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    Technology

    Ubuntu Security Podcast

    A fortnightly podcast talking about the latest developments and updates from the Ubuntu Security team, including a summary of recent security vulnerabilities and fixes as well as a discussion on some of the goings on in the wider Ubuntu Security community.

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    Copyright: © Copyright 2019 Canonical

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    Latest Episodes:
    Episode 163 Jun 10, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview This week we dig into some of the details of another recent Linux malware sample called Symbiote, plus we cover security updates for the Linux kernel, vim, FreeRDP, NTFS-3G and more. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 82 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5456-1] ImageMagick vulnerability [00:36] 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28463 Heap UAF found by oss-fuzz [LSN-0086-1] Linux kernel vulnerability [00:51] 7 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-30594 CVE-2022-29581 CVE-2022-21499 CVE-2022-1116 CVE-2022-1055 CVE-2022-0492 CVE-2021-39713 Various recent local privesc vulns: cgroups v1 release_agent UAF in network scheduling subsystem UAF in network traffic control subsystem integer overflow in io_uring seccomp restrictions bypass UAF in network queuing and scheduling subsystem Secure boot bypass through kgdb canonical-livepatch status Kernel type 22.04 20.04 18.04 16.04 14.04 aws — 86.3 86.3 86.3 — aws-5.4 — — 86.3 — — aws-hwe — — — 86.3 — azure — 86.3 — 86.3 — azure-4.15 — — 86.3 — — azure-5.4 — — 86.3 — — gcp 86.4 86.3 — 86.3 — gcp-4.15 — — 86.3 — — gcp-5.4 — — 86.3 — — generic-4.15 — — 86.3 86.3 — generic-4.4 — — — 86.3 86.3 generic-5.4 — 86.3 86.3 — — gke 86.4 86.3 — — — gke-4.15 — — 86.3 — — gke-5.4 — — 86.3 — — gkeop — 86.3 — — — gkeop-5.4 — — 86.3 — — ibm 86.4 86.3 — — — ibm-5.4 — — 86.3 — — linux 86.4 — — — — lowlatency 86.4 — — — — lowlatency-4.15 — — 86.3 86.3 — lowlatency-4.4 — — — 86.3 86.3 lowlatency-5.4 — 86.3 86.3 — — oem — — 86.3 — — [USN-5465-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [02:02] 3 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2022-30594 CVE-2022-1966 CVE-2022-21499 secure boot bypass via kgdb UAF in netfliter -> privesc seccomp restrictions bypass [USN-5466-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities 8 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28390 CVE-2022-28356 CVE-2022-1419 CVE-2022-1016 CVE-2021-4149 CVE-2021-3772 CVE-2022-1966 CVE-2022-21499 secure boot bypass, netfilter UAF plus btrfs deadlock, infoleak in netfilter + virtual graphics manager, double free in 802.2 LLC driver and EMS CAN/USB drivers [USN-5467-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [02:29] 21 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28390 CVE-2022-28389 CVE-2022-28356 CVE-2022-26966 CVE-2022-24958 CVE-2022-23042 CVE-2022-23041 CVE-2022-23040 CVE-2022-23039 CVE-2022-23038 CVE-2022-23037 CVE-2022-23036 CVE-2022-1516 CVE-2022-1353 CVE-2022-1198 CVE-2022-1158 CVE-2022-1011 CVE-2021-4197 CVE-2021-3772 CVE-2022-1966 CVE-2022-21499 Most of the above plus privesc via mishandling of permission checks when migrating processes across cgroups, KVM page table handling -> host crash (DoS), UAF in USB-Gadget, Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer, 6pack protocol driver and more [USN-5468-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities 6 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-28390 CVE-2022-24958 CVE-2022-1972 CVE-2022-1158 CVE-2022-1966 CVE-2022-21499 Subset of the above [USN-5469-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities 20 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28390 CVE-2022-28389 CVE-2022-28388 CVE-2022-28356 CVE-2022-1972 CVE-2022-1671 CVE-2022-1651 CVE-2022-1516 CVE-2022-1353 CVE-2022-1263 CVE-2022-1205 CVE-2022-1204 CVE-2022-1199 CVE-2022-1198 CVE-2022-1195 CVE-2022-1158 CVE-2022-1048 CVE-2022-0168 CVE-2022-1966 CVE-2022-21499 More of the same [USN-5470-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities 4 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-1972 CVE-2022-1836 CVE-2022-1966 CVE-2022-21499 [USN-5471-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities 8 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-29968 CVE-2022-1972 CVE-2022-1836 CVE-2022-1734 CVE-2022-1205 CVE-2022-1012 CVE-2022-1966 CVE-2022-21499 [USN-5458-1] Vim vulnerabilities [03:17] 9 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2022-0443 CVE-2022-0408 CVE-2022-0368 CVE-2022-0361 CVE-2022-0359 CVE-2022-0351 CVE-2022-0319 CVE-2022-0213 CVE-2021-4193 OOB reads, heap buffer overflows, stack buffer overflows, UAFs etc via crafted input files [USN-5460-1] Vim vulnerabilities 10 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2022-1621 CVE-2022-1620 CVE-2022-1619 CVE-2022-1616 CVE-2022-0943 CVE-2022-0729 CVE-2022-0714 CVE-2022-0685 CVE-2022-0572 CVE-2022-0554 [USN-5459-1] cifs-utils vulnerabilities [03:49] 4 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-29869 CVE-2022-27239 CVE-2021-20208 CVE-2020-14342 Tools for managing cifs mounts etc Privesc via stack buffer overflow in mount.cifs via crafted command-line arguments - used strcpy() to copy the provided IP address after first checking length - but did comparison using strnlen() which returns the max length even if the string is longer - so subsequent strcpy() would then overflow Possible shell command injection into mount.cifs when it spawns a subshell for password input Exposure of host kerberos credentials when mounting a CIFS share using kerberos authentication within a container [USN-5461-1] FreeRDP vulnerabilities [05:21] 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-24883 CVE-2022-24882 Episode 162 - Last week we talked about a couple different packages that mishandled empty password to then improperly authenticate a user Similar vuln in FreeRDP when using NTLM authentication - allows a client to authenticate to the server with an empty NTLM password [USN-5462-1, USN-5462-2] Ruby vulnerabilities [06:11] 2 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28739 CVE-2022-28738 Double free in regexp compiler when handling a crafted regex as input - so if allow attackers to provide regex which will then get compiled could abuse this to gain code execution as the ruby interpreter [USN-5463-1] NTFS-3G vulnerabilities [06:41] 8 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-30787 CVE-2022-30785 CVE-2022-30789 CVE-2022-30788 CVE-2022-30786 CVE-2022-30784 CVE-2022-30783 CVE-2021-46790 ntfsck code execution via crafted disk images (Episode 162) Incorrect handling of crafted disk images during mounting etc -> various heap buffer overflows -> code execution Logic error exposes a user to intercept the FUSE protocol traffic between nfts-3g and the kernel [USN-5464-1] E2fsprogs vulnerability [07:17] 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-1304 Similarly, OOB R/W in e2fsprogs -> used when doing fsck, mkfs, resizefs, badblocks etc on crafted file system image -> code execution Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community Symbiote Linux malware analysis [07:58] https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/new-linux-threat-symbiote/ Research from Intezer and Blackberry Found targeting financial sector in Latin America Described as ’nearly impossible’ to detect Uses LD_PRELOAD to ‘infect’ binaries on system Evades detection by then hooking various functions in libc, libpcap etc to change their behaviour and alter their output so that when running tools like ls, ps etc they don’t show evidence of infection Also loads BPF filter to hide it’s own network traffic from being seen when say running a local tcpdump etc ‘Nearly impossible to detect’ claim Indeed, is going to be very hard to detect it from the machine itself which is compromised If an attacker has control over the machine they can clearly influence that environment to hide themselves Reminds of a recent twitter thread involving halvarflake, Mathias Krause and others, and then a follow-up blog post from Brad Spengler from grsecurity looking at Tetragon eBPF Security Observability and Runtime Environment eBPF based system which allows sysadmins to develop policy to detect and kill exploits Runs on the system itself in kernel-space and tries to detect once a user has elevated privileges etc e.g. kernel memory corruption to set their own uid as 0 But since the attacker has already got code execution in the kernel to be able to achieve this they can just as easily first disable Tetragon and then go and elevate privileges and hence not be detected Basically if you are trying to detect compromise from within the environment itself the attacker is always at an advantage and can change the environment to evade detection and make everything look normal / disable checks etc Instead need to be at a higher level of abstraction In the case of detecting Symbiote - would need to say take a disk image and analyse it offline from another machine so that the analysis environment can’t be influenced by the malware itself Ubuntu 21.10 (Impish Indri) reaches End of Life on July 14 2022 [12:45] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-announce/2022-May/000280.html Hiring [13:16] Security Engineer - Ubuntu https://canonical.com/careers/2925180/security-engineer-ubuntu-remote Security Certifications Product Manager - CIS, FIPS, FedRAMP and more https://canonical.com/careers/3781589/security-certifications-product-manager-cis-fips-fedramp-and-more-remote Get in contact security@ubuntu.com #ubuntu-security on the Libera.Chat IRC network ubuntu-hardened mailing list Security section on discourse.ubuntu.com @ubuntu_sec on twitter

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Episode 162 Jun 03, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview

    This week we cover security updates for dpkg, logrotate, GnuPG, CUPS, InfluxDB and more, plus we take a quick look at some open positions on the team - come join us!

    This week in Ubuntu Security Updates

    31 unique CVEs addressed

    [USN-5446-1, USN-5446-2] dpkg vulnerability [00:42]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-1664
    • Directory traversal vulnerability when extracting untrusted source packages
      • debian source packages consist of two tarballs - orig and debian
      • orig is unpacked and then debian in unpacked on top of that - if orig is crafted to contain a symlink which pointed to a file outside of the source code, then when unpacking debian it will follow that symlink and hence would overwrite arbitrary files outside the source directory
      • Only really a problem for debian/ubuntu developers

    [USN-5447-1] logrotate vulnerability [02:58]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-1348
    • logrotate creates a ‘state’ file to avoid parallel executions of itself - each instance locks this file as a mutex mechanism
    • if this doesn’t exist, it gets created - but is created world readable - which allows unprivileged users to take the lock on this file
    • as such the real logrotate will fail to run since it can’t get the lock -> DoS

    [USN-5402-2] OpenSSL vulnerabilities [04:13]

    • 2 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2022-1473
      • CVE-2022-1292
    • Episode 159

    [USN-5448-1] ncurses vulnerabilities [04:21]

    • 11 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2017-13728
      • CVE-2017-11113
      • CVE-2017-13734
      • CVE-2017-13733
      • CVE-2017-13732
      • CVE-2017-13731
      • CVE-2017-13730
      • CVE-2017-13729
      • CVE-2017-11112
      • CVE-2017-10685
      • CVE-2017-10684
    • Crafted inputs could cause ncurses to crash - most of these were found via fuzzing and are stack buffer overflows - these are generally mitigated via stack-protector, others are NULL ptr deref, but again same outcome (crash -> DoS)
    • Possible infinite loop as well -> cpu based DoS

    [USN-5449-1] libXv vulnerability [04:58]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2016-5407
    • Remove X server could trigger OOB read in the X client via crafted response -> crash -> DoS

