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    Technology

    Faster, Please! — The Podcast

    Welcome to Faster, Please! — The Podcast. Several times a month, host Jim Pethokoukis will feature a lively conversation with a fascinating and provocative guest about how to make the world a better place by accelerating scientific discovery, technological innovation, and economic growth.

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    🎇 An age of transformation: My chat (+transcript) with techno-futurist Peter Leyden Jul 10, 2025
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    My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,The 1990s and the dawn of the internet were a pivotal time for America and the wider world. The history of human progress is a series of such pivotal moments. As Peter Leyden points out, it seems we’re facing another defining era as society wrestles with three new key technologies: artificial intelligence, clean energy, and bioengineering.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Leyden about American leadership in emerging technology and the mindset shifts we must undergo to bring about the future we dream of.Leyden is a futurist and technology expert. He is a speaker, author, and founder of Reinvent Futures. Thirty years ago, he worked with the founders of WIRED magazine, and now authors his latest book project via Substack: The Great Progression: 2025 to 2050.In This Episode* Eras of transformation (1:38)* American risk tolerance (11:15)* Facing AI pessimism (15:38)* The bioengineering breakthrough (24:24)* Demographic pressure (28:52)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Eras of transformation (1:38)I think we Americans tend to reset the clock in which we get in these dead ends, we get in these old patterns, these old systems, and the things are all falling apart, it's not working. And then there is a kind of a can-do reinvention phase . . .Pethokoukis: Since World War II, as I see it, we have twice been on the verge of a transformational leap forward, economically and technologically. I would say that was right around 1970 and then right around 2000, and the periods of time after that, I think, certainly relative to the expectations then, was disappointing.It is my hope, and I know it's your hope as well, that we are at another such moment of transformation. One, do you accept my general premise, and two, why are we going to get it right this time?If I'm hearing you right, you're kind of making two junctures there. I do believe we're in the beginning of what would be much more thought of as a transformation. I would say the most direct parallel is closer to what happened coming off of World War II. I also think, if you really go back in American history, it's what came off of Civil War and even came off of the Founding Era. I think there's a lot of parallels there I can go into, I've written about in my Substack and it's part of the next book I'm writing, so there's a bigger way that I think about it. I think both those times that you're referring to, it seems to me we were coming off a boom, or what seemed to be an updraft or your “Up Wing” kind of periods that you think of — and then we didn't.I guess I think of it this way: the ’50s, ’60s, and ’90s were exciting times that made it feel like the best was yet to come — but then that momentum stalled. I’m hopeful we’re entering another such moment now, with so much happening, so much in motion, and I just hope it all comes together.The way I think about it in a bigger lens, I would just push back a little bit, which is, it's true coming off the ’90s — I was at WIRED magazine in the ’90s. I was watching the early ’90s internet and the Digital Revolution and I sketched out at that time, in my first book but also cover stories in WIRED, trying to rough out what would happen by the year 2020. And it is true that coming off the ’90s there was a Dot Com crash, but temporarily, honestly, that with the Web 2.0 and others, a lot of those trends we were talking about in the ’90s actually just kept picking up.So depending how big the lens is, I would argue that, coming off the ’90s, the full digital revolution and the full globalization that we were starting to see in the early to mid-’90s in some respects did come to fruition. It didn't play out the way we all wanted it to happen — spreading wealth all through the society and blah, blah, blah, and many of the things that people complain about and react to now — but I would argue that a lot of what we were saying in those ’90s, and had begun in the ’90s with the ’90s boom, continued after a temporary pause, for sure.The Dot Com boom was just frothy investment. It crashed, but the companies that come out of that crash are literally trillion-dollar companies dominating the global economy now here on the west coast. That was some of the things we could see happening from the mid-’90s. The world did get connected through the internet, and globalization did, from a lens that's beyond America, we took 800 million peasants living on two bucks a day in China and brought them into the global economy. There's all kinds of positive things of what happened in the last 25 years, depending on how big your lens is.I would say that we've been through a largely successful — clearly some issues, “Oh my gosh, we didn't anticipate social media and that stuff,” but in general, the world that we were actually starting to envision in the ’90s came about, at some level — with some flaws, and some issues, and we could have done better, but I'm saying now I think AI is bigger than the internet. I think the idea that humans are now working side-by-side with intelligent machines and being augmented by intelligent machines is a world historical event that is going to go beyond just connecting everybody on the planet through the internet, which is kind of what the ’90s was, and the early Digital Revolution.This is a bigger deal, and I do think this transformation has the potential to be way bigger too. If we manage it right — including how we did it positively or negatively in the last 25, 30 years off the ’90s — if we do this right, we could really pull off what I think is a reinvention of America and a much better world going beyond this. That’s not a prediction that we're going to do that, but I think we certainly have the potential there.While I was preparing for our chat, I recalled a podcast I did with Marc Andreessen where we discussed AI — not just its potential to solve big problems and drive progress, but also about the obstacles, especially regulatory ones. He pointed out that those barriers are why we don’t have things like widespread nuclear power, let alone fusion reactors.When I asked why he thought we could overcome those barriers this time around, he said we probably won’t — that failure should be the baseline because these obstacles are deeply rooted in a risk-averse American society. Now, why isn't that your baseline?My baseline is that America — again, I'm taking a bigger lens here, which is we periodically come to these junctures in history in which you could say, from left and right, there's kind of an ossification of the old system. What happens is the old ways of doing things, the old systems, essentially get kind of stuck, and ossified, and just defunct, and long in the tooth, and all different ways you can describe it. But what happens at these junctures — and it happened coming off World War II, it happened after the Civil War, I happened after in the Founding Era too, coming off the colonial world — there is an incredible period of explosion of progress, essentially, and they usually are about 25 years, which is why I'm thinking about the next 25 years.I think we Americans tend to reset the clock in which we get in these dead ends, we get in these old patterns, these old systems, and the things are all falling apart, it's not working. And then there is a kind of a can-do reinvention phase that, frankly, is beyond Europe now. The great hope of the West is still going to be America here. But I think we're actually entering it and I think this is what's happening, and . . . I've read your book, The Conservative Futurist, I would call myself more of a “Progressive Futurist,” but I would say both left and right in this country have gone too extreme. The right is critiquing “government can't do anything right,” and the left is critiquing “the market, corporations can't do anything right.”The actual American framework is the Hamiltonian government, coming off Lincoln's government, the FDR government. There is a role for government, a vigorous kind of government presence that can drive change, but there's also a great role for the market too.There’s this center left and center right that has now got to recalibrate for this next era of America. I think because the old system — and from the right, the old system might be big bureaucratic government that was born out of World War II, the great welfare state bureaucracies, also the Pax Americana. Trump is kind of banging against, dismantling that old thing that's been going for 80 years and, frankly, is kind of run out of steam. It's not really working. But the left is also coming out, carbon energy, and drilling for oil, and industrial pollution, and all that other stuff that was coming off of that scaling of the 20th century economy is also not working for the 21st century. We’ve also got to dismantle those systems. But together, looking forward, you could imagine a complete reinvention around these new technologies. AI is a huge one. Without question, the first among equals it's going to be the game changer around every field, every industry.Also clean energy technologies, I would argue, are just hitting the point of tipping points of scale that we could imagine a shift in the energy foundation. We could see abundant clean energy, including nuclear. I think there's a new re-appreciation of nuclear coming even from left-of-center, but also potential fusion on the horizon.I also think bioengineering is something that we haven't really got our heads into, but in terms of the long-term health of the planet, and all kinds of synthetic biology, and all kinds of things that are happening, we are now past the tipping point, and we know how to do this.I think there's three world historic technologies that America could get reinvented around in the next 25 years. I think the old system, left and right, is now done with this old thing that isn't working, but that opens up the potential for the future. So yes, what Andreessen's talking about is the late stage of the last gummed-up system that wasn't working. For that matter, the same thing from the left is complaining about the inequality, and the old system isn't working now the way it was, circulating wealth through society. But I think there's a way to reinvent that and I actually think we're on the verge of doing it, and that's what I'm trying to do for my project, my book, my Substack stuff.American risk tolerance (11:15)I think there is an elite on the right-of-center tech and the left-of-center tech that sees the same commonalities about the potential of the technology, but also the potential for transformation going forward, that would be healthy. Do you feel that there's enough ferment happening that, institutionally, there will be enough space for these technologies to flourish as you hope? That the first time that there's a problem with an AI model where people die because some system failed, we're not going to be like, “We need to pause AI.” That the next time with one of these restarted nuclear reactors, if there's some minor problem, we're not going to suddenly panic and say, “That's it, nuclear is gone again.” Do you think we have that kind of societal resilience to deal? I think we've had too little of that, but do you think there's enough now, for the reasons you're talking about, that we will continue to push forward?I think there's absolutely the chance that can happen. Now, like Andreessen said, it's not a prediction like, “Oh, this will be fine, it’s all going to work out.” We could also go the way of Europe, which is we could get over-regulated, over-ossified, go back to the old days, be this nice tourist spot that, whatever, we look at our old buildings and stuff and we figure out a way to earn a living, but it's just getting more and more and more in the past. That's also a possibility, and I suppose if you had to bet, maybe that's the greater possibility, in default.But I don't think that's going to happen because I do believe more in America. I'm also living in Northern California here. I'm surrounded for the last 30 years, people are just jam packed with new ideas. There's all kinds of s**t happening here. It's just an explosive moment right now. We are attracting the best and the brightest from all over the country, all over the world. There is no other place in the world, bar none, around AI than San Francisco right now, and you cannot be here and not just get thrilled at the possibility of what's happening. Now, does that mean that we're going to be able to pull this off through the whole country, through the whole world? I don’t know, there is a lot of ambiguity there and this is why you can't predict the future with certainty.But I do believe we have the potential here to rebuild fundamentally. I think there is an elite on the right-of-center tech and the left-of-center tech that sees the same commonalities about the potential of the technology, but also the potential for transformation going forward, that would be healthy. For example, I know Andreessen, you talk about Andreessen . . . I was also rooted in the whole Obama thing, there was a ton of tech people in the Obama thing, and now there's a ton of tech people who are kind of tech-right, but it's all kind of washes together. It's because we all see the potential of these technologies just emerging in front of us. The question is . . . how do you get the systems to adapt?Now, to be fair, California, yes, it's been gummed up with regulations and overthink, but on the other hand, it's opened itself up. It just went through historic shifts in rolling back environmental reviews and trying to drive more housing by refusing to let the NIMBY shut it down. There's a bunch of things that even the left-of-center side is trying to deal with this gummed-up system, and the right-of-center side is doing their version of it in DC right now.Anyhow, the point is, we see the limits on both left-of-center and right-of-center of what's currently happening and what has happened. The question is, can we get aligned on a relatively common way forward, which is what America did coming off the war for 25 years, which is what happened after the Civil War. There were issues around the Reconstruction, but there was a kind of explosive expansion around American progress in the 25 years there. And we did it off the Revolution too. There are these moments where left-of-center and right-of-center align and we kind of build off of a more American set of values: pluralism, meritocracy, economic growth, freedom, personal freedom, things that we all can agree on, it's just they get gummed up in these old systems and these old ideologies periodically and we’ve just got to blow through them and try something different. I think the period we're in right now.Facing AI pessimism (15:38)The world of AI is so foreign to them, it's so bizarre to them, it's so obscure to them, that they're reacting off it just like any sensible human being. You’re scared of a thing you don't get.I feel like you are very optimistic.Yes, that is true.I like to think that I am very optimistic. I think we're both optimistic about what these technologies can do to make this country and this world a richer world, a more sustainable world, a healthier world, create more opportunity. I think we're on the same page. So it's sad to me that I feel like I've been this pessimistic so far throughout our conversation and this next question, unfortunately, will be in that vein.Okay, fair enough.I have a…

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    ✨ 🧬 When AI meets biotechnology: My chat (+transcript) with techno-futurist Jamie Metzl Jun 27, 2025
    Show notes

