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    The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin

    In The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin, intellectual property attorney Scott Hervey and his guests discuss current IP issues related to trademark, copyright, and entertainment, as well as IP litigation and intellectual property in the news.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Jingle Brawl: The Battle for ‘Queen of Christmas’ Dec 15, 2023
    Show notes

    Mariah Carey has widely been referred to by fans as the ‘Queen of Christmas,’ but when she attempted to trademark the title last year, it was met with pushback from another singer and songwriter who claimed to hold the same title. Scott Hervey and Tara Sattler discuss this dispute on this Holiday edition of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:
    In 2022, Mariah Carey sought to register the trademark ‘Queen of Christmas’ for a wide variety of goods and services. Her application was opposed by a singer-songwriter who claimed she was known as the Queen of Christmas. I’m Scott Hervey with Weintraub Tobin, and I’m joined today by my partner Tara Sattler to discuss this holiday trademark dispute on this next installment of The Briefing, Christmas edition, by Weintraub Tobin.

    Tara, welcome to The Briefing. You have a great holiday sweater on.

    Tara:
    Thanks for having me, Scott, and so do you.

    Scott:
    So, as you know, Tara, Mariah Carey is extremely well known for her 1994 holiday hit “All I Want for Christmas is You”, which has reportedly made more than $60 million in royalties alone. In 2022, her company filed a trademark registration application for Queen of Christmas, covering a wide variety of goods and services. In the prosecution of her trademark application, while the United States Patent and Trademark Office trademark examiner assigned to the application raised a few issues, the application pretty much sailed through to publication.

    Tara:
    Then, later that year, singer-songwriter Elizabeth Chan filed an opposition to the registration of the mark. The basis of Chan’s opposition was likelihood of confusion. In her filing, Chan claimed that she is pop music’s only full-time Christmas singer-songwriter and has herself been repeatedly dubbed the Queen of Christmas. She claims to have prolifically written, composed, and performed only original Christmas holiday-themed songs for more than a decade, and due to the notoriety that she’s attained for this singular and specific achievement, Elizabeth Chan has been referred to as the Queen of Christmas by multiple media, including in 2018 by the New Yorker Magazine.

    Scott:
    In her opposition, Chan claims to have been in continuous use of the Mark Queen of Christmas since at least 2014. Chan further argued that Queen of Christmas should not be owned or controlled by Ms. Carey’s company since Ms. Carey herself has admitted that she did not create the title or moniker Queen of Christmas, and she does not even consider herself the Queen of Christmas.

    Tara:
    So, with the opposition filed, Ms. Carey’s company was required to file an answer by a date certain, which did not happen. As a result, a default was entered against Ms. Carey’s company, and the application to register the mark was deemed abandoned by the TTAB. So Scott, do you think that Carey was being Scrooge in filing her trademark application?

    Scott:
    I don’t think so. She was represented by a highly reputable law firm and she certainly could have pressed her rights if she desired to do so. Maybe she was moved by the opening paragraph in Chan’s petition, which said Christmas is big enough for more than one queen. Over the decades, several recording artists have been dubbed with the nickname Queen of Christmas, including Darlene Love, Brenda Lee, Elizabeth Chan, and Mariah Carey. This is a perennial nickname that has been and will continue to be bestowed on multiple future singers for decades to come. I mean, whatever Carey’s motivation was not to defend against the petition and to allow her application to go abandoned. This thing we can be certain of, as certain as there is a Santa Claus, that there will be more than one queen of Christmas.

    Tara:
    Well, that’s a really interesting case study and example. Scott, thanks for telling us about this one.

    Scott:
    Thank you for listening to this episode of The Briefing. We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    Netflix to Pay $2.5M to GoTV for Patent Infringement Dec 08, 2023
    Show notes

    Netflix has been ordered to pay GoTV Streaming $2.5 Million in damages for infringing one of its wireless technology patents. Scott Hervey and Eric Caligiuri discuss this update on this episode of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:
    I’m Scott Hervey with Weintraub Tobin. In a prior discussion with my colleague, Eric Caligiuri, earlier this year, we talked about a case where a federal court denied discovery requests aimed at uncovering details surrounding the financing of a plaintiff’s patent litigation. That case was GoTV Streaming LLC versus Netflix in the Central District of California. In response to some inquiries and requests for further updates from some of our viewers and listeners, we wanted to give you an update on the broader outcome of this case. That’s coming up on this installment of The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin.

    Eric, welcome to another episode of the Briefing. Thanks for joining us today.

    Eric:
    Great to be here, Scott.

    Scott:
    Eric, what can you tell us about what’s happened in the GOTV streaming versus Netflix case since we last spoke?

    Eric:
    Well, Scott, California jury has found that Netflix did in fact, infringe one of GOTV Wireless’s technology patents with its television and movie streaming platform, and found Netflix owes GOTV Streaming 2.5 million for the infringement. In the verdict, the jury said that Netflix should pay GOTV the damages in one lump sum as a penalty for infringing US patent number 898715. But the jury did find that Netflix did not infringe a second patent that was also included in the suits. Both patents generally covered methods for rendering content on a wireless device.

    Scott:
    So, 2.5 million is not really a lot of money for Netflix. But I do have a technical question for you, and maybe you might not know, based on the judgment, does the judgment include ongoing royalties? In other words, will Netflix be able to continue to use this technology if it continues a particular royalty payment? Or does that $2.5 million include ongoing use of the patent, or is this just for past use, and Netflix can’t use this technology without further infringement? Do you know?

    Eric:
    Yeah. So, that judgment was just for past infringement. It was a lump sum payment. There’s nothing about ongoing royalties or future payments. There’s probably a bit of an open question in terms know what Netflix can do in the future, and they may have to go and license the patent. But there was nothing specific in the jury verdict about going forward. It was simply damages for past infringement.

    Scott:
    Okay, so either Netflix has to enter into a commercial deal with GOTV, or they need to come up with a technology that doesn’t infringe that particular patent. Interesting. Eric, can you tell us about some of the background of this case?

    Eric:
    Yeah, sure. So GOtV first sued Netflix in October of 2022, alleging certain parts of Netflix’s streaming service infringed two of its wireless technology patents. Specifically, GOTV alleged Netflix’s streaming service uses the methods covered by GOtV’s patents to lay up content on its app and website, like its widgets, menu buttons, photo imagery. Netflix argued in response that it had no pre-filing knowledge of the patents, and without that knowledge, there couldn’t be any indirect infringement or induced infringement. Instead, Netflix argued that GotV tried to create knowledge of the patents by filing suit, sorting the patents, and then alleging inducement and an amended complaint. But, according to Netflix, in order to claim induced infringement, there has to be proof that the infringer had knowledge of the patents in suit before the complaint was filed.

    Scott:
    Interesting. So what happened next?

    Eric:
    Well, after conducting discovery, including covering some of the issues into litigation funding that we discussed last time, the jury found that Netflix did in fact infringe on one of GOTV’s patents through the use of its cloud computing providers to operate its streaming platform. But it did not infringe Netflix. That is the other one of the patents which was covering Netflix’s operation of the devices. So that’s when the jury then awarded the $2.5 million for the infringement of the one patent.

    Scott:
    Okay, so, I mean, as I just said, I think $2.5 million is almost a rounding error for Netflix nowadays. Do you have any idea what’s going to happen next? Is Netflix just going to pay the $2.5 million, or do you think they might appeal?

    Eric:
    Can’t say exactly what Netflix will do, but most likely, Netflix won’t just hand over the 2.5 million to go TV at this point, and instead, they may try to challenge the jury’s verdict, either through some post-trial motions with the district court or possibly an appeal to the Federal Circuit, sort of separately. Netflix also still has some challenges to the patents at the patent office that remain pending that could invalidate the patents and thus reduce or wipe out the jury verdict if the patents are found to be invalid to the extent that Netflix hasn’t paid the money yet. This also, a little bit, goes to what you were talking before, where what’s going to happen in the future with these patents and the infringement? So, if Netflix could invalidate the patents, that would also solve that issue going forward in terms of trying to work out some future royalty or payments. So, in short, this is still far from over.

