The High Court Report - SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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Opinion Summary: Abouammo v. United States | Trial on Home Turf Not Government's Pick Jun 15, 2026

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FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026

Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of action against a comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme.

Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.

Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner (the Funds):
(1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;
(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.
Respondent (Saba):
(1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;
(2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;
(3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.

Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;
(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.
Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.

Implications:

(1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;
(2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;
(3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.

The Fine Print:

Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."
Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."

Primary Cases:

Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley Austin
Respondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Opinion Summary: FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Wins Fiduciary Fairness Fight Jun 14, 2026

Show notes

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026

Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.

Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner (the Funds):
(1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;
(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.
Respondent (Saba):
(1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;
(2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;
(3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.

Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;
(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;
(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.
Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.

Implications:

(1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;
(2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;
(3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.

The Fine Print:

Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."
Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."

Primary Cases:

Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner (FS Credit) and Respondents (BlackRock): Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
For United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of FS Credit and BlackRock: Max E. Schulman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
For Respondent (Saba): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Keathley v. Buddy Ayers | Nondisclosure Doesn't Lead to Lawsuit Dismissal Jun 13, 2026

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Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 3/24/2026 | Decided: 6/11/2026

Oral Advocates:

Petitioner (Keathley): Gregory G. Garre of Latham and Watkins
United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur): Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
Respondent (Buddy Ayers Construction): William M. Jay of Goodwin Proctor

Overview: A bankruptcy debtor's failure to disclose a personal-injury lawsuit triggered the Fifth Circuit's rigid two-factor estoppel test, splitting federal circuits over whether courts must examine all circumstances or presume bad faith from knowledge and motive alone.

Question Presented: Whether courts must examine the totality of circumstances — not just two factors — to determine if a bankruptcy debtor's omission of a lawsuit qualifies as inadvertent.

Posture: District court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's personal-injury lawsuit under rigid two-factor judicial estoppel rule.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner Keathley: (1) Courts must examine all circumstances before concluding a bankruptcy omission reflects intentional concealment; (2) The Fifth Circuit's test conflates theoretical motive with actual bad faith, eliminating any real inadvertence exception; (3) Blocking honest debtors' lawsuits rewards tortfeasors and destroys assets creditors could recover.
Respondent Buddy Ayers Construction: (1) Objective inconsistency — not subjective bad intent — supplies the basis for judicial estoppel; (2) The inadvertence exception covers only objectively verifiable errors, not every non-malicious explanation a debtor offers; (3) A multi-factor holistic test eliminates deterrence, invites abuse, and guts the bankruptcy disclosure system.

Holding: Courts must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding a debtor's bankruptcy omission to determine whether that omission qualifies as inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel; the Fifth Circuit erred by artificially restricting its inquiry to only two factors.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Vacated and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Judicial estoppel functions as an equitable doctrine, and equity demands case-by-case flexibility — not a mechanical two-factor checklist that blocks courts from considering all available evidence;
(2) The Fifth Circuit's test fails both as too rigid — barring courts from looking beyond two factors — and too broad — those two factors apply to virtually every bankruptcy omission, making the exception meaningless;
(3) Courts must weigh all circumstances — including prompt correction, absence of actual benefit, counsel's knowledge, and local bankruptcy practice — to determine whether an omission truly resulted from inadvertence.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Thomas (concurring, joined by Gorsuch): Joins majority in full but questions whether federal courts hold any authority to apply judicial estoppel at all; the doctrine lacks statutory, procedural, or founding-era support and merits reexamination in a future case.
Justice Sotomayor (concurring): Agrees with majority but argues judicial estoppel may never appropriately apply during open bankruptcy proceedings — bankruptcy courts already hold targeted remedies that serve the doctrine's goals without destroying debtors' claims.

Implications:

(1) Debtors who forget to disclose post-petition claims now receive a full-facts review before courts bar their lawsuits;
(2) Personal-injury defendants lose the automatic kill switch that a bankruptcy filing once supplied in Fifth and Tenth Circuit courts;
(3) Thomas and Gorsuch's concurrence opens the door to a future challenge to judicial estoppel's existence in federal courts entirely.

The Fine Print:

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1): "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement" of the bankruptcy case, including pending and unliquidated claims against third parties.
Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, Pt. 4, Question 33: Debtors must disclose "[c]laims against third parties, whether or not [the debtor] ha[s] filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment."

