Supreme Court Oral Arguments

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**Supreme Court Oral Arguments**

A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court.
* Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov
* Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information.
* Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available when an aligned transcript is ready).
Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

Latest Episodes:

[25A312] Trump v. Cook Jan 21, 2026

Show notes

Trump v. Cook

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Jan 21, 2026.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.
Respondent: Lisa D. Cook, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Advocates:

D. John Sauer (for the Applicants)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

None

Question

None

[24-1046] Wolford v. Lopez Jan 20, 2026

Show notes

Wolford v. Lopez

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 20, 2026.

Petitioner: Jason Wolford.
Respondent: Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii.

Advocates:

Alan A. Beck (for the Petitioners)
Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2023, Hawaii and California enacted new laws, Act 52 and Senate Bill 2, respectively, that significantly restrict the public carry of firearms. Both laws prohibit individuals with carry permits from bringing firearms into numerous specified “sensitive places.” Hawaii’s list includes fifteen categories, such as bars, restaurants serving alcohol, parks, beaches, and banks. California’s list is broader, covering more than two dozen types of property, including hospitals, public transit, playgrounds, libraries, museums, places of worship, and casinos.

Both states also changed the default rule for private property open to the public, generally banning firearms unless the property owner expressly permits them. Hawaii allows owners to consent verbally, in writing, or via a posted sign. California’s rule is stricter, permitting consent only through the posting of a specific, state-mandated sign. Plaintiffs in both states include individuals who hold concealed-carry permits and various gun-rights organizations. They filed lawsuits alleging that these new restrictions violate their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

Plaintiffs in both actions sued their respective state attorneys general, and federal district courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking enforcement of many of the new provisions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases, affirming the injunctions in part but reversing them in large part. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling allowed many of the challenged restrictions to remain in effect but agreed with the district courts that the states could not, for example, ban firearms in banks or hospitals.

Question

Does a law that makes it a crime for a licensed concealed carry permit holder to bring a handgun onto private property open to the public—such as a store or restaurant—unless the property owner gives “express authorization” violate the Second Amendment?

[23-1209] M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund Jan 20, 2026

Show notes

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 20, 2026.

Petitioner: M & K Employee Solutions, LLC.
Respondent: Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund.

Advocates:

Michael E. Kenneally, Jr. (for the Petitioners)
John E. Roberts (for the Respondent)
Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

M&K Employee Solutions operated three facilities that participated in the IAM National Pension Fund, a retirement plan jointly funded by multiple employers whose workers were represented by the International Association of Machinists union. In late 2017, the Fund’s actuary valued the plan’s unfunded obligations at about $448 million. Shortly after, in January 2018, the actuary met with the Fund’s trustees and decided to change key financial assumptions used to calculate how much departing employers owed the Fund. Most importantly, they lowered the assumed investment return rate from 7.5% to 6.5%, a change that would significantly increase the bills for employers leaving the plan.

M&K had already begun pulling out of the Fund when two of its facilities stopped participating in 2017. When M&K completely withdrew in 2018, the Fund calculated what M&K owed based on financial data from December 31, 2017, but used the new assumptions adopted in January 2018. This resulted in a withdrawal liability bill of over $6 million. Ohio Magnetics, another company in the Fund, faced a similar situation when it withdrew in mid-2018 and received a bill for about $447,000 calculated the same way.

Both companies challenged their bills through arbitration and won, with arbitrators ruling the Fund could not use assumptions created after the December 31, 2017 measurement date. The Fund then sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to overturn these arbitration decisions. The district court sided with the Fund, ruling that actuaries could adopt new assumptions after the measurement date as long as they were based on information available at that time. The court remanded the cases to the arbitrators for reconsideration. Both employers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.

Question

When a pension plan calculates how much a departing employer owes “as of the end of the plan year,” must the plan use the financial assumptions it had already adopted by that date, or can it use new assumptions created after that date if they are based on information that was available at year-end?

[24-1021] Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. Jan 14, 2026

Show notes

Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 14, 2026.

Petitioner: Cedric Galette.
Respondent: New Jersey Transit Corporation.

Advocates:

Michael Zuckerman (for New Jersey Transit Corp., et al. (Respondent in No. 24-1021, Petitioners in No. 24-1113))
Michael B. Kimberly (for Galette and Colt, et al. (Petitioner in 24-1021, Respondents in 24-1113))

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In August 2018, Cedric Galette was a passenger in a vehicle stopped on Market Street in Philadelphia when it was struck by a vehicle operated by the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit). Galette suffered physical injuries as a result of the collision and brought a negligence lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court against both the vehicle’s driver, Julie McCrey, and NJ Transit. NJ Transit responded by asserting that it was an arm of the State of New Jersey, and therefore immune from private suit in Pennsylvania under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity.

