Audio narrations of LessWrong posts. Includes all curated posts and all posts with 125+ karma.
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Audio narrations of LessWrong posts. Includes all curated posts and all posts with 125+ karma.
If you’d like more, subscribe to the “Lesswrong (30+ karma)” feed.
Copyright: © 2023 LessWrong Curated Podcast
I spent a few hundred dollars on Anthropic API credits and let Claude individually research every current US congressperson's position on AI. This is a summary of my findings.
Disclaimer: Summarizing people's beliefs is hard and inherently subjective and noisy. Likewise, US politicians change their opinions on things constantly so it's hard to know what's up-to-date. Also, I vibe-coded a lot of this.
Methodology
I used Claude Sonnet 4.5 with web search to research every congressperson's public statements on AI, then used GPT-4o to score each politician on how "AGI-pilled" they are, how concerned they are about existential risk, and how focused they are on US-China AI competition. I plotted these scores against GovTrack ideology data to search for any partisan splits.
1. AGI awareness is not partisan and not widespread
Few members of Congress have public statements taking AGI seriously. For those that do, the difference is not in political ideology. If we simply plot the AGI-pilled score vs the ideology score, we observe no obvious partisan split.
There are 151 congresspeople who Claude could not find substantial quotes about AI from. These members are not included on this plot or any of the plots which follow.
[...]
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Outline:
(00:46) Methodology
(01:12) 1. AGI awareness is not partisan and not widespread
(01:56) 2. Existential risk is partisan at the tails
(02:51) 3. Both parties are fixated on China
(04:02) 4. Who in Congress is feeling the AGI?
(11:10) 5. Those who know the technology fear it.
(12:54) Appendix: How to use this data
The original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.
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First published:
January 16th, 2026
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WLdcvAcoFZv9enR37/what-washington-says-about-agi
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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Since artificial superintelligence has never existed, claims that it poses a serious risk of global catastrophe can be easy to dismiss as fearmongering. Yet many of the specific worries about such systems are not free-floating fantasies but extensions of patterns we already see. This essay examines thirteen distinct ways artificial superintelligence could go wrong and, for each, pairs the abstract failure mode with concrete precedents where a similar pattern has already caused serious harm. By assembling a broad cross-domain catalog of such precedents, I aim to show that concerns about artificial superintelligence track recurring failure modes in our world.
This essay is also an experiment in writing with extensive assistance from artificial intelligence, producing work I couldn’t have written without it. That a current system can help articulate a case for the catastrophic potential of its own lineage is itself a significant fact; we have already left the realm of speculative fiction and begun to build the very agents that constitute the risk. On a personal note, this collaboration with artificial intelligence is part of my effort to rebuild the intellectual life that my stroke disrupted and hopefully push it beyond where it stood before.
Section 1: Power Asymmetry [...]
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First published:
January 16th, 2026
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kLvhBSwjWD9wjejWn/precedents-for-the-unprecedented-historical-analogies-for-1
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
Boaz Barak, Gabriel Wu, Jeremy Chen, Manas Joglekar
[Linkposting from the OpenAI alignment blog, where we post more speculative/technical/informal results and thoughts on safety and alignment.]
TL;DR We go into more details and some follow up results from our paper on confessions (see the original blog post). We give deeper analysis of the impact of training, as well as some preliminary comparisons to chain of thought monitoring.
We have recently published a new paper on confessions, along with an accompanying blog post. Here, we want to share with the research community some of the reasons why we are excited about confessions as a direction of safety, as well as some of its limitations. This blog post will be a bit more informal and speculative, so please see the paper for the full results.
The notion of “goodness” for the response of an LLM to a user prompt is inherently complex and multi-dimensional, and involves factors such as correctness, completeness, honesty, style, and more. When we optimize responses using a reward model as a proxy for “goodness” in reinforcement learning, models sometimes learn to “hack” this proxy and output an answer that only “looks good” to it (because [...]
