Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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Bava Metzia 9 - March 8, 28 Adar 1 Mar 08, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Rikki and Alan Zibitt in loving memory of Helen Zibitt on her 24th yahrzeit. "Mom was a devoted and loving mother, grandmother and great-grandmother, who lived a life filled with middot, chesed, learning and ahavat Yisrael. May her memory be a blessing."

Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a grandson to Cheryl Savitsky. "A celebration of the inauguration of our friend and co-learner, Cheryl, into the grandparents' club. No matter what the new prince (born to Eliana and Shimmy) will call you and Avi, we are certain of two things: that he has wonderful role models of Torah, avoda and gemilut chasadim, and that you will have enormous nachat from him and the entire family! תזכו לגדלו לתורה ולחופה ולמעשים טובים!"

Rav Yehuda holds that riding on an animal does not mean that one has acquired the animal. A braita is brought to support his opinion – first by an inference and then by a particular use of wording in the braita. But both attempts are rejected. Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty against Rav Yehuda, but they are resolved. The first braita itself seems to be difficult and to resolve it, they change the wording of the braita. Rabbi Avahu explains the difficulty without changing the wording, but the Gemara rejects his explanation. The second braita explains that actions can create an acquisition of an animal when the action taken is a typical one such as riding an animal in a field or leading an animal in the city. Rabbi Elazar asks if one can acquire objects that are on an animal by pulling the animal if one does not intend to acquire the animal. His question presumes that if one acquires the animal, then one acquires the objects that are on the animal. Rava questions this presumption as the animal is like a "walking courtyard" that cannot acquire items in it. To resolve this, they assume that Rabbi Elazar's question was only relevant in a case where the animal was tied up. Two difficulties are raised against Rava's ruling that a "walking courtyard" does not acquire items, but are resolved. The Mishna says that if one sees a lost item and asks someone to pick it up for him/her, as long as the one who picks it up has not yet handed the lost item to the person who asked for it, the person can claim it as their own. The Gemara quotes a Mishna in Peah 4:9 that describes someone who collects part of the corner of another's field on behalf of a poor person. Ulla and Rav Nachman disagree about whether the debate in the Mishna in Peah is only when a wealthy person takes the item for a poor person or even a poor person for a poor person. Rav Nachman raises a difficulty with Ulla's ruling from our Mishna.

Bava Metzia 8 - March 7, 27 Adar 1 Mar 07, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Rochel Cheifetz in loving memory of her aunt, Rose Rubelow, Rachel bat haRav Moshe v'Tzipora Mashbaum whose yartzeit was 26 Adar.

When the law is to split an item, the meaning is to split the market value. There are three attempts to prove this from our Mishna or tannatic sources. The first two are rejected but the last is accepted. Rami bar Hama teaches that one can derive from our Mishna that one who finds an item on the street and picks it up on behalf of another, is effective. Rava disagrees and only permits it in a case where the one who lifted it acquired part of it for him/herself and therefore can acquire the rest for someone else. But if one acquired it exclusively for someone else, it would not be effective. Rava proves this by comparing a case of one who stole on behalf of another and one who stole on behalf of oneself and another (partners). Rava teaches a halakha based on this principle but the Gemara modifies it as it is incomprehensible as transmitted. From which line in the Mishna did Rami bar Hama derive his opinion? The Gemara suggests five possibilities - all are rejected except the last one. Shmuel is quoted as having said about riding on an animal and leading it - one is an act of acquiring and the other is not. Which one is it? Rav Yehuda infers from a Mishna that riding is not an act of acquiring as holding the reigns will only work in a sale where one is passing to the other, but holding the reigns on an ownerless animal is not a valid act of acquiring. How does this all fit with our Mishna where it is clear that riding on the animal enables one to acquire a lost animal? To answer this, they explain the Mishna in a case where the one riding was also leading the animal with his/her feet. If so, why does the Mishna mention leading in two different ways?

Bava Metzia 7 - March 6, 26 Adar 1 Mar 06, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Eitan and Pnina Lipsker "in honor of all the women daf yomi learners, especially those who make an extra-human effort to join the Hebrew Zoom at 6:20 every morning. They add kedusha and Torah to Am Yisrael. May we be blessed to continue to learn Torah daily and l'hagdil Torah u'lehaadira."

