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    Government

    Public Procurement Podcast –

    Podcast bringing public procurement issues to a lay audience. Interviews by Dr. Pedro Telles

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    #23 - Mari Ann Simovart (University of Tartu) Jul 18, 2016
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    Article 72 of Directive 2014/24/EU and limitations to contract modifications iTunesInterview with Mari Ann Simovart from the University of Tartu about Article 72 of Directive 2014/24/EU and limitations to contract modifications. For her PhD Mari Ann looked into the relations between national private and EU public procurement laws with regards to public contract terms, modification and validity. Transcript In terms of the, the topics that we’re going to be talking today, it’s going to be modifications to public contracts so let’s start by trying to analyse, or describing at least, why do you think that it’s important to limit modifications to public contracts?Well, to put it very simply, the situation is that if the parties to the public contracts, the contracting parties, had an absolute unlimited freedom to modify the contract as they would have if it would be a simple private contract then it would in fact make all the preceding public procurement procedure a complete joke, yes? Award of public contracts, as long as they are subject to the EU law, we know is always subject to the general principles of transparency, non-discrimination and pursuit of competition as well as elaborate specific rules that govern the process of awarding contracts. So as long as we agree that public contract must follow these principles and these more detailed rules, then they have to have certain restrictions to modification of the public contracts as well, otherwise all the efforts that we have before entering the contract will become futile and as a result there is no transparency, no equal treatment of tenderers, no competition that can be guaranteed in the process. Now, the other question is the level of these restrictions. While we agree that we can’t have public contracts freely modified whenever and however the parties might decide, it is somewhat difficult to draw the line where we have the modification that does not yet harm the transparency or equal treatment and where we have the modifications that can cause that harm. So this is the difficult part but necessary part of regulating contracts modifications. If you think about it, it’s almost like saying that we need to limit the modifications to the contracts because otherwise we would be subverting the system or at least allow the system to be subverted during the contract performance which is to actually perform a contract which was not contracted originally. Yes, I think you put it very well. That can undermine the system very easily.But if you look at the level of restrictions in modifications, and I used to be a lawyer in this field and I worked a lot with complex infrastructure projects, it’s very hard to actually get everything right in the first attempt and from the beginning so there’s always the need to modify a contract as you keep performing it. Now, the point you raised here in your first comment is, or in the second comment, that you’ve made is that we need to know exactly where the modification actually harms the legal system and where the modification does not harm the legal system, so where do we find that boundary?Yes, well, happily for us the Court of Justice of the EU has drawn that line and they have used the criterion of materially different modifications. What was said in the case of Pressetext was that when a contract is considered to be materially different in character from the contract that was originally entered into and when the modification thus shows the intention of the parties to renegotiate the essential terms of that contract, then we have to look at the modification not as just a change to the initial contract but in fact like a new contract. And as always a new public contract requires a new award procedure. So the criterion of material difference or substantial modification is what we have to focus on. And in your experience how easy and, or how difficult in the other sense, is it to actually gauge if a contract modification is materially different or not? In my experience, when I was a practising lawyer, it is very difficult of course. It cannot be easy and that’s part of why I am very happy to have the new EU directives that actually try to elaborate these criteria in more detail.Yes, because Pressetext is a case from a few years ago and predates the current directive from 2014 so if you look at the directive and if you look at Article 72 of the directive in terms of contract modification, what criteria will we find there that will help contract authorities guide their, the way that they manage the contract performance? Yes, well, Article 72 of the new directive, as I understand it, makes three different categories of modifications or three types of cases. Firstly, there are these cases where the directive says: these modifications are acceptable, you can make them without a new award procedure. These are the cases that we consider to be not substantial, or not material. Then if the modification that the parties want to make, or have made in case of a court dispute, if the modification does not correspond to any of these acceptable modifications, we have to look if it is maybe among those that are prohibited in Article 72, Section 4, I believe. And then there is the third type of cases that do not correspond to either of these types precisely and these cases we have to evaluate. So this is the part where the law requires to act as it does now. You have to evaluate the case. Now, the examples of the accepted, or acceptable, modifications one can make. Some of them are easier to establish, for instance under the de minimis rule, we have certain minor changes that are below certain financial thresholds. This is quite easy to establish and in this case you do not need to have a new award procedure.Then there is Article 72, Section 1 (a) that allows to have review clauses in a public contract if those review clauses are clear and precise so they foresee exactly under what circumstances you can make what kind of change, then you can use these review clauses and make these changes if it is sufficiently clear - you have foreseen already at the beginning that there might be an occasion where you want to change the contract. The simple example of using the review clauses could be maybe an index clause. That’s the simplest example.Also, the directive allows you to have modification for additional works or supplies under certain conditions and if they remain under certain financial value. Then you can make modifications if the need for that change has been brought about by outer circumstances that a diligent contracting authority could not foresee. Again, that must be under certain financial value and it cannot change the overall nature of the contract. For instance, you cannot say that because of unexpected circumstances you have to build, I don’t know, a school house instead of a hospital. I believe that would be outside the overall nature of the contract. And then you can replace the contractor, again under certain conditions. For instance, if that is necessary due to corporate restructuring - take-over, merger -, insolvency or other type of succession cases, so these could be the examples where making the modifications has, has been made a bit easier.A bit easier by highlighting exactly when they can happen. On the financial threshold side, I mean, I have to be careful with what I say here because I’m still bound by my ethics obligations as a lawyer in Portugal, but it’s very interesting because one of the things I saw in practice was that with infrastructure contracts, effectively there was a race to the bottom in terms of the price that contractors or economic operators would offer to do the job, obviously because it’s a winner takes all market and if they’re not competitive on prices it’s very unlikely that you’re going to be able to win the contract. And once they won the contract and once they started performing, then the incentives changed and turned to the other side which is they always tried to get as much money back from the contracting authority as possible so it was always a game of cat and mouse between what they could get extra in comparison with the original price. I remember knowing about a specific case where an economic operator was performing in the contract and the person that was leading that project actually had specific objectives on his contract that if he got more money than it was legally available, he would get effectively a good chunk of cash for himself. This was obviously beyond what was legally admissible but what became very clear over the years is as long as you knew how to do it on a steady way and you used any material changes to your advantage, so for example, the weather, I mean, I remember being on a contracting authority side and for the years that I was in Portugal every single year was the most, or the rainiest year over the last century, which is incredible, at least for the purposes of, the amount of rain that we usually get in Portugal, but one of those reasons that the economic contractors were claiming as justification to get more money out of the contract. So even though we can actually create these legal rules which are clear and they are an improvement in comparison with the past, I still think that we have an issue with the enforcement and oversight because really difficult once the contract is being performed and if the economic operator knows how to do and how to play the game, it becomes really difficult to actually know what is happening and to detect any infringement to Article 72. But if you think about it in terms of the way that the criteria for modifications are set, it’s one thing what we have in the law and it’s one thing what we have in Article 72, it’s another thing what we have happening in real life in practice. So I remember when I was a lawyer back in the day in Portugal that it was very common for economic operators to submit bids that were unrealistically low at the tendering stage with the objective of actually winning the contract and then doing the performance of the contract to maximise the amount of revenue that they could get from it. Naturally, there were limits as there are now in the directive, there were limits under the Portuguese law of how much money you could try and increase the contract to but I know for a fact that in some circumstances even the project managers in certain projects would receive a nice bonus if they were able to actually bring the money or bring the total money above that legal threshold. You can question, is that legal or not. Probably it wasn’t legal but economic operators became very good at masking these kinds of operations in the sense that actually they do not trip any wires. In consequence, I mean, one of the important issues that we could perhaps look at is the difficulties of actually taking what is in the law nowadays, taking what is on the directive, and actually trying to apply it in practice and ensuring that there is oversight in terms of contract modification and the limitations that there are to contract modifications.Yes, I know what you mean. I think the example of unrealistically low bids and then ordering additional works or supplies is a very common problem, at least, we have this problem very seriously in Estonia. In this light, well, I was a little bit disappointed in the rules of the directives that said that threshold for the acceptable amount of additional works for instance is so high as 50% of the value of the contract, so yeah, that can be criticised.But of course generally speaking the oversight or the enforcement part of these rules is very important and it seems to me that right now it is a bit problematic. It has not been addressed by the latest changes to the directives or by the new directives. The oversight or the enforcement part of public procurement rules should be working through two types of means and that would be of course remedies or peer review on one hand, and then of course national public law remedies or the overview by administrating bodies on the other hand. And as I see it, the peer review part or remedies that are used by competitors has been the primary resort in public procurement law until now because most of the remedies have been used for breaches that took place before the award of contract. Now that we have in the directive the rules that concern contract modification, meaning rules that apply after the award of the contract, I don’t think these remedies work so well and that might mean that the public or administrative oversight, administrative review, should have a stronger position.Or then it might mean that we need to seriously consider if the remedies directives need a review as well because at present all the remedies, all the review system, has been introduced based on the presumption that every breach takes place or at least most of the breaches take place before the contract is awarded. I think the review system works quite well for these breaches but they might not work so well for the breach of contract modification rules. For instance, as I understand it the primary remedy when contract is modified in a way that it shouldn’t be, the primary remedy seems to be contract ineffectiveness and there are lots of questions that come up if someone tries to use that remedy. Firstly, there is the issue of having information about the contract amendment. I don’t think that the competitors generally know what is going on in contracting relations between the competitor and the contracting authority. So there is not so big a chance that they will learn of the contract being modified at all or, even if they learn that, that it has been modified in a way that it shouldn’t be. So one can argue that perhaps the general principle of transparency obliges the contracting authorities to make such modifications or perhaps any decisions made in the performance phase to be public or at least to be publically available if you ask for them. But I don’t think it has been enforced that way, at least it hasn’t been in Estonia. It’s not generally known if somebody modifies a contract and if the modification is made, what are the terms of the modification. So that would be the first obstacle to using any remedy. It’s worth noting that for contract ineffectiveness we have a very strict limitation period - it’s a maximum of six months from when the modification was made. So I don’t think it will be used very often in case of these breaches.I mean, we can also say that in addition to transparency we’ve got an issue, and I relate it with incentives, which is even if it’s public, who has incentive to actually challenge the contract modification? Because even if competitors get wind that a contract has been modified beyond what it was supposed to be modified, they’re going to be engaging the same practice themselves in the contracts they win so they may not be interested as a matter of fact, in a sense, to challenge any decisions or put the spotlight in those kinds of decisions because they may be on the receiving end in the future. So it may well be that they reserve all their, let’s say all their fighting spirit in a sense for the contract award phase and they will challenge that if they think that something was done wrong but once the contract has been performed, the contract has been performed, they move on to something else. So I think there’s an issue with incentives there. And if you take economic operators or potential competitors out of the equation, then that effectively just leaves us with, you know, the average citizen that maybe having a keen interest in a particular contract, would they go down the route of actually challenging it? I mean, in Portugal we’ve had a few challenges because the Portuguese law allows pretty much anyone to challenge a contract award and also a contract performance, but that’s pretty much it. Yes, I quite agree with you. It’s absolutely true that the…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    #22 - Willem Janssen (Utrecht University) Jun 29, 2016
    Show notes