Primary Cases:

New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Established the modern federal framework for judicial estoppel and left open whether inadvertence or mistake may block the doctrine's application.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946): Confirmed that equitable doctrines "eschew mechanical rules" and depend on flexibility, requiring case-by-case analysis rather than rigid checklists.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:18] Argument Begins

[00:01:26] Keathley Opening Statement

[00:03:33] Keathley Free for All Questions

[00:18:46] Keathley Round Robin Questions

[00:33:09] United States Opening Statement

[00:34:28] United States Free for All Questions

[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:47:24] Buddy Ayers Opening Statement

[00:49:27] Buddy Ayers Free for All Questions

[01:09:04] Buddy Ayers Round Robin Questions

[01:09:13] Keathley Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: Keathley v. Buddy Ayers | Nondisclosure Doesn't Lead to Lawsuit Dismissal Jun 12, 2026

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Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 3/24/2026 | Decided: 6/11/2026

Question Presented: Whether courts must examine the totality of circumstances — not just two factors — to determine if a bankruptcy debtor's omission of a lawsuit qualifies as inadvertent.

Posture: District court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's personal-injury lawsuit under rigid two-factor judicial estoppel rule.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner Keathley: (1) Courts must examine all circumstances before concluding a bankruptcy omission reflects intentional concealment; (2) The Fifth Circuit's test conflates theoretical motive with actual bad faith, eliminating any real inadvertence exception; (3) Blocking honest debtors' lawsuits rewards tortfeasors and destroys assets creditors could recover.
Respondent Buddy Ayers Construction: (1) Objective inconsistency — not subjective bad intent — supplies the basis for judicial estoppel; (2) The inadvertence exception covers only objectively verifiable errors, not every non-malicious explanation a debtor offers; (3) A multi-factor holistic test eliminates deterrence, invites abuse, and guts the bankruptcy disclosure system.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Judicial estoppel functions as an equitable doctrine, and equity demands case-by-case flexibility — not a mechanical two-factor checklist that blocks courts from considering all available evidence;
(2) The Fifth Circuit's test fails both as too rigid — barring courts from looking beyond two factors — and too broad — those two factors apply to virtually every bankruptcy omission, making the exception meaningless;
(3) Courts must weigh all circumstances — including prompt correction, absence of actual benefit, counsel's knowledge, and local bankruptcy practice — to determine whether an omission truly resulted from inadvertence.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Thomas (concurring, joined by Gorsuch): Joins majority in full but questions whether federal courts hold any authority to apply judicial estoppel at all; the doctrine lacks statutory, procedural, or founding-era support and merits reexamination in a future case.
Justice Sotomayor (concurring): Agrees with majority but argues judicial estoppel may never appropriately apply during open bankruptcy proceedings — bankruptcy courts already hold targeted remedies that serve the doctrine's goals without destroying debtors' claims.

Implications:

(1) Debtors who forget to disclose post-petition claims now receive a full-facts review before courts bar their lawsuits;
(2) Personal-injury defendants lose the automatic kill switch that a bankruptcy filing once supplied in Fifth and Tenth Circuit courts;
(3) Thomas and Gorsuch's concurrence opens the door to a future challenge to judicial estoppel's existence in federal courts entirely.

The Fine Print:

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1): "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement" of the bankruptcy case, including pending and unliquidated claims against third parties.
Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, Pt. 4, Question 33: Debtors must disclose "[c]laims against third parties, whether or not [the debtor] ha[s] filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment."

Primary Cases:

New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Established the modern federal framework for judicial estoppel and left open whether inadvertence or mistake may block the doctrine's application.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946): Confirmed that equitable doctrines "eschew mechanical rules" and depend on flexibility, requiring case-by-case analysis rather than rigid checklists.

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Hikma Pharmaceuticals v. Amarin Pharma | Generic Drug Beats Patent Trap Jun 11, 2026

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Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 04/29/2026 | Decided: 06/04/2026

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Hikma): Charles B. Klein of Winston & Strawn LLP
Amicus Curiae (United States): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice
Respondents (Amarin Pharma): Michael R. Huston of Perkins Coie LLP

Overview: Amarin's cardiovascular drug patent faced challenge when generic maker Hikma launched a skinny-label version and marketed it through statements Amarin claimed encouraged doctors to prescribe the generic for the still-patented heart indication.

Question Presented: Whether a generic drug maker's marketing statements plausibly constitute "active steps" inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b).

Posture: District Court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner (Hikma):

(1) Statements fully consistent with lawful skinny-label marketing cannot constitute active inducement under §271(b);
(2) Federal law mandated the label's contents, making legal compliance an obvious alternative explanation that forecloses liability;
(3) The Federal Circuit's physician-reading standard would destroy the Hatch-Waxman section viii pathway and expose generics to devastating litigation risk.

