an important aid to Washington, who actually wrote a couple of books making this case. But for some of the more familiar figures, it was sort of in the background. (13:25): So I am not an archival scholar. I don’t claim to have found things that other people haven’t found, but to the extent that I have any discoveries, I located a diary entry by John Adams from when he was riding the circuit in Massachusetts in the late 1760s. So in those days, as some listeners may know, the court moved so people could do their legal business and then all the lawyers would follow the court around the colony. So they spent a lot of time hanging out in taverns talking because they were away from home and didn’t have anything else to do. And Adams reports that one night in the tavern, he and his colleagues were talking about the restoration of the Jews. So this was an idea that people were aware of. It was something they heard referred to in the pulpit. It was a subject of sort of lay religious discussion. (14:32): And I think that created a climate in which many leading political figures, even if they were not particularly orthodox or even particularly pious, were sympathetic in principle to the idea that Jews were a nation, and that like other nations, it would be good for them to have their own state. So there’s a famous letter that Adams writes many years later to Mordecai Manuel Noah, who is the most prominent Jewish politician in the early republic. And he says to Noah, I really wish to see the Jews again in Judea, a state. And he goes on to say: And yourself at the head of an army of 100,000. And I don’t take that too literally. In part–and people who quote the letter don’t always say this–Noah had been bothering Adams for a blurb for his book, basically. So he’s sort of sending him away with this nice sentiment that he can use for promotional purposes. For Adams–he wouldn’t say anything that he didn’t really believe, either. And there are lots of statements by prominent founders and framers that express this sort of sympathy, again, for something that looks a lot or sounds a lot like Zionism, a century before the emergence of the organized Zionist movement in the late nineteenth century. James Patterson (16:13): One of my favorite places to go in the United States is Savannah, Georgia. There’s a synagogue there called Congregation Mickve Israel, I think the oldest or one of the oldest synagogues, 1735 is the founding. And it was Sephardic Jews escaping the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition. So in a way, when they came to Savannah, they didn’t realize that they were going to be bordering the Spanish to their south, and immediately became very good friends with the Anglicans there, because of this common threat from the Catholic Church. So sometimes the Christian Zionism is complicated and its history… Sam Goldman (16:58): And one of the complicating factors is that this is a time when there are very, very few Jews in the United States. Nobody really knows for certain because the census didn’t count in those days, but in 1800 there were almost certainly fewer than 10,000 Jews in the United States. And even that may be high because I can’t remember exactly where that estimate includes. So part of the complication in this story has to do with the relation between this idealization of the national Israel and the encounter with actually existing Jews in the United States or elsewhere. James Patterson (17:49): The Scofield Bible that you mentioned earlier is a major inspiration for what eventually becomes known as pre-millennial dispensationalism, and that’s very strongly associated with contemporary Christian Zionism as Tucker Carlson misuses it, as you explained. And what’s really great about your book is how you illustrate that a lot of the early sympathies for Jewish inclusion in the American project, as well as for the Zionist project, was not from fundamentalists, it was from mainline Protestants of the Presbyterian and Episcopalian and Methodist sort of variety. What is it about post-millenarianism, which gets less attention, that drove them to that? Sam Goldman (18:41): Well, so maybe we should step back first and talk about the differences in these theories. So the classic way of doing this is saying there are people who are pre-millennial or pre-millenarian and they believe that Christ is going to return in person and then set up the millennial kingdom. And it is said that these people are waiting for a catastrophe. Things are going to get worse before they get better, and then there’ll be this miraculous intervention in history. And that’s an idea that has come to be associated with Christian Zionism, as we said earlier, partly through the influence of people like Darby and Scofield. Against that is so-called post millennialism, post-millenarianism, which is the idea that first human beings will establish the millennial kingdom, which is this, sort of, not exactly utopian but vastly improved condition that the New Testament describes. And then Christ will come back at the end. (19:55): And it is sometimes said that people who hold this set of eschatological views are more inclined to campaigns of political and social improvement. They want to make things better. They believe that’s how you build up the Kingdom of God. There is something to that distinction, bu…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    The Recent History of Free Speech Nov 17, 2025
