Stay ConnectedThe Supreme Court decision syllabus, read without personal commentary. See: Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) and United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. Photo by: Davi Kelly. Founded by RJ Dieken. Now hosted by Jake Leahy. Frequent guest host Jeff Barnum.
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Copyright: © 2024 Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)
Florida and Texas both enacted laws regulating social media companies and other online platforms. Netchoice alleges a facial challenge to the statutes under the First Amendment. Held: both judgments (of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits) are vacated, as neither court conducted a proper analysis to the facial challenges under the First Amendment to these two laws.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Trump v. United States
A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, and that the indictment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. The District Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding that former Presidents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.
Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined in full, and in which BARRETT, J., joined except as to Part III–C. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Read by RJ Dieken.
City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
Grants Pass, Oregon, is home to roughly 38,000 people, about 600 of whom are estimated to experience homelessness on a given day. Like many local governments across the Nation, Grants Pass has publiccamping laws that restrict encampments on public property. The Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibits activities such as camping on public property or parking overnight in the city’s parks. See §§5.61.030, 6.46.090(A)–(B). Initial violations can trigger a fine, while multiple violations can result in imprisonment. In a prior decision, Martin v. Boise, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause bars cities from enforcing public-camping ordinances like these against homeless individuals whenever the number of homeless individuals in a jurisdiction exceeds the number of “practically available” shelter beds. 920 F. 3d 584, 617. After Martin, suits against Western cities like Grants Pass proliferated.
Plaintiffs (respondents here) filed a putative class action on behalf of homeless people living in Grants Pass, claiming that the city’s ordinances against public camping violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified the class and entered a Martin injunction prohibiting Grants Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless individuals in the city. App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a–183a. Applying Martin’s reasoning, the district court found everyone without shelter in Grants Pass was “involuntarily homeless” because the city’s total homeless population outnumbered its “practically available” shelter beds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a, 216a. The beds at Grants Pass’s charity-run shelter did not qualify as “available” in part because that shelter has rules requiring residents to abstain from smoking and to attend religious services. App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a–180a. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Martin injunction in relevant part. 72 F. 4th 868, 874–896. Grants Pass filed a petition for certiorari. Many States, cities, and counties from across the Ninth Circuit urged the Court to grant review to assess Martin.
Held: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Pp. 15–35.
GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
Read by RJ Dieken.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” §1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on January 6, 2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the building, breaking windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal complaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2). He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Held: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
This is a consolidated opinion of two cases that were argued this term. Both of them bring into question rules promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the Magnuson-Stevens Act -- which applies the Adminsitrative Procedures Act. The only question on appeal is whether Chevron is still good law. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 6-3 Court, holds that "The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled."
In this very brief Per Curiam decision, RJ Dieken also reads the concurring opinions authored Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett.
Ohio v. EPA
The Clean Air Act requires both the States and federal government to help develop environmental regulations. When the EPA creates certain standards regarding air quality, states have to develop their own "State Implementation Plan," which requires States to both set out how to go about applying the federal regulations, and it also requires States to consider its impact on neighboring States (called the Good Neighbor Provision). The EPA can step in when States won't comply with federal guidelines in creating their plan. Some State plans were not approved, and 12 States obtained a stay of enforcement of these denials. This changes the numbers for either State -- becasue part of the benefit of multiple States coming together is the economies of scale of implementation. Ohio, and some other States, now are trying to obtain a stay of the EPA's decision to implement a federal plan, alleging that implementation is arbitrary or caprcicious, given that so many other States are now out of the plan. The main issue of the four factors to determine whether to grant a stay, according to the Court, is which side is likely to prevail on the merits. The Court held that the stay is granted pending review from the D.C. Circuit. Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson.
Harrington v. Purdue Pharma
Purdue Pharma pleaded guilty in 2007 to a federal felony based on its role in misbranding Oxycontin -- which was far more addictive than the company had made it out to be. Purdue faced seemingly endless lawsuits in the following years based on how addictive the opioid Oxycontin was. For over a decade that followed, the Sackler family, who owned Purdue, began to pull money out of the company -- they eventually pulled $11 billion out of the company -- 75% of the company's assets. In 2019 the company filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As part of the plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court, the Sackler family would contribute $4.2 billion towards settling all opioid related lawsuits, and the Bankruptcy Court would enjoin future claims against the family. The District Court threw out the plan on review. The Second Circuit, in a divided panel, reversed, upholding the third-party releases. The Court reversed, deciding that the Bankruptcy Code's "catch-all" provision, is not so broad so as to allow a discharge of third-party claims against a third-party debtor.