Respondent (Amarin):

(1) Hikma's totality of statements — repeatedly invoking "generic Vascepa," using an overbroad therapeutic category, and touting Vascepa's billion-dollar sales — plausibly encouraged infringing use;
(2) Amarin spent $300 million discovering the cardiovascular indication and patent law must protect that investment from free-riders;
(3) Seven other generic manufacturers avoided liability by accurately describing only their narrow approved uses, demonstrating Hikma's conduct fell outside normal practice.

Holding: Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement in violation of §271(b); none of Hikma's alleged statements — individually or in totality — plausibly constituted active steps encouraging infringement of Amarin's cardiovascular-use patents.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No Justice filed a separate opinion. Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Active inducement requires affirmative steps to encourage infringement — not merely statements physicians could read as instructions to infringe;
(2) Hikma's label reflected legal compliance under the duty of sameness, its "generic Vascepa" description reflected standard industry practice, and omissions alone cannot support active inducement;
(3) Website category descriptions, patient leaflet warnings, and investor press release sales figures lacked the clear, affirmative message inducement demands.

Separate Opinions: None. The decision was unanimous.

Implications:

(1) Generic manufacturers may use the Hatch-Waxman skinny-label pathway without automatic inducement liability for routine commercial communications;
(2) Brand manufacturers must plead specific affirmative acts of encouragement — not inferences drawn from vague statements or omissions;
(3) The active inducement framework now applies with fresh clarity across all patent-holding industries.

The Fine Print:

35 U.S.C. §271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."
21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(v): Requires a generic drug application to contain "information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [reference] listed drug . . . except for changes required because of differences approved under [applicable regulations]."

Primary Cases:

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Active inducement requires purposeful, culpable expression and conduct designed to stimulate infringement; distributing a product capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses does not, alone, impose liability.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007): A complaint must plead facts supporting a plausible claim for relief; allegations carrying obvious alternative lawful explanations fail to clear the plausibility bar.

Opinion Summary: Hikma Pharmaceuticals v. Amarin Pharma | Generic Drug Beats Patent Trap Jun 10, 2026

Show notes

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 04/29/2026 | Decided: 06/04/2026

Question Presented: Whether a generic drug maker's marketing statements plausibly constitute "active steps" inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b).

Posture: District Court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner (Hikma):

(1) Statements fully consistent with lawful skinny-label marketing cannot constitute active inducement under §271(b);
(2) Federal law mandated the label's contents, making legal compliance an obvious alternative explanation that forecloses liability;
(3) The Federal Circuit's physician-reading standard would destroy the Hatch-Waxman section viii pathway and expose generics to devastating litigation risk.

Respondent (Amarin):

(1) Hikma's totality of statements — repeatedly invoking "generic Vascepa," using an overbroad therapeutic category, and touting Vascepa's billion-dollar sales — plausibly encouraged infringing use;
(2) Amarin spent $300 million discovering the cardiovascular indication and patent law must protect that investment from free-riders;
(3) Seven other generic manufacturers avoided liability by accurately describing only their narrow approved uses, demonstrating Hikma's conduct fell outside normal practice.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No Justice filed a separate opinion. Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Active inducement requires affirmative steps to encourage infringement — not merely statements physicians could read as instructions to infringe;
(2) Hikma's label reflected legal compliance under the duty of sameness, its "generic Vascepa" description reflected standard industry practice, and omissions alone cannot support active inducement;
(3) Website category descriptions, patient leaflet warnings, and investor press release sales figures lacked the clear, affirmative message inducement demands.

Separate Opinions: None. The decision was unanimous.

Implications:

(1) Generic manufacturers may use the Hatch-Waxman skinny-label pathway without automatic inducement liability for routine commercial communications;
(2) Brand manufacturers must plead specific affirmative acts of encouragement — not inferences drawn from vague statements or omissions;
(3) The active inducement framework now applies with fresh clarity across all patent-holding industries.

The Fine Print:

35 U.S.C. §271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."
21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(v): Requires a generic drug application to contain "information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [reference] listed drug . . . except for changes required because of differences approved under [applicable regulations]."

