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Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard Nov 01, 2022

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1. Should this Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions? 2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act bans race-based admissions that, if done by a public university, would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003). Is Harvard violating Title VI by penalizing Asian-American applicants, engaging in racial balancing, overemphasizing race, and rejecting workable race-neutral alternatives? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-1199.html

Students for Fair Admissions v. University of NC Nov 01, 2022

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1. Should this Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions? 2. Can a university reject a race-neutral alternative because it would change the composition of the student body, without proving that the alternative would cause a dramatic sacrifice in academic quality or the educational benefits of overall student-body diversity? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-707.html

Helix Energy Solutions v. Hewitt Oct 12, 2022

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Respondent was a supervisor on Helix's offshore vessels and was compensated commensurate with his high-ranking position. Every two weeks, Helix paid Respondent at least $963 for each day that he worked. In all, Respondent earned $248,053 in 2015, $218,863 in 2016, and $143,680 in the eight months he worked for Helix in 2017. After his performance- related release, Respondent sued Helix under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), claiming that he was also entitled to substantially more in retroactive overtime pay. The FLSA sensibly exempts many highly compensated supervisors from the Act's overtime requirements. Specifically, employees who perform executive duties, earn at least $100,000 per year, and receive at least $455 per week paid on a salary basis are "deemed exempt." 29 C.F.R. §541.601(a). It is undisputed that Respondent performed executive duties and met the annual earnings threshold. Nevertheless, a sharply divided en banc Fifth Circuit ruled that Respondent was non-exempt and entitled to retroactive overtime pay because he was paid based on a daily rate, not a weekly rate, even though his daily rate was more than twice the weekly minimum. The majority reached that counterintuitive conclusion only by applying a separate provision, 29 C.F.R. §541.604, that the First and Second Circuits have both held inapplicable when determining whether highly compensated employees are exempt. The question presented is: Whether a supervisor making over $200,000 each year is entitled to overtime pay because the standalone regulatory exemption set forth in 29 C.F.R. §541.601 remains subject to the detailed requirements of 29 C.F.R. §541.604 when determining whether highly compensated supervisors are exempt from the FLSA's overtime-pay requirements. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-984.html

Andy Warhol Found., Inc. v. Goldsmith Oct 12, 2022

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This Court has repeatedly made clear that a work of art is "transformative" for purposes of fair use under the Copyright Act if it conveys a different "meaning or message" from its source material. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 8. Ct. 1183, 1202 (2021). In the decision below, the Second Circuit nonetheless held that a court is in fact forbidden from trying to "ascertain the intent behind or meaning of the works at issue." App. 22a-23a. Instead, the court concluded that even where a new work indisputably conveys a distinct meaning or message, the work is not transformative if it "recognizably deriv[es] from, and retain[s] the essential elements of, its source material." Id. at 24a. The question presented is: Whether a work of art is "transformative" when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material (as this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other courts of appeals have held), or whether a court is forbidden from considering the meaning of the accused work where it "recognizably deriv[es] from" its source material (as the Second Circuit has held). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-869.html

Reed v. Goertz Oct 11, 2022

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In Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 524-25 (2011), this Court held that state prisoners may pursue post-conviction claims for DNA testing of crime-scene evidence in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The Court made clear that a prisoner bringing such a § 1983 claim may seek "to show that the governing state law denies him procedural due process" after he has unsuccessfully sought DNA testing under available state procedures. Id. at 525, 530. The question presented is whether the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begins to run at the end of state-court litigation denying DNA testing, including any appeals (as the Eleventh Circuit has held), or whether it begins to run at the moment the state trial court denies DNA testing, despite any subsequent appeal (as the Fifth Circuit, joining the Seventh Circuit, held below). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-442.html