    [USN-5431-1] GnuPG vulnerability [04:24]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2019-13050
    • Weakness in PGP/SKS keyserver design - if a key/certificate has many signatures, GnuPG will take an inordinate amount of time to process these when downloading the key from the keyserver -> DoS
      • Certificate spamming attack - anyone can sign someone else’s cert thereby attaching another signature to it on the SKS keyserver network
      • The OpenPGP spec doesn’t limit the number of signatures (but SKS keyserver network does - 150k)
      • So anyone can poison someone else’s cert by attaching a large number of signatures to it
      • GnuPG would download all of these signatures when importing a key and then proceed to validate them all
        • Also would do this when say validating a signature from that poisoned cert
    • Fixed to not import key signatures by default anymore and to then fallback to only import self-signatures on large keyblocks

    [USN-5452-1] NTFS-3G vulnerability [07:55]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2021-46790
    • ntfsck tool failed to perform proper bounds checking on filesystem metadata - if could trick a user into running it on an untrusted filesystem image could then possibly get code execution
      • Upstream have deprecated this tool and it is only present in the ntfs-3g-dev package which is not installed by default

    [USN-5453-1] FreeType vulnerability [08:38]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2022-27406
    • OOB read when processing a crafted font file -> DoS

    [USN-5454-1, USN-5454-2] CUPS vulnerabilities [08:50]

    • 3 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2020-10001
      • CVE-2019-8842
      • CVE-2022-26691
    • Upstream Apple advisory describes this as:
      • “Logic issue addressed with improved state management… An application may be able to gain elevated privileges”
    • Looks like it was discovered by Mandiant
      • CUPS provides the ability to authenticate via Basic Web Authentication or through a 32-byte randomly generated token created at runtime
      • Comparison function would only compare the supplied token value against the real one based on the length of the shortest input - so if supplied an empty string then would compare 0 bytes of the two and return success!
    • Other two issues were memory handling issues in IPP printing - could submit a print job which would cause an OOB read in CUPS -> crash -> DoS

    [USN-5451-1] InfluxDB vulnerability [10:39]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2019-20933
    • Similar authentication bug in InfluxDB - could bypass authentication by supplying a JWT token with an empty SharedSecret

    [USN-5442-2] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [11:06]

    • 3 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-30594
      • CVE-2022-1116
      • CVE-2022-29581
    • 5.4 - GCP/GKE/IBM/Oracle/Raspi
    • Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng found integer overflow in io_uring - an unprivileged user can spam requests which would eventually overflow counter and then could be used to trigger an OOB write -> controlled memory corruption -> privesc
      • Not the first bug in io_uring found by this researcher - https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2021/q2/127
    • Similarly, Jann Horn (GPZ) found kernel didn’t properly check privileges of a process when allowing it to set a flag which would then disable seccomp filters on another process or itself
      • Could then allow an unprivileged process to turn of seccomp for itself / other processes and allow them to bypass intended access restrictions
    • Regular kernel security bug - ref count issue in network queueing subsystem -> UAF - able to be triggered by a local attacker -> crash / code execution

    [USN-5443-2] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [12:47]

    • 2 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10)
      • CVE-2022-30594
      • CVE-2022-29581
    • 5.13 Oracle/GCP

    [USN-5457-1] WebKitGTK vulnerabilities [12:58]

    • 5 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-26719
      • CVE-2022-26717
      • CVE-2022-26716
      • CVE-2022-26709
      • CVE-2022-26700
    • Latest webkit point release - usual mix of issues fixed - XSS, DoS, RCE etc

    Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community

    Hiring

    Security Engineer - Ubuntu [13:25]

    • https://canonical.com/careers/2925180/security-engineer-ubuntu-remote

    Security Certifications Product Manager - CIS, FIPS, FedRAMP and more [14:24]

    • https://canonical.com/careers/3781589/security-certifications-product-manager-cis-fips-fedramp-and-more-remote

    Get in contact

    • security@ubuntu.com
    • #ubuntu-security on the Libera.Chat IRC network
    • ubuntu-hardened mailing list
    • Security section on discourse.ubuntu.com
    • @ubuntu_sec on twitter

    Episode 161 May 27, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview

    This week we take a look into BPFDoor, a newsworthy backdoor piece of malware which has been targeting Linux machines, plus we cover security updates for Bind, Vim, Firefox, PostgreSQL and more.

    This week in Ubuntu Security Updates

    32 unique CVEs addressed

    [USN-5429-1] Bind vulnerability [00:38]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-1183
    • Only affects most recent releases
    • When using bind configured with DNS over HTTPS (DoH) possible for a client to cause the server to terminate a TLS connection early and hence trigger an assertion failure within Bind -> terminates -> DoS

    [USN-5430-1] GNOME Settings vulnerability [01:18]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-1736
    • GNOME includes support for desktop sharing via RDP + VNC
    • By default in Ubuntu we have a no open ports policy)
    • However, GNOME settings daemon contained a logic flaw where when disabling the remote desktop service via the gnome-control-center UI it would then automatically get re-enabled on next login

    [USN-5424-2] OpenLDAP vulnerability [01:57]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2022-29155
    • Episode 160
    • SQL injection in the sql backend of slapd via an SQL statement within a LDAP query

    [USN-5433-1] Vim vulnerabilities [02:20]

    • 9 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2022-1154
      • CVE-2022-0318
      • CVE-2022-0261
      • CVE-2021-4192
      • CVE-2021-4069
      • CVE-2021-4019
      • CVE-2021-3984
      • CVE-2021-3974
      • CVE-2021-3973
    • All various instances of memory corruption vulnerabilities, where if a user was tricked into opening a specially crafted file, could then either crash Vim or possibly get code execution as the user
      • Whilst a lot of regular desktop users may not use Vim, is still often used by sysadmins to edit config files / inspect other files which they find on the machine - and in that case, this can then be a good privesc target

    [USN-5432-1] libpng vulnerabilities [03:01]

    • 2 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2018-14048
      • CVE-2017-12652
    • Speaking of specially crafted files :) - same for libpng - is used by many other higher level libraries / applications

    [USN-5434-1] Firefox vulnerabilities [03:20]

    • 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10)
      • CVE-2022-1802
      • CVE-2022-1529
    • 100.0.2
    • 2 vulns courtesy of ZDIs Pwn2Own - Manfred Paul - achieved code execution within the privileged component of Firefox thereby escaping Firefox’s internal sandbox - awarded $100k USD

    [USN-5435-1] Thunderbird vulnerabilities [03:57]

    • 11 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-19916
      • CVE-2022-1802
      • CVE-2022-1529
      • CVE-2022-1520
      • CVE-2022-29917
      • CVE-2022-29916
      • CVE-2022-29914
      • CVE-2022-29913
      • CVE-2022-29912
      • CVE-2022-29911
      • CVE-2022-29909
    • 91.9.1
    • Same as above plus a bunch of other recent vulns in Firefox which also apply to TB as well as a TB specific issue where it would show the wrong security status for a signed/encrypted attached message and hence could allow an attacker to trick the user into thinking the message was trustworthy

    [USN-5436-1] libXrender vulnerabilities [04:28]

    • 2 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2016-7950
      • CVE-2016-7949
    • Remote X server could trigger OOB write -> memory corruption -> code execution

    [USN-5437-1] libXfixes vulnerability

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2016-7944
    • 32-bit platform specific issue - but roughly same as above

    [USN-5438-1] HTMLDOC vulnerability [04:46]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2021-23165
    • Used to covert HTML/Markdown files to generate EPUB/HTML/PS/PDF with ToC etc
    • Crafted HTML file could trigger a heap buffer overflow -> crash/code execution

    [USN-5439-1] AccountsService vulnerability [05:06]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-1804
    • Old CVE-2020-16126 was inadvertently reintroduced as the patch which fixed it got dropped accidentally
      • Episode 95

    [USN-5440-1] PostgreSQL vulnerability [05:36]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS)
      • CVE-2022-1552
    • Possible for an attacker who is able to create non-temp objects could then achieve SQL code execution as the superuser

    [USN-5404-2] Rsyslog vulnerability [05:51]

    • 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM)
      • CVE-2022-24903
    • Episode 159

    Goings on in Linux Security Community

    BPFDoor malware targeting Linux and Solaris [06:08]

    • https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/cyber-year-in-retrospect/yir-cyber-threats-report-download.pdf

    • https://doublepulsar.com/bpfdoor-an-active-chinese-global-surveillance-tool-54b078f1a896

    • https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/

    • Malware that has been in the wild for a while (over 5 years)

    • Reported on by PwC in their Cyber Threats 2021: A year in Retrospect report

      • Attribute it to a Chinese threat actor which they call Red Menshen
      • Observed targeting telco providers and govt, education and logistics via custom backdoor ‘BPFDoor’
    • Stealthy - allows to backdoor a system for RCE but without opening any new network ports or firewall rules by piggy-backing on existing network facing applications

    • Uses BPF filter to watching incoming packets and activate accordingly

    • Earlier versions are on VT - with lots of other variants too

    • Even source code too - https://pastebin.com/kmmJuuQP

    • As I said - stealthy

      • deletes itself from the filesystem and renames its processes to look innocent so can hide in plain sight
      • loads BPF filter to sniff traffic
      • upon activation then will modify firewall to allow attacker direct access
    • In more detail:

      • Copies itself to /dev/shm/kdmtmpflush and then forks to clean itself up to alter timestamps (timestomp) to a specific timestamp (7:17pm Thursday October 30th 2008)
      • Drops a file at /bar/run/haldrund.pid to prevent further copies of itself from running
      • Deletes itself from the /dev/shm/ ramdisk and then exits to leave the forked copy running resident in memory and then use BPF filter to watch for incoming traffic to activate
    • Doesn’t appear to have any particular persistence mechanism but some reports suggest use of crontab or rc/init scripts

    • By deleting itself from the ramdisk this avoids detection from filesystem scanners (although processes running from since deleted binaries are a suspicious sign themselves and can be easily detected since once the binary is removed the kernel notes this in /proc/self/exe for the process)

    • Renames its argv[0] so that it looks like other commonly found processes like dbus-daemon / udevd / auditd etc

    • Also wipes its environ too to try and help hide it’s activities, however this again is another suspicious activity and can easily be detected (e.g. strings on /proc/$PID/environ will show as empty which is basically never normally the case for normal processes)

    • BPF filter inspects either ICMP, TCP or UDP packets and then if it has a special magic value in the first couple bytes it passes into the main packet processing routine

      • This then looks for a couple specific passwords (encrypted via RC4) - if found then sets up either a local bindshell for the attacker to connect to OR connects back to the attacker via a reverse bindshell
      • Then sets up an iptables rule to redirect traffic from the original port to the port of the bindshell on the localhost
    • bindshell masquerades its process name to look like postfix as well as setting a specific environment too (including HISTFILE=/dev/null)

    • Then attacker has full access to the machine (as the user)

    • Reasonably advanced malware

    • What is not clear is what is the initial compromise vector and then how to privesc from that to give privileges to load BPF filter on a raw socket

      • Crowdstrike blog post mentions that on Solaris CVE-2019-3010 is used to privesc via xscreensaver but this vuln is specific to Solaris platforms
    • Why it is important to keep systems updated with latest patches etc.

