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Karcho Polselli v. IRS Mar 30, 2023

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The Internal Revenue Code generally requires the IRS, when it serves a summons on a third-party recordkeeper for records pertaining to a person "identified in the summons," to give that identified person notice of the summons. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(l). If the IRS issues a summons directing a bank to produce an accountholder's records, for example, it must generally notify that accountholder of the summons. Section 7609 then provides that "any person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to quash" that summons in district court. Id. § 7609(b)(2); see id. § 7609(h) (l). In other words, only a person entitled to notice of a summons can seek judicial review of that summons. There are a few exceptions to the notice requirement. As relevant here, the IRS need not provide notice of "any summons ... issued in aid of the collection of (i) an assessment made or judgment rendered against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued; or (ii) the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person referred to in clause (i)." Id. § 7609(c)(2)(D). The question presented is whether the § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) exception applies only when the delinquent taxpayer owns or has a legal interest in the summonsed records (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the exception applies to a summons for anyone's records whenever the IRS thinks that person's records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer's liability (as the Sixth Circuit, joining the Seventh Circuit, held below). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1599.html

Samia v. United States Mar 30, 2023

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Whether admitting a codefendant's redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on the surrounding context violates the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-196.html

Lora v. United States Mar 29, 2023

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District courts have discretion to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences unless a statute mandates otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii) of Title 18 includes such a mandate, but only for sentences imposed "under this subsection." Efrain Lora was convicted and sentenced under a different subsection, Section 924(j), which does not include such a mandate. Lora therefore argued that the district court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences because Section 924(j) creates a separate offense not subject to Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii); yet the Second Circuit ruled that the district court was required to impose consecutive sentences because Section 924(j) counts as "under" Section 924(c). This Court, however, has held that provisions like Sections 924(c) and 924(j) define separate offenses, not the same offense, because they set forth different potential punishments based on different elements. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 100 (2013). Four circuit courts have agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion, although for distinct reasons (the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth). At least two circuits have disagreed (the Tenth and Eleventh). In addition to the numerous appellate decisions, this issue recurs in district courts frequently, because Section 924 is one of the most frequently charged federal criminal statutes. The question presented is: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii), which provides that "no term of imprisonment imposed ... under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment," is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-49.html

Smith v. United States Mar 29, 2023

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Whether the proper remedy for the government's failure to prove venue is an acquittal barring re-prosecution of the offense, as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held, or whether instead the government may re-try the defendant for the same offense in a different venue, as the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1576.html

United States v. Hansen Mar 28, 2023

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Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional on First Amendment overbreadth grounds. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-179.html

Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi Mar 28, 2023

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Section 112 of the Patent Act provides that a patent's "specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it," sufficient "to enable any person skilled in the art * * * to make and use the" invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The requirement that the specification teach skilled artisans "to make and use" the invention is referred to as the "'enablement'" requirement. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996). The questions presented are: 1. Whether enablement is "a question of fact to be determined by the jury," Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 4 (1846), as this Court has held, or "a question of law that [the court] review[s] without deference," Pet. App. 6a, as the Federal Circuit holds. 2. Whether enablement is governed by the statutory requirement that the specification teach those skilled in the art to "make and use" the claimed invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112, or whether it must instead enable those skilled in the art "to reach the full scope of claimed embodiments" without undue experimentation-i.e., to cumulatively identify and make all or nearly all embodiments of the invention without substantial "'time and effort,'" Pet.App. 14a (emphasis added). LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-757.html

Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products Mar 23, 2023

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Respondent VIP Products LLC markets and sells dog toys that trade on the brand recognition of famous companies such as petitioner Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. The district court found that VIP's use of Jack Daniel's trademarks to sell poop-themed dog toys was likely to confuse consumers, infringed Jack Daniel's marks, and tarnished Jack Daniel's reputation. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that VIP's First Amendment interest in using Jack Daniel's trademarks as its own marks on funny dog toys conferred special protection from infringement claims and rendered VIP's commercial dog toys "noncommercial" and thus exempt from dilution-by-tarnishment claims. The questions presented are: I. Whether humorous use of another's trademark as one's own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act's traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims. 2. Whether humorous use of another's mark as one's own on a commercial product is "noncommercial" under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-148.html

Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski Mar 22, 2023

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Under§ 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, when a district court denies a motion to compel arbitration, the party seeking arbitration may file an immediate interlocutory appeal. This Court has held that an appeal "divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). The question presented is: Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court's jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal, as the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have held, or does the district court retain discretion to proceed with litigation while the appeal is pending, as the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-105.html

Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. Mar 22, 2023

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Petitioners-all foreign nationals-were subjected to a $90 million damages award under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., for allegedly infringing respondent's U.S. trademarks. While trademark rights are distinctly territorial, the accused sales occurred almost entirely abroad. Of approximately $90 million in sales, 97% were purely foreign: They were sales in foreign countries, by foreign sellers, to foreign customers, for use in foreign countries, that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers. The Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially to all of petitioners' foreign sales. Recognizing that the circuits have splintered in this area, the Tenth Circuit adopted an expansive view that other courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have concededly rejected. Under the Tenth Circuit's view, the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially whenever foreign defendants' foreign conduct allegedly diverts foreign sales from a U.S. plaintiff. Such an effect, the court held, sufficiently affects U.S. commerce because it prevents foreign revenue from flowing into the U.S. economy. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially to petitioners' foreign sales, including purely foreign sales that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers.

Arizona v. Navajo Nation & Dept. of Interior v. Navajo Nation (Consolidated) Mar 21, 2023

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The Consolidated Decree in Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006), apportions the mainstream of the Colorado River in the Lower Basin ("LBCR") among three States, decrees rights to the LBCR for five Indian Reservations (but not the Navajo reservation) and various other entities, and prescribes how the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") shall operate the mainstream dams in satisfaction of the decreed rights and water delivery contracts entered under the Boulder Canyon Project Act ("BCPA''). The Court retained exclusive jurisdiction "for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy." Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added). The United States "assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute," treaty, or regulation. U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176-77 (2011). The federal treaties with the Navajo Nation ("Nation") do not require the Secretary to develop a plan to secure water for the Nation; and they do not address water at all. The doctrine of implied rights to water in Winters v. United States, 426 U.S. 207 (1908) ("Winters Doctrine") cannot justify imposing such a fiduciary duty on the Secretary. The questions presented are: I. Does the Ninth Circuit Opinion, allowing the Nation to proceed with a claim to enjoin the Secretary to develop a plan to meet the Nation's water needs and manage the mainstream of the LBCR so as not to interfere with that plan, infringe upon this Court's retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the LBCR mainstream in Arizona v. California? II. Can the Nation state a cognizable claim for breach of trust consistent with this Court's holding in Jicarilla based solely on unquantified implied rights to water under the Winters Doctrine? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1484.html Whether the federal government owes the Navajo Nation an affirmative, judicially enforceable fiduciary duty to assess and address the Navajo Nation's need for water from particular sources, in the absence of any substantive source of law that expressly establishes such a duty. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-51.html

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