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    The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin

    In The Briefing by Weintraub Tobin, intellectual property attorney Scott Hervey and his guests discuss current IP issues related to trademark, copyright, and entertainment, as well as IP litigation and intellectual property in the news.

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    Latest Episodes:
    Closing The Royalty Loophole Push for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings Jul 19, 2024
    Show notes

    Closing The Royalty Loophole Push for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings

    Did you know? In the U.S., terrestrial radio stations don’t pay royalties to non-songwriter performers or record labels! Unlike other countries, only songwriters and publishers get paid. Weintraub attorneys Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg share how musicians are pushing Congress to change this with the American Music Fairness Act in this installment of “The Briefing.”

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott

    As you are aware, or you may not be aware, that in the United States, terrestrial radio broadcasters do not have to pay royalties to the singer or the record label for the performance of music. That’s correct. While radio stations pay the songwriter and publisher or performance royalty, the non-songwriter performers, whether that be the singer, guitar player, or drummer, as well as the record label, get nothing. This is different than most other countries around the world and is also different from how royalties are paid for songs that are streamed over the Internet, such as on Spotify or Pandora. Some musicians are pushing Congress to change that. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and I’m joined today by fellow Weintraub lawyer and frequent “Briefing” contributor Jamie Lincenberg. We are going to talk about what some are calling a loophole that benefits US radio station conglomerates and the arguments to change that in today’s installment of “The Briefing.”

    Jamie, welcome back to “The Briefing.”

    Jamie

    Thanks, Scott. Glad to be here again.

    Scott

    So, Jamie, before you heard my opening, did you know that US radio stations don’t make any payments to the non-songwriter, artist or record labels when they play music over terrestrial airwaves?

    Jamie

    I don’t think I did.

    Scott

    I don’t think most people knew that, to be quite honest with you. So, the fact that non-songwriters and record labels get nothing when a US radio station plays a song has its genesis in the difference in rights a copyright holder in a composition has from the rights a copyright holder in a sound recording has. So, first, let’s clarify a couple of things. So one, a piece of recorded music has two copyrights. The first is in the underlying musical composition, and the second is in the sound recording itself. The rights in a musical composition are usually owned by a songwriter or the music publisher, and the sound recording rights are usually owned by either the artist or a record label if there is one. Now, the copyright act vests copyright holders with certain exclusive rights. However, the rights a copyright holder has in a sound recording is more limited than the rights a copyright holder has in a musical composition. The copyright owner of a sound recording has the right to make and distribute copies of the sound recording and make derivative works from it, such as remixes, videos using the sound recording, etc. The public performance rights for sound recordings, however, is limited only to digital audio transmissions.

    This means that AM and FM radio stations do not have to get permission or pay royalties to publicly perform a sound recording. However, since the Copyright Act grants a copyright holder in a composition the right to control the public performance of that composition, a US radio station does have to pay the songwriter or publisher a royalty for the public performance of that composition when they play music over the airwaves.

    Jamie

    This is only the case for US radio stations, correct? Outside of the US, non-songwriter artists and labels are paid a royalty by radio stations. In the US, a digital audio transmission, such as streaming a song on Spotify or the like, triggers royalties for artists and labels.

    Scott

    Yeah, that’s right. So according to a post in Variety that’s written by senators Alex Padilla and Marshall Blackburn, foreign performance royalty collection entities, those who already pay their own local artists for radio airplay, currently withhold royalties to American music creators simply because the United States does not reciprocate by paying their performers. So those senators estimate that American artists are missing out on approximately $200 million each year.

    Jamie

    Wow, that’s quite a big number.

    Scott

    It is.

    Jamie

    So what legislation is being proposed on this now?

    Scott

    So, there was a bill that was proposed last year called the American Music Fairness Act, which would establish that the copyright holders of a sound recording have the exclusive right to publicly perform the sound recording through an audio transmission. So, this would essentially require terrestrial radio to secure a performance license for the sound recording. Now, this will most likely be a compulsory license, and the copyright royalty board will determine the royalty rates, just like they do for the compulsory license issued for compositions. Now, the bill proposes certain exemptions for smaller broadcast stations who would have really only have to pay, well, it’s proposed that they would only have to pay a flat fee of either $2 per day and not more than $500 annually to play unlimited music. And for certain public radio stations and college radio stations, and nonprofit radio stations, it would only be $100 per year.

    Jamie

    That’s interesting, Scott. It seems like it’s interesting to me that, this hasn’t been adopted yet until this time.

    Scott

    Yeah, I agree.

    Jamie

    When’s the last time you listened to the radio?

    Scott

    Um, that’s very funny. Last time I listened to the radio is actually this morning as I was driving in my car coming back from a conference, so, but I got to say, I do not normally listen to the radio. I do normally listen to satellite radio, so, which pays, by the way, a performance royalty to the performers and the songwriters as well. So, you know, it’s interesting with the kind of crash or decline, maybe is a kinder word in the audience for traditional terrestrial radio, this is an additional cost for terrestrial radio that they would have to bear. We may very well see maybe some, if this does in fact, pass, we may see some consolidation or some closings of some smaller radio stations.

    Jamie

    Or more ads.

    Scott

    More, yeah, more ads! More, but I mean, if you got less people listening to terrestrial radio, the value of those ads, the amount that the ad sale guys can sell those ads for, that goes down, too. It’s just a really, that kind of a really bad death spiral. But in any event, that’s the scoop. I thought everybody would be interested knowing that in the United States, non-songwriter performers have don’t get paid a royalty. Historically, since the beginning of radio in the United States, have not received a royalty.

    Jamie

    Yeah. Thanks for sharing that with us, Scott.

    Scott

    Thank you for listening to this episode of “The Briefing.” We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and


    Not Terminated – Cher Still Entitled to Her Share of Music Royalties Jul 12, 2024
    Show notes

    Not Terminated Cher Still Entitled to Her Share of Music RoyaltiesCher recently won a major lawsuit over her music royalties from her divorce from Sonny Bono. Join Weintraub attorneys Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg on today’s episode of “The Briefing” as they break down this case and its implications for copyright law.

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott

    Cher recently won quite a big victory in a lawsuit over whether a copyright termination in various Sonny Bono compositions could terminate her share of music royalties that were accorded to her in the divorce settlement between her and Sonny. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and I’m joined by frequent Briefing contributor Jamie Lincenberg. We are going to talk about this case on today’s episode of “The Briefing.”

    Jamie, welcome back to “The Briefing.”

    Jamie

    Thanks for having me, Scott.

    Scott

    Let’s jump into the facts of this case. In 2016, Mary Bono, that’s Sonny Bono’s widow, issued a notice of copyright termination under Section 203 of the Copyright Act to various music publishers that held rights in Sonny Bono’s compositions. Under Section 203, authors or their successors may terminate copyright assignments and licenses that were made on or after January 1, 1978. Upon termination, all rights in the work that were covered by the grant revert to the author. However, any derivative works that were prepared under the authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after that grant is terminated. Apparently, though, in September 2021, Mary Bono notified Cher that pursuant to the copyright termination and their rights, Cher was no longer entitled to the 50% of royalties she was accorded under the divorce settlement agreement. Cher ended up suing for declaratory relief to enforce her rights under the marital settlement agreement she had with Sonny Bono.

    Jamie

    There is some important language in the marital settlement agreement. Let’s highlight that first. The agreement, which is governed by California law, gave Cher a 50% interest in any record royalties, which is all contingent receipts payable after July 14th, 1978, from Atlantic Recording Corporation under the agreement dated August 30th, 1966, from Liberty, U. A. Inc, under the agreements dated from and after November 1, 1964, and from MCA Records Inc, under agreements dated January 1, 1972, and February 11th, 1971. It also gave a share of 50% interest in any composition royalties, which is the contingent receipts payable after July 14, 1978, from musical compositions and interests therein written and composed in whole or in part by Sonny or others prior to February 1, 1974, and/or were acquired by Sonny and certain other entities prior to the couple’s separation.

    Scott

    That’s right, Jamie. The marital settlement agreement also states that any of Sonny’s successors and interests or assigned are also subject to share rights in both the record royalties and the composition royalties. So, in Cher’s lawsuit for declaratory relief, she sought from the court a declaration that Mary Bono’s copyright termination notice did not terminate and could not have terminated the marital settlement agreement and its assignment to share 50% of the composition royalties. Mary Bono took the position that Section 304(c) of the Copyright Act, the copyright termination section, preempts state contract law as to the rights to the renewal terms of the copyrights at issue. And as a result, the marital settlement agreement is now preempted and lacks effect.

