Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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Bava Metzia 19 - March 18, 8 Adar 2 Mar 18, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Allie Alperovich in loving memory of her grandmother, Frima Iosilevich who passed away this week a month shy of her 98th birthday.

Rav Ashi was uncertain whether the law that a person can retrieve lost items by giving an identifying mark (siman) is a Torah law or not. As a result, when he reconciled the contradiction between the Tosefta that permitted one to return a lost get to the wife when the husband agreed and Mishna that did not, he explained that it could be returned if the husband gave a siman muvhak, a very clear one, and not more generic siman. Raba bar bar Hanna lost a get that he was supposed to deliver. It was found and he retrieved it by giving a siman (a basic one) and also by tviut aina, visual recognition, which is specifically permitted to Torah scholars, but he was unsure if the rabbis permitted it to be returned to him on account of the siman or the visual recognition. The Tosefta Bava Metzia 1:5, quoted previously, ruled that a get for divorce or emancipation document for a slave can be returned to the wife/slave if the husband/owner agrees. Both documents have financial ramifications, as the produce of the woman's property becomes her own in the event of divorce, and items the slave purchases belong to his owner while he is a slave but are his own if he is a free man. If so, why are we not concerned that perhaps they were not divorced/freed, and by returning the document to the woman or slave, we may be allowing them to collect property that is not rightfully theirs? If one gives a gift using the language "now and after death," the body of the item is given as a gift, but the produce is still owned by the original owner until his/her death. There is another contradiction between our Mishna and a braita as our Mishna states that wills can be returned if the owner admits he/she gave it and we are not concerned that the owner wrote it and then changed his/her mind and never gave it to the recipient, and a braita states that even if both agree that it was given, we do not return the document to either one. Rabbi Abba bar Mamal resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the cases - the Mishna refers to a promise of one on one's deathbed (which one can rescind) and the braita refers to a gift of a healthy person (which can't be rescinded). The Gemara explains in detail the relevance of that distinction. Rav Zevid resolves the contradiction differently. He says that both the Mishna and braita refer to a gift on one's deathbed but the Mishna is in a case where the one who wants to return the deed is the person who wrote it and the braita is when it is his son (after the original owner's death).

Bava Metzia 18 - March 17, 7 Adar 2 Mar 17, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Audrey Mondrow from her children and grandchildren. "You are an example of a lifetime learner."

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in honor of the marriage of their daughter, Sophia Altman today, and also the recent marriage of their son, Isaac Altman, and the yahrtzeit of Moshe Rabbeinu. "Sending brachot that the ultimate Shadchan find matches for all of those who are looking."

Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia (Sara Devora) Simmons in loving memory of her father, Avraham Nachum ben Yisroel Simelis z"l on his yahrzeit today. "Survivor of the Kovno ghetto, "a brand plucked from burning fire" he planted the seeds of Torah learning with his enduring faith still inspiring today and in the future."

There is another unsuccessful attempt to find a source to show that a betrothed woman who is widowed receives the ketuba money, even if she did not have a written ketuba. Therefore, Abaye's support for Rabbi Yochanan's reading of the Mishna in Ketubot 88b is edited and is derived directly from the words of the Mishna by rejecting the possibility that the Mishna was referring only to a place where in general they did not write ketubot and women used their get documents to collect their ketuba money. Therefore the Mishna is referring even to a case where a ketuba was written and yet we allow the woman to collect her ketuba money even without producing the ketuba document and do not trust the husband to claim it was already paid. The Mishna says if one finds a get or will or gift document, one cannot return it because maybe the person changed their mind and decided not to give it. This implies that if the husband/owner says now that he wants to give it (after we find it) he can, even if time has elapsed. This contradicts a Mishna in Gittin 27 that rules that one can only give a get that was found immediately and not after time has elapsed, as perhaps someone else with the same name lost it and it is not the get written for this man and this woman. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between a place where there are caravans and it is known that there are two couples with the same names. Rabbi Zeira raises the same contradiction but between the Mishna in Gittin and a Tosefta, not from an inference from our Mishna. He resolves it in the same way as Raba, however, it is unclear if he limits the Mishna to a case where there are caravans or also when it is known that there are two people with the same names. If he disagrees with Raba on that issue, what is the root of their debate? Why did Raba choose to bring the contradiction from our Mishna and Rabbi Zeira to bring it from the Tosefta? Rabbi Yirmia and Rav Ashi each bring two other resolutions to the contradiction between the Tosefta and the Mishna in Gittin.

Bava Metzia 17 - Shabbat March 16, 6 Adar 2 Mar 15, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Karen Carter in honor of Julie Hilton Danan's birthday! "Happy birthday to my first chevruta!"