    In-house contracts and public-public cooperation issues under Directive 2014/24/EU iTunesInterview with Willem Janssen, Lecturer and PhD Researcher at the Public Procurement Research Centre of Utrecht University and Twente University. His PhD researches the influence of EU public procurement law on the performance of services by cooperating public authorities and the issues of regulating and enforcing the make-or-buy decision of public authorities. TranscriptThank you very much for accepting to be interviewed for the podcast. You were selected a few months ago to come to the conference but couldn’t join us so it’s great to finally be speaking with you.Exactly. And, I mean, let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to discuss public-public cooperation with you today. Before we begin, I must say that your podcast series is truly a great project. I think it really personifies what academia is in today’s society. I mean, writing a paper, presenting it amongst peers is simply not sufficient anymore and I think research must be relevant and accessible to society and Twitter, LinkedIn, blogs, they can play an imperative role in that to get your message across. But, truly, your podcasts they take it to the next level and I hope that will continue for a while.I certainly hope so. And I think this series is going to be twenty episodes long, this is the last one, but thank you very much for the very kind words as we start the podcast. So let’s talk about in-house contracts. Why do you think discussing in-house contracts is important?Truly, like what I said just then, it’s I think the perfect question to kick off our talk today. as I said, I believe the ‘why’ question is very important and the debate on the in-house doctrine and more particularly public cooperation is important for a number of reasons. But, maybe before we delve into more detailed conversation about the particularities of the Court’s jurisprudence or their codification in the 2014 directives, perhaps it’s good to first briefly outline the basics of this doctrine, which is quite technical, but if you’ll allow me, I will aim to briefly sketch their contours.Of course.I think it’s important to consider that the basic notion of the EU public procurement rules is that they’re only applicable if a contracting authority awards a public contract to a separate entity. Now, this means that a contracting authority itself is always allowed to provide services with its own departments. Now, this type of delivery falls outside the scope of EU public procurement law and outside of the treaties. This would for instance be an IT department of a municipality that creates and maintains its own digital infrastructure, or a waste management department of the same town that picks up your bag of rubbish every Monday morning.Now, where it becomes difficult though is when things aren’t as straightforward anymore as these situations, so the question really is, and that’s the question that the in-house doctrine raises, how do these rules apply within the public sector when contracting authorities decide to work together for the delivery of their tasks? And this is, I think, where the in-house doctrine starts. It all begins with considering that there’s no express exemption for contracting authorities that want to provide services in cooperation with others. This means that the rules on transparency and equality that we hold dear in the public procurement directives in principle apply to contractual agreements between two contracting authorities or between a contracting authority and a, for instance a privatised authority which was previously part of the contracting authority itself. Now, this also doesn’t mean that all of these contractual agreements are public contracts that must be put up for tender. Even if they qualify as a public contract they can be exempted from a duty to tender. And I think, it’s important to briefly touch upon three of these alternatives that can exempt a public contract from this duty. The first one is the oldest possibility to do so is to grant an exclusive right to another contracting authority. This is currently vested in Article 11 of the new directives. Now, I won’t go too much detail on this but I mentioned it because it was the inapplicability of this exemption in Teckal in the year ’99 of the last century that made the Court of Justice decide to lay the foundations for the in-house doctrine. In this case, the applicable directive on supply contracts did not contain an exclusive right exemption at the time, which did exist in the directive on public service contracts, but as a consequence the Court decided to introduce two criteria, which would deem the award of a public contract exempt from the scope of EU public procurement law. Now, on the one hand, the awarding authority has to exercise control over the receiving entity. This control has to be similar to the type of control, which it exercises over its own departments. I think this is where you clearly see the link with the discretionary power of public authority to provide services with their own department and, on top of this control criterion, the controlled entity also has to perform the essential part of its activities. So I suppose briefly said formal independence must be trumped by practical dependence. A person at a conference once said “just like the Spice Girls, When Two Become One”. [Pedro laughs] So since then numerous cases before the Court have further clarified these two criteria and I believe what has caused a lot of confusion is the different names that it has gotten. It’s been called quasi in-house, vertical cooperation, or institutionalised exemption. Me myself I prefer ‘institutionalised’ as it actually shows that the cooperation is institutionalised in a separate entity, but I suppose that’s really your own preference.Now, I’ll quickly go onto the second, or the third really, exemption, or the second exemption that was created by the Court in 2009, when it was faced again with a scenario where it deemed these Teckal criteria inapplicable, but it decided to introduce another type of exemption, in an infringement procedure of the Commission against Germany. Now, in this case, the Court ruled that a contractual agreement can be exempted if the cooperation between contracting authorities which does not rely on a separate entity is governed by considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest and that the principle of equal treatment is respected so that no private undertaking is placed in an advantageous position when compared to its competitor. Now, this has since been referred to as the non-institutionalised exemption or horizontal cooperation.So, I think, these are the basics of the in-house doctrine and now to get back to your question after what I realise was a fairly long introduction. So, why is it important to discuss these exemptions and why is it a good development that this line of case law has been codified in the directives? Well as I said, there’s a couple of reasons I think. I believe the societal relevance of efficient and effective service provision by contracting authorities which aims to ensure that best value for money is achieved is probably the most important one. I mean this means that rules should enable cooperation on the one hand and ban it if a public contract should be tendered in light of the internal market.Value for money is not one of the directives of the directive and as you said public-public cooperation contracts are not covered by public procurement law because technically there’s not a contract being awarded, so not going to the market?No, exactly. You’re absolutely right. I totally agree that on the European level the directives focus on achieving the internal market, however on the national level we do have to deal with these type of arrangements and that they do limit to some extent what contracting authorities can do for society or how they organise their service provision. So, I suppose yes, on a more dogmatic level, I completely agree with you, however on a national implementation level we’re still faced with national goals which are often to achieve best value for money.That’s true.Yeah. So, I think, the second reason is that there’s a strong regulatory dilemma, and I suppose that also comes back in what I just previously said, is that in EU public procurement law and the in-house doctrine we aim to strike a balance between on the one hand allowing service provision by contracting authorities who wish to cooperate for the provision of services, and on the other hand we try to achieve the main objective of this field of law like you just said which is to create an internal market for public contracts.So clarity is very important for that and I think that has often lacked in practice, which is particularly troublesome if we look at the Court’s move to apply these exemptions to other subject matters such as concessions or perhaps even more in the future to limited authorisation schemes. And this is I think why I also welcome the codification of the in-house doctrine in Article 12 which in itself should be seen as a milestone of EU public procurement law and all of this is even more relevant when we consider that we’ve seen a rise in the popularity in many EU member states of these type of cooperations which are often in the form of shared service centres or other types of cooperations.Going into the directive 2014/24, why do you think that the codification occur and why do you think that we have so many exemptions on Article 12 nowadays?Yeah, that’s a great question actually. I love looking at the sometimes ungraspable regulatory part of the EU. And sometimes things happen for no reason I think. Sometimes they do fortunately but what’s interesting here though is that, what is very clear is that from the start of the reforms of the internal market from say 2010 when former EU Commissioner, Monty at the time, placed public procurement at the centre of his vision for the future of the single market. The new framework was aimed to improve the efficiency of public spending by simplifying the existing rules and aimed for further flexibility when applying them and I think in light of this it was the legislature of that deemed it important to clarify that the rules were applicable to in-house procurement but what we see in the expansion of these exemptions is that it’s driven by a strong call from contracting authorities all over the EU, who clearly found their way to the Commission and to the European Parliament who wanted more flexibility and space to provide services together. And I think that’s what mostly caused these exemptions to expand.So changed in terms of public-public cooperation between 2004 and 2014? Because if you look at the way that public-public cooperation is included in the new directive is very different from what we had in 2004, so what do you think changed between these two sets of directives?So, when they were attempting to codify the Teckal ruling in 2004 it failed obviously. We do now have the inclusion of Article 12 as something unique, in the sense that we didn’t have it before, but of course we had the exclusive right exemption. But perhaps this attempt failed at the time, because either the member states were not able to construct a common wording for this exemption as there had not been a lot of clarifications from the Court following Teckal and, I suppose, this can be explained again by the organisational differences between public-public cooperations across the EU. It would be great actually if everyone did things in the same way which means that making legislation would be a lot easier but, unfortunately, and I suppose luckily we’re not faced with that reality. On the other hand, the European legislature may have been hesitant like I said before to codify the jurisprudence at a stage where many questions and issues had not been decided upon. So, what changed afterwards? Like I said I think the emphasis of public authorities in their role of contracting authorities wanting to jointly provide services grew substantially and I think because of that the boundaries of EU public procurement law also became more visible. And I suppose it made contracting authorities and competitors on the market who filed proceedings before the Court more aware of those limitations and with that came the call for more flexibility and legal certainty. And this is interestingly enough also reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice. The Court was very hesitant to accept any of the cases put before it until 2007 when a clear turning point was visible in Tragsa and Coditel when the Court became more willing to accept and expand these exemptions. Now, in the past, it’s been argued that this was partly due to the recognition of regional and local self-governance in the Lisbon Treaty. Of course, this is one example of how strongly the EU is changing and that there’s not so much the EU level, or the member state level anymore, or the level of public authorities, but it’s recognising that national administrations are very complex and that we do have a local and a regional level that is also very important and has a say when it comes to codifying or making legislation.Where do you stand in the argument about accepting or not private capital in public-public cooperation contracts under Article 12, Paragraph 3, in other words are you siding with the Court of Justice in Coditel or Stadt Halle?I think, private capital, out of all the criteria that the Court has introduced, is probably the most interesting. I mean, this is really where the state, the market and their relationship really becomes visible and you can clearly see how the Court is struggling to deal with this.Now, it’s fair to say that the Court has been very hesitant towards private capital and that is somewhat justified. The absolute ban provides absolute legal certainty which is interesting and has some benefits because yes there are risks involved when including private capital participation as the objectives of such parties can be different which would mean that control cannot be exercised anymore, and on the other hand it might favour these undertakings over their competitors which appears to prevent any type of state aid.However, I do question whether an absolute ban is justified and completely necessary, particularly if one considers the practical and financial need for private capital investments that are very often necessary to be able to provide services at a certain level. And also state aid law if you compare it with this other field of law is generally not as strict. I mean, it requires an assessment of exemptions, even if state aid is found it can still be justified, so this means that I see possibilities to introduce a different approach which would be a presumption of diminished control. So, the existence of private capital would presume that control is diminished and I suppose the subsequent relevant question would then be if this means that decisive control is lost.Now, this was something that was also advanced by the Advocate-General in Stadt Halle. And this different approach would not necessarily exclude private majority shareholdings but, in that regard, it is unlikely that the minority private holdings would be able to ensure decisive control over an entity. And, I mean in this respect, the higher the level of private participation the more unlikely it would be that control could exist. And it’s not just the actual percentage, I think that should be taken into account after having assessed the applicable national legislative framework, which would need to be considered as that can differ amongst member states in relation to the rights that types of shareholdings give shareholders in practice and if these rights are substantial, which can for instance be the case with veto and blocking righ…

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    #21 - Petra Ferk (Graduate School of Government and European Studies) Jun 17, 2016
    Show notes

    Status quo for electronic procurement under Directive 2014/24/EU iTunesInterview with Petra Ferk, Assistant Professor for public administration at Graduate School of Government and European Studies and a researcher at the Institute for Public-Private Partnership Slovenia. Petra Ferk is the co-author of legal monograph, several articles and national reports dealing with public procurement, services of general (economic) interest (SGEI), public-private partnerships, state aid, energy and environment.TranscriptHello Petra, welcome to the programme.Thank you, it’s nice to be here.Our topic for today is electronic procurement, in Directive 2014/24/EU in general, what would you like to talk about in this context?Well, first I would like to mention that electronic procurement is not something what was completely new in 2014 procurement directive. The 2004 procurement directive had some provisions on electronic procurement, but they were on voluntary basis. In the preamble it was explained that contracting authorities may make use of electronic purchasing techniques providing that such use complies with rules drawn up under the directive and principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency. So already in 2004 it was recognised that these new techniques exist and it is possibility that contracting authorities use electronic procurement. Some contracting authorities actually did start to use electronic procurement prior to 2014 directive. What changed in 2014 directive it was that electronic procurement was introduced as mandatory. Particlarly important are Article 22 and Article 90 in terms of transposition deadline. And if we look at the text of the procurement directive, the 2014 directive as whole, we can see that approximately one fourth of the directive deals with electronic procurement issues. So this was major step forward. Also in infrastructure directive the electronic procurement provisions were introduced and those are substantially similar to those in classical sector. Also in concessions directive we can find electronic procurement provisions, however the concessions directives includes electronic procurement provisions on voluntary basis, so it’s not mandatory.Now, the most important provision, it’s the first paragraph of Article 22. This is actually the paragraph which introduces mandatory electronic procurement and it reads as follows: ‘Member states shall ensure that all communication and information exchanged under this directive, in particular electronic submission are performed using electronic means of communication in accordance with requirements of this article. The tools and devices to be used for communicating via electronic means as well as their technical characteristics shall be non-discriminatory, generally available and interoperable with ICT products in general use and shall not restrict economic operators access to procurement procedure.’ The whole article of Article 22 of the 2014 directive is on two pages; so this issue is really important. But from the content of this article it’s not really clear what is actually that has become mandatory. So we have to go through preamble and Commission’s documents to see what we are talking about and to be able to extract what has become mandatory. And the following phrases are mandatory: e-notification, electronic access to procurement documents and electronic submission. Since electronic notification and electronic access to procurement documents were in one or another way already used prior to 2014 directive, so the really new is electronic submission; this is also why it is underlined in the first paragraph of Article 22 with ‘in particular’ electronic submission.When the 2014 directive or package was being adopted the clear political signal was given for electronic procurement and Member States, said ‘yes we’ll do it, it’s a good idea’, when Commission proposed mandatory electronic procurement. But then they postponed deadlines, and also, when finally the directive was adopted, there are quite some lengthy transposition deadlines for electronic procurement in Article 90. The general transposition deadline, as we know, for procurement directives was 18th April this year, 2016 and then for electronic procurement longer transposition deadline was foreseen and this is October 18th, 2018, except for those instruments where used of electronic means is mandatory and this is for dynamic purchasing system, electronic auctions, electronic catalogues, for central purchasing bodies and then electronic availability of procurement documents and publication of notices. Although, notwithstanding these provisions, the Member States may also postpone the application of Article 22 for central purchasing bodies till April 2017. When the directive was adopted it was expected that these are long enough transposition deadlines that Member States will be able to transpose this provision in time; now we can see that quite a few Member States did not transpose the directives yet and that those who did transpose the directives didn’t make clear major steps towards introducing also electronic procurement. So in practice we can see although the provisions are very……ambitious, clear?Ambitious [laughs], yes, ambitious, in practice there are problems with implementing those provisions.Let’s talk about the transposition timescales, I find it very interesting that when it comes down to say private business, all of us have been able to use electronic means to make purchases for the last almost 20 years, not 20 years, but almost, and it has been very common for all of us to purchase goods and services online for let’s say 15 years so it’s very interesting, that when it comes down to public procurement, the current directive, although it makes the use of electronic means to deal with the, especially with the submissions which is the most important bit, mandatory, it only does so from 2018 onwards, so effectively it’s almost like public procurement is lagging the private sector for 15 or 20 years in terms of adopting a technology, adopting almost a business strategy in a sense which has