    Get in contact

    • security@ubuntu.com
    • #ubuntu-security on the Libera.Chat IRC network
    • ubuntu-hardened mailing list
    • Security section on discourse.ubuntu.com
    • @ubuntu_sec on twitter

    Episode 160 May 20, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview Ubuntu get’s pwned again at Pwn2Own Vancouver 2022, plus we look at security updates for the Linux kernel, RSyslog, ClamAV, Apport and more. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 57 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5413-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [01:06] 6 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2022-28390 CVE-2022-27223 CVE-2022-26490 CVE-2021-4157 CVE-2021-39713 CVE-2020-27820 4.4 - 16.04 ESM GA + 14.04 ESM UAF in nouveau driver when device is removed - external NVIDIA GPU? or local user unbinding the driver? UAF due to race condition in network packet scheduler OOB write in NFS - user who had access to an NFS mount could possibly exploit this Buffer overflow in ST Micro NFC driver - failed to validate parameters from NFC device - physically approximate attacker could possibly exploit this but would need custom hw/sw Similarly, Xilinx USB2 gadget driver failed to validate USB endpoints ESM CAN/USB double-free [USN-5415-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [02:27] 8 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27223 CVE-2022-26490 CVE-2022-25375 CVE-2022-25258 CVE-2022-20008 CVE-2022-1016 CVE-2021-26401 CVE-2020-27820 5.4 - 20.04 LTS GA + 18.04 LTS HWE + clouds Above vulns plus: AMD specific issue around insufficient mitigations for Spectre v2 attacks OOB read -> info leak through mishandling of MMC/SD read errors [USN-5417-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [03:07] 8 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-29156 CVE-2022-27223 CVE-2022-26966 CVE-2022-26490 CVE-2022-25375 CVE-2022-25258 CVE-2022-20008 CVE-2021-26401 5.13 - 21.10, 20.04 LTS HWE + some clouds ~ same as above [USN-5418-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [03:19] 13 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27223 CVE-2022-26966 CVE-2022-26490 CVE-2022-25375 CVE-2022-25258 CVE-2022-24958 CVE-2022-23042 CVE-2022-23040 CVE-2022-23039 CVE-2022-23038 CVE-2022-23037 CVE-2022-23036 CVE-2021-26401 4.15 - 18.04 LTS GA, 16.04 ESM HWE + clouds + OEM, 14.04 ESM azure ~ same as above [USN-5416-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities [03:26] 5 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28390 CVE-2022-28389 CVE-2022-28388 CVE-2022-1516 CVE-2022-1158 5.14 - 20.04 LTS OEM KVM mishandled guest page table updates -> guest VM crash host OS 2 similar issues in CAN bus drivers - 8 Devices USB2CAN and Microchip CAN Bus analyzer both had double-free on error paths - local attacker could crash -> DoS Plus ESM CAN/USB issue from above [USN-5419-1] Rsyslog vulnerabilities [04:26] 3 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2019-17042 CVE-2019-17041 CVE-2018-16881 2 issues in handling of various message types (AIX + Cisco log messages failed to properly validate contents and so could result in heap buffer overflow) 1 in handling of plain TCP socket comms - but this module is not enabled in the default rsyslog configuration for Ubuntu [USN-5420-1] Vorbis vulnerabilities [05:01] 3 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2018-10393 CVE-2018-10392 CVE-2017-14160 heap buffer overflow, OOB read + stack buffer overflow via crafted input files - DoS / RCE [USN-5421-1] LibTIFF vulnerabilities [05:16] 5 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-0865 CVE-2022-0891 CVE-2022-0562 CVE-2022-0561 CVE-2020-35522 Similar types of issues in libtiff - OOB reads / writes [USN-5422-1] libxml2 vulnerabilities [05:32] 2 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-29824 CVE-2022-23308 UAF plus possible integer overflows -> unspec impact (but requires victim to process a multiGB XML file) [USN-5311-2] containerd regression [06:03] 1 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-23648 Episode 152 - subsequent update to containerd by different team reverted the CVE fix accidentally - reinstated it [USN-5423-1, USN-5423-2] ClamAV vulnerabilities [06:24] 5 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-20796 CVE-2022-20792 CVE-2022-20785 CVE-2022-20771 CVE-2022-20770 0.103.6 Various infinite loops in different parsers (CPU-based DoS), memory leaks plus a couple OOB writes [USN-5424-1] OpenLDAP vulnerability [06:53] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-29155 SQL injection in the sql backend of slapd via an SQL statement within a LDAP query [USN-5425-1] PCRE vulnerabilities [07:09] 2 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2020-14155 CVE-2019-20838 OOB read -> info leak integer overflow -> buffer overflow? -> crash / code execution [USN-5426-1] needrestart vulnerability [07:20] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-30688 detects daemons that need to be restarted after libraries are upgraded uses various regex’s to detect scripting languages - but since these were not specific enough, it could allow a user to get their own script executed in the context of the user which is running needrestart - which could be root [USN-5427-1] Apport vulnerabilities [08:08] 8 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28658 CVE-2022-28657 CVE-2022-28656 CVE-2022-28655 CVE-2022-28654 CVE-2022-28652 CVE-2022-1242 CVE-2021-3899 Gerrit Venema reported a heap of issues in Apport - thanks to Marc Deslauriers on our team for working on these Crash handler in Ubuntu - is invoked by the kernel when an application crashes to collect various data to then upload to Ubuntu developers Runs as root but can be invoked as a regular user so has been a target for privesc vulns in the past Has various code to drop privileges etc but these were found to be incomplete Impacts of these issues range from DoS by crashing Apport through to local privesc to root [USN-5428-1] libXrandr vulnerabilities [09:14] 2 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2016-7948 CVE-2016-7947 Integer overflows -> OOB write plus another different OOB write - all able to be triggered by a malicious remote X server Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community Ubuntu in Pwn2Own Vancouver 2022 [09:39] 15 year anniversary of Pwn2Own 17 teams attempting to exploit 21 targets - including Ubuntu Desktop for EoP https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/5/17/pwn2own-vancouver-2022-the-schedule 5 different teams targeting Ubuntu Desktop - Ubuntu 22.04 LTS fully up-to-date Prize of $40k USD 2 on day 1, 2 on day 2, 1 on day 3 (tomorrow) https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/5/18/pwn2own-vancouver-2022-the-results So far all 4 have been successful: Team Orca of Sea Security (not live streamed) OOBW + UAF Keith Yeo UAF Bien Pham UAF Zhenpeng Lin (@Markak_), Yueqi Chen (@Lewis_Chen_), and Xinyu Xing (@xingxinyu) of Team TUTELARY UAF Lots of great new bugs - expect to hear more about these in the coming weeks Past episodes covering Ubuntu @ Pwn2Own over previous years Episode 111 and Episode 71 - in particular has a great interview with Steve and Marc from our team who cover what it is like as a vendor Get in contact security@ubuntu.com #ubuntu-security on the Libera.Chat IRC network ubuntu-hardened mailing list Security section on discourse.ubuntu.com @ubuntu_sec on twitter

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Episode 159 May 15, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview This week we bring you part 2 of our look at the new Ubuntu 22.04 LTS release and what’s in it for security, plus we cover security updates for DPDK, OpenSSL, Cron, RSyslog, Curl and more. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 37 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5401-1] DPDK vulnerabilities [00:54] 2 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-0669 CVE-2021-3839 Data-plane development kit (provides TCP offloading to userspace to accelerate package processing workloads) Used by openvswitch for OpenStack software defined networking OOB write due to missing check on queue length in vhost comms - could allow a malicious guest to crash or get code execution on the host Also fixed a possible DoS attack between a malicious vhost-user primary and secondary where the primary can spam the secondary with with a huge number of open file-descriptors which eventually leads the secondary to exhaust it’s fd limit and hence DoS [USN-5402-1] OpenSSL vulnerabilities [01:36] 4 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-1473 CVE-2022-1434 CVE-2022-1343 CVE-2022-1292 All 4 affect 22.04 whilst only one affects the older releases - in this case if running 22.04, exposed to 4 vulns whilst for the older releases only 1 Would be interesting to try and compare number of CVEs over the lifetime of a piece of software - if always running the latest version do you get exposed to more and more CVEs each time you upgrade? Is it better to stick with older software since the rate of vulns found over time likely decreases as it gets older… Anyway, of these vulns 1 is a memory leak during certificate decoding which could usually affect something like an TLS server which uses client certs for authentication, plus a possible MiTM attack against RC4-MD5, incorrect return code when validating OCSP messages which could cause a user / application to believe was valid when in fact was not plus possible code execution via the c_rehash script through shell-metacharacters - but no privilege escalation so only get whatever privileges the script is executing under (c_rehash is used to create symlinks named as the hashes of certs etc when importing a cert into a cert store so it can then easily be looked up via it’s hash value as the filename) [USN-5395-2] networkd-dispatcher regression [03:44] 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-29800 CVE-2022-29799 Episode 158 - upstream fix contained a small regression where an error would be encountered under certain situations [USN-5354-2] Twisted vulnerability [04:06] 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-21716 Episode 156 - Equivalent update for ESM releases plus latest Ubuntu LTS release [USN-5403-1] SQLite vulnerability [04:20] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-36690 Crash / possible code execution in CLI client when using a crafted query - upstream dispute this as an actual vuln since if can execute sqlite cli then can already execute arbitrary commands [USN-5405-1] jbig2dec vulnerabilities [04:40] 2 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2020-12268 CVE-2017-9216 used in ghostscript, mupdf and others for handling JBIG2 files NULL ptr dereference -> crash -> DoS Heap buffer overflow -> crash / code execution [USN-5259-2] Cron vulnerabilities [04:58] 4 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2019-9706 CVE-2019-9705 CVE-2019-9704 CVE-2017-9525 DoS via a very large crontab file with many many lines or very long lines Ubuntu specific vuln allowing possible privesc from crontab group to root when the crontab package is upgraded via a symlink attack - so in general was a dormant / latent vuln that would only be able to be triggered if a sysadmin manually reinstalled cron or we released a new update 😁 - so fixed now [USN-5259-3] Cron regression [05:47] 4 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2019-9706 CVE-2019-9705 CVE-2019-9704 CVE-2017-9525 but unfortunately caused a minor regression where some harmless but possibly scary looking error messages would be printed when cron was upgraded - fixed with this further update [USN-5404-1] Rsyslog vulnerability [05:57] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-24903 Potential heap buffer overflow in TCP syslog reception - so a malicious host which is logging to a centralized syslog server could possibly crash or get code execution on the server (as the syslog user only) [USN-5244-2] DBus vulnerability [06:18] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2020-35512 Possible UAF when running on a system where multiple usernames are mapped to the same UID - if policy references these usernames, may free it via one username whilst it is still being accessed by the other Not really likely to encounter this setup or be able to easily exploit it [USN-5179-2] BusyBox vulnerability [07:03] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2021-28831 Episode 141 [USN-5407-1] Cairo vulnerabilities [07:10] 4 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2020-35492 CVE-2019-6462 CVE-2017-9814 CVE-2016-9082 2 OOB reads, stack buffer overflow and infinite loop in handling of crafted image / font files [USN-5408-1] Dnsmasq vulnerability [07:24] 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-0934 Heap-based UAF found by oss-fuzz when handling malicious DHCPv6 requests [USN-5409-1] libsndfile vulnerability [07:46] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2021-4156 OOB read in FLAC codec -> crash / possible info leak [USN-5410-1] NSS vulnerability [07:54] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2020-25648 Mishandled ChangeCipherSpec messages in TLS 1.3 - remote client could crash a server by sending multiple of these [USN-5411-1] Firefox vulnerabilities [08:06] 8 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-29918 CVE-2022-29917 CVE-2022-29916 CVE-2022-29915 CVE-2022-29914 CVE-2022-29912 CVE-2022-29911 CVE-2022-29909 100.0 - usual mix of issues for web browsers/rendering engines (XSS, RCE, DoS, bypass permission checks etc) [USN-5412-1] curl vulnerabilities [08:24] 3 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27782 CVE-2022-27781 CVE-2022-27780 More curl vulns - seems to be more every 5-10 weeks or so lately - fuzzing? logic error on connection reuse could reuse an old connection after parameters had been changed Possible infinite loop when constructing a server’s TLS cert chain -> DoS incorrect handling of %-encoded URL separators - could parse URL wrongly and so end up visiting wrong URL or bypassing access checks / filters etc curl is part of hackerone and has so far paid out $17k USD in bounties Whilst preparing this week’s episode 6 more vulns were announced in curl Interesting twitter thread from curl maintainer on the ratio of vulns which are due to C mistakes vs general programming logic mistakes - general mistakes higher so I assume this is used as an argument as to why implementing such a ubiquitous piece of software in such an unsafe language is “ok” - can’t say I agree Also compared how long it takes to find vulns from C mistakes vs non-C mistakes - non-C mistakes take longer to find, presumably due to lack of good tools for finding them (compared to say UBSan, Coverity etc for finding C specific mistakes) Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community What’s new in security in Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (part 2) [11:35] In part 1 we covered new security features in the kernel This week we look at userspace security improvements OpenSSL 3 disables a lot of legacy algorithms by default, upstream have a migration guide which explains the main changes from 1.1.1 as well as how to enable the legacy provider if you still require access to them Default security level is still 2 but it now disables (D)TLS 1.2 protocols (and below) openssh 8.9 Lots of changes since 8.2 in 20.04 LTS, but in particular has improved handling of FIDO/U2F hardware tokens - openssh in 20.04 LTS first introduced support for FIDO/U2F tokens as 2FA for remote SSH logins - basically would generate a new openssh key where the private half of the key is only accessible with the FIDO/U2F token - this new release brings support for using a PIN with the token and much better improved UX so that users don’t have to keep getting prompted for their PIN each time. Plus supports verifying WebAuthn signatures nftables as default firewall backend firewalling on Linux has 2 components - kernel-space mechanism and userspace tooling to control that traditionally kernel supported iptables (aka xtables - ip,ip6,arp,eb -tables) nftables as introduced into the kernel in 3.13 as a new mechanism to implement network packet classification and handling - aka firewalling etc kernel has 2 mechanisms then - xtables and nftables userspace then has 2 primary tools for handling these - iptables for xtables and nftables (nft) for nftables iptables userspace added a nft backend so existing iptables rules and users would be switched to that automatically - so can still use traditional iptables command to configure firewall rules etc but they will then be loaded into the kernel’s nft backend rather than xtables also has a separate userspace command nft to directly configure nft backend which supports more advanced rule types Need to be careful that all tools which configure firewall rules use the same backend in the kernel otherwise they may conflict and get weird results gcc 11 with improved static analysis via -fanalyzer Double free, UAF, free of non-heap memory, malloc leak, NULL ptr deref, unsafe calls within signal handlers and more bash 5.1 - $SRANDOM vs $RANDOM RANDOM is a psuedo-random number which comes internally from bash and hence is deterministic based on the original seed value SRANDOM is derived from the kernel’s /dev/urandom and hence is not reproducible / deterministic - ie. is actually more truly random Private home directories by default Get in contact security@ubuntu.com #ubuntu-security on the Libera.Chat IRC network ubuntu-hardened mailing list Security section on discourse.ubuntu.com @ubuntu_sec on twitter