    My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,Once-science-fiction advancements like AI, gene editing, and advanced biotechnology have finally arrived, and they’re here to stay. These technologies have seemingly set us on a course towards a brand new future for humanity, one we can hardly even picture today. But progress doesn’t happen overnight, and it isn’t the result of any one breakthrough.As Jamie Metzl explains in his new book, Superconvergence: How the Genetics, Biotech, and AI Revolutions will Transform our Lives, Work, and World, tech innovations work alongside and because of one another, bringing about the future right under our noses.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Metzl about how humans have been radically reshaping the world around them since their very beginning, and what the latest and most disruptive technologies mean for the not-too-distant future.Metzl is a senior fellow of the Atlantic Council and a faculty member of NextMed Health. He has previously held a series of positions in the US government, and was appointed to the World Health Organization’s advisory committee on human genome editing in 2019. He is the author of several books, including two sci-fi thrillers and his international bestseller, Hacking Darwin.In This Episode* Unstoppable and unpredictable (1:54)* Normalizing the extraordinary (9:46)* Engineering intelligence (13:53)* Distrust of disruption (19:44)* Risk tolerance (24:08)* What is a “newnimal”? (13:11)* Inspired by curiosity (33:42)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Unstoppable and unpredictable (1:54)The name of the game for all of this . . . is to ask “What are the things that we can do to increase the odds of a more positive story and decrease the odds of a more negative story?”Pethokoukis: Are you telling a story of unstoppable technological momentum or are you telling a story kind of likeA Christmas Carol, of a future that could be if we do X, Y, and Z, but no guarantees?Metzl: The future of technological progress is like the past: It is unstoppable, but that doesn't mean it's predetermined. The path that we have gone over the last 12,000 years, from the domestication of crops to building our civilizations, languages, industrialization — it's a bad metaphor now, but — this train is accelerating. It's moving faster and faster, so that's not up for grabs. It is not up for grabs whether we are going to have the capacities to engineer novel intelligence and re-engineer life — we are doing both of those things now in the early days.What is up for grabs is how these revolutions will play out, and there are better and worse scenarios that we can imagine. The name of the game for all of this, the reason why I do the work that I do, why I write the books that I write, is to ask “What are the things that we can do to increase the odds of a more positive story and decrease the odds of a more negative story?”Progress has been sort of unstoppable for all that time, though, of course, fits and starts and periods of stagnation —— But when you look back at those fits and starts — the size of the Black Plague or World War II, or wiping out Berlin, and Dresden, and Tokyo, and Hiroshima, and Nagasaki — in spite of all of those things, it's one-directional. Our technologies have gotten more powerful. We've developed more capacities, greater ability to manipulate the world around us, so there will be fits and starts but, as I said, this train is moving. That's why these conversations are so important, because there's so much that we can, and I believe must, do now.There’s a widely held opinion that progress over the past 50 years has been slower than people might have expected in the late 1960s, but we seem to have some technologies now for which the momentum seems pretty unstoppable.Of course, a lot of people thought, after ChatGPT came out, that superintelligence would happen within six months. That didn’t happen. After CRISPR arrived, I’m sure there were lots of people who expected miracle cures right away.What makes you think that these technologies will look a lot different, and our world will look a lot different than they do right now by decade’s end?They certainly will look a lot different, but there's also a lot of hype around these technologies. You use the word “superintelligence,” which is probably a good word. I don't like the words “artificial intelligence,” and I have a six-letter framing for what I believe about AGI — artificial general intelligence — and that is: AGI is BS. We have no idea what human intelligence is, if we define our own intelligence so narrowly that it's just this very narrow form of thinking and then we say, “Wow, we have these machines that are mining the entirety of digitized human cultural history, and wow, they're so brilliant, they can write poems — poems in languages that our ancestors have invented based on the work of humans.” So we humans need to be very careful not to belittle ourselves.But we're already seeing, across the board, if you say, “Is CRISPR on its own going to fundamentally transform all of life?” The answer to that is absolutely no. My last book was about genetic engineering. If genetic engineering is a pie, genome editing is a slice and CRISPR is just a tiny little sliver of that slice. But the reason why my new book is called Superconvergence, the entire thesis is that all of these technologies inspire, and influence, and are embedded in each other. We had the agricultural revolution 12,000 years ago, as I mentioned. That's what led to these other innovations like civilization, like writing, and then the ancient writing codes are the foundation of computer codes which underpin our machine learning and AI systems that are allowing us to unlock secrets of the natural world.People are imagining that AI equals ChatGPT, but that's really not the case (AI equals ChatGPT like electricity equals the power station). The story of AI is empowering us to do all of these other things. As a general-purpose technology, already AI is developing the capacity to help us just do basic things faster. Computer coding is the archetypal example of that. Over the last couple of years, the speed of coding has improved by about 50 percent for the most advanced human coders, and as we code, our coding algorithms are learning about the process of coding. We're just laying a foundation for all of these other things.That's what I call “boring AI.” People are imagining exciting AI, like there's a magic AI button and you just press it and AI cures cancer. That's not how it's going to work. Boring AI is going to be embedded in human resource management. It's going to be embedded just giving us a lot of capabilities to do things better, faster than we've done them before. It doesn't mean that AIs are going to replace us. There are a lot of things that humans do that machines can just do better than we are. That's why most of us aren't doing hunting, or gathering, or farming, because we developed machines and other technologies to feed us with much less human labor input, and we have used that reallocation of our time and energy to write books and invent other things. That's going to happen here.The name of the game for us humans, there's two things: One is figuring out what does it mean to be a great human and over-index on that, and two, lay the foundation so that these multiple overlapping revolutions, as they play out in multiple fields, can be governed wisely. That is the name of the game. So when people say, “Is it going to change our lives?” I think people are thinking of it in the wrong way. This shirt that I'm wearing, this same shirt five years from now, you'll say, “Well, is there AI in your shirt?” — because it doesn't look like AI — and what I'm going to say is “Yes, in the manufacturing of this thread, in the management of the supply chain, in figuring out who gets to go on vacation, when, in the company that's making these buttons.” It's all these little things. People will just call it progress. People are imagining magic AI, all of these interwoven technologies will just feel like accelerating progress, and that will just feel like life.Normalizing the extraordinary (9:46)20, 30 years ago we didn't have the internet. I think things get so normalized that this just feels like life.What you're describing is a technology that economists would call a general-purpose technology. It's a technology embedded in everything, it's everywhere in the economy, much as electricity.What you call “boring AI,” the way I think about it is: I was just reading a Wall Street Journal story about Applebee's talking about using AI for more efficient customer loyalty programs, and they would use machine vision to look at their tables to see if they were cleaned well enough between customers. That, to people, probably doesn't seem particularly science-fictional. It doesn't seem world-changing. Of course, faster growth and a more productive economy is built on those little things, but I guess I would still call those “boring AI.”What to me definitely is not boring AI is the sort of combinatorial aspect that you're talking about where you're talking about AI helping the scientific discovery process and then interweaving with other technologies in kind of the classic Paul Romer combinatorial way.I think a lot of people, if they look back at their lives 20 or 30 years ago, they would say, “Okay, more screen time, but probably pretty much the same.”I don't think they would say that. 20, 30 years ago we didn't have the internet. I think things get so normalized that this just feels like life. If you had told ourselves 30 years ago, “You're going to have access to all the world's knowledge in your pocket.” You and I are — based on appearances, although you look so youthful — roughly the same age, so you probably remember, “Hurry, it's long distance! Run down the stairs!”We live in this radical science-fiction world that has been normalized, and even the things that you are mentioning, if you see open up your newsfeed and you see that there's this been incredible innovation in cancer care, and whether it's gene therapy, or autoimmune stuff, or whatever, you're not thinking, “Oh, that was AI that did that,” because you read the thing and it's like “These researchers at University of X,” but it is AI, it is electricity, it is agriculture. It's because our ancestors learned how to plant seeds and grow plants where you're stationed and not have to do hunting and gathering that you have had this innovation that is keeping your grandmother alive for another 10 years.What you're describing is what I call “magical AI,” and that's not how it works. Some of the stuff is magical: the Jetsons stuff, and self-driving cars, these things that are just autopilot airplanes, we live in a world of magical science fiction and then whenever something shows up, we think, “Oh yeah, no big deal.” We had ChatGPT, now ChatGPT, no big deal?If you had taken your grandparents, your parents, and just said, “Hey, I'm going to put you behind a screen. You're going to have a conversation with something, with a voice, and you're going to do it for five hours,” and let's say they'd never heard of computers and it was all this pleasant voice. In the end they said, “You just had a five-hour conversation with a non-human, and it told you about everything and all of human history, and it wrote poems, and it gave you a recipe for kale mush or whatever you're eating,” you'd say, “Wow!” I think that we are living in that sci-fi world. It's going to get faster, but every innovation, we're not going to say, “Oh, AI did that.” We're just going to say, “Oh, that happened.”Engineering intelligence (13:53)I don't like the word “artificial intelligence” because artificial intelligence means “artificial human intelligence.” This is machine intelligence, which is inspired by the products of human intelligence, but it's a different form of intelligence . . .I sometimes feel in my own writing, and as I peruse the media, like I read a lot more about AI, the digital economy, information technology, and I feel like I certainly write much less about genetic engineering, biotechnology, which obviously is a key theme in your book. What am I missing right now that's happening that may seem normal five years from now, 10 years, but if I were to read about it now or understand it now, I’d think, “Well, that is kind of amazing.”My answer to that is kind of everything. As I said before, we are at the very beginning of this new era of life on earth where one species, among the billions that have ever lived, suddenly has the increasing ability to engineer novel intelligence and re-engineer life.We have evolved by the Darwinian processes of random mutation and natural selection, and we are beginning a new phase of life, a new Cambrian Revolution, where we are creating, certainly with this novel intelligence that we are birthing — I don't like the word “artificial intelligence” because artificial intelligence means “artificial human intelligence.” This is machine intelligence, which is inspired by the products of human intelligence, but it's a different form of intelligence, just like dolphin intelligence is a different form of intelligence than human intelligence, although we are related because of our common mammalian route. That's what's happening here, and our brain function is roughly the same as it's been, certainly at least for tens of thousands of years, but the AI machine intelligence is getting smarter, and we're just experiencing it.It's become so normalized that you can even ask that question. We live in a world where we have these AI systems that are just doing more and cooler stuff every day: driving cars, you talked about discoveries, we have self-driving laboratories that are increasingly autonomous. We have machines that are increasingly writing their own code. We live in a world where machine intelligence has been boxed in these kinds of places like computers, but very soon it's coming out into the world. The AI revolution, and machine-learning revolution, and the robotics revolution are going to be intersecting relatively soon in meaningful ways.AI has advanced more quickly than robotics because it hasn't had to navigate the real world like we have. That's why I'm always so mindful of not denigrating who we are and what we stand for. Four billion years of evolution is a long time. We've learned a lot along the way, so it's going to be hard to put the AI and have it out functioning in the world, interacting in this world that we have largely, but not exclusively, created.But that's all what's coming. Some specific things: 30 years from now, my guess is many people who are listening to this podcast will be fornicating regularly with robots, and it'll be totally normal and comfortable.. . . I think some people are going to be put off by that.Yeah, some people will be put off and some people will be turned on. All I'm saying is it's going to be a mix of different —Jamie, what I would like to do is be 90 years old and be able to still take long walks, be sharp, not have my knee screaming at me. That's what I would like. Can I expect that?I think this can help, but you have to decide how to behave with your personalized robot.That's what I want. I'm looking for the achievement of human suffering. Will there be a world of less human suffering?We live in that world of less human suffering! If you just look at any metric of anyt…

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    🚀 NASA and the New Space Age: My chat (+transcript) with James Meigs Jun 12, 2025
    Show notes