    Jamie

    The key question before the court was whether the composition royalties and certain approval rights under the marital settlement agreement constitute copyright grants that were affected by the notice of termination.

    Scott

    Right. Now, the court did find that the marital settlement agreement is linked to the musical compositions and Sonny’s corresponding property interests. However, the granting of a royalty and the approval rights that are within the marital settlement agreement did not refer to and were not a grant of a transfer or license of the underlying copyrights, and shares rights under the marital settlement agreement arise solely under state law. Section 304 of the Copyright Act expressly provides that it in no way affects rights arising under any other federal, state, or foreign law. As such, the notice of termination issued by Mary Bono cannot affect share’s contractual rights to receive financial compensation as was set forth in the marital settlement agreement.

    Jamie

    Right. This does align with the holdings of other courts finding that a right to receive royalties is distinct from a grant of copyright.

    Scott

    Yeah, that’s right. I think this case is a good reminder for those of us that may be involved in a dispute that involves copyright assets. So clearly, in any marital settlement agreement, when the community property involves copyright interest, it’s probably not the best course of action to transfer any interest in the copyright. But this also goes beyond the marital settlement situation and can include any type of settlement situation.

    Jamie

    Yeah, that’s interesting and definitely a good reminder.

    Scott

    Yeah. Well, Jamie, thanks for joining us today.

    Jamie

    Thank you for listening to this episode of “The Briefing.” We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and do share this episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about any of the topics that we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    The Strength of a Trademark (Archive) Jul 05, 2024
    Show notes

    Trademarks perform a number of important functions. Scott Hervey discusses the spectrum of trademark strength in this archive episode of “The Briefing”

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:
    Trademarks perform a number of important functions. They are consumer road signs; they tell consumers which products to buy. They are a company’s public persona; they epitomize of all the positive (and negative) qualities of a company or a product. Lastly, trademarks represent a solemn promise to the purchasing public that the products or services branded with a company’s mark will meet certain standards. Yet, even with marks as important as they are, some business select marks that are intrinsically weak and have limited protection. WE are going to talk about the spectrum of trademark strength on this installment of The Briefing by the IP Law Blog

    Scott:
    Trademarks can be one of the more valuable assets a company owns. Trademarks generate brand equity based on the amount a consumer will pay for a branded product as compared to a non-branded product. For some companies, brand equity can make up a substantial portion of its value. For example, according to a 2001 ranking by Interbrand, the Coca-Cola brand, valued at $68,945,000, represents 61% of Coca-Cola’s market capitalization as of July, 2001. Xerox’s brand, valued at $6,019,000, represents 93% of Xerox’s market capitalization as of July, 2001.

    Josh:
    In business, branding comes as second nature. In order to survive in a competitive environment, a business must separate itself and its products from the pack and summarize these differences in a concise and succinct manner. This is even more important for emerging companies who are new to the field and in competition against established businesses with market share.

    Scott:
    Given the important function of trademarks, it is imperative that an emerging company identify its marks, analyze whether the marks are strong or weak, and then protect the stronger marks from infringement, being diluted and from becoming generic due to public misuse.

    Josh For the most part, a trademark can be anything. According to the Lanham Act, the Federal law that deals with trademark issues, a trademark can be a word, a saying, or a logo. A Trademark can even consist of a sound (think Intel), color (pink for Corning ware fiberglass insulation) and a smell. As long as the proposed mark meets the essential purpose of functioning as a trademark, that is, it serves to identify the manufacturer of the goods or provider of the services, it can properly be categorized as a trademark. The proposed mark must mentally trigger an association between the mark owner and the goods or services bearing the mark, otherwise it is not a trademark.

    Scott:
    And while it’s true that a trademark can be anything, not everything can and should be a trademark.

    Josh:
    That’s right Scott. There are certain marks that will be denied protection as a trademark. Marks which consist of immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter or matter which disparages any person, living or dead, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, are not registrable or protectable.

    Scott:
    Neither are marks which resemble flags of code or arms or other insignias of the United States or of any state or municipality or of any foreign nation, or marks which utilize the name, portrait or signature of a particular living individual without that individuals consent Also, marks which consist or comprise of a portrait of a deceased president of the United States are not registrable during the life of the president’s widow except by written consent of the widow In addition, certain organizations, by acts of Congress, have been granted exclusive rights to use certain marks. For example, the United States Olympic Committee has been granted exclusive right to use a number of “Olympic” symbols, marks and terms

    Josh:
    Marks which describe the intended purpose, function or use of the goods, the size of the goods, desirable characteristics of the goods, the nature of the goods or the end effect upon the user are really not the best choice for a trademark. This type of mark is considered merely descriptive and is not registerable on the principal register absent establishing secondary meaning.

    Scott:
    Its iron Josh how often companies gravitate toward a descriptive mark. The penchant for a descriptive mark was explained to me by a client – they work because the consumer knows exactly what they are getting. That’s useful in the short term but does nothing for brand building.

    Josh:
    Here is a few examples of descriptive marks – NICE ‘N SOFT® for bathroom tissue or PARK ‘N FLY® for off-airport auto parking services are descriptive marks. The same is true with respect to marks that identify the place in which the goods or services originate and therefore are geographically descriptive.

    Scott:
    The major reasons for not protecting marks that are merely descriptive is to prevent the owner of a mark from inhibiting competition in the sale of particular goods and to maintain freedom of the public to use language which naturally describes the goods or services, thus avoiding the possibility of harassing infringement suits by the registrant against others who use the mark when advertising or describing their own product

    Josh:
    Marks that are merely self-laudatory and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product are regarded as being descriptive. Laudation does not per se prevent a slogan or mark from being registerable. Like other descriptive marks, a mark that is self-laudatory may be registerable upon establishing secondary meaning. However, courts have refused registration even on the Supplemental Register of marks that are so highly laudatory and descriptive of the alleged product that they are incapable of functioning as a trademark

    Scott:
    One step up from descriptive marks, but miles away as far as protectability goes, are suggestive marks. Suggestive marks are registerable on the Principal Register without proof of secondary meaning. Suggestive marks are those which, while not really descriptive of the product’s qualities, nevertheless, suggest some benefit or property of the product. An example involves ROACH MOTEL® for insect traps, in which this mark was enforced against an infringer using “Roach Inn.” The Court explained,

    We do not find the mark ROACH MOTEL® to be a merely descriptive mark. While roaches may live in some motels against the will of the owners, motels are surely not built for roaches to live in. Hence, the mark is fanciful on conception. Indeed, its very incongruity is what catches one’s attention

    Josh:
    The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive and therefore not registerable absent evidence of secondary meaning or merely suggestive has always been a challenging task. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the quasi-judicial body responsible for adjudicating issues which arise concerning the registration of a trademark ) has opined that there is “a thin line of demarcation involved in making a determination as to whether a term or slogan is suggestive or merely descriptive and, apropos, thereto, when a term stops suggesting and begins to describe the goods in connection with which it is used, it is, at times, a difficult question to resolve.”

    Scott:
    The Board suggested that in determining whether a mark has crossed the threshold from suggestiveness to descriptiveness, the following factors should be analyzed: (1) is the mark used in a trademark sense and not in a descriptive manner to describe the goods; (2) is the mark an expression that would be or is commonly used to describe the goods; (3) does the mark possess some degree of ingenuity in its phraseology; (4) does the mark say something at least a little different from what might be expected from a product, or say expected things in an unexpected way; and (5) does the mark possess more than a single meaning, namely, a double-entendre, which imparts to it a degree of ingenuity and successfully masks or somewhat obscures the intended commercial message

    Josh:
    The strongest marks are those which are coined words, having no intrinsic meaning or arbitrary words which, although they might exist as words in the English language, have no conceivable rational connection to the product, e.g. KODAK® (coined) for film and CAMEL® (arbitrary) for cigarettes. Because such coined or arbitrary marks are inherently distinctive, no proof of secondary meaning is necessary before a court will protect the trademark rights of the senior user of such marks.


    Supreme Court Holds Copyright Damages Can Go Beyond 3 Years Jun 28, 2024
    Show notes

    Supreme Court Holds Copyright Damages Can Go Beyond 3 Years Weintraub attorneys Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg unpack the Supreme Court’s follow-up decision on damages in Neely v. Warner Chapel Music. Explore how this ruling could reshape future infringement cases.