been very, very common in the private sector.Yes, well, I see the main reason for it really in lack of willingness to do it because in technical terms I don’t believe it’s really so difficult to develop these platforms, they might be expensive, but not so expensive that it wouldn’t be possible, you know, to develop them if you have the will. So I think that everybody might be, I don’t know how to say, afraid to open up the markets because on one side, you know, it was meant that electronic procurement and platforms would open market and to enable higher cross border statistics. Although now I see, on the other hand, possibility that this might not be actually the case, because procurement platforms could be or can be developed also in a manner that will make additional barriers for procurement, you know, for the foreign suppliers, if additional tools will not be implemented. For countries like Slovenia if the Contracting Authorities will not start to be preparing tender documentation in other languages… As one of the biggest barriers I see language really. I think that the other reason why we are in public sector really behind the private one, is maybe also lack of expertise with procurement officials, even to prepare specifications for procuring the company who would develop the platform, because they don’t have this capacity themselves. And on the other side they don’t encourage the markets, that the market would make design, that it would develop the platforms itself, as we can see in some countries. Portugal is always given as a good example, you know. The clear signal was given that electronic procurement will start to be used, so the market developed the platforms. Nobody really knows how many electronic procurement platforms now exist in Europe, it is estimated somewhere about 250, 300 platforms. And I agree with Abby Semple - she says that this is a really good signal, that we have healthy electronic procurement platform market. But, it is happening only in those Member States which were able to give clear signal to the private sector, to the companies, that they will start to use electronic procurement and this is something that what they will encourage. Also, that they will give into this area additional effort - send procurement officials to some additional education and also some other complimentary measures. Because, even if the market develops the platforms and contracting authorities don’t start to use it, they don’t see, why would they do it, you know what I mean…I think your reference to Portugal is quite interesting and correct, I remember that back in 2008 ’09, or just 2009 when it became mandatory for e-procurement to be used in Portugal, that there was a huge backlash in the country, people saying, no, the market is not ready, suppliers are not ready, the public sector is not ready, no-one is ready, and the thing is seven years onwards everyone was more or less ready, contrary to what you would be expecting from hearing and talking with the industry or listening to the news, but for me what is the biggest message of the experience in Portugal is that actually it made life easier for SMEs and essentially national SMEs probably because something you mentioned and I agree with which is the issue of language. So if all the tenders are done in a local language, and in the Portuguese case well they’re done in Portuguese, if you do things online you’re going to be lowering the transaction costs for everyone in the market, yes but the biggest beneficiaries are going to be the national SMEs because they already have the advantage of speaking the language. So will it lead to more cross-border procurement, I’m not entirely sure. I think that it’s only one of the pieces of the puzzle that needs to change, electronic procurement, so that you can actually increase the share of cross-border procurement in Europe, there’s a lot more that needs to be done in addition to electronic procurement, that’s my take on it. About the current legal framework, what are the main positives that you see on it?Well I see as the main positive the introduction of mandatory provisions as such, and then I think from there, everything is up to the Member States. It’s really like the initial push which the Commission encouraged with proposal, and then the Member States will have to do it from there. Because electronic procurement, also as you said, you know, by self it will not change much. Other measures will have to be done to achieve what was actually the first objective [laughs], why procurement was introduced at the first place. It was to encourage international trade or to open up the market, to encourage international business. First mover Member States did well. A lot is really in knowledge of public officials, so this is something what we must not forget. A lack of knowledge and the language barrier, this is something what we have to consider if we talk about further development of the procurement as such. So electronic procurement is only one option. But why did I say that Member States will have to do it themselves? It’s really because we don’t have ,or at the moment I don’t see, any feasible measure what the Commission could do to enforce electronic procurement. Namely as long as we don’t have standards, it will really be difficult to assess if the Procurement Directive provisions on electronic procurement were implemented adequately, and to talk about inadequate transpositions, which might result in infringement procedures. This is really the only tool which Commission has to force Member States to change the current status quo because we see that not a lot of Member States made the step forward. So I believe that the next step which should be done, it’s really to develop the standards. How we will get to that point, to the standards it’s still not clear. My first guess was - because shortly after the adoption of a procurement directive, the directive on e-invoicing was adopted, and it is much more advanced than Procurement Directive on provisions on electronic invoicing and this is mainly due to the reason that electronic invoicing is being used to huge extent in Europe, due to other instruments, it was well developed also already for SEPA, so…And also it’s being used by the private sector.Yes, yes, developed by banks, it was really only the solutions that will now be used and made mandatory by public sector in public procurement. So in this directive on e-invoicing the implementation was made in three steps, first adoption of delegated acts, and then second to mandate the relevant European standardisation organisation to draft the standard, and then as the third step the obligation of Member States to ensure that contracting authorities and contracting entities really comply with that standard. I was expecting that this is the same, what will happen in public procurement. But then I talked to some politicians and also researchers which know the situation also well, what is happening, and then they estimated that Commission wouldn’t dare to adopt delegated acts on this issue, so it’s more we expect guidelines would be given at least in the first stage.Very well, moving on from talking about electronic procurement in general, also e-invoicing in general, could you give us some flavour of what’s happening in Slovenia specifically?Slovenia implemented the Classical Procurement Directive and also the Utilities Directive. In general we could say that what was a big change, why we have problems now, is that both of these directives were transposed with one act, one law, and that’s huge difference now, and we are dealing with, whole country is dealing now more with this issue, and electronic procurement is not being discussed really. The Ministry said that Central Purchasing Bodies will start to use electronic procurement in 2017, but they didn’t make any major step to start to develop the platform. And the private sector is not being encouraged to start to develop the platform(s), because there is really no signal, that it’s going to be used and it’s going to be encouraged. So nobody really sees the business opportunity.It will have to be used from April 2018 whatever happens, I mean…Yes.…in a worst case scenario comes April 2018. I think it’s probably arguable that those provisions have direct effect, so it makes life very difficult for Member States if they don’t have electronic procurement platforms in place. So my question is do you think that Slovenia will go down the route of developing a public platform or adopting a platform that’s going to be the public one, or they’re going to be like Portugal has done and open the markets for new providers to come in?They are aiming to develop public platform, and this is also, why private sector is reluctant to invest into developing the platforms, so…Yeah, it makes perfect sense.Yeah, but discussions which they had now on how the new platform would be designed- it doesn’t seem that it would be user-friendly really. Also, what the new, what they did now with official gazette, where the tenders and notices are published, it’s much less user-friendly as it used to be. So this is why everybody really, you know, are just waiting what will happen … But it is not really optimistic to expect, that the new platform would be user-friendly.Okay, unfortunately I don’t think that is the best way to go forward for a small country but let’s hope that…It’s not, it’s not, and we are like… Because [laughs] I am one of the founders of Public Private Partnership Institute, we are seriously starting to consider starting to work on a platform ourselves, although this is huge investment for a small group as ours. But we have - because we are advising contracting authorities - we have huge problems with getting the bids. And it’s really difficult t…

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    #20 - Carlos Arrebola (University of Cambridge) Mar 23, 2016
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    Do Advocate-General opinions influence decisions by the Court of Justice of the EU? iTunesInterview with Carlos Arrebola, Ph.D candidate at the University of Cambridge and one of the authors of a paper on the potential impact Advocate General's opinions have on decisions taken by the Court of Justice of the European Union. For the final episode of series 1 of the Public Procurement Podcast the interview duties were mostly left in the capable hands of Albert Sanchez-Graells (University of Bristol).TranscriptPedro Telles (PT): For the 20th and last programme of the series we are doing something different. I have with me, not one, but two persons in the virtual studio, Carlos Arrebola a PhD candidate at University of Cambridge and Albert Sanchez-Graells from the University of Bristol. The purpose of our talk today is to probe a little bit more about Carlos’ research into the influence of the Advocate General’s opinion in subsequent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. So Carlos and some of his colleagues put up a very interesting paper on SSRN and Albert decided to critique it and provide some very helpful feedback. And that is mainly the reason why I’m bringing Albert back because I want him to take the reins of the conversation today and effectively redo a little bit of his work of his critique that he did for the blog http://www.howtocrackanut.com.Carlos and his colleagues replied to Albert's critique, by guest posting in Albert’s blog and as such this show is going to be slightly different from usual with me hosting the call more than anything else and Carlos and Albert hammering out their differences on a very reasonable and sensible conversation with a cup of tea or a cup of coffee as they prefer. Welcome to today’s show, can you start by introducing yourselves so that we can match the voices to the names? Carlos Arrebola (CA): Oh thank you very much Pedro, I’m Carlos Arrebola.Albert Sanchez-Graells (ASG): And I’m Albert Sanchez-Graells, it’s a pleasure to be on your show once again. PT: Yeah, I couldn’t finish without you Albert, I started with you, I had to finish with you as well, so it’s great that we found out a way to do it.ASG: That’s so kind Pedro. PT: I’m going to kick off the interview, I’m going to kick off the talk with a low ball question for Carlos, Carlos could you summarise your research and what were the main findings please. CA:Yes, so the research project that we devised was, as you said, about the influence of the Advocate General. It’s very interesting and thank you for giving me the opportunity to sort of give a bit more background information. Because how this came about was by Julia, who is another PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge, and me, we were talking about research methodologies. We were asking ourselves “what is it to do legal research?”, and comparing it with other sciences. So out of an example it came out this claim that people say all the time that is, well you know, “the Court follows the Advocate General” or “the Advocate General influences the Court”. And we are thinking, well, actually has that been proven or is there any evidence for it? So that’s how it came about. Then, after doing a bit of a literature review we saw that many people do some sort of statistics about it, but there was no econometric study where different variables are accounted to determine whether that’s accurate or not. So we decided to do it. And we called another friend of mine, who was doing MPhil in economics at the time at Cambridge as well, and asked him for some help in developing this model and testing whether the Advocate General actually was causing, as in whether we could establish causality in its opinions towards the decisions of the Court. So we did this. We put together a database of about 20 years of action for annulment and we came out with a response that was basically that yes, there is an influence. And the way we phrased the influence is that if the Advocate General asked the Court to annul an act, the Court will be 67% more likely to annul such act. To be honest, we were expecting the results to show that the Advocate General was less influential than we thought, than those claims about the Advocate General suggest. So that was a bit surprising. But, in a nutshell, to quote Albert’s blog, that’s what our research project was saying.PT: Okay, Albert you read the paper and what were your main ideas or main thinking lines about it? ASG: So I saw the paper on SSRN and I thought it was really interesting as a project, I think that definitely there is need to try to bring more econometric analysis to the analysis of case law to see whether we can identify patterns, but it’s been very interesting, it’s also extremely complicated to do so I tried to brush up my econometrics from when I studied the undergrad, which is certainly not yesterday and I looked at the model, you know, with the difficulty of trying to understand the model I just, I thought that there was some basic underlying assumption that I was not really buying it on the first reading so I started reading about more detail and I think that the main issues that we need to control in those models for noise or for factors that would explain what we’re trying to measure for different reasons and that’s a perspective from which I thought that some of the points that Carlos and his colleagues raised could be explored differently, particularly in terms of the tests that they run but of course that’s something quite in the detail so maybe it’s better for Carlos to go on and explain their claim and how they got their specifics and then maybe I can just pitch in when needed. CA:So Albert is definitely right. That was the very first problem. When I approached my economics colleague I said “How can we do this?” And obviously you have to put together a database of different variables, different factors that you are going to account for that can explain why the Court decides in a particular way. To put it simply, we said we’re going to see if the Court decides to annul or partially annul or not. And the reason for why the Court or a particular judge may decide to annul, or not, are not necessarily related to the Advocate General at all. There can be many reasons, and one of them is because the law was very clear, it was ultra vires or whatever it might be. So we had to, as I said, account for all those other things that had nothing to do with the Advocate General, and we put together different variables, the ones that we thought were simple enough or relevant enough to be put into our database and so we chose something like who was the claimant? Was the claimant, an institution? Was the claimant a member state? etc, etc. Also, who was the Advocate General? Because we thought that maybe some Advocates General could be more influential than others and, so yeah, we compiled all that information. Of course we left out many variables that affect the decisions but there’s nothing you can really do about it. You can always refine your model, but there will always be something that you leave out. But then, and this was one of the main criticisms by Albert in his post, is that he was saying that, that makes it not reliable. We have to disagree a little bit here. We think that even if you leave out variables that are important or relevant for why the Court decides in a particular way your econometric model can be reliable. And that would be going a bit further into the econometrics. But, basically, it’s because your results are still statistically significant. And that’s what happened in our model. We ran different models and we came out with one that seemed to be, according to several econometric measures, reliable enough as to present the results.PT: Albert. ASG: Yeah, no, on that point I guess that that’s a link to the second of the criticisms I raise in the blog was then basically it’s not so much leading variables that could explain the decision of the Court out, it’s more about how the model is constructed in terms of which decisions the Court can adopt and this is a point that Carlos and his colleagues acknowledge in the paper and they say well it’s complex because the outcome in these proceedings basically could be either to dismiss the claim or not admit it and those would be negative results for the claimant or then there could be either partial or full annulment which would be resolved that are positive for the claimant and that’s how they construct their variables. So basically they give zero when the case is either not admitted or dismissed and one when there is partial or total annulment. They explain quite well why partial and total annulment can be grouped together because basically I think that they’ve run tests and they see that there is no significant difference in the outcome but my main concern is with grouping, lack of admissibility and dismissal on the grounds of substance because basically from a legal point of view, it is not the same to say the case is not receivable by the Court for variable procedural reasons than to say it’s been received, it’s been assessed on the grounds of substance and then we dismiss it. And it’s not only that these are different steps but it’s also that the law that controls these two assessments are very different and I would claim that the