Primary Cases:

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Active inducement requires purposeful, culpable expression and conduct designed to stimulate infringement; distributing a product capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses does not, alone, impose liability.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007): A complaint must plead facts supporting a plausible claim for relief; allegations carrying obvious alternative lawful explanations fail to clear the plausibility bar.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Hikma): Charles B. Klein of Winston & Strawn LLP
Amicus Curiae (United States): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice
Respondents (Amarin Pharma): Michael R. Huston of Perkins Coie LLP

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Sripetch v. SEC | Victimless Fraudsters Can't Keep Profits Jun 09, 2026

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Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026

Overview: The Supreme Court resolves a circuit split over whether the SEC must prove investors lost money before ordering disgorgement — preserving billions in annual securities enforcement power.

Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.

Main Arguments:

Sripetch: (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's disgorgement definition, requiring restoration of funds to actual victims; (3) SEC's reading creates statutory anomalies and lets the agency circumvent jury-trial and procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.
SEC: (1) Disgorgement targets the wrongdoer's gain, not the victim's loss — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 statute, eliminating any pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) "Unjust enrichment" in the 2021 text carries a common-law meaning that never required proof of monetary loss.

Holding: The SEC may obtain a disgorgement award without proving investors suffered pecuniary loss. Traditional equitable principles tie the remedy to the defendant's wrongful gain from invading legally protected interests — not to any documented financial loss by the victim. Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Traditional equitable principles — confirmed across centuries of case law and the Restatements — measure disgorgement by the defendant's wrongful gain, not the victim's financial loss; no pecuniary harm requirement ever existed in equity;
(2) Liu's "for victims" requirement drew from traditional equitable principles; those principles define a victim as someone whose legally protected interests the wrongdoer invaded, not someone who documented a financial loss;
(3) When a defendant enriched himself without leaving the plaintiff financially worse off, equity prefers stripping the wrongdoer of unjust gains over allowing him to benefit from misconduct.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Thomas (concurring): Agreed with the outcome but argued Congress's 2021 amendments transformed disgorgement into a legal remedy; urged the Court to recognize, in a future case, that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial for SEC disgorgement actions.

Implications:

(1) The SEC's multi-billion-dollar disgorgement toolkit survives intact — fraudsters cannot escape profit-stripping by structuring schemes so victims lose no documentable money;
(2) The "nobody lost money" defense no longer shields securities violators from disgorgement;
(3) Justice Thomas's concurrence invites a future Seventh Amendment jury-trial challenge to SEC disgorgement under the 2021 statute.

The Fine Print:

15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."

Primary Cases:

Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must go "for victims" — the foundational ruling this decision extended.
SEC v. Govil (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit required proof of investor pecuniary harm before disgorgement, creating the circuit conflict the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLP
Respondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice

Opinion Summary: Sripetch v. SEC | Victimless Fraudsters Can't Keep Profits Jun 08, 2026

Show notes

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026

Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.

Main Arguments:

Sripetch: (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's disgorgement definition, requiring restoration of funds to actual victims; (3) SEC's reading creates statutory anomalies and lets the agency circumvent jury-trial and procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.
SEC: (1) Disgorgement targets the wrongdoer's gain, not the victim's loss — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 statute, eliminating any pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) "Unjust enrichment" in the 2021 text carries a common-law meaning that never required proof of monetary loss.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

(1) Traditional equitable principles — confirmed across centuries of case law and the Restatements — measure disgorgement by the defendant's wrongful gain, not the victim's financial loss; no pecuniary harm requirement ever existed in equity;
(2) Liu's "for victims" requirement drew from traditional equitable principles; those principles define a victim as someone whose legally protected interests the wrongdoer invaded, not someone who documented a financial loss;
(3) When a defendant enriched himself without leaving the plaintiff financially worse off, equity prefers stripping the wrongdoer of unjust gains over allowing him to benefit from misconduct.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Thomas (concurring): Agreed with the outcome but argued Congress's 2021 amendments transformed disgorgement into a legal remedy; urged the Court to recognize, in a future case, that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial for SEC disgorgement actions.

Implications:

(1) The SEC's multi-billion-dollar disgorgement toolkit survives intact — fraudsters cannot escape profit-stripping by structuring schemes so victims lose no documentable money;
(2) The "nobody lost money" defense no longer shields securities violators from disgorgement;
(3) Justice Thomas's concurrence invites a future Seventh Amendment jury-trial challenge to SEC disgorgement under the 2021 statute.

The Fine Print:

15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."

