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Pulsifer v. United States Oct 02, 2023

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The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). The question presented is whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3- point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold). ORDER OF 10/2/2023: THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED FURTHER HEREIN IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED. J. ROBERT BLACK, OF OMAHA, NEBRASKA, IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER IN THIS CASE.

Tyler v. Hennepin County Apr 26, 2023

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Hennepin County confiscated 93-year-old Geraldine Tyler's former home as payment for approximately $15,000 in property taxes, penalties, interest, and costs. The County sold the home for $40,000, and, consistent with a Minnesota forfeiture statute, kept all proceeds, including the $25,000 that exceeded Tyler's debt as a windfall for the public. In all states, municipalities may take real property and sell it to collect payment for property tax debts. Most states allow the government to keep only as much as it is owed; any surplus proceeds after collecting the debt belong to the former owner. But in Minnesota and a dozen other states, local governments take absolute title, extinguishing the owner's equity in exchange only for cancelling a smaller tax debt, code enforcement fine, or debt to government agencies. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause? Whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt plus, interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?

Yegiazaryan v. Smagin & CMB Monaco v. Smagin, consolidated Apr 26, 2023

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In RJR Nabisco, this Court, applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, held that a civil RICO plaintiff states a cognizable claim under RICO's private right of action only if it alleges a "domestic"-not foreign-injury. 579 U.S. 325, 354 (2016). The Court left unresolved, however, what legal test determines whether an injury is foreign or domestic. Id. ("[D]isputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged in- jury is 'foreign' or 'domestic.' But we need not concern ourselves with that question in this case."). Since RJR Nabisco, the Courts of Appeals have divided three ways as to the proper legal test for assessing whether a foreign plaintiff suffers a "domestic" injury to intangible property-such as court judgments, arbitration awards, contract rights, patents, and business reputation or goodwill. The question presented is: Does a foreign plaintiff state a cognizable civil RICO claim when it suffers an injury to intangible property, and if so, under what circumstances. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016), this Court held that a plaintiff proceeding under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., must plead and prove a "domestic" injury to maintain a claim in U.S. court. Following RJR Nabisco, the courts of appeals have split on the issue of where a foreign plaintiff suffers its injury to its intangible property for purposes of the domestic-injury inquiry. On one hand, the Seventh Circuit correctly holds that the foreign plaintiff suffers its injury abroad. On the other, the court below and Third Circuit have adopted an open-ended balancing test to determine the location of the plaintiff’s injury. Incorrectly applying that standardless test in reference to defendants' conduct, the Ninth Circuit held below that the plaintiff had suffered a domestic injury, even though he is a foreign resident with no alleged connection to the U.S. The question presented therefore is: Whether a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States may nevertheless allege a "domestic" injury under RJR Nabisco sufficient to maintain a RICO action based only on injury to intangible property.

Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin Apr 26, 2023

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Whether the Bankruptcy Code expresses unequivocally Congress's intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes.

Dupree v. Younger Apr 26, 2023

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This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable conflict regarding an important issue related to the preservation of legal claims for appeal. Parties may appeal only from "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Thus the general rule is that "[a]n appeal from the final judgment brings up all antecedent issues," In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1987), and that "all interlocutory orders are reviewable on appeal from the final decree," Gloria Steamship Co. v. Smith, 376 F.2d 46, 47 (5th Cir. 1967). "Interlocutory orders therefore may be stored up and raised at the end of the case." Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1988). Notwithstanding these precepts, the circuits have squarely divided over whether purely legal claims denied at summary judgment are reviewable on appeal after a jury trial where those claims have not been reasserted in a post-trial motion. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the 8-3-1 circuit split. But the panel declared itself bound by Fourth Circuit precedent and held that it would "not review, under any standard, the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits, even in circumstances where the issue rejected on summary judgment and not reasserted in a post-trial motion is a purely legal one." That holding was outcome-determinative-the sole basis on which the court refused to consider petitioner's PLRA exhaustion defense-and this case is a perfect vehicle for resolving the widespread disagreement over this important question. The question presented is: Whether to preserve the issue for appellate review a party must reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment.

Counterman v. Colorado Apr 20, 2023

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Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence.

U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. (21-1326) & U.S., ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway, Inc. (22-111) Apr 19, 2023

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The False Claims Act protects government programs from fraud by, inter alia, imposing civil liability on anybody who knowingly presents false claims for payment to the government or makes false statements that are material to such claims. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The statute defines "knowingly" to include acting with: (1) actual knowledge; (2) deliberate ignorance; or (3) reckless disregard of the falsity of information. See id. § 3729(b)(l)(A). The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-111 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. This case presents the same question as No. 21-1326, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. It also arises from the same court of appeals. The Court may wish to consider the two petitions together. The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-1326 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT

Groff v. DeJoy (22-174) Apr 18, 2023

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual "because of such individual's * * * religion." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2). The statute defines "religion" to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 2000e(j). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), this Court stated that an employer suffers an "undue hardship" in accommodating an employee's religious exercise whenever doing so would require the employer "to bear more than a de minimis cost." Id. at 84. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether this Court should disapprove the more-than-de-minimis-cost test for refusing Title. VII religious accommodations stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Whether an employer may demonstrate "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business" under Title VII merely by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee's co-workers rather than the business itself.

Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani (22-200) Apr 18, 2023

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Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 permits suits alleging misrepresentations in a registration statement only if the plaintiffs "acquir[ed] such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 12(a)(2) of the Act provides that someone who "offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus" may be liable for misstatements in that prospectus "to the person purchasing such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). For more than 50 years, every court of appeals to consider the question has held that "such security" in Section 11 means a share registered under the registration statement the plaintiffs claim is misleading. And this Court has held that Section 12 (a)(2) applies only when there is an obligation to distribute a prospectus-an obligation that exists only for registered shares. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e. Departing from that well-established law, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit read "such security" to mean any share, registered or unregistered, and held that plaintiffs suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) need not prove that they bought registered shares. The question presented is: Whether Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading.

Pugin v. Garland (22-23) & Garland v. Cordero-Garcia (22-331), Consolidated Apr 18, 2023

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Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a noncitizen who is convicted of an "aggravated felony" is subject to mandatory removal and faces enhanced criminal liability in certain circumstances. One aggravated felony is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The questions presented are: 1. Whether a state offense-like petitioner's accessory-after-the-fact offense here- that does not involve interference with an existing official proceeding or investigation may constitute an "offense relating to obstruction of justice." 2. Whether, assuming that the phrase "offense relating to obstruction of justice" is deemed ambiguous, courts should afford Chevron deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of that phrase. THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-331 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT Whether dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, in violation of California law, is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice," 8 U.S.C. 110l(a)(43)(S). THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-23 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT.

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