National Pork Producers v. Ross Oct 11, 2022

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Proposition 12 bans the sale of pork in California unless the sow from which it derived was housed with space allowances that almost no farms satisfy (for good reason). Californians account for 13% of the Nation's pork consumption, but raise hardly any pigs. The massive costs of complying with Proposition 12 fall almost exclusively on out-of-state farmers. And because a single pig is processed into cuts that are sold nationwide in response to demand, those costs will be passed on to consumers everywhere, in countless transactions having nothing to do with California. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that petitioners plausibly allege that Proposition 12 has "dramatic upstream effects," requires "pervasive changes to the pork production industry nationwide," and imposes costs that "mostly fall on non-California transactions." Nevertheless- in conflict with other circuits and contrary to the views of amici the United States, 20 States, and business groups-it held that petitioners failed to plead a dormant Commerce Clause violation. In doing so, it brushed aside this Court's decisions holding that laws with significant extraterritorial effects violate our federalist scheme, and failed to engage in meaningful balancing under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. The questions presented are: Whether allegations that a state law has dramatic economic effects largely outside of the state and requires pervasive changes to an integrated nationwide industry state a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, or whether the extraterritoriality principle described in this Court's decisions is now a dead letter. Whether such allegations, concerning a law that is based solely on preferences regarding out-of-state housing of farm animals, state a Pike claim. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-468.html

Arellano v. McDonough Oct 05, 2022

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Under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1), "[t]he effective date of an award of disability compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the date of the veteran's discharge or release if application therefor is received within one year from such date of discharge or release." (emphasis added.) Veterans who miss this one-year statutory deadline-even if because of a service-connected physical or mental impairment- are barred from recovering retroactive disability benefits reaching back to their date of discharge. In Irwin, this Court held that "the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States." Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). Despite this, an "equally divided" Federal Circuit held 6-6 that military veterans are categorically precluded from pursuing equitable tolling of § 5110(b)(1)'s one-year deadline, regardless of the facts and circumstances of their individual cases. The questions presented are: · · (1) Does Irwin's rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling apply to the one- year statutory deadline in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) for seeking retroactive disability benefits, and, if so, has the Government rebutted that presumption? (2) If 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) is amenable to equitable tolling, should this case be remanded so the agency can consider the particular facts and circumstances in the first instance? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-432.html

Merrill v. Milligan Oct 04, 2022

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CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-1087 FOR ONE HOUR ARGUMENT. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IN THESE CASES IS: WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURTS IN THESE CASES CORRECTLY FOUND A VIOLATION OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 52 U. S. C. §10301. ORDER OF 3/21/2022: UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE MOTION TO MODIFY OR AMEND THE QUESTION PRESENTED, THE QUESTION PRESENTED IN THESE CASES IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: WHETHER THE STATE OF ALABAMA’S 2021 REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR ITS SEVEN SEATS IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIOLATED SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 52 U. S. C. §10301.21. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1086.html

Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Oct 04, 2022

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EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER Plaintiff State of Delaware respectfully submits the following exceptions to the First Interim Report of the Special Master issued on July 23, 2021: 1. Delaware takes exception to, and this Court should decline to adopt, the Special Master’s report and recommendation to deny Delaware’s request for partial summary judgment and to grant Defendants’ request for partial summary judgment. 2. Delaware takes exception to, and this Court should decline to adopt, the components of the Special Master’s report and recommendation, including: a. The Special Master’s definition of “money order”; b. The Special Master’s definition of “third party bank check”; c. The Special Master’s definition of “other similar written instrument”; d. The other flaws discussed in the accompanying brief, which addresses these exceptions (and related errors) more fully. CONSOLIDATED WITH 146 Orig. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o145.html

Sackett v. EPA Oct 04, 2022

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Petitioners Michael and Chantell Sackett own a vacant lot in a mostly built-out residential subdivision near Priest Lake, Idaho. The lot has no surface water connection to any body of water. In April, 2007, with local permits in hand, the Sacketts began building a family home. But later that year, Respondent Environmental Protection Agency sent them an administrative compliance order determining that their home construction violated the Clean Water Act because their lot contains wetlands that qualify as regulated "navigable waters." In Rapanos v. United States, 54 7 U.S. 715 (2006), the Court held that the Clean Water Act does not regulate all wetlands, but no opinion explaining why that is so garnered a majority of the Court. A plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by three other Justices argued that only those wetlands that have a continuous surface water connection to regulated waters may themselves be regulated. A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy advanced a different and much broader test, allowing for regulation of wetlands regardless of any surface connection, so long as the wetlands bear an (undefined) "significant nexus" with traditional navigable waters. Below, the Ninth Circuit employed Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test to uphold EPA's authority over the Sacketts' homesite. The question presented is: Should Rapanos be revisited to adopt the plurality's test for wetlands jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act? https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-454.html

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