    Show notes

    The English-speaking world has long enjoyed free speech rights unheard of in other parts of the world. But where did this legal regime come from? And as partisan strife becomes more heated on both sides of the Atlantic, what does free speech’s future hold? In his new book, Law & Liberty contributing editor Adam Tomkins argues that understanding the history of our rights is essential to maintaining a free constitution. He joins James Patterson on the podcast to discuss his book, On the Law of Speaking Freely, as well as several pressing current free speech cases in the United Kingdom. Related Links On the Law of Speaking Freely by Adam Tomkins“The UK’s Speech Problem,” by Adam Tomkins“From Heresy to Hate Speech,” a book review by Helen DaleCato’s Letters by John Trenchard and Thomas GordonAreopagitica by John MiltonAdam Tomkins’s Law & Liberty author pageGB News v. OfCom Transcript James Patterson (00:06): Welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. I’m your host, James Patterson. Law & Liberty is an online magazine featuring serious commentary on law, policy, books, and culture, and formed by a commitment to a society of free and responsible people living under the rule of law. Law & Liberty and this podcast are published by Liberty Fund. Hello and welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. My name is James Patterson, contributing editor to Law & Liberty and associate professor of public affairs at the Institute of American Civics at the University of Tennessee. Today with me is Professor Adam Tomkins, who is the John Miller Professor of Public Law at the University of Glasgow. Today we’ll be talking about his book On the Law of Speaking Freely. Dr. Tomkins, welcome to the Law & Liberty Podcast. Adam Tomkins (01:08): Thank you so much for having me, James. It’s great to be here. James Patterson (01:10): So we have reviewed your book very favorably on our website, and now we are getting to talk to you about it. I’m very excited about this. As I said before we were recording, this is a book that I wish I’d had to assign to students because so much of the history you cover is a common history with the United States and with the UK. So why don’t we start there? There’s a kind of nexus of rights that appear at the dawn of the Reformation. There’s rights of conscience, rights of assembly, rights of publication or press, and rights of speech. How are these all interrelated? Adam Tomkins (01:51): Yeah, so I think that’s absolutely right. I write, I’m a law professor and I write about the constitutional law of a country that does not have a codified constitution. So there is no equivalent in the United Kingdom Constitution of the US First Amendment. So I can’t start a book on free speech by quoting what it says about freedom of speech in the text that everybody agrees is the Constitution. I have to work my way towards that. And of course, freedom of expression is protected in British constitutional law. I was going to say just like it’s protected in American constitutional law, but it’s not just the same actually, but of course freedom of expression is protected in British constitutional law. But because we don’t have a codified text, we don’t have any equivalent of the US Constitution in the UK, we need to do the work of showing, of demonstrating where that idea comes from. (02:48): And there’s a trend at the moment in British constitutional scholarship to do as if the fundamental principles of the constitution can be taken for granted. And I just don’t think, I think they need to be argued for, contended for and the only place that we can go, I think in order to establish what those principles are, the principles on which the British constitution is based, the only place we can go is history. So unless and until you understand something of the history and the making of the constitution, you really don’t understand anything of the contemporary law of the constitution. I would say that that’s true whatever constitution anywhere in the world you’re looking at, because I think it’s also the case in the United States that the more you understand of the history and making of the US Constitution, the more you’ll understand of the US Constitution. (03:35): So even where you have a codified text, you need to have some sense of where these things came from and who was talking about them and why they were talking about them and all of that kind of stuff. So the first question I asked myself in the argument in this book is, well, where does the idea of free speech come from? We know why we think it’s important. That’s quite well received information even in the twenty-first century. We know that there’s a sort of argument about truth, and we know that there’s a sort of argument about participating in a democracy and that freedom of speech is a necessary ingredient of these kinds of things. But where did it actually come from? And when you look back, when you peel away the various layers of the onion and you look to what the starting point is of the story of free speech, you learn two things. (04:21): The first thing that you learn is that at least in European terms, it’s a very recent story. And the second thing that you learn is that it doesn’t start off in the domain of politics. It starts