rules controlling admissibility are much more limited and I would say are more straightforward because they are about whether there is sufficient reasoning behind the claim, legal standing, timing, so they are easier, they are more accepted by the parties and also I think that usually the filter of admissibility tends to end on the case not receiving the case and then discussing the grounds. So I would maybe separate those two because I think that maybe otherwise it’s going to skew the results. Of course I would need to rerun a model with these differences and I haven’t had the time, or maybe not even the skill, at the moment to do it but my impression is that those two should not be grouped together and that’s something that Carlos replied on the blog, rebuttal by saying “Well that’s the way we did it”, so I don’t know Carlos, do you have any further thoughts on this?CA:Yeah, I think it gives me the opportunity now to clarify. I tried to do it in the rebuttal post but it’s a bit complex, so I tried to keep it simple. Basically yes, you are right that we grouped those things together. But our results are not saying anything about inadmissibility or dismissal, because we are only looking at opinions when the Advocate General says or suggests to annul. So we are not saying anything... our claim or our final result are 67% more likely, it is not in the direction of negative opinions, it’s only in the direction of positive opinions. So basically when the Advocate General suggests to annul, how does the Court react to that? So basically that’s why our claim is that it doesn’t make any difference that we group together inadmissibility and dismissal. But there’s something interesting that you said is yeah, there are many other ways of looking at our model and maybe one of those ways, it’s looking at it in the negative like, what would happen if the Advocate General suggested to dismiss a case. Is he followed to the same percentage in that case? But that would require fiddling a lot with our database. Then there’s another problem and this is why we grouped total annulment with partial annulment, is that even we collected 20 years of data, when it comes to cases of partial annulment you might have no more than 20, and I’m not entirely sure whether there are more than 20 or not, but I remember that there were a very limited number. That’s difficult for econometrics because it means that the results are not going to be significant enough so your claims cannot be reliable. So basically that’s why we grouped them together and they were, we are missing some sort of information there. But we thought that going towards the direction of annulment was something that could be grouped together.ASG: Yeah, no, as I said before I agree with the direction of annulment and particularly if we only have 20 observations or 20 something in 20 years, it’s not going to be significant. But the issue on the model being only one direction is the one that the third point I was trying to raise in the blog was that I think the big advantage that econometric studies of case law have, is they allow for intuitions to be either proven or disproven so in other words whether the results can be understood without deep model and would still make sense or if there is a counter-intuitive point, if they explained the counter-intuitive point very well. At the beginning your research, as you said, is basically about trying to give support to whether the Advocate General actually influences it or do not so the research question is what is the influence of the Advocate General? And I think that the results or the model would be much more credible or would convince the sceptics like myself, if you could make the claim both ways. So if you could say, it is not only that the Advocate General influences a Court when it decides to suggest that something should be annulled but also when it decides that something should not annulled or even when it submits that it should be dismissed. Because in that case you cannot have the counter explanation that the Court of Justice has for instance an activist or intergrationist agenda in which case it is more likely to annul on substance whenever there is any issue concerning restriction of freedoms for instance. So I think that that’s why it’s so difficult to build models, I think that maybe what we could agree is that you have developed half of the model and that for your claim to be solid, you would need to test it the other way round. Also because this is one of the problems with econometrics, we don’t know what’s going to come out. So if you were to say, well the Advocate General influenced the Court which suggests that it should annul but it doesn’t really suggest that it shouldn’t annul then I think that we will be conflating two issues which is the problem in maybe bias of the Court and the position of the Advocate General. PT: Yeah, can I add something on there which I think would be interesting, which is you just looked at the actions for annulment in one big batch, am I correct Carlos? CA: Yeah, yeah.PT: So what I would like to know is if the influence of the Advocate General actually changes depending on the formation of the Court, i.e., the Court can meet in many configurations from a bench of what five Judges, that’s the smallest configuration Albert?ASG:Yeah, or three. PT: Or three, so my question would be does the influence of Advocate General actually decrease as the complexity of the case increases and, for example, if you have decisions that are taken by the Grand Chamber of Judges, does he have any influence at all? CA:Yes, so coming to the last question by Pedro, we did include the composition of the Court. That was one of our variables. And, to be honest I don’t really remember, I’m scrolling through the paper to see if that showed us anything because I don’t want to summarise my own paper incorrectly.PT: Sure. CA: But I think we came out with something like the grand chamber was a variable that could explain the decision of the Court to a great degree but I’m not completely sure that it was a very relevant variable.PT: Having said that I agree with Albert’s critique that your model to be sustainable needs to work the other way around as well. CA:Yes, absolutely, that’s something we most definitely agree that, well we present a project and the results and obviously those have to be tested again and again to... that’s the basis of science, isn’t it? When you, you make a claim and it has to be an observation that can be done again and again by different tests and that’s when the claim becomes accur…

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    #19 - Stephan Litschig (Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) Mar 18, 2016
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    Does an increased audit risk affect corruption practices? iTunesInterview with Stephan Litschig, Associate Professor at the Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, GRIPS, in Tokyo. His research interests are in the area of development, public and political economics. His work has been published in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, the Journal of Public Economics and the Journal of Human Resources. He also serves as an Associate Editor of the Journal of Human Resources. Today’s talk is focused on his joint paper with Yves Zamboni called ‘Audit risk and rent extraction, evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil’.TranscriptI find your paper with Yves Zamboni very interesting and what I would like to know for us to start the conversation with was what led you to carry out this research.The motivation was that we know that let’s say anecdotally, corruption is very prevalent in many countries but it is much less known what the people could do to reduce corruption. And by corruption what I have in mind in particular is in public procurement for example that public officials will take kickbacks in return for steering the contract to certain suppliers but I also have in mind a broader concept of corruption which is rents in the delivery of public services where the fact is that in many countries public servants don’t show up for work, teachers for example or health service providers. So the basic motivation is just that we know that procurement and service delivery in general could be better and then the question was can we change this by increasing the scrutiny that comes from the top basically, increased audit risk.And why doing this in Brazil specifically?So this was an opportunity I had come across the fact that in Brazil they have this peculiar way of auditing local governments which is done at random so there’s literally a lottery that is done that’s actually on television and so that, what that gives you is that it gives you comparable data on audit findings across Brazil, so for a large number of municipalities, and then I basically got in touch with this agency and wrote to them and proposed this and my current co-author was the one who picked it up and said “look, this is interesting, let’s do this together”. So it’s basically the fact that in Brazil they were doing a particular interesting way to conduct these audits and what we did with Yves we designed this study on top of this existing lottery where we added another layer that basically put aside a hundred and twenty municipalities during one year into a high audit risk group so these guys knew that, basically in the control group audit risk per year was something like 5% but if you were in this high audit risk group you had like a 25% chance to be audited over the subsequent year.How was that selection done? Was that selection done by you or specifically was that a purposeful sampling or was it done at random saying “you guys in this year actually have a higher audit risk”?Yeah, exactly. So it was purposefully at random if you want so, you know, they were already doing this random sampling using a literal lottery, like it’s the same machinery that was used for a money lottery in Brazil, that was very popular so they used the same machines, then we also used those machines to set aside a group of municipalities that, because it’s a random sample should have all observable and unobserved characteristics the same as those that were not selected. So then the idea is that if later on once the auditors go in and they find differences in the incidence of irregularities of matters of corruption this has to be because of the only difference between the two groups which is that they were exposed to ex ante higher audit risk.And did they know that in advance, so were they informed?Yes. So that’s an excellent point. So the overall lottery that was regularly done by this audit agency CGU was very well publicized so in that sense we could assume that they knew about it but to make sure that those that were put into this extra scrutiny high audit risk group, that they were aware of that, in addition CGU also sent them a letter and said “by the way, for one year you’ve been selected, you are one out of a hundred and twenty municipalities and at the end of the year we’ll take thirty of you to be audited according to our usual audit procedures”. So they did also receive a letter.In terms of communication of information to those municipalities, so you guys sent a letter but if you’re looking into corruption to the municipality you’re looking into probably I would suspect multiple levels within the organisation, so did you expect the information about the higher audit risk to filter from the top down or just for that information to remain with the person or the persons that received it?So we were agnostic about that, so the idea was that perhaps, so the mayor for sure would receive the letter…Sure, yeah.…but then some of the people in his cabinet would receive it, then, whether he would communicate this to, down to the health offices and all the teachers we were sort of, we didn’t want to micromanage that so we just said “okay, let’s just send this letter”. The key thing that changed was that objectively they were in a high audit risk group so we thought about this but we thought we don’t want to make this too artificial in a sense. Suppose the government would increase the audit intensity, right, they’re not going to send around lots of letters, they’re just going to do it, they might inform some people but we wanted to keep this as real as possible. But it’s true so what that means is that we don’t know how far the information travelled, that is a limitation.In terms of findings, what were your main findings?So we find that when we look at procurement outcomes we find that there is a reduction in both the share of the amount of audited resources that has evidence of corruption, so both in money terms but also when we look at it at the procurement process level and there’s something like 1,600 procurement processes that we have the data on and we find that at that level as well there’s a reduction in the probability that auditors find evidence of corruption. Now what does corruption mean? We basically use, so these auditor reports have been used before in the literature so we use existing corruption codings and one unambiguous example would be the auditors go in and they find that the firm that, you know, received the contract in fact doesn’t exist. So that [Pedro laughs], it’s scary but these things happen, you know. Other…I know.…other things that, right. Yeah, yeah, well, you know, some people are very surprised but I guess you’re more of an expert in this, in this area. But yeah, so other things are when they go in, the auditors go in and they find that the government paid more than what they had agreed to in the auction basically, without gaining any other compensation.I was laughing because a few years ago in Portugal when we started collating the contract data, some people that I know in Portugal they cross-referenced data from that particular database, the contract database with information from the companies registry and they found that certain companies were being awarded contracts even before they existed. That’s why I laughed because I’ve seen that kind of stuff happening before!Excellent.So it’s not only Brazil, yeah.No, I’m pretty sure. You know, so this, you know, I’m getting ahead of myself here but I think in terms of future research there is a lot to be done here, just sort of, just in terms of measuring how frequent does that happen in different countries in different contexts, I think we just know very little about that. And, you know, one reason for that that we know little about it is obviously data, data problems of merging different datasets but the other one is that in most countries the audit agencies would target sectors or firms where they think there’s a high likelihood of corruption and you end up with a very unrepresentative sample of things of what’s actually, what the state is in the overall country. The nice thing about Brazil is that because of this random sampling what we have here is basically a, you can think of it as a random sample so if we find for example that the incidence of corruption is something like let’s say 40% amongst restricted modalities, that’s one of our main findings, we can sort of confidently say that’s more or less what’s going on in the public sector at a local level in Brazil, as opposed to, you know, this reflects the tip of the iceberg or something like that. But, you know, to do that you need the random sampling and that’s, no other country in the world does that so if you want to do comparable studies across, just, you know, compare the incidence of corruption across countries you have to convince public officials to do things in a random way and that’s often very tough. But that’s, in terms of future research that’s sort of where I think this could go.That’s one of the point that I would like to drill down a little bit further which is in terms of processes, which processes have you found out that were more likely to generate corruption or have corruption arise from them?Yeah, so that was an interesting find is that for the first time in our study we have the detailed process level data which means that basically that process is it’s a given purchase, they vary a lot in terms of magnitude but what we know for each purchase is was it done through a modality that restricts competition in some way or not, which is an open auction and you specify in the call what you want and then anybody can pretty much apply. So we group modalities, there’s more than those two but we group them into two and the finding is pretty stark, is that, amongst let’s say public procurement auctions the incidence overall of corruption is much lower, something like 20% and it doesn’t change at all, whereas amongst modalities that restrict competition and give more discretion to the public official, the overall incidence in the control will be something like 40% and there we find the reduction, it only occurs there, something like 15 percentage points. So it’s only the modalities that restrict competition, that afford more discretion that, where this corruption seems to be going on and where it is affected by higher audit risk.Does Brazil have financial thresholds in terms of determining which kind of modalities you’re going to use, if you’re going to use the auctions or you’re going to use the restrictive competition ones?Yes.Or is it just done by case-by-case scenario?No. There are thresholds and one of the things that the auditors look at and that we also, that is part of some of our corruption measures is in fact whether they basically fraction the purchase to avoid those thresholds. So there are thresholds.Because that is fascinating, especially, or even in Europe because the financial thresholds in Europe are quite high so you only apply rules for contracts above 100 and something, for goods and services 100 and something thousand Euros if I’m not wrong or more, or even more if you’re a local authority. And I’ve always thought that it was not a very good idea, especially on corruption grounds but I’ve been writing about that area over the last few years and I’m going to revisit it again and you’ve just given me a new piece of the puzzle for me to work with which is actually where there is more discretion for public procurers we are creating the conditions to generate more corruption or at least make corruption more likely?So that’s what our findings suggest for the first time that at least in Brazil in this particular context this discretion tends to be abused, okay. Now how externally valid is that? As you say I think that’s…Yeah, we don’t know?That’s research, we don’t know, that’s right.Okay. But in that sense I’m writing about these ideas and obviously this area of public procurement from a legal perspective so I can afford the limited availability of data to try and shape my thoughts, although obviously I want it to be sustained by evidence and…?Mm, and of course, of course.Right, okay. So I’ve got a few extra comments for you.Sorry Pedro, can I, because you asked and I’ve been going off topic I think so the paper is about procurement but if you don’t mind?Yes, sure.One of the things we also look at is this idea that when you increase the audit risk service providers are more likely to actually show