Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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Bava Kamma 109 - February 19, 10 Adar 1 Feb 19, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Idana Goldberg and Michael Kellman in honor of the marriage of their daughter Noam to Avichai Klugerman last night in Israel. "May these two chayalim build a bayit neeman b'yisrael and may the zechut of our learning keep all the soldiers safe."

If a shomer falsely claims an item was stolen or lost, what is the shomer responsible to pay if witnesses come and prove that the shomer lied? If the claim was theft, the thief pays a double payment, but if the claim was that the item was lost, just the principal is returned. If the shomer confesses, he/she pays the principal, adds one-fifth (chomesh) and brings a guilt offering. If a son steals from his father and then confesses after the father's death, he needs to return the item and the chomesh payment to the sons of his father or the father's brothers, but he cannot inherit it. However, if he has no money, he can borrow money to pay the heirs and the creditor can collect the loan from the estate, in which the thief is included. A similar solution is suggested when a father takes a vow not to allow his son to benefit from him in life and after death. Rav Yosef rules in the case of theft from a father, if there are no heirs, the son can give the money to charity. This statement assumes that there is no way to pardon the principal, as if there was, the son could pardon his own obligation to return the principal. However, a Mishna on Bava Kamma 103a explains that one can pardon the principal. Three possible answers are brought, connecting it with a debate between Rabbi Yosi haGalili and Rabbi Akiva regarding one who stole from a convert who then died without heirs. If one steals from a convert who has no heirs and denies the claim under oath, if the convert dies and then the thief confesses, the payment is given to the kohanim. From where do they derive that this law applies to female converts as well? Which kohanim receive it? It is given to the ones who are working in the Temple the week that the thief brings the guilt offering. If the thief is a kohen, they cannot take the lost item for themselves but must give it to the kohanim working in the Temple that week - from where is this derived?

Bava Kamma 108 - February 18, 9 Adar 1 Feb 18, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Yaffa Wenner in loving memory of her mom, Lea Steinlauf. "My mother enjoyed the pursuit of knowledge. She loved the challenge it presented. I think my learning Daf Yomi would make her smile and chuckle. How far we've come as women, in our journey."

Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of her father, Sherman Israel Klein, Shnayor ben Yerachmiel v'Sara. "He loved learning, the Jewish people, Israel, and his family. Everything was "interesting" to him. We continue to learn from his example."

Two questions are asked (one is answered, one is not) regarding the mechanism by which one may be obligated only in the double payment, canceling the one-fifth payment. Is it possible there could be situations where one could be obligated both? Can one person be obligated to pay the one-fifth payment twice on the same item? If a shomer chinam opts not to take an oath that the item was stolen and pays for it, the shomer gains the rights to the double payment if the robber is caught. However, there is a disagreement between Rava and Abaye regarding a case where the shomer first took an oath and then paid. What is the reason for each opinion and how does each prove his opinion from a Mishna in Bava Metzia 33b? If the shomer takes an oath, is the shomer still considered relevant to the case, and if the thief were to confess to the shomer, but deny the theft to the owner, and witnesses came, would the thief be exempt from the double payment on account of the confession to the shomer? On what does it depend? Other questions are raised about who is responsible for finding the thief if the shomer paid the owner for the value of the stolen item.

Bava Kamma 107 - Shabbat February 17, 8 Adar 1 Feb 16, 2024

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Study Guide Bava Kamma 107

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba's third statement in the name of Rabbi Yochanan is that one in not liable to payment for claiming an item one is watching is stolen unless there is a partial confession and partial denial (modeh b'miktzat). This is a subject of debate between him and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef who holds that modeh b'miktzat is not relevant in this type of case - only in a loan. What is the logic behind his distinction? There is a three-way argument regarding the relationship between shlichut yad (where the shomer used the item he was watching) and the case where the shomer claims the item was stolen. If the shomer used the item and then claimed it was stolen, is he/she obligated in the double payment or do we say that first he/she was obligated for shlichut yad in which case he/she acquires the object and is now responsible even for accidental damage or do we say that the obligation for claiming it was stolen is only in a case where there is shlichut yad? Or possibly both are options.