After deliberations on Bava Metzia 6 regarding a contested item that was sanctified by one of the parties, the Gemara brings a ruling that the sanctification is not effective unless the one who sanctified had proof of ownership that would hold up in court. However, this is limited to land, as the sanctification of moveable items is ineffective unless the item is physically in the domain of the one sanctifying it. Rav Tachlifa brings a braita that states if two people are holding on to part of the tallit, each one gets to keep the part they are holding on to and the remainder is divided evenly. Rabbi Avahu added that this is only if they take an oath. In light of this braita, Rav Papa explains that our Mishna must refer to a case where each was holding onto the edge of the garment. Comparisons are made to other cases like a kinyan sudar or a get, divorce document, where two people are holding onto the object. Are these cases similar or different to our case and why? How is the garment divided if there is gold running through it? A braita discusses the case of two people holding a document - the creditor claiming ownership, such that the debtor still owes the money, and the debtor claiming ownership as the loan was already paid back. Rebbi says the document is validated if the witnesses' signatures can be confirmed. They explain this to mean that if it is validated, the document is split, but if not, since the debtor admits there was a loan, but claims it was paid, the debtor is believed as "the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted." Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says they split it in either case. The principle of "the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted" is not relevant here as there is a document as well. If the document is found near the judge (meaning, the judge validated it), the rabbis and Rabbi Yosi disagree - is it never able to be collected or does it remain valid for collecting? Rabbi Yosi holds it can be collected as we are not concerned that the debtor already paid back the loan. However, this is difficult in light of a different braita relating to a ketuba that is found and contested by the husband and wife, Rabbi Yosi rules (against the rabbis) that if the woman is divorced or widowed, we assume it was paid. The rabbis suggest three possible ways to resolve the contradiction. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan differentiate between a typical case where two people are holding a document and a case in which one is holding the main part (toref) and one is holding the tofes (the summary at the end which does not include the date. What exactly is this case and how would it be divided? How do we assess the difference between the value of the toref and the tofes?

Bava Metzia 6 - March 5, 25 Adar 1 Mar 05, 2024

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Since Rabbi Yochanan explained the reason for the oaths in the Mishna is to prevent one from grabbing the tallit from the other, the Gemara continues to prove that if one can be believed to take an oath even if we are concerned they have stolen. The third attempt to prove this is from a statement of Rav Huna regarding a shomer who claims something happened to the item which would exempt the shomer, but he/she chooses to pay for the item. They take an oath, even though there is a concern that perhaps they want to keep the item for themselves. Again, this proof is rejected as the shomer pays money for the item and can therefore justify keeping the item. Three other oaths - shevuat heiset, a case with a shopkeeper and workers, and the oath taken by a shomer chinam who claims the item was last or stolen can all prove that even one who perhaps is lying is trusted to take an oath. Abaye brings an alternative explanation for the oaths in the Mishna as he does not hold that we can trust one who perhaps is stealing to take an oath. According to Abaye, the concern is that there is a doubt about whether one owes money to the other and therefore the creditor grabs the tallit as payment for the loan in question. Why is Abaye not concerned in that case as well for a false oath? Rabbi Zeira asks: if the two people were holding the tallit in the court and one grabbed it from the other, does the one now holding the entire tallit have full rights to it? In what exact case was this question asked? What are the arguments for and against? Assuming the one holding it gets to keep it, would the same hold true if one consecrated the whole tallit without having grabbed it since regarding consecration, speech is considered the same as pulling an object. To answer this question, the Gemara brings a story about a bathhouse that two people claimed rights to, and then one of them consecrated the bathhouse. Rav Hamnuna ruled that the consecration worked and learned it from a Mishna about a safek bechor but Raba rejected his proof. Rav Chanania brings proof from a braita for Raba's explanation and Abaye first rejects the proof but then reinstates it.

Bava Metzia 5 - March 4, 24 Adar 1 Mar 04, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Abby Flamholz in honor of her daughter in law, Sigal. "She is a superwoman and inspirational wife, mother and Torah Jew!"

Today's daf is sponsored by Romi and Josh Sussman in honor of their oldest son finishing 3 years and 8 months of service in the IDF this week. "We have been in awe of how you carried yourself with grace, confidence, determination and leadership since the day your service started. Through countless nights in the shetach and months in Gaza, you have stayed true to yourself. We love you and couldn't possibly be more proud of your service!"