up for work, okay. So there’s, it’s not corruption in terms of stealing but corruption in the sense of you’re paid to do a job and you don’t do it so, and the reason we can do that is because the CGU audits they include that as a standard procedure for them to basically also try to assess whether for example in health service delivery the officials, and these are going to be doctors and nurses but also going to be health workers that are supposed to visit the health facility users preventively, so the idea is that it’s cheaper to prevent than to cure but to, the prevention requires that these guys go out there and visit the families to find out whether someone is ill so that the prevention can actually take place and that’s costly of course for these agents. So what we looked at there or what the auditors looked at is they ask a random sample of potential service users in a given area they make household visits and they ask “are you receiving these visits from these preventative healthcare workers?” They also ask “when you go to the health post is it open when it should be open and when you go there is the doctor there?” These kind of questions so, and they ask some questions in control and treatment municipalities, okay. Now what we find on that front is that although in the control group there is not perfect performance in the sense that people do report that the health post is not always open as it should, the doctor is not always there, the increase in audit risk has no effect on that performance, on that compliance with your stipulated job requirements. In stark contrast to what we find in procurement, we find this reduction.So what we, we were puzzled by this, it was we didn’t expect that but then what we do in the paper is we obtained a standard economic model and we see whether we can rationalise these findings. And one explanation for these results could be that when you get audited in procurement basically you can’t argue with those findings, you know. If the auditor finds that the firm that you awarded the contract to doesn’t exist there’s not much more you can say, whereas if the auditor goes in and he finds that people report that the doctors were not in the health centre when they should have been, the doctors are going to say “no, I was there” and the audit finding doesn’t generate that kind of hard evidence that would make people work. So we think that ex post we can rationalise our findings so the fact that health service providers might just not be worried by the audit because they can always say “well no, no, I was there” or “I was in another room” or “I was, I don’t know, I was visiting a family out in the field” so it just doesn’t generate the same kind of evidence. And so that, you know, what that, it just, I guess it also, it’s not, obviously it’s not clear how general the finding is but it raises this issue that the quality of audits can be useful to monitor certain things but not others. And then that has implications for audit design so perhaps the auditors can save these visits because at the end what’s being generated is not really useful that much.Anyway, so I just wanted to mention that. I know this is a procurement audience but because the increased audit risk happened for everybody in the entire municipality and because the auditors look at these things as a matter of routine we thought that it’s useful to look at that as well, even though it’s a null result we…

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    #18 - Kirsi-Maria Halonen (University of Lapland) Mar 11, 2016
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    Contractual ineffectiveness in public procurement iTunesInterview with Kirsi-Maria Halonen, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Lapland. Kirsi worked previously for Hansel Ltd, the central purchasing body of the Finnish Government. She concluded in August 2015 her Ph.D at the University of Turku on the consequences of contractual ineffectiveness in public procurement.Transcript Let’s dive in, straight into your research, you finished your PhD last year on contractual ineffectiveness in public procurement, so could you tell us a little bit more about that research? Yeah, sure. So I think I wasn’t concentrating that much on the remedy of contractual ineffectiveness. Of course I looked at the rules concerning contractual ineffectiveness as well but my focus was merely on the consequences of the remedy itself between the contracting parties, so I was interested on whether the contracting authority can be held liable towards the contractor, for example, in cases where they have infringed severely public procurement rules which have led to contractual ineffectiveness. Then I also looked at what kind of liability regimes could be applied on this kind of liability, if there is any, and what are the possible ways to manage risks of contracting authorities, is there a possibility to mitigate the damages somehow and are the rules of contributory negligence applicable to this kind of liability.So what did you find? What did I find? I think you can divide those conclusions in three parts. So firstly, I think the most important conclusion was that at least according to Finnish law, Finnish private law, the trust towards the actions, the rightfulness or lawfulness of the actions of public authorities is very strong. As the contracting authorities are the ones actually responsible to comply with the public procurement rules, and if they infringe those rules they can be held liable if the other party is not aware or should not have been aware of this infringement. So there is a certain risk for liability in these cases. And the second conclusion that I found was concerning the liability regimes. If the contract is declared ineffective there is no contractual liability available for the parties so merely the liability regimes that could be applied here are based on extra contractual liability such as principles of culpa in contrahendo or the general law on damages. And then the third part of my conclusions relate to the ways of risk management or liability mitigation so I looked at the limitation of liability clauses and whether these are considered binding and effective. Then I looked also the rules concerning contractor’s bona fide so whether or not and on what grounds we can decide on if the contractor was actually aware or should have been aware of this infringement and what effects it has on the contracting authority’s liability. Also the general rule of duty to limit your own damages is applied here and I concluded that actually EU law doesn’t prevent the application of such rules and therefore it’s based on national law whether or not these kind of rules are applied here.And did you look only at Finland or did you cast a gaze as well to other jurisdictions? Yes, my main focus was in Finland and I also conducted my research and published my dissertation in Finnish but as in Nordic legal studies often it’s done, at least in Finland, you also look at the neighbouring countries, the other Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden and Norway where the legal systems are quite similar to ours. Usually in Sweden you can find some quite interesting thoughts in the legislative preparatory works. Then I looked at France because they have a long tradition with contractual ineffectiveness. Also the other southern European countries do have similar traditions, like Spain and I believe also Portugal and Italy have a tradition of nullity of public contracts that may be ordered by a Court, which we didn’t have up in north before the rules of contractual ineffectiveness were transposed. It was interesting to find out that there was actually a previous case law also relating to procurement contracts on these kind of remedies, so that’s why France was interesting. And then I also looked at the UK a bit because there the attitude is very business oriented in a sense that there is lots of freedom for the parties to agree on things, for example, to agree on risk sharing for the event of contractual ineffectiveness which is explicitly stated in the UK’s procurement rules. This has created a lot of discussion on whether or not that kind of legislation could be possible also in other countries. So there were interesting details that I found in looking at other countries.Why is the interplay between national contract law and public procurement rules important? Well I think it is important for the reason that without looking at things on several perspectives you are not finding true answers. So if you are looking at the consequences of contractual ineffectiveness solely from public procurement rules perspective, you are not finding a complete answer. In Finland traditionally public procurement has been viewed as a part of public law, administrative law and as an administrative procedure to choose a winner in a certain contract award. But if we are looking at the rules as an administrative procedure to choose a winner, then we don’t get the whole picture of what happens afterwards because we’re actually buying something, we’re making a commercial transaction and we’re not applying public procurement rules for the reason that we want to just comply with these rules as such but as a mean to purchase something. That’s why I think it is important to also take private law into account, meaning the contract law commercial law in general, as public procurement contract in Finland is considered as a private contract. It is utmost important from a buyer’s perspective to realise how these private law rules should be interpreted in the context of public procurement where EU law, and especially its principles, are actually limiting the interpretation which usually in private law is considered to be a freedom of the parties to agree on anything and here EU law has, and the public procurement rules have a lot to say on how to look at things.I think that’s a very important point and it’s intimately connected with one of the issues that I’ve found over the years in public procurement which is that there’s a huge emphasis and focus from EU rules on the procedural part of things but when it comes down to the actual contracts, the rules that are applicable to the contract are left for the national member states. I have not done any research on this, but this is just my gut feeling, my take on this is that in consequence economic operators find it more difficult to actually apply for contracts in other member states because they don’t know what will be the contract law that is going to be applicable to that contract. They know that in terms of residual rules they’re going to be entitled to certain rights and certain protections but even if they’re awarded a contract then they’re subject to national law. Yes, you are absolutely right and I know that you have a background as a procurement lawyer in practice as well, as I do, so yeah, often also research in public procurement is done via the principles of EU law and the public procurement rules as such. But somehow I think it is very important to always keep in mind that this is the reality, this is actually business and we need to look at public procurement rules as a toolkit to get the best possible result. And here, as you pointed out, if we are wanting to create a single market then it should be clear for all the players at the market what are the common rules and where comes the line after which the national rules are applied. And this is not clear for me, not even in Finland, nor I think that it is necessarily clear in UK or Portugal for example, If you think about private companies, I believe that this might create some obstacles to participate for sure.Yes, indeed and just by coincidence yesterday I was watching a programme on Euronews about the strategy by the commission for the digital single market and one of the actual legs of that particular stool that the commission wants to set up was to uniform or have some sort of harmonisation at least for contract law that is applicable to cross border online contracts. And if you think about it in general, online contracts or online contracts for consumers, involve very low amounts of money so if the commission understands that for that specific sector it makes sense to uniform or at least harmonise contract law. Why aren’t we thinking about the same for public procurement?Oh that’s a very good question and I, unfortunately I don’t have the answer to that question but I think that that could really speed up the progress of opening the borders in public procurement. One other thing that comes to my mind relating the differences of contract laws in different countries is the binding effect of an offer. So basically there are different rules in different countries on the binding effect: a company submitting an offer to a contract award in Spain might be able to cancel it if it wants to but in Finland I am not able to cancel a bid after it has been opened. In Finland actually according to the basic contract law rules, not though in public procurement anymore, a contract is considered concluded when the offer is accepted but already before this moment the offer itself is binding and it can lead to similar consequences, similar liability issues as if you would cancel a contract.That's a common discussion in contract law in various jurisdictions which is each jurisdiction has defined its own way of interpreting the moment when the contract is formalised, so is this acceptance or the sending of the offer, if the offer contains all the necessary elements, so on and so forth. But again in the field of public procurement that is one of the areas that’s perhaps at a level we have not spent enough energy and attention in trying in sort and solve. On that note what do you think should be done at a level in the future that we could consider to be a potential solution for the differences that we are finding in the treatment of contractual ineffectiveness in public procurement in the various member states? Well I think it is important that EU public procurements rules don’t go too far in limiting the applicability of national public or private contract law or national public procurement rules, but at the same time we should have some clarity on which rules or on what aspects EU law are applicable. So that could help the national systems to develop their own legislation and argumentation relating thereto and to provide similar results even though the legal systems behind these rules are quite different. So I would want to know what are the actual conditions of liability for example in certain issues. I would also like to know whether EU law is actually giving any protection to ex-contractors when the contract is considered ineffective. I think now the European Commission’s point of view is that there is no protection provided towards ex-contractors because they have participated in the infringement even though they wouldn’t be aware of the infringement but it is assumed that they must have been aware of it. I think there are questions concerning remedies and then there is also a question of clarity so that the companies involved could really know what are the conditions of liability and what is the proof they need to provide in this context? So it wouldn’t always be a matter of national law to interpret, it’s according to their own principle. But as an answer to your question, I think there are several small things that could be developed but I’m not saying that something should be done or something shouldn’t be done but at least we should know what are the exact rules that are applied. It is a bit ambiguous at the moment where goes the line between EU law and national rules? But, at the same time, this is very interesting from a researcher’s point of view, so if we bring here too much clarity then probably I need to get another hobby.Do you reckon that in a future review of the remedies directive perhaps we’ll see something along those lines or do you reckon it’s not going to happen? I think maybe, though I think now it’s all about principle of effectiveness, especially the length of judicial procedure that is on the table. I still think that EU legislators are not that worried on the parties of the contract, the ex-contractors and their rights, as the interest is focused on removing unlawful or infringing decisions and bringing back the contract to the markets which is what the remedies are mainly designed for. The main focus lies on the remedies for those who have suffered from contracting authority’s infringement and not the rights of those who have been part of it. I think those companies are not going to get a lot of support in the remedies directive in future either..I think it’s a shame because as we were saying before, if you don’t tackle some of the outstanding differences in terms of contract law, in terms of consequences, I feel that uncertainty, the uncertainty that is generated by these different systems, actually probably deters economic operators from participating in the first place and obviously if they don’t participate they cannot win the contracts in other jurisdictions, in other member states. So I think it’s a shame that the discussion is still very much focused on what I would call formalistic approaches to remedies, saying “Oh do you have access to the Courts and only the Courts and nothing else, do the Courts decide quickly enough?” That is important but at the end of the day that is only one part of the discussion. Yes, yeah, yeah, for sure, I agree with that.But we are where we are. Hmm.Speaking about research and speaking about interest, you spent a lot of time over the last few years looking at this interplay between public procurement and contract law, looking at the contractual ineffectiveness in public procurement, where do you want to focus your research going forward? Well as you said, I have been quite involved in public procurement and private law matters, I really like it, so I don’t plan to entirely abandon it but lately I have been more and more interested on the requirement of transparency, quite classical subject I would say. But as a broader phenomenon combining lots of different goals and objectives, maybe controversial towards each other, either fighting corruption, securing the access to remedies in a public procurement process and at the same time its potential adverse effects on creation of innovations as a commercial interest protection issue. And perhaps we will see an empirical research relating to these aspects during the few years. And I’m also currently discussing with different multidisciplinary research groups, one of the potential projects that we’re planning on is on looking at Finnish corruption, especially in public procurement in more detail and another one is relating to creation of innovations. So hopefully these projects will go forward and I’m also very anxiously waiting to hear what the European Commission is planning for the new Remedies Directive because that is something, the remedies I mean that I have always been interested at so probably I will look at that as well when we have more information on what are the changes to be made in future.Well I think that’s a great way to finish the programme. Thank you very much Kirsi. Thank you Pedro.