    My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,America is embarking upon a New Space Age, with companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin ready to partner with NASA to take Americans to a new frontier — possibly as far as Mars. Lately, however, the world is witnessing uncertainty surrounding NASA leadership and even an odd feud between SpaceX boss Elon Musk and the White House. At a critical time for US space competition, let’s hope key players can stick the landing.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with James Meigs about the SLS rocket, NASA reforms, and the evolving private sector landscape.Meigs is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. He is a contributing editor of City Journal and writer of the Tech Commentary column at Commentary magazine. He is also the former editor of Popular Mechanics.Meigs is the author of a recent report from the Manhattan Institute, U.S. Space Policy: The Next Frontier.In This Episode* So long, Jared Isaacman (1:29)* Public sector priorities (5:36)* Supporting the space ecosystem (11:52)* A new role for NASA (17:27)* American space leadership (21:17)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. So long, Jared Isaacman (1:29)The withdrawal of Jared Isaacman . . . has really been met with total dismay in the space community. Everyone felt like he was the right kind of change agent for the agency that desperately needs reform, but not destruction.Pethokoukis: We're going to talk a lot about your great space policy report, which you wrote before the withdrawal of President Trump's NASA nominee, Jared Isaacman.What do you think of that? Does that change your conclusions? Good move, bad move? Just sort of your general thoughts apart from the surprising nature of it.Meigs: I worked sort of on and off for about a year on this report for the Manhattan Institute about recommendations for space policy, and it just came out a couple of months ago and already it's a different world. So much has happened. The withdrawal of Jared Isaacman — or the yanking of his nomination — has really been met with total dismay in the space community. Everyone felt like he was the right kind of change agent for the agency that desperately needs reform, but not destruction.Now, it remains to be seen what happens in terms of his replacement, but it certainly pulled the rug out from under the idea that NASA could be reformed and yet stay on track for some ambitious goals. I'm trying to be cautiously optimistic that some of these things will happen, but my sense is that the White House is not particularly interested in space.Interestingly, Musk wasn't really that involved in his role of DOGE and stuff. He didn't spend that much time on NASA. He wasn't micromanaging NASA policy, and I don't think Isaacman would've been just a mouthpiece for Musk either. He showed a sense of independence. So it remains to be seen, but my recommendations . . . and I share this with a lot of people advocating reform, is that NASA more or less needs to get out of the rocket-building business, and the Space Launch System, this big overpriced rocket they've been working on for years — we may need to fly it two more times to get us back to the moon, but after that, that thing should be retired. If there's a way to retire it sooner, that would be great. At more than $4 billion a launch, it's simply not affordable, and NASA will not be an agency that can routinely send people into space if we're relying on that white elephant.To me what was exciting about Isaacman was his genuine enthusiasm about space. It seemed like he understood that NASA needed reform and changes to the budget, but that the result would be an agency that still does big things. Is there a fear that his replacement won’t be interested in NASA creative destruction, just destruction?We don't know for sure, but the budget that's been proposed is pretty draconian, cutting NASA's funding by about a quarter and recommending particularly heavy cuts in the science missions, which would require cutting short some existing missions that are underway and not moving ahead with other planned missions.There is room for saving in some of these things. I advocate a more nimble approach to NASA's big science missions. Instead of sending one $4 billion rover to Mars every 20 years, once launch costs come down, how about we send ten little ones and if a couple of them don't make it, we could still be getting much more science done for the same price or less. So that's the kind of thing Isaacman was talking about, and that's the kind of thing that will be made possible as launch costs continue to fall, as you've written about, Jim. So it requires a new way of thinking at NASA. It requires a more entrepreneurial spirit and it remains to be seen whether another administrator can bring that along the way. We were hoping that Isaacman would.Public sector priorities (5:36)Congress has never deviated from focusing more on keeping these projects alive than on whether these projects achieve their goals.It seems to me that there are only two reasons, at this point, to be in favor of the SLS rocket. One: There’s a political pork jobs aspect. And the other is that it’s important to beat China to the moon, which the Artemis program is meant to do. Does that seem accurate?Pretty much, yeah. You can be for beating China the moon and still be against the SLS rocket, you kind of just grit your teeth and say, okay, we've got to fly it two more times because it would be hard to cobble together, in the timeframe available, a different approach — but not impossible. There are other heavy lift rockets. Once you can refuel in orbit and do other things, there's a lot of ways to get a heavy payload into orbit. When I started my report, it looked like SLS was the only game in town, but that's really not the case. There are other options.The Starship has to quit blowing up.I would've loved to have seen the last couple of Starship missions be a little more successful. That's unfortunate. The pork part of SLS just can't be underestimated. From the get go, going way back to when the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, and even before to when after the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster — that's the second disaster — there was a really big effort to figure out how to replace the space shuttle, what would come next. There was a strong movement in Congress at that time to say, “Well, whatever you build, whatever you do, all the factories that are involved in working on the Space Shuttle, all of the huge workforces in NASA that work on the space shuttle, all of this manpower has to be retained.” And Congress talked a lot about keeping the experience, the expertise, the talent going.I can see some legitimacy to that argument, but if you looked at the world that way, then you would always focus on keeping the jobs of the past viable instead of the jobs of the future: What are we going to do with the blacksmiths who shoe horses? If we lose all this technological capability of shoeing horses . . . we’d better not bring in all these cars! That's an exaggeration, but as a result, first they aim to replace the Space Shuttle with a rocket called Constellation that would recycle some of the Shuttle components. And then eventually they realized that that was just too bloated, too expensive. That got canceled during the Obama administration replaced with the Space Launch System, which is supposed to be cheaper, more efficient, able to be built in a reasonable amount of time.It wound up being just as bloated and also technologically backward. They're still keeping technology from the Shuttle era. The solid fuel engines, which, as we recall from the first Shuttle disaster, were problematic, and the Shuttle main engine design as well. So when SLS flies with humans on board for the first time, supposedly next year, it'll be using technology that was designed before any of the astronauts were even born.In this day and age, that's kind of mind-blowing, and it will retain these enormous workforces in these plants that happen to be located in states with powerful lawmakers. So there's an incredible incentive to just keep it all going, not to let things change, not to let anything be retired, and to keep that money flowing to contractors, to workers and to individual states. Congress has never deviated from focusing more on keeping these projects alive than on whether these projects achieve their goals.I've seen a video of congressional hearings from 15 years ago, and the hostility toward the idea of there being a private-sector alternative to NASA, now it seems almost inexplicable seeing that even some of these people were Republicans from Texas.Seeing where we are now, it’s just amazing because now that we have the private sector, we're seeing innovation, we're seeing the drop in launch costs, the reusability — just a completely different world than what existed 15, 16, 17 years ago.I don't think people really realize how revolutionary NASA's commercial programs were. They really sort of snuck them in quietly at first, starting as far back as 2005, a small program to help companies develop their own space transportation systems that could deliver cargo to the International Space Station.SpaceX was initially not necessarily considered a leader in that. It was a little startup company nobody took very seriously, but they wound up doing the best job. Then later they also led the race to be the first to deliver astronauts to the International Space Station, saved NASA billions of dollars, and helped launch this private-industry revolution in space that we're seeing today that's really exciting.It's easy to say, “Oh, NASA's just this old sclerotic bureaucracy,” and there's some truth to that, but NASA has always had a lot of innovative people, and a lot of the pressure of the push to move to this commercial approach where NASA essentially charters a rocket the way you would charter a fishing boat rather than trying to build and own its own equipment. That's the key distinction. You’ve got to give them credit for that and you also have to give SpaceX enormous credit for endless technological innovation that has brought down these prices.So I totally agree, it's inconceivable to think of trying to run NASA today without their commercial partners. Of course, we'd like to see more than just SpaceX in there. That's been a surprise to people. In a weird way, SpaceX's success is a problem because you want an ecosystem of competitors that NASA can choose from, not just one dominant supplier.Supporting the space ecosystem (11:52)There's a reason that the private space industry is booming in the US much more than elsewhere in the world. But I think they could do better and I'd like to see reform there.Other than the technical difficulty of the task, is there something government could be doing or not doing, perhaps on the regulatory side, to encourage a more sort of a bigger, more vibrant space ecosystem.In my Manhattan Institute report, I recommend some changes, particularly, the FAA needs to continue reforming its launch regulations. They’re more restrictive and take longer than they should. I think they're making some progress. They recently authorized more launches of the experimental SpaceX Starship, but it shouldn't take months to go through the paperwork to authorize the launch of a new spacecraft.I think the US, we’re currently better than most countries in terms of allowing private space. There's a reason that the private space industry is booming in the US much more than elsewhere in the world. But I think they could do better and I'd like to see reform there.I also think NASA needs to continue its efforts to work with a wide range of vendors in this commercial paradigm and accept that a lot of them might not pan out. We've seen a really neat NASA program to help a lot of different companies, but a lot of startups have been involved in trying to build and land small rovers on the moon. Well, a lot of them have crashed.Not an easy task apparently.No. When I used to be editor of Popular Mechanics magazine, one of the great things I got to do was hang out with Buzz Aldrin, and Buzz Aldrin talking about landing on the moon — now, looking back, you realize just how insanely risky that was. You see all these rovers designed today with all the modern technology failing to land a much smaller, lighter object safely on the moon, and you just think, “Wow, that was an incredible accomplishment.” And you have so much admiration for the guts of the guys who did it.As they always say, space is hard, and I think NASA working with commercial vendors to help them, give them some seed money, help them get started, pay them a set fee for the mission that you're asking for, but also build into your planning — just the way an entrepreneur would — that some product launches aren't going to work, some ideas are going to fail, sometimes you're going to have to start over. That's just part of the process, and if you're not spending ridiculous amounts of money, that's okay.When we talk about vendors, who are we talking about? When we talk about this ecosystem as it currently exists, what do these companies do besides SpaceX?The big one that everybody always mentions first, of course, is Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos's startup that's been around as long as SpaceX, but just moved much more slowly. Partly because when it first started up, it was almost as much of a think tank to explore different ideas about space and less of a scrappy startup trying to just make money by launching satellites for paying customers as soon as possible. That was Musk's model. But they've finally launched. They've launched a bunch of suborbital flights, you've seen where they carry various celebrities and stuff up to the edge of space for a few minutes and they come right back down. That's been a chance for them to test out their engines, which have seemed solid and reliable, but they've finally done one mission with their New Glenn rocket. Like SpaceX, it's a reusable rocket which can launch pretty heavy payloads. Once that gets proven and they've had a few more launches under their belt, should be an important part of this ecosystem.But you've got other companies, you've got Stoke Aerospace, you've got Firefly . . . You've got a few companies that are in the launch business, so they want to compete with SpaceX to launch mostly satellites for paying customers, also cargo for payloads for governments. And then you have a lot of other companies that are doing various kinds of space services and they're not necessarily going to try to be in the launch business per se. We don't need 40 different companies doing launches with different engines, different designs, different fuels, and stuff like that. Eight or 10 might be great, six might be great. We’ll see how the market sorts out.But then if you look at the development of the auto industry, it started with probably hundreds of little small shops, hand-building cars, but by the mid-century it had settled down to a few big companies through consolidation. And instead of hundreds of engine designs that were given 1950, there were probably in the US, I don't know, 12 engine designs or something like that. Stuff got standardized — we'll see the same thing happen in space — but you also saw an enormous ecosystem of companies building batteries, tires, transmissions, parts, wipers, all sorts of little things and servicing in an industry to service the automobile. Now, rockets are a lot more centralized and high-tech, but you…

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    🤖 Superintelligence and national security: My chat (+transcript) with AI expert Dan Hendrycks May 08, 2025
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    My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,As we seemingly grow closer to achieving artificial general intelligence — machines that are smarter than humans at basically everything — we might be incurring some serious geopolitical risks.In the paper Superintelligence Strategy, his joint project with former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and Alexandr Wang, Dan Hendrycks introduces the idea of Mutual Assured AI Malfunction: a system of deterrence where any state’s attempt at total AI dominance is sabotaged by its peers. From the abstract: Just as nations once developed nuclear strategies to secure their survival, we now need a coherent superintelligence strategy to navigate a new period of transformative change. We introduce the concept of Mutual Assured AI Malfunction (MAIM): a deterrence regime resembling nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD) where any state’s aggressive bid for unilateral AI dominance is met with preventive sabotage by rivals. Given the relative ease of sabotaging a destabilizing AI project—through interventions ranging from covert cyberattacks to potential kinetic strikes on datacenters—MAIM already describes the strategic picture AI superpowers find themselves in. Alongside this, states can increase their competitiveness by bolstering their economies and militaries through AI, and they can engage in nonproliferation to rogue actors to keep weaponizable AI capabilities out of their hands. Taken together, the three-part framework of deterrence, nonproliferation, and competitiveness outlines a robust strategy to superintelligence in the years ahead.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Hendrycks about the potential threats posed by superintelligent AI in the hands of state and rogue adversaries, and what a strong deterrence strategy might look like.Hendrycks is the executive director of the Center for AI Safety. He is an advisor to Elon Musk’s xAI and Scale AI, and is a prolific researcher and writer.In This Episode* Development of AI capabilities (1:34)* Strategically relevant capabilities (6:00)* Learning from the Cold War (16:12)* Race for strategic advantage (18:56)* Doomsday scenario (28:18)* Maximal progress, minimal risk (33:25)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Development of AI capabilities (1:34). . . mostly the systems aren't that impressive currently. People use them to some extent, but I'd more emphasize the trajectory that we're on rather than the current capabilities.Pethokoukis: How would you compare your view of AI . . . as a powerful technology with economic, national security, and broader societal implications . . . today versus November of 2022 when OpenAI rolled out ChatGPT?Hendrycks: I think that the main difference now is that we have the reasoning paradigm. Back in 2022, GPT couldn't think for an extended period of time before answering and try out multiple different ways of dissolving a problem. The main new capability is its ability to handle more complicated reasoning and science, technology, engineering, mathematics sorts of tasks. It's a lot better at coding, it's a lot better at graduate school mathematics, and physics, and virology.An implication of that for national security is that AIs have some virology capabilities that they didn't before, and virology is dual-use that can be used for civilian applications and weaponization applications. That's a new concerning capability that they have, but I think, overall, the AI systems are still fairly similar in their capabilities profile. They're better in lots of different ways, but not substantially.I think the next large shift is when they can be agents, when they can operate more autonomously, when they can book you flights reliably, make PowerPoints, play through long-form games for extended periods of time, and that seems like it's potentially on the horizon this year. It didn't seem like that two years ago. That's something that a lot of people are keeping an eye on and think could be arriving fairly soon. Overall, I think the capabilities profile is mostly the same except now it has some dual-use capabilities that they didn't have earlier, in particular virology capabilities.To what extent are your national security concerns based on the capabilities of the technology as it is today versus where you think it will be in five years? This is also a way of me asking about the extent that you view AGI as a useful framing device — so this is also a question about your timeline.I think that mostly the systems aren't that impressive currently. People use them to some extent, but I'd more emphasize the trajectory that we're on rather than the current capabilities. They still can't do very interesting cyber offense, for instance. The virology capabilities is very recent. We just, I think maybe a week ago, put out a study with SecureBio from MIT where we had Harvard, MIT virology postdocs doing wet lab skills, trying to work on viruses. So, “Here's a picture of my petri dish, I heated it to 37 degrees, what went wrong? Help me troubleshoot, help me guide me through this step by step.” We were seeing that it was getting around 95th percentile compared to those Harvard-MIT virology postdocs in their area of expertise. This is not a capability that the models had two years ago.That is a national security concern, but I think most of the national security concerns where it's strategically relevant, where it can be used for more targeted weapons, where it affects the basis of a nation's power, I think that's something that happens in the next, say, two to five years. I think that's what we mostly need to be thinking about. I’m not particularly trying to raise the alarm saying that the AI systems right now are extremely scary in all these different ways because they're not even agential. They can't book flights yet.Strategically relevant capabilities (6:00). . . when thinking about the future of AI . . . it's useful to think in terms of specific capabilities, strategically-relevant capabilities, as opposed to when is it truly intelligent . . .So that two-to-five-year timeline — and you can debate whether this is a good way of thinking about it — is that a trajectory or timeline to something that could be called “human-level AI” — you can define that any way you want — and what are the capabilities that make AI potentially dangerous and a strategic player when thinking about national security?I think having a monolithic term for AGI or for advanced AI systems is a little difficult, largely because there's been a consistently-moving goalpost. So right now people say, “AIs are dumb because they can't do this and that.” They can't play video games at the level of a teenager, they can't code for a day-long project, and things like that. Neither can my grandmother. That doesn't mean that she's not human-level intelligence, it's just a lot of people don't have some of these capabilities.I think when thinking about the future of AI, especially when thinking about national security, it's useful to think in terms of specific capabilities, strategically-relevant capabilities, as opposed to when is it truly intelligent or something like that. This is because the capabilities of AI systems are very jagged: they're good at some things and terrible at others. They can't fold clothes that reliably — most of the AI can't —and they're okay at driving in some cities but not others, but they can solve really difficult mathematics problems, they can write really long essays and provide pretty good legal analysis very rapidly, and they can also forecast geopolitical events better than most forecasters. It's a really weird capabilities profile.When I'm thinking about national security from a malicious-use standpoint, I'm thinking about weapon capabilities, I'm thinking about cyber-offensive capabilities, which they don't yet have, but that's an important one to track, and, outside of malicious use, I'm thinking about what's their ability to do AI research and how much of that can they automate? Because if they can automate AI research, then you could just run 100,000 of these artificial AGI researchers to build the next generations of AGI, and that could get very explosive extremely quickly. You're moving from human-speed research to machine-speed research. They’re typing 100 times faster than people, they're running tons of experiments simultaneously. That could be quite explosive, and that's something that the founders of AI pointed at as a really relevant capability, like Alan Turing and others, where that’s you could have a potential loss-of-control type of event is with this sort of runaway process of AI's building future generations of AIs quite rapidly.So that's another capability. What fraction of AI research can they automate? For weaponization, I think if it gets extremely smart, able to do research in lots of other sorts of fields, then that would raise concerns of its ability to be used to disrupt the balance of power. For instance, if it can do research well, perhaps it could come up with a breakthrough that makes oceans more transparent so we can find where nuclear submarines are or find the mobile launches extremely reliably, or a breakthrough in driving down the cost by some orders of magnitude of anti-ballistic missile systems, which would disrupt having a secure second-strike, and these would be very geopolitically salient. To do those things, though, that seems like a bundle of capabilities as opposed to a specific thing like cyber-offensive capabilities, but those are the things that I'm thinking about that can really disrupt the geopolitical landscape.If we put them in a bucket called, to use your phrase, “strategically-relevant capabilities,” are we on a trajectory of a data- and computing-power-driven trajectory to those capabilities? Or do there need to be one or two key innovations before those relevant capabilities are possible?It doesn't seem like it currently that we need some new big insights, in large part because the rate of improvement is pretty good. So if we look at their coding capabilities — there's a benchmark called SWE-bench verified (SWE is software engineering). Given a set of coding tasks — and this benchmark was weighed in some years ago — the models are poised to get something like 90 percent on this this summer. Right now they're in this 60 percent range. If we just extrapolate the trend line out some more months, then they'll be doing nine out of 10 of those software engineering tasks that were set some years ago. That doesn't mean that that's the entirety of software engineering. Still need coders. It's not 100 percent, obviously, but that suggests that the capability is still improving fairly rapidly in some of these domains. And likewise, with their ability to play that take games that take 20-plus hours, a few months ago they couldn't — Pokémon, for instance, is something that kids play and that takes 20 hours or so to beat. The models from a few months ago couldn't beat the game. Now, the current models can beat the game, but it takes them a few hundred hours. It would not surprise me if in a few months they'll get it down to around human-level on the order of tens of hours, and then from there they'll be able to play harder and harder sorts of games that take longer periods of time, and I think that this would be indicative of higher general capabilities.I think that there's a lot of steam in the current way that things are being done and I think that they've been trapped at the floor in their agent capabilities for a while, but I think we're starting to see the shift. I think that most people at the major AI companies would also think that agents are on the horizon and I don't think they were thinking that, myself included, a year ago. We were not seeing the signs that we're seeing now.So what we're talking about is AIs is having, to use your phrase, which I like, “strategically-relevant capabilities” on a timeline that is soon enough that we should be having the kinds of conversations and the kind of thinking that you put forward inSuperintelligence [Strategy]. We should be thinking about that right now very seriously.Yeah, it's very difficult to wrap one's head around because, unlike other domains, AI is much more general and broad in its impacts. So if one's thinking about nuclear strategy, you obviously need to think about bombs going off, and survivability, and second strike. The failure modes are: one state strikes the other, and then there's also, in the civilian applications, fissile material leaking or there being a nuclear power plant meltdown. That's the scenario space, there’s what states can do and then there's also some of these civilian application issues.Meanwhile, with AI, we've got much more than power plants melting down or bombs going off. We've got to think about how it transforms the economy, how it transforms people's private life, the sort of issues with them being sentient. We've got to think about it potentially disrupting mutual assured destruction. We've got to think about the AIs themselves being threats. We've got to think about regulations for autonomous AI agents and who's accountable. We've got to think about this open-weight, closed-weight issue. We've got, I think, a larger host of issues that touch on all the important spheres society. So it's not a very delimited problem and I think it's a very large pill to swallow, this possibility that it will be not just strategically relevant but strategically decisive this decade.Consequently, and thinking a little bit beforehand about it is, useful. Otherwise, if we just ignore it, I think we reality will slap us across the face and AI will hit us like a truck, and then we're going, “Wow, I wish we did something, had some more break-glass measures at a time right now, but the cupboard is bare in terms of strategic options because we didn't do some prudent things a while ago, or we didn't even bother thinking about what those are.”I keep thinking of the Situation Room in two years and they get news that China's doing some new big AI project, and it's fairly secretive, and then in the Situation Room they're thinking, “Okay, what do we know?” And the answer is nothing. We don't have really anybody on this. We're not collecting any information about this. We didn't have many concerted programs in the IC really tracking this, so we’re flying blind. I really don't want to be in that situationLearning from the Cold War (16:12). . . mutual assured destruction is an ugly reality that took decision-makers a long time to internalize, but that's just what the game theory showed would make the most sense. As I'm sure you know, throughout the course of the Cold War, there was a considerable amount of time and money spent on thinking about these kinds of problems. I went to college just before the end of the Cold War and I took an undergraduate class on nuclear war theory. There was a lot of thinking. To what extent does that volume of research and analysis over the course of a half-century, to what extent is that helpful for what you're trying to accomplish here?I think it's very fortunate that, because of the Cold War, a lot of people started getting more of a sense of game theory and when it's rational to conflict versus negotiate, and offense can provide a good defense, some of these counterintuitive things. I think mutual assured destruction is an ugly reality that took decision…