    Scott:
    Yeah, you raised an interesting point there, Eric. If Netflix has not created a technological workaround, and if its challenges to the patents are still pending at the patent office, then it may just continue to pursue those for the purpose of probably entering into a global licensing deal with GoTV because I’m pretty sure GOTV would not want that patent to be invalidated.

    Eric:
    Correct? That’s a little bit of sort of a tactic here, too, because once Netflix pays the 2.5 million for the jury verdict, that money is gone. So even if the patents will say later invalidated, it doesn’t get the money back. So it has a lot of incentive to keep fighting and not pay that money until as late as.

    Scott:
    Right, right. Got it. This is really interesting. Let’s keep an eye on this case, shall we? And let’s deliver more updates to our listeners and our viewers as they come up.

    Eric:
    We’ll do, Scott; thank you for listening to this episode of the Briefing. We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about the topic we covered today, please leave us a comment, and we’ll try to get that family close.


    Once Upon A Time – SCOTUS Rejects Trademark Infringement Claim Against Quentin Tarantino Film Dec 01, 2023
    Show notes

    The Supreme Court rejected a trademark infringement claim against the producers of the Quentin Tarantino film ‘Once Upon a Time… in Hollywood’ over its portrayal of the late actor Christopher Jones. Scott Hervey and Tara Sattler discuss this decision in this episode of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Tara:
    The laws surrounding false endorsement claims in the United States are rooted in section 43 A of the Lanham Act. There’s quite a bit of case law that analyzes false endorsement claims brought by celebrities who claim that a company or brand used a lookalike or soundalike to promote the brand in advertising or marketing campaigns without the celebrity’s permission. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review a California case about this exact topic. This time, the case was brought by the partner of the late actor Christopher Jones concerning the popular 2019 Quentin Tarantino film ‘Once Upon a Time in Hollywood.’ This is what we will be discussing in today’s installment of the Briefing by Weintraub Tobin.

    Scott:
    I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin. Tara, thanks for joining me today. So you’re right that celebrities bring these types of false endorsement claims under section 43 A of the Lanham Act relatively frequently. So, let’s talk about the specific language in the Lanham Act that addresses false endorsement.

    Tara:
    That’s a great place to start. Section 43 A imposes civil liability on any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol or, device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin. False. Or misleading description of fact or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to deceive consumers as to the affiliation, connection, association sponsorship, or approval of another person’s goods or services.

    Scott:
    Right. And courts have held that a celebrity’s physical likeness, voice, or other unique or distinguishing characteristics does constitute a symbol or device as specified in section 43 A of the Lanham Act. So, this is the usual basis for a celebrity false endorsement claim. These types of claims often arise in marketing and advertising campaigns where a brand or a service will use a lookalike or a sound alike of a celebrity. And I’ve even seen cases where they’ve used photographs of a celebrity to market that brand. Vanna White from Wheel of Fortune and the pop culture and music icon Ariana Grande, to name just a few, have brought false endorsement claims in the past.

    Tara:
    This recent case that went up to the U.S. Supreme Court concerns the likeness and unique physical attributes of the late actor Christopher Jones. Jones was a popular actor in the 1960s, starring in both TV and movies. Jones passed away in 2014 and assigned the rights in his likeness to his partner, Paul McKenna. Sony released Quentin Tarantino’s film Once Upon a Time in Hollywood in 2019. The film is loose historical fiction based in the 1950s and centers around fictional characters played by Leonardo DiCaprio and Brad Pitt. It also touches on the Manson family murder of Sharon Tate McKenna.

    Scott:
    The executor of Jones’s estate brought both a false endorsement claim and a trademark infringement claim against the producers of Tarantino’s film. The plaintiff cited a few examples as the basis of the claim. First, Jones’s name was mentioned in Tarantino’s film. Second, a television advertisement and a marquee advertisement that mentions Jones’s name and one of Jones’s films. Three in The Addict are shown on screen in Tarantino’s film. And third, Jones was used as the inspiration for the fictional character played by Brad Pitt and Leonardo DiCaprio. While these characters interacted with commercial brands.

    Tara:
    In Tarantino’s film, the trial court evaluated the merits of McKenna’s claim. While evaluating the defendant’s anti-slapp motion on the false endorsement claim, the trial court emphasized that mere use of a celebrity’s image or likeness is not actionable, but the use of a celebrity’s image and likeness needs to suggest sponsorship or approval in order to constitute a false endorsement. The court further emphasized that a false endorsement must also be something that is likely to confuse consumers or mislead them into thinking that the celebrity endorsed a product or brand when they actually did not. While the question of consumer confusion is a factual one, the court did not find it plausible that a brief use of Jones’s name or some loosely similar personality characteristics would mislead a reasonable viewer watching the film.

    Scott:
    Right. And this is in line with the decades of other precedent on this matter that establishes that a celebrity’s voice, likeness, or persona; first it needs to be distinctive enough to be recognized and identifiable to consumers and the public in order to ultimately be capable of misleading consumers of being a trademark and then misleading consumers. The other interesting analysis in the McKenna case is the analysis on trademark infringement. There’s also established court precedent relating to this argument. First, courts have consistently held that, as a general rule, a person’s image or likeness cannot function as a trademark, and that’s because that image does not perform the trademark function of designation. Thirdly, or secondly, sorry, it’s difficult for a personal name to garner trademark protection because a person’s name is not inherently distinctive, and proof of secondary meaning is needed in order for that name to establish itself as a protectable trademark.

    Tara:
    And the last trademark infringement argument that McKenna makes is one of infringement of Jones’s trade dress. Trade dress refers to the totality of an image, design, and appearance of a product. The court found no authority or no prior cases supporting that an individual’s physical likeness, clothing, style, or personality traits constitute protectable trade dress. And understandably, the court did not believe that the circumstances of this case constituted protectable trade dress either. So, after all of this, McKenna’s question on cert to the US. Supreme Court was, does the Lanham Act properly prohibit the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s persona advertising third-party brands with logos in a commercial motion picture as a trademark infringement?

    Scott:
    And since the United States Supreme Court will not answer this question specifically because they denied cert, let’s talk a bit about this. More so, laws that protect motion pictures as protected speech under the First Amendment are very well established generally when weighing First Amendment interest against Lanham Act interests or right of publicity type issues. At least in the case of non-commercial speech, the First Amendment generally wins. We saw this in the California Court of Appeals ruling in De Havilland versus FX. And although that was brought as a right of publicity case, De Havilland could have also brought this as a trademark case. There, the court refused to restrict or limit speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment, which safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life, including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary, and transform them into art, be it articles, books, movies, or plays.

    Tara:
    So, yes, the First Amendment presents a pretty big barrier to overcome with a trademark infringement claim. But there are some cases out there that supported McKenna’s position. For example, parks versus Leface Records. In that case, the heirs of Rosa Parks brought a trademark claim against the band OutKast and the band’s label based on the use of Parks’ name as the title of a song. Parks contends that the defendants violated the Lanham Act because the Rosa Parks title misleads consumers into believing that the song is about her, or that she is affiliated with the defendants, or has sponsored or approved the Rosa Park song and the album on which the song is featured.

    Scott:
    In that case, the Court of Appeals applied the Rogers Test, and that’s a test that we’ve talked about here many, many times on The Briefing. And this test is used to analyze trademark claims based on a trademark’s use in a First Amendment-protected work. There, the Court of Appeals found that the artistic relevance of the use of Park’s name, that’s the first prong of the Rogers Test, the artistic relevance of the use of Park’s name for the title, is not obvious and is open to debate. Now, I think that the court’s application of this first prong of the Rogers Test was flawed. Since artistic relevance is a very low standard. Prior cases have said, basically, it’s got to be just above zero. I mean, even a modicum of artistic relevance would satisfy this first prong. But this case is out there, and it does stand for the proposition that sometimes trademark interests win over a First Amendment interest. I mean, that’s what the Rogers Test is for. It’s there to balance those two. I mean, there have been cases where the Rogers Test has come out on the side of the trademark owner and not the owner of the copyright and the First Amendment work that’s being challenged.

