The High Court Report - SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024 Feb 21, 2024

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Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024

Case consolidated with Kinder Morgan, Inc. v. EPA, Case No. 23A350, American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, Case No. 23A351 and U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, Case No. 23A384.

Link to Docket: Here.

Holding: The enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency's federal implementation plan against the applicant states, whose own state implementation plans were determined by EPA to be inadequate because they failed to adequately address certain obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision, shall be stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought.

Result: Application for stay granted.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For state applicants: Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
For industry applicants: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For state Respondents: Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24 Feb 21, 2024

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Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the Circuit Courts and the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. §507(b), a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.

Holding: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N.Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Feb 20, 2024

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Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry."

Question Presented: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

Holding: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.
For Respondents: Traci L. Lovitt, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024 Feb 20, 2024

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Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Petitioner Corner Post, Inc. is a convenience store and truck stop in North Dakota that first opened for business in 2018. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a Board rule adopted in 2011 that governs certain fees for debit-card transactions. The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)'s six-year statute of limitations. In so doing, it adopted the majority position in an acknowledged circuit split on when APA claims "first accrue[]" under §2401(a). The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims "first accrue[d]" when the Board issued the rule in 2011-even though Corner Post did not open for business until seven years later. As a result, Corner Post's limitations period expired in 2017-a year before it opened for business. The court did not explain how Corner Post could have "suffer[ed] legal wrong" from or been "adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's rule-a predicate to stating an APA claim, 5 U.S.C. §702-before Corner Post accepted even one debit-card payment subject to the rule.

Question Presented: Does a plaintiff's APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)?

Holding: An Administrative Procedure Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), the default 6-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States, until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va.
For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24 Feb 08, 2024

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Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review.

Question Presented: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Holding: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the states, responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal officeholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Donald Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
For Respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo.
For Respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.

Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Jan 17, 2024

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Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Magnuson-Stevens Act ("MSA'') governs fishery management in federal waters. It states that, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") may require fishing vessels to carry federal observers who enforce the agency's regulations. Congress appropriates funds for these observers. In three circumstances absent here, but not elsewhere, the MSA allows federal observers to be paid in some manner by the regulated party. Deeming annual Congressional appropriations for the federal observers insufficient, the agency asserted a right to force the fishing vessels into contracts to pay the federal observers. The First Circuit approved this practice without stating whether its conclusion was a "product of Chevron step one or step two." It held the mere fact that the MSA provides for federal observers gave the agency carte blanche to charge the regulated party for those observers. Neither Chevron nor the MSA provision allowing measures "necessary and appropriate" to enforce the statute allows this result.

Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Jan 17, 2024

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Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

Case consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, Case No. 22-1219.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to "carry" federal observers onboard to enforce the agency's myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations-although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel's haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Jan 16, 2024

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Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly. Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading.

Question Presented: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise-misleading statement.

Holding: Pure omissions are not actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5(b), which makes it unlawful to omit material facts in connection with buying or selling securities when that omission renders "statements made" misleading.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Linda T. Coberly, Chicago, Ill.
For Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Jan 16, 2024

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Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was "self-executing" and that "[s]tatutory recognition was not necessary" for claims for just compensation because they "are grounded in the Constitution itself[.]" 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). Since First English, several state courts of last resort have held that the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause requires them to entertain claims directly under the Clause without the need for statutory authorization. Two federal Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, disagree and have held that claims for just compensation are only available if they are legislatively authorized.

Question Presented: May a person whose property is taken without compensation seek redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action?

Holding: Owners of property north of U.S. Interstate Highway 10 adversely affected by the flood evacuation barrier constructed by Texas should be permitted on remand to pursue their takings clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Robert J. McNamara, Arlington, Va.
For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Jan 10, 2024

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Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst's statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert's opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.

Holding: When an expert conveys an absent lab analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and IV. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in part. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Hari Santhanam, Chicago, Ill.
For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Alexander W. Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.

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