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    #17 - Grith Skovgaard Olykke (Copenhagen Business School) Feb 25, 2016
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    Abnormally low tenders in public procurement Interview with Dr. Grith Skovgaard Olykke, Associate Professor at the Copenhagen Business School about abnormally low tenders in public procurement and mixed methods research (law and economics).TranscriptIt’s great to finally have you here, and I’m very grateful that you accepted the invitation to be on the programme, and also to be one of the referees in the Early Career Research conference that we’re setting in for early March, and I was very happy with the kind of work that you did on selecting the participants.Oh you’re welcome, and thanks for inviting me to participate.Yeah, I’m looking forward to the conference, but we’ll leave that for the end of the show. Speaking about abnormally low tenders, this is your, I would say, your main area of research so far in your career, can you start by explaining us a little bit what are abnormally low tenders?Well that’s a very good question to start with because there’s no clear answer, and that’s why it’s such an interesting research topic, I think. Basically there’s some agreement that there’s no definition of abnormally low tenders, which means that there’s a lot of discretion with authorities and with the national review bodies. Basically I think the idea is that the tenders are perceived to be abnormal though they don’t appear serious. But, then again, that’s a lot of discretion into defining what serious means. A general idea is also that there might be a risk that the contract might not be performed on the terms, and that could also indicate an abnormally low tender. The Courts of Justice has not been asked specifically what an abnormally low tender is, and hence my interest in this topic.Yeah, I agree with you. One of the things that has always surprised me about abnormally low tenders, in addition to the fact that it’s not very well-defined, and the fact that is a very important limitation, a very important consideration in the whole area, what I find interesting as well is that even if a tender is found abnormally low, there is no obligation from the contracting authority to actually exclude such tender from the contract, it can still keep it.Yeah but that was sort of the 2004/18 approach. Now with the new directive there’s actually an obligation to verify and to reject abnormally low tenders under certain circumstances. So that’s going to be very interesting to see what’s going to happen with the case law on this topic in the future.Well, I hope it changes the practice because, for me, it never made much sense in the old directive that we would have a situation whereby a tender may be abnormally low but there would be no consequence for such tenders, so let’s keep an eye open for the near future on that area. In terms of the research that you’ve already done on abnormally low tenders, what have you found out that is important about this area?Yeah well, to begin with, with my thesis, when I started, I was fascinated by this lack of a definition, so I set out to actually find out, with an EU law perspective, what is an abnormally low tender, and what I started out with was to think about where else do we have rules on low pricing. Obviously this would be competition law. What I did was to try to argue that a well-developed legal tool from competition law could probably be transferred into public procurement law, so I’m not talking about using competition law, I’m talking about utilising a tool developed in competition law to assess pricing in a procurement context. I call this the coverage of cost approach, because obviously competition law talks about you have to cover certain costs. So I tried to sort of transfer this into a procurement context. I think the approach is appropriate, in particular regarding arguments of coherence in the EU legal system, because if there is a difference between an abnormally low tender and a situation where a low price breaches competition law, there will be a risk of exploitation, of the public procurement context to distort competition and exclude competitors. So I think there needs to be coherence here, and that was one of my basic arguments.In addition to that, and moving on a little bit to the work that you’re doing today, what has changed in the way that you are treating abnormally low tenders or the way that we should be treating abnormally low tenders?I think so far we’ve had a situation where you couldn’t really do anything in these cases, unless the tender had been rejected. What I’m looking at the moment is Danish case law and Swedish case law on abnormally low tenders, and I see, a lot of these cases were the acceptance of low tenders has been challenged, but with no success because there’s no obligation to reject such tenders. I think it’s interesting to see what’s going to happen now with the obligation in the new directive where actually sometimes, having to reject abnormally low tenders when they’re low on certain grounds. That’s the Article 18(2)[?? 06:06] grounds, the social, developmental and labour law obligations that need to be adhered to. When you’re pricing a tender, obviously your price needs to reflect these costs . I think what we will be seeing, is going to be a massive change because now you’ve got a right to challenge the award to a low price tender, and this could be very interesting to see what’s actually going to happen. I think we’ll see a lot of case law and also think that the approach that I proposed in my thesis is actually supported by the new obligation to reject tenders, because as I mentioned, the tender has to reflect social and economic obligations. So, I think it’s a very interesting time for this topic.What jurisdictions are you covering in the current project?The current project is an interdisciplinary project, so I’m working together with Swedish economists. The law part is looking at what is the concept of an abnormally low tender in Denmark and Sweden, and there are differences I can already feel are there. And the economist is going to look at what kind of strategies might be identifiable in these cases, so what kind of strategic pricing might we see, and together then we’re going to look at how should strategic pricing that we see in these cases be handled legally, and also we’re going to try to say something about what’s going to change with the new provision and the obligation to reject.On that note, do you think that there’s a relationship there between abnormally low tenders and what economists call the winner’s curse in auctions?That’s not what we see.It’s not what you see?No, it’s not what I’ve seen in the cases that I have looked at so far. What I see in the case law is more the economic concept of unbalanced pricing, maybe?Sure.So some prices high, some prices low, according to what you expect demand might be, and it’s all the prices are collected in the assessment of the price, then you could have a good score on the price, even though your tender is actually going to be more expensive for the contracting authority because you’ve higher priced some of the items, that’s going to be demanded a lot, or that’s going to be the main part of the contract, but since other price items weigh the same in the assessment, then you have a very good price and you score well on the price. So I think that’s what I’ve seen so far, but I’ve only just started to go through the Swedes’ case law now and there’s a lot of judgments . It’s also acknowledged by the Swedish court that we see strategic pricing and basically that it’s OK.Well, that reminds me, it connected with something that we’ve not talked about, which is additional works. I mean that reminds me, when I was a lawyer, and this was before the directive 2004/18 was [?? 09:05 resposed] into Portugal, I remember being a procurement lawyer and having discussions with clients, both private and public, about the sustainability of certain bits, and pretty much everyone in the specific sector, which I’m not going to disclose, obviously, they always under-priced their bids at least 25% because the Portuguese law at the time allowed them to, during the contract performance, to find ways to claw back those 25% legally. Things changed a little bit and the Portuguese law now imposes a 5% limit, so I don’t know if that’s changed the practice in Portugal or not. Now, what may happen nowadays, which, if I recall correctly in the directive, there’s not a hard limit or very strong limitation on additional works as it was in the past, what you may see is that there will be a tendency for suppliers to under-price their offers, their bids, precisely because they think that once they get the contract, they may try to make it up in additional works in, or additional services.Yeah, yeah, I agree. You are referring to Article 72 on amendment of contracts,? I agree, and I think maybe the obligation to reject abnormally low tenders sort of goes in the other direction, because at least you have to share that some of the specific costs are covered in the tender, otherwise it would not make sense having an obligation to reject. So it could go both ways I think, but you’re right that the discretion to change the contract after it’s been entered into, puts at risk that you have to pay extra for the same.Yeah, I agree with you in that as well. So looking a little bit further down the line, into the regulation, what do you think that we should do regarding abnormally low tenders? Do you think that the decision by the lawmakers, including mandatory exclusions of abnormally low tenders in the current directive, is a good thing or we should move back to the old system?Oh, I think it’s a very difficult question, and I’m not sure that I’ve actually made up my mind.That’s fine.I think we have to see what happens, you know, what kind of cases we’re going to get. I know that in the Swedish practice I’ve been looking at, this is very preliminary research results, we already have quite a lot of cases on hourly wage, you know, you should have a specific hourly wage in your tender, and that’s sort of, something that I think we’ve got to discuss in the future, and I don’t know quite how this is going to end. So I think I’ll sit back a bit and watch and see what happens before I make up my mind.Let’s explore that a little bit because that is a topic that is creeping up here in the UK as well, and at least some, I would say, some guidance, and if I’m not wrong as well, at least in the Scottish position of the directive, which is an effort to put the floor on the wages, which might be different than the minimum wage here in the UK.Yeah.Is that what’s happening in Sweden as well?Sweden’s a bit complex because they’ve got a “problematic” collective agreement system. They’ve been challenged with the Laval case, and they’ve made some changes. It’s the same here in Denmark, we don’t really know what the minimum wageis. So we’ve got some issues. I think what they have been doing is trying to sort of fix a minimum hourly wage but not necessarily with reference to collective agreements, and some of the tenderers arguments in the case law that I’ve read is that we are actually adhering to the collective agreement but the minimum wage set by the contract unfortunately was higher than this. But it’s not really been explored by the courts, so I think maybe it’s the same trend we’re seeing in the UK, but there’s not been any arguments regarding the posting of workers directive, etc, because it’s been national cases.Yeah, OK, makes sense. Moving onto the second topic that I would like for us to focus on today, which is your experience with interdisciplinary research. So as I said at the start, you have a mixed law and economics background, I think that it’s a very interesting mix of skills and approaches. What has been so far your experience in trying to bring those two different, let’s say, frameworks of thought into research?Yeah, I guess I’m a bit biased because, as you said, I’ve got this business administration and commercial law education, and I’ve got difficulties letting economics, leaving economics completely out of my mind-set, not that that’s a necessarily good thing to do. So, I’m always thinking economics when I’m doing my research, and what I’ve tried to do recently is to team up with economists to do interdisciplinary research. I’ve focused mainly on law myself, but I’ve got some ideas of the economics that could be interesting to do as well, and then I’ve teamed up with an economist to do that part, and that’s been really fruitful and interesting for me.So why do you prefer to bring on board an economist instead of doing it yourself, the economist’s bits, so that you can focus on law? Why do you do that? What is the benefit?Well the benefit for me is that I’ve majored in the law since I finished education in 2006, so my economics is a bit rusty. I’ve got some of the general ideas and I just want to make sure that if I do research then the economics should be an appropriate level as well.Yeah, that makes sense. I mean, that’s one of the things I’ve noticed which is there’s only so much you can do coming in from a different discipline.Yes.It’s good if you are able to bring, let’s say, some tools off a different discipline into our own. So for example, for my PhD I used social sciences research methods, and certainly I would like to use quantitative research methods in the future, with my research. But at the end of the day I’m also very aware of my own limitations.Yeah, exactly.And mine are even more pressing than yours because you have an education, an economics background, you have an education in economics, I don’t, so I left maths and all that section of knowledge in my education when I was 15 or 16.Yeah.So I think that is a very important shortcoming in my view about legal education in general, is that it does not foster in the students the development of those quantitative skills, and that’s something that, for example, I would like to work for in the future as well. But going back to the research, as time goes on, one of the things I’ve noticed is that, especially for us lawyers or legal minds, it’s very hard to have, I wouldn’t say complete but a realistic view about the problem if all the skillsets that are brought to bear in that research, are legal skills.Yeah, I agree with you, I think it’s very important to have alternative disciplines or other disciplines having a look at the problem as well. Sometimes it’s completely new perspectives and I think it’s very important to actually get one step further, or, not just one more, but some steps further by bringing in another discipline. A very good example of this is a paper that has just been published in the European Journal of Law and Economics, which I co-authored with an economics professor on the concept of services of general economic interest, because it was something that I’ve been wondering about for a while, and I know that different people have tried to say something about, what are the services of general economic interests, from a legal perspective. So I talked to this professor, whom I taught a course with, that also concerned services of general economic interest, and we decided to try to work out what would be the economic point of view on this concept, and we ended up doing a very interesting article, I think, I had good fun doing the research, and we had great discussions on how we could bring economics into this concept which was mainly legal.I agree with you because in my own research, what I’ve seen, and this is, as I said, an idea that has developed, that I’ve developed as time goes on, is that in the end, I mean, the legal perspective, it’s a means to an end, and that’s something that to me, as lawyers, sometimes miss out, we think that law is an end in itself. So when you’re drafting the laws, you’re thinking about the legal implications and not the wider implications of the law, and when we’re interpreting it, we’re just looking a…

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    #16 - Guilherme Lichand (Harvard University) Feb 15, 2016
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    Can a little bit of corruption be good for your health? iTunesGuilherme Lichand's Harvard page and his job market paper.TranscriptIt’s great to have you here Guilherme. Your paper it’s fascinating and thought provoking. Why did you decide to look into the issue of corruption in the health sector and its potential downstream effects? Great. The idea – not only in health, but more broadly – is that while we have increasing evidence of what tools can most effectively fight corruption (in particular, audits have been shown to significantly decrease missing government expenditures), we have much less credible evidence about what is the effect of those tools on the outcomes that corruption is supposed to detrimentally affect. The distinction matters, because bureaucratic performance has multiple dimensions; rent capture is just one of them. On the other dimensions we have, for instance, the quantity and the quality of public goods’ provision. So while, on the one hand, limiting the extent to which bureaucrats can capture rents should mechanically increase resources flowing towards public goods’ provision, on the other hand it might decrease incentives for bureaucrats to exert effort on those other dimensions. Theory predicts that the implications of deterring corruption on public service delivery should be ambiguous, and, hence, we try to understand whether deterring corruption helps or hurts public service delivery. That’s the prime motivation on the paper.Any reason why you picked Brazil over any other country that you could have done this research on? Brazil introduced an anti-corruption program nationally in 2003, so it provided a great opportunity to try to answer this question. First, because the programme was introduced right at the mid-point of the Mayor’s political term. The term is from 2001 through 2004, and the programme was announced exactly in January 2003. Second, because these audits are retrospective. Basically, when auditors go there, they follow the paper trail of every investigation, at least up to three years prior to the time of the audit. This way we have the data we needed to try to answer this question. That also takes us to the point of why health. The answer is, first – given the audit data that we needed to code – because we needed to restrict that attention to a particular area of public policies, because it is a huge amount of data. Second, because of outcomes – availability is very good at the municipal level for health. We have a lot of indicators at the municipal level that are measured for all municipalities every year, and that was really what we needed in terms of data requirements to try to answer this question.What's the main finding of your paper? On the one hand, we find that the program greatly reduced corruption – and by this I mean procurement manipulation, off-the-record settlements with vendors, and resource diversion. These kind of problems, according to the audit reports, are greatly decreased by the introduction of the program. But on the other hand, what happened is that the program also dramatically deteriorated the quality of health indicators – and by this I mean hospital beds per thousand inhabitants, immunisation coverage, or household access to piped water and proper sanitation, in comparison to other health indicators that involve much less procurement. So to anticipate the results, what basically happened is that, it seems, we thrown the baby out with the dirty bath water. The programme was a major institutional improvement in terms of transparency, but by focusing so much on corruption – both in terms of public opinion and administrative punishments –, what seems to have happened is that spending fell by so much that corruption per dollar spent has actually increased after the program.Really?Yes.So let’s break that down into sub-questions or comments. So the audit programme did reduce corruption so you guys were able to measure that, right, okay, so that is one element. So in terms of the let’s say, first degree objective of the programme it worked as it was supposed to work in terms of reducing corruption at least in absolute levels if not, as you were saying, in relative levels per spend. So when we look at the percentage of investigations that were coded as corruption, looking at these audit reports, indeed it is the case that the baseline incidence of corruption is decreased by half. It is a major effect. Just to give you a sense, among those transfers that involved a lot of procurement – we look at how programs earmarked to specific spending, like buying hospital beds or contracting hospital reforms, those sort of transfers –, before the program, about 37% of our investigations were coded as corruption, some sort of the problems that I previously mentioned. After the program, that rate falls to about 12%, and this is the same rate for those audit transfers that did not involve procurement at all – like those earmarked to pay wages of doctors or local procurement staff. So, basically, the idea is that, as you said, if you just focus on corruption, then the program would do exactly what it was supposed to do: every investigation now had much less of this procurement problems that were very