Primary Cases:

Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must go "for victims" — the foundational ruling this decision extended.
SEC v. Govil (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit required proof of investor pecuniary harm before disgorgement, creating the circuit conflict the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLP
Respondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice

Oral Argument Re-Listen: FCC v. AT&T | Forfeiture Fines Without Force Jun 07, 2026

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FCC v. AT&T, Inc. / Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here | Argued: April 21, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.): Jeffrey B. Wall of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Respondents (FCC): Vivek Suri of the Department of Justice

Overview: The FCC fined AT&T $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million for mishandling customer location data through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violated the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil suits at common law.

Question Presented: Whether the FCC's administrative forfeiture process violates the Seventh Amendment by imposing civil monetary penalties on regulated carriers without guaranteeing a jury trial.

Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second Circuit upheld Verizon's. Court consolidated and granted cert.

Main Arguments:

FCC/United States (Petitioner): (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — carriers may lawfully decline to pay; (2) the Seventh Amendment right attaches at the Section 504 collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial; (3) Meeker and Hof already upheld this model — a preliminary nonbinding agency determination followed by a jury trial satisfies the Constitution.
AT&T and Verizon (Respondents/Carriers): (1) The FCC's orders deploy mandatory statutory language — "determine," "assess," and "impose" — creating a binding present obligation to pay; (2) the back-end Section 504 jury option offers no real path, as no carrier received a jury trial in forty-seven years under this scheme; (3) the scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury rights on defying a nine-figure federal order.

Holding: Because forfeiture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not definitively resolve the parties' legal obligations, and the FCC's factual findings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate the Seventh Amendment for the Commission to issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. No. 25-406 (Fifth Circuit): reversed and remanded. No. 25-567 (Second Circuit): affirmed.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) FCC forfeiture orders create no legally enforceable payment obligation — the agency holds no seizure power, interest does not accrue, and Section 504(c) bars the Commission from using unresolved orders against regulated parties; (2) Section 504(a)'s "trial de novo" requirement renders the Commission's factual findings legally void in any enforcement action — the jury starts from scratch; (3) unlike the SEC in Jarkesy, the FCC holds no administrative collection tools, so a jury makes the ultimate factual determination before the government can collect a dollar.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Thomas (Dissenting): Thomas agreed the orders carried no binding force and the carriers deserved de novo jury trials — but dissented because the majority granted no relief to carriers who paid in good faith reliance on orders commanding payment within thirty days.

Implications: (1) Regulated carriers may now decline FCC forfeitures without accruing interest or penalties — DOJ must file collection suits within five years or the forfeiture evaporates; (2) AT&T and Verizon's combined hundred-million-dollar refund claims remain unresolved and available for future litigation; (3) agencies without immediate collection tools — unlike the SEC — likely survive Seventh Amendment scrutiny today.

The Fine Print:

U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be...recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States....any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."

Primary Cases:

SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment bars the SEC from imposing civil penalties through in-house proceedings where those penalties carry immediate enforceability and no de novo jury review of the underlying violation.
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue nonbinding monetary determinations — enforceable only in subsequent jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.

Opinion Summary: FCC v. AT&T | Forfeiture Fines Without Force Jun 06, 2026

Show notes

FCC v. AT&T, Inc. / Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here | Argued: April 21, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026

Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second Circuit upheld Verizon's. Court consolidated and granted cert.

Main Arguments:

FCC/United States (Petitioner): (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — carriers may lawfully decline to pay; (2) the Seventh Amendment right attaches at the Section 504 collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial; (3) Meeker and Hof already upheld this model — a preliminary nonbinding agency determination followed by a jury trial satisfies the Constitution.
AT&T and Verizon (Respondents/Carriers): (1) The FCC's orders deploy mandatory statutory language — "determine," "assess," and "impose" — creating a binding present obligation to pay; (2) the back-end Section 504 jury option offers no real path, as no carrier received a jury trial in forty-seven years under this scheme; (3) the scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury rights on defying a nine-figure federal order.

Opinion: Here

Separate Opinions:

Justice Thomas (Dissenting): Thomas agreed the orders carried no binding force and the carriers deserved de novo jury trials — but dissented because the majority granted no relief to carriers who paid in good faith reliance on orders commanding payment within thirty days.

The Fine Print:

U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be...recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States....any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."

Primary Cases:

SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment bars the SEC from imposing civil penalties through in-house proceedings where those penalties carry immediate enforceability and no de novo jury review of the underlying violation.
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue nonbinding monetary determinations — enforceable only in subsequent jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.

Oral Advocates:

Petitioners (AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.): Jeffrey B. Wall of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Respondents (FCC): Vivek Suri of the Department of Justice

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