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    🗽 America's immigration edge: My chat (+transcript) with policy expert Alex Nowrasteh May 02, 2025
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    My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,With the rise of American populist nationalism has come the rise of nativism: a belief in the concept of “heritage Americans” and a deep distrust of immigration. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Alex Nowrasteh about the ideology beneath this severe skepticism, as well as what Americans lose economically if we shut our doors to both low- and high-skilled immigrants.Nowrasteh is the vice president for economic and social policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is the author of his own Substack with David Bier, as well as the co-author of Wretched Refuse? The Political Economy of Immigration and Institutions.Read more of Nowrasteh’s work on immigration, nationalism, and other research.In This Episode* Illegal immigration (1:16)* Rise of xenophobia (3:48)* Psychology of immigration skeptics (9:20)* The future American workforce (14:04)* Population decline and assimilation (17:35)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Illegal immigration (1:16)The system that I would favor is one that allows a substantially larger number of people at every skill level to come into this country legally, to work, to live, and to become Americans . . . because this country demands their labor and there's no way for them to come legally.Pethokoukis: Will you, in a very short period of time, give me a sense of the situation at the southern border of the United States of America in terms of immigration, how that has evolved from Trump 1, to Biden, to now? Is it possible to give me a concise summary of that?Nowrasteh: From Obama through Trump 1, the border apprehension numbers were pretty reasonable, you were talking about somewhere between 400,000 and 800,000 per year. Then came Covid, crashed those numbers down to basically nothing by April of 2020.After that, the numbers progressively rose. They were at the highest point in December of 2020 than they had been for any other December going back over 25 years. Then Biden takes office, the numbers shoot through the roof. We're talking about 170,000 to 250,000, sometimes 300,000 a month until January or so of 2024; those numbers start coming down precipitously. December of 2024, they're at 40,000 or so, 45,000. January 2025, Trump comes in, they go down again. First full month of Trump's administration in February, they're about 8,000, the lowest numbers without a pandemic in a very long time.What's the right number?That's a hard question to answer? In an ideal world where costs and benefits didn't matter, I think the ideal number is zero. But the question is how do you get to that ideal number, right? Is it by having an insane amount of enforcement, of existing laws where you basically end up brutalizing people to an incredible extent? Or is it practically zero because we let people come in lawfully to work in this country. The system that I would favor is one that allows a substantially larger number of people at every skill level to come into this country legally, to work, to live, and to become Americans, and that would bring that number down to about what it is now or even lower than what it is now every month, because the reason people come illegally is because this country demands their labor and there's no way for them to come legally.Rise of xenophobia (3:48). . . I just don't think the economic argument is what moves people on this topic.As I’ve understood it, and maybe understand it wrong, is this issue has developed that — at first it seemed like the concern, and it still is the concern, was with illegal undocumented immigrants. And then it seems to me the argument became, “Well, we don't want those, and then we also really don't want low-skill immigrants either.” And now it seems, and maybe you have a different perspective, that it's, “Well, we don't really want those high-skill immigrants either.”You gave me the current state of illegal immigration at the southern border. What is the current state of the argument among people who want less, perhaps even no immigration in this country?State of the argument is actually what you described. When I started working on this topic about 15 years ago, I never thought I would've heard people come out against the H-1B visa, or against high-skilled immigrants, or against foreign entrepreneurs. But you saw this over Christmas actually, December of 2024. You saw this basically online “H-1 B-gate” where Vivek Ramaswamy and Elon Musk were saying H-1Bs are great. I think Musk had tweeted, “over my dead body we're going to cut the H-1B,” right? And you see this groundswell of conservatives and Republicans — not all of them, by any means — come out and say, “We don't even want these guys. We don't want these skilled immigrants,” using a whole range of arguments. None of them economic, by the way. Almost none of them economics; all culture, all voting habits, all stereotypes, a lot of them pretty nasty in my opinion.So there is this sense where some people just don't want immigrants. The first time I think I encountered this in writing from a person who was prominent was Anne Coulter, Jeff Sessions when he was senator, and these types of people around 2015, in a big way, and it seems to have become much more prominent than I ever thought it would be.Is it that they don't understand the economic argument or they just don't care about that argument?They don't care about it. I have come to the realization — this makes me sad because I'm an economist by training — but I just don't think the economic argument is what moves people on this topic. I don't think it's what they care about. I don't think it animates . . . It animates me as a pro-immigration person, I think it animate you, right?It does, yeah, it sure does.It does not animate the people who are opposed to it. I think it is a cultural argument, it is a crime element, it is a threat element, it is a, “This makes us less American somehow” weird, fuzzy-feeling argument.Would it matter if the immigrants were all coming from Germany, France, and Norway?Maybe for a handful of them, but generally no, I don't think so. I think the idea that America is special, is different, is some kind of unique nation that ethnically, or in other ways cannot be pierced or contaminated by foreigners — I think it's just like an “Ew, foreigners,” type of sentiment that people have. A base xenophobia that a lot of people have combined with a very reasonable fear and dislike of chaos. When people see chaos on the border, they hate it.I hate chaos on the border. My answer is to get rid of the chaos by letting people come in legally, because you legalize a market, you can actually regulate it. You can't regulate an illegal market. But I think other people see chaos, they have this sort of purity conception of America that's just fanciful, in my opinion, and they just don't want foreigners, and the chaos prompts them, makes it even more powerful.To what extent is it fear that all these immigrants will eventually vote for things you don't want? Or in this case, they're all going to become Democrats, so Republicans don't want them.That’s definitely part of it. I think that's more of an elite Republican fear, or an elite sort of nativist or conservative fear than it is amongst the people online who are yelling at me all the time or yelling at Elon Musk. I think that resonates a lot more in this city and in online conservative publications, I think that resonates much more. I don't think it's borne out by the facts, and people who say this will also loudly trumpet how Hispanics now basically split their vote in the 2024 election. David Shore, who is the progressive analyst of electoral politics, said he thinks that Trump actually won the naturalized immigrant vote, which is probably the first time a Republican has won the naturalized immigrant vote since the 19th century.The immediate question is, does that kind of thing, will that resonate into a changing opinion among folks on the right if they feel like they feel like they can win these voters?I don't think so because I think it's about deeper issues than that. I think it's a real feelings-, values-based issue.Psychology of immigration skeptics (9:20)When people feel like they don't have control of something in their country or their government doesn't have control of something, they become anti- whatever is the source of that chaos, even the legal versions of it.Has this been there for a long time? Was it exacerbated for some reason? Was it exacerbated by the financial crisis and the slow economy afterward? The only time I remember hearing about people using the idea of “heritage Americans” were elite people whose great great grandparents came over on the Mayflower and they thought they were better than everybody else, they were elites, they were these kind of Boston Brahmans. So I was aware of the concept from that, but I've never heard people — and I hear it now — about people who were not part of the original Mayflower wave, or Pilgrims, think of themselves as “heritage Americans” because their parents came over in the 1850s or the 1880s, but now their “heritage.” That idea to me seems new.I hadn't heard of it until just a few years ago, frankly, at all. I racked my brain about this because I used to have a lot of affinity for the Republican Party, just to be frank. And I'm from California, and I'm in my ’40s, so I remember Prop 187 in 1994 when the state had a big campaign about illegal immigrants’ enforcement and welfare, and it really changed the state's voting patterns to be much more democratic, eventually.Then I saw the Republican Party under George W. Bush, and John McCain, and all these other guys who were pro-Republican, but always in California the Republicans were very skeptical of immigration across the board, but I didn't really see that spread. Then I saw it go to Arizona in 2010, 2009, 2008, around there. I saw it go to South Carolina, Mississippi, some of these places, and then all of a sudden with Trump, it went everywhere.So I racked my brain thinking, did I miss something? Was there always something there and I was just too myopic to view it, or I wasn't in those circles, or I wanted to convince myself that it wasn't there? And I really think that it was always there to some small extent, but Trump is the most brilliant political entrepreneur of our lifetime and probably of our country's history, and that he took over this party from the outside and he convinced people to be nativists. Because what he was saying, the words — not that different from Scott Walker saying about immigration. It was not that different from what Mike Huckabee was saying about immigration. It wasn't that different from Santorum. But he said it or sold it in a way that just worked, I guess. That maybe absolves me of some responsibility or maybe allows me to say that I didn't miss anything, but I do think that that largely explains it.And how does it explain that, and you may not have an answer. I can sort of understand the visceral concern about chaos at the border or people coming here illegally. But then to take it to the point that we don't even want AI engineers to come to this country from India, or, “I'm really angry that someone from a foreign country is taking my kid's spot at Harvard.” That, to me, seems almost inexplicable.It's not the fact of the chaos, but it's the perception of the chaos, because when Trump came in in 2015, the border crossing numbers were really low. They were in the 300,000s, low 400,000s, but he talked about it like it was millions, and he created this perception of just insane, outrageous chaos.There's a research and political psychology field about the locus of control. When people feel like they don't have control of something in their country or their government doesn't have control of something, they become anti- whatever is the source of that chaos, even the legal versions of it. In some way, it's an understandable human reaction, but in some ways it is so destructive. But, like you said, it spreads to AI engineers from China because it's like all immigration, and it's so bad, and it's so destructive, and that is the best explanation that I've seen out there about that.The future American workforce (14:04)What we notice in the economics of immigration, when we do these types of studies and we take a look at the wage impacts, we've got basically no wage effect on those of native-born Americans.I write a lot about, hopefully, this technological wave that we're going to be experiencing, and then I also write a little about immigration. The question I get is, if we're going to be worried about the jobs of the future being taken over by software or by robots, if we really think that's going to happen, shouldn’t we really be thinking very hard about the kinds of people we let enter into this country, even legally, and their ability to function in that kind of economy?I think we need to think about what is the best mechanism to select people to come here that the economy needs. What you described . . . assumes an amount of knowledge, and foresight, and, frankly, the incentive to make a wise decision in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians that they just do not have and that they will never have. and what matters most and who can pick the best in the market,You can say STEM degrees only. I only want people who have STEM degrees from colleges that, on some global ranking, are in the top 500 universities. You could say that. That would be one way of selecting.They could try to centrally plan it like that. . .You're saying “centrally planned” because you know that's going to get a reaction out of me, but go ahead.I do. The thing is, there's all different types of ways to have an immigration system and there's going to be a little bit of planning any immigration system. But I think the one that will work best is the one that allows the market to have the widest possible choice. We don't know how automation is going to turn out.There's this thing called Moravec’s paradox in a lot of AI writing, which is the idea that you'll probably be able to automate a lot of high-skill jobs more easily than you will be able to automate, say, somebody who's a maid, or a nanny, or a nurse, or a plumber, just because the real world is harder than . . . You and I type, and talk, and do math. That's probably easier to do. So maybe the optimal thing to do would be to increase immigration for low-skilled people because all the jobs in the future are going to be low-skilled anyway, because we're going to be able to automate all the high-skilled jobs.Though you could say then that that would take away the jobs from the natives.You could say that, of course. What we notice in the economics of immigration, when we do these types of studies and we take a look at the wage impacts, we've got basically no wage effect on those of native-born Americans. If we were to have a situation where let's say massive amounts of jobs disappear in entire sectors of the economy, vanished, automated . . . well, that just means that we're going to have more opportunities and specialization, division of labor, where there's going to be a lot more lower-skilled and mid-skill jobs, just because there's such a much larger and more productive side of the economy.There's going to be so much more profits in these other ones that we're going to have a bigger economy in the same way that when agriculture basically shrank as a massive section of the workforce, tho…