SEC v. Jarkesy
In the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress passed a suite of laws designed to combat securities fraud and increase market transparency. Three such statutes are relevant: The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. These Acts respectively govern the registration of securities, the trading of securities, and the activities of investment advisers. Although each regulates different aspects of the securities markets, their pertinent provisions—collectively referred to by regulators as “the antifraud provisions,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a, 202a— target the same basic behavior: misrepresenting or concealing material facts. To enforce these Acts, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two forums. It can file suit in federal court, or it can adjudicate the matter itself. The forum the SEC selects dictates certain aspects of the litigation. In federal court, a jury finds the facts, an Article III judge presides, and the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ordinary rules of discovery govern the litigation. But when the SEC adjudicates the matter in-house, there are no juries. The Commission presides while its Division of Enforcement prosecutes the case. The Commission or its delegee—typically an Administrative Law Judge—also finds facts and decides discovery disputes, and the SEC’s Rules of Practice govern. One remedy for securities violations is civil penalties. Originally, the SEC could only obtain civil penalties from unregistered investment advisers in federal court. Then, in 2010, Congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act authorized the SEC to impose such penalties through its own in-house proceedings. Shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC initiated an enforcement action for civil penalties against investment adviser George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm, Patriot28, LLC for alleged violations of the “antifraud provisions” contained in the federal securities laws. The SEC opted to adjudicate the matter in-house. As relevant, the final order determined that Jarkesy and Patriot28 had committed securities violations and levied a civil penalty of $300,000. Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order on the ground that adjudicating the matter in-house violated the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
Held: When the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.
Murthy v. Missouri
Missouri, alongside a few other states, sued the federal government alleging that certain federal officials illegally coordinated with social media companies to effectively silence certain viewpoints -- which they claim, amounts to these companies becoming state actors within the meaning of First Amendment jurisprudence. Held: Neither the individual nor the state plaintiffs have established Article III standing to seek an injunction against any defendant. Reasoning that the objection is with the platforms, not with the named defendants, therefore, an injunction would be improper.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Snyder v. United States
Snyder served as the Mayor in a town in Indiana. After the town awarded a $1.2 million contract to a trucking company, he received a $13,000 payment from that company, he said this was for consulting services. He was prosecuted by the federal government and convicted for taking an illegal gratuity. He said that Section 666, which is what the charges were brought under, only prohibited bribes, not gratuities after the fact. The district court rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court reversed, stating that for six reasons, the statute does not apply gratuities -- only bribes. Reversed and remanded. Kavanagh writing for the 6-3 majority, with Gorsuch concurring. Jackson writing for the dissent, joined by Kagan and Sotomayor.
Texas v. New Mexico
Approved by Congress in 1938, the Rio Grande Compact is an interstate agreement that apportions the waters of the Rio Grande River among Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. The Compact relies on the Federal Bureau of Reclamation’s operation of an irrigation system called the Rio Grande Project. Under the Compact, New Mexico must deliver a certain amount of water to the Elephant Butte Reservoir, located in southern New Mexico. Then, in accordance with agreements called the “Downstream Contracts,” Reclamation releases specified amounts of water from the Reservoir for delivery to two water districts in New Mexico and Texas. In 2013, Texas filed suit in this Court against the Compact’s other two signatory States, alleging that excessive groundwater pumping in New Mexico was depleting supplies of Rio Grande water bound for Texas. The United States sought to intervene, alleging essentially the same claims as Texas. In 2018, this Court allowed the United States to intervene, holding that the United States “has an interest in seeing that water is deposited in the [Elephant Butte] Reservoir consistent with the Compact’s terms,” as that “is what allows the United States to meet its duties under the Downstream Contracts, which are themselves essential to the fulfillment of the Compact’s expressly stated purpose.” Texas v. New Mexico, 583 U. S. 401, 414 (2018). Texas and New Mexico now seek approval of a proposed consent decree that would resolve this case and codify a methodology for allocating each State’s share of the Rio Grande’s waters. The Special Master recommended that this Court approve the consent decree, but the United States objected and filed an exception to the Special Master’s report.
Held: Because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States’ Compact claims without its consent, the States’ motion to enter the consent decree is denied.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Department of State v. Munoz
Sandra Munoz is an American citizen who married Luis Ascenio-Cordero -- an El Salvador resident -- in 2010. He was denied entry into the United States by the consulate in San Salvador. Generally, these are finally determinations. But, Munoz, his wife, filed suit, claiming that his denial represented a fundamental liberty interest that was entitled to due process of law. She claimed that she had a right for her spouse to enter the United States. The Court rejected this argument, stating that there is no fundamental right for a non-U.S. resident to be granted entry to the U.S. to live with their spouse domestically. And therefore, there is no heightened showing required of the government to support its decision. Reversed and remanded. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court. Gorsuch concurred. Sotomayor filed a dissent, joined by Kagan and Jackson.
Erlinger v. United States
Paul Erlinger pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g). At sentencing, the judge found Mr. Erlinger eligible for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, §924(e)(1), which increases the penalty for a 922(g) conviction from a maximum sentence of 10 years to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years when the defendant has three or more qualifying convictions for offenses committed on different occasions. Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit held in unrelated decisions that two of the offenses on which the government relied for Mr. Erlinger’s sentence enhancement no longer qualified as ACCA predicate offenses. The District Court vacated Mr. Erlinger’s sentence and scheduled resentencing. At the resentencing hearing, prosecutors again pursued an ACCA sentence enhancement based on a new set of 26-year-old convictions for burglaries committed by Mr. Erlinger over the course of several days. Mr. Erlinger protested that the burglaries were part of a single criminal episode and did not occur on separate occasions, as required by ACCA.