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Episode 158 May 06, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview Microsoft’s Nimbuspwn sets the Linux security media ablaze but where there’s smoke there’s not always fire, plus we bring you the first part of a 2 part series looking at some of the security features in the latest Ubuntu 22.04 LTS release. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 92 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5381-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities 11 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-28356 CVE-2022-27223 CVE-2022-26966 CVE-2022-26490 CVE-2022-24958 CVE-2022-1048 CVE-2022-1016 CVE-2022-1011 CVE-2022-0854 CVE-2022-0494 CVE-2022-1015 [USN-5383-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities 8 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-24959 CVE-2022-26878 CVE-2022-24448 CVE-2022-1016 CVE-2022-0617 CVE-2021-44879 CVE-2021-43976 CVE-2022-1015 [USN-5384-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities 3 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-24959 CVE-2022-24448 CVE-2022-0617 [USN-5385-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities 4 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2022-24959 CVE-2022-24448 CVE-2022-0617 CVE-2021-43975 [USN-5387-1] Barbican vulnerabilities 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-23452 CVE-2022-23451 [USN-5376-2] Git vulnerability 1 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-24765 [USN-5388-1] OpenJDK vulnerabilities 5 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-21496 CVE-2022-21476 CVE-2022-21443 CVE-2022-21434 CVE-2022-21426 [USN-5388-2] OpenJDK vulnerabilities 6 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-21496 CVE-2022-21476 CVE-2022-21443 CVE-2022-21434 CVE-2022-21426 CVE-2022-21449 [USN-5389-1] Libcroco vulnerabilities 4 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2020-12825 CVE-2017-8871 CVE-2017-8834 CVE-2017-7960 [USN-5390-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities 3 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-26490 CVE-2022-1016 CVE-2022-1015 [USN-5376-3] Git regression Affecting Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) [USN-5391-1] libsepol vulnerabilities 4 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-36087 CVE-2021-36086 CVE-2021-36085 CVE-2021-36084 [USN-5366-2] FriBidi vulnerabilities 3 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-25310 CVE-2022-25309 CVE-2022-25308 [USN-5393-1] Thunderbird vulnerabilities 8 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-1197 CVE-2022-28289 CVE-2022-28286 CVE-2022-28285 CVE-2022-28282 CVE-2022-28281 CVE-2022-1196 CVE-2022-1097 [USN-5371-2] nginx vulnerability 3 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2020-36309 CVE-2020-11724 CVE-2021-3618 [USN-5394-1] WebKitGTK vulnerabilities 4 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-22637 CVE-2022-22629 CVE-2022-22628 CVE-2022-22624 [USN-5392-1] Mutt vulnerabilities 2 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-1328 CVE-2021-32055 [USN-5395-1] networkd-dispatcher vulnerabilities 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-29800 CVE-2022-29799 [USN-5396-1] Ghostscript vulnerability 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2019-25059 [USN-5397-1] curl vulnerabilities 4 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27776 CVE-2022-27775 CVE-2022-27774 CVE-2022-22576 [USN-5398-1] Simple DirectMedia Layer vulnerability 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-33657 [USN-5399-1] libvirt vulnerabilities 6 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-3631 CVE-2020-25637 CVE-2022-0897 CVE-2021-4147 CVE-2021-3975 CVE-2021-3667 [USN-5400-1] MySQL vulnerabilities 23 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10), Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-21478 CVE-2022-21462 CVE-2022-21460 CVE-2022-21459 CVE-2022-21457 CVE-2022-21454 CVE-2022-21452 CVE-2022-21451 CVE-2022-21444 CVE-2022-21440 CVE-2022-21438 CVE-2022-21437 CVE-2022-21436 CVE-2022-21435 CVE-2022-21427 CVE-2022-21425 CVE-2022-21423 CVE-2022-21418 CVE-2022-21417 CVE-2022-21415 CVE-2022-21414 CVE-2022-21413 CVE-2022-21412 [USN-5400-2] MySQL vulnerabilities 6 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2022-21460 CVE-2022-21454 CVE-2022-21451 CVE-2022-21444 CVE-2022-21427 CVE-2022-21417 [USN-5390-2] Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities 3 CVEs addressed in Jammy (22.04 LTS) CVE-2022-26490 CVE-2022-1016 CVE-2022-1015 Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community Nimbuspwn [01:46] Nimbuspwn - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/26/microsoft-finds-new-elevation-of-privilege-linux-vulnerability-nimbuspwn/ At the end of April Microsoft disclosed some vulnerabilities which gathered a lot of media attention, leading to a lot of outlets seemingly claiming most Linux systems were affected and that this was a high severity issue Describes a number of issues in networkd-dispatcher which could be used to get RCE directory traversal symlink race TOCTOU permissions check race condition However, all relies on being able to have an arbitrary process run under the systemd-network user (since this user is the only one which can bind to the right dbus name org.freedesktop.network1) Originally they provided some vague mentions of gpgv plugins and epmd running under this user. gpgv plugins are launched by apt=/=apt-get during package install / upgrade so this sounds like a common scenario that would affect most users (instead of say epmd which is the erlang port mapper daemon, so unless you are running erland applications you would not be affected by that) Looking again though at these gpg plugins running as the systemd-network user - this is definitely not the case for standard Ubuntu - since apt is very clear to run them under the _apt user account purposefully to restrict their privileges After we questioned Microsoft about this, they amended the blog post to then just say they were able to detect several instances of other processes running under this user in various customer environments but then state that some of these were due to customer misconfigurations. So there is no real evidence here that in general Ubuntu / Linux users would be affected as all the original media reporting suggested Perhaps these customers were using containers and running processes in those where the UID mapped back to the systemd-network user ID on the host? This is a common pitfall with containers and something which users need to be aware of when deploying containers As such, what appeared to be quite a high priority and high profile vulnerability in fact is likely more of a bit of a non-issue - whilst it could be argued that these are real issues in networkd-dispatcher since they are not able to be exploited in standard configurations they are not a real threat to most users Interesting to note while the blog post has been amended, all the various media articles which cited the original report have not been updated and still seem to claim that Ubuntu and other distros would be affected by this Also interesting to note, Microsoft worked directly with the upstream maintainer of networkd-dispatcher but didn’t involve any downstream distros - as suggested by Julian Andres Klode from the Ubuntu Foundations team (and upstream apt maintainer) - perhaps Microsoft should have pre-disclosed this issue to the linux-distros mailing list - if they had done so this likely would have been assessed and clarified earlier so that Microsoft could have more properly understood the extent of the vulnerabilities which they discovered the internet could have avoided another brief panic scenario What’s new in security in Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (part 1) [08:05] Preview of the first half of blog post which will be published in the coming weeks on the various security features which are included in Ubuntu 22.04 LTS. This week we will look at enhancements provided by the Linux kernel whilst next week we will look at features provided by other parts of the distribution. 22.04 LTS latest long term support release - 5 years of standard support plus 5 years of ESM - total 10 years of support via Ubuntu Advantage (free for personal use) Great foundation to use then to deploy services / applications etc and know they will be supported for a long time to come Has been 2 years since the last LTS so there are lots of features to cover - I will only touch on some of them - if you want a more deep dive, check out the blog posts we published for the interim releases Optimised kernels for different platforms OEM desktops - 5.17 Desktop & server - 5.15 Desktop will get HWE stack by default so in future will get kernel version upgrades bringing new features etc whilst server will stick with GA kernel for stability Clouds have their own optimised kernels Hardware specific enhancements SGX on Intel for secure enclaves Memory tagging on ARM64 to protect against memory corruption attacks AMD SEV for KVM to protect guest VM registers from the host Generic kernel improvements Core scheduling to provide a means to use SMT in the face of various hardware microarchitectural side-channel attacks like L1TF and the like (this was only partially mitigated in SW/microcode and could still potentially affect VMs running across SMT siblings) - so in past had to disable SMT to be fully certain were protected - now can use core scheduling to specify to the kernel which processes should not be scheduled on sibling HTs to avoid these sorts of attack Kernel stack offset randomisation across system calls BPF improvements - one of the most popular subsystems in the kernel, used not just for tracing and packet filtering but also now BPF LSM and more use-cases. However, has also caused a number of security vulns as covered previously - now disabled unprivileged BPF by default. Also work has been done to try and support signed BPF programs to ensure only trusted code is executed as well. Landlock LSM for application-level sandboxing - like seccomp, Landlock allows a process to specify it’s own policy so can sandbox itself - rather than say traditional MAC systems of AppArmor/SELinux where the system admin configures the policy LSM stacking allows Landlock to be used in conjunction with AppArmor for a more defense-in-depth approach Get in contact security@ubuntu.com #ubuntu-security on the Libera.Chat IRC network ubuntu-hardened mailing list Security section on discourse.ubuntu.com @ubuntu_sec on twitter