    Tara:
    Yeah, I think that’s a really good point. And I also think that McKenna tries to make some pretty interesting arguments about trade dress. Unfortunately, I don’t think that today, the actor Christopher Jones really has all that much relevance or distinctiveness in our society. But I can think of some actors or pop culture icons who definitely do have a really unique style, persona, personality that a lot of society would recognize if that was mimicked or infringed, if you will. So, I wonder if this trade dress argument really has any viability in today’s viral day and age. What do you think, Scott?

    Scott:
    The question is, how different is that from a right of publicity claim, right? I mean, if you’re alive because we know right of publicity, claims generally expire with the death of the celebrity. Unless you’re from New York or California, where there’s posthumous right of publicity, but that has its specific requirements. But if you are a living celebrity, like, I don’t know, Taylor Swift, right, with her very red lipstick and her tutus and friendship bracelets and other things that seem to scream Taylor Swift.

    Could easily bring a riot publicity claim as opposed to bringing a trade dress claim, but I assume you could bring both. It’s interesting, I’m not aware of any celebrity trade dress cases to date, but if I were a lawyer representing the celebrity in a lawsuit, I certainly would bring as many causes of action as I can in good faith.

    Tara:
    Yeah, I think that’s right. I think that’s a pretty common litigation strategy. So, while the strategy didn’t happen to work here in this case, it may or may not be one that we see again in the future. Thanks for talking with me about this, Scott.

    Scott:
    Yeah. Thanks, Tara.

    Tara:
    Thank you for joining us and listening to this installment of the briefing. If you are interested in finding more of our content, you can find us on YouTube, tube, and wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you liked what you heard today, please rate us and give us a review. Hope you have a great day.


    Are LEGO Creations Based on Religious Texts Eligible for Copyright Protection? Nov 22, 2023
    Show notes

    The creator of a LEGO brick Second Holy Temple product is accusing another LEGO creator of copyright infringement for their interpretation of the same temple. Scott Hervey and Eric Caligiuri discuss this case on this episode of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or read Eric’s article about this case here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:
    I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin. My colleague Eric Caligiuri wrote an interesting article for The Briefing about a recent copyright ruling involving competing LEGO sets. And we’re not talking about just any old LEGO set, but a LEGO Brick interpretation of the Second Holy Temple. We are going to talk about this case, the case of JBrick versus Chazak Kinder, Inc, on this installment of The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin.

    Eric, welcome back to the podcast.

    Eric:
    Thanks, Scott. Good to be here.

    Scott:
    Great. Can you give us a rundown of the case?

    Eric:
    Yeah, sure. Of course. The founders of Plaintiff JBrick created a LEGO brick Second Holy Temple product that was based on independent research and at least three years of studying of historical teachings. Plaintiff also consulted with various rabbis as part of the design process. According to the court, the Second Holy Temple product is a tangible, sculptural interpretation of what the Second Holy Temple may have looked like in real life, based on the written words and interpretations of Hebrew scholars and philosophers.

    Scott:
    And JBrick even went so far as to obtain copyright registrations for its Second Holy Temple product, along with the copyright registrations for the product’s photographs, right?

    Eric:
    Yes, that’s correct. And now the plaintiff, JBrick, alleged that the defendant’s product was almost an exact replica of its own Second Holy Temple product, containing all the unique features that set JBrick’s product apart from its competitors. Accordingly, JBrick filed a complaint in May of 2021, citing claims for copyright infringement and unfair competition against these defendants. The defendants responded by claiming or by filing counterclaims for non-infringement of copyright, copyright invalidity, torture’s interference with prospective economic advantage, and false advertising.

    Scott:
    And let’s forward to the recent court ruling. And in that ruling, the court addressed the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the defendant’s counterclaim for copyright invalidity. So, under the Copyright Act, a copyright registration creates a rebuttal presumption that the copyright is valid. This presumption of validity may be rebutted where other evidence casts doubt on that question. So, given what we have here, given that JBrick has copyright registrations, the burden it shifted to the defendant to come forward with evidence that the works in question were copied from the public domain.

    Eric:
    Yes, that’s exactly right. So, the defendants argued that because the information concerning the Second Holy Temple is in the public domain, the plaintiff’s copyrighted works are not original. As a result, the defendants contended that the plaintiff’s second Holy Temple product can be copied and used in derivative works. The defendants further argued that a historically accurate replication does not constitute a new and original work.

    Scott:
    So I can see that Eric being a fairly compelling argument. How did J Brick respond to this?

    Eric:
    The plaintiff responded that there’s no evidence to support the defendant’s depiction of the Second Holy Temple in the public domain, that there’s no evidence that plaintiff’s depiction is a historically accurate replication because the Second Holy Temple was destroyed almost 2000 years ago and there are no images from before when the building was destroyed. In order to create the Second Holy Temple product, the plaintiff had to read numerous textual descriptions and translated words into a 3D sculpture, further supporting its claim. Originality.

    Scott:
    So, to qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. And originality means only that the work was independently created by the author, as opposed to being copied from some other works, and that this work possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. Now, a new work that incorporates public domain material can itself enjoy copyright protection as long as the author-added content meets the threshold of originality. Eric, how did the court address J Brick’s contention that its work was not in the public domain?

    Eric:
    Well, the court found that defendants did not show that the work had been copied from the public domain. Court noted that the defendants identified only four written texts that would support its public domain argument. A copyright is invalid only if the subject work shows no originality. That is, the copyrighted work is in no way distinguishable from something that had already been in the public domain. The court found that no reasonable jury could disagree that the plaintiff’s second Holy Temple product is thus sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection.

    Scott:
    And as a result of that, the court basically rejected the defendant’s copyright invalidity counterclaim, right?

    Eric:
    Yes, that’s correct.

    Scott:
    So I think this case is a great reminder of the interplay between public domain works and works that can be protected by copyright even if they incorporate public domain material.

    Eric:
    Absolutely. Just because a new work contains something that’s in the public domain or even based on something that’s in the public domain does not necessarily invalidate that portion of the work. And in fact, it can reflect the author’s own originality.

    Scott:
    That’s great. Thanks, Eric, for bringing this case to our attention.

    Eric:
    Yes, of course.

    Scott:
    Thank you for listening to this episode of the Briefing. We hope you enjoyed this episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe. Leave us a review and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    SCOTUS to Determine if USPTO Refusal to Register TRUMP TOO SMALL is Unconstitutional Nov 17, 2023
    Show notes

    The Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in the case of Vidal v. Elster to determine whether the USPTO’s refusal to register the trademark “Trump Too Small” violates the applicant’s First Amendment rights. Scott Hervey and Eric Caligiuri discuss this case on this installment of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:
    Today, November 1, 2023, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on whether the Trademark Office’s refusal to register the trademark “Trump Too Small” on the grounds that it violates Section Two C of the Lanham Act, which bans the issuance of trademarks that include the names identifying a particular individual without that individual’s consent violates the applicant’s First Amendment rights. We are going to talk about this case on this installment of The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin. The case is Vidal v. Elster. The facts are relatively simple. Elster sought to register the mark “Trump Too Small” for T-shirts. The USPTO refused to register the mark based on section Two C of the Lanham Act, which bans the issuance of trademarks that include the names identifying a particular individual without that individual’s consent. Elster appealed this refusal to the Federal Circuit, where Judge Timothy B. Dyke held for a unanimous panel that the government’s interest in protecting the privacy and publicity rights of President Trump did not outweigh Elster’s First Amendment right to criticize that public figure.