prevalent beforehand.But on the other hand? Yes, on the other hand... before we even tried to look at the mechanism, if we look at the outcomes – because, you know, corruption fell by so much you might think that health indicators would become much, much better after this –, what we find is that these health indicators (comparing again these two sets of transfers: those with a lot procurement and those basically with no procurement) become significantly worse. Just to give you a sense: in a cross-sectional comparison, the magnitude of the effect is equivalent to losing between half and all of the support of the federal government towards municipalities’ health budget. Because municipalities depend so essentially on federal redistribution to be able to provide those local public goods, this effect might mean that they have no budget left, and this is consistent to the effects when we look at spending. After we found these effects on the health indicators, we wanted to understand the mechanism. What was happening? Why was corruption going down but health indicators becoming worse? So we looked at two other dimensions of bureaucratic performance. First, quantity – proxied by spending. What we find is that using the same strategy, differential spending across the two sets of transfers fell by at least 50% after introduction on the program. This effect is consistent with the deterioration of the health indicators. And just by residual, since corruption fell by about 30 percentage points (the percentage of investigation coded as corruption), and since spending fell by at least 50%, this must mean that corruption per dollar spent must have increased by at least 20 percentage points. So that’s where this figure comes from.We also look at quality: from these audit reports, we can also look at implementation problems. We find that, basically, infrastructure problems abound, infrastructure is no longer functional (or high quality), and also medication stock problems abound after the program. Because you’re not spending, then all these problems are coming about and this is consistent with the overall story that (i) either because bureaucrats can no longer capture rents they have less incentive to exert effort in these other dimensions or, (ii) and this is something we might talk more about, these procurement guidelines are so complex and the quality of these local procurement staff is so low that it’s now easier just not to spend and blame the federal government for not transferring resources than perhaps running into a procurement mistake and being labelled as corrupt.We’ll address that in a minute. There was something that I was listening to you and I think it’s important to probe a little bit further there as well, which is it makes sense that the outputs or at least a proxy for the outputs, would go down if spend goes down as your analysis show so, you know, fewer beds per a thousand inhabitants, worse outcomes in terms of immunisation or the availability of medicines, all that makes sense because you’re talking about the health budget and how public procurement is really in the health system work. What I didn’t understand was the relationship with the access to piped water and as well to the waste treatment so how do you connect those two elements? Because if I get it correctly, is the audit then to the whole municipality or just to the Health Department?So these audits look at overall expenses, it’s just that within health and education they look at the whole set of transfers whereas in other areas they look at a sample of the transfers. But the thing is, there are some health programmes (in Brazil at least) that are targeted to improving the connection to piped water, the quality of water and sanitation, and so when we choose indicators we look at what indicators the Health Ministry uses for monitoring and evaluation.No, that makes sense now, it’s just that I wasn’t seeing the connection right immediately because the other ones are obvious and that one I knew that there must be a reason there, I couldn’t just find it. In terms of your analysis, you’ve done something that I find very interesting, is that you decide to separate the analysis in accordance with different procurement intensity so you’ve looked both at procurement intensive processes and procurements not intensive processes if it makes sense, why did you do that?So you know the program involves random audits. So one might think that you could just look at the effect of the audits themselves on corruption and on these health outcomes to understand whether the mechanism we propose makes sense. Now, one problem with this is that, although we can indeed do exactly what I just said, most of the effects of procurement might perhaps have happened at the announcement of the program, even before any audits actually took place. So to understand the overall effect of the program we have to resort to a differences in differences strategy. We can compare (because we have the retrospective data), municipalities before and after both the Mayor and the local procurement staff learned they could be audited – so that’s one dimension of comparison. But if we just did these over time comparisons, many other things changed in 2003, so this is not enough to really pin down the effect of the program. So the idea is to look within municipalities, to different sets of transfers: those that involve a lot of procurement, and those that do not. The idea is that, first, the program should have had a differential effect across these transfers. Because most of corruption is linked to procurement problems, it should have had a higher effect on those transfers that involve a lot of procurement. And second, any differential in corruption across these two sets of transfers should have remained constant otherwise. That’s the assumption for relying on this strategy to try to pin down the effects of the program. We also use recent nearby audits as a complementary strategy (because they are random) for trying to assess the same mechanism. Roughly, the effects that we find are consistent. So both the overall effect of the program and those of audits themselves are in the direction of decreasing corruption, but also of decreasing spending by so much the health indictors actually become worse.Yes, okay. Speaking about the audits, are they really random, i.e., is really a lottery or is this that the official claim from the system for the outside world is internally they pick who they want to do the audit to?That’s a good question. This program is a joint venture with the National Lottery, so the draws are in television. Every two months or so (at least in principle), about sixty municipalities were supposed to be drawn. The first papers to exploit variation from this programme were by Claudio Ferraz (PUC-Rio) and Frederico Finan (Stanford). They try to understand if these audits are indeed random, so they look at a broad range of variables, political parties included, and they don’t find significant differences. Each municipality has a 1% probability of being drawn, they do it in this way every draw. What we had to do involved an extra step: to show that not only audits are random, but also that conditionally on municipality’s characteristics, recent audits that happened nearby are also random, so that we can exploit not only if a municipality itself is audited, but also if a neighbour is audited, it this raises the perceived probability of you being audited in the future – out of a behavioural mechanism – to look at the effects of interest.Yes, the reason I was asking this is because in Portugal theoretically you are selected randomly to provide evidence about your tax situation and it was claimed originally to be a lottery but I mean the same people were getting the letters from the IRS, the Portuguese IRS, every year so it was very clear quite quickly that there was no lottery involved. What I did not know is that in Brazil actually it’s really a lottery and it’s done at least apparently above board. Right. So there are many oversight programs in place, some of which are not based on random audits. The state tribunals do a bunch of audits which are motivated by either some event or even by a private investigation, so it’s an overlay of different institutions. This program specifically is based on random audits, and that’s what makes it nice at least for the investigation in this paper.Yes, it makes perfect sense because if it’s random it’s one less variable or one less bias slash problem you may have with the data that could be influencing you. Exactly.Very well, moving onto another topic which is how transferable is this finding or these findings to other areas of public sector that are also subject to procurement analysis of expenditure, particularly areas that are very procurement intensive like say, for example, public works which is always usually the one that comes to mind? Our thought is that there’s nothing really specific, it seems, about this program in Brazil that would prevent the findings from being extended elsewhere. First, this kind of bureaucratic politics through which the federal government transfers resources that would fund the provision of local public goods, with a local bureaucracy which is responsible for running procurement before these resources can reach their final users – citizens – in the form of these public services, is the modal workings of public bureaucracy in the developing world, it’s seems to us. And there is evidence from other settings that are very consistent with this findings. There is a paper, from 2015, in the American Economic Review, for instance, about a program in Nigeria, showing that when it monitored bureaucrats on several dimensions of bureaucratic performance then they exert less effort in those dimensions; they try to divert efforts to dimensions that are less subject to monitoring. This is consistent with this idea that whenever you have this layer – bureaucrats that must procure resources before they can actually reach citizens –, you are subject to this kind of tension between actually procuring / spending, on the one hand, and on the other hand, making proper use of public funds. So the only difference that I can foresee is when, in some settings, resources are directly transferred to the end users. There is a paper, from 2004, with data from Uganda, in which they tried to investigate the effects of a newspaper campaign aimed at ensuring that the federal resources would reach schools. They claimed that, in Uganda, before the campaign, basically the modal transfer to schools was zero. So most schools were getting basically nothing out of what they should actually get.…

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    #15 - Sarah Schoenmaekers (Maastricht University) Feb 08, 2016
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    Exclusion of candidates under Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU iTunes TranscriptI’d like to start by talking about generally the regime of Article 57, why is it important? Before you answer, I would like to add a note here, which myself and our colleague, Dr Albert Sanchez Graells, when we commented on the transposition of the directive into England and Wales on our blogs, telles.eu and howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk, one of the entries that was most popular over the whole series that we did, was precisely Article 57. Even today, almost six months after we wrote it, people are still going regularly and checking what we wrote about Article 57. So what’s so special about this Article?Well, why the Article is important is because the primary goal of public procurement in the European Union is to ensure that we have the widest possible competition, which means that we have the highest possible participation of tenderers, which is based on the whole free movement regime of the European Union, and precisely in public procurements, we see that there is very big constant interaction between public and private parties, which is very good. We also see that there are very large financial flows going from the public side to the private side, and it has been seen in many publications that specifically for this reason, public procurement is really susceptible to corruption. If you look at public procurement budgets, then a recent study of PricewaterhouseCoopers has indicated that 13% of the overall project budget is actually money that is paid because of corruption. So the whole idea that the new directive wants to achieve is that we exclude corrupt operators, but of course the exclusion of corruption is just one of the exclusion grounds that are mentioned in the directive, but it is very important that all the candidates who are interested in working, that they are not participating anymore in public procurement procedures, precisely because it costs a lot of money.But to a certain extent that has always been the case with public procurement, at least public procurement as it is regulated at the EU level. If you think about, and go back to the ‘60s and the ‘70s when the first round of directives was being put forward for [?? 03.09 works], the same thing already existed there, the same ultimate objective, which was to make sure that procurement was not a corrupt process, or did not lead to corrupt outcomes.That is true, and on that side the new directive has not really changed that much, because also in the previous directive we had an Article that specifically dealt, as you said, with the exclusion of economic operators, but I think that it has only been recently seen how big of a problem it actually is, and how many corrupt practices there are. One has always expected it, or knew it, but now there are actual numbers, and it has been seen how important it actually is.So looking at the Article 57, what has changed in the new directive, in comparison with directive 24/18? Well there are some small changes, but also some big changes. One change that we have is, well what is the saying, I may have to start with that, is that in both the old and new directives, there is a distinction between mandatory exclusion grounds, and discretionary exclusion grounds. And mandatory exclusion grounds means that economic operators have to be excluded, while with the discretionary exclusion grounds, economic… well, the competition authorities have the discretion, so they are free to decide whether they are going to exclude an economic operator. In the new directive, there are more mandatory exclusion grounds than we have in the old directive. For example, we now have exclusion grounds that deal with terrorist offences, they’re precisely because terrorism has become more and more a problem in society. There’s also new exclusion grounds dealing with child labour, and human trafficking, and we have a specific mandatory exclusion grounds if you do not pay your social security or taxes, and there has been judgements by a court or by an administration, then you also have to be mandatory excluded. In the previous directive there was also this mentioning of not paying your social security or your taxes, but that was something that only feel within the discretionary exclusion grounds. Now it is mandatory as long as there is a final judicial or administrative decision.Another new element in the directive is that Article 57 now specifically refers to the proportionally principle. The proportionality principle is a principle that is of course always relevant in EU law, whether or not it has been mentioned, because it is one of the founding principles. By specifically mentioning it here, I think that the European legislature wanted to underline its importance, and also set an example, if you only have not paid a very small amount of your taxes for example, or a very small amount of your social security contributions, then excluding you from a public procurement procedure might not really be proportional, and then the mandatory exclusion will certainly not be the best option, because it would violate proportionality. You also see that proportionality comes back when one talks about the length of the exclusion period, because the directive specifically says that if there is no judgement saying otherwise, mandatory exclusion grounds cannot cause for a longer debarment period than five years from the date of the conviction. And when it is about discretionary exclusion grounds, it cannot be longer than three years from the date of the relevant event. So those are important changes. There are also some changes with regard to discretionary exclusion grounds.There are also here more exclusion grounds in the directive, for example, if you did not respect environmental, social or labour law, that could be a relevant ground for excluding someone, and here you also see how important social and environmental issues are for the European legislature. You don’t only see this in Article 57, but you see this in many places in the directive, where for example when one talks about the award criteria of the most economically advantageous vender, then you see that environmental aspects have really increased in importance compared to before, because the directive specifically foresees in a definition of life cycle costs and things like that, which doesn’t mean that contracting authorities have to award on the basis of the most economically advantageous standard, the lowest price is in principle still a relevant award criteria, but you see that a lot of attention has been paid recently to these environmental issues in public procurement. There are also some new aspects with regard to this discretionary exclusion grounds when it comes to, if you have been prior involved in a public procurement procedure, if you enter into agreement to distort competition, or if there were deficiencies in a prior contract in which the economic operator was engaged, or if there was unduly influencing of the decision making process, those are all additional discretionary exclusion grounds that are now in the directive. Finally, maybe the most important new aspect of the directive is that Article 57, paragraph six specifically, literally [?? 09.22 foresees] in self-cleaning, which wasn’t actually laid down in the previous directives.Okay, we’ll go to self-cleaning in a minute, but before that there’s a couple of comments that I would like to put to you, or try to probe for a little bit more information. Thinking about the exclusions due to lack of payment for taxes and social security, one of the things I’ve noticed over the years is, if you look at the transpositions into various member states, when they refer to the lack of payment of taxes and social security, and also any of the mandatory exclusion grants that depend on other specific rules, they always refer to the national rules of that specific member state. So for example here in the UK, or at least for England and Wales, if you go into Regulation 57 and also in prior regulations, you’d find there the reference to the applicable national law, or in this case, well it’s actually a national law I think, about the payment of taxes and social security, which then leads me to the question which is, what happens when we’re talking about, and we’re discussing the participation of foreign economic operators, economic operators based in other member states?Well, if you look precisely at the Article and the directive, then they refer, in Article 57, paragraph two, to not paying taxes or social security contributions where this has been established by judicial or administrative decision in accordance with legal provision of the country in which it is established or with those of the member states of the contracting authority. So while it’s important that you always have to look first whether there has been at national level a judicial or administrative decision that has binding effect, and only after you have such a binding national decisions, then you can look at Article 57, paragraph two. So if there has not been a binding decision at national level, then Article 57 as such is not really relevant. So you always has to see, whether it is possible in the national legal system for courts for example to say that foreign economic operators did not respect their national law, I think that many member states, at least there’s no problem for courts to judge up on the compliance of foreign economic operators in the domestic legal system.My question was a little bit more specific than that, which is it’s not about the legal system, where the contract is going to be performed, or where the contracting authority is based, but it’s about the other legal system, the legal system where the economic operator is based. So although technically, especially now that we have the European Single Procurement Document already out there, and it’s going to come into force in the next few months and years, although the economic operators have to self-declare that they are up to date with all their, let’s say, tax and social security obligations, what is the likelihood that a contracting authority will be able to probe that information, and will be able to get access to information that contradicts a positive self-declaration? So I’m moving the discussion from the theoretical level, which is understandable, into the actual practical level, trying to figure out how contracting authorities will be able to do that on a day-to-day basis. I think that will certainly not be very easy, because