Bava Kamma 106 - February 16, 7 Adar 1 Feb 16, 2024

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Study Guide Bava Kamma 106

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her parents, Yechezkel Shraga ben Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther Tydor whose yahrzeit is 7 Adar, and Shirley K Tydor, Sara Reizel bat Mordechai Yitzchak and Freida Sima, whose yahrzeit was 23 Shevat. "They would have been thrilled to know their daughter and granddaughters learn daf yomi!"

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of Gitta's granddaughter, Esti Rosenberg engagement to Baruch Lapidus. "May the couple be blessed with a lifetime of good health, happiness and nachat."

Today's daf is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of Miriam's father, -יעקב יצחק בן משה נחום הלוי ז"ל Jack Zemsky zl on his 20th yahrzeit tomorrow. "His life embodied a metaphoric reading of the pasuk, "ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים" He was one whose actions were infused with drawing closer to הקב"ה. His modeling of אהבת ה' & אהבת ישראל continue to inspire us יהי זכרו ברוך"

Rav Sheshet holds that once one denies a claim regarding an item he/she was watching, he/she is considered a robber and is obligated to pay even for accidental damages, even if they didn't take an oath denying the claim. Rami bar Chama contradicts Rav Sheshet's opinion from a braita, but it is resolved. Another contradiction is brought from a halakha of Ilfa and is resolved in two possible ways. Rav learns from the verse "the owner takes and he doesn't need to pay" that once a shomer (or debtor) takes an oath, even if witnesses come and prove is was stolen, the shomer will no longer be exempt from payment. Three rabbis raise difficulties against this statement of Rav. The first two are resolved. As a result of the last difficulty, Rava qualifies Rav's statement and limits it to a case where the shomer claimed it was lost, and then swore and witnesses came to contradict the oath. Only in that case, is one exempt from payment. But in all other cases where the shomer came forward and admitted or in a case where the claim was that it was stolen and then witnesses came, he/she would be obligated to pay as the verses in the Torah clearly state that. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba states in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that if one claims an item they were watching was stolen and they also slaughtered it, they would also be liable to pay the four/five payment. They raise difficulties with this opinion but resolve it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba states in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that if one claims an item that one found was stolen from them, all the same laws apply as to a shomer. A difficulty is raised, but resolved in two ways.

Bava Kamma 105 - February 15, 6 Adar 1 Feb 15, 2024

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Today's daf is dedicated in memory of all the soldiers who were killed this week and for a refuah shleima to all those injured.

Two answers are given to resolve the contradiction between the inference from our Mishna and a braita about whether or not heirs need to pay the chomesh. Since the Mishna establishes that the obligation to return the item directly to its owner only applies when the item owed is more than a pruta, Rava explains the law in a case where the price drops in value, but raises a question in a case where the value of the items stolen was a pruta and but half were already returned and what is left is no longer a pruta. Two other similar-type questions are brought that Rava asked about the shaving of a nazir and laws of impurity. Rava also asks about chametz that was stolen before Pesach and at the time the robber swore falsely, it was already after Pesach and the item no longer had value. Do the laws of swearing falsely for theft apply since the chametz has potential value as it can cause a monetary obligation or do they not apply since the chametz now has no inherent value, as it is forbidden to benefit from? Raba thought there was an obvious answer - one is obligated because of its potential value as he proves from a different case. Rav Amram questions his answer from a braita and Raba answers it by distinguishing between the chametz case and the case in the braita. Some clarifications are made regarding some of the cases mentioned in the braita quoted by Rav Amram. Ben Azai talks about three types of false claims one can swear about in denying one knows testimony about a lost item. Rabbi Chanina and Shmuel understand this source differently. The root of their debate is connected to the ideas discussed previously about a claim that could lead to a potential financial loss and whether or not laws of false oath denying monetary claims apply to those cases as well. Rav Sheshet holds that once one denies a claim regarding an item he/she was watching, he/she is considered a robber and is obligated to pay even for accidental damages, even if they didn't take an oath denying the claim. Rav Sheshet brings a source to prove his claim, but it is rejected. Rami bar Chama raises a contradiction to Rav Sheshet's opinion from a braita, but it is resolved.