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott:

    In a previous episode of “The Briefing,” we pondered just how far back a plaintiff in a copyright infringement case can go in recovering damages when we discussed the case of Warner Chapel Music versus Neely. Well, the Supreme Court answered that question on May 9th, 2024. The answer is as far back as they’re able. I’m Scott Hervey of Weintraub Tobin, and I’m joined today by my colleague and frequent briefing guest, Jamie Lincenberg. We will be talking about the Neely case and how the Supreme Court’s answer to what was a contested question in copyright law might impact future infringement cases on today’s episode of “The Briefing.” Jamie, welcome back, and thank you for joining us today.

    Jamie

    Thanks, Scott. I’m happy to be here.

    Scott

    Jamie, can you give us some background on this case?

    Jamie

    Of course. In the case of Neely versus Warner Chapel Music, which began in 2018, music producer Sherman Neely filed a lawsuit against Warner Chapel Music and Artist Publishing Group. It was a run-of-the-mill copyright infringement case in which Neely claimed that Flo Rida’s 2008 song, “In the Air,” featured an unlicensed sample of a 1984 track that Neely owned.

    Scott

    And this case became not so run-of-the-mill when Neely’s lawsuit headed to the Supreme Court to answer the then unresolved question of whether damages in a copyright case are limited to just the last three years before the case was filed, or can damages go way back beyond the three years? The reason why this case was right for Supreme Court review was due to a circuit split on the issue.

    Jamie

    Right. The Second Circuit, the jurisdiction covering Neely’s case, applied a three-year damages cap that Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsberg explained in the Supreme Court’s past holding in Petrella versus MGM, as a successful plaintiff can gain retrospective relief only three years back from the time of suit. No recovery may be had for infringement in earlier years, and profits made in those years remain the defendants to keep. The Second Circuit applied the three-year limitation on damages, even in where a plaintiff alleges that his discovery of the infringement was only recently discovered. Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent endorsement of the three-year limitation on damages rule, the Ninth Circuit and the 11th Circuit later broke rank and held that if a plaintiff can prove they only recently discovered the fact that their copyright was infringed, not only can they bring a copyright lawsuit outside of the three-year limitation period, but the plaintiff can also see seek damages going back all the way to the very first infringement.

    Scott

    That’s right. So, the question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Neely was whether under the discovery, a cruel rule applied by the circuit courts, a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit. And the Court, the Supreme Court, ended up answering that question in the affirmative.

    Jamie

    Right. The Court points out that if any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the acts remedial sections, but these sections do not apply a time limit on monetary recovery. The Court points out that these sections just state without any qualification that an infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits. So, a copyright owner possessing a timely claim for infringement is entitled to damages no matter when the infringement occurred. The Court also took a shot at the Second Circuit’s logic for applying the three-year damages cap. The Court pointed out that the Second Circuit recognizes the discovery rule and allows a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit for acts of infringement that occurred more than three years earlier, but does not allow the plaintiff to recover damages for the infringement that is the very basis of the lawsuit.

    Scott

    That’s right, but the still unanswered question from this case is the validity of the discovery rule itself. In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledges that it has never decided whether a copyright claim accrues when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered an infringement rather than when the infringement happened. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch said that the discovery rule has no role in copyright infringement cases, option of finding a fraud or concealment by the defendant. Justice Gorsuch acknowledged that this court, deciding the Neely case, was not under any independent obligation to take up the question of the validity of the discovery rule since that was not the issue before the court. However, rather than spending time on the Neely case, Gorsuch said he would have dismissed it as improvidently granted and waited another case squarely presenting the question whether the Copyright Act authorizes the discovery rule since, in his words, it is better to answer a question that does matter than one that almost certainly does not.

    Jamie

    So, Scott, based on this opinion, how do you think that this is going to impact the filing of infringement cases moving forward?

    Scott

    I mean, think about it. There is a damage cap under the accrual where you know that infringement occurred and you’re aware of the infringement at the time that the infringement occurs. And it’s not an instance where you only recently discover an infringement that has been occurring for longer than the three-year statutory period. In those cases, you’re naturally limited to three years of damages because most likely you’re aware of the act of infringement when it happened. But taking into account the discovery rule where an act of infringement has been happening for a very long time, as was the case in the Neely case, where he was not aware of Flo Rida’s song. We previously talked about how anybody could not be aware of that particular song. But nonetheless, I think it’s going to I think it’s going to encourage more of these types of cases. I think it’s going to encourage more cases where it’s alleged that the plaintiff only recently discovered the act of infringement, and then it will be the burden of the defendant to disprove that, to prove that the plaintiff was actually aware or any reasonable person under similar circumstances would have been aware of the act of infringement, and then try to end the case based on late filing of the complaint and a running of the statutory period. But I definitely think this will encourage more people to bring these types of cases because the pot of gold is so much bigger.

    Jamie

    Right. Yeah, that’s what I was going to say.

    Scott

    But I also think with more of these cases brought, I mean, justice such as dissenting opinion just teed it up for a potential defendant who is going to attack the discovery rule. I mean, that would be if I was defending a defendant who was the recipient of a copyright infringement claim, and the claim was based on the discovery rule, essentially, I would attack the validity of the discovery rule and appeal that all the way up because it seems if Justice Gorsuch, and the majority as well, they were basically welcoming an opportunity to rule on the validity of the discovery rule.

    Jamie

    Right. I feel like right now, the discovery rule, based on this opinion, is maybe in a little bit of a gray area. Do we follow it? Do we not? So, yeah, this leads us to maybe be a case that’s going to examine this discovery rule, maybe all the way up to the Supreme Court?

    Scott

    Yeah. Well, we’ll definitely keep an eye on that and basically see if the discovery rule falls out of favor in certain circuits. It’s based on this opinion because it somewhat puts its validity into question. Or definitely, like you said, puts it in a gray area for sure. We’ll have to track some of these cases and we’ll report back for sure.

    Jamie

    Thank you for listening to this episode of “The Briefing.” We really hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share the episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about the topics we covered, please leave us a comment.


    The Briefing: Is the FTC Recent Rule on Non-Competes a New Reality for Reality TV Stars Jun 21, 2024
    Show notes

    Is The FTC Recent Rule on Non-Competes a New Reality for Reality TV StarsThe FTC just issued a final rule banning post-employment non-compete clauses, and it’s shaking things up, especially in the non-scripted TV world. How will this impact talent deals? Join Weintraub attorneys Scott Hervey and Shauna Correia as they discuss what this means for networks and on-air talent on the latest installment of “The Briefing.”

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott

    The FTC recently issued a final rule banning post-employment non-compete clauses in agreements between employers and their workers. While this is causing consternation with the standard corporate GC set, in-house counsel of television networks that are heavy into non-scripted television are quietly expressing concern. Why? Well, post-term exclusivity provisions are huge in the non-scripted television industry, and they’re used to prevent non-scripted talent from jumping ship. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and today I’m joined by my partner, Shauna Correia. We’re going to talk about this FTC ban and how it will impact non-scripted talent deals on today’s installment of “The Briefing” by Weintraub Tobin. Shauna, welcome to “The Briefing.”

    Shauna

    Thanks for having me, Scott.

    Scott

    Okay, so Shauna, why don’t you tell us what this ruling actually says?

    Shauna

    This 540-page rule that the FTC came up with prohibits an employer from entering into or attempting to enter into any post-employment non-competent clause with a worker in the United States. The definition of worker is very broad. It applies to all-natural persons, so that’s direct and indirect relationships with employees and independent contractors. There are a couple of important but narrow exceptions. First, it does not apply to senior executives, which is defined as individuals making over $151,164 in annual compensation and are in a policy-making position for the company like a CEO or president, and the non-compete agreement was in place before the rule took effect. Second, it doesn’t apply in connection with a legitimate sale of a business. Third, it doesn’t apply to a small number of industries, which include nonprofits or specific industries like air carriers or ground transportation or banks that are not governed by the FTC but are regulated by some other governmental agency. But the vast majority of industries are covered by this.

    Scott

    What about existing non-competes?

    Shauna

    It’s important to note that this rule will not take effect for 120 days from today, May 7th. We have until September 4th before it becomes law. But assuming the rule takes effect, unless this worker is a senior executive, the rule as written will apply to retroactively ban enforcement of existing non-competes. Also, to note, if a cause of action for a breach of a valid non-compete has accrued prior to the effective date of the rule, that can still be enforced.

    Scott

    Companies that have non-competed agreements in place, they’re also required to send out a notice of non-enforcement, correct?

    Shauna

    Right. Employers are going to be required to send out a clear and conspicuous notice to all workers that have a non-competent provision in their contract, and the notice will have to tell the workers that the non-compete provisions will not and cannot be legally enforced.