contracting authorities, if they want to get access to information in principle, the first one who they have to rely on is on the economic operators themselves, and if you look at the directive, contracting authorities are not even obliged to ask for proof. So if you look at the mandatory exclusion grounds, then the fact has to have happened, there also has to be a conviction, but the directive doesn’t even oblige contracting authorities to ask for proof. Of course in order to perform well, they have to make sure that they have all the relevant information, but I think of course it will not be very likely in the first place that economic operators are going to self-declare.That is something that has also been shown by the practice in the US, and in the World Bank for example, because even though economic operators were asked on many occasions to come up with all the information, to give all the information that was relevant to the contracting authorities, in practice it was shown that they didn’t, for many reasons. First of all because they didn’t want to reveal things that might harm them, but also because they thought that if they would not reveal it no one would know it anyway, so they would always be safe. And at the World Bank and in the US they now have this system in which you cannot only be debarred for the fact itself, so for example for fraud or corruption, so for the basic mistake that you did, but you can also be debarred simply for not informing the contracting authorities about those things in which you behaved incorrectly. And it was shown that only if a system like this is used, then economic operators think twice, because they risk to be debarred, even for the simple fact of not informing the contracting authorities. Well of course this is all very recent, but it is presumed that this is going to have much more effect, because the previous system didn’t really have much effect in the US. Of course we will have to see whether the same will apply in Europe, we cannot tell yet, but that is the first information that we may have already on this topic.Well, that was precisely the angle that I was going for, which is inside each member state, it may be easy or more difficult, but it’s possible for the contracting authority to find out the information, because they will know the system, they will know where to find that information, but when you’re talking about economic operators that can come from any other 27 member states, plus the EEA states, it becomes very difficult for a contracting authority to have access to that information, and that’s one of the concerns I have with the current system, which is, I’m all for reducing transaction costs like this system does with the self-declaration, but at the same time I’m always wary that not enough consequences are clearly present, so to actually give the right incentives to contracting operators to comply with. A few years ago I did some pilots here in the UK for contracts below the thresholds where we tried to implement a similar system of self-declaration. It worked really well, and we didn’t have any problems, but my question was always, if we scale this from small contracting authorities to bigger contracting authorities and more cases, to more contracts, what will then happen when you start having a higher volume of contracts and also economic operators? Some of them, I was afraid of, could very well try to find a defence for not providing the information. So what we did back then was to put in the tender document very clear consequences for the economic operator, but that was as far as we went, and that was only for a contracting authority. I think this is something that is important enough, that should have been addressed directly in the directive, and if not, at least in the national laws.Yes, I fully agree with you. I also think that a problem might be that once you come clean, the directive says that in principle, you should be excused, so you should be able to take part in a public procurement procedure again, while in the US that is absolutely not the case. It is not because you came clean and because you did all those good things, therefore you will no longer be debarred, it is a much higher threshold, and I think it would be better because otherwise what would be the incentive for economic operators in the first place, not to engage in untrustworthy behaviour. Because they know almost, “Oh, if we later say I’m sorry, and we will do some additional measures, and we will have some programmes in our company to make sure it doesn’t happen again, then we will be excused anyway.” So the question can rightly be, why would someone behave correctly in the first place if you know that by just coming clean, and by taking some steps of course, you can get off the hook? It’s not really that you are then being treated equally, compared to someone, to a company that never did something wrong in the first place. Of course I understand that everyone should be able to get a second chance, because that is of course the European system and the European spirit, but on the other hand it is not always a good thing, I think, that you are still able to partake even if you are engaged in a serious offense before, even though you complied later with self-cleaning measures.Moving on to self-cleaning, how it is dealt with in the new…

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    #14 - Richard Craven (University of Leicester) Jan 25, 2016
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    Research methods in public procurement (law) iTunesInterview with Dr. Richard Craven, Lecturer at the University of Leicester.His research interests lie at the crossroads between law and social sciences, with a particular emphasis in public procurement research methods. Today’s talk will have more of a shared approach to it than usual as we both have something to say about research methods in public procurement.TranscriptIt’s great to have you here, we’ve known each other for a few years but I think it’s the first time that we are getting back together and talking about procurement and procurement research methods.Yes.Let’s start with your PhD, what research did you do for your PhD and what methods did you use?Okay so my PhD completed in 2012, looked at the legal framework in the UK for regulating public private partnerships, so what we know as competitive dialogue, and then as you said, it wasn’t just a case of looking at the law in books. So looking at case law, looking at what the legislation said about how people are supposed to behave, it was more we went out into practice and conducted interviews with lawyers interpreting and applying the rules in practice, policy makers and procurement officers and contracting authorities, so I suppose just to see what sort of legal uncertainties were being interpreted in practice and how difficult areas may be where we might not want to comply with the rules, how that was approached in practice and, yes so really just that sort of, yes law in books to law in action-type approach.I mean that’s very similar to the research I’ve done and I did in 2010, that I finished in 2010 for my PhD. I also was looking forward to see how competitive dialogue had been implemented and was being used in practice in Portugal and Spain. What I find very interesting is that it’s very different from watching or seeing the law being deployed in action by agents that are actually using and sometimes abusing the law in comparison with what you can read in the books, what you can read let’s say in the directives or in the laws and regulations.Yes same here really, I think probably in the UK I think there was a lot of say reporting in the trade press that competitive dialogue was causing problems in practice, but I think it was about seeing overall, why were those problems being caused, how was it being interpreted maybe to cause those problems and what strategies were adopted to get around it. So yes, it was fascinating really coming from sort of a law background, you know you’re always studying law as in, ‘Or what are these legal rules?” and then sort of taking a completely different perspective that actually the law is what people are doing in practice, not necessarily what it says in the books yes.Yes, I think that’s a very good point to remember, back in 2004, 2005 let’s say or 2006 maybe, the commission say in interpretive communication or whatever about competitive dialogues using some made-up examples of where the competitive dialogue could be used for example if [?? 3.25] authority wasn’t sure to use a bridge or a tunnel to cross a river, those kind of examples which made perhaps perfect sense in theory and for the people that were involved in drafting first the Directive 2004/18 and then obviously that communication or interpretation. Then in practice there was no correspondence with reality I mean, I have never seen an example where that kind of problem actually happened in practice.Yes definitely, I agree, and hopefully then I suppose that’s what our PhDs contributed to good policy-making, because we’ve seen the law reformed now to something that’s maybe a bit more commercially sensible. I think originally without those commission interpretations, the law wasn’t being interpreted in sort of a way that was relevant for practice, and it was because of that sort of research, and we weren’t the only ones, but sort of highlighting that sort of miss-match between the, yes you know maybe for transparency reasons we might like to have these rules, but for commercially sensible reasons it’s just not going to work necessarily. So yes I completely agree there.Well that takes me to the second question which is, what can we say that is wrong or limited with purely black letter or doctrinal analysis?Well I don’t want to be too critical of doctrinal analysis, you know I enjoy reading doctrinal analysis sort of, obviously it sets up my work because I do empirical research, but I think it’s always that it can only take us so far, and particularly with public procurement in the UK as well where we have limited case law, we have legislation that’s uncertain in areas and complicated, and also a lot of guidance documents, so what we might call soft law so you don’t have to comply with it but you know, is authoritative in some sense. So a black letter legal analysis can, yes it can tell you what the law might be but actually it can’t tell you what the reality of the law is, what’s actually happening out there so yes, it can only take it so far really.Yes but I think that is a very important point to make in a very important limitation to highlight, which is it only takes us this far but then it doesn’t allow us to actually know how the law is being used in practice and how to improve it, because at the end of the day to a certain extent, like with the analysis, it’s a little more than just opinion yes, it’s a legal opinion, but it’s only that.Yes, I can only agree yes, it’s just one side of it and you know, there’s sort of great academic debates that go in say public procurement, public law but in practice just isn’t happening in line with that so it’s, as I say, just limited value isn’t it.Yes, personally I’m always much more interested perhaps because I used to be a lawyer because I became an academic, I’m always more interested in looking at what is the job to be done that a certain piece of legislation is trying to solve and see if it’s actually solving it in practice, looking at in reality what it is doing instead of what people wanted it to do from the outside.Definitely, and I suppose it’s in the UK, I suppose it’s just a modern way of doing things as well, so we’ve always, sort of legal researchers have always favoured doctrinal analysis and it’s only more recently that we’re sort of embracing social science methods which can only be a good thing.Well to be honest, I mean it’s much easier and to a certain extent cheaper as well and less time-consuming to be just black letter analysis instead of doing empirical research.Yes definitely, but I mean I have colleagues complain that you know, with doctrinal analysis they can’t apply for funding and what have you whereas actually empirical researchers, we can always make case for funding which I think is always viewed quite positively.Yes that’s true, I hear the same thing both here in Swansea where I am now and also at Bangor University where I was before, the colleagues with the more traditional skillset in terms of legal academia, they find it very difficult in this day and age to find funding.I think it just shows you what kind of you know, policy-makers, they want that, they want to know what’s happening out there, they don’t just want to know the particular sort of view point or analysis of one person necessarily.Yes, agree with you. Now moving onto another question, why should we be using mixed methods for legal research, what are the pros and cons of doing it?I suppose, I mean we’ve outlined the pros to a certain extent.Well some of them at least.Yes, and I suppose some of the cons as well in terms of the, sort of the expense and the time, I think also without wishing to be critical of black letter analysis [?? 8.15] or overly critical, I think in the same way black letter legal analysis can be, empirical research can be done very badly.Yes that’s true.So I think it’s only good if it’s done sort of quite robustly you know, you’ve got strong methodology there, and I think if it’s not done that, it’s very easy to pull apart and it’s just time wasted, so you know I don’t think it’s something people should just, or researchers should just jump into, I think it is quite hard to do and it needs to be done correctly. But the pros there I mean, as we’ve said in terms of what it tells you about the law and what is happening out there, and the way it can inform policy and show where legal rules might not be achieving what they were intended to achieve, I don’t think there’s any, well the alternative being black letter would not be a suitable approach for that.I think you’ve made a very good point there about the difficulty of doing empirical research well. That is one of the limitations that we have in legal academia, is that by and large in the undergrad studies and even at the postgrad level, by and large we do not foster in the students the development of research skills other than the traditional research skills.Yes.And I think that is a very important constraint that we have then further down the pipeline when people start doing their own research in their PhD or even after the PhDs when they become early career academics, it becomes very hard to retrain and regain those skills that were not gained perhaps in the moment they should have been gained.Yes.I notice that for example, not exactly as much with empirical research but certainly with more economics-minded research, when I try to blend law and economics I can easily get to the limits of my knowledge and the limits of my ability of doing that kind of mixed-method research which I’m really interested in doing, but because I do not have the right background in terms of quantitative skills it becomes really really hard to do it well.Mmm, I think there’s a lot to be said there, but at the same time though I mean, I think empirical research is never going to be perfect is it, it’s just about sort of justifying what you’ve done, there’s always, if you don’t write the findings of particular empirical findings I’m sure you can find some faults in the methodology somewhere and pull it apart, but I suppose that’s just the nature of it. So it’s never going to be perfect but it does need to have that sort of, that strength behind it as the sort of solid foundations and, yes I think the more academics are trained in it and I think universities do provide that sort of training now more and more, so they’re better.On that note what would you like to have known at the beginning of your PhD that you know now about research methods, especially empirical research methods?I think it’s probably that, that it’s not going to be perfect and things are going to go wrong, you know maybe interviews that are arranged are going to fall through and, or you know, the interviewees aren’t going to say the sort of things that you expect them to say or maybe you want them to say if it’s going to fit with a hypothesis.Did you have problems with that?I didn’t but I think you’re just worrying the whole way through because it feels so messy you know it doesn’t feel, you know I think doctrinal research, I think it often feels like you’re in control whereas empirical research doesn’t always feel that way because it’s so dependent, you know so sort of spanning over maybe a couple of years and it’s so, yes just hoping that people contribute and participate in your research but you know, I’ve sort of read around you know afterwards about other sort of empirical studies or famous empirical studies in different areas, and that’s really what they talk about. So you know, you have this book at the end that sort of details this amazing research but actually, getting those findings it was not an easy process and it did feel messy at times, so it would have been good to know that, would have been reassuring to know that.I can certainly relate to that experience, I remember effectively discovering the main finding of my empirical research literally at the dying stage of the research stage when I was doing my final interviews, and it was actually my last interview in person that I did, I still had a few other ones to do over Skype or phone or something like that, but I remember going into that interview and still thinking “I still need something, there’s something here that I’m not getting”. And I had just had that eureka moment after the final interview, the final in-person interview.Yes, I think any empirical research will sort of relate with that, and I suppose another thing that I would do differently is just keep on top of all my data a bit better, I think as I was going through I was sort of taking these interviews down and wasn’t sort of transcribing them straightaway and that, you know.Really?Yes, well occasionally and I think it is important to sort of just interview, transcribe and let that feed into the next interview.Yes that’s actually one of the things I learned to do right from the start, which was to transcribe the interview as soon as possible after the interview has taken place where everything is still fresh.Yes.I never had any technical problems but if you try to transcribe the interview much later after it was done and you find out for example whatever technology, piece of technology you were using wasn’t working in that scenario, you’re pretty much screwed.You are yes, I was quite fortunate though, it was all on a digital recorder and, thank goodness, lesson learned.Yes, what about let’s say other mixed methods of research like economics for example, have you ever been attracted to that?No not really just because I suppose it just hasn’t been something that I’ve really sort of encountered in my studies, so it’s just been a sort of natural progression to get where I am, and I see myself more as a qualitative researcher, I think I’m more interested in people you know and how people respond to legal rules, so that’s what, sort of just regulation more broadly. So I think just following my interests, it’s got me to there but we still sort of go off an sort of continued the empirical line of things, so rather than law and economics we’ve been recently researching into litigation behaviour. So for example why case law and public procurement are so limited in the UK and that was more sort of questionnaires and numbers involved with also, interviews.What did you find on that one?A number of findings actually so looking at behaviour, we’re looking at sort of numbers. I think an overall finding that was limited case law because actually many suppliers didn’t see any reason for litigating, but actually they were happy with the process which actually was quite an interesting finding and you’re you know, maybe not feeling a need to pursue a challenge where there was only a slight technical breach, but then a long with that just the usual sort of reasons for not bringing a charge, be it sort of cost of litigation and fear of upsetting, you know biting the hand that feeds, upsetting the public sector who you might be working with, you might be bidding for further contracts from.The famous fear of blacklisting?Yes.In a sense, that doesn’t seem very different from the research that Despina [?? 16.04] did maybe fifteen years ago or twelve years ago.Yes, yes, so it was sort of building on her research really, but it was sort of a modern, you know Despina’s research was sort of pre- I suppose…Remedies directive.…remedies directive, pre-sort of financial fallout if that had any impact, but yes, I was just basically seeing “well has it all changed now?” and actually it hasn’t changed, those are the main deterrents to litigation like sort of cost, time, actually there not being appropriate remedies in place or people not feeling that there are appropriate remedies in place or attainable remedies in place, those are all sort of limiting in the same way. Another big factor being sort of the approach the UK has to interim relief and sort of cross-undertaking in damages being a requirement, [?? 16.57] seem to be a real inhibitor.I find…

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