    Eric:
    USPTO suspended the examination of applications of trademarks that cover phrases that are critical of government officials or public figures and petitioned the Supreme Court for review?

    Scott:
    That’s right. The question for review by the Supreme Court is whether the Section Two C Bar of the Registerability of trademarks that identify a particular individual without their consent, including those that are critical of government officials or public figures, is a condition of a government benefit, the trademark registration, or a restriction on speech.

    Eric:
    So let’s talk about this in light of Matal vs. Tam, which struck down a ban on trademarks that may disparage groups of people, which included marks that incorporated racist or demeaning terms on First Amendment grounds, and also Iancu v. Brunetti that invalidated a ban on profane or lewd trademarks, also on First Amendment grounds.

    Scott:
    That’s a good point, Eric. In its petition to the Supreme Court, the USPTO distinguished these two cases from this instant case. The USPTO argued that the restrictions at issue in Tam and Brunetti were viewpoint-based restrictions. The USPTO contends that Section Two C is viewpoint neutral, meaning it doesn’t matter whether the application is for a mark that is critical of a live person, complimentary of a live person, or neutral. If the mark contains the name of a live individual, it can’t be registered without their consent under section two C.

    Eric:
    So, Scott, putting aside the argument that Section Two C is a viewpoint neutral, do you think that the trademark Office’s refusal to register Chill’s political speech?

    Scott:
    I don’t remember. Registered trademark is a protectable right. So what happens if this applicant was granted registration? Then, others who want to express a similar political sentiment on a T-shirt or a bumper sticker would be prohibited from doing so. The granting of a trademark registration to Marx that includes political criticism of notable figures would actually limit that kind of speech. Specifically, the office stated that it is the registration of marks like the respondents, not the refusal to register them, that would chill such speech.

    Eric:
    Thanks, Scott. Very interesting. Be sure to update us when the Supreme Court issues a ruling.

    Scott:
    I certainly will. Thank you for listening to this episode of the Briefing. We hope you enjoyed this episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a commentary.


    AI Training and Copyright Infringement: Lessons from the Ross Intelligence Case Nov 09, 2023
    Show notes

    Thomson Reuters sued Ross Intelligence for using its content to train its AI technology. Scott Hervey and Tara Sattler talk about this copyright dispute on this installment of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:
    Thompson Reuters, the provider of the Westlaw Legal Research Platform, sued Ross Intelligence for copyright infringement based on Ross’s use of Westlaw content to train Ross’s IP technology. This court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may provide guidance for future similar cases, and it even provides some additional guidance into the application of a post-Warhol fair use defense. We’re going to talk about this case on the next installment of The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin. These are the basic facts underlying this lawsuit. Ross is an AI legal startup. Ross hired a subcontractor to create memos with legal questions and answers. The questions were meant to be those that a lawyer would ask, and the answers were direct quotations from legal opinions. Those memos were used to train Ross’s AI tool. Thompson Reuters contends that these questions were essentially Westlaw case Headnotes. Ross denies that the Westlaw Headnotes were copied but also raises a fair use defense. As the case went forward, both sides moved for summary judgment on Ross’s fair use defense. The court denied the party’s motions for summary judgment on Ross’s fair use defense, but there are a few points in this opinion that may shape the way future AI training cases play out.

    Tara:
    Before we get into the analysis of Ross’s fair use defense, the court spent a significant amount of time talking about the scope of Westlaw’s copyright. Westlaw’s copyright extends to its Headnotes and its arrangement of the Headnotes and opinions, but its copyright does not extend to the opinions itself.

    Scott:
    That’s right, and the reason the court spent so much time talking about the scope of Westlaw’s copyright was because Ross challenged Westlaw’s copyright claim in the Headnotes. Ross claims that the Westlaw Headnotes follow or closely mirror the language of the judicial opinions. And if a Headnote merely copies a judicial opinion, it’s not copyrightable. But if it varies more than a trivial amount, then Westlaw owns a valid copyright. The court found that this leaves a genuine factual dispute about how original the Headnotes are. If the Headnotes are mere regurgitation of parts of an opinion, this will severely impact the strength and the extent of Westlaw’s copyright case and Westlaw’s copyright in its whole, including in the Headnotes. And it also goes to whether Ross was copying the Headnotes or the opinions themselves.

    Tara:
    So, how do you see this applying to other copyright cases involving AI training?

    Scott:
    Well, this analysis is part of the extrinsic test, which is used in the determination of substantial similarity after the plaintiff has identified specific criteria which it alleges have been copied. The court separates the unprotectable elements, such as facts or ideas, from the elements that are protectable. And then, it sorts out whether there is enough similarities between the works as to the elements that are protectable, such that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s work is substantially similar to the protected elements of the plaintiff’s work. This analysis is part of any copyright case, and it certainly will be part of an AI training case as well.

    Tara:
    Okay, so back to Ross’s fair use defense, because the court finds that Ross actually copied the head notes. So fair use balances four factors: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted material. The first factor assesses whether the use is transformative, as established in the Supreme Court case of Campbell versus Acuff Rose music. Transformativeness occurs where the new work adds something new with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.

    Scott:
    Right? And the Warhol decision now requires courts to ask, as part of the first factor, whether and to what extent the use at issue has a purpose or character different from the original and whether that supports a justification for copying. So now, the first fair use factor will analyze whether the purpose of the use of the second work is different enough from the first to reasonably justify copying. Under the Warhol decision, a transformative use cannot be found for any use that just adds some new expression, meaning, or message. Now, the purpose of the use must be distinct enough from the purpose of the original use to justify copying.

    Tara:
    We have always known that the first fair use factor is extremely important, but based on recent post-Warhol cases, it seems that the fourth factor is of equal importance also.

    Scott:
    I would agree with that assessment, Tara. I think this is because the fourth-factor effect on the market also ties into part of the first factor, that part being commerciality.

    Tara:
    So Ross’s use was clearly commercial, plus its goal is to compete with Westlaw. This weighs against fair use.

    Scott:
    True, but in this decision, the Court seems to pull away from what may seem to be an overemphasis on the weight of commerciality in Warhol. The court determined that the use in question was not fair use, largely by emphasizing its commercial nature. But the judge in this case said that he declines to overread one decision, especially because the court recognized that a use’s transformativeness may outweigh its commercial character and that in Warhol, both elements pointed in the same direction. And further supporting this court’s position is the recent case of Google versus Oracle, a technological context that is much more like this case. Thompson Reuters versus Ross. In that case, in Google versus Oracle, the court placed much more weight on transformation than commercialism.

    Tara:
    Westlaw made a strong argument that Ross’s use was not transformative. Westlaw is a legal research platform that synthesizes the law. Ross used Westlaw’s synthesis to build a legal research platform that also synthesizes the law. I’m certain that Ross presented a more nuanced argument supporting transformativeness, right?

    Scott:
    You’re right, Tara. Yes, Ross did. So, let’s remember the court found that Ross copied the Westlaw Headnotes. Ross argued that it’s copying of the Headnotes is part of building a search engine that avoids human-intermediated materials, meaning a user would simply enter a query and then get a responsive quotation from a judicial opinion, no clicking around or any commentary needed. Once the plain language entries are entered into the ROS database, they are converted into numerical data. Next, ROS feeds that numerical data into its machine learning algorithm to teach the artificial intelligence about legal language. The idea is that the artificial intelligence will be able to recognize patterns in the question-answer pairs. The idea is that those patterns can be used to find answers, not just to the exact questions fed into the AI platform, but to all sorts of other legal questions a user might ask.

    Tara:
    This seems to follow the logic underlying the intermediate copying cases. In those cases, a user copies material to discover unprotectable information or as a minor step towards developing an entirely new product. So, the final output, despite using copied material as input, is indeed transformative. The Supreme Court has cited these intermediate cases favorably, particularly in the context of adapting the doctrine of fair use in light of rapid technological change.