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Outline:
(08:19) Impact of training
(12:32) Comparing with chain-of-thought monitoring
(14:05) Confessions can increase monitorability
(15:44) Using high compute to improve alignment
(16:49) Acknowledgements
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First published:
January 14th, 2026
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k4FjAzJwvYjFbCTKn/why-we-are-excited-about-confession
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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Two cats fighting for control over my backyard appear to have settled on a particular chain-link fence as the delineation between their territories. This suggests that:
On Thinkish, Neuralese, and the End of Readable Reasoning
In September 2025, researchers published the internal monologue of OpenAI's GPT-o3 as it decided to lie about scientific data. This is what it thought:
Pardon? This looks like someone had a stroke during a meeting they didn’t want to be in, but their hand kept taking notes.
That transcript comes from a recent paper published by researchers at Apollo Research and OpenAI on catching AI systems scheming. To understand what's happening here - and why one of the most sophisticated AI systems in the world is babbling about “synergy customizing illusions” - it first helps to know how we ended up being able to read AI thinking in the first place.
That story starts, of all places, on 4chan.
In late 2020, anonymous posters on 4chan started describing a prompting trick that would change the course of AI development. It was almost embarrassingly simple: instead of just asking GPT-3 for an answer, ask it instead to show its work before giving its final answer.
Suddenly, it started solving math problems that had stumped it moments before.
To see why, try multiplying 8,734 × 6,892 in your head. If you’re like [...]
The original text contained 3 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.
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First published:
January 6th, 2026
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gpyqWzWYADWmLYLeX/how-ai-is-learning-to-think-in-secret
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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It seems to be a real view held by serious people that your OpenAI shares will soon be tradable for moons and galaxies. This includes eminent thinkers like Dwarkesh Patel, Leopold Aschenbrenner, perhaps Scott Alexander and many more. According to them, property rights will survive an AI singularity event and soon economic growth is going to make it possible for individuals to own entire galaxies in exchange for some AI stocks. It follows that we should now seriously think through how we can equally distribute those galaxies and make sure that most humans will not end up as the UBI underclass owning mere continents or major planets.
I don't think this is a particularly intelligent view. It comes from a huge lack of imagination for the future.
Property rights are weird, but humanity dying isn't
People may think that AI causing human extinction is something really strange and specific to happen. But it's the opposite: humans existing is a very brittle and strange state of affairs. Many specific things have to be true for us to be here, and when we build ASI there are many preferences and goals that would see us wiped out. It's actually hard to [...]
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Outline:
(01:06) Property rights are weird, but humanity dying isnt
(01:57) Why property rights wont survive
(03:10) Property rights arent enough
(03:36) What if there are many unaligned AIs?
(04:18) Why would they be rewarded?
(04:48) Conclusion
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First published:
January 6th, 2026
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/SYyBB23G3yF2v59i8/on-owning-galaxies
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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We’ve significantly upgraded our timelines and takeoff models! It predicts when AIs will reach key capability milestones: for example, Automated Coder / AC (full automation of coding) and superintelligence / ASI (much better than the best humans at virtually all cognitive tasks). This post will briefly explain how the model works, present our timelines and takeoff forecasts, and compare it to our previous (AI 2027) models (spoiler: the AI Futures Model predicts about 3 years longer timelines to full coding automation than our previous model, mostly due to being less bullish on pre-full-automation AI R&D speedups).
If you’re interested in playing with the model yourself, the best way to do so is via this interactive website: aifuturesmodel.com
If you’d like to skip the motivation for our model to an explanation for how it works, go here, The website has a more in-depth explanation of the model (starts here; use the diagram on the right as a table of contents), as well as our forecasts.
Why do timelines and takeoff modeling?
The future is very hard to predict. We don't think this model, or any other model, should be trusted completely. The model takes into account what we think are [...]
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Outline:
(01:32) Why do timelines and takeoff modeling?