Bava Kamma 104 - February 14, 5 Adar 1 Feb 14, 2024

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Rava concludes that the Mishna relates to a different case than the Rabbi Tarfon/Rabbi Akiva debate in Yevamot 118b. Our Mishna is a case where the thief knows who he/she stole from. Therefore, whether or not one needs to return the item directly or one can let the person know that the stolen item is available to be picked up is dependent on the severity of the actions of the thief - whether or not the thief swore and admitted and needs repentance from that or not. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva's debate is not dependent on whether or not one swore as the issue there is because the thief does not know the identity of the one whom he/she stole from. If one appointed an agent in front of witnesses to receive a loan payment (for example), Rav Hisda and Rabba disagree about whether when the agent receives the payment, the borrower is no longer responsible if something happens to the money on the way or was the agent appointed to make it easier for the borrower to get the money back to the original owner but does not assume responsibility. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda's opinion, that the agent assumes responsibility, one from a Mishna in Bava Metzia 98b and one from our Mishna. Both are resolved. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar held like Rav Chisda as well. Shmuel was hesitant to allow people to send money with agents appointed by the creditor as they do not assume responsibility even if they carry a stamp and a signature of the creditor. How were people able to collect loans back from debtors who lived far away? How can it be done securely? Two stories are brought highlighting a possible method. The nature of the payment of the one-fifth, chomesh, is discussed - is it to effect atonement for the thief or is it a financial payment? If it is a financial payment, and the thief dies, the children are liable to pay it. This contradicts a braita which rules that they do not. How can that contradiction be resolved?

Bava Kamma 103 - February 13, 4 Adar 1 Feb 13, 2024

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Study Guide Bava Kamma 103

In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation explaining one of the braitot like Rabbi Yehuda - how could a sale be valid when the agent changes what the buyer wanted as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? A braita is quoted about one who buys land but uses someone else's name on the document of sale to discourage others from bringing claims against the property rights of the land. At first, it is suggested that the author of this braita disagrees with the opinion of the rabbis in Israel as the seller thinks the buyer is the other person (whose name appears in the sale document) when it is actually sold to the buyer. However, the braita is then explained differently and the ruling in the braita does not relate to the issue the rabbis in Israel were discussing. Rav Kahana bought flax from someone but hadn't yet received the flax. As the price of flax then increased, the seller sold Rav Kahan's flax and returned Rav Kahana the amount of money he received for selling it, which was more than Rav Kahana had given him originally. Is there an issue of interest here? Rav ruled that it depended on whether or not the one who bought the flax for the higher price knew that it was Rav Kahana's flax or thought it was the seller's. At first, the Gemara suggests that this distinction suggests that Rav held like the rabbis in Israel, but then they explain that the issue was a different one and was unrelated. The Mishna explained that one who steals, takes an oath denying it, and then admits their lie, must return the lost item directly to the hands of the one it was stolen from and adds an extra fifth (which is calculated as 25% of the value of the item) and brings a guilt offering, asham gezeila, to achieve atonement. The Mishna assumes that only if the thief took an oath it is necessary to return the lost item directly to the one who it was stolen to receive the atonement, but if one did not take an oath, but witnesses testified against the thief, then it is enough to put the item aside and wait for the one who it was stolen from to come and collect it. The Gemara questions that this seems to match neither Rabbi Tarfon's nor Rabbi Akiva's opinion about returning a stolen item as appears in the Mishna in Yevamot 118b regarding one who stole and five people claim he/she stole from them and the thief doesn't know which one is the one he/she stole from. Three different suggested answers are brought. The first two are rejected.

Bava Kamma 102 - February 12, 3 Adar 1 Feb 12, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Hinda Herman in loving memory of her mother, Ethel Rosenthal's yahrzeit. "Among the many mitzvot my mother performed, the mitzvah of Hachnasat Orchim was most dear to her. We miss you every day!!"

Baruch Matir Asurim. Today's daf is dedicated to the continued good health of the two hostages rescued last night, Fernanado Marman and Louis Har. We continue to pray for the safe return of all the others.