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    🌾 Land of plenty: My chat (+transcript) with science journalist Charles C. Mann on the agricultural history you never learned Apr 17, 2025
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    In the 1960s, a deep anxiety set in as one thing became seemingly clear: We were headed toward population catastrophe. Paul Ehrlich’s “The Population Bomb” and “The Limits to Growth,” written by the Club of Rome, were just two publications warning of impending starvation due to simply too many humans on the earth.As the population ballooned year by year, it would simply be impossible to feed everyone. Demographers and environmentalists alike held their breath and braced for impact.Except that we didn’t starve. On the contrary, we were better fed than ever.In his article in The New Atlantis, Charles C. Mann explains that agricultural innovation — from improved fertilization and irrigation to genetic modification — has brought global hunger to a record low.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Mann about the agricultural history they didn’t teach you in school.Mann is a science journalist who has worked as a correspondent for The Atlantic, Science, and Wired magazines, and whose work has been featured in many other major publications. He is also the author of 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus and1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus Created, as well as The Wizard and the Prophet: Two Remarkable Scientists and Their Dueling Visions to Shape Tomorrow’s World.In This Episode* Intro to the Agricultural Revolution (2:04)* Water infrastructure (13:11)* Feeding the masses (18:20)* Indigenous America (25:20)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Intro to the Agricultural Revolution (2:04)I don't think that people realize that the fact that most people on earth, almost the average person on earth, can feed themselves is a novel phenomenon. It's something that basically wasn't true since as far back as we know.Pethokoukis: What got my attention was a couple of pieces that you've worked on for The New Atlantis magazine looking at the issue of how modern Americans take for granted the remarkable systems and infrastructure that provide us comfort, safety, and a sense of luxury that would've been utterly unimaginable even to the wealthiest people of a hundred years ago or 200 years ago.Let me start off by asking you: Does it matter that we do take that for granted and that we also kind of don't understand how our world works?Mann: I would say yes, very much. It matters because these systems undergird the prosperity that we have, the good fortune that we have to be alive now, but they're always one generation away from collapse. If they aren't maintained, upgraded and modernized, they'll fall apart. They just won't stand there. So we have to be aware of this. We have to keep our eye on the ball, otherwise we won't have these things.The second thing is that, if we don't know how our society works, as citizens, we're simply not going to make very good choices about what to do with that society. I feel like both sides in our current political divide are kind of taking their eye off the ball. It's important to have good roads, it's important to have clean water, it's important to have a functioning public health system, it's important to have an agricultural system that works. It doesn't really matter who you are. And if we don't keep these things going, life will be unnecessarily bad for a lot of people, and that's just crazy to do.Is this a more recent phenomenon? If I would've asked people 50 years ago, “Explain to me how our infrastructure functions, how we get water, how we get electricity,” would they have a better idea? Is it just because things are more complicated today that we have no idea how our food gets here or why when we turn the faucet, clean water comes out?The answer is “yes” in a sort of trivial sense, in that many more people were involved in producing food, a much greater percentage of the population was involved in producing food 50 years ago. The same thing was true for the people who were building infrastructure 50 years ago.But I also think it's generally true that people's parents saw the change and knew it. So that is very much the case and, in a sense, I think we're victims of our own success. These kinds of things have brought us so much prosperity that we can afford to do crazy things like become YouTube influencers, or podcasters, or freelance writers. You don't really have any connection with how the society goes because we're sort of surfing on this wave of luxury that our ancestors bequeathed to us.I don't know how much time you spend on social media, Charles — I'm sure I spend too much — but I certainly sense that many people today, younger people especially, don't have a sense of how someone lived 50 years ago, 100 years ago, and there was just a lot more physical suffering. And certainly, if you go back far enough, you could not take for granted that you would have tomatoes in your supermarket year round, that you would have water in the house and that water would be clean. What I found really interesting — you did a piece on food and a piece on water — in the food piece you note that, in the 1980s, that was a real turning point that the average person on earth had enough to eat all the time, and rather than becoming an issue of food production, it became an issue of distribution, of governance. I think most people would be surprised of that statistic even though it's 40 years old.I don't think that people realize that the fact that most people on earth, almost the average person on earth, can feed themselves is a novel phenomenon. It's something that basically wasn't true since as far back as we know. That's this enormous turning point, and there are many of these turning points. Obviously, the introduction of antibiotics for . . . public health, which is another one of these articles they're going to be working on . . .Just about 100 years ago today, when President Coolidge was [president], his son went to play tennis at the White House tennis courts, and because he was lazy, or it was fashionable, or something, he didn't put on socks. He got a blister on his toe, the toe got infected, and he died. 100 years ago, the president of the United States, who presumably had the best healthcare available to anybody in the world, was unable to save his beloved son when the son got a trivial blister that got infected. The change from that to now is mind boggling.You've written about the Agricultural Revolution and why the great fears 40 or 50 years ago of mass starvation didn't happen. I find that an endlessly interesting topic, both for its importance and for the fact it just seems to be so underappreciated to this day, even when it was sort of obvious to people who pay attention that something was happening, it still seemed not to penetrate the public consciousness. I wonder if you could just briefly talk to me about that revolution and how it happened.The question is, how did it go from “The Population Bomb” written in 1968, a huge bestseller, hugely influential, predicting that there is going to be hundreds of millions of people dying of mass starvation, followed by other equally impassioned, equally important warnings. There's one called “Famine, 1975!,” written a few years before, that predicted mass famines in 1975. There's “The Limits to Growth.” I went to college in the ’70s and these were books that were on the curriculum, and they were regarded as contemporary classics, and they all proved to be wrong.The reason is that, although they were quite correct about the fact that the human race was reproducing at that time faster than ever before, they didn't realize two things: The first is that as societies get more affluent, and particularly as societies get more affluent and give women more opportunities, birth rates decline. So that this was obviously, if you looked at history, going to be a temporary phenomenon of whatever length it was be, but it was not going to be infinite.The second was there was this enormous effort spurred by this guy named Norman Borlaug, but with tons of other people involved, to take modern science and apply it to agriculture, and that included these sort of three waves of innovation. Now, most innovation is actually just doing older technologies better, which is a huge source of progress, and the first one was irrigation. Irrigation has been around since forever. It's almost always been done badly. It's almost always not been done systematically. People started doing it better. They still have a lot of problems with it, but it's way better, and now 40 percent, roughly, of the crops in the world that are produced are produced by irrigation.The second is the introduction of fertilizer. There's two German scientists, Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch, who essentially developed the ways of taking fertilizer and making lots and lots of it in factories. I could go into more detail if you want, but that's the essential thing. This had never been done before, and suddenly cheap industrial fertilizer became available all over the world, and Vaclav Smil . . . he's sort of an environmental scientist of every sort, in Manitoba has calculated that roughly 40 percent of the people on earth today would not be alive if it wasn't for that.And then the third was the development of much better, much higher-yielding seeds, and that was the part that Norman Borlaug had done. These packaged together of irrigation fertilizer and seeds yielded what's been called the Green Revolution, doubled, tripled, or even quadrupled grain yields across the world, particularly with wheat and rice. The result is the world we live in today. When I was growing up, when you were growing up, your parents may have said to you, as they did me, Oh, eat your vegetables, there are kids that are starving in Asia.” Right? That was what was told and that was the story that was told in books like “The Population Bomb,” and now Asia's our commercial rival. When you go to Bangkok, that was a place that was hungry and now it's gleaming skyscrapers and so forth. It's all based on this fact that people are able to feed themselves through the combination of these three factors,That story, the story of mass-starvation that the Green Revolution irrigation prevented from coming true. I think a surprising number of people still think that story is relevant today, just as some people still think the population will be exploding when it seems clear it probably will not be exploding. It will rise, but then it's going to start coming down at some point this century. I think those messages just don't get through. Just like most people don't know Norm Borlaug, the Haber-Bosch process, which school kids should know. They don't know any of this. . . Borlaug won the Nobel Prize, right?Right. He won the Nobel Peace Prize. I'll tell you a funny story —I think he won it in the same year that “The Population Bomb” came out.It was just a couple years off. But you're right, the central point is right, and the funny thing is . . . I wrote another book a while back that talked about this and about the way environmentalists think about the world, and it’s called the “Wizard and the Prophet” and Borlaug was the wizard of it. I thought, when I proposed it, that it would be easy. He was such an important guy, there'd be tons of biographies about him. And to this day, there isn't a real serious scholarly biography of the guy. This is a person who has done arguably more to change human life than any other person in the 20th century, certainly up in the top dozen or so. There's not a single serious biography of him.How can that be?It's because we're tremendously disconnected. It's a symptom of what I'm talking about. We're tremendously disconnected from these systems, and it's too bad because they're interesting! They're actually quite interesting to figure out: How do you get water to eight billion people? How do you get . . . It is a huge challenge, and some of the smartest people you’ve ever met are working on it every day, but they're working on it over here, and the public attention is over here.Water infrastructure (13:11). . . the lack of decent, clean, fresh water is the world's worst immediate environmental problem. I think people probably have some vague idea about agriculture, the Agricultural Revolution, how farming has changed, but I think, as you just referred to, the second half, water — utter mystery to people. Comes out of a pipe. The challenges of doing that in a rich country are hard. The challenges doing a country not so rich, also hard. Tell me what you find interesting about that topic.Well, whereas the story about agriculture is basically a good story: We've gotten better at it. We have a whole bunch of technical innovations that came in the 20th century and humankind is better off than ever before. With water, too, we are better off than ever before, but the maddening thing is we could be really well off because the technology is basically extremely old.There's a city, a very ancient city called Mohenjo-daro that I write about a bit in this article that was in essentially on the Pakistan-India border, 2600 BC. And they had a fully functioning water system that, in its basics, was no different than the water system that we have, or that London has, or that Paris has. So this is an ancient, ancient technology, yet we still have two billion people on the planet that don't have access to adequate water. In fact, even though we know how to do it, the lack of decent, clean, fresh water is the world's worst immediate environmental problem. And a small thing that makes me nuts is that climate change — which is real and important — gets a lot of attention, but there are people dying of not getting good water now.On top of it, even in rich countries like us, our water system is antiquated. The great bulk of it was built in the ’40s, ’50s, and ’60s, and, like any kind of physical system, it ages, and every couple years, various engineering bodies, water bodies, the EPA, and so forth puts out a report saying, “Hey, we really have to fix the US water system and the numbers keep mounting up.” And Democrats, Republicans, they all ignore this.Who is working on the water issue in poorer countries?There you have a very ad hoc group of people. The answer is part of it's the Food and Agricultural Organization because most water in most countries is used for irrigation to grow food. You also have the World Health Organization, these kinds of bodies. You have NGOs working on it. What you don't have in those countries like our country is the government taking responsibility for coordinating something that's obviously in the national interest.So you have these things where, very periodically — a government like China has done this, Jordan has done this, Bolivia has done this, countries all over the world have done this — and they say, “Okay, we haven't been able to provide freshwater. Let's bring in a private company.” And the private company then invests all this money in infrastructure, which is expensive. Then, because it's a private company, it has to make that money back, and so it charges people for a lot of money for this, and the people are very unhappy because suddenly they're paying a quarter of their income for water, which is what I saw in Southwest China: water riots because people are paying so much for water.In other words, one of the things that government can do is sort of spread these costs over everybody, but instead they concentrate it on the users, Almost universally, these privatization efforts have led to tremendous political unhappiness because the governmen…