Held: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions for ACCA purposes. Pp. 5–26.
Read by RJ Dieken.
Smith v. Arizona
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. In operation, the Clause protects a defendant’s right of cross-examination by limiting the prosecution’s ability to introduce statements made by people not in the courtroom. The Clause thus bars the admission at trial of an absent witness’s statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior chance to subject her to cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53–54. This prohibition “applies only to testimonial hearsay,” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 823, and in that two-word phrase are two limits. First, in speaking about “witnesses”—or “those who bear testimony”—the Clause confines itself to “testimonial statements,” a category this Court has variously described. Id., at 823, 826. Second, the Clause bars only the introduction of hearsay—meaning, out-of-court statements offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Anderson v. United States, 417 U. S. 211, 219.
Held: When an expert conveys an absent analyst’s statements in support of the expert’s opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth. Pp. 11– 22. (a)
Read by Jeff Barnum.
United States v. Rahimi
Respondent Zackey Rahimi was indicted under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8), a federal statute that prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm. A prosecution under Section 922(g)(8) may proceed only if the restraining order meets certain statutory criteria. In particular, the order must either contain a finding that the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of his intimate partner or his or his partner’s child, §922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[ ] the use,” attempted use, or threatened use of “physical force” against those individuals, §922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Rahimi concedes here that the restraining order against him satisfies the statutory criteria, but argues that on its face Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. The District Court denied Rahimi’s motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. While Rahimi’s case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (2022). In light of Bruen, the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Government had not shown that Section 922(g)(8) “fits within our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” 61 F. 4th 443, 460 (CA5 2023).
Held: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.
Read by RJ Dieken.
Gonzalez v. Trevino
The decision of the 5th Circuit is vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Gonzalez was 72 years old, when in 2019, she was elected to a seat on her local City Council in Texas. She collected signatures for a petition trying to get the City Manager removed. There was a long debate at the meeting about this topic. The Mayor asked for the petition at the meeting, she denied having it. She was searched and they found the petition. She said she didn't know it was there, the Mayor told the police and hired a private attorney to investigate the situation. she was arrested under a statute which purports to criminalize "intentionally removing a government record." She filed an action under Section 1983. The district court determined that she could proceed and that even though there was probable cause, it was enough to show that this type of crime was not typically prosecuted. The Appellate Court reversed, determining that she needed to show a closer analog. The Court determined that the Circuit Court's decision was too narrow and that it should be remanded for further determination. Per Curiam decision. Read by Jeff Barnum.
Moore v. United States
Congress generally taxes the income of American business entities in one of two ways. Some entities, such as S corporations and partnerships, are taxed on a pass-through basis, where the entity itself does not pay taxes. 26 U. S. C. §§1361–1362. Instead, the entity’s income is attributed to the shareholders or partners, who then pay taxes on that income even if the entity has not distributed any money or property to them. §§61(a)(12), 701, 1366(a)–(c). Other business entities do pay taxes directly on their income. Those entities’ shareholders ordinarily are not taxed on that income but are taxed when the entity distributes a dividend or when the shareholder sells shares. Congress treats American-controlled foreign corporations as passthrough entities. Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code attributes income of those business entities to American shareholders and taxes those shareholders on that income. §§951–952. Subpart F, however, applies only to a small portion of the foreign corporation’s income, mostly passive income. In 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. As relevant here, Congress imposed a one-time, backwardlooking, pass-through tax on some American shareholders of American-controlled foreign corporations to address the trillions of dollars of undistributed income that had been accumulated by those foreign corporations over the years. Known as the Mandatory Repatriation Tax, the tax imposed a rate from 8 to 15.5 percent on the pro rata shares of American shareholders. §§965(a)(1), (c), (d).
In this case, petitioners Charles and Kathleen Moore invested in the American-controlled foreign corporation KisanKraft. From 2006 to 2017, Kisan Kraft generated a great deal of income but did not distribute that income to its American shareholders. At the end of the 2017 tax year, application of the new MRT resulted in a tax bill of $14,729 on the Moores’ pro rata share of KisanKraft’s accumulated income from 2006 to 2017. The Moores paid the tax and then sued for a refund, claiming, among other things, that the MRT violated the Direct Tax Clause of the Constitution because, in their view, the MRT was an unapportioned direct tax on their shares of KisanKraft stock. The District Court dismissed the suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The MRT—which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity’s American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that income—does not exceed Congress’s constitutional authority.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which ALITO, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon
This case involves a dispute between petitioner Jascha Chiaverini and police officers from Napoleon, Ohio. The officers charged Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner, with three crimes: receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor; dealing in precious metals without a license, also a misdemeanor; and money laundering, a felony. After obtaining a warrant, the police arrested Chiaverini and detained him for three days. But county prosecutors later dropped the case. Chiaverini, believing that his arrest and detention were unjustified, then sued the officers, alleging what is known as a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983. To prevail on this claim, he had to show that the officers brought criminal charges against him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment to the officers, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that Chiaverini’s prosecution was supported by probable cause. In holding this, the court did not address whether the officers had probable cause to bring the money-laundering charge. In its view, there was clearly probable cause to charge Chiaverini with the two misdemeanors. And so long as one charge was supported by probable cause, it thought, a malicious-prosecution claim based on any other charge must fail.