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Episode 157 Apr 22, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (Jammy Jellyfish) is officially released 🎉 and so this week we take a quick look at the new features and enhancements, with a particular focus on security, plus we cover security updates for the Linux kernel, Firefox, Django, Git, Gzip and more. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 58 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5368-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [00:51] 23 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27666 CVE-2022-0742 CVE-2022-0516 CVE-2022-0435 CVE-2022-0382 CVE-2022-0264 CVE-2021-45480 CVE-2021-45402 CVE-2021-45095 CVE-2021-44733 CVE-2021-43975 CVE-2021-4197 CVE-2021-4135 CVE-2021-39698 CVE-2021-39685 CVE-2021-28715 CVE-2021-28714 CVE-2021-28713 CVE-2021-28712 CVE-2021-28711 CVE-2022-0492 CVE-2022-1055 CVE-2022-23222 5.13 azure/oracle for 20.04 LTS BPF verifier could possibly allow pointer arithmetic in BPF operations - OOB read / write -> crash (DoS) or privesc cgroups v1 release_agent not properly restricted -> privesc UAF in network traffic control - DoS/crash [USN-5377-1] Linux kernel (BlueField) vulnerabilities [01:52] 15 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27666 CVE-2022-0435 CVE-2021-45480 CVE-2021-45469 CVE-2021-45095 CVE-2021-44733 CVE-2021-43976 CVE-2021-4135 CVE-2021-28715 CVE-2021-28714 CVE-2021-28713 CVE-2021-28712 CVE-2021-28711 CVE-2022-0492 CVE-2022-1055 BPF verifier could possibly allow pointer arithmetic in BPF operations - OOB read / write -> crash (DoS) or privesc cgroups v1 release_agent not properly restricted -> privesc [USN-5366-1] FriBidi vulnerabilities [02:07] 3 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-25310 CVE-2022-25309 CVE-2022-25308 Various memory corruption vulns in library for handling unicode bidirectional text [USN-5369-1] oslo.utils vulnerability [02:21] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-0718 Python utility functions for OpenStack Passwords which contained a double-quote would not be properly masked in debug logs in which case the part of the password following the double quote would be exposed [USN-5370-1] Firefox vulnerabilities [02:50] 11 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-28287 CVE-2022-28283 CVE-2022-28289 CVE-2022-28288 CVE-2022-28286 CVE-2022-28285 CVE-2022-28284 CVE-2022-28282 CVE-2022-28281 CVE-2022-24713 CVE-2022-1097 99.0 Including an issue where just selecting text could be enough to cause a memory corruption in text selection cache and cause firefox to crash [USN-5331-2] tcpdump vulnerabilities [03:34] 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2020-8037 CVE-2018-16301 Episode 153 for xenial - now same updates for bionic + focal [USN-5373-1, USN-5373-2] Django vulnerabilities [03:47] 3 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-32052 CVE-2022-28347 CVE-2022-28346 2 different SQL injection attacks and 1 header in injection attack [USN-5374-1] libarchive vulnerability [04:07] 1 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-26280 OOB when handling crafted LZMA archives -> DoS [USN-5372-1] Subversion vulnerabilities [04:24] 2 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-24070 CVE-2021-28544 2 vulns in svn server - both in handling of path based auth rules - 1 as logic error could then allow an attacker to bypass these and info about private paths other as a UAF -> crash/RCE [USN-5376-1] Git vulnerability [05:13] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-24765 Possible local RCE if another user creates a .git directory in the system root and specifies arbitrary commands in that git config [USN-5371-1] nginx vulnerabilities [05:55] 3 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-3618 CVE-2020-36309 CVE-2020-11724 HTTP req smuggling [USN-5378-1, USN-5378-2, USN-5378-3, USN-5378-4] Gzip & XZ Utils vulnerability [06:05] 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-1271 xzgrep/zgrep with crafted filenames -> local file overwrite [USN-5379-1] klibc vulnerabilities [06:27] 4 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2021-31873 CVE-2021-31872 CVE-2021-31871 CVE-2021-31870 Various integer overflows and other bugs leading to memory corruption -> RCE in these low-level tools (designed for use in initramfs/embedded systems etc - cat/dd/dmesg/gzip/ipconfig/mv/readlink and more) [USN-5380-1] Bash vulnerability [07:12] 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2019-18276 Incorrect handling of setuid binaries - didn’t drop privileges correctly, so could allow a user who could cause bash to load their own crafted builtin module to then escalate privileges by then restoring the saved UID Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community Ubuntu 22.04 LTS Release! [08:02] By the time you read / hear this will likely already be out LTS - 5 years of standard support, plus 5 years of ESM support - 10 years of security support in total https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/jammy-jellyfish-release-notes/24668 Multiple kernels depending on which product you install Desktop 5.17 on OEM certified devices Rolling HWE kernel for other hardware (currently 5.15) Server Non-rolling LTS kernel (5.15) Cloud Use optimised kernels in collaboration with partners (currently 5.15+ with additional backports / features) As always these are just the defaults and you can change as you desired (ie could enable rolling HWE kernel on server if required) UDP disabled for NFS mounts Toolchain upgrades GCC 11.2.0, Python 3.10 (with PIE🥧), LLVM 14, Golang 1.18.x, rustc 1.58 OpenJDK 18 provided (but not default and not in main, still default to openjdk-11 in main and supported) systemd-oomd enabled by default on Ubuntu desktop OpenSSL 3.0 Disables various legacy algorithms (SHA1/MD5 for certificate hashes) nftables default backend for firewall Still ship legacy iptables tools which will use the xtables backend but not by default - sysadmins need to ensure all applications which configure firewall rules use the same backend (e.g. if using docker snap need to switch to legacy xtables backend until the snap is updated to detect and use the new nftables backend) ssh-rsa with sha-1 signatures disabled by default in openssh scp supports a new -s option to use sftp instead of scp which is safer (see USN-3885-1 etc) Firefox is a snap Maintained and published directly by Mozilla - faster access to newer versions Sandboxed for improved security hardening Lots of changes for server too (new BIND, Apache, PostgreSQL, Django, MySQL, Samba) Qemu 6.2.0 (massively improved RISC-V support) Libvirt + swtpm for TPM emulation virt-manager will then enable a TPM OOTB for UEFI boot of VMs wireguard is now in main \o/ First LTS release for Ubuntu Desktop on RPi Ubuntu Security Podcast on break for 1 week Returning end of the first week of May 2022 Get in contact security@ubuntu.com #ubuntu-security on the Libera.Chat IRC network ubuntu-hardened mailing list Security section on discourse.ubuntu.com @ubuntu_sec on twitter