(03:18) Why our approach to modeling? Comparing to other approaches
(03:24) AGI timelines forecasting methods
(03:29) Trust the experts
(04:35) Intuition informed by arguments
(06:10) Revenue extrapolation
(07:15) Compute extrapolation anchored by the brain
(09:53) Capability benchmark trend extrapolation
(11:44) Post-AGI takeoff forecasts
(13:33) How our model works
(14:37) Stage 1: Automating coding
(16:54) Stage 2: Automating research taste
(18:18) Stage 3: The intelligence explosion
(20:35) Timelines and takeoff forecasts
(21:04) Eli
(24:34) Daniel
(38:32) Comparison to our previous (AI 2027) timelines and takeoff models
(38:49) Timelines to Superhuman Coder (SC)
(43:33) Takeoff from Superhuman Coder onward
The original text contained 31 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.
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First published:
December 31st, 2025
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YABG5JmztGGPwNFq2/ai-futures-timelines-and-takeoff-model-dec-2025-update
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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For the past year I've been sinking into the Great Books via the Penguin Great Ideas series, because I wanted to be conversant in the Great Conversation. I am occasionally frustrated by this endeavour, but overall, it's been fun! I'm learning a lot about my civilization and the various curmudgeons that shaped it.
But one dismaying side effect is that it's also been quite empowering for my inner 13 year old edgelord. Did you know that before we invented woke, you were just allowed to be openly contemptuous of people?
Here's Schopenhauer on the common man:
They take an objective interest in nothing whatever. Their attention, not to speak of their mind, is engaged by nothing that does not bear some relation, or at least some possible relation, to their own person: otherwise their interest is not aroused. They are not noticeably stimulated even by wit or humour; they hate rather everything that demands the slightest thought. Coarse buffooneries at most excite them to laughter: apart from that they are earnest brutes – and all because they are capable of only subjective interest. It is precisely this which makes card-playing the most appropriate amusement for them – card-playing for [...]
The original text contained 3 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.
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First published:
January 4th, 2026
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/otgrxjbWLsrDjbC2w/in-my-misanthropy-era
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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Past years: 2023 2024
Continuing a yearly tradition, I evaluate AI predictions from past years, and collect a convenience sample of AI predictions made this year. In terms of selection, I prefer selecting specific predictions, especially ones made about the near term, enabling faster evaluation.
Evaluated predictions made about 2025 in 2023, 2024, or 2025 mostly overestimate AI capabilities advances, although there's of course a selection effect (people making notable predictions about the near-term are more likely to believe AI will be impressive near-term).
As time goes on, "AGI" becomes a less useful term, so operationalizing predictions is especially important. In terms of predictions made in 2025, there is a significant cluster of people predicting very large AI effects by 2030. Observations in the coming years will disambiguate.
Predictions about 2025
2023
Jessica Taylor: "Wouldn't be surprised if this exact prompt got solved, but probably something nearby that's easy for humans won't be solved?"
The prompt: "Find a sequence of words that is: - 20 words long - contains exactly 2 repetitions of the same word twice in a row - contains exactly 2 repetitions of the same word thrice in a row"
Self-evaluation: False; I underestimated LLM progress [...]
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Outline:
(01:09) Predictions about 2025
(03:35) Predictions made in 2025 about 2025
(05:31) Predictions made in 2025
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First published:
January 1st, 2026
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/69qnNx8S7wkSKXJFY/2025-in-ai-predictions
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
They say you’re supposed to choose your prior in advance. That's why it's called a “prior”. First, you’re supposed to say say how plausible different things are, and then you update your beliefs based on what you see in the world.
For example, currently you are—I assume—trying to decide if you should stop reading this post and do something else with your life. If you’ve read this blog before, then lurking somewhere in your mind is some prior for how often my posts are good. For the sake of argument, let's say you think 25% of my posts are funny and insightful and 75% are boring and worthless.
OK. But now here you are reading these words. If they seem bad/good, then that raises the odds that this particular post is worthless/non-worthless. For the sake of argument again, say you find these words mildly promising, meaning that a good post is 1.5× more likely than a worthless post to contain words with this level of quality.
If you combine those two assumptions, that implies that the probability that this particular post is good is 33.3%. That's true because the red rectangle below has half the area of the blue [...]
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Outline:
(03:28) Aliens
(07:06) More aliens
(09:28) Huh?
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First published:
December 18th, 2025
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/JAA2cLFH7rLGNCeCo/good-if-make-prior-after-data-instead-of-before
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
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