Supreme Court Oral Arguments

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**Supreme Court Oral Arguments**

A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court.
* Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov
* Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information.
* Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available when an aligned transcript is ready).
Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

Latest Episodes:

[25-6] Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated Mar 24, 2026

Show notes

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 24, 2026.

Petitioner: Thomas Keathley.
Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated.

Advocates:

Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
William M. Jay (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In August 2021, while his bankruptcy case was ongoing, Keathley was in a motor vehicle collision with David Fowler, a truck driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (BAC). Keathley hired a personal injury attorney the next day and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against BAC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in December 2021, alleging negligence and vicarious liability.

Keathley, however, failed to disclose this new personal injury lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court. He submitted multiple amended bankruptcy plans in March 2022 and June 2022, none of which mentioned the pending lawsuit. The bankruptcy court confirmed Keathley’s modified plan in July 2022, unaware of the personal injury claim. Keathley only amended his bankruptcy schedule to include the lawsuit after BAC moved to dismiss the personal injury case.

BAC moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley’s claim because he failed to disclose it during his bankruptcy proceeding. The district court granted BAC’s motion, dismissing the lawsuit, and subsequently denied Keathley's motion for reconsideration. Keathley then appealed both of those decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decisions.

Question

May the doctrine of judicial estoppel be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith?

[25-5] Noem v. Al Otro Lado Mar 24, 2026

Show notes

Noem v. Al Otro Lado

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 24, 2026.

Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.
Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation.

Advocates:

Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners)
Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks.

While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials.

Question

Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?

[24-1260] Watson v. Republican National Committee Mar 23, 2026

Show notes

Watson v. Republican National Committee

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 23, 2026.

Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.
Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al.

Advocates:

Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)
D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states.

In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day.

Question

Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?

[24-1238] Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC Mar 04, 2026

Show notes

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 4, 2026.

Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery.
Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the Respondents)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his tractor-trailer, stopped on the shoulder of an Illinois highway, was struck by another truck. The other driver, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, was employed by the motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”). C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“Robinson”), a freight broker, had arranged for Caribe to haul the shipment. Robinson and Caribe operated under an agreement stating that Caribe was an independent contractor and retained exclusive control over its personnel and the manner of its performance.

Montgomery sued the driver and Caribe, and also sued the broker, Robinson. His claims against Robinson alleged that the broker was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence, arguing Caribe was Robinson’s agent. Montgomery also claimed Robinson had negligently hired the driver and the carrier.

The district court granted judgment to Robinson on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Caribe was an independent contractor, which defeated the vicarious liability claim, and that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted the state-law negligent hiring claim.

Question

Does 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?

[24-1063] Hunter v. United States Mar 03, 2026

Show notes

Hunter v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 3, 2026.

Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Zoe A. Jacoby (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Munson P. Hunter, III pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud affecting a financial institution and to aiding and abetting. A federal district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. A specific condition of that supervised release requires Hunter to take any mental health medication prescribed by his physician.

Hunter challenged his sentence at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the medication condition infringed on his due process liberty interests and that the written judgment improperly included the “aiding and abetting” reference. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the medication condition, finding it was barred by an appeal waiver in Hunter's plea agreement, and affirmed the judgment, noting that the “aiding and abetting” charge was indeed part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty.

Question

1. Does an appeal waiver bar all claims except for ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum?

2. Does such a waiver become ineffective if the sentencing judge later tells the defendant they can appeal, and the government fails to object?

[24-1234] United States v. Hemani Mar 02, 2026

Show notes

United States v. Hemani

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 2, 2026.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani.

Advocates:

Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner)
Erin E. Murphy (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A grand jury indicted Ali Danial Hemani in February 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal law prohibiting firearm possession by an “unlawful user of…a controlled substance.” The indictment alleged that in August 2022, Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while being an unlawful user of controlled substances. The government specified that Hemani allegedly used marijuana, promethazine, and cocaine.

The pistol was located in the closet of Hemani’s parents’ home. Crucially, the prosecution did not allege that Hemani was intoxicated or using a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. The government’s case rested on his status as a regular drug user, not on simultaneous use and possession.

Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a binding regional precedent (United States v. Connelly) rendered the law’s application to Hemani unconstitutional.

Question

Does a federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” violate the respondent’s Second Amendment right to bear arms?

[25-95] Pung v. Isabella County Feb 25, 2026

Show notes

Pung v. Isabella County

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 25, 2026.

Petitioner: Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung.
Respondent: sabella County, Michigan.

Advocates:

Philip L. Ellison (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Matthew T. Nelson (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case involves a dispute over the foreclosure and sale of the Pung property in Isabella County, Michigan, following the death of its owner, Timothy Scott Pung, in 2004. The property had a Principal Residence Exemption (PRE) from local school taxes. In 2010, the township tax assessor, Patricia DePriest, retroactively denied the PRE for the years 2007-2009, asserting a new owner must file an affidavit. Although the Michigan Tax Tribunal overturned this decision in 2012, holding the PRE remained valid for the estate, DePriest subsequently revoked the PRE for the 2012 tax year based on the same unfiled-affidavit rationale. This denial created an unpaid tax bill of $2,241.93. The County Treasurer, Steven Pickens, initiated foreclosure proceedings for this delinquency. After a final judgment of foreclosure, the property sold at a public auction for $76,008. Isabella County and Pickens retained the entire $76,008 from the sale, refusing to return the surplus proceeds above the tax debt to Michael Pung, the estate's representative. Michael Pung sued, alleging this retention of the surplus violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

The district court granted Pung summary judgment on the Takings Clause claim, ruling he was entitled to the surplus proceeds (the sale price minus the tax debt), but not to the greater loss in equity based on the property’s fair market value. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all claims, including the amount of compensation awarded.