Held: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge. The parties, and the United States as amicus curiae, all agree with this conclusion, which follows from both the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Petitioner Delilah Diaz was stopped at a port of entry on the United States-Mexico border. Border patrol officers searched the car that Diaz was driving and found more than 54 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in the vehicle. Diaz was charged with importing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§952 and 960, charges that required the Government to prove that Diaz “knowingly” transported drugs. In her defense, Diaz claimed not to know that the drugs were hidden in the car. To rebut Diaz’s claim, the Government planned to call Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Andrew Flood as an expert witness to testify that drug traffickers generally do not entrust large quantities of drugs to people who are unaware they are transporting them. Diaz objected in a pretrial motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which provides that “[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.” The court ruled that Agent Flood could not testify in absolute terms about whether all couriers knowingly transport drugs, but could testify that most couriers know they are transporting drugs. At trial, Agent Flood testified that most couriers know that they are transporting drugs. The jury found Diaz guilty, and Diaz appealed, challenging Agent Flood’s testimony under Rule 704(b). The Court of Appeals held that because Agent Flood did not explicitly opine that Diaz knowingly transported methamphetamine, his testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).
Held: Expert testimony that “most people” in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about “the defendant” and thus does not violate Rule 704(b).
Diaz v. United States
Read by RJ Dieken
United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC
Two Terms ago, in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 596 U. S. 464, the Court held that a statute violated the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement because it permitted different fees for Chapter 11 debtors depending on the district where their case was filed. In this case, the Court is asked to determine the appropriate remedy for that constitutional violation. As noted in Siegel, there are three options: (1) refund fees for the thousands of debtors charged higher fees in districts administered by the U. S. Trustee Program, (2) retroactively extract higher fees from the small number of debtors charged lower fees in districts administered by the Bankruptcy Administrator Program, or (3) require only prospective fee parity. See id., at 480. As in Siegel, this case arises from a case filed in a U. S. Trustee district. In 2016, 76 legal entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Kansas. In 2018, under the amended fee statute the Court later found unconstitutional in Siegel, the debtors began paying higher fees than they would have if their case had been filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district. In 2020, the debtors challenged the constitutionality of those fees. The Bankruptcy Court found no constitutional violation, but the Tenth Circuit, anticipating Siegel, reversed. To remedy the constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit ordered a refund of the debtors’ quarterly fees to the extent they exceeded the lower fees paid in the Bankruptcy Administrator districts. This Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case in light of Siegel, and the Tenth Circuit reinstated its original opinion without alteration.
Held: Prospective parity is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel.
Campos-Chavez v. Garland
To initiate the removal of an alien from the United States who is either “inadmissible” under 8 U. S. C. §1182 or “deportable” under §1227, the Federal Government must provide the alien with “written notice” of the proceedings. §§1229(a)(1), (2). Two types of “written notice” are described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of §1229(a): Paragraph (1) provides that the alien be given a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” or NTA, which must set out, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” Paragraph (2) states that “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” the agency must provide “a written notice” specifying “the new time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences” of failing to attend. An alien who fails to attend a hearing despite receiving notice “shall be ordered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that “the written notice” was provided and that “the alien is removable.” §1229a(b)(5)(A). Three scenarios permit the rescinding of an in absentia removal order, one of which is when an alien “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” of §1229(a). §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). In these consolidated cases (one from the Fifth Circuit, and two from the Ninth), aliens Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, each moved to rescind his in absentia order of removal on the ground that he did not receive proper notice of the removal hearing. In each case, the Government provided an initial NTA, but the NTA did not specify the time and place of the removal hearing. Eventually, the Government provided each alien with a notice of hearing under §1229(a)(2) which set out the specific time and place of the removal hearing. None of the aliens showed up for his hearing, and each was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. Each then sought to rescind the removal order, arguing that he did not receive a proper NTA under §1229(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit considered and denied one of the petitions, but the Ninth Circuit granted the other two.