    Scott:
    That’s right, the intermediate copying cases will have a great impact on all of the other AI training copyright cases. Ross says that its AI studied the Headnotes and opinion quotes only to analyze language patterns, not to replicate Westlaw’s expression, but define these language patterns. That will allow Ross to develop a wholly new and competing product, a search tool that would produce highly relevant quotations from judicial opinions. In response to natural language questions, the court said that if Ross’s characterization of its activities is true and accurate, the Ross’s final product would not contain any output of infringing material, and Ross’s use would be transformative intermediate copying now the court is leaving it to the jury to determine if Ross’s stated intention is actually, its intention, though, the jury will.

    Tara:
    Have to determine whether Ross’s AI studied the language patterns in the Headnotes to learn how to produce judicial opinion quotes or whether Ross used the untransformed text of Headnotes to get its AI to replicate and reproduce the creative drafting done by Westlaw’s attorney editors.

    Scott:
    That’s right. And I think there’s a really tall order for the jury, but they are the trier of fact. I’d like to talk just a little bit about the implications of these intermediate copying cases on the number of AI training copyright infringement cases that are out there right now. I think that this doctrine and the holdings in the intermediate copying cases may very well be an incredibly high hurdle and maybe a hurdle that the plaintiffs may not be able to overcome depending upon what the AI is trained to. So, you know, there’s AI training copyright infringement case brought by Sarah Silverman, right?

    Tara:
    Tara. Yeah, and a couple of other authors. And in that case, those authors are claiming infringement and copying of their work that is being done when the AI platform chat GPT is being trained using their materials. Right.

    Scott:
    But if the AI platform in this copyright infringement lawsuit could establish that, okay, it ingested the material, it copied the material, but it was only for the purpose of finding patterns in the writing style such that a user could ask for the creation of an entirely new story that does not incorporate any of the creative elements of the original work. But it’s in the style of Sarah Silverman that might very well be acceptable intermediate copying and could very well be, at least under the finding of this case, fair use.

    Tara:
    Yeah, I think that’s right. And I also wonder about the new Warhol decision that focuses on transformativeness and the purpose of the use needing to be different in order to actually be a transformative. And that holding wasn’t there yet and hadn’t come down when A lot of these intermediate copying cases were decided. So I wonder if that’s going to have an impact on all of these decisions as well.

    Scott:
    I mean, it might, but I have to come back to this decision, right, where the court in this case said, I’m not going to overemphasize the reading and the weight of commerciality. Basically, this judge kind of backpedaled from what was like almost equal weight of the fourth factor with the first factor and just basically said, well, if it’s more transformative, that will outweigh the fact that it’s commercial in nature and the fact that it may have a significant impact on the marketplace for the first work, kind of going back to how we used to analyze transformativeness and fair use and the fourth factor because there were a number of decisions that said, if it’s transformative, it doesn’t really matter as much if the transformative work has a negative impact on the market, for the first. Yeah, we’re going to have to keep our eye on this. Right. There’s a lot of this case can impact a lot of elements, not only in AI training but also in fair use analysis post-Warhol. I mean, how important is the fourth factor?

    Tara:
    Right.

    Scott:
    Before this case, it seemed to be of equal importance. Now, this court is saying, well, maybe not so much in technology cases. So, we have to keep our eye on kind of both lines from this case. Right? Any progeny, any other cases that cite these cases for those particular aspects? Because I think this case could have some very big impact on those two areas of the ever-changing law.

    Tara:
    Definitely, it’s really interesting and really timely. So it’ll be great to see how this changes and evolves and where we go from here.

    Scott:
    Thanks for talking about this today, Tara.

    Tara:
    Thanks for having me, Scott.

    Scott:
    Thank you for listening to this episode of the Briefing. We hope you enjoyed this episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    Tattoos, Tiger King, and Copyright Lawsuits – Oh My – Cramer v. Netflix Nov 03, 2023
    Show notes

    A tattoo artist is suing Netflix for showing one of her tattoos in the series “Tiger King” without her permission. Scott Hervey and Tara Sattler discuss this case on this episode of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:
    On this installment of The Briefing, we’re going to talk about yet another post-Warhol fair use case. However, in this case, the Court finds the secondary use to be transformative. This case also makes me think that fair use, grounded in use as a biographical anchor, isn’t quite as dead as I may have thought it is. We’re going to talk about Molly Cramer vs. Netflix on this installment of the Briefing.

    The case is Molly Kramer vs. Netflix. It arises from a tattoo artist’s lawsuit against Netflix due to the portrayal of her Joe Exotica tattoo, actually, a picture of her Joe Exotica tattoo as tattooed on her husband’s arm that she posted on Facebook, and the use of this image in the first episode of the second season of Tiger King. The context of the display of this photo and the tattoo is relevant to the Court’s analysis. So the opening of the episode, this is the first episode of the second season, is meant to be reflective of the popularity of Tiger King and Joe Exotica and how it spread like literal wildfire during the first half of COVID The montage shows approximately 27 TikTok videos depicting dancers dressed as Joe Exotica are wearing animal print clothing and a clip from a Trump press conference where he asks, is that Joe Exotica?

    Then there are about 58 seconds into the episode, an eight-way split-screen montage appears with all types of images of or relating to Joe Exotica, and this includes the photo of the tattoo in the lower left-hand corner. And this appears on screen for about 2.2 seconds. The barrage of images and videos continue on for about three minutes in total, all of which is to show how Joe Exotica, Carol Baskin, and the other cast of characters from Tiger King became a huge part of the cultural zeitgeist for that specific moment in time.

    Tara:
    So the tattoo artist here, Molly Kramer, obtained a copyright registration covering the tattoo and then sent Netflix a demand letter. The court opinion says that she demanded $10 million to settle the infringement claim.

    Scott:
    So, let’s talk about that demand for a second. If, as a plaintiff in a case like this, you come out with such a huge demand number, a number that, at least as far as I’m concerned, has no relation to the amount of damages that you would likely be awarded. I think it only pushes the defendant to defend the case because it says that you either aren’t reasonable or that you don’t understand how damages in a copyright case are to be assessed. So, yes, I mean, Netflix has a lot of money, but it isn’t handing out bags of money to plaintiffs who have a potentially defensible claim.

    Tara:
    And it seems like that’s probably what happened here, because it seems that Netflix and Kramer’s attorney did exchange further letters, and Kramer eventually offered to settle for $50,000 instead of 10 million. But Netflix continued to insist that their use was fair use. Kramer eventually filed a copyright infringement lawsuit, and Netflix filed a twelve B six motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that Netflix’s use of the tattoo image was fair use.

    Scott:
    So, to determine whether a work constitutes fair use, courts engage in a case-by-case analysis and a flexible balancing of relevant factors. Those factors are the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of commercial nature or is for a nonprofit educational purpose. The second factor being the nature of the copyrighted work that’s copied, the third factor being the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work that’s used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. And the fourth factor is the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

    Tara:
    So, the first factor assesses whether the use is transformative, as established in the Supreme Court case of Campbell versus Cuff Rose Music. Transformativeness occurs where the new work adds something new with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.

    Scott:
    Right. And the recent Warhol decision now requires courts to ask, as part of the first factor, whether and to what extent the use at issue has a purpose or character different from the original and whether that supports a justification for copying. So now, the first fair use factor will analyze whether the purpose of the use of the second work is different enough from the first to reasonably justify a copying. Under the Warhol decision, a transformative use cannot be found for any use that just adds some new expression, meaning, or message. Now, the purpose of the use must be distinct enough from the purpose of the original use in order to justify copying.

    Tara:
    Yeah. So, the first fair use factor here, the Court looked at the purpose and character of Kramer’s use. According to Kramer’s own allegations, this was to capitalize on Joe Exotic’s popularity in order to sell her tattooing services. Netflix’s purpose of including the image was, according to Netflix, to showcase some of the stranger online images related to Joe Exotica in order to give scale to the large and bizarre reaction to Tiger King and its characters.