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Episode 156 Apr 08, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview This week we bring you the TL;DL (too-long, didn’t listen 😉) version of Camila’s recent 4-part Ubuntu hardening series, plus we look at security updates for Twisted, rsync, the Linux kernel, DOSBox, Tomcat and more. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 48 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5354-1] Twisted vulnerabilities [00:47] 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-21716 CVE-2022-21712 No limit to the amount of memory consumed when parsing the SSH version string from a client/server - malicious client/server could then send an infinite length version and crash the corresponding server/client - limited to 4KB Cookies and auth headers exposed in cross-origin redirects - leak sensitive info [USN-5355-1, USN-5355-2] zlib vulnerability [01:34] 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2018-25032 Announced by Tavis Ormandy on oss-security in last week of March - reproducible crash when compressing certain inputs Reported upstream only to be told was already fixed upstream back in 2018 but no CVE was ever assigned and since no release had been made since then no distros had picked it up Shows the importance of CVEs to distros security patching workflows - in general no CVE, no patch New upstream release has now been made as well [USN-5359-1] rsync vulnerability [03:09] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2018-25032 Same as above - rsync contains a vendored copy of zlib code [USN-5357-1, USN-5357-2] Linux kernel vulnerability [03:24] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27666 4.15 18.04 LTS, 16.04 ESM Episode 155 - heap buffer overflow in handling IPsec ESP transformations -> local user crash / codeexec UAF in network traffic control subsystem - requires an attacker to be root OR to be able to use unprivileged user namespaces - which is the default for Ubuntu (but it is often suggested to disable this in most hardening guides) [USN-5358-1, USN-5358-2] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [04:45] 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-27666 CVE-2022-1055 5.13 (21.10), 5.4 (20.04 LTS, 18.04 LTS HWE) [USN-5356-1] DOSBox vulnerabilities [05:01] 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2019-12594 CVE-2019-7165 Heap buffer overflow when parsing BAT files with very long lines Incorrectly would allow access to files under /proc (e.g. /proc/self/mem) - could then allow an application to get code execution - added checks on file access to prevent this [USN-5360-1] Tomcat vulnerabilities [05:47] 9 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2021-41079 CVE-2021-25329 CVE-2020-9494 CVE-2021-33037 CVE-2020-9484 CVE-2021-30640 CVE-2021-25122 CVE-2020-17527 CVE-2020-13943 Thanks to Evren Yurtesen for providing the patches (from Debian) for 20.04 LTS Various deserialisation issues -> RCE Input length validation -> infinite loop -> CPU DoS HTTP/2 issues on request header handling -> expose requests of one connection to a different one -> info leak [USN-5361-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [06:46] 14 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2021-45486 CVE-2021-43976 CVE-2021-42739 CVE-2021-4083 CVE-2021-39636 CVE-2021-37159 CVE-2021-31916 CVE-2021-28964 CVE-2021-0935 CVE-2021-0920 CVE-2020-3702 CVE-2020-26145 CVE-2020-26141 CVE-2020-12888 4.4 Various issues from previous episodes [USN-5362-1] Linux kernel (Intel IOTG) vulnerabilities [07:03] 16 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-22942 CVE-2022-0742 CVE-2022-0516 CVE-2022-0435 CVE-2022-0330 CVE-2021-42327 CVE-2021-4155 CVE-2021-4090 CVE-2021-4083 CVE-2022-0001 CVE-2022-0185 CVE-2022-0492 CVE-2022-0847 CVE-2022-23222 CVE-2022-23960 CVE-2022-25636 5.13 kernel targetted to intel IoT platforms Again includes fixes for various vulns discussed in past episodes [USN-5364-1] Waitress vulnerability [07:17] 1 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-24761 Pure python impl of Webserver Gateway Interface (WSGI) standard - interface spec on how server an application communicate Request smuggling vuln due to differences in how waitress and a possible frontend proxy interpret HTTP requests [USN-5365-1] H2 vulnerabilities [07:47] 2 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-23221 CVE-2021-42392 Database engine Deserialisation of untrusted data -> code execution Crafted connection URLS -> code execution Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community TL;DL of recent series on Ubuntu hardening [08:11] Various listener requests for a summary on the recent series of episodes discussing Ubuntu hardening Transcript Hello listener! This is going to be a quick episode and so I will make a quick introduction for it. During our last four episodes we talked about how to harden our Ubuntu systems, making it more robust…and dare I say it? More secure! However, four episodes is quite a lot, and not everyone is willing to listen to several minutes of my awesome voice, so I am here today to fix that and give you an episode that is a summary, a “Too Long, Didn’t Listen” if you will, of those previous four episodes. So let’s get going because today is no day for delays, and let’s talk, shortly and succinctly, about things you can do to harden your Ubuntu system. Let’s start with hardening measures you can apply to your system whilst installing it: (1) Encrypt your disk. Input and output operations might take a little while longer to happen, but if your hardware can take it, that might not even be an issue. Do remember though that everytime the device is shutdown, when you turn it on, you will have to decrypt the disk before using the operating system, which in turn means: inputting a password to get things going. So maybe only do this if you have a system where this won’t be a hindrance. Oh, and don’t lose your password, or else, you’ll end up with a disk full of pretty, but uninterpretable, characters and no functional operating system at all! (2) Create a swap partition or a swap file to get the most out of your RAM. Availability is also a cyber security concern you should have, and providing your system with some swap space not only buffs it by giving it more RAM memory to work with - even it if is only a wannabe RAM - but it also allows you, as a system administrator, to be better prepared to face memory issues that might come to haunt your system, since you can monitor your swap space usage and use this as reference to know if your system might be feeling a little bit overloaded. Avoiding unnecessary crashes just got a whole lot easier. Choo OOM manager! A side note, though: check your system requirements so that you setup swap in a way that fits your system’s needs, or else, instead of making your device work better, you will only make it work harder. (3) Partition your system! Put /var and /home in different disk partitions and avoid all that log file backup or those kitty videos from flooding your disk space and forcing your critical processes to stop execution because there is no space left in the system. Ooops. Maybe we should also take some time to update the log backup script and to remind users that the server is no place to store videos…even if they are adorable. And while you are at it, maybe also add /tmp to its own partition. World writable /tmp is a well known attacker target and grounding it and sending it to the corner to think about its bad behavior might be a good way to avoid possible attacks. Especially considering that different partitions can be set to have different permissions. (4) Strong passwords. This shouldn’t even be in this list because you already use strong passwords when setting up your users during install, right? What? I’m not nervous because I definitely need to change my password from ‘security2022’ to something a lot better, you are! With an installed system, our hardening journey is far from over, as we now need to set everything up securely before getting our service and its related applications running. How to proceed? (1) Ubuntu does not enable a password for the ‘root’ user for a reason, and so, recommendation number one is: just leave ‘root’ and its password alone. Leave it there hibernating with all of its amazing and yet destructive power over the system. No ‘root’ user password, no successful brute force attacks, not even through SSH. An attacker in a regular user shell is a lot less scary than an attacker in a ‘root’ shell. Use ‘sudo’ instead, and configure ‘sudo’ permissions for your users appropriately in the /etc/sudoers file. YOU get to CHOOSE what commands each user can run as the superuser, so take your time to set these up. Give each user the least they need to perform their tasks, and stay safe. I know…it’s amazing…you get to CONTROL what your users are allowed to do in your system. “What? Has this always existed?” Yes, my friend, yes it has, so it’s about time you start configuring it properly. (2) Use SSH instead of Telnet for remote login, because you are NOT a caveman that requires your data to be transmitted over the network in plain text. Yes, cavemen knew not to use Telnet and they also knew that even when using SSH they had to properly configure it before using it, or else, not even encryption would save them. If you doubt me, go do your research…this is 100% historically accurate, my fingers are definitely not crossed behind my back as I say this. Disable root access through SSH, use SSH2 instead of SSH1, setup allowlists and denylists for users and IP addresses, and set a maximum number of login attempts were all of the basic things cavemen in our planet did when setting up their SSH servers whilst sitting around their very cozy and newly discovered fires. Plus, they also setup private key login for their SSH servers, not because they were too lazy to type in their passwords - …nooooo, they had passphrases for their keys - but instead because it is a well-known and trusted way to verify the identity of whoever is trying to connect to the server. Passwords by themselves sometimes just aren’t enough. So…if cavemen were able to discover fire AND properly set up their SSH servers…then it is more than your obligation to at least do the same, if not more. Oh, and don’t forget to properly set permissions in the ‘authorized_keys’ file…I mean…come on guys…properly setting permissions in a very important file in your OS is a lot easier than hunting, foraging, surviving in the menacing prehistoric Earth environments, and that’s why cavemen did it as well. (3) Can we really call it hardening of the system if we don’t consider hardening of the one and only, the star of the show, the kernel itself? The ‘sysctl’ command in your Ubuntu system is there to attend to all of your kernel hardening needs, allowing you to define kernel configurations, but not requiring you to reboot the machine to get them to stick. With ‘sysctl’ you can do so many things that I wouldn’t be able to summarize it all here, and I am already in a pinch because I am very bad at making my scripts short, and I need to keep this one short. So, for now, I will give you a little taste of what ‘sysctl’ can do to get those curiosity juices flowing! Restrict users allowed to read kernel logs and block IP packet forwarding for devices that are not routers. Was I able to make you interested? Well, I know I wont get the answer to that, but what I do know is that both those measures I mentioned can already take you a long way when you think of hardening your system, and they are two amongst many available…sooo, get those fingers typing and those kernel options researched and you, my friend, are in the right path to get your system hardened! (4) Setup a host based firewall. They are efficient in blocking unwanted network traffic, they can be configured to your host’s specific needs and they are portable, since, when the host migrates, its firewall goes with it. Plus, it’s very easy to set up, you can use the Ubuntu tool known as the Uncomplicated Firewall (‘ufw’) to help you, and it gets you started on protecting yourself against the harsh, harsh Internet ecosystem that lies out there. Oh, and don’t even try to argue with me and tell me about your network based firewall and how it already does the job for you, because I just discussed it in the long version of this series, so to make it short, I will say one simple word to get my point across once again: layers! (5) Remember when we were talking about partitioning your disk/filesystem? Well, let’s kick that up a notch and configure each partition individually, setting permissions and defining usage configurations for each one of the different partitions in our disks. We are all unique in this huge world we live in, and so are our partitions. Treat them with the love, care and individuality that they deserve and they shall return all of your efforts in the form of a more secure system. If you have a network shared partition, for example, why not set the ’noexec’ option for this partition, and avoid executables to be run from an area in your device that could be considered untrustworthy at best and devastatingly dangerous at worst? Don’t trust users, I always say, specifically when they come for your files through the network. Another good option would be to set a partition as read-only, if it is a partition that requires no more permissions than this. The /etc/fstab file is the one you can go to in order to set all of these configurations, which will be applied at mount time, exactly during system boot. (6) Don’t ignore your logs. Setup a nice logging system for your device. Use syslog or journal to do so, and yeah…sure…thank me later, I won’t complain if you do. But seriously though, how can you expect to maintain and troubleshoot a device if you don’t know what is happening with that device? And how do you expect to keep a system secure if you can’t maintain and troubleshoot it? Yes, logs can be annoying to look at and analyze sometimes, but that is why utilities such as ‘syslogd’ and ‘journald’ exist to help you search through those logs. Syslog even allows you to send all of your data to a centralized server, which can then focus exclusively on processing log data that it gets from various network devices. You have all of that goldmine of data at your feet and all you need to do now is use it. Ubuntu has the tools that allow you to do that, but it doesn’t have the will…that, my friend, needs to come from you. So to show how important it is to set up and use logs, I will end this suggestion with a quote, because everything that includes quotes is usually considered important, right? “Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom” - Aristotle. There, now go get some logging setup. Ok. Next step is installing your applications so that you can get your service up and running. I am not even going to go into detail about using secure software, setting up this software including security configurations, and using encryption when sending data through the network, because that is obvious enough, right? If not…then I am sorry to tell you, you might need to listen to the long version of this. I will go into detail though, not much, but a little bit (if you want ‘much’, go listen to parts 1, 2, 3 and 4), on what you can do after you set up your service, and on what you can do until forever to keep your hardened system from going soft on you. So let’s jump in. (1) One or two network services per device!!! Don’t make your server a jack of all trades, because that is a recipe for a hack of all spaces. If you are going to use the network to expose your service, maybe incorporate it as a part of the service’s architecture as well. Have more than one device running server software which makes up a part of the entire provided service, and have those devices communicate with each other through the network. Different server a…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Episode 155 Apr 01, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview It’s an off-by-one error in the podcast this week as we bring you part 4 of Camila’s 3-part Ubuntu hardening series, plus we look at security updates for Thunderbird, OpenVPN, Python, Paramiko and more. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 47 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5345-1] Thunderbird vulnerabilities [00:45] 13 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-0566 CVE-2022-26387 CVE-2022-26386 CVE-2022-22756 CVE-2022-22754 CVE-2022-26384 CVE-2022-26383 CVE-2022-26381 CVE-2022-22764 CVE-2022-22763 CVE-2022-22761 CVE-2022-22760 CVE-2022-22759 91.7.0 Long wait times for TB updates raised as an issue in Ubuntu Discourse [USN-5346-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerability [01:21] 1 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-0742 ICMPv6 memory leak - DoS via remote unauthenticated user [USN-5353-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerability 1 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-27666 Heap buffer overflow in IPsec when doing ESP transformations - not remotely triggerable, requires local user -> DoS/privesc [USN-5347-1] OpenVPN vulnerability [02:00] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-0547 Possible authentication bypass through only partially correct credentials due to use of multiple plugins which do deferred authentication - updated to only allow one plugin to do deferred auth [USN-5321-3] Firefox regressions [02:42] 7 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-26387 CVE-2022-26385 CVE-2022-26384 CVE-2022-26383 CVE-2022-26382 CVE-2022-26381 CVE-2022-0843 98.0.2 [USN-5342-1] Python vulnerabilities [02:54] 3 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-0391 CVE-2021-4189 CVE-2021-3426 pydoc server could disclose other files - shouldn’t be exposed to untrusted users Mishandling of FTP requests (could be tricked into connecting to wrong server) urllib.parse mishandled URLs with embedded newlines - possible to bypass regular checks leading to possible URL/request injection etc [USN-5348-1] Smarty vulnerabilities [03:42] 6 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-29454 CVE-2021-26120 CVE-2021-26119 CVE-2021-21408 CVE-2018-16831 CVE-2018-13982 PHP templating engine Failed to validate paths in templates - attacker controlled template could then get arbitrary file read Various code execution vulns affecting applications that use Smarty [USN-5349-1] GNU binutils vulnerability [04:17] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2019-1010204 gold linker - not the default linker in Ubuntu (would have to specify it manually via -fuse-ld=gold to gcc) OOB read when handling a crafted ELF file [USN-5352-1] Libtasn1 vulnerability [04:42] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2018-1000654 CPU based DoS on crafted ASN.1 input [USN-5351-1, USN-5351-2] Paramiko vulnerability [05:11] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-24302 Race condition between creating a then setting permissions on the private key file allows a local attacker to possibly read the private key - fixed to simply create the file with the restricted permissions in the first place [USN-5313-2] OpenJDK 11 regression [05:55] 15 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-21365 CVE-2022-21366 CVE-2022-21360 CVE-2022-21341 CVE-2022-21340 CVE-2022-21305 CVE-2022-21299 CVE-2022-21296 CVE-2022-21294 CVE-2022-21293 CVE-2022-21291 CVE-2022-21283 CVE-2022-21282 CVE-2022-21277 CVE-2022-21248 OpenJDK 11 specific regression in handling of HTTP/2 - upstream - 11.0.14.1 [USN-5350-1] Chromium vulnerability [06:17] 1 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2022-1096 Thanks to Olivier Tilloy (oSoMoN) from Desktop team Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community Camila discusses Ubuntu hardening (part 4 / follow-up) [06:43] Follow-up to the previous 3 part series on Ubuntu hardening (Episode 154, Episode 153, Episode 152) Minor improvements and corrections to the various tips presented over the past few episodes Transcript Hello listener! Welcome back to our Ubuntu hardening journey in the Ubuntu Security Podcast. Hey! I know what you’re thinking: I can’t count. I said this would be a three part series…and well…here I am in a fourth episode talking about this again. You could also be thinking “Hey, you’ve got the wrong title there…what’s the new topic for this episode?”, and should this be any other situation, I might’ve said you are right to either one of these two assumptions because I can be a bit of a scatterbrain sometimes. But not this time! I am here today once again talking about Ubuntu hardening because, hey…cyber security is a continuous effort. Remember that? And you know what also is a continuous effort? Learning and becoming wiser, and in our journey to do so, it is very likely that we will make a few mistakes here and there, myself included. Ok, ok, I’ll stop rambling and saying pretty words to distract you from the real deal here: I might’ve made some mistakes…Ooops! I apologize. Because yes, I do know about cyber security, but I am definitely not the master of all when it comes to it. So, in the past three episodes there were some sentences here and there that might have been a little bit incorrect, and some other sentences that might have been forgotten to be said. BUT WORRY NOT! I am here today to fix this. I got a review on my script for the last three episodes made by another one of the security team members, and they gave me a lot of helpful feedback on what I said and on what I suggested to you all. Since I had already recorded the other episodes and my laziness spoke a little higher than my willingness to spend the day re-editing audio files, I decided to instead bring a new episode to you. Coincidentally, recording a part 4 to a previously established 3 part series really resonates with the vibe that is the hardening process of an operating system: we want to always review our work, and fix mistakes whenever possible. Maintain and evolve, even if we do hit a few bumps on the road and make some mistakes along the way. We are human after all, and even if the computer isn’t, all that it does is do what we ask of it, so…yeah! Enough introductions, let’s move on to the meat and potatoes of this episode and right some wrongs! Oh…actually…I don’t think it is really necessary to mention this…but there is always that one person, so: listen to the other episodes if you haven’t yet. I can’t really fix something that you don’t even know is broken. Ok, point number one that was brought to my attention: remember when we were talking about the swap partition in part 1? Well, it is a valid solution for all the reasons that I mentioned there, but it is not the only one. Drumroll please, as I introduce you all, if you don’t already know it, to the swap file. TADA! The swap file, as the name suggests, is a file in your system that will serve the same purpose as a swap partition. However, instead of being configured as a separate partition of your disk, a swap file is created under the root partition in your system and you simply nudge the OS to remind it that that specific file should be used as swap whenever necessary. Neat, right? Specially because resizing swap files is a lot easier than resizing an entire swap partition. A LOT easier. Using command ‘fallocate’ or command ‘dd ‘will help you get a swap file ready in case you wish to use this method of swapping instead of creating an entire new partition during install, or in case you forgot about it during install. Use the ‘mkswap’ tool to tell Ubuntu that the new file is a swap space and enable the swap file with ‘swapon’. To finish it off, and make changes permanent, add information on the swapfile to ‘fstab’. Remember to correctly set permissions in this swap file, as, even though it is a swap entity, it is still a file. Only the root user should be able to write to that file or read from it, so get your ‘chmod 600’ ready for that. The conclusion here is: both a swap partition and a swap file will serve the same purpose, and they are both located on disk, so not much to compare on that front. However, if you are looking for something more flexible, stretchy, if you will, consider using the swap file. It will help you out with your maintainability needs, and with adjusting to changes in the future, especially if these changes involve increasing the size of the swap, or decreasing it due to hardware changes applied to your device, or any other type of related changes. I do stress though, hopefully enough that you are just being reminded of this here: do this if it suits YOUR needs. Maybe you already have a swap partition, and it is ok to you for it to have an immutable size until the end of eternity, and that is great! You do you. What is important for you to takeaway here is that I am giving you another option, one that might better suit your needs, or not, but I am not the one to decide that for you. Next up, let’s talk about that ‘hidepid=2’ suggestion I made in part 2, shall we? This suggestion came up when we were talking about fstab, and I was telling you about ways to protect your /proc directory from the prying eyes of possibly malicious users. Well, it unfortunately doesn’t work when you have systemd installed, which is the case for Ubuntu. Whewhe. So yes, blame me for relaying possibly incorrect information to you. I am deeply sorry…but please don’t cancel me for it. There are a few bug threads that mention this error and a lot of proposed solutions given by the community can be found in the various comments. I will not go into too much detail on those here because it might be a bit difficult to get the actual solution through without any visual aid, but I do encourage you to do some research on this, and maybe apply one of the suggested alternatives should it be adequate for your system. Sorry once again for giving you a hardening tip that would cause an error in your system, but hopefully the solutions out there will allow you to get right what I initially got wrong. I’ll try to get some links containing some of these solutions added to the podcast notes in order to help you out, and in order to atone for my mistakes. I’m sorry, I’m sorry once again. Ok, I’ll stop now. Point number three: I told you to love your logs and embrace your logs during part 2 of this series. The computer pours out its innermost secrets to you and you decide to ignore it? Well…I kind of ignored it a little bit as well, because I talked so much about ‘syslog’ and all of its log files that I forgot about another oh so very important member of the logging squad: ‘journald’. If your Linux system has ‘systemd’, it does have ‘journald’, and therefore, if you are using Ubuntu, you most likely have it too. Since ‘journald’ stores data in binary format, the usual way of accessing the data it collects is not recommended here, as our brains have still not yet evolved to immediately read and process unreadable characters when looking at a sequence of those characters. There are no plain text log files here. Instead, if you want to check out all of the logging goodness that ‘journald’ can provide, and expose all of your device’s secrets, you have to use the ‘journalctl’ utility. I am pretty sure this name is familiar to you, as most times when you have a service issue in Ubuntu or a system issue in general, it recommends you check out the output of ‘journald’ by typing in a shell ‘journalctl -x’. ‘Journald’ is a very interesting logging tool and it can allow you to troubleshoot your system very efficiently. It tracks each log to a specific system boot, for example, and this means that you can check logs considering only data connected to a specific boot instance when using the ‘-b’ option. So, if you have a situation where you know that the issue happened the last time you turned on your computer, instead of checking all of the log, you can narrow it down and try to find your problem in fewer lines of log data instead. You can also filter log data based on a time range, based on a specific service, based on a specific user or based on message priority level. Which one is better to use between ‘syslog’ and ‘journald’, you ask? It depends on your needs. Advantages of using ‘journald’ include the fact that it structures data in such a way that searches can be optimized, plus, it indexes data, meaning that lookup operations of the log files will happen in a much faster manner than they would when searching for information in plain text files. Filtering is also easier with ‘journald’, as seen by all of the options I mentioned previously that you can use together with ‘journalctl’. With ‘syslog’ and all its different plain text log files, it might be a little bit more difficult or troublesome to find exactly what you are looking for, and even correlate log information without having a third party software to maybe assist you with this job. When searching through ‘syslog’ logs we usually end up using ‘grep’, our handy-dandy text file search tool, but unfortunately, ‘grep’ will not take into account the context of a situation. So, when searching through ‘syslog’ logs, instead of a simple one line command you would type if using ‘journalctl’, you create a huge multiline beast with a lot of pipes to get a coherent and valuable result out of the many ‘syslog’ files you wish to have analyzed. Another advantage of ‘journald’ is that ‘journald’ has permissions associated to its log files, so every user is able to see their own log without actually being able to see output that would be exclusive only to root, for example, said users needing to prove their privileged identity before accessing this other sensitive data about the system. Therefore, regular users are able to troubleshoot using ‘journald’ logs, but at the same time, information that should not be exposed to regular users for one reason or another is protected. With ‘syslog’ it will all depend on permissions associated to the log text files, and these will include ALL of the information for one specific log source, so it won’t be every random user that will have the opportunity to possibly use log data to solve their issues, unless you allow said random user to actually read logs in their entirety. Talking a bit about possible disadvantages related to ‘journald’: ‘journald’ does not include a well-defined remote logging implementation and, therefore, is not the best option to consider when you need to build a central logging server, whereas ‘syslog’ allows that to happen very well, since there is even a same name protocol which is used to send messages to a main log server running a ‘syslog’ instance. Plus, ‘journald’ considers only information of Linux systems, while ‘syslog’ encopasses more, such as logs generated by firewall devices and routers. This means that correlation between the logs of the different devices in your infrastructure might be made more efficient when you indeed have a centralized ‘syslog’ server to gather all of that information, especially considering that it is possible to send ‘journald’ data to an already existing ‘syslog’ implementation, as ‘journald’ retains full ‘syslog’ compatibility. One of the issues we find with this though, is that most advantages that come with ‘journald’ are lost when such messages are sent to the centralized ‘syslog’ server, as this server, as the name implies, will include a ‘syslog’ implementation instead of a ‘journald’ one, this ‘syslog’ implementation recovering, storing and processing messages as a regular ‘syslog’ instance would…so, no indexing and no optimized data reading and filtering. The other possible issue is that ‘journald’ needs to send its data to a local ‘syslog’ server, and this server will then send that data to the remote one. Having two tools doing the same logging work might not be the most…