off in the domain of theology. And the first battles for free speech were fought only about 500 years ago. Now, perhaps in some of the New World, 500 years feels like an awfully long time ago, but trust me, in a constitutional order that goes all the way back to Magna Carta, which is more than 800 years old, 500 years is nothing, right? So it’s a relatively recent idea. So it’s much more recent than the idea of democracy, which goes back two and a half thousand years. It’s much more recent than the idea of citizenship, which goes back at least two millennia, right? It’s much more recent than the idea of a balanced constitution or even the separation of powers, which are ideas which you can trace all the way back to ancient Rome, if not ancient Greece. (05:16): There is no equivalent of freedom of speech in the ancient world. It comes to Europe at the same time as the printing press comes to Europe. Because until the printing press the purpose of writing, very few people of course could write marginally, more people could read, but very few people could write. And the purpose of writing was not to say anything new. The purpose of writing was to try and inscribe what we already knew, principally, of course, it would be biblical texts, it would be the Bible, and monks would sit and for hours and hours and hours and try not to say anything new. What they would try to do is to write down and preserve knowledge. And anything which challenged that knowledge was regarded as heresy and heresy was a capital offense, not just in Britain, but across Europe. And of course the first advocates of free speech are the first proponents of free speech or what became free speech were Protestants in the Reformation in the middle of the sixteenth century who were seeking to break away from the rule of the Catholic church. (06:24): Now, Martin Luther was not exactly your conventional twentieth century free speech proponent. Martin Luther burned books himself. It is true that his books were burnt by the Pope, but he also burnt books. So he wasn’t particularly in favor of interpretations of the Bible that he disagreed with, and particularly in interpretations of St. Paul that he disagreed with. But that the struggle for free speech emerged out of the struggle for freedom of conscience, which really starts to come to a head in Europe in the sixteenth century in what we now call the Protestant Reformation. So the first claim I make in the book, James, is to say that you can’t understand anything about the history of free speech unless you accept and understand that it’s deeply entwined in the history of freedom of conscience. James Patterson (07:10): That’s right. And the first fights are between Protestants and Catholics. And of course the kingdom of England becomes Anglican, breaks away from the Catholic church, and then there are fights with the Scottish, the nature of the ecclesial order, right? There’s the wars over reformed interpretations of the ecclesial order with bishops not necessarily being allowed, which then means that because the church belongs to the crown, dissent is now a crown issue as much as it is a religious issue. So this brings us to all kinds of different restrictions on the press in the form of licensing. And I find that students often don’t appreciate that when there’s a discussion of freedom of the press, what’s often going on here is the idea of a licensing arrangement and how is this linked to the idea of freedom of speech? Adam Tomkins (08:03): Yeah, absolutely. So when the printing press came to Europe, the legal position in English law was simply that the crown assumed the right to license the press right from the very beginning. So there was never a free or an unlicensed press in English history because as soon as printing became a technology which was available, the crown simply assumed the right to license it. And it did that for two reasons. It did that partly because it was terrified of its potentially revolutionary potential, even in a largely illiterate country of what that might mean and what that might become. But also, of course, it was a revenue raising measure, right? As soon as you license something, James Patterson (08:53): Yeah, that’s right. Adam Tomkins (08:54): Right, you can charge a fee for a license, and printing was a source of revenue for the crown and was a source of revenue for a crown that was always desperately short of money and looking for new ways of being able to tax subjects of the crown without having to ask Parliament for permission. I mean, no taxation without representation was a great mantra of the American Revolution, but with all due respect to the great American revolutionaries, they didn’t invent it. James Patterson (09:22): Yeah, we got it from somewhere. Adam Tomkins (09:23): They got it from somewhere, they got it from us. And so here was a means whereby the crown could tax its subjects in an extra parliamentary way and also at the same time control the flow of information. And so there was never such a thing as a golden age of a free press. This had to be fought for, it had to be struggled for, it had to be fought for. One of the greatest proponents of an unlicensed press in the English seventeenth century was the great poet, John Milton. And Milton was up to his eyes in what was then revolutionary politics. He was an ally of Cromwell’s. He was a