The trial court denied NJ Transit’s motion to dismiss, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that NJ Transit qualifies as an arm of the state and is therefore immune under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity.

Question

Is the New Jersey Transit Corporation an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes?

[24-43] West Virginia v. B.P.J. Jan 13, 2026

Show notes

West Virginia v. B.P.J.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Jan 13, 2026.

Petitioner: West Virginia, et al.
Respondent: B. P. J., By Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson.

Advocates:

Michael R. Williams (for the Petitioners)
Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Joshua A. Block (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

B.P.J. is a transgender girl who has identified as female since the third grade. At the onset of puberty, B.P.J. began taking puberty blockers and estrogen for medical treatment of gender dysphoria, effectively halting male pubertal development and aligning her physical characteristics with those of cisgender girls. Since her social transition, B.P.J. has consistently lived as a girl at school and participated on girls’ athletic teams. In 2021, West Virginia enacted the “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which requires public school and collegiate sports teams to be designated based on “biological sex” and excludes individuals identified as male at birth from participating on female teams. This law, by its design and effect, prevented B.P.J. from continuing to compete on her school’s girls’ cross-country and track teams.

Shortly after the Act took effect, B.P.J., through her mother, sued the West Virginia State Board of Education and other state and county education officials, as well as the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. She alleged that excluding her from girls’ sports violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. The State of West Virginia intervened to defend the law. Initially, the district court granted B.P.J. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to participate on girls’ teams pending litigation. However, at summary judgment, the district court reversed course and upheld the law, concluding that the classification on the basis of “biological sex” was substantially related to the important government interest in ensuring fairness and opportunity in girls’ athletics. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied B.P.J.’s cross-motion, holding that the exclusion of B.P.J. from girls’ sports did not violate the Constitution or Title IX. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It held that application of the law to B.P.J. violated Title IX and that factual disputes precluded summary judgment against her equal protection claim.

Question

Does Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause prohibit a state from assigning students to girls’ and boys’ sports teams based on their biological sex as determined at birth?

[24-38] Little v. Hecox Jan 13, 2026

Show notes

Little v. Hecox

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Jan 13, 2026.

Petitioner: Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al.
Respondent: Lindsay Hecox, et al.

Advocates:

Alan M. Hurst (for the Petitioners)
Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Kathleen R. Hartnett (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which categorically barred transgender girls and women from participating on female athletic teams in public schools—from elementary school through college. Prior to the law’s passage, Idaho’s high school athletic association and the NCAA allowed transgender women to compete on women’s teams after a year of hormone therapy. At the time, there were no known instances of transgender girls competing in Idaho athletics under those existing rules. Nonetheless, Idaho lawmakers passed the Act, citing concerns about “fairness” and biological differences attributed to testosterone and other factors. The law allowed any individual to challenge a female athlete’s gender, triggering a mandatory medical verification process that could include analysis of reproductive anatomy, genetic make-up, or testosterone levels. Cisgender women, including those perceived as more masculine, could also be subjected to these checks.

Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wished to join the women’s cross-country team, filed suit alongside a cisgender high school athlete known as Jane Doe. They alleged that the Act violated their constitutional rights, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hecox had undergone hormone therapy, significantly lowering her testosterone levels, but was still categorically excluded under the law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the law in August 2020, finding it likely unconstitutional. After several rounds of appeal and remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the injunction as applied to Hecox but remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the scope of the injunction, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Labrador v. Poe.

Question

May a state, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, categorically require sports participants to compete based on their biological sex, rather than gender identity?

[24-813] Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana Jan 12, 2026

Show notes

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 12, 2026.

Petitioner: Chevron USA Incorporated.
Respondent: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Aaron Z. Roper (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana coastal parishes—including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish—filed lawsuits in state court against a consortium of oil and gas companies such as BP America Production Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Shell Oil Company, and others. The parishes, joined by Louisiana state agencies and officials, alleged the companies had violated Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA), which requires certain activities within the state’s designated “coastal zone” to comply with an environmental permitting system. Specifically, the parishes claimed the companies engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation in various “Operational Areas” along the Louisiana coast without securing the proper permits or by violating the conditions of the permits they did have. The complaints further alleged that pre-1980 activities (before SLCRMA’s effective date) were not “lawfully commenced,” and thus not exempt under the Act’s grandfather clause. The parishes seek wide-ranging remedies, including damages and restoration of affected coastal lands.

The events at issue span decades, with the oil companies’ challenged operations beginning prior to SLCRMA and, in some cases, dating back to World War II. During the war, some defendant companies operated under federal government contracts to refine petroleum products for the war effort, and they argue that some of the crude oil produced in the disputed areas was used to fulfill those contracts. The parishes' claims, however, focus on whether the companies’ activities in the coastal zone were environmentally compliant under Louisiana law, regardless of any federal wartime contracts or regulations.