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    🚀 Mars or bust! My chat (+transcript) with aerospace engineer Robert Zubrin Mar 21, 2025
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    In his famous 1962 address to Rice University, President Kennedy declared,We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard . . .The current administration has chosen, among other things, to go to Mars. Some, Elon Musk included, are looking for a backup planet to Earth. For others, like Robert Zubrin, Mars is an opportunity for scientific discovery, pure challenge, and a revitalized human civilization.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, Zubrin and I discuss how to reorient NASA, what our earliest Mars missions can and should look like, and why we should go to Mars at all.Zubrin is the president of aerospace R&D company Pioneer Astronautics, as well as the founder and president of the Mars Society. He was also formerly a staff engineer at Lockheed Martin. He has authored over 200 published papers and is the author of seven books, including the most recent, The New World on Mars: What We Can Create on the Red Planet.For more, check out Zubrin’s article in The New Atlantis, “The Mars Dream is Back — Here’s How to Make It Actually Happen.”In This Episode* Colonization vs. exploration (1:38)* A purpose-driven mission (5:01)* Cultural diversity on Mars (12:07)* An alternative to the SpaceX strategy (16:02)* Artemis program reform (20:42)* The myth of an independent Mars (24:17)* Our current timeline (27:21)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Colonization vs. exploration (1:38)I do think that it is important that the first human mission to ours be a round-trip mission. I want to have those people back, not just because it's nice to have them back, but I want to hear from them. I want to get the full report.Pethokoukis: Just before we started chatting, I went and I checked an online prediction market — one I check for various things, the Metaculus online prediction market — and the consensus forecast from all the people in that community for when will the first humans land successfully on Mars was October 2042. Does that sound realistic, too soon, or should it be much further away?I think it is potentially realistic, but I think we could beat it. Right now we have a chance to get a Humans to Mars program launched. This current administration has announced that they intend to do so. They're making a claim they’re going to land people on Mars in 2028. I do not think that is realistic, but I do believe that it is realistic for them to get the program well started and, if it is handled correctly — and we'll have to talk a lot more about that in this talk — that we could potentially land humans on Mars circa 2033.When I gave you that prediction and then you mentioned the 2020s goal, those are about landing on Mars. Should we assume when people say, “We're going to land on Mars,” they also mean people returning from Mars or are they talking about one-way trips?Musk has frequently talked about a colonization effort, and colonization is a one-way trip, but I don't think that's in the cards for 2028 or 2033. I think what is in the cards for this time period on our immediate horizon is exploration missions. I do think that we could potentially have a one-way mission with robots in 2028. That would take a lot of work and it's a bit optimistic, but I think it could be done with determination, and I think that should be done, actually.To be clear, when people are talking about the first human mission to Mars, the assumption is it's not a one way trip for that astronaut, or those two astronauts, that we intend on bringing them back. Maybe the answer is obvious, but I'm not sure it's obvious to me.From time to time, people have proposed scenarios where the first human mission to Mars is a one-way mission, you send maybe not two but five people. Then two years later you send five more people, and then you send 10 people, and then you send 20 people, and you build it up. In other words, it's not a one-way mission in the sense of you're going to be left there and your food will then run out and you will die. No, I don't think that is a credible or attractive mission plan, but the idea that you're going to go with a few people and then reinforce them and grow it into a base, and then a settlement. That is something that can be reasonably argued. But I still think even that is a bit premature. I do think that it is important that the first human mission to ours be a round-trip mission. I want to have those people back, not just because it's nice to have them back, but I want to hear from them. I want to get the full report.A purpose-driven mission (5:01)In the purpose-driven mode, the purpose comes first, you spend money to do things. In the vendor-driven mode, you do things in order to spend money. And we've seen both of these.So should we just default to [the idea] that this mission will be done with government funding on SpaceX rockets, and this will be a SpaceX trip? That's by far the most likely scenario? This is going to need to be a public-private partnership. SpaceX is rapidly developing the single most important element of the technology, but it's not all the technology. We need surface systems. We need the system for making rocket fuel on Mars because the SpaceX mission architecture is the one that I outlined in my book, The Case for Mars, where you make your return propellant on Mars: You take carbon dioxide and water, which are both available on Mars, and turn them into methane and oxygen, which is an excellent rocket fuel combination and which, in fact, is the rocket fuel combination that the Starship uses for that reason. So that's the plan, but you need the system that makes itWe're going to need surface power, which really should be a nuclear power source and which is difficult to develop outside of the government because we're talking about controlled material. Space nuclear reactors will need to use highly enriched uranium, so it should be a partnership between NASA and SpaceX, but we're going to have to reform NASA if this is going to work. I think, though, that this mission could be the vehicle by which we reform NASA. That is, that NASA Artemis moon program, for example, is an example of how not to do something.That's the current government plan to get us back to the moon.Right. But you see, NASA has two distinct modes of operation, and one I call the purpose-driven mode and the other is the vendor-driven mode. In the purpose-driven mode, the purpose comes first, you spend money to do things. In the vendor-driven mode, you do things in order to spend money. And we've seen both of these. To be fair, there's been times when NASA has operated with extreme efficiency to accomplish great things in very short amounts of time, of which, of course, the Apollo Program is the most well-known example where we got to the moon and eight years from program start. The difference between Apollo and Artemis was it wasn't human nature — and there were plenty of greedy people in the 1960s that, when the government's spending money, they want a piece of the action, they were all there.There's no shortage of people who, when you’ve got a lot of money to spend, are willing to show up and say, “Hi, you got a great idea, but you can't do it until you fund me.” And there were plenty of them then, but they were shown the door because it was clear that if we did all these side projects that people were trying to claim were necessary (“you can't do your program until you do my program”) we would not make it to the moon by 1969. So actually, the forcing function was the schedule. That's what forced the nonsense out of the room.Artemis, on the other hand, has been undertaken as a project whose leadership thought that they could secure a lot of support for the program if they gave a lot of people money. So Artemis has five different flight systems which are incompatible with each other. It's a ridiculous program. That's not the way to do things. We have to have a program leadership which is committed to humans-to-Mars not as a way to get pet technology programs funded, or pet constituencies funded, or pet vendors funded, or any of that stuff. It's got to be: the mission comes first. And if you have that kind of emphasis on this, this can be done and it can be the way to reform NASA.I liken NASA today to a peacetime military, but then it gets thrown into battle, and you get rid of your McClellans and you bring in your Grants. In other words, you have a certain period of chaos and disorganization because you've got deadwood running the place, but under the stress of actually beginning a decisive mission and not being tolerant of anything less than real performance, you actually get the army you need.So that sounds like that's a presidential decision, to give that agency a very specific goal, and perhaps a timeline, to create that kind of purpose-driven culture.Yes. Now that's one necessity. There's another necessity as well, which is that the conceptual base of this program, the political base, if you will, which is derived from its intellectual base, has got to be expanded. This cannot be seen as a Trump-Musk boondoggle because Trump and Musk have both defined themselves in extremely partisan terms, and if this is seen as their program and not America's program, it will be gone as soon as the political fortunes of war shift, which they always do. Musk has this concept that he's been promoting, which is the reason why we have to go to Mars is so that there'll be survivors on Mars after the Earth is destroyed, and I don't think this is particularly —You don't find that a compelling reason, given that there's not currently an obvious threat of us being destroyed, to run a program that could necessarily exist over multiple administrations and be quite expensive.That idea is derived from Isaac Asimov’s Foundation novel: The scientists go to the planet Terminus so they can reestablish civilization after the Galactic Empire collapsed. It may please science-fiction fans, but I don't think it's attractive to the general public, and also, frankly, I don't think it's practical. I don't think a Mars colony could have a million people on Mars that will survive as an autarchy. There's no nation on earth that survives as an autarchy. The ones that try are extremely poor as a result for trying.The correct reason to go to Mars is, immediately, for the science, to find out the truth about the prevalence of diversity of life in the universe; for the challenge, to challenge our youth, learn your science and you can be an explorer and maker of new worlds; and for the future, but for the future, it's not for a few survivors to be hiding away after the earth is destroyed, it's to create a new branch, or perhaps several new branches, of human civilization which will add their creative inventiveness to human progress as a whole, as America did for Western civilization. By establishing America, you had a new branch of Western civilization which experimented in everything from democracy to light bulbs and airplanes and greatly enhanced human progress as a result.And the Martians, you are going to have a group of technologically adept people in a frontier environment that's going to challenge them. They're going to come up with lots of inventions that they need for their own progress, but which will benefit human as a whole. And that is why you should colonize Mars.Cultural diversity on Mars (12:07)I believe that there will . . . be many colonies on Mars established by different people with different ideas on what the ideal civilization should be, and the ones with the best ideas will attract the most immigrants and therefore outgrow the rest.It very much reminds me of the scenario laid out inThe Expanse book and TV series where mankind has spread throughout the solar system. They're all branches of human civilization, but being out there has changed people, and Mars is different than Earth. Mars has a different society. The culture is different. I think that's a very interesting reason that I had not heard Elon Musk discuss.I have a book called The New World on Mars, which you might want to check out because I discuss this very thing. I believe that there will, once it's possible to colonize Mars, there'll be many colonies on Mars established by different people with different ideas on what the ideal civilization should be, and the ones with the best ideas will attract the most immigrants and therefore outgrow the rest. So, for example, the one thing I disagree with about The Expanse is they have this militaristic Spartan civilization on Mars.There's just one sort of universal culture.Yeah, and I don't think that that civilization would attract many immigrants. The reason why the American North outgrew the South is because the North was free. That's why all the immigrants went to the North. That's why the North won the Civil War, actually. It had a larger population of more industry because all the immigrants went there and became far more creative. This is a very good thing, that the form of civilization that ultimately prevails on Mars will be one, I think, that will offer human freedom and be the most attractive in as many other respects as possible. That's why it will prevail, because it will attract immigrants.But I want to get back to this program. If it is possible not to land humans on Mars in 2028, but to land — if you can land Starship on Mars, you can land not a robot, but a robotic expedition.Starship, Musk claims it could land 100 tons on Mars. Let's say it could land 30. That's 30 times as much as we can currently land. The JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory)-led Mars science community, they're still thinking about Mars exploration in the terms it's been done since the ’60s, which is single spacecraft on single rockets. Imagine you can now land an entire expedition. You land 30 rovers on Mars along with 30 helicopters that are well instrumented and a well instrumented science lab in it. So now you are bringing not only heavy lift, but heavy lander capability to the Mars science program, and now you have a robotic expedition on Mars. For every instrument that made it onto perseverance, there were 10 that were proposed because they could only take six, and like 100 teams wanted to get their instruments on the rover. So imagine now we can actually land 30 rovers and 30 helicopters, not little ones like Ingenuity, but ones that can carry five or six instruments each themselves.So now you have 100 science teams, you've got life-detection experiments, you've got ground penetrating radar, you've got all sorts of things that we haven't done on Mars all being done. You're expanding Mars science by two orders of magnitude by bringing into existence the kind of transportation capability that is necessary to enable humans to Mars. So now you bring on board the science community and the science-interested public, which includes all parts of the political spectrum, but frankly it leans somewhat left, overall — university scientists, people like this.So now this isn't just about Elon Musk, the Bond villain. This is about what we as America and we as a culture which is committed to pushing the boundaries of science. This is what we are doing. It's not what SpaceX is doing, it's not what Musk is doing, it's not what Trump is doing, it's what America is doing, and celebrating the highest values of Western civilization, which is the search for truth.An alternative to the SpaceX strategy (16:02)Starship plus Starboat is the flight hardware combination that can do both the moon and Mars.That…

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    📈 Back to the Nineties? My chat (+transcript) with economist Skanda Amarnath on the 2020s productivity outlook Mar 14, 2025
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    The American economy is growing, and, in many ways, it’s looking a lot like the 1990s. Upward trends in productivity growth and employment paired with downward trends in inflation are cause for optimism. The question is whether we will maintain this trajectory or be derailed by this emerging era of uncertainty.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Skanda Amarnath about trade policy, fiscal and monetary policy, AI advancement, demographic trends, and how all of this bodes for the US economy.Amarnath is the Executive Director of Employ America, a macroeconomic policy research and advocacy organization. He was previously vice president at MKP Capital Management, as well as an analyst at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.In This Episode* The boomy ’90s (1:24)* Drivers of growth (7:24)* The boomy ’20s? (11:38)* Full employment and the Fed (22:03)* Demographics in the data (25:37)* Policies for productivity (27:55)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The boomy ’90s (1:24)The ’90s stand out as a high productivity growth, low inflation, high employment economy, especially if we look at the years 1996 to the year 2000.Pethokoukis: What got me really excited about all the great work that Employ America puts out was one particular report that I think came out late last year called “The Dream of the 90’s is Alive in 2024,” and hopefully it's still alive in 2025. By ’90s of course you mean the 1990s.Let me start off by asking you: What was so awesome about the 1990s that it is worth writing about a dream of its return?Amarnath: The 1990s — if you're a macroeconomist, at least — had pitch-perfect conditions. Employment was reasonably high, we achieved the highest levels of prime-age employment relative to the population. We had low and declining inflation, and that variable that we use to say, this is the driver of welfare over time, productivity outcomes, the amount of output we can spin up from finite inputs, was also growing at a very strong rate, and one that we haven't really seen replicated since or really in the decades before.The ’90s stand out as a high productivity growth, low inflation, high employment economy, especially if we look at the years 1996 to the year 2000. We'd had high productivity maybe even afterwards . . . but that was also a period where a lot of that productivity was gained from the recession. When employment falls really quickly, productivity can go up for illusory reasons, but it's really that ’90s sweet spot where everything was kind of moving in the right direction.Obviously, over the last several years, we've seen a lot of those different challenges flare up, whether it was employment during Covid, but then also inflation over the last few years. So . . . a model to build towards, in some ways.Some of us — not me, and I don't think you — remember the very boomy immediate post-war decades. Probably many more of us remember the go-go 1990s. One thing I always find interesting is how gloomy people were in those years right before the takeoff, which is a wonderful contrarian indicator that we had this period [when] we appeared to have won the Cold War but we had a nasty recession early in the decade, kind of a choppy recovery, and there was plenty of gloom that the days of fast growth were over. And just as we sort of reached the nadir in our attitudes, boy, things took off. So maybe that's a good omen for right nowIf we're a contrarian, and if the past can be present, maybe that is a positive indicator to consider. In some ways, it's a bit surprising how much you hear the talk about growth [being] stuck in a very low-growth environment. Over the last two years, we have seen above-trend real GDP growth, above-trend productivity growth. We're going to get some productivity data revisions tomorrow. Again, this measure of productivity is output per hour, so it's basically, to a first approximation, real GDP divided by hours worked. We've seen that the labor market has, largely speaking, held itself up over the last few years, and yet, at the same time, real output has accelerated.So that's at least something that suggests better things are possible. It's a sign that productivity can accelerate, and with the benefit of revisions tomorrow, we are likely to see at least . . . I'd say if you take a fair reading of the pre-pandemic trend on productivity growth, so five to 15 years, maybe you want to include the financial crisis and what happened before, maybe you don't, but you end up with something like 1.4 percent is what we were seeing. 1.4, maybe 1.45, that's a pretty generous view of pre-pandemic productivity growth.I would like to do better than that going forward.I would too. And since 2019 Q4, with the benefit of data revisions, until now, we're likely to see something like 1.9 percent — 50 basis points higher, 0.5 percent higher, we could ideally like to do even better than that. But it's 0.5 percent better over a five-year horizon in which whatever labor market weirdness spanned Covid, we've largely recovered from that. Obviously, there are a lot of different things that have changed between now and five years ago, but at least the data distortion issues should hopefully have been filtered out at this point. And yet, we probably are posting much better real output outcomes.So through a lot of this turbulence, through a lot of the dynamism that's kind of transpired over the last few years, especially in terms of business formation activity, there was a high labor turnover environment in ’21 and ’22. That churn has come down in more recent quarters, but we have seen better productivity outcomes.Now, can they sustain? There's a lot of things that probably go into that. There are some new potential risks and shocks on the horizon, but at least it tells you better things are possible in a way that if — I'm sure you've had these discussions throughout the previous decade, in the 2010s, when people made a lot of claims about why productivity growth was destined to be stuck, that we were either not innovating enough, or we were not able to capture that into GDP, or else there are just some secular reasons, and so I think it's an instructive moment. If people are actually looking at the data, the last two years, real output and productivity growth has been very impressive, objectively. And it's not just about, “Hey, we're reverting to the pre-pandemic trend and nothing more.” I think there are signs that this is something at least a little different from what an honest forecast pre-pandemic would've suggested.Drivers of growth (7:24)The three-legged stool is one where you want have a labor market that's strong, fixed investment that's growing (ideally faster than usual), and on the third leg it's the set of things that you can do to control really salient costs that everyone's paying.Let's talk about those signs, but first let's take a quick step back. When you look at what drove growth, and productivity growth, specifically, in the ’90s, give me the factors that drove growth and then why those factors give us lessons for policymaking today.I think there are three drivers I can point to that are a little bit independent of each other.One is we had — I don't want to say a tight labor market, but especially a fully employed labor market is helpful in so far as, and we see this now over multiple episodes, especially when you're at high levels of prime-age employment, that's typically a point when there's a lot of human capital that's accumulated. People who have been employed for a while, they've been trained up, there's a little more returns to scale, they can scale revenue, they can scale output better. You don't need to add an additional worker to add additional unit of GDP.In the more tangible sense, it's that people are trained up, they have more tangible experience, productive experience. You're able to see output gains without necessarily having to add hours worked. We generally saw over the late ‘90s: Hours worked slowed down, but real GDP growth held up very well.The labor market wasn't contracting by any stretch, it was just, largely speaking, finding an equilibrium in which employment levels were high, job growth was solid if not always spectacular, but we were still seeing that real GDP growth could still be scaled up in a lot of ways. So there is a labor market dynamic to this.There is a fixed investment dynamic. Fixed investment growth is very strong in the late ’90s. That was about information processing equipment, IT, software. We did telecommunications deregulation in 1996, which is meant to really expand and accelerate the rollout of things. That became the fiber boom. We saw a lot of construction that went into those sectors, and so we saw it really touch construction, we saw it touch equipment, and we also saw it effect intellectual property.An investment to prevent the millennium bug?There was probably a lot of overinvestment that also was born of some of that deregulation, but at least in terms of it adding to our welfare, making it easier for us to use the internet and the long-term benefits of that, a lot of that was built in the late ’90s. You could probably point to some stuff in policy, obviously interacting with technology that was very favorable.The third thing I would say is also probably underrated is inflation fell over that whole period. While some of that inflation falling would've been some fortuitous dynamics, especially in the late ’90s around food and energy prices falling, the Asian financial crisis, there were also things that were very important for creating space for the consumer to spend more. Things like HMOs. Healthcare inflation really fell throughout the ’90s.Now, HMOs became more unpopular for a lot of reasons. These health management organizations were meant to control costs and did a pretty good job of it. This is something that Janet Yellen actually wrote about a long time ago, talking about the ’90s and how the healthcare dynamic was very underrated. In the 2000s, healthcare inflation really picked up again and a lot of the cost-control measures in the private sector were less effective, but you could see evidence that that was also creating space in terms of price stability, the ability for the consumer to spend more on other types of goods and services. That also allows for both more demand to be available but also for it to be supplied.I think with all these stories there's a demand- and a supply-side aspect to them. I think you kind of need both for it to be successful. The three-legged stool is one where you want have a labor market that's strong, fixed investment that's growing (ideally faster than usual), and on the third leg it's the set of things that you can do to control really salient costs that everyone's paying. Like healthcare, obviously there's a lot of cost bloat, and thinking about ways to really curb expenditure without curbing quality or real consumption itself, but there's obviously a lot of room for reforms in that area.The boomy ’20s? (11:38)Right now, you have still an increasing number of people who have had meaningful work experience over the last one, two, three, years. That human capital should accumulate and be more relevant for GDP growth going forward . . .So you've identified what, in your view, is a very successful mix of these very critical factors. So if you want to be bullish about the rest of this decade, which of those factors — maybe all of them — are at play right now? Or maybe none of them!Right now, the labor market is still holding up rather well. While we may not be seeing quite the level of labor market dynamism we saw earlier in this expansion, at the same time, that was also a period of great turbulence and high inflation. Right now, you have still an increasing number of people who have had meaningful work experience over the last one, two, three, years. That human capital should accumulate and be more relevant for GDP growth going forward, assuming we don't have a recession in the next year or two or whatever.If we do, I think it obviously would mean a lot of people are probably likely to not be as employed, and if that's the case, their marketable and productive skills may atrophy and depreciate. That's the risk there, but, all things considered, right now, non-farm payroll growth has been roughly speaking 160,000 per month. Employment rates adjusted for demographics are a little higher than they were before the pandemic. It's pretty historically high. That's not a bad outcome to start with and those initial conditions should hopefully bode well for the labor market's contribution to productivity growth.The challenge is in terms of real GDP growth. It's also a function of a lot of other factors: What are we going to see in terms of cost stability? I would generally say there's obviously a lot of turbulence right now, but what's going to happen to a lot of these key costs? On one hand, commodity prices should hopefully be stable, there's a lot of signs of, let's say, OPEC increasing production.On the other hand, we have also things about tariffs that are pretty significant threats on the table and I think you could also be equally concerned about how much this could matter. We've already had a bigger run-through of this with a lot of this supply chain turbulence, pandemic error stimulus, and how that stuff interacted. That was quite turbulent. Even if tariffs aren't quite as turbulent as that, it could still be something that detracted from productivity growth.We saw, actually, in the first two quarters of 2022 when inflation exploded, there were a compounding number of shocks on the supply side with the demand side that it did have a depressing effect on productivity in the short run. And so you can think if we see things on the cost side blow out, it will also restrict output. If you have to mark up the price of a lot of things to reflect different costs and risks, it's going to have some output-throttling effect, and a productivity-throttling effect. That's one side of things to be concerned about.And then the other side of it, in terms of fixed investment, I think there's a lot of reasons for optimism on fixed investment. If we just took the start of the year, there's clearly a lot of investment tied to the artificial intelligence boom: Data centers, all of the expenditures on software that should change, expenditures on hardware that should be upgraded, and there's a whole set of industrial infrastructure that's also tied to this where you should see capital deepening really emerge. You should see that there should be more room to scale up in capital formation relative to labor. You can probably point to some pockets of it right now, but it hadn't shown up in the GDP data yet. That was the optimistic case coming into this year and I think it's still there. The challenge is there's now other headwinds.The tariffs make me less optimistic. I really worry about the uncertainty freezing business investment and hiring, for that matter.I share your sentiment there. I think we learned in 2018 and -19, there were tariffs being implemented but on much smaller scale and scope, and even those had a pretty meaningful or identifiable impact on the manufacturing sector, leave aside even the other sectors that use manufactured inputs from imports or otherwise. So these are going to be likely headwinds if you're any kind of company that exports at any point in time to something across borders, you have to now incorporate higher costs, more uncertainty. We don't know how lon…