    Scott:
    Right. Netflix states that their use of the image of the tattoo has an entirely new and different biographical purpose, as well as a different meaning and message, namely, helping to show that Joe Exotica or Joe Exotic is it exotica or exotic?

    Tara:
    It’s exotic.

    Scott:
    Exotic. Joe Exotic accumulated a mass I like exotica better.

    Tara:
    I think it should.

    Scott:
    Anyways, helping the show that Joe Exotic accumulated a mass following of fanatical viewers, the plaintiff argued that this really is not a new purpose that justifies copying, as her purpose for choosing Joe Exotic was because of Joe Exotic’s notoriety, global recognition, fame, and a number of fanatical viewers. She basically says that the reason why she chose Joe Exotic for the tattoo is the same reason and purpose that Netflix chose the photograph of her tattoo.

    Tara:
    So, on this, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s tattoo design is indisputably a byproduct of the cultural phenomenon created by the first season of the Tiger King series. And the tattoo was created to capitalize on the portrayal of Joe Exotic created by the series. And that is why there is a seemingly similarity in purpose, but not vice versa.

    Scott:
    Addressing Kramer and Netflix’s purpose, with Kramer’s purpose being to sell tattoos and Netflix’s purpose being to show the magnitude of the global popularity of Tiger King and its characters, the Court found these purposes to be fundamentally different. Further, the Court stated that the different in purposes is made further apparent by the inability of the episode to supersede the tattoo. The Court points to the Supreme Court’s discussion in Warhol of the Warhol soup can series. The Court says that in Warhol, the Supreme Court stated that it did not mean that all derivative works borrowing heavily from an original cannot be fair use. And the Supreme Court specifically noted that the Warhol Soup cans is illustrative of that distinction. The Supreme Court stated that the purpose of Campbell’s Soup logo is to advertise its soup, and Warhol’s Soup Can canvases do not share that purpose. Instead, they’re used for artistic commentary on consumerism, which is independent from the purpose of advertising Soup.

    Tara:
    So, how can we extrapolate from this case? Brandon Boots versus Penske Media Corporation, the Dirt case you previously reported on, and obviously Warhol to come up with some cohesive application of the purpose-based analysis in fair use, right?

    Scott:
    It’s kind of challenging to find the through line in all of these cases, but we’ll try. So both Vootz and Kramer’s use was to encourage a sale, right? Vootz being encouraging a sale of real estate, Kramer’s being to encourage a sale of tattoo services. So there is that similarity there. Netflix’s use wasn’t to comment on Joe Exotic’s lifestyle but rather used as just one small part of a larger combination of various photos and videos to exemplify the general public’s unexplainable and seemingly insatiable interest in the Tiger King series and its characters.

    Tara:
    And in Warhol. The Court discussed Warhol’s. Campbell Soup Can series. There, the Court said that the purpose of the Campbell Soup logo is to advertise Soup, while Warhol’s Canvas series uses the Soup company’s copyrighted logo for an artistic commentary on consumerism, which is a purpose independent from advertising Soup.

    Scott:
    So, this all ties into the fourth fair use factor. And maybe that’s the through line. Maybe really, that’s what we should be looking at is: the fourth fair use factor and this purpose-based analysis together. So the fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work, because this seems to have relevance to the purpose based analysis where the secondary work could usurp the market for the first work. Obviously, this lends against the finding of fair use. So, where there is a meaningful or a significant effect upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work, this would weigh against the finding of fair use. And seemingly, the purpose underlying the use of the second work wouldn’t justify the copying.

    Tara:
    We can see this in Warhol. The purpose of the use of the Warhol image was the use of a licensed image of Prince in an article about Prince. Clearly, this would have a significant effect on the market for Goldsmith’s image. And I can also see this in Voots versus Penske media. While Voots hadn’t historically licensed his photos to parties other than real estate agents, if the plaintiff can show that the challenge use becomes widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work, which weighs against fair use. Here in Kramer, the Court found that Netflix’s use of the image in the series would not have a significant effect on the market for Kramer’s tattoo. But what if Kramer was also in the business of licensing photos of her tattoos? Would that create a different result?

    Scott:
    That’s an interesting question. Initially, I’m inclined to say no because.

    Tara:
    The core purpose of Kramer’s use was to sell tattoos, and Netflix’s use of the image in the series would not have a significant effect on the market for Kramer’s tattoos. However, if Kramer was in the business of licensing photos of her tattoos to third parties, I think that could trigger a different result.

    Scott:
    So, one interesting note in the Vootz case is the Court’s statement that 9th Circuit precedent instructs the widespread reproduction of copyrighted photographs in news articles, even if that reproduction is unrelated and subject matter to what the plaintiff normally licenses its photographs for. That would damage the plaintiff’s market to license those photographs and thus weigh against a finding of fair use. The way I interpret that language is if a plaintiff is in the business of licensing photographs, even if the purpose of the use may be well, let me say it’s a different way.

    If the plaintiff is in the business of licensing photographs, then the purpose of the use it’s going to have to be related because the purpose of the use will be the use of that particular photograph in whatever context the defendant is using it in. So I kind of read this as this biographical use that Netflix uses Kramer’s image for is not necessarily available in the circumstances where the plaintiff has an active licensing business.

    Tara:
    I agree with you, Scott. I think I read it the same way, and I think this is also getting really complicated. So I think we’re going to have to watch and see the future cases that are coming down here continuing to try to interpret Warhol and put some more practical examples out there for everybody to interpret and try to yeah, I agree.

    Scott:
    We’ll be watching this closely. Well, thanks for taking the time to talk with me today about yet another post-Warhol fair use case.

    Tara:
    Thanks, Scott. And I’m sure there will be more soon, so I’m looking forward to it.

    Scott:
    Tara, thank you for listening to today’s installment of the briefing and for joining us here. You can find us anywhere that you find your podcast and also on YouTube. Please also don’t forget to rate us or leave us a review if you’d like. Sam.


    Is Linda Fairstein’s Portrayal in Netflix’s “When They See Us” Fair? Oct 27, 2023
    Show notes

    Former New York prosecutor Linda Fairstein is suing Netflix over her portrayal in the limited series “When They See Us,” which tells the story of the 1989 Central Park Five case. Scott Hervey and Tara Sattler discuss this dispute on this episode of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Tara:
    There have been quite a few high-profile defamation cases making their way through the courts recently. One of those cases is Fairstein v. Netflix, a defamation case brought by attorney Linda Fairstein, the New York City prosecutor who ran the sex crimes unit and oversaw the prosecution of five African American men known as the Central Park Five, who were wrongly accused and imprisoned for a near-fatal rape in Central Park. Fairstein sued Netflix for defamation over her character’s depiction in the limited series When They See US, that was released by Netflix and produced by The Streamer. Even though the case has not yet gone to trial, there have been several interesting pretrial rulings. In the most recent ruling, a federal judge in New York denied Netflix’s motion for a summary judgment, which means that the case is one step closer to trial. On this installment of the briefing, we’re going to talk about the recent ruling and the potential impacts that this ruling may have on the uber-popular film and television programming that’s based on real events and real people.

    Scott:
    Since it has been a while since we’ve talked about this case, let’s briefly talk through Fairstein’s allegation of defamation. She alleges that she was incorrectly portrayed by actress Felicity Huffman as having a larger role in the Central Park Five’s fate than was factually accurate. She mentions three specific episodes and that she is portrayed in a false and defamatory manner in nearly every scene in those episodes. Her original complaint claims that this series depicts her using her true name as a racist, unethical villain who is determined to jail innocent children of color at any cost.

    Tara:
    Decades of case law has established that in order to prevail in a defamation case, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish that the statements at issue were indeed false. And here, because the plaintiff is considered a public figure, the plaintiff also has to prove that the defendant acted with actual malice in making the statement at issue. While there are some other factors in defamation, these factors are the most interesting in this particular case.