    Scott

    A company can’t satisfy this by, say, putting a notice on its website, can’t it?

    Shauna

    No. The rule will require individualized communication, but it’s pretty open. It can be by email, mail, or even text message. I think the key is that you want to have proof that the notice went out. The FTC rule does provide model language that can be used.

    Scott

    Okay. Well, now let’s talk about how this rule defines a non-competent clause and how that could impact what we normally see in participant agreements in non-scripted television.

    Shauna

    Sure. The rule defines a non-competent clause as a term or condition of employment that prohibits a worker from, penalizes a worker for, or functions to prevent a worker from seeking or accepting work in the United States with a different person, where such work would begin after the conclusion of the employment, or two operating a business in the United States after the conclusion of the employment that includes this non-competent term or condition.

    Scott

    The rule makes it clear that it would ban the enforceability of other contract clauses that have the same effect as a non-competent clause. The FTC provided an illustration, an NDA between an employer and a worker, written so broadly that it effectively precludes the worker from working in the same field after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with that employer.

    Shauna

    Correct. Unlike under California state law, it doesn’t specifically ban non-solicitation provisions, but a super broad NDA like the example you gave, or for example, a non-solicitation clause, could be invalidated because the rule bars any provision or policy that functions to prevent someone from competing once their job for the company is done.

    Scott

    Okay, so let’s see how this could impact participant deals in non-scripted television. So generally, in contracts with principal talent or participants in a non-scripted program, there is an exclusivity clause that generally requires the talent to be exclusive to the producer or the network. When these provisions are challenged in negotiation, networks like to argue that on-air talent becomes well known because of the network’s investment and reputation and that the network must be able to use this exclusivity provision to protect this investment. The scope of exclusivity can be very broad. For example, as an on-camera performer in all media, that’s a scope of the exclusivity. Or it could be narrower as an on-camera performer in unscripted television. Depending on the leverage the talent has, the talent could negotiate some carve-out, such as allowing the talent to participate in other types of non-scripted television, such as competition shows or something that is different than the format of the program that they’re being hired, or they can negotiate to allow for internet programming, such as a YouTube series. Now, to get this would require some leverage, and that’s not something that most participants that aren’t already celebrities have. Most of the average participants in non-scriptive television would start out with a very broad exclusivity provision.

    Shauna

    The language in the exclusivity provision ends up essentially prohibiting this type of competition post-term.

    Scott

    That’s right. The term of the exclusivity generally spans the period of time the producer has options on the talent services. So, generally, a talent agreement gives the producer the option to hire the talent back for subsequent seasons. Usually, it’s for five, six, or seven seasons. The option period language you usually see is something like 12 months from the initial airing of the previous season of the program.

    Shauna

    So effectively, how long could that be?

    Scott

    So, let’s look at the time period after the camera stops rolling. From the end of principal photography until the time that the show actually airs, could be as long as 6 to 12 months. Then you have the run of that particular season, so that could be an additional 6 to 12 weeks, depending upon the number of episodes ordered to production. Then you have the option window, the 12-month span from the first airing of the last episode of that season. So effectively, that period could be as long as 20 months to two years plus. The commission specifically declined to provide an exclusion to the rule for on-air talent. So, it’s clear that the commission intended this rule to be applicable to persons who participate in programming on air. Do you believe such an exclusivity provision, the type that we just talked about, would be interpreted as a non-competent clause?

    Shauna

    Yeah, I think so because, as you described it, it would be seen as prohibiting that on-air talent from effectively doing any other work during this time, which could be, like you said, 20 months to 2 years.

    Scott

    Well, let’s get it clear: prohibit them from doing any other work as an on-camera talent. Most of the time, these participants do something else. They have some other job or skill or expertise that may have something to do with being on camera.

    Shauna

    Yeah, I think, as written, this would be seen as prohibiting on-air talent from effectively doing other work for another employer during this time, at least as on-air talent.

    Scott

    Currently, there are some legal challenges to the rule. Let’s focus largely on the lack of statutory authority of the FTC to enact this type of rule. However, if the rule is upheld, I can see networks, maybe in an attempt to get around this prohibition, revising how on-camera talent is paid. Instead of paying the talent over the course of production, which is how they’re normally paid, I can see a network stretching the payment all the way out to the very last date when the vast majority of the talent’s work is performed and making the last payment due on the date that the producer’s option would have to be exercised. I could see networks arguing that this is an intern prohibition and not a post-term and thus it doesn’t fall under the FTC’s rule or isn’t prohibited by the FTC rule.

    Shauna

    Yeah. As you mentioned, there are these legal challenges right now. The US Chamber of Commerce and two private entities have already filed suit to enjoin this law from being enforced, both on grounds that it’s retroactive, arbitrary, exceeds the bounds of the FTC’s authority delegated from Congress, constitutional grounds, you name it. We’ll have to see what happens there. But to your point, I agree with you, networks are going to get creative to achieve their goals, and there’s room for that. In fact, the FTC itself seems to suggest that what is traditionally known in the old labor as garden leave could work here, which would mean, though, talent being paid the same pay and benefits to stay on the payroll for the whole exclusivity period while really not doing any work. As you say, that may just end up meaning the network stretching the same dollars of pay over longer period of time. Or there’s other options, maybe really beefing up the nondisclosure provisions and things like that to prevent leaks of information about the show before it’s air and things like that.

    Scott

    I think the network’s focus really is going to be locking in the talent to that particular network and not allowing them to do another show for another network. I can see a network stretching out the pay because they’re paid by the episode. They’re not paid by the week or by the month. Stretching out that pay and making the last payment due on the date that the producer’s option to pick up their services for next season would otherwise expire.

    Shauna

    Yeah, and to be clear, nothing about the rule prohibits exclusivity provisions during employment. So, I would think that that would be viable.

    Scott

    Yeah, interesting, interesting. Okay, well, let’s keep track of this and see what happens. And if we start seeing networks revising the way in which non-scripted talent are paid, if this rule, in fact, comes into effect as law, then we’ll have another subject to talk about. But thanks for joining us today, Shauna.

    Shauna

    All right. Thanks a lot.

    Scott

    Thanks for listening to this episode of The Briefing. We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    Scarlett Johansson vs Chat GPT What the Legal Claims Would Look Like Jun 14, 2024
    Show notes

    Scarlett Johansson vs Chat GPT - What the Legal Claims Would Look LikeDid Scarlett Johansson’s voice inspire ‘Sky’? Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg of Weintraub Tobin unpack the controversy between Scarlett Johansson and OpenAI’s Chat GPT. Explore potential legal claims and the intricacies of voice rights in AI on this episode of The Briefing.

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott

    Scarlett Johansson claims that Chat GPT’s voice of Sky is her voice, or is intended to be her voice. Despite Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, attempting to engage Johansson to voice Chat GPT, Altman claims that Sky isn’t her, that it’s a voice actress OpenAI hired well before his initial discussions with Scarlett’s agent. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and I’m joined today by a fellow Weintraub lawyer and frequent “Briefing” contributor, Jamie Lincenberg. We are going to talk about the Scarlett Johansson OpenAI controversy, the claims she could bring, and how those claims may fair on today’s episode of “The Briefing” by Weintraub Tobin.

    Jamie, welcome back to “The Briefing.” I think this one’s going to be a good one.

    Jamie

    Thanks, Scott. It’s good to be back. I’m excited to dive in.

    Scott

    This has been in the news for quite a while now, and the facts are mostly out there. In a nutshell, Sam Altman approached Scarlett Johansson in September 2023 about voicing Chat GPT. According to Scarlett Johansson, Altman said that he felt that by voicing the system, she could bridge the gap between tech companies and creatives and help consumers feel comfortable with the seismic shift concerning humans and AI. Apparently, Altman felt that her voice would be comforting to people. Scarlett Johansson ultimately declined. Two days before the Chat GPT 4.0 demo was released, Altman contacted Johansson’s agent asking that Scarlett reconsider. Now, also sometime before the Chat GPT demo was released, Sam Altman tweeted, “Her”, which seems to point to the 2013 movie where Scarlett Johansson voiced a Siri-like AI assistant. Now, apparently, before the two could connect, the Chat GPT demo was released, and Scarlett began getting calls and emails from friends and family who thought that the Chat GPT voice, Sky, was her. Altman claims that the voice of Sky is that of a voice actor who was hired before he contacted Scarlett Johansson’s agent.

    Jamie

    Thanks, Scott. I think that sums up the facts. That’s far, fairly well. Let’s now talk about the type of claims that Johansson could bring. I think the first logical step is a right of publicity claim.

