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The High Court Report – SCOTUS Oral Arguments

The High Court Report makes Supreme Court decisions accessible to everyone.
We deliver comprehensive SCOTUS coverage without the legal jargon or partisan spin—just clear analysis that explains how these cases affect your life, business, and community.

What you get: Case previews and breakdowns, raw oral argument audio, curated key exchanges, detailed opinion analysis, and expert commentary from a practicing attorney who’s spent 12 years in courtrooms arguing the same types of cases the Supreme Court hears.

Why it works: Whether you need a focused 10-minute update or a deep constitutional dive, episodes are designed for busy professionals, engaged citizens, and anyone who wants to understand how the Court shapes America.

When we publish: 3-5 episodes weekly during the Court’s October-June term, with summer coverage of emergency orders and retrospective analysis.

Growing archive: Oral arguments back to 2020 and expanding, so you can hear how landmark cases unfolded and track the Court’s evolution.
Your direct line to understanding the Supreme Court—accessible, thorough, and grounded in real legal expertise.**

Copyright: © Copyright 2025 The High Court Report

Latest Episodes:

Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Nov 27, 2023

Show notes

Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

Host Note: Case consolidated with Jackson v. United States, Case No. 22-6640.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

Question Presented: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach?

Holding: For purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on certain defendants with three or more previous convictions, a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and III.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner Brown: Jeffrey T. Green, Washington, D.C.
For Petitioner Jackson: Andrew Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Nov 08, 2023

Show notes

Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.

Holding: Service members who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to 38 U.S.C. § 3695(a)'s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: For Petitioner: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
For Respondent: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Nov 07, 2023

Show notes

Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

Holding: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: J. Matthew Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Amarillo, Tex.

Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24 Nov 06, 2023

Show notes

Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.

Holding: A consumer may sue a federal agency under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 16810 for defying the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Nandan M. Joshi, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Nov 01, 2023

Show notes

Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

Question Presented: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.

Holding: The Lanham Act's names clause "which prohibits the registration of a mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent," does not violate the First Amendment.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined that opinion in full; Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined all but Part III; and Justice Barrett joined Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Kagan joined, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts I, II, and III-B, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.

Oral Arguments: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24 Oct 31, 2023

Show notes

Case Info: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24

Background: Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office."

Question Presented: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.

Holding: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official's social-media page engages in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the state's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Victoria R. Ferres, Port Huron, Mich.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024 Oct 31, 2023

Show notes

Case Info: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024

Question Presented: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.

Holding: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in Lindke v. Freed.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per Curiam opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Washington, D.C.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For Respondents: Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford, Cal.

Oral Argument: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24 Oct 30, 2023

Show notes

Case Info: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

Question Presented: In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

Holding: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the due process clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Oct 11, 2023

Show notes

Case Info: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

Background: The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight-day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job.

Questions Presented:

Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent?
Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case?
Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics?
Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles?
Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?

Holding: Because the district court's finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina's first congressional district was clearly erroneous, the district court's racial-gerrymandering and vote-dilution holdings cannot stand.

Result: Reversed in Part, Remanded in Part.

Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Appellants: John M. Gore, Washington, D.C.
For Appellees: Leah C. Aden, New York, N. Y.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24 Oct 10, 2023

Show notes

Case Info: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

Background: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv).

Question Presented: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?

Holding: A whistleblower seeking to invoke the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must prove that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer's unfavorable personnel action, but need not prove that the employer acted with "retaliatory intent."

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
For Respondents: Eugene Scalia, Washington, D.C.

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