Question

1. When the government takes property for tax debt, does the Fifth Amendment require compensation based on the property’s true fair market value, or only on the lower amount it sold for at a tax foreclosure auction?

2. Does the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause prohibit the government from seizing and keeping a property worth far more than the small tax debt owed on it?

[24-783] Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel Feb 24, 2026

Show notes

Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 24, 2026.

Petitioner: Enbridge Energy, LP.
Respondent: Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan.

Advocates:

John J. Bursch (for the Petitioners)
Ann M. Sherman (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Enbridge Energy, LP, owns and operates Line 5, an oil pipeline that transports petroleum products through Wisconsin and Michigan before terminating in Ontario, Canada. Since 1953, Line 5 has run across the bottomlands of the Straits of Mackinac under an easement granted by the State of Michigan, which owns the submerged lands. In recent years, concerns over Line 5’s safety and environmental impact led to increased scrutiny and legal challenges regarding the pipeline’s continued operation, including questions about Michigan’s regulatory authority and the potential preemption of state law by federal pipeline laws and international treaties.

On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking to enjoin Enbridge from operating Line 5 in the Straits. The Attorney General alleged violations of the public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance, and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Both parties filed dispositive motions, with Enbridge asserting, in part, that federal law preempted Michigan’s claims. Separate but closely related litigation followed when Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued an easement-revocation notice in November 2020 and filed her own state-court suit against Enbridge.

After engaging in nearly two years of state-court proceedings in the Attorney General’s case, Enbridge removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan in December 2021, arguing federal-question jurisdiction. The district court rejected the Attorney General’s motion to remand, holding that removal was proper either under statutory timing rules or equitable exceptions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Enbridge’s removal was untimely and that statutory deadlines for removal are mandatory and immune to equitable exceptions, and ordered the case remanded to Michigan state court.

Question

Do district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)?

[24-699] Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) Feb 23, 2026

Show notes

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba)

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 23, 2026.

Petitioner: Exxon Mobil Corporation.
Respondent: Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al.

Advocates:

Morgan L. Ratner (for the Petitioner)
Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Jules L. Lobel (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case involves Exxon Mobil Corporation’s claim to property confiscated by the Cuban government decades ago. Exxon, through its predecessor Standard Oil Company, owned several subsidiaries in Cuba, including Esso Standard Oil, S.A. (Essosa), which operated oil and gas assets like a refinery, product terminals, and over 100 service stations. In 1960, following Fidel Castro’s rise to power, the Cuban government confiscated these assets without providing compensation. The assets were subsequently transferred to Cuban state-owned enterprises, including Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET), the state oil company, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), a conglomerate. In 1969, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified Standard Oil's loss at over $71 million, plus interest, due to the confiscation. In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action in Title III for U.S. nationals to sue any “person” who “traffics in” their confiscated property, explicitly defining “person” to include an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Although every President suspended this right of action until May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration then allowed the suspension to lapse, and Exxon filed its lawsuit that same day.

Exxon’s complaint names the Cuban instrumentalities CIMEX, CUPET, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Panama) as defendants, alleging they continue to traffic in the confiscated property through commercial activities such as refining oil and operating service stations that process remittances and sell imported goods.

The Cuban defendants moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court held that the Helms-Burton Act did not independently abrogate foreign sovereign immunity and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply, but found that the commercial-activity exception was met for CIMEX. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the Helms-Burton Act did not displace the FSIA and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but vacated the ruling on the commercial-activity exception and remanded for further jurisdictional discovery.

Question

Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, even if the parties do not satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

[24-983] Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. Feb 23, 2026

Show notes

Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 23, 2026.

Petitioner: Havana Docks Corporation.
Respondent: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al.

Advocates:

Richard D. Klingler (for the Petitioner)
Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The dispute centers on property in the Port of Havana now known as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal. In the early 20th century, the Cuban Government granted a 50-year concession to a predecessor of Havana Docks Corporation (Havana Docks) to build and operate piers and terminal facilities at the port. This concession, a usufructuary right, was extended to 99 years in 1920, with a scheduled expiration date in 2004. Havana Docks, a company organized under the laws of Delaware and determined to be a U.S. national, acquired the concession in 1928. In 1960, shortly after Fidel Castro came to power, the Cuban Government confiscated the concession, expropriating Havana Docks’ property and assets at the Port of Havana without compensation. Subsequently, Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified a loss of over $9 million stemming from the confiscation. After Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in May 2019, Havana Docks sued several cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises S.A. Co., for “trafficking” in the confiscated port property when their ships used the Havana Cruise Port Terminal from 2016 to 2019.

The district court initially issued judgments totaling over $100 million against the four cruise lines. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments related to the 2016-2019 conduct, holding that Havana Docks’ limited property interest, the 99-year concession, would have expired in 2004, meaning the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property during that period. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Havana Docks’ separate claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking between 1996 and 2001.

Question

Is the legal right to sue under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act tied to the confiscated property claim or the hypothetical, unexpired duration of the original property interest?

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