After the initial filing in state court, the oil companies have tried multiple times to remove these cases to federal court, invoking various theories of federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer removal statute, based on their World War II-era federal contracts. Each time, the district courts ruled against removal and remanded the cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet the statutory requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the remand orders, and the companies now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question

Can an oil company being sued in state court for its World War II-era oil production move its case to federal court simply because the oil was produced to meet federal government contracts for wartime fuel—even if the contract did not specifically direct how to produce the oil?

[24-872] Hamm v. Smith Dec 10, 2025

Show notes

Hamm v. Smith

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Dec 10, 2025.

Petitioner: John Q. Hamm, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections.
Respondent: Joseph Clifton Smith.

Advocates:

Robert M. Overing (for the Petitioner)
Harry Graver (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Joseph Clifton Smith was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Alabama. Years later, Smith filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to overturn his death sentence on grounds that he is intellectually disabled and therefore cannot be executed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The central issue in Smith’s case involved determining whether he met the three-prong test for intellectual disability: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation of these qualities before age 18.

Smith's IQ testing revealed multiple scores—72, 74, 75, 74, and 78—that fell within or near the range associated with intellectual disability when accounting for standard error of measurement. His experts testified that four of his five scores were consistent with mild intellectual disability, while the state’s expert, Dr. King, argued that Smith’s multiple scores placed him in the borderline range just above intellectual disability. After extensive evidentiary hearings featuring competing expert testimony about both Smith’s IQ scores and his adaptive functioning deficits, the district court found Smith intellectually disabled.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted Smith’s habeas petition and vacated his death sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case, asking the Eleventh Circuit to clarify whether its ruling relied solely on the lower end of Smith's IQ score range or on a holistic analysis of all evidence. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit explained that its reasoning was based on a holistic analysis.

Question

When a capital defendant has taken multiple IQ tests with varying results, how should courts evaluate the cumulative effect of those scores to determine whether the defendant has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning under Atkins v. Virginia?

[24-345] FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Dec 10, 2025

Show notes

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Dec 10, 2025.

Petitioner: FS Credit Opportunities Corp.
Respondent: Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners and BlackRock Respondents supporting the Petitioners)
Max E. Schulman (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Paul D. Clement (for the Saba Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Investment funds organized as closed-end mutual funds under Maryland law adopted “control share provisions” that stripped voting rights from shareholders who owned 10% or more of a fund’s shares. These provisions were adopted in response to activist investor Saba Capital, which had been acquiring large positions in underperforming closed-end funds with the goal of unlocking shareholder value through various strategies, including electing new directors and advocating for share buybacks.

Saba Capital sued sixteen closed-end funds in June 2023, seeking rescission of these control share provisions. Saba argued that the provisions violated Section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which requires that “every share of stock shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding stock.” Saba brought its lawsuit under Section 47(b) of the ICA, relying on Second Circuit precedent that recognized an implied private right of action for parties seeking to rescind contracts that violate the ICA.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Saba against eleven of the funds (five were dismissed due to forum selection clauses requiring suit in Maryland). The district court held that the control share provisions violated the ICA’s equal voting rights mandate and ordered their rescission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision in a summary order.

Question

Does Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), create an implied private right of action?

[24-621] National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission Dec 09, 2025

Show notes

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Dec 9, 2025.

Petitioner: National Republican Senatorial Committee.
Respondent: Federal Election Commission.

Advocates:

Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners)
Sarah M. Harris (for the Respondents, supporting the Petitioners)
Roman Martinez (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)
Marc E. Elias (for the Intervenors)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2022, two Republican party committees—the National Republican Senatorial Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee—along with then-Senator J.D. Vance and then-Representative Steve Chabot, sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The Republican committees asserted that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) unconstitutionally restricts their ability to coordinate campaign advertising with their own candidates. This coordination allows the party and its candidates to unify their political message and spend money more efficiently. For example, in the 2021-2022 election cycle, the senatorial committee spent about $15.5 million and the congressional committee spent about $8.3 million on such coordinated expenditures, which primarily fund political advertising.

The plaintiffs argue that developments since a 2001 Supreme Court decision, FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which upheld these same limits, have rendered that decision obsolete. Specifically, they point to changes in campaign finance law, the rise of “Super PACs,” and shifts in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as reasons the restrictions no longer pass constitutional muster.

The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. As required by FECA for constitutional challenges, the district court certified the legal question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the FECA’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures do not violate the First Amendment and denied both the facial and as-applied challenges brought by the plaintiffs.

Question

Do FECA limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with “party coordinated communications”?

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