    Scott

    Yeah, I agree with you, Jamie.

    Jamie

    California’s right of publicity statute is Civil Code Section 3344 and prohibits the use of another’s name, voice, photograph, or likeness on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, such products, merchandise, goods, or goods without such person’s prior consent. California also has a common law right of publicity that’s a bit broader than the statute. If Johansson did bring a case, it would follow some of the soundalike recording cases that the Ninth Circuit has previously adjudicated.

    Scott

    Yeah, that’s right. The first was Midler versus Ford, and the second was Tom Waits versus Frito-Lay. Both of those cases involved the use of a soundalike singer singing a song in the style of that particular artist in TV commercial. Both Midler and Waits sued for violation of their rights of publicity under the Civil Code and also under California’s Common Law. The trial court in Midler initially granted Ford its motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, addressing Midler’s Common Law claim, held that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated that which is not theirs and have committed a tort in California. The Waits Court, which relied on Midler, found similarly.

    Jamie

    There are a few issues that I can already see with this type of claim if Johansson were to bring it. The Midler and Waits cases held that when a voice is a sufficient indicia of a celebrity’s identity, the right of publicity protects against its imitation for commercial purposes without the celebrity’s consent. The first hurdle Johansson would have to overcome is whether her voice is sufficient in indicia of her identity. Although she was the voice of the Siri-like personal assistant in the movie Her, it’s still an open question whether her voice is so recognizable that it’s linked to her and her celebrity.

    Scott

    Yeah, I tend to agree with you, Jamie. I’ve listened to Scarlett Johansson’s voice, and while she has a bit of a husky quality in her voice, it’s nowhere near Clint Eastwood’s. I think of celebrities who have tremendously recognizable voices: Arnold Schwarzenegger, Samuel L. Jackson, Morgan Freeman, James Earle Jones, Christopher Walken, and probably the most recognizable voice of all, Fran Drescher. I just don’t I think Scarlett Johannison’s voice is like theirs. There were two important jury findings in the Waits case. One was that the voice in the commercial was a deliberate imitation of Waits’ voice, and the second was that Waits had a distinctive voice, which is widely known. I don’t know whether Scarlett Johansson has that.

    Jamie

    To your first point that you just made, there are some facts out there that tend to point toward the voice of Sky being a deliberate imitation of Johansson, and discovery would likely shed a lot more light on that.

    Scott

    Oh, I agree. In this case, if she were to sue, it would be all about discovery. But OpenAI, in a press release or in an article that I had read and prepping for this, said that its Chief Technology Officer was in charge of the voice casting, and Sam Altman wasn’t really that involved. It was an interview with NPR. She told NPR, Miriam Maradi, that she didn’t even know what Scarlett Johansson sounded like until people were comparing Skye to Scarlett Johansson?

    Jamie

    Well, whether Skye was a deliberate imitation would probably end up being a question for the jury, and there would be a lot of expert testimony comparing the two voices. It would also be a question of fact for the jury whether Johansson had a distinctive voice that was widely known. The jury instructions in the Waits case provide that a voice is distinctive if it is distinguishable from the voices of other singers, if it has particular qualities or characteristics that identify it with a particular singer.

    Scott

    Yeah, I think that would be the big hurdle for Scarlett, would be if her voice meets the elements necessary to be distinctive. All right, so let’s talk about the other claim she could bring, which is a false endorsement claim under Section 43A of the Lanham Act. That prohibits the use of false designations of origin, false descriptions, and false representations in the advertising and the sale of goods and services. Courts have widely recognized a false endorsement claims brought by celebrities for the unauthorized imitation of their distinctive attributes, such as a celebrity’s likeness, where those attributes amount to essentially an unregistered commercial trademark.

    Jamie

    Right. And these false endorsement cases make sense. A celebrity has a commercial investment in their name, appearance, and sometimes voice. And those are tantamount to the interests of a trademark holder. In a distinctive mark.

    Scott

    Yeah, I agree. And those cases are really well-established. And so, here’s the potential hurdle that Johansson would face. Both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, which cover the major media markets in New York and California, they require evidence of either recognizability or public prominence to support a false endorsement claim. So similar to the issue she would face in a write a publicity claim, Scarlett Johansson would have to show recognizability and public prominence in her voice. And this may prove to be challenging for her. For sure, it’s a question of fact for the jury.

    Jamie

    Well, regardless of whether Johansson sues, and if anyone were to have the backbone to go up against OpenAI, it would be her. I think there’s probably a bit more drama to come.

    Scott

    I definitely agree with you, Jamie. There’s more drama to come here. Thanks for joining us today.

    Jamie

    Thank you.

    Scott

    Thank you for listening to this episode of “The Briefing.” We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about the topics we cover today, please leave us a comment.


    Another Court Gets It Right in Tattoo Copyright Dispute Jun 07, 2024
    Show notes

    Another Court Gets It Right in Tattoo Copyright DisputeThe recent decision on Hayden vs. 2K Games is a big win for video game publishers. Dive into the fascinating world of copyright disputes over tattoos in video games. Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg from Weintraub Tobin discuss how this case compares to past decisions and what it means for athletes, celebrities, and the video game industry on the latest episode of “The Briefing”

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott Two years ago, I took the position that the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois and the Court of Appeals in the case of Alexander versus Take2 Interactive Software got it completely wrong when they found that the depiction of tattoos on wrestler Randy Orton in a video game published by Take2 Interactive infringed the tattoo artist’s copyright in the tattoos. I said that both the court’s rejection of Take-Two’s defenses, defenses that won the day in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in Solid Oak Sketches versus 2K Games was absolutely incorrect. Now, we have the US District Court for the Northern District of Ohio deciding another copyright dispute over an inked athlete depicted in a take two interactive video game, and this court got it right. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and I’m joined today by frequent Briefing contributor, Jamie Lincenberg, and we’re going to talk about this case, Hayden versus 2K Games, Inc, on this next installment of “The Briefing.” Jamie, welcome back to the briefing.

    Jamie

    Thanks, Scott. It’s good to be here again.

    Scott

    So, let’s dive right into this case because these tattoo lawsuits, I find them interesting. Well, this one decision that I previously noted, the Alexander case, really got under my skin. But let’s talk about this one first. The result in Hayden versus 2K Games was a jury verdict. The jury found that 2K Games enjoyed an implied license to incorporate a depiction of certain tattoos on LeBron James and that the depiction, as depicted on a video game character, did not violate the copyright of Hayden, who was the tattoo artist that created these tattoos. This was the same result that the court reached in Solid Oak Sketches versus Take-Two Interactive.

    Jamie

    Yes, that case also involved LeBron James’ tattoos and the NBA 2K video game.

    Scott

    That’s right. Solid Oak was a licensing firm that represented or represents, probably still, the go-to tattoo artist for NBA players. And Solid Oak Sketches sued Take-Two Interactive Software, the game publisher behind the popular NBA 2K basketball video game. And Solid Oak Sketches alleged that the game maker’s depiction of LeBron James and his tattoos, infringe the tattoo artist copyright in six tattoos. In ruling on the video game publisher’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that the publisher had an implied license to depict the tattoos in the video game. Now, an implied license exists where one party created work at the other party’s request and handed it over, intending that the other party copy and distribute or otherwise use it in the manner intended. The court in this case found that the players had an implied license to use the tattoos as elements of their likeness, and the defendants right to use the tattoos in depicting players in the video game derives from this implied license from the tattoo artist to the player. A crucial element of the court’s finding that the tattoo artist knew their subject was likely to appear in public, on television, in commercials, and in other forms of media. That was a crucial element of the court’s finding in Solid Oak Sketches.

    Jamie

    While we’ve only seen a copy of the verdict form, which noted a win for 2K Games based on an implied license, I do think it’s safe to assume that the reasoning was the same or similar to that in Solid Oaks.

    Scott

    Yeah, I would agree with you, Jamie. We have two video game cases, both finding an implied license, and then we have Alexander versus Take-Two, where an implied license isn’t found. Actually, where the jury instructions on an implied license were not given to the jury. There’s a factual wrinkle in that case on which the court hangs its holding, but I don’t know that that’s enough of a distinction to actually justify the results of the case. Let me talk about this case a little bit. Tattoo artist Katherine Alexander sued Take-Two and 2K Games in the US District Court for the Southern District of Illinois for depicting World wrestling entertainment wrestler Randy Orton in the video game WWE 2K. Alexander testified that she had never given permission to any of her clients to use copies of her tattoo works in video games and argued that the WWE and Take-Two conflated Orton’s rights to his own likeness and the right to appear in media with an implied license to use her copyrights in an unlimited and other commercial way, such as video games. In the ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Alexander Court found that it wasn’t clear whether Alexander or Orton actually ever discussed whether and to what extent Orton had permission to copy and distribute the tattoos and whether any implied license would include sub-licensing rights and the Court denied summary judgment on the implied license affirmative defense.