Does intent play a role in determining whether or not fruits have the sanctity of the shmita year, kedushat shviit? If wood is cut for firewood, since it is consumed before one benefits from it, it does not have the kedushat shviit in the shmita year, as is it different from food where one benefits as it is consumed. However if one cuts wood for heat or to make a flame, as its benefit comes with its consumption, does it have kedushat shviit? On the other hand, since wood is generally cut for firewood, is all wood treated as if it was cut for firewood, regardless of the intent? This issue is a subject of debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yosi regarding different uses for wine. Rabbi Yosi rules that if grapes are picked for other uses, such as for soaking flax, where the benefit is after its consumption, the fruits do not have kedushat shviit, and can therefore be used for soaking flax and other uses. However, intent only plays a role if it is a use that is needed by everyone. If it is a use that is only for sick people or only for wealthy people, then even according to Rabbi Yosi, intent does not play a role and the fruits will have kedushat shviit. Rav Huna ruled like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha on one issue and like Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna. Rav Yosef heard his rulings and got upset at him for stating the obvious regarding Rabbi Yehuda as there is a rule that if there is a debate in one Mishna and then an unattributed (stam) Mishna states one of the opinions, it is clear we rule by that opinion. Since Rabbi Yehuda's ruling appears in Bava Metzia, the next Masechet, it is clear that we rule like Rabbi Yehuda. If so, how did Rav Huna explain the need to issue that ruling? If one hires a messenger to buy a type of grain and the messenger buys a different type, what is the law? Two braitot bring two different rulings and Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on how to reconcile the two. Is it the same debate as between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna or are both according to Rabbi Meir but each braita is referring to a different purpose of the agency - in one it was for eating and in the other for investment/resale purposes. In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation explaining one of the braitas like Rabbi Yehuda - how could the sale be valid as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? Rabbi Abahu explains why there is a distinction regarding this issue when the agent performs the action requested and when the agent doesn't perform the action requested and brings a tanaitic source to prove it. Rabbi Abba rejects his proof and two difficulties are raised against his rejection until he modifies his statement and succeeds in rejecting Rabbi Abahu's proof.

Bava Kamma 101 - February 11, 2 Adar 1 Feb 11, 2024

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Today's daf is dedicated by Di Kushar in honor of her granddaughter Ayala's bat mitzva which took place this Shabbat. "We learned together long distance, online, laws of damages and compensation in Parshat Mishpatim which are developed further in the current dapim of Baba Kamma. Now at a family reunion, we will celebrate together. Mazal tov!"

A question is asked regarding the dyeing of wool - when the dye is added to the wool, does the dye enhance the wool or not? The Gemara questions the question's meaning/relevance and brings seven possible explanations - four of which are rejected and three of which are not. They attempt to answer the question by bringing in sources relating to dyeing using shmita and orla produce, but these proofs are rejected as the laws are unique to those situations based on the verses in the Torah. Rava then raises a contradiction between the orla case and a case of impurity case, which is resolved. Rava also brings two contradictory sources relating to whether or not kedushat shviit applies to plants/wood from a tree not used for eating. This contradiction is also resolved.

Bava Kamma 100 - Shabbat Rosh Chodesh Adar 1 - February 10, 1 Adar 1 Feb 09, 2024

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If a money changer mistakenly tells a customer that a coin is valid and causes a loss to the customer, is the money changer responsible for reimbursing for the loss? If the money changer is a real professional, then he/she is exempt but if not, he/she is responsible. However, Rabbi Chiya reimbursed a woman for her loss based on his mistake, even though he was a professional as he decided to go beyond the letter of the law (lifnim meshurat hadin). There is a case with Rabbi Elazar and Reish Lakish and Reish Lakish explains to Rabbi Elazar that he is relying on his valuation of the coin. If Rabbi Elazar made a mistake, he would need to reimburse Reish Lakish as this would be a case of garmi, and Reish Lakish held by Rabbi Meir who obligates one for garmi-type damages. Where can we find Rabbi Meir's ruling on garmi? Four different sources are suggested - only the last is accepted as the answer. The Mishna discusses three different cases where the dyer did something different from what the customer asked - burned, did a poor job, or colored it the wrong color. What is the halakha in each case?

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