One more question is raised against Rav Sheshet who holds that one who partially admits a claim but says 'heilach' is exempt from taking an oath and one attempt is brought to prove Rabbi Chiya who held that an oath is required, but the question is answered and the proof rejected. The sugya goes back to the original statement of Rabbi Chiya that if there are witnesses to part of the claim, the claimant must take an oath on the second part. A contradiction is raised from a drasha on a verse in the Torah, but an alternative explanation is offered. There was a case with a shepherd who denied a claim and there were witnesses for part of the claim. Rabbi Zeira asked why did they not require the shepherd to take an oath according to Rabbi Chiya? Abaye questioned Rabbi Zeira as the shepherd should not be allowed to take an oath since two witnesses testified against the shepherd that he took items that were not his own, making him a thief who is not trusted to take an oath in court. Why did Abaye need to call the shepherd a thief, any shepherd is not believed in court as shepherds generally bring their animals to graze in other people's fields? Both Abaye's question and the Gemara's question on Abaye are resolved. An issue is raised with the language of the oath in the Mishna regarding the case of two people holding onto a tallit, "I do not have ownership of less than half" as the language is ambiguous and could lead to one taking the oath even though one does not have any rights at all to the tallit. Rav Huna therefore changes the language of the oath required to prevent abuse of the system. The Gemara suggests some other suggestions for the wording of the oath and explains why the Mishna did not choose them. Rabbi Yochanan explains the purpose of the oath is to prevent one of the people holding the tallit from grabbing a tallit that someone else found and claiming it as their own. If so, the purpose of the oath is to clarify that one of the parties is not lying. If we suspect the person may be lying, how can we trust them to take an oath? The answer is that people who are suspected of taking other people's items are not presumed to lie under oath as the latter is taken more seriously. The Gemara attempts to prove this assumption, first from one who admits to part of a claim (modeh b'miktzat), then from Rami bar Hama's position about the oath of the shomrim, but both are rejected as the concern in both those cases is not that the claimant is truly lying, but just trying to push off the creditor temporarily. They further try to prove this assumption from a statement of Rav Huna about a shomer who claims something happened to the item which would exempt the shomer, but he/she is choosing to pay for the item. They take an oath, even though there is a concern that perhaps they want to keep the item for themselves. Again, this is rejected.

Siyum Masechet Bava Kamma Mar 03, 2024

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Finishing the end of the last daf with some insights about the last sugya.

Bava Metzia 4 - March 3, 23 Adar 1 Mar 03, 2024

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This week's learning is sponsored by Rachel Savin in loving memory of her father, Shalom ben Shmuel z"l.

Today's daf is sponsored by Miriam Tannenbaum in honor of Rina Yahalom and in memory of Rebecca Baruch. "Rina, a dear 'former student' & "bat bayit", and her close friend, Rebecca Baruch הי"ד had planned to be chevrutot as they started their daf yomi journey together. Honoring Rina as she begins her daf journey with Bava Metzia, in Rebecca's memory. May Rina's learning be a source of strength for her and a zechut for all of Am Yisrael."

The Gemara concludes that the kal va'chomer from which Rabbi Chiya derived that two witnesses who testify to half a claim can obligate the defendant to take an oath about the rest was learned out jointly from both one who admits to part of a claim, modeh bemiktzat, and from one witness, who both obligate an oath. Rabbi Chiya had also proven this halakha our Mishna. However, after raising a difficulty on this, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Chiya brought our Mishna as proof for a different halakha - one where one admits to half a claim and then says 'heilach'. Rabbi Chiya holds that even in that case one is still obligated to take an oath and that halakha can be proven from our Mishna. Rav Sheshet disagrees with Rabbi Chiya and does not require one to take an oath in that case. A braita is brought to first raise a difficulty against Rabbi Chiya, but is resolved. Then a different version of that difficulty is brought, using the dissenting opinion in that same braita to raise a difficulty against Rav Sheshet, but is resolved. Another difficulty is brought from a Mishna in Shevuot 38b against Rav Sheshet's opinion but is also resolved.