    Jamie

    So after the Court’s ruling on the motions for judgment, the matter then went to trial. Apparently, shortly before trial, the court refused to allow the jury to hear instructions on the implied license affirmative defense, even though neither party objected to the jury getting this instruction. There were also shortcomings in the court’s fair use instructions. So, it seems that the trial court didn’t get instructions on the affirmative defenses it should have, which led to a jury verdict for the tattoo artist in an amount just under $4,000.

    Scott

    Yeah, I think the results in the Alexander case are wrong for a number of reasons. First, I think that every tattoo artist who inks a musician, or a sports figure, or an artist understands that this public figure will be portrayed and depicted in many, many, many mediums: television, photography, animation, etc. Could you imagine if some tattoo artist, just before starting the work on LeBron James or any athlete or musician or artist, said, Oh, by the way, you can’t allow anyone to film or to pick this tattoo that I’m putting on your body. That’s going to last forever. I mean, it’s ridiculous, and most likely, I’m going to assume that the person would just get out of the chair and walk out of the tattoo parlor. For the court in Alexander not to allow the finder of fact to weigh the evidence related to whether this conversation ever happened was a huge mistake. But even crazier is the practical effect of this ruling. Essentially, according to, well, at least in Chicago, once someone gets a tattoo, that person loses full control over that body part. Now, the tattoo artist has essentially a blocking right on the depiction of that body art. If a celebrity has an arm tattoo, and that celebrity has to be shirtless in a movie, unless the producers cover up the tattoo with makeup, which they very well may need to do after the Alexander ruling, or at least if the actor is from Chicago, or there might be jurisdiction in Chicago, the producer would need to get a release from the tattoo artist. What if the tattoo artist didn’t want to grant the release, and for some reason, the producer couldn’t cover up the tattoo? Does that mean that the actor may lose that job, possibly. This sounds a bit extreme, but it’s a logical extension from the Alexander decision, and that’s why I think the case is wrong.

    Jamie

    Scott, what if the arm tattoo is fully visible in the celebrity’s social media pictures? Technically, that would be an infringing public display of the work. I understand the fundamentals of a paparazzi suing a celebrity when that celebrity posts a picture taken by a paparazzi without permission. But I have a very hard time with a tattoo artist suing a celebrity when the celebrity, say, takes a selfie that captures the tattoo on the celebrity’s arm.

    Scott

    Yeah, I agree. This Alexander decision, which, despite these two courts getting it correct, means that the person who has tattoos no longer has complete control and autonomy over their persona. They don’t control their right of publicity anymore, or at least in Chicago, in Illinois, they don’t. Because a person’s outward appearance is part of that person’s right of publicity, how is it reasonably understood that when a person gets a tattoo, that tattoo becomes in actually merge with that person’s likeness and that any rights a person has in exploiting their likeness would extend to that tattoo. How is it possible to then fathom that a tattoo artist would have a blocking right on this individual’s right to exploit their personal rights?

    Jamie

    I’m curious: What’s your recommendation to your studio and production company clients based on this? I will say that I have seen in a lot of the brand endorsement deals that I work on that language has been added that your tattoo cannot be in the promotional content that you’re posting. Sometimes, as the talent reps, we push back on that. But I understand where the brands are coming from if this is really a concern that we might be facing.

    Scott

    Yeah, think about it. At least according to the Alexander Court, all the tattoo artist needs to say in order to get past the motion or summary judgment and drag a copyright infringement case all the way out is they just need to say, “Well, no, we never talked about an applied license.” Or, “No, I told him that he couldn’t show his arm in animation, cartoons, or video games.” That’s all that a tattoo artist would have to say. If an actor is going to be seen on camera, I guess at this point in time, given the Alexander case, the actor should get a release from the tattoo artist. Now, I mean, sometimes this could be impossible, in which case production might need to consider covering up the tattoo with makeup or clothing.

    Jamie

    What about video games?

    Scott

    Right. I mean, that’s another thing because it’s a depiction of the artist. The point of a video game, you want video games to be fully immersive. You want them to be reflective of reality. I mean, could you imagine having LeBron James in a video game without any tattoos? That’s not the real LeBron James.

    Jamie

    Yeah. How do you deal with content that’s already done and is out in the marketplace already?

    Scott

    Now, be the first to file a deck relief action in the Southern District of New York or in the Northern District of Ohio, and at all costs, avoid Illinois.

    Jamie

    Scott, I was also thinking and for these celebrities who are constantly getting new tattoos, and maybe they have relationships with certain tattoo artists, where they live, or they fly out to LA or New York or wherever to get their tattoos; maybe it makes sense that they enter into work for hire agreements with their tattoo artist beforehand. Those agreements set out that the tattoos, the results, and the proceeds of the tattoo artist’s services are owned by the celebrity. They have the right to use the tattoos moving forward in any way that they see fit.

    Scott

    Look, I agree with you. I think that would be a smart idea. I think if you really want to be a customer-friendly tattoo parlor, maybe you have the forms already there that say, “We have no claim in the tattoo that we’re putting on your body, and you may fully use it.” I don’t know how many times a person goes to a tattoo artist fully prepared with a release or a work for higher acknowledgment or an assignment agreement. But I will say this seems to be not the norm. The vibe seems to be that most tattoo artists acknowledge that the tattoo on one’s body is an extension of their persona. And most tattoo artists really aren’t… They’re not making these claims. They’re not claiming copyright in any of the tattoos. But there’s always haters out there, and there’s always someone out there who’s going to try to game the system. It might behoove celebrities or athletes if they have a favorite tattoo artist to have that discussion with the tattoo artist, have them sign a piece of paper, and then you can go on your way and get it inked up.

    Jamie

    It’s not an issue for the average Joe. I don’t think. I think it’s an issue for those celebrities who are making money off of their likeness and those tattoo artists are claiming a piece of their likenesses.

    Scott

    Yeah. Well, I don’t have a tattoo. I know lots of people do, and I think it’s becoming more acceptable and definitely more common nowadays. It’s definitely an issue that will bubble up from time to time, again and again. Thanks for joining me today, Jamie.

    Jamie

    Thanks, Scott. Thank you for joining us on this episode of The Briefing. We hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about what we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    Paramount Splashes Top Gun Maverick Copyright Lawsuit May 31, 2024
    Show notes

    Paramount Splashes Top Gun Maverick Copyright Lawsuit Paramount triumphs in the Top Gun Maverick copyright case. Join Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg of Weintraub Tobin on ‘The Briefing’ as they dissect the court’s ruling.

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott

    Paramount was finally able to shoot down Ehud Yonay’s copyright infringement lawsuit, which alleged that Top Gun Maverick, the sequel to the popular 1986 motion picture Top Gun, infringed the copyright in his magazine article. The district Court granted Paramount’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Yonay’s complaint. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and I’m here today with Jamie Lincenberg from Weintraub Tobin and we’re going to talk about the Court’s ruling on this installment of “The Briefing.” Jamie, welcome back to “The Briefing.”

    Jamie

    Thanks for having me today, Scott.

    Scott

    Great. Well, first, let’s get into the facts of the case a little bit. So, in May 1983, California Magazine published the article Top Guns by Ehud Yonay. This article was an inside look at the real Navy fighter’s weapons school, Top Gun, based out of Miramar, California. The article begins with a vivid description of two Top Gun F-14 Tomcat aviators, Yogi and Possum, on a hop, a simulated dogfight training against two Top Gun instructors. Then, the article continues with a deep dive into what makes Yogi and Possum and the other fighter pilots at Top Gun tick. A look at the Top Gun training regimen, what life on the base is like, and the history of Top Gun. When the article was published, it was optioned. In the credits for Top Gun, Yonay is credited in the original movie as the writer of the magazine article.

    Jamie

    On January 23rd, 2018, the Yonays properly availed themselves of their right to recover the copyright to the story optioned by Paramount by sending Paramount a statutory notice of termination under the Copyright Act, and then filed it with the Copyright Office. As we have discussed previously on this program, Section 203 of the Copyright Act permits authors or their successors to terminate grants of copyright assignments and licenses that were made on or after January 1, 1978, when certain conditions have been met. Upon the effective date of termination, all rights in the work that were covered by the terminated grant revert to the author. However, any derivative work prepared under the authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination. But this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant. The Yonays sued Paramount for copyright infringement, claiming that the Top Gun Maverick infringes that Yonays rite in their original article.