    Scott:
    That’s right. And the last element you mentioned, that the defendants acted with actual malice, was part of the recent ruling in the Fairstein case of Netflix’s motion for summary judgment. In order to prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for the truth. Here, we’re dealing with dramatization, and courts have applied the actual malice standard to dramatized accounts of real events, often recognizing that the use of invented dialog or a condensed timeline may be necessary for storytelling and that those facts are not themselves evidence of actual malice. Here, Fairstein needed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that Netflix and the producers acted in reckless disregard for the truth when portraying her in the series.

    Tara:
    So Netflix filed for summary judgment, arguing that they did not act with actual malice. Because the filmmakers are very confident that their portrayal of Ferrise reflected the essence of truth based on their multiple trusted sources and research, including previously published books, news reports, the Ken Burns documentary, and extensive interviews with the five, their families, and their lawyers. The Court denied Netflix’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that a jury could reasonably find that the producers recklessly disregarded the truth and that it is the job of a jury to evaluate all of the evidence in this case.

    Scott:
    And the Court mentioned some interesting things about the creative process in its ruling. First, the Court noted that while the filmmakers can refer to numerous research sources, many of those sources generally critique law enforcement and law enforcement’s overall handling of the case. But those sources didn’t specifically attribute certain actions or statements to any one person, including Fairstein herself. Also, the Court noted various notes and emails, both from production and from Netflix, which commented on making Fairstein appear to be unsympathetic. On that, the Court found that a reasonable jury could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the decision to make Fairstein the face of the system and the central villain caused the defendants to act with actual malice by recklessly imputing conduct to Fairstein that was unsupported by the writer’s substantial body of source material.

    Tara:
    That is really interesting, Scott. So, really, now that a jury may need to make a finding on actual malice, if this case actually proceeds all the way to trial, it seems like there’s really going to be a much deeper look under the hood into the creative process that Netflix and the producers used while they were developing the show and writing the scripts for the episodes. Because development often takes place over many, many years by a large team of producers, interns, assistants, writers, and executives, this is a really big task, and it’s also nearly an impossible task to depict 100% of the facts of a true story on screen. And the courts have also acknowledged a certain level of permissible fictionalization of characters based on actual people, like you mentioned.

    Scott:
    Right? And another aspect that keeps coming up and will be part of the jury’s analysis of actual malice is the fact that this case was marketed as a true story. The marketing campaign for “When They See US,” Netflix marketed the series with various taglines: that the series was, quote, based on the true story of the five, end quote, and that the story would show people, quote, the truth they haven’t heard. And there was quite a bit of social media chatter about the series and the series depicting the real truth.

    Tara:
    That’s right. There really is a lot that a jury is going to have to review if this case ever makes it to a jury trial. And in the meantime, we’re going to keep watching it because this case could have quite an impact on all the popular based on true story shows and movies that everybody loves. So, while we’re watching this case, Scott, what advice would you share with producers who are just starting out on the development and writing journey for these types of true story projects?

    Scott:
    That’s a great question and probably a really great takeaway for this podcast. So first, if a producer is going to attribute specific facts to a real person, make sure that those facts are accurate. This is the case even if that specific person is the sole real person in an otherwise fictionalized story. And it’s also the case if it’s just a throwaway single line. If you may recall, a single throwaway line in the second to last scene in the last episode of “The Queen’s Gambit” was the basis for a defamation case that is ongoing. Now, if your story requires a degree of fictionalized bad conduct, or if one character will be the vehicle for critique, or of something else like capitalism, or a general critique of the criminal justice system, create a fictionalized character, a composite character, or a fictionalized character to carry that. As the judge said in the recent Fairstein ruling, the choice to attribute this conduct to a real-life person is not immunized because the defendants intended the depiction to be a critique of the criminal justice system. And lastly, make sure that the character traits and attributes that you attribute to a real-life character on screen are backed up by your sources.

    Tara:
    So, if you’re going to depict somebody in a particular manner, make sure that the source material you’re relying on supports that depiction.

    Scott:
    That’s really great advice, Scott. Thanks for sharing. And I guess everybody better make sure to keep all of their notes for years to come, just in case this happens to come about. And we’ll definitely keep an eye on this case to see what happens next. Thanks for talking with me about it.

    Tara:
    Well, thanks for tuning in to this episode of The Briefing. We hope you enjoyed this episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    When Parmesan isn’t Parmesan – Cheese Consortium Attempts to Fight Off Counterfeit Cheese Oct 20, 2023
    Show notes

    The Parmigiano Reggiano Consortium claims that Italy’s renowned Parmigiano Reggiano cheese is one of the most counterfeited cheeses in the world. Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg discuss how they plan to fight off these counterfeits on this episode of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Scott:
    The Parmigiano Reggiano Consortium claims that Italy’s renowned Parmigiano Reggiano cheese is one of the most counterfeited cheeses in the world. And the consortium is seeking to fight off the cheap imitations through lawsuits and through technology. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin. I’m joined today by my colleague, Jamie Lincenberg. We are going to talk about when Parmesan cheese isn’t Parmesan cheese on this next installment of the Briefing by Weintraub Tobin. For those who may not know, Parmigiano Reggiano traces its history back to the Middle Ages. In 1996, the European Union recognized a protective designation of origin, or a PDO, for Parmigiano Reggiano. According to the PDO, this cheese can only be produced in a small geographic area of northern Italy, which includes Parma and Reggiano. A PDO designation is used for agricultural products that traditionally have been produced in a particular geographic region. When used on a product, the PDO designation guarantees that the food product originates in that specific region or follows a particular traditional production process.

    Jamie:
    If I’m recalling correctly, there was a legal issue involving a challenge to Germany permitting the sale of cheese branded as Parmesan, but it didn’t meet the PDO designation requirements. Germany argued that Parmesan was a generic term for a type of cheese often grated over food and could not be called uniquely Italian. A European Court of Justice, hearing the dispute, finally held that Parmesano Reggiano is the only type of cheese that can be called Parmesan within Europe and that Parmesan is not a generic term.

    Scott:
    That’s right. And that’s why when you go to Italy or other members of the European Union when you buy Parmesan, you’re buying Parmesan or Reggiano. But that ruling and the PDO is only binding within the European Union. Now, the consortium is taking steps to try to prevent the sale of what it calls counterfeit Parmesan cheese outside of the European Union. This includes filing various certification marks with trademark offices throughout the world, which includes the United States. Under the Trademark Act, a certification mark is used to certify regional or other origin, material, motive, manufacture, quality, accuracy or other characteristics of goods or services or that the works of labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization. With regard to the certification mark, Parmesan or Reggiano, it certifies that the cheese that is branded Parmigiano Reggiano originates in the Parma Reggiano region of Italy.

    Jamie:
    So what about Kraft? We all know that green can of Kraft Grated cheese. I assume Kraft has the right to use that mark.

    Scott:
    Kraft does have various registered trademarks in the US. Covering its product, but the consortium seems to be fighting Kraft’s use of Parmesan. Last year, the consortium filed the equivalent of an opposition with the Australian Trademark Office challenging Kraft’s application for its Parmesan cheesemarks in Australia. The consortium argued that Kraft’s use will confuse consumers. Kraft argued that the term Parmesan is generic for a certain style of hard cheese Kraft’s position that Parmesan is generic for a certain style of hard cheese is supported by the fact that Kraft has disclaimed the term parmesan in its trademark applications in and outside of the United States.

    Jamie:
    A mark owner trying to register its mark is required to disclaim the right to use a word that is part of the mark when that word is either descriptive or generic. The reason behind this is that merely descriptive or generic words should be free.

    Scott:
    For all of us to use, that’s right, under the US Trademark law, a mark is merely descriptive if it immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, a feature, a function, or a characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used. And the test for generalness is comprised of two parts. The first part being what is the genus of the good or services at issue? And two, does the relevant public understand the designation primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services? So with regard to Parmesan, the first part of the generic test would be the genus being cheese. And the second part does the relevant public understand the designation primarily to refer to that genus meaning cheese? And I think in the United States, it clearly does.