Bava Metzia 3 - Shabbat March 2, 22 Adar 1 Mar 01, 2024

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The Gemara continues to compare the law in our Mishna to tannatic opinions in other cases of disputed money that seem to reach different halakhic conclusions. Distinctions are made between the various cases to prove that our Mishna could match the opinions of the tannaim in those sources as the details of our case are different and would therefore lead to a different ruling. Rabbi Chiya rules that if the defendant denies a claim but witnesses testify that the defendant owes half the contested amount, the defendant must pay half and take an oath on the other half to be exempt from payment. He derives this from kal v'chomer from modeh bemiktzat (one who admits to half a claim, where the law is that he/she takes an oath on the other half to be exempt). The Gemara brings our mishna as proof for this law of Rabbi Chiya and then explains why there was a need for a kal v'chomer. As Rabbi Chiya did not explain the kal v'chomer from which he derived this law, the Gemara attempts to determine how it was derived. However, the first suggestion is that the lenient part of the kal v'chomer argument is a case of confession, but that is rejected as it is actually more stringent in one way than a case of witnesses. There are four attempts to explain why a confession is more stringent, but the first three are rejected. The final attempt to find a stringency in confession over witnesses is that other witnesses cannot undo it, and that answer is accepted. The second suggestion, one witness, is rejected as the case where one witness can obligate the claimant to take an oath is referring to an oath on the part the witness testified about, whereas the two witnesses in our case are obligating an oath on the part that they did not testify about. Therefore, one cannot learn from one to the other.

Bava Metzia 2 - March 1, 21 Adar 1 Mar 01, 2024

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If two people are holding onto a tallit - each one claiming they found it or each claiming it belongs entirely to them, the Mishna rules that each one swears that no less than half is theirs and they split it (or sell it and split the value). If one claims it is entirely theirs and the other claims that half is theirs, one takes an oath that no less than three-quarters belongs to him/her and the other takes an oath on one-quarter and the item is split accordingly. The law would be the same if two people were arguing about an animal and both were riding on it or one was riding and one was leading it. The Gemara suggests two different explanations as to why the first case in the Mishna had each person making two different statements - "I found it" and "It is completely mine." Are these considered one case and the extra statement is meant to teach something additional or are there two different cases? If it is one case, the extra wording of "I found it" is meant to teach that the finder does not acquire rights to an object if one sees a lost item but does not lift it. After rejecting this reading of the Mishna, Rav Papa explains that the Mishna refers to two different cases – the first is a lost item and the second is a purchased item that each side claims the seller sold to him/her. In the case of a sale, the seller only agreed to sell it to one of the two but both paid for it. The Gemara compares our ruling in the Mishna to other tannatic opinions brought in similar cases of disputed money where different methods are employed to resolve the dispute. The Gemara first suggests that our Mishna does not hold by those tannaim, but then concludes that the Mishna may hold by those opinions as the cases have significant differences that could explain why in one case the ruling would be different than in another.

Bava Kamma 119 + Siyum - February 29, 20 Adar 1 Feb 29, 2024

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For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here.
For more information about What is a Siyum, click here.

Siyum Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Shuster family in loving memory of Ozer's mother Devorah Shuster and as a zechut for complete lasting peace in Eretz Yisrael.

Siyum Bava Kamma is sponsored by Ilana Friedman in honor of the marriage today of her wonderful niece Adira Leah Barber to Yonatan Glicksman. "May HaShem grant you the zechut to build a strong Jewish household steeped in Torah values that will continue our family's and nation's mesora. Mazal tov!"

Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Lowe with love and gratitude to David Denker and all of the chayalim of Hativa 55 who have and are defending Israel and our People. "May you be safe and go from strength to strength. "

Today's daf is sponsored by Susan Vishner in loving memory of her parents Ruth and Everett Gruber, Rivkah Rahel Bat Nachman Yair v'Menucha Baila, and Yehuda Gedalia Ben Sender Chaim v'Perl, on what would have been their actual 19th wedding anniversary. "They shared great love for one another, for their family and for Israel and Jewish learning."

Different situations are described where the seller could be selling stolen items and therefore it is forbidden to purchase them. In what cases/circumstances are we suspicious/not suspicious? From where do we learn that one who steals from another, is considered as if they took the soul of the one they robbed? The Masechet ends by delineating what remains of items workers are allowed to keep for themselves and what parts they need to return to the owner, alluding to the fact that in regular everyday situations, one could become a thief just by not being careful enough.

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