Held: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper §1229(a)(2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
The National Firearms Act of 1934 defines a “machinegun” as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U. S. C. §5845(b). With a machinegun, a shooter can fire multiple times, or even continuously, by engaging the trigger only once. This capability distinguishes a machinegun from a semiautomatic firearm. With a semiautomatic firearm, the shooter can fire only one time by engaging the trigger. Using a technique called bump firing, shooters can fire semiautomatic firearms at rates approaching those of some machineguns. A shooter who bump fires a rifle uses the firearm’s recoil to help rapidly manipulate the trigger. Although bump firing does not require any additional equipment, a “bump stock” is an accessory designed to make the technique easier. A bump stock does not alter the basic mechanics of bump firing, and the trigger still must be released and reengaged to fire each additional shot. For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) consistently took the position that semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks were not machineguns under §5845(b). ATF abruptly changed course when a gunman using semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks fired hundreds of rounds into a crowd in Las Vegas, Nevada, killing 58 people and wounding over 500 more. ATF subsequently proposed a rule that would repudiate its previous guidance and amend its regulations to “clarify” that bump stocks are machineguns. 83 Fed. Reg. 13442. ATF’s Rule ordered owners of bump stocks either to destroy or surrender them to ATF to avoid criminal prosecution. Michael Cargill surrendered two bump stocks to ATF under protest . . .
Held: ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies a bump stock as a “machinegun” under §5845(b).
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
Read by RJ Dieken.
FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration approved a new drug application for mifepristone tablets marketed under the brand name Mifeprex for use in terminating pregnancies up to seven weeks. To help ensure that Mifeprex would be used safely and effectively, FDA placed additional restrictions on the drug’s use and distribution, for example requiring doctors to prescribe or to supervise prescription of Mifeprex, and requiring patients to have three in-person visits with the doctor to receive the drug. In 2016, FDA relaxed some of these restrictions: deeming Mifeprex safe to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks; allowing healthcare providers, such as nurse practitioners, to prescribe Mifeprex; and approving a dosing regimen that required just one in-person visit to receive the drug. In 2019, FDA approved an application for generic mifepristone. In 2021, FDA announced that it would no longer enforce the initial in-person visit requirement. Four pro-life medical associations and several individual doctors moved for a preliminary injunction that would require FDA either to rescind approval of mifepristone or to rescind FDA’s 2016 and 2021 regulatory actions. Danco Laboratories, which sponsors Mifeprex, intervened to defend FDA’s actions. The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and in effect enjoined FDA’s approval of mifepristone, thereby ordering mifepristone off the market. FDA and Danco appealed and moved to stay the District Court’s order pending appeal. As relevant here, this Court ultimately stayed the District Court’s order pending the disposition of proceedings in the Fifth Circuit and this Court. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing. It concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their challenge to FDA’s 2000 and 2019 drug approvals, but were likely to succeed in showing that FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions were unlawful. This Court granted certiorari with respect to the 2016 and 2021 FDA actions.
Held: Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge FDA’s actions regarding the regulation of mifepristone. Pp. 5–25.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
After several Starbucks employees announced plans to unionize, they invited a news crew from a local television station to visit the store after hours to promote their unionizing effort. Starbucks fired multiple employees involved with the media event for violating company policy. The National Labor Relations Board filed an administrative complaint against Starbucks alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor practices. The Board’s regional Director then filed a petition under §10( j) of the National Labor Relations Act seeking a preliminary injunction for the duration of the administrative proceedings that would, among other things, require Starbucks to reinstate the fired employees. The District Court assessed whether the Board was entitled to a preliminary injunction by applying a two-part test that asks whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred,” and whether injunctive relief is “just and proper.” McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 875 F. 3d 333, 339. Applying this standard, the District Court granted the injunction, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Held: When considering the NLRB’s request for a preliminary injunction under §10( j), district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7. Pp. 4–11.
Read by RJ Dieken.
Drawing on a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange between thencandidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio, respondent Steve Elster sought to federally register the trademark “Trump too small” to use on shirts and hats. An examiner from the Patent and Trademark Office refused registration based on the “names clause,” a Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent,” 15 U. S. C. §1052(c). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed, rejecting Elster’s argument that the names clause violates his First Amendment right to free speech. The Federal Circuit reversed.
Held: The Lanham Act’s names clause does not violate the First Amendment.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Petitioner Truck Insurance Exchange is the primary insurer for companies that manufactured and sold products containing asbestos. Two of those companies, Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Hanson Permanente Cement (Debtors), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after facing thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits. As part of the bankruptcy process, the Debtors filed a proposed reorganization plan (Plan). That Plan creates an Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (Trust) under 11 U. S. C. §524(g), a provision that allows Chapter 11 debtors with substantial asbestos related liability to fund a trust and channel all present and future asbestos-related claims into that trust. Truck is contractually obligated to defend each covered asbestos personal injury claim and to indemnify the Debtors for up to $500,000 per claim. For their part, the Debtors must pay a $5,000 deductible per claim, and assist and cooperate with Truck in defending the claims. The Plan treats insured and uninsured claims differently, requiring insured claims to be filed in the tort system for the benefit of the insurance coverage, while uninsured claims are submitted directly to the Trust for resolution. Truck sought to oppose the Plan under §1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits any “party in interest” to “raise” and “be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Among other things, Truck argues that the Plan exposes it to millions of dollars in fraudulent claims because the Plan does not require the same disclosures and authorizations for insured and uninsured claims. Truck also asserts that the Plan impermissibly alters its rights under its insurance policies. The District Court confirmed the Plan. It concluded, among other things, that Truck had limited standing to object to the Plan because the Plan was “insurance neutral,” i.e., it did not increase Truck’s prepetition obligations or impair its contractual rights under its insurance policies. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Truck was not a “party in interest” under §1109(b) because the plan was “insurance neutral.”