    Jamie:
    So how did the consortium fare in its challenge in Australia?

    Scott:
    Well, Kraft had been selling its product in Australia since 1966. The Australian Trademark Office said that it was highly unlikely that Australian cheese consumers would confuse Kraft’s jarred product with the wedges of Parmesano reggiano produced in Italy. Apparently, the consortium is appealing this decision. Now, the consortium has also opposed Kraft’s application in New Zealand, in Ecuador, and in Singapore, and in Ecuador and Singapore, the consortium prevailed.

    Jamie:
    But in the United States, kraft is not likely to be divested of its right to use Parmesan. It seems that the term parmesan is generic in the United States. But, Scott, at the top of this story, you said that the consortium is also using technology to tackle counterfeiting. What does that entail?

    Scott:
    Right, I did. So it seems that the consortium is now requiring its cheesemakers to insert a microchip into the label found on the rind of its cheese wheel. These microchips allow consumers to scan the cheese rind and then track the product back to their point of origin. Obviously, this is not a legal issue, but I thought it was kind of cool.

    Jamie:
    So we’re now microchipping cheese?

    Scott:
    We are now microchipping cheese. And apparently, by the way, these microchips have also been tested for food safety, and they are apparently very safe to eat.

    Jamie:
    Well, this discussion is making me very hungry.

    Scott:
    Yeah. Time for a nice plate of pasta.

    Jamie:
    Thanks, Scott.

    Jamie:
    Thanks for listening to this episode of the Briefing. We hope you enjoyed this episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today. Please leave us a comment.


    Unmasking Luxury Knockoffs: Amazon Sues Influencers for Promoting Counterfeit Goods Oct 13, 2023
    Show notes

    Amazon is suing two social media influencers for promoting the sale of counterfeit luxury goods on the platform. Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg discuss this case on this episode of The Briefing.

    Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.

    Show Notes:

    Jamie:
    Last week, Amazon.com, Seattle-based tech and e-commerce giant, and its counterfeit crimes unit launched lawsuits in Seattle federal court against two social media influencers and their coconspirators, accusing the defendants of using their profiles to promote, advertise, and facilitate the sale of knockoff luxury brand products as part of a scheme with third-party counterfeit sellers. I’m Jamie Lincenberg of Weintraub Tobin, and we’ll be joining my colleague Scott Hervey to talk about this case on today’s episode of The Briefing.

    Scott:
    Thank you for joining me today, Jamie. Can you provide us with a quick recap of the lawsuits?

    Jamie:
    Sure. In the filed complaints, Amazon Alleges that Influencers Ashley Howett and Cameron Russell posted links on Instagram and other social platforms to direct their followers to dupes of Prada, Hermes, Chanel, Louis Vuitton, Christian Dior, and other designer accessories through hidden links leading to seemingly generic product listings in the Amazon store. The lawsuits say that both influencers collaborated with a series of retailers on, per the complaints, sophisticated campaigns of false advertising in an attempt to evade Amazon’s counterfeit and infringement detection tools. Amazon alleges that both influencers use the same CD method to avoid getting caught through social media posts. The influencers make it very clear that they are promoting fake versions of the luxury brand items but then direct their followers to product listing pages in the seller’s Amazon stores, where the items appear generic with blurred logos or pixelated images. Amazon’s complaint against how it says that she openly acknowledged that the products were fake, informed her followers that they would receive products bearing luxury brand trademarks, and urged them to order the products before Amazon could take down the listings. According to the lawsuit against how Amazon, investigators ordered some of the products that she advertised and confirmed they spore the stolen brand names and logos.

    Scott:
    Both Howet and Russell, of course, received commissions for sales via the links they shared on their social media channels.

    Jamie:
    Yeah. The crux of the case against the influencers there are a number of charges against the manufacturers of the counterfeit goods, which are allegedly Chinese manufacturers located in various provinces of China. But the crux against the influencers is 15 USC. 1125 A, which is part of the Lanham Act. And that statute prohibits the use in commerce of any mark or false designation of origin, which can be a designation of the manufacturer in connection with goods that are false. Or misleading and which A are likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his. Or her goods, services, or commercial activities by that other person or b in commercial advertising or promotion misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities. The lawsuits accuse the influencers of contributory violations of this statute. The complaint alleges that the influencers’ liability stems from their knowing, facilitation, and assistance in the sale of counterfeit and infringing products offered by the manufacturers. But, Jamie, like you said, all of the Influencer social posts admitted and acknowledged that the products were counterfeit.

    Scott:
    The Influencers did not try to hold the products out as legitimate. And I’m curious about this from a legal standpoint.

    Jamie:
    Yeah, Scott, I am, too. Do you think that the Influencers thought by admitting and acknowledging that the products were counterfeit that would somehow eliminate any liability under their part? Is it possible that they were thinking if we admit the goods are counterfeit, there can be no consumer confusion as to the authenticity of the goods?

    Scott:
    No, Jamie, we don’t represent them or know them. So I’m only assuming that that could have been what they were thinking, but that’s not going to save them. Contributory infringement happens where you intentionally induce or encourage direct infringement, and that’s exactly what the Influencers did here. They contributed by funneling the buyers to the Amazon stores or the manufacturers who were making the counterfeit goods. The director of Amazon’s Counterfeit Crimes Unit said that the Influencers and the sellers they worked with knew exactly what they were doing when they attempted to evade Amazon’s brand protection systems to sell counterfeit products. That clearly infringed on brand’s intellectual property rights.

    Jamie:
    Yeah, and Amazon takes counterfeiting very seriously. Since establishing its Counterfeit Crimes Unit in the summer of 2020, Amazon’s been working across the globe to take action against counterfeiting, filing joint lawsuits with brands to eliminate the sale of counterfeits, not only in Amazon’s e-commerce store but across the supply chain. In 2021, Amazon reached a settlement against a group of defendants attempting similar hidden link schemes via social media. And that same year, Amazon seized and disposed of more than 3 million counterfeit products. In 2022, Amazon filed a joint lawsuit with Cartier against an individual and eight other businesses for a very similar scheme. Also, last year, it worked with Chinese authorities to seize counterfeits, knocking off Puma and Hugo Boss.

    Scott:
    And the reason why Amazon is so active policing the sale of counterfeit goods on its platform is because of its potential liability under the Lanham Act. This goes back to the 1992 case of Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. Versus Concession Services, which found a flea market operator contributorily liable for trademark infringement for allowing the sale of counterfeit goods at its flea market. Concession Services supplied the market and the buyers for the sale of the counterfeit goods.

    Jamie:
    Counterfeiting, unfortunately, is a longtime issue in the fashion industry, and luxury brands have typically been the target of such knockoffs. Amazon strongly supports legitimate content creators who strive to help their followers discover new products and really understand the vital role that Influencers now serve for consumers and businesses around the globe. However, those who knowingly promote and sell counterfeit items are really diminishing the reputation of legitimate content creators and need to be held accountable for their actions.

    Scott:
    Yeah, I agree with you, Jamie. But here’s another takeaway from this. And this is for, I guess, a bit of advice for all influencers who may seek to partner with foreign manufacturers in such a scheme. So my guess is that, in this case, the influencers are going to be the ones left holding the bag. These Chinese manufacturing defendants will either be unservable or they’ll have no assets, or they’ll just quickly vanish into the ether. And it will be these two individual influencers that will be the entire brunt of this lawsuit. And also, that’s not the end of the bad news for these influencers. They’re probably going to face lawsuits directly from the brands themselves.

    Jamie:
    That’s right. Thanks, Scott.

    Scott:
    Thanks, Jamie.

    Jamie:
    Thank you for joining us on this episode of the Briefing. We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share the episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today, leave us a comment.


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