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    🚀 My chat (+transcript) with economist Matt Weinzierl on the growing business of space Mar 06, 2025
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    The space business landscape is changing. Companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin are moving at breakneck speed toward goals Americans have dreamed of since the 1960s. At the same time, a whole host of smaller startups are arriving on the scene, ready to tackle everything from asteroid mining to next-gen satellites to improved lunar missions.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, I’m talking with Matt Weinzierl about what research developments and market breakthroughs are allowing these companies to thrive.Weinzierl is the senior associate dean and chair of the MBA program at Harvard Business School. He is also a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Weinzierl is the co-author of a new book with Brendan Rosseau, Space to Grow: Unlocking the Final Economic Frontier.In This Episode* Decentralizing space (1:54)* Blue Origin vs. SpaceX (4:50)* Lowering launch costs (9:24)* Expanding space entrepreneurship (14:42)* Space sector sustainability (20:06)* The role of Artemis (22:45)* Challenges to success (25:28)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Decentralizing space (1:54). . . we had this amazing success in the ’60s with the Apollo mission . . but it was obviously a very government-led, centralized program and that got us in the mode of thinking that's how you did space.You’re telling a story about space transitioning from government-led to market-driven, but I wonder if you could just explain that point because it's not a story about privatization, it's a story about decentralization, correct?It really is, I think the most important thing for listeners to grab onto. In fact, I teach a course at Harvard Business School on this topic, and I've been teaching it now for a few years, and I say to my students, “What's the reason we're here? Why are we talking about space at HBS?” and it's precisely about what you just asked.So maybe the catchiest way to phrase this for folks, there was one of the early folks at SpaceX, Jim Cantrell, he was one of the earliest employees. He has this amazing quote from the early 2000s where he says, “The Great American Space Enterprise, which defeated Communism in defense of Capitalism, was and is operating on a Soviet economic model.” And he was basically speaking to the fact that we had this amazing success in the ’60s with the Apollo mission and going to the moon and it truly was an amazing achievement, but it was obviously a very government-led, centralized program and that got us in the mode of thinking that's how you did space. And so for the next 50 years, basically we did space in that way run from the center, not really using market forces.What changed in various ways was that in the early 2000s we decided that model had kind of run its course and the weaknesses were too big and so it was time to bring market forces in. And that doesn't mean that we were getting rid of the government role in space. Just like you said, the government will always play a vital role in space for various reasons, national security among them, but it is decentralizing it in a way to bring the power of the market to bear.Maybe the low point — and that low point, that crisis, maybe created an opportunity — was the end of the Space Shuttle program. Was that an important inflection point?It's definitely one that I think most people in the sector look to as being . . . there's the expression “never waste a crisis,” and I think that that's essentially what happened. The Shuttle was an amazing engineering achievement, nobody really doubts that, and what NASA was trying to do with it and with their contractors was incredibly hard. So it's easy to kind of get too negative on that era, but it is also true that the Shuttle never really performed the way people hoped, it never flew as often, it was much more costly, and then in 2003 there was the second Shuttle tragedy.When that happened, I think everybody felt like, "This just isn't the future." So we need something else, and the Shuttle program was put on a cancellation path by the end of that decade. That really did force this reckoning with the fact that the American space sector, which had put men on the moon and brought them back safely in 1969, launching all sorts of dreams about space colonies and hotels, now, 40 years later, it was going to be unable to even put a person into orbit on its own rockets. We were going to be renting rockets from the Russians. That was really a moment of soul searching, I guess is one way you think about it in the sector.Blue Origin vs. SpaceX (4:50)I guess the big lesson . . . is that competition really does matter in space just like in any other business.I think naturally we would lead into talking about SpaceX, which we certainly will do, but the main competitor, Blue Origin, the Jeff Bezos company, which seems to be moving forward, but it's definitely seemed to have adopted a very different kind of strategy. It seems to me different than the SpaceX strategy, which really is kind of a “move fast, break things, build them back up and try to launch again” while Blue Origin is far more methodical. Am I right in that, is that eventually going to work?Blue Origin is a fascinating company. In fact, we actually opened the book — the book is a series, basically, of stories that we tell about companies, and people, and government programs, sprinkled in with some economics because we can't resist. We're trying to structure it for folks, but we start with the story of Blue Origin because it really is fascinating. It illustrates some really fundamental aspects of the sector these days.To your specific question, we can talk more about Blue in many of its aspects. The motto of Blue from its beginning has been this Latin phrase, gradatim ferociter or, “step-by-step, ferociously,” and Bezos in the earliest days, they even have a tortoise on their company shield, so to speak, to signal this tortoise and the hair metaphor or fable. From the earliest days the idea was, “Look, we're going to just methodically work our way up to these grand visions of building infrastructure for space,” eventually in the service of having, as they always said, millions of people living and working in space.Now there's various ways to interpret the intervening 20 years that we've had, or 25 now since they were founded. One interpretation says, well, that's a nice story, but in fact they made some decisions that caused them to move more slowly than even they would've wanted to. So they didn't continue working as closely with NASA as, say, for instance SpaceX did. They relied really almost exclusively on funding from Bezos himself issuing a lot of other contracts they could have gotten, and that sort of reduced the amount of external discipline and market competition that they were facing. And then they made some other steps along the way, and so now they're trying to reignite and move faster, and they did launch New Glenn, their orbital rocket, recently. So they're back in the game and they're coming back. That's one story.Another story is, well yes, they've made decisions that at the time didn't seem to move as fast as they wanted, but they made those decisions intentionally. This is a strategy we will see pay off pretty well in the long run. I think that the jury is very much still out, but I guess the big lesson for your listeners and for me and hopefully for others in the sector, is that competition really does matter in space just like in any other business. To the extent that Blue didn't move as fast because they didn't face as much competition, that's an interesting lesson for the private sector. And to the extent that now they're in the game nipping at the heels of SpaceX, that's good for everybody, even for SpaceX, I think, to have them in the game.Do you think they're nipping at the heels?Well, yeah, I was just thinking as I said that, that might have been a little optimistic. It really does depend how you look at it. SpaceX is remarkably dominant in the commercial space sector, there's no question there. They launch 100 times a year plus and they are . . . the latest statistic I have in 2023, they launched more than 80 percent of all the mass launched off the surface of Earth, so they run more than half the satellites that are operational in space. They are incredibly dominant such that concerns about monopoly are quite present in the sector these days. We can talk about that.I think “nipping at the heels” might be a little generous, although there are areas in which SpaceX still does have real competition. The national security launch sector, ULA (United Launch Alliance) is still the majority launcher of national security missions and Blue is looking to also get into the national security launch market. With Amazon's satellite constellation, Kuiper, starting to come into the launch cadence over the next couple of years, they will have demand for lots of launch outside of SpaceX and that will start to increase the frequency with which Blue Origin and ULA also launch. So I think there is reason to believe that people in the sector will have more options, even for the heavy-lift launch vehicles.Lowering launch costs (9:24)[SpaceX] brought the cost of getting a kilogram of mass into orbit down by 90 percent in less than, really 10 or 15 years, which had been a stagnant number for going on four or five decades.People in Silicon Valley like talking about disruption and disruptors. It's hard to think of a company that is more deserving, or A CEO more deserving than Elon Musk and SpaceX. Tell me how disruptive that company has been to how we think about space and the economic potential of space.We open our chapter in the book on SpaceX by saying we believe it'll go down as one of the most important companies in the history of humanity, and I really do believe that. I don't think you have to be a space enthusiast, necessarily, to believe it. The simplest way to summarize that is that they brought the cost of getting a kilogram of mass into orbit down by 90 percent in less than, really 10 or 15 years, which had been a stagnant number for going on four or five decades. It had hovered around — depending on the data point you look at — around $30,000 a kilogram to low earth orbit, and once SpaceX got Falcon 9 flying, it was down to $3,000. That's just an amazing reduction.What's also amazing about it is they didn't stop there. As soon as they had that, they decided that one of the ways to make the business model work was to reinvent satellite internet. So in a sector that had just over a decade ago only 1000 operational satellites up in space, now we have 10,000, 6,000 plus of which are SpaceX's Starlink, just an incredibly fast-growing transformational technology in orbit.And then they went on to disrupt their own disruption by creating a rocket called Starship, which is just absolutely massive in a way that's hard to even imagine, and that, if it fulfills the promise that I think everyone hopes it will, will bring launch costs down, if you can believe it, by another 90 percent, so a total of 99 percent down to, say, $300 a kilogram. Now you may not have to pass those cost savings on to the customers because they don't have a lot of competition, but it's just amazingWhat's possible with those launch costs in that vicinity? Sometimes, when I try to describe it, I'm like, well, imagine all your 1960s space dreams and what was the missing ingredient? The missing ingredient was the economics and those launch costs. Now plug in those launch costs and lots of crazy things that seem science-fictional may become science-factual. Maybe give me just a sense of what's possible.Well first tell me, Jim, which of the ’60s space dreams are you most excited about?It's hard for me, it's like which of my seven kids do I love more? I love the idea of people living in space, of there being industry in space. I like the idea of there being space-based solar power, lunar mining, asteroid mining, the whole kit and caboodle.You've gone through the list. I think we're all excited about those things. And just in case it's not obvious to your listeners, the reason I think you asked that question is that, of course, the launch cost is the gateway to doing anything in space. That's why everyone in the industry makes such a big deal out of it. Once you have that, it seems like the possibilities for business cases really do expand.Now, of course, we have to be careful. It's easy to get overhyped. It's still very expensive to do all the things you just mentioned in space, even if you can get there cheaply. Once you put humans in the mix, humans are very hard to keep alive in space. Space is a very dangerous place for lots of reasons. Even when there aren't humans in space, operating in space, even autonomously, is obviously quite hard, whether it's asteroid mining or other things. It's not as though, all of a sudden, all of our biggest dreams are immediately going to be realized. I do think that part of what's so exciting, part of the reason we wrote the book, is that there is a new renaissance of enthusiasm of startups building a bit on the SpaceX model of having a big dream, being really cost-conscious as you build it, moving fast and experimenting and iterating, who are going after some of these dreams you mentioned..So whether it's an asteroid mining company — actually, in my course later this week, we're having Matt Gialich, who's the CEO of AstroForge, and they're trying to reboot the asteroid mining industry. He's coming in to talk to our students. Or whether it's lunar mining, we have Rob Meyerson who ran Blue Origin for more than a decade, now he’s started up a company that's going to mine Helium 3 on the moon; or whether you're talking about commercial space stations, which could eventually house tourists, manufacturing, R&D, a whole new push to bring the cost savings from the launch sector into the destinations sector, which we really haven't had.We've had the International Space Station for 20 plus years, but it wasn't really designed for commercial activity from the start and costs are pretty high. So there is this amazing flowering, and we'll see. I guess I would say that, in the short run, if you're trying to build a business in space, it's still mostly about satellites. It's still mostly about data to and from space. But as we look out further, we all hope that those bigger dreams are becoming more of a reality.Expanding space entrepreneurship (14:42)The laws of supply and demand do not depend on gravity.To me, it is such an exciting story and the story of these companies, they're just great stories to me. They're still, I think, pretty unknown. SpaceX, if you read the books that have been published, very harrowing, the whole thing could have collapsed quite easily. Still today, when the media covers — I think they're finally getting better —that anytime there'd be a SpaceX rocket blow up, they're like, “Oh, that’s it! Musk doesn't know what he's doing!” But actually, that's the business, is to iterate, launch again, if it blows up, figure out what went wrong, use the data, fix it, try again. It’s taken a long time.To the extent people or the media think about it, maybe 90 percent of the thought is about SpaceX, a little bit about Blue Origin, but, as you mentioned, there is this, no pun intended, constellation of other companies which have grown up, which have somewhat been enabled by the launch costs. Which one? Give me one of those that you think people should know about.There'…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    🌍 My chat (+transcript) with researcher Toby Ord on existential risk Jan 31, 2025
    Show notes