In what cases is one no longer trusted to take an in court that he/she paid back the loan? Rav Nachman was quoted as differentiating between a case where the court had ruled "Give the money back" and "You are obligated to pay." However, there were two different versions of the situation in which Rav Nachman distinguished between the cases. Two statements of Rabbi Yochanan are brought where based on a false claim one makes regarding a case, they are no longer believed to be able to take an oath relating to that case. Rabbi Asi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if a promissory note stamped by the court is found with today's date, we can assume it was not yet paid back as people do not generally return loans on the same day. However, this contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yochanan that is premised on the fact that people could pay loans back on the same day. This is resolved in two possible ways. Rabbi Yochanan makes another statement that if something is deemed obligatory by the court, such as a ketuba, then one is not trusted to say "I already paid it back" (if they can't bring witnesses to prove it) even if the other side does not have a document in hand. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba questions Rabbi Yochanan by asking isn't that an explicit Mishna? Rabbi Yochanan responds by saying that without his statement, it would not have been clear from the Mishna. Abaye suggests that what Rabbi Yochanan said cannot be derived from the Mishna but then changes his mind and explains that it can be, using as proof a case of a widow from betrothal who receives ketuba money. Rav Keshisha tries to find a source for Abaye's halakha about a betrothed woman from a Mishna but rejects his own suggestion. own suggestion.

Bava Metzia 16 - March 15, 5 Adar 2 Mar 15, 2024

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Today's daf is sponsored by Miriam Adler in honor of her children's return to Kibbutz Saad. "May they have many healthy and safe years while building and planting in ארצנו הקדושה."

Rav holds that if the seller of stolen land subsequently purchased the land from the original owner, the assumption is that the seller originally sold the land and any rights to the land that the seller may have in the future. Therefore, the land is fully owned by the buyer. The logic behind Rav's ruling is a source of debate between Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi. Is it because the seller doesn't want the buyer to call him/her a thief or because the seller wants to be known as reliable? What is the practical difference between the two? Three answers are brought - the first two are rejected. The Gemara mentions variations on this case where Rav would theoretically rule that the seller did not intend to pass over rights to the buyer. At what stage in the judgment process is this ruling of Rav no longer relevant? Two questions are raised against Rav, but they are resolved. Another ruling of Rav on a related issue: If a seller says to a buyer, "This field will be yours from now, when I purchase it," the sale is effective. Rav holds by Rabbi Meir that one can acquire an item that is "not yet in the world." Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether a document in the street that was either ratified by the court or was a shtar hakna'a (in which the land is automatically liened from the date of the document regardless of whether the loan happened or not), gets returned to the credit. Can we assume that it was not yet paid, since if it was, the borrower would have ripped it up, or do we assume that it was paid back, since if it wasn't, the lender never would have lost it?

Bava Metzia 15 - March 14, 4 Adar 2 Mar 14, 2024

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Study Guide Bava Metzia 15

Today's daf is sponsored by Barbara Goldschlag in honor of the engagement of Aliza Goldschlag and Sam Clarke.

If one sold a field that he/she stole, when the owner takes back the land and the buyer returns to the seller to retrieve the money from the sale, Shmuel holds that the seller does not need to reimburse the buyer for improvements to the field. The second difficulty raised against Shmuel is resolved in three possible ways. A third difficulty is raised as Shmuel himself said that the buyer receives a guarantee of the enhancements. To resolve this, Rav Yosef suggests a possible way that the buyer of stolen property can demand the value of the enhancements from the seller after the property is taken away. There are two different versions of Rav Yosef's answer. In the context of this discussion, they mentioned a different opinion of Shmuel that a creditor who seizes liened property for a loan can take the enhancements as well. Rava proves this from the language of a sale document which includes a guarantee for the enhancements. Why would there be a guarantee for enhancements for a sale and not for a gift? If one buys property knowing it is stolen and the owner takes back the land, Rav and Shmuel debate whether or not the buyer can get his/her money back from the seller. The basis of their argument is discussed and compared to another case where they also debate the same issue. Why is there a need to show they disagreed in both cases?

Bava Metzia 14 - March 13, 3 Adar 2 Mar 13, 2024

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her father, Melvyn Sydney Goldstein, on his 4th yahrzeit. "He was gone too soon, and his presence and good counsel are missed by many of his friends and family."