Held: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a “party in interest” under §1109(b) that “may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 case.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except ALITO, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U. S. C. §5301 et seq., enables an Indian tribe to enter into a “self-determination contract” with the Indian Health Service to assume responsibility for administering the healthcare programs that IHS would otherwise operate for the tribe. §5321(a)(1). When IHS administers such programs itself, it funds its operations through congressional appropriations and third-party insurance payments. Healthcare programs administered by a tribe under a self-determination contract have a parallel funding structure. First, IHS must provide to the tribe the Secretarial amount, which “shall not be less” than the congressionally appropriated amount that IHS would have used to operate such programs absent the self-determination contract. §5325(a)(1). Second, like IHS when it runs the healthcare programs, a contracting tribe can collect revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers. See 42 U. S. C. §§1395qq(a), 1396j(a); 25 U. S. C. §1621e(a). These third-party funds are called “program income” and must be used by the tribe “to further the general purposes of the contract” with IHS. §5325(m)(1). The Secretarial amount and program income, however, do not place a contracting tribe on equal footing with IHS. That is because the tribe must incur certain overhead and administrative expenses that IHS does not incur when it runs the healthcare programs. To remedy this funding shortfall, Congress amended ISDA to require IHS to pay the tribe “contract support costs” to cover such “reasonable costs for activities which must be carried on by a [tribe] as a contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the [self-determination] contract.” §5325(a)(2). Contract support costs eligible for repayment include “direct program expenses for the operation of the Federal program” and “any additional administrative or . . . overhead expense incurred by the [tribe] in connection with the operation of the Federal program, function, service, or activity pursuant to the contract.” §5325(a)(3)(A). Such costs are limited, however, to those “directly attributable to” selfdetermination contracts. §5326. And no funds are available for “costs associated with any contract . . . entered into between [a tribe] and any entity other than [IHS].” Ibid. These cases involve self-determination contracts between IHS and two tribes—the San Carlos Apache Tribe and the Northern Arapaho Tribe. Both Tribes sued the Government for breach of contract, contending that although they used the Secretarial amount and program income to operate the healthcare programs they assumed from IHS under their self-determination contracts, IHS failed to pay the contract support costs they incurred by providing healthcare services using program income. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits concluded that each Tribe was entitled to reimbursement for such costs. Held: ISDA requires IHS to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
Read by RJ Dieken.
Connelly v. United States
Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders in Crown C Supply, a small building supply corporation. The brothers entered into an agreement to ensure that Crown would stay in the family if either brother died. Under that agreement, the surviving brother would have the option to purchase the deceased brother’s shares. If he declined, Crown itself would be required to redeem (i.e., purchase) the shares. To ensure that Crown would have enough money to redeem the shares if required, it obtained $3.5 million in life insurance on each brother. After Michael died, Thomas elected not to purchase Michael’s shares, thus triggering Crown’s obligation to do so. Michael’s son and Thomas agreed that the value of Michael’s shares was $3 million, and Crown paid the same amount to Michael’s estate. As the executor of Michael’s estate, Thomas then filed a federal tax return for the estate, which reported the value of Michael’s shares as $3 million. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the return. During the audit, Thomas obtained a valuation from an outside accounting firm. That firm determined that Crown’s fair market value at Michael’s death was $3.86 million, an amount that excluded the $3 million in insurance proceeds used to redeem Michael’s shares on the theory that their value was offset by the redemption obligation. Because Michael had held a 77.18% ownership interest in Crown, the analyst calculated the value of Michael’s shares as approximately $3 million ($3.86 million x 0.7718). The IRS disagreed. It insisted that Crown’s redemption obligation did not offset the life-insurance proceeds, and accordingly, assessed Crown’s total value as $6.86 million ($3.86 million + $3 million). The IRS then calculated the value of Michael’s shares as $5.3 million ($6.86 million x 0.7718). Based on this higher valuation, the IRS determined that the estate owed an additional $889,914 in taxes. The estate paid the deficiency and Thomas, acting as executor, sued the United States for a refund. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government. The court held that, to accurately value Michael’s shares, the $3 million in life-insurance proceeds must be counted in Crown’s valuation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: A corporation’s contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation’s value for purposes of the federal estate tax.
In Cantero v. Bank of America, the Supreme Court reviewed a Second Circuit decision that struck down a New York bank regulation, finding that the State's authority was preempted by federal law. The Court held that Dodd-Frank requires a nuanced analysis -- rather than a bright line test -- on the issue of federal preemption. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed and remanded with instructions on the analysis required to determine preemption.
Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) sued respondent Maria Vullo—former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS)—alleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. The Second Circuit held that Vullo’s alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the NRA’s complaint states a First Amendment claim. The NRA’s “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage. DFS regulates insurance companies and financial services institutions doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investigations and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for criminal prosecution. The NRA contracted with DFS-regulated entities— affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton)—to administer insurance policies the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite. In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insurance policies—Carry Guard—on a tip passed along from a gun-control advocacy group. The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured gun owners from intentional criminal acts in violation of New York law, and that the NRA promoted Carry Guard without the required insurance producer license. Lockton and Chubb subsequently suspended Carry Guard. Vullo then expanded her investigation into the NRA’s other affinity insurance programs. On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s, expressed her views in favor of gun control, and told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in pursuing” infractions unrelated to any NRA business “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. at 199– 200, ¶21. Vullo and Lloyd’s struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on those syndicates which served the NRA.” Id., at 223, ¶69. On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued letters entitled, “Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations.” Id., at 246–251 (Guidance Letters) . . .
Held: The NRA plausibly alleged that respondent violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Thornell v. Jones
Respondent Danny Lee Jones was convicted of the premeditated firstdegree murders of Robert and Tisha Weaver and the attempted premeditated murder of Robert’s grandmother Katherine Gumina. Arizona law at the time required the trial court to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E). The trial court found three aggravating circumstances that applied to both Robert’s and Tisha’s murders: Jones committed multiple homicides, §13– 703(F)(8); he was motivated by “pecuniary” gain, §13–703(F)(5); and the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved,” §13– 703(F)(6). The trial court found an additional aggravating circumstance with respect to Tisha’s murder: she was a young child, §13– 703(F)(9). The trial court also concluded that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: long-term substance abuse, drug and alcohol impairment at the time of the murders, head trauma, and childhood abuse. 9 Record 2465. The court concluded that these mitigating circumstances were “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it sentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.” 185 Ariz. 471, 492, 917 P. 2d 200, 221. Jones later sought state postconviction review on the theory that defense counsel was ineffective, but the Arizona courts rejected Jones’s claims. Jones next filed a federal habeas petition in District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could not show prejudice because the additional information he presented “ ‘barely. . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.’ ” Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 700). The Ninth Circuit reversed, but this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v. Jones, 563 U. S. 932. On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v. Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1137. Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc review. One dissent, joined by eight judges, asserted that the Ninth Circuit panel flouted Strickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulative mitigation evidence” as “enough to overcome . . . weight[y] . . . aggravating circumstances.” Id., at 1155. Held: The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of Strickland was in error.
Reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Read by RJ Dieken
Coinbase v. Suski
The dispute here involves a conflict between two contracts executed by petitioner Coinbase, Inc., operator of a cryptocurrency exchange platform, and respondents, who use Coinbase. The first contract—the Coinbase User Agreement that respondents agreed to when they created their accounts—contains an arbitration provision with a delegation clause. Per this provision, an arbitrator must decide all disputes under the contract, including whether a given disagreement is arbitrable. The second contract—the Official Rules for a promotional sweepstakes respondents entered—contains a forum selection clause providing that California courts “shall have sole jurisdiction of any controversies regarding the [sweepstakes] promotion.” Respondents ultimately filed a class action in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the sweepstakes violated various California laws. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement’s delegation clause. The District Court determined that the Official Rules’ forum selection clause controlled the parties’ dispute and accordingly denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held: Where parties have agreed to two contracts—one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts—a court must decide which contract governs.
These cases concern the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act to state drug convictions that occurred before recent technical amendments to the federal drug schedules. ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on defendants who are convicted for the illegal possession of a firearm and who have a criminal history thought to demonstrate a propensity for violence. As relevant here, a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a serious drug offense” qualifies for ACCA’s enhanced sentencing. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). For a state crime to qualify as a “serious drug offense,” it must carry a maximum sentence of at least 10 years’ imprisonment, and it must “involv[e] . . . a controlled substance . . . as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act.” §§924(e)(1), (2)(A)(ii). Under the categorical approach, a state drug offense counts as an ACCA predicate only if the State’s definition of the drug in question “matche[s]” the definition under federal law. Shular v. United States, 589 U. S. 154, 158. The question presented is whether a state crime constitutes a “serious drug offense” if it involved a drug that was on the federal schedules when the defendant possessed or trafficked in it but was later removed. Petitioners Justin Rashaad Brown and Eugene Jackson were separately convicted of the federal crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of §922(g)(1). In both cases, an ACCA enhancement was recommended based on prior state felony drug convictions. And both defendants argued that their prior convictions did not qualify as “serious drug offense[ s].”
Held: A state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that offense. Pp. 4– 19.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined, and in which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.