    The 2020s have so far been marked by pandemic, war, and startling technological breakthroughs. Conversations around climate disaster, great-power conflict, and malicious AI are seemingly everywhere. It’s enough to make anyone feel like the end might be near. Toby Ord has made it his mission to figure out just how close we are to catastrophe — and maybe not close at all!Ord is the author of the 2020 book, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. Back then, I interviewed Ord on the American Enterprise Institute’s Political Economy podcast, and you can listen to that episode here. In 2024, he delivered his talk, The Precipice Revisited, in which he reassessed his outlook on the biggest threats facing humanity.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, Ord and I address the lessons of Covid, our risk of nuclear war, potential pathways for AI, and much more.Ord is a senior researcher at Oxford University. He has previously advised the UN, World Health Organization, World Economic Forum, and the office of the UK Prime Minister.In This Episode* Climate change (1:30)* Nuclear energy (6:14)* Nuclear war (8:00)* Pandemic (10:19)* Killer AI (15:07)* Artificial General Intelligence (21:01)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Climate change (1:30). . . the two worst pathways, we're pretty clearly not on, and so that's pretty good news that we're kind of headed more towards one of the better pathways in terms of the emissions that we'll put out there.Pethokoukis: Let's just start out by taking a brief tour through the existential landscape and how you see it now versus when you first wrote the bookThe Precipice, which I've mentioned frequently in my writings. I love that book, love to see a sequel at some point, maybe one's in the works . . . but let's start with the existential risk, which has dominated many people's thinking for the past quarter-century, which is climate change.My sense is, not just you, but many people are somewhat less worried than they were five years ago, 10 years ago. Perhaps they see at least the most extreme outcomes less likely. How do you see it?Ord: I would agree with that. I'm not sure that everyone sees it that way, but there were two really big and good pieces of news on climate that were rarely reported in the media. One of them is that there's the question about how many emissions there'll be. We don't know how much carbon humanity will emit into the atmosphere before we get it under control, and there are these different emissions pathways, these RCP 4.5 and things like this you'll have heard of. And often, when people would give a sketch of how bad things could be, they would talk about RCP 8.5, which is the worst of these pathways, and we're very clearly not on that, and we're also, I think pretty clearly now, not on RCP 6, either. So the two worst pathways, we're pretty clearly not on, and so that's pretty good news that we're kind of headed more towards one of the better pathways in terms of the emissions that we'll put out there.What are we doing right?Ultimately, some of those pathways were based on business-as-usual ideas that there wouldn't be climate change as one of the biggest issues in the international political sphere over decades. So ultimately, nations have been switching over to renewables and low-carbon forms of power, which is good news. They could be doing it much more of it, but it's still good news. Back when we initially created these things, I think we would've been surprised and happy to find out that we were going to end up among the better two pathways instead of the worst ones.The other big one is that, as well as how much we'll admit, there's the question of how bad is it to have a certain amount of carbon in the atmosphere? In particular, how much warming does it produce? And this is something of which there's been massive uncertainty. The general idea is that we're trying to predict, if we were to double the amount of carbon in the atmosphere compared to pre-industrial times, how many degrees of warming would there be? The best guess since the year I was born, 1979, has been three degrees of warming, but the uncertainty has been somewhere between one and a half degrees and four and a half.Is that Celsius or Fahrenheit, by the way?This is all Celsius. The climate community has kept the same uncertainty from 1979 all the way up to 2020, and it’s a wild level of uncertainty: Four and a half degrees of warming is three times one and a half degrees of warming, so the range is up to triple these levels of degrees of warming based on this amount of carbon. So massive uncertainty that hadn't changed over many decades.Now they've actually revised that and have actually brought in the range of uncertainty. Now they're pretty sure that it's somewhere between two and a half and four degrees, and this is based on better understanding of climate feedbacks. This is good news if you're concerned about worst-case climate change. It's saying it's closer to the central estimate than we'd previously thought, whereas previously we thought that there was a pretty high chance that it could even be higher than four and a half degrees of warming.When you hear these targets of one and a half degrees of warming or two degrees of warming, they sound quite precise, but in reality, we were just so uncertain of how much warming would follow from any particular amount of emissions that it was very hard to know. And that could mean that things are better than we'd thought, but it could also mean things could be much worse. And if you are concerned about existential risks from climate change, then those kind of tail events where it's much worse than we would've thought the things would really get, and we're now pretty sure that we're not on one of those extreme emissions pathways and also that we're not in a world where the temperature is extremely sensitive to those emissions.Nuclear energy (6:14)Ultimately, when it comes to the deaths caused by different power sources, coal . . . killed many more people than nuclear does — much, much more . . .What do you make of this emerging nuclear power revival you're seeing across Europe, Asia, and in the United States? At least the United States it’s partially being driven by the need for more power for these AI data centers. How does it change your perception of risk in a world where many rich countries, or maybe even not-so-rich countries, start re-embracing nuclear energy?In terms of the local risks with the power plants, so risks of meltdown or other types of harmful radiation leak, I'm not too concerned about that. Ultimately, when it comes to the deaths caused by different power sources, coal, even setting aside global warming, just through particulates being produced in the soot, killed many more people than nuclear does — much, much more, and so nuclear is a pretty safe form of energy production as it happens, contrary to popular perception. So I'm in favor of that. But the proliferation concerns, if it is countries that didn't already have nuclear power, then the possibility that they would be able to use that to start a weapons program would be concerning.And as sort of a mechanism for more clean energy. Do you view nuclear as clean energy?Yes, I think so. It's certainly not carbon-producing energy. I think that it has various downsides, including the difficulty of knowing exactly what to do with the fuel, that will be a very long lasting problem. But I think it's become clear that the problems caused by other forms of energy are much larger and we should switch to the thing that has fewer problems, rather than more problems.Nuclear war (8:00)I do think that the Ukraine war, in particular, has created a lot of possible flashpoints.I recently finished a book calledNuclear War: A Scenario, which is kind of a minute-by-minute look at how a nuclear war could break out. If you read the book, the book is terrifying because it really goes into a lot of — and I live near Washington DC, so when it gives its various scenarios, certainly my house is included in the blast zone, so really a frightening book. But when it tried to explain how a war would start, I didn't find it a particularly compelling book. The scenarios for actually starting a conflict, I didn't think sounded particularly realistic.Do you feel — and obviously we have Russia invade Ukraine and loose talk by Vladimir Putin about nuclear weapons — do you feel more or less confident that we'll avoid a nuclear war than you did when you wrote the book?Much less confident, actually. I guess I should say, when I wrote the book, it came out in 2020, I finished the writing in 2019, and ultimately we were in a time of relatively low nuclear risk, and I feel that the risk has risen. That said, I was trying to provide estimates for the risk over the next hundred years, and so I wasn't assuming that the low-risk period would continue indefinitely, but it was quite a shock to end up so quickly back in this period of heightened tensions and threats of nuclear escalation, the type of thing I thought was really from my parents' generation. So yes, I do think that the Ukraine war, in particular, has created a lot of possible flashpoints. That said, the temperature has come down on the conversation in the last year, so that's something.Of course, the conversation might heat right back up if we see a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. I've been very bullish about the US economy and world economy over the rest of this decade, but the exception is as long as we don't have a war with China, from an economic point of view, but certainly also a nuclear point of view. Two nuclear armed powers in conflict? That would not be an insignificant event from the existential-risk perspective.It is good that China has a smaller nuclear arsenal than the US or Russia, but there could easily be a great tragedy.Pandemic (10:19)Overall, a lot of countries really just muddled through not very well, and the large institutions that were supposed to protect us from these things, like the CDC and the WHO, didn't do a great job either.The book comes out during the pandemic. Did our response to the pandemic make you more or less confident in our ability and willingness to confront that kind of outbreak? The worst one that saw in a hundred years?Yeah, overall, it made me much less confident. There'd been general thought by those who look at these large catastrophic risks that when the chips are down and the threat is imminent, that people will see it and will band together and put a lot of effort into it; that once you see the asteroid in your telescope and it's headed for you, then things will really get together — a bit like in the action movies or what have you.That's where I take my cue from, exactly.And with Covid, it was kind of staring us in the face. Those of us who followed these things closely were quite alarmed a long time before the national authorities were. Overall, a lot of countries really just muddled through not very well, and the large institutions that were supposed to protect us from these things, like the CDC and the WHO, didn't do a great job either. That said, scientists, particularly developing RNA vaccines, did better than I expected.In the years leading up to the pandemic, certainly we'd seen other outbreaks, they’d had the avian flu outbreak, and you know as well as I do, there were . . . how many white papers or scenario-planning exercises for just this sort of event. I think I recall a story where, in 2018, Bill Gates had a conversation with President Trump during his first term about the risk of just such an outbreak. So it's not as if this thing came out of the blue. In many ways we saw the asteroid, it was just pretty far away. But to me, that says something again about as humans, our ability to deal with severe, but infrequent, risks.And obviously, not having a true global, nasty outbreak in a hundred years, where should we focus our efforts? On preparation? Making sure we have enough ventilators? Or our ability to respond? Because it seems like the preparation route will only go so far, and the reason it wasn't a much worse outbreak is because we have a really strong ability to respond.I'm not sure if it's the same across all risks as to how preparation versus ability to respond, which one is better. In some risks, there's also other possibilities like avoiding an outbreak, say, an accidental outbreak happening at all, or avoiding a nuclear war starting and not needing to actually respond at all. I'm not sure if there's an overall rule as to which one was better.Do you have an opinion on the outbreak of Covid?I don't know whether it was a lab leak. I think it's a very plausible hypothesis, but plausible doesn't mean it's proven.And does the post-Covid reaction, at least in the United States, to vaccines, does that make you more or less confident in our ability to deal with . . . the kind of societal cohesion and confidence to tackle a big problem, to have enough trust? Maybe our leaders don't deserve that trust, but what do you make from this kind of pushback against vaccines and — at least in the United States — our medical authorities?When Covid was first really striking Europe and America, it was generally thought that, while China was locking down the Wuhan area, that Western countries wouldn't be able to lock down, that it wasn't something that we could really do, but then various governments did order lockdowns. That said, if you look at the data on movement of citizens, it turns out that citizens stopped moving around prior to the lockdowns, so the lockdown announcements were more kind of like the tail, rather than the dog.But over time, citizens wanted to kind of get back out and interact more, and the rules were preventing them, and if a large fraction of the citizens were under something like house arrest for the better part of a year, would that lead to some fairly extreme resentment and some backlash, some of which was fairly irrational? Yeah, that is actually exactly the kind of thing that you would expect. It was very difficult to get a whole lot of people to row together and take the same kind of response that we needed to coordinate the response to prevent the spread, and pushing for that had some of these bad consequences, which are also going to make it harder for next time. We haven't exactly learned the right lessons.Killer AI (15:07)If we make things that are smarter than us and are not inherently able to control their values or give them moral rules to work within, then we should expect them to ultimately be calling the shots.We're more than halfway through our chat and now we're going to get to the topic probably most people would like to hear about: After the robots take our jobs, are they going to kill us? What do you think? What is your concern about AI risk?I'm quite concerned about it. Ultimately, when I wrote my book, I put AI risk as the biggest existential risk, albeit the most uncertain, as well, and I would still say that. That said, some things have gotten better since then.I would assume what makes you less confident is one, what seems to be the rapid advance — not just the rapid advance of the technology, but you have the two leading countries in a geopolitical globalization also being the leaders in the technology and not wanting to slow it down. I would imagine that would make you more worried that we will move too quickly. What would make you more confident that we would avoid any serious existential downsides?I agree with your…

    Full show notes at the publisher

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