    Scott

    In Paramount’s motion for summary judgment, the court took into account expert testimony of both parties. The court found that the plaintiff’s expert testimony was unhelpful and inadmissible because that expert failed to filter out the elements of the article and the sequel that are not protectable by copyright law.

    Jamie

    In order to state a claim for infringement, a plaintiff must show substantial similarity between the work’s protected elements. Determining whether works are substantially similar involves a two-part analysis consisting of, one, the extrinsic test and two, the intrinsic test. The extrinsic test assesses the objective similarities of the two works, focusing only on those protectable elements of the plaintiff’s expression. Whereas, on the other hand, the intrinsic test examines an ordinary person’s subjective impressions. Although a plaintiff must prove both to establish substantial similarity, a finding of substantial similarity under the extrinsic component is a necessary prerequisite to considering the intrinsic component, which is expressly reserved for the jury. As such, on a motion to dismiss, the court will only consider the extrinsic test, and the extrinsic test can end a plaintiff’s infringement case only when the similarities between the works are either wholly due to unprotected elements or where the amount of similar protected expression is de minimis as a matter of law.

    Scott

    In applying the extrinsic test and by filtering out the elements that are not protected under copyright law, that is, facts, ideas, sans affair, which are situations and incidents that flow necessarily or naturally from a basic plot line or plot premise. And stock elements, the two works are not substantially similar. The plaintiffs contended that the article and the sequel were substantially similar because they have similar plots, sequences of events, pacing, themes, moods, dialogs, characters, and settings. Paramount contended that the similarities identified by the Yonays were either not similarities at all or were similarities based on unprotected elements of the work. The court agreed with Paramount.

    Jamie

    The court found that any similarities between the article and the sequel were due either to the inclusion of unprotectable facts, general plot ideas, or sans affair. The fact that both the article and the sequel contain Top Gun instructors and graduate fighter pilots is not actionable since those are factual elements and are not protected by copyright. The fact that the article and the sequel are similar because they depict or describe fighter pilots landing on an aircraft carrier being shot down while flying and cruising at a bar is a showing of familiar stock scenes or sans affair.

    Scott

    The court also found significant portions of the article and the movie dissimilar. The themes and the moods of the two works are dissimilar, as is the dialog and the selection and arrangement of elements, including the unprotectible elements. The court found those to all be dissimilar.

    Jamie

    The selection and arrangement analysis that Scott just noted goes back to Feist, the telephone book case, where a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship.

    Scott

    That’s right. The court here found that the selection and arrangement of the unprotectable elements were not necessarily original enough or not substantially similar enough. Not just that they were not original enough but that they were not substantially similar. Additionally, the court noted that the dialog in the article is unprotectable in any event since the dialog itself is a historical fact. In summing up the court’s objective comparison of the works, the article and Top Gun Maverick, their respective plots, their sequence of events, their pacing, their themes, their moods, their dialog, and their characters, the court found that the two works are not substantially similar. And while the article and Top Gun Maverick have some similarities, those similarities are all based on unprotected elements.

    Jamie

    So, wrap this up for us, Scott. What’s our takeaway from this lawsuit?

    Scott

    So, first takeaway is the importance of expert opinion. And we really just touched on this for a moment, but it did loom large in the court’s opinion itself. Once a copyright case gets past the pleading stage, in the Ninth Circuit, at least, It really becomes a war of the experts on the battleground of substantial similarity, like how I kept to the military theme there. The second is that historical source material can be tricky. While the positive side for the producer is that your work won’t necessarily infringe on the source material, the negative side is that another work based on the same historical source material might not infringe on your work either.

    Jamie

    Thanks, Scott. There are definitely more of these lawsuits on the horizon, so I’m sure you will keep a pulse on those, and we’ll see where these go.

    Scott

    We will. We’ll definitely track these termination lawsuits because they’ll definitely be interesting. Thanks, Jamie, for joining me today.

    Jamie

    Thank you.

    Scott

    Thank you for listening to this episode of The Briefing. We hope you enjoyed it. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a comment.


    Filmmakers Express Concern Over Impending Death of ‘Biographical Anchor’ Fair Use Basis May 24, 2024
    Show notes

    Filmmakers Express Concern Over Impending Death of ‘Biographical Anchor’ Fair Use BasisUnraveling the threads of Fair Use and how recent legal rulings threaten documentary filmmakers. Join Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg as they dissect the Tenth Circuit’s Impact on filmmaking in this episode of ‘The Briefing.’

    Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott

    Leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Andy Warhol Foundation versus Goldsmith, there was significant concern by documentary filmmakers about how the Court’s decision in favor of Goldsmith could upend how those filmmakers make use of fair use as part of the filmmaking process. Now, in light of the Tenth Circuit recent application of the Warhol case in Timothy Seppi versus Netflix, filmmakers are again concerned and are calling for a rehearing or an inbound rehearing. If left uncheck, the Motion Picture Association said that this decision threatens to severely impair the ability of filmmakers and other creators to create documentaries, docudramas, biographies, and other works based on the real world. I am Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and today I’m joined by my colleague, Jamie Lincenberg. We are going to talk about the Tenth Circuit’s controversial decision in Seppi versus Netflix. On this installment of “The Briefing.” Jamie, welcome back to “The Briefing.”

    Jamie

    Thanks for having me, Scott.

    Scott

    For a while now, I have expressed some concern that the Warhol case does, in fact, remove a fair use basis that filmmakers have relied on for quite some time. The use of a third-party clip or third-party content as a biographical anchor. That is, quoting copyrighted works of popular culture to illustrate an argument or point, and the use of copyrighted material in a historical sequence. Those have been used for a very long time by filmmakers, and they’ve been regarded as a best practice in fair use.

    Jamie

    Right. A great example of what a biographical anchor looks like comes from the of Hofheinz first A&E Television Networks, where the court found that a TV biography that used a short clip of movie star Peter Graves from one of his earliest films was justified, not because it commented on the original film, but because it enabled the viewer to understand the actor’s modest beginnings in the film business.

    Scott

    That’s right. The Tenth Circus decision in Seppi runs the risk of forever reversing decades of jurisprudence. Seppi, some facts of the case. Seppi was a former Zoom employee who livestream the funeral of the husband of Joe Exotic. Joe Exotic, Tiger King, right? Everybody knows Joe Exotic and Tiger King. Netflix used a one-minute portion of the funeral video in its series, Tiger King. Netflix tried to dismiss Seppi’s infringement claim based on fair use, specifically based on the biographical anchor claim or jurisprudence. Post-war hall in determining fair use, courts ask, as part of the first factor, whether and to what extent the use at issue has a purpose or character different from the original and whether that supports a justification for copying. Now, the appeals court granted Seppi’s opposition to Netflix’s motion, finding that Netflix’s use was not transformative under the first fair use factor since it did not criticize or comment on the work itself, meaning the video that Seppi filmed, but instead was used to comment on and criticize Joe Exotic.

    Jamie

    The concerns from the parties that filed briefs requesting review of this decision all express concern that the Tenth Circuit, whether it was intentional or not, has created a bright line comment on requirement and is not examining other justifiable uses beyond criticism or commentary.

    Scott

    That’s right. Left as is, there is a concern that this opinion will negatively impact filmmakers who use third-party content for historical value and newsworthiness, even though they do not target the underlying third-party content through criticism or commentary. A number of the amicus brief cite past cases supporting the use of third-party content by a biographer or a filmmaker as a biographical or historical anchor. These cases include Time, Inc. Versus Bernard Geis Associates, which involved the use of sketches of President Kennedy’s assassination that were taken from the famous Zapruder films, Bill Graham Archives versus Dorian Kindersley, which involved the use of Grateful Dead concert posters in a book about the history of the band. Sofa Entertainment versus Dodger Productions, which involved the use of a short clip from the Ed Sullivan show in a musical about the band, The Four Seasons, and Elvis Presley enterprises versus Passport Video, which used television clips featuring Elvis. While the funeral scene in Tiger King isn’t as significant as President Kennedy’s assassination, and while Joe Exotic doesn’t have the same cultural significance as The Grateful Dead or Elvis, the funeral does bear on an issue of public interest. And the funeral clip did serve as a historical marker and biographical anchor in the Netflix program Tiger King.