fierce and passionate and extraordinarily brave republican or commonwealth man, to use the seventeenth century expression. He wrote a pamphlet before the King was executed in 1649, arguing that regicide was a constitutional way to proceed. (10:23): He argued immediately before the crown was restored in 1660, that it shouldn’t be. So Milton was extraordinarily brave, but he didn’t always agree with Cromwell. And, Cromwell, well, licensing collapsed in the English Civil War. Quite a lot of things collapsed in the English Civil War. Wars can do that to governments. It can be quite hard to hold a government together when the country’s fighting itself. And licensing was one of many things about English government that collapsed in the early 1640s. And when it became clear that Cromwell was winning the Civil War, he sought to reimpose it. And Milton didn’t like licensing even when it was in Cromwell’s hands any more than he liked licensing in the days when it had been in the king’s hands. And he wrote this remarkable pamphlet in 1644, very famous pamphlet called “Areopagitica,” in which Milton argues for an unlicensed press. (11:20): And that’s really the first time in our language that there is an argument constructed for what becomes freedom of speech. Now, the freedom of speech that Milton was asking for, was arguing for, was far from complete, and it was also very partial, but nonetheless, it planted seeds which in subsequent generations were allowed to flourish and grow and Areopagitica is an extremely important stepping stone on the way to an unlicensed press. Milton’s argument was unsuccessful. Cromwell did reintroduce licensing, and it wasn’t until the end of the seventeenth century that the licensing act lapsed, and it lapsed under the influence much more of John Locke’s arguments than it did of John Milton’s arguments, and Locke’s arguments were really very different from Milton’s arguments. Milton’s arguments were about the Christian duty that all God-fearing Christians have to struggle towards their own truth, to struggle towards God’s truth. And the only way in which you can do that is by reading works which are bad, wrong, evil, and figuring out for yourself why they’re bad, wrong, or evil. (12:33): Milton makes this great distinction between eating poisonous meat that can really do you serious physical damage and reading poisonous words. And he says that the government may very well have the duty to keep its citizens safe from poisonous food, but it does not have a duty to keep its citizens safe from poisonous or bad ideas. That’s Milton’s contribution. And as I say, that argument failed in the 1640s, and licensing was reestablished by Cromwell and sustained thereafter in the restored monarchy of the 1660s and ‘70s. It collapsed eventually in 1695 for an altogether different reason. And the reason that might appeal to a lot of our listeners, it was a reason about trade. John Locke had spent quite a lot of his time in Amsterdam in the Netherlands where there was an unlicensed press, and he liked the fact that books were produced to a very high standard in the Netherlands. (13:33): They were well printed on paper that wouldn’t immediately rot and corrode as soon as you tried to turn it. Good quality printing, good quality books. And what Locke hated about the licensed press in England was that because it was a monopoly, it wasn’t a very good product. And he was a writer who wanted his works to be read, and he wanted his works to be read in books, which were a pleasure to read, a pleasure to hold, and wouldn’t fall apart as soon as you started to try and work your way through them. And so his argument against licensing was that licensing was in restraint of trade, and that argument was successful in the 1690s, and the House of Commons voted not to renew the licensing legislation, and it lapsed from 1695. So it’s been the case that from 1695 onwards, the press in the United Kingdom, what later became the United Kingdom, what was then England, has been unlicensed. And that’s what freedom of speech meant even a hundred years later. (14:35): So when Madison writes the Bill of Rights, when the third amendment in Madison’s Bill of Rights becomes the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791, what Madison has in mind when he writes those famous words, “Congress shall make the law bridging the freedom of speech,” is we shall have an unlicensed press. That’s what those words meant to start with. Of course, that’s not what they mean anymore. They mean much more than that. But the original meaning of the First Amendment was to put into US constitutional law what had by that point been the position in English common law for a century that the press must be unlicensed. James Patterson (15:15): Speaking of Madison, the founding generation was very influenced by Cato’s Letters, and these are kind of like the next generation of defenders after Milton and Locke, right? Adam Tomkins (15:29): Yes, that’s right. So Cato’s Letters is not very widely known outside of the academy, right? I mean, that’s right. A lot of people have heard of Milton and not just because of the poetry. A lot of people have heard of Locke and not just because of what he said about licensing, but not many people have heard of Cato’s L…

    Full show notes at the publisher

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