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    Episode 154 Mar 25, 2022
    Show notes

    Overview It’s PIE🥧 for everyone this week as Python finally becomes a position independent executable for Ubuntu 22.04, plus Camila brings you the third part in her Ubuntu server hardening guide and we cover security updates for FUSE, Bind, Apache, the Linux kernel and more. This week in Ubuntu Security Updates 105 unique CVEs addressed [USN-5326-1] FUSE vulnerability [00:49] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2018-10906 When using SELinux on Ubuntu, possible to bypass regular restrictions that would normally prevent non-root users from mounting a FUSE fs with the allow_other mount option - this option specifies all users can access files from the FUSE fs whereas normally FUSE enforces on the user which mounted the file has access Could trick another user into then accessing files from the FUSE fs [USN-5334-1] man-db vulnerability [02:22] 1 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2015-1336 daily cron job could allow a local user to access the man user account [USN-5321-2] Firefox vulnerabilities [02:57] 7 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-26387 CVE-2022-26385 CVE-2022-26384 CVE-2022-26383 CVE-2022-26382 CVE-2022-26381 CVE-2022-0843 arm64 binaries for Firefox 98.0.1 Episode 153 [USN-5332-1, USN-5332-2] Bind vulnerabilities [03:25] 2 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-0396 CVE-2021-25220 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2021-25220 Possible cache poisoning attack via forwarded NS records fd exhaustion if client could trick bind into keeping connection in CLOSE_WAIT status for an indefinite period, after connection was closed - DoS [USN-5333-1, USN-5333-2] Apache HTTP Server vulnerabilities [04:11] 4 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-23943 CVE-2022-22721 CVE-2022-22720 CVE-2022-22719 heap OOB r/w via mod_sed -> crash, RCE OOB read from crafted request via mod_lua - crash -> DoS Possible HTTP request smuggling attack since failed to close an inbound connection when an error was encountered which caused the request body to be discarded Possible integer overflow on 32-bit systems if had changed default LimitXMLRequestBody to > 350MB (is 1MB by default) -> OOB write -> crash, RCE [USN-5335-1] ImageMagick vulnerabilities [05:51] 15 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2021-20243 CVE-2021-20241 CVE-2021-20176 CVE-2020-27770 CVE-2020-27766 CVE-2020-27762 CVE-2020-27760 CVE-2020-27750 CVE-2020-25676 CVE-2020-27753 CVE-2020-25674 CVE-2020-25665 CVE-2020-25664 CVE-2017-13144 CVE-2020-19667 OOB read/write/NULL ptr deref, div by 0 etc when processing crafted image files [USN-5337-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [06:23] 21 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2022-0742 CVE-2022-0516 CVE-2022-0435 CVE-2022-0382 CVE-2022-0264 CVE-2021-45480 CVE-2021-45402 CVE-2021-45095 CVE-2021-44733 CVE-2021-43975 CVE-2021-4197 CVE-2021-4135 CVE-2021-39698 CVE-2021-39685 CVE-2021-28715 CVE-2021-28714 CVE-2021-28713 CVE-2021-28712 CVE-2021-28711 CVE-2022-0492 CVE-2022-23222 5.13 (impish, 20.04 HWE) BPF verifier could possibly allow pointer arithmetic in BPF operations - OOB read / write -> crash (DoS) or privesc cgroups v1 release_agent not properly restricted -> privesc [USN-5338-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [07:31] 13 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-0516 CVE-2022-0435 CVE-2021-45480 CVE-2021-45095 CVE-2021-44733 CVE-2021-43976 CVE-2021-4135 CVE-2021-28715 CVE-2021-28714 CVE-2021-28713 CVE-2021-28712 CVE-2021-28711 CVE-2022-0492 5.4 (focal, bionic HWE) [USN-5339-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [07:43] 6 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS) CVE-2022-0435 CVE-2021-45095 CVE-2021-44733 CVE-2021-43976 CVE-2021-3506 CVE-2022-0492 4.15 (bionic, xenial ESM, trusty ESM - azure) [USN-5343-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [08:00] 45 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2018-5995 CVE-2021-45485 CVE-2021-45469 CVE-2021-45095 CVE-2021-43389 CVE-2021-42008 CVE-2021-40490 CVE-2021-39648 CVE-2021-38208 CVE-2021-38204 CVE-2021-38198 CVE-2021-38160 CVE-2021-3679 CVE-2021-3612 CVE-2021-3573 CVE-2021-3564 CVE-2021-3506 CVE-2021-3483 CVE-2021-34693 CVE-2021-33098 CVE-2021-33034 CVE-2021-33033 CVE-2021-32399 CVE-2021-29650 CVE-2021-28972 CVE-2021-28688 CVE-2021-23134 CVE-2021-20317 CVE-2021-20292 CVE-2020-36385 CVE-2020-36322 CVE-2021-0129 CVE-2020-26558 CVE-2020-26555 CVE-2020-26147 CVE-2020-26139 CVE-2020-25673 CVE-2020-25672 CVE-2020-25671 CVE-2020-25670 CVE-2020-12655 CVE-2019-19449 CVE-2016-2854 CVE-2016-2853 CVE-2022-0492 4.4 (xenial ESM, trusty ESM) [LSN-0085-1] Linux kernel vulnerability [08:15] 2 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS) CVE-2022-25636 CVE-2022-0492 Livepatch KERNEL TYPE 20.04 18.04 16.04 14.04 aws 85.1 85.1 85.1 — azure 85.1 — 85.1 — azure-4.15 — 85.1 — — gcp 85.1 — — — generic-4.15 — 85.1 85.1 — generic-4.4 — — 85.1 85.1 generic-5.4 85.2 85.2 — — gke 85.1 — — — gke-4.15 — 85.1 — — gke-5.4 — 85.1 — — gkeop 85.1 — — — gkeop-5.4 — 85.1 — — ibm 85.1 — — — ibm-5.4 — 85.1 — — lowlatency-4.15 — 85.1 85.1 — lowlatency-4.4 — — 85.1 85.1 lowlatency-5.4 85.2 85.2 — — oem — 85.1 — — [USN-5341-1] GNU binutils vulnerabilities [09:04] 3 CVEs addressed in Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM) CVE-2021-45078 CVE-2021-3487 CVE-2017-17122 OOB read, OOB write and memory leak when handling crafted files - binutils is not generally expected to operate on untrusted data so upstream and our team do not usually consider vulns in binutils to be high impact [USN-5340-1] CKEditor vulnerabilities [09:50] 6 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Impish (21.10) CVE-2021-37695 CVE-2021-33829 CVE-2021-32809 CVE-2021-32808 CVE-2020-9281 CVE-2018-9861 JS rich text editor to be embedded in web pages - often used by django and other projects 3x XSS, 3xJS RCE Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community Camila discusses Ubuntu hardening (part 3) [10:23] In the third part of this series on hardening a Ubuntu machine against external attack, Camila looks at steps you can take to secure your applications once deployed on your hardened Ubuntu system. This includes steps towards reducing your attack surface, using MAC to provide POLA and other good security hygiene practices. Listen on to find out more. Hello listener! Welcome back to our Ubuntu hardening podcast mini-series, where in three episodes, released across several weeks, we have been discussing how to build a network service in an Ubuntu operating system, but not just any Ubuntu operating system, and instead, a HARDENED one. Up until this point, we went from nothing to digital big bang, which was the equivalent of our system install; to years of chemical, geological, and climatic transformations, which were actually a few weeks maybe of setting up basic security measures after our initial install; to, at last, the point where we are ready to finally have our server be born, just as life once did in our beautiful planet Earth. We reach the next stage in our evolution and prepare ourselves to now finally install our server. Don’t be a cheater though, and don’t skip any steps: if you haven’t listened to the other episodes, go do that before you move on here. Earth did not become what it did in a day, so…you can spare a few minutes to listen to the other episodes before continuing with this one. Other listeners might have waited a few weeks, and poor Earth waited billions of years! Lucky you that hardening your Ubuntu system is slightly easier than creating an entire planet, and even an entire universe from scratch. Introductions made, lets jump right in to finally getting our service and all related software up and running in our already hardened machine. And let’s harden it even more, shall we? I will start this off by just saying: no installing of services that don’t use cryptography. HTTP? Gone! FTP? Next! Telnet? Please no. Don’t even joke about that. Just don’t, or I might actually just start crying unencrypted tears of anger. Encryption technology should be here to stay, and if you are sending sensitive data over the wire, give that data a reason to feel safe and protected during its digital travel. Add that S to the end of the network protocol names. Level up your HTTP and make it HTTPS. Configure your Apache or Nginx server to use TLS. Not SSL. SSL is deprecated. TLS version 1.2 or above. Another important thing to consider when installing the entire stack of applications, libraries and frameworks you might need to run your system: less is more. I actually saw this in a cooking show, and I agree with this statement. I know we sometimes might get amazed at the huge amount of possibilities we have whenever installing software. The human mind has created the most incredible utilities, and we have the power to simply install all of them with one simple command. But just because you have a wide variety of ingredients, it doesn’t mean you have to use them. Some people might like french fries with ice cream. That does not imply you need a french fry library to get your sundae application to be delicious. Sometimes a little chocolate sauce drizzle is all you need. Chef’s kiss! The point here is: install the minimum necessary to run your application. Don’t increase the attack surface. The more you have running in your system, the more possibilities of entry an attacker will have. Keep it short and sweet and avoid getting lost in a sea of files, users and processes that you don’t know how they really work or what they really do. And while we are at it…if you do have the chance, try to install only one or two network services per system/device. Don’t have your server simultaneously be a web server, a mail server, a file server, a database server, and an ice cream server, because why not, right? Don’t, though. This limits the number of services that can be compromised if a compromise ends up happening. It limits the exposure for a single device. Plus, when installing the applications necessary to run these services, remember that a lot of applications like Apache, Nginx, MySQL, PHP…they all have security settings. They know they are the regular targets of attacks, so they provide the user with the tools to perform a secure install or set secure post install configuration values. If it is provided to you, use it! Harden your application as well, after all, it is this application that will most likely be the point of entry into your system. So divide, secure and conquer! We did it, friends. We have a device providing a service over the network. One would think that after 6 days of work creating a digital ecosystem we would be able to rest on the 7th day, as done by some mighty entities before us, however…people concerned with cyber security don’t sleep. Or stop. Ever! Cyber security is a continuous effort, so post application setup measures must be taken as well if you want your server to keep securely thriving. We have got to ensure the evolution of the species and keep our metaphorical Earth safe and in tiptop shape in order to guarantee the best chances of, not only, survival, but growth and prosperity. Who needs sleep when you can have the joy of knowing that you set up your device for execution success and longevity in the grueling environment that is the Internet! Let’s start then by disabling unnecessary open ports and stopping the execution of unwanted services. You set up your application using the minimum necessary, which is great. Sometimes, however, during install, or even during configuration, applications will open ports and setup services you might not need. Heck, we are talking about this in the post application install and setup phase of our process, however, this could also be done in the post installation of the operating system phase of the process. Checking out which ports are unnecessarily open, and closing these ports will reduce the attack surface area in your system, as an attacker has less points of entry to choose from. A house with one door and one door only provides one single point of entry to an external entity. Of course this external entity could manufacture a new entry point using mechanical tools, but I then digress from the real intention of this analogy, so let’s stick to the basics of the idea here, shall we? An example of an unnecessary open port might be a database port. Sure, you have set up a host based firewall as we have already suggested, and no internet traffic which would have this service as a destination is allowed through, but still…layers!!! When we talk about security we talk about having various and various layers that will protect you in case the previous one has somehow been cracked. So…trust your firewall without trusting it completely. If you don’t need the database port open to the entire Internet, only to localhost, then leave it open just for localhost. If you don’t want to do it for yourself, then do it for me? Please? It makes me a lot less nervous knowing that a multitude of unused open ports are being closed and removed from harm’s way. The Internet can be a brutal place, you know? Use a tool such as ’netstat’, check your open ports and disable Internet access for those that don’t need it through the related application’s configuration file or other available resources. It’ll be quicker than you think, and will provide you with long term peace of mind. Bonus points for the fact that you will know something weird might be happening when you see that some port that should not be accessible through cyberspace is being used to send some data to some shady IP address in a remote country. Syslog mail incoming! This same idea applies to unwanted services or unwanted daemons. Check out what is set to run automatically or in the background of your system, check your ‘cron’ files, and make sure that these background programs that might be a risk are not just there executing with the sole purpose of being exploited. Only the bare minimum necessary! Let’s not be digital gluttons here, after all, gluttony is one of the seven deadly sins. Deadly for your poor server which will have that background daemon cleaning files in a directory that did exist in the system, but doesn’t anymore, and is now completely useless. Yeah, that server gets exploited by an attacker that was able to leverage an unpatched zero-day in your Internet facing application. No, you might not have been able to defend yourself against the zero-day, but you definitely would’ve been able to avoid a more sophisticated attack against your device had you not let an unnecessary vulnerability prone daemon execute in your system just for the fun of it. The attacker gets in through an issue that is not your fault, but gets to stay and cause more problems because you were too software hungry to delete something that was no longer needed by the system. More software, more vulnerabilities. Another important thing to note here: this is a continuous effort, remember? Yes, we are talking about post application installation and setup security measures that be applied to your system in order for it to be hardened, however, since the application environment will change together with the application, it is necessary to maintain the system and reanalyze all that has been setup in order to update the hardening in case it is necessary. Your hardening needs to evolve together with your software and your application. We haven’t yet talked about or dove deep into the elephant in the room subject that is system files. We surrounded the subject, got close to it here and there, but we still have not faced it head on, so let’s go for it now. Files contain the data which we analyze, which we process, which we use to perform our computing, since even execution of a p…

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