    Jamie

    This uncertainty isn’t good for documentarians or the consuming public that enjoys these compelling documentaries.

    Scott

    No, Jamie, it certainly isn’t. I do think that the Tenth Circuit needs to reexamine its opinion, either as a rehearing or a rehearing in bonk, because left unexamined, I think this may be the beginning of the end of the ability to use the biographical anchor Exemption under fair use, essentially.

    Jamie

    Yeah. For so many reasons, that would be a huge concern to the documentary space and to many of our clients who work in that area, and we advise them on fair use, and this is definitely going to dictate how we advise our clients.

    Scott

    Yeah. As a practical matter, as a practical matter, it really can end up prohibiting a documentarian from telling a story. If they are unable to express a fact, if they’re unable to explain how a fact or an event occurred in a compelling manner without paying an exorbitant license fee, they may be priced out of their ability to make their documentary, or they may not be able to tell their story in a way that would capture the viewer’s attention. Either way, I don’t think that this ruling really encourages the evolution of creative arts. It doesn’t encourage the reuse of works in a different and compelling and entertaining manner. I think it stymies creativity and puts unnecessary roadblocks in front of storytellers who sometimes need to be able to use existing material in a different way to tell their stories.

    Jamie

    Yes, we will definitely follow along and see where this ends up.

    Scott

    We have an update in the case of Seppi versus Netflix. The day after we recorded the main portion of this episode, the portion you just listened to, the Tenth Circuit vacated its March 27, 2024 judgment and granted Netflix’s request for a rehearing. As part of the rehearing, the court asked for a supplemental briefing and oral argument on the questions of whether the principles of fair use jurisprudence that relate to documentary filmmaking, including the use of content as historical markers, are appropriate in light of, in this case, Netflix’s commercial use of the film clip, and what impact does the Warhol decision in general have on the fair use jurisprudence applicable to documentary filmmaking? So maybe the use of third-party content in documentaries as a historical marker or a biographical anchor is not that. We’ll wait and see what the Tenth Circuit does in light of this rehearing.

    Jamie

    Thank you for listening to this episode of “The Briefing.” We really hope you enjoyed the episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share the episode with your friends and colleagues. If you have any questions about the topics we covered, please leave us a comment.


    Netflix Defamation Lawsuit About Inventing Anna – Not an Imposter May 17, 2024
    Show notes

    Netflix Defamation Lawsuit About Inventing Anna – Not an ImposterUpdate on Rachel Williams’ defamation lawsuit against Netflix’s “Inventing Anna.” Weintraub lawyers Scott Hervey and Jamie Lincenberg discuss the recent court ruling as a warning for docudrama producers on “The Briefing.” Get the full episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here or listen to this podcast episode here.

    Show Notes:

    Scott

    We have an update on the defamation lawsuit brought by Rachel Williams, the Vanity Fair photo editor whose friendship with Anna Delvey, who passed herself off as German heiress Anna Sorkin, was featured in the Netflix series Inventing Anna. The news is not great for Netflix, and this should be a warning for producers of docudramas who take creative license with facts. I’m Scott Hervey from Weintraub Tobin, and today, I’m joined by fellow Weintraub lawyer Jamie Lincenberg. We are going to review this lawsuit, the recent court ruling not allowing Netflix to get out from under William’s defamation claim, and talk about how this should be a concern for producers of the genre du jour docudramas on today’s installment of “The Briefing” by Weintraub Tobin. Jamie, welcome back to “The Briefing.”

    Jamie

    Thanks for having me today, Scott.

    Scott

    So, let’s jump right into this. For those who may not remember, Rachel Williams is a real person. At the time of her portrayal in the Netflix program Inventing Anna, she was a Vanity Fair photo editor and a friend to Anna Delvey, also known as Anna Sorkin. Williams did not come across well in inventing Anna.

    Jamie

    No, she didn’t. She comes across as a privileged freeloader who sponges off of Sorkin and then abandons her when her real situation comes to life.

    Scott

    True, true. She does come across that way. As a result, Williams sued for defamation. Now, in order to prevail, she would have to demonstrate that her portrayal in inventing Anna was an assertion of fact was actually false or created a false impression about her, that it was highly offensive to a reasonable person or was defamatory. Since Williams is a public figure, she published a story in Vanity Fair and published a book about her experience with Sorkin; she must also prove by clear and convincing evidence the statements were made with actual malice, meaning that the defendants knew that the statements were false or had serious doubts about the truth of the statement.

    Jamie

    There are numerous instances of William’s portrayal in this series, she claims to be actionable. We recently reran the podcast episode where you first reported on this lawsuit, where you covered all of the instances in detail. So, there’s no need to do that here. Instead, let’s look at the two portrayals addressed by the court in denying Netflix’s motion to dismiss. Both of those have to do with the scene in Morocco where Williams leaves.

    Scott

    That’s right. The first portrayal comes after several scenes depicting the problems with the credit cards at the hotel and a very expensive private museum tour. Williams tells Anna, who is portrayed as being alone in her room, drinking and heavily depressed, that she is leaving. Sorkin is portrayed as begging Williams not to leave her, but Williams leaves anyways. Now, the next portrayal is the following statements that’s made by another character in Inventing Anna. This character says, “Please, Rachel abandoned Anna, kicked her when she was down, and left her alone in some foreign country. Rachel’s happy to call herself Anna’s friend when it means free ‘stuff’ trips to Morocco. But as soon as times got tough, some friend.” actually, the character didn’t say “tough” or “stuff,” she said some expletive that we won’t use here on the pod. So according to the complaint, Williams alleges that these statements are false, as Williams had a pre-existing business meeting in France. And Williams told Sorkin, prior to the pair heading to Morocco, that she would have to leave early. Also, according to the complaint, when Williams left Morocco, Sorkin was not sad, was not depressed, and was not alone. Williams alleges that those statements in those scenes are defamatory because Williams is falsely portrayed as a fair-weather friend who abandoned Sorkin when she was alone, depressed, and in trouble in Morocco and needed help and support. Williams claims that these are negative personal traits or attitudes that she does not hold.

    Jamie

    The court does agree that Williams plausibly alleged that both of these statements are false statements of fact and are defamatory. Netflix tried to argue that the statements were substantially true because Williams actually left Morocco before Sorkin to go to France, and before knowing Sorkin was a fraud, Williams had also decided to give the relationship some space. But the court didn’t buy it or the argument that other scenes in the series portraying Williams as a true friend, somehow make these two portrayals not defamatory.

    Scott

    That’s right. The court states that in context, these other scenes, which make Williams look like a true friend, do not nullify the portrayal of Williams leaving Sorkin in a troubled state, nor do they rectify the potentially defamatory nature of these two portrayals. Based on the finding that Williams had properly pled a defamation claim based on these two statements, the court said it did not need to decide whether any of the remaining allegedly defamatory statements were actionable. Now, remember, this is just a motion to dismiss where the court examines whether the complaint includes sufficient factual allegations to state a possible claim for defamation and it left the examination of these other statements for later action in the case.

    Jamie

    Right. But the result is that this case goes forward into discovery, which is not only time-consuming but expensive and William’s leverage and the potential settlement value just went up significantly, I would say.

    Scott

    Yeah, I agree with that assessment.

    Scott

    As we’ve seen with other docu-drama defamation cases, one of the big risk points seems to be when a producer fictionalizes part of a storyline, especially when the truth and the fictionalized version are so divergent that it would cause viewers to feel differently.

    Scott

    Right. I can only imagine why Shonda Rimes decided to play the scene the way she did. I have no insight into why she did it. It certainly makes Anna look more sympathetic, and it supports the character’s role as the show’s anti-hero. Look, Delvey was convicted on eight charges, including second-degree grand larceny in theft of services and first-degree attempted grand larceny. But in watching the show, and I watch the show, you really can’t help but root for her. So certainly, Shonda Rimes may have had very good reason to play the scene the way she did, creatively. But this little twist in the narrative now exposes Netflix to liability. That’s the lesson for producers of docudrama. Any deviation from the truth needs to be examined from a legal risk perspective. If you need a scene to play a certain way in order to deliver a specific emotion or narrative, make up the scene and have the characters interact with made-up characters who display the necessary or needed defamatory traits.

    Jamie

    That’s a good point. If the case doesn’t settle, I’m sure that Netflix will eventually bring a motion for summary judgment down the line. So, Scott, let’s be sure to report back then.

    Scott

    Oh, we certainly will. Thank you for listening to this episode of The Briefing. We hope you enjoyed this episode. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we covered today, please leave us a comment.


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