Alexander v. NAACP
The Constitution entrusts state legislatures with the primary responsibility for drawing congressional districts, and legislative redistricting is an inescapably political enterprise. Claims that a map is unconstitutional because it was drawn to achieve a partisan end are not justiciable in federal court. By contrast, if a legislature gives race a predominant role in redistricting decisions, the resulting map is subjected to strict scrutiny and may be held unconstitutional. These doctrinal lines collide when race and partisan preference are highly correlated. This Court has endorsed two related propositions when navigating this tension. First, a party challenging a map’s constitutionality must disentangle race and politics to show that race was the legislature’s “predominant” motivating factor. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 916. Second, the Court starts with a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith. To disentangle race from other permissible considerations, plaintiffs may employ some combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 291. Where race and politics are highly correlated, a map that has been gerrymandered to achieve a partisan end can look very similar to a racially gerrymandered map. Thus, in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the high bar for a racial-gerrymandering claim when they failed to produce an alternative map showing that a rational legislature sincerely driven by its professed partisan goals would have drawn a different map with greater racial balance. Id., at 258. Without an alternative map, the Court also found it difficult for plaintiffs to defeat the starting presumption that the legislature acted in good faith.
Held: 1. The District Court’s finding that race predominated in the design of District I in the Enacted Plan was clearly erroneous.
2. Because the same findings of fact and reasoning that guided the court’s racial-gerrymandering analysis also guided the analysis of the Challengers’ independent vote-dilution claim, that conclusion also cannot stand. The District Court also erred in conflating the two claims. A plaintiff pressing a vote-dilution claim cannot prevail simply by showing that race played a predominant role in the districting process, but rather must show that the State “enacted a particular voting scheme as a purposeful device to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities.” Miller, 515 U. S., at 911. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the State’s districting plan “has the purpose and effect” of diluting the minority vote. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 649. In light of these two errors in the District Court’s analysis, a remand is appropriate. Pp. 34–35. Reversed in part and remanded in part. ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part III–C. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
In Harrow v. Department of Defense, Stuart Harrow appealed an adverse administrative decision after the 60-day deadline -- claiming that he was unaware of the deadline. He filed this appeal to the Federal Circuit. Because the Federal Circuit saw the mandatory "shall" language in the statute (that is, it shall be filed within 60 days), the Court denied his request, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction. The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether this provision was jurisdictional. Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, decided that the provision was mandatory, but not jurisdictional, and the lower court therefore, could exercise its discretion to hear the case. Vacated and remanded.
Smith v. Spizzirri
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Section 3 of the FAA, entitled “Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration,” provides that when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U. S. C. §3. In this case, petitioners filed suit against respondents in state court alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. Respondents then removed to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Petitioners agreed their claims were arbitrable, but contended that §3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely. The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, §3 compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit. Statutory text, structure, and purpose all point to this conclusion. The plain text of §3 requires a court to stay the proceeding upon request. The statute’s use of the word “shall” “creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”
Reversed and remanded. SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Read by Jeff Barnum
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU ET AL. v. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LTD., ET AL.
The Constitution gives Congress control over the public fisc subject to the command that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art. I, §9, cl. 7. For most federal agencies, Congress provides funding through annual appropriations. For the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, however, Congress provided a standing source of funding outside the ordinary annual appropriations process. Specifically, Congress authorized the Bureau to draw from the Federal Reserve System an amount that its Director deems “reasonably necessary to carry out” the Bureau’s duties, subject only to an inflation-adjusted cap. 12 U. S. C. §§5497(a)(1), (2). In this case, several trade associations representing payday lenders and credit-access businesses challenged regulations issued by the Bureau pertaining to high-interest consumer loans on statutory and constitutional grounds. As relevant here, the Fifth Circuit accepted the associations’ argument that the Bureau’s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause.
Held: Congress’ statutory authorization allowing the Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the Bureau’s duties satisfies the Appropriations Clause.
(a) Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes.
(b) The associations’ three principal arguments for why the Bureau’s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause are unpersuasive.
51 F. 4th 616, reversed and remanded. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
Read by RJ Dieken
Culley v. Marshall
Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners’ cars were seized under an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “incident to an arrest” so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. Ala. Code §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed forfeiture complaints against Culley’s and Sutton’s cars just 10 and 13 days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceedings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioners’ claims, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally required.
Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
Read by RJ Dieken.
Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy
Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must file suit “within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U. S. C. §507(b). On one understanding of that limitations provision, a copyright claim “accrue[s]” when “an infringing act occurs.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 670. But under an alternative view, the so-called discovery rule, a claim accrues when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered,” the infringing act. Ibid., n. 4. That rule enables a diligent plaintiff to raise claims about even very old infringements if he discovered them within the three years prior to suit. In this case, respondent Sherman Nealy invoked the discovery rule to sue Warner Chappell Music for copyright infringements going back ten years. Nealy argued that his claims were timely because he first learned of the infringing conduct less than three years before he sued. In the District Court, Warner Chappell accepted that the discovery rule governed the timeliness of Nealy’s claims. But it argued that, even if Nealy could sue under that rule for older infringements, he could recover damages or profits for only those occurring in the last three years. The District Court agreed. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a timely claim. Held: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred. The Act’s statute of limitations establishes a threeyear period for filing suit, which begins to run when a claim accrues (here, the Court assumes without deciding, upon its discovery). That provision establishes no separate three-year limit on recovering damages. If any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act’s remedial sections. But those provisions merely state that an infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits. See §504(a)–(c). There is no