How does the braita previously quoted raise a difficulty with Shmuel on two counts? Another statement of Shmuel is brought explaining the rabbi's position - that even if a document doesn't say that the property is liened to the loan, the property is still liened to the loan, as we assume the scribe forgot to add it. Rava bar Itai raises a contradiction between that statement of Shmuel's and another statement of Shmuel's in a different context. The Gemara then distinguishes between the cases - one was a loan and the other was a sale. A story is brought to support this distinction. Abaye mentions a few laws about liened property. If a creditor collects from liened property, the debtor can get involved to bring a claim against the creditor even though the creditor seized it from the one who purchased it from the debtor, as the debtor is still considered an involved party. Can one back out of a deal if rumors are circulating that the land doesn't belong to the "owner"? At what stage, and does it depend if the land was sold with a guarantee? If one sold a field that he/she stole, when the owner takes back the land and the buyer returns to the seller to retrieve the money from the sale, Rav and Shmuel debate whether or not the seller needs to reimburse the buyer for improvements to the field. Shmuel does not allow the buyer to collect the money for improvements as it looks like an interest payment. Rava raises a difficulty with Shmuel but it is resolved. A further difficulty is raised against Shmuel but it is resolved as well.

Bava Metzia 13 - March 12, 2 Adar 2 Mar 12, 2024

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Study Guide Bava Metzia 13

If someone finds a promissory note in the street and it is unclear if it was paid back or not, can it be returned to the creditor? According to Rabbi Meir, it depends on whether or not the document specified that there was property lein on the loan - if there was, the document is not returned, if there was not, it is. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that in both cases, the document is not returned. There are two suggestions to explain the case of the Mishna - is it a case where the debtor agrees that the loan was not yet repaid or does the debtor claim it was repaid? First, the Gemara suggests the former and explains the position of Rabbi Meir that there may be a problem with the date of the loan written in the contract. Therefore there is a concern that land will be collected improperly from a date that may have preceded the loan. However, a contradiction is brought from a Mishna in Bava Batra where no such concern exists. Rav Asi and Abaye resolve the contradiction in different ways. Difficulties against each position are raised and resolved. In the resolution of Abaye's opinion, they assume that Abaye holds that Rabbi Meir is concerned that if there is a property lien, the creditor and debtor may conspire together to lie in order to repossess and share land that the debtor sold. As Shmuel is not concerned about a conspiracy, he must either hold like Rav Asi or perhaps he understands the case in the Mishna differently - that the debtor claims the loan was repaid. If so, the basis for Rabbi Meir's distinction is that he holds if a document does not include a property lien, it cannot be collected at all. Therefore, if there is no property lien, it can be returned to the creditor without concern of it being collected. Still, it is returned so the creditor can use the paper for other uses, i.e. to cover a jug. If it has a property lien, we trust the debtor that the loan was already paid back and it is not returned to the creditor. There is a debate among Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar about whether Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree in a case where the debtor admits there is still a loan or one where the debtor denies it. They each explain according to their position the basis of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis. The Gemara introduces a braita and explains that it supports Rabbi Yochanan's position and raises one difficulty with Rabbi Eleazar's position and two with Shmuel. However, a difficulty is raised as the braita disagrees on two issues with Rabbi Elazar!

Bava Metzia 12 - 2nd day of Rosh Chodesh - March 11, 1 Adar 2 Mar 11, 2024

Show notes

This month's learning is sponsored in loving memory of Shay Uriel ben Carmit & Harav Shimon Pizam and Ayal Mevorach ben Shiri Chaya & Mordechai Moti Twito.

This week's learning is sponsored by Nira Feldman in loving memory of Faye Darack z"l, Finkel bat Baruch v'Dina in commemoration of her first yahrzeit.

Rav Ashi explains why if a husband puts a bill of divorce in his wife's courtyard, it is only effective if she is standing nearby, whereas, for a gift, there is no need to be standing near the courtyard. This is based on the principle that one can do something that is in a person's best interest (gift) not in their presence but one cannot do something bad for another (divorce) not in their presence. Rava asks about a case where someone throws a wallet and it goes through the airspace of another's property - is it acquired by the owner of the property as in the case of the Mishna? How is the case different from the case brought in the Mishna? The next Mishna teaches: If the following people find a lost item, the item goes to the father/husband/owner: a young child, a wife, and a Caananite slave. If the following people find a lost item, they can keep it for themselves: an older child, a Jewish slave, and a divorced woman even if she did not receive her ketuba. Shmuel explains that a child who finds a lost item goes to his/her father as it is common for children to give items they find to their parents. This implies that Shmuel holds that a child does not acquire items by Torah law. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel from a braita regarding a worker who leaves sheaves that fall in the field (leket) and his child can collect them. The sages suggest three possible resolutions. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Shmuel as he understands the word "minor" in the Mishna not to be referring to a minor as one underage but one who is supported by his father, in which case the Mishna teaches nothing regarding the ability of a minor to acquire items. A braita states that a day worker who is hired to do everything for the owner and finds a lost item on the job, the item goes to the one who hired him. This contradicts the Mishna which states that a Jewish slave who finds lost items can keep them. The sages suggest three solutions. What is the case of a Jewish slave woman in the Mishna who gets to keep lost items - shouldn't they go to her father, and if he died, didn't Reish Lakish teach that she go free? To resolve this, they explain that the Mishna means the item goes to her father, not her master. Why does the Mishna need to teach that a divorced woman can keep items she finds? Isn't this obvious?! The case must be one where there is a doubt about whether or not she is divorced. If one finds promissory notes, are they returned to the creditor? On what does it depend? Why?

Bava Metzia 11 - Rosh Chodesh Adar 2 - March 10, 30 Adar 1 Mar 10, 2024

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by Emma and Richard Rinberg in honor of the engagement of their son Joseph to Shachar, daughter of Ayelet and Amir Yefet of Shoham.

After concluding that everyone agrees that if a husband puts a get in his wife's courtyard, she is divorced because her courtyard is considered an extension of her hand, the Gemara brings three explanations as to what Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about regarding the acquiring of an item through the courtyard of a minor. If people are running after an animal with a broken leg who has entered into someone's field, the owner of the field can acquire it by saying "My field acquired it" since the animal is incapable of running away. But if the animal could run fast and escape, then that statement would be ineffective. Shmuel qualifies the Mishna that the field is unprotected and the owner is standing nearby. The Gemara brings proof from a braita that in an unprotected field, the owner must be nearby in order to acquire an ownerless item in the field. The braita contradicts itself and therefore an alternative reading is suggested which is used to prove Shmuel. However, the Gemara suggests an alternative reading of the braita to reject the proof, but that reading is not accepted. Ulla and Rabba bar bar Hana also qualified the Mishna in the same way as Shmuel. Rabbi Abba raises a difficulty against Ulla from a Mishna in Maaser Sheni 5:9 about Rabban Gamliel giving rights to maaser to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva while they were on a boat by giving them rights to a piece of land on his property. Since they were not standing near the property, one can prove that they acquired it without being next to the property. One possible response to the difficulty is to explain that the act of acquiring was a kinyan agav, whereby one who acquires land and moveable items, acquires the land (through money) and the moveable items automatically become theirs. Rabbi Abba didn't accept this response and Rava explains why. Rava suggests that since there was an easier way to do it - by a kinyan sudar, and they did not use that method of acquiring, it must be because giving rights to maaser is not valued as money, since the maaser belongs to all the Levites/poor people and choosing which one is just considered a benefit. However, the Gemara rejects Rava's suggestion and explains that gifts of the tithes are considered money and explains why a symbolic act of acquisition would not have been effective, but kinyan agav is. Rav Papa offers a different answer to Rabbi Abba's difficulty by distinguishing between an ownerless item and one that is passed on by someone else. Is this an accurate distinction, as Ulla rules that when a husband passes a get to a wife's courtyard, it will only be effective if she is standing nearby?

Bava Metzia 10 - Shabbat March 9, 29 Adar 1 Mar 08, 2024

Show notes

The Gemara quotes a Mishna in Peah 4:9 that describes someone who takes part in the corner of another's field on behalf of a poor person. Ulla and Rav Nachman disagree about whether the debate Mishna in Peah is only when a wealthy person takes the item for the poor person or even a poor person for a poor person. Rav Nachman raises a difficulty with Ulla's ruling from our Mishna. How do Ulla and Rav Nachman understand the case in the Mishna differently to correspond to their understanding of the Mishna in Peah? A creditor cannot ask someone else to collect a debt when the debtor also owes others and may not have enough funds for all the creditors as they are causing a loss to others. Only the creditor him/herself can collect the loan. Does that concept apply to a lost item since potentially it is causing everyone else not to acquire it or since there is no potential financial loss for anyone as the lost item wasn't something they are owed, one can acquire it for a friend? Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda disagree with Rabbi Yochanan on this issue. The Mishna rules that one who jumps on an item does not acquire it. Reish Lakish brings a halakha in the name of Rabbi Abba Bardala Cohen that one acquires everything within the four cubits surrounding a person. A difficulty is raised against this statement from both a Mishna in Peah and our Mishna and three answers are brought for each source to explain why it does not contradict, the first is rejected and the last two are accepted. Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether a minor girl's divorce document can be given to her by placing it in her courtyard or in the four cubits surrounding her. The first suggestion is that the argument is based on whether a courtyard functions as an extension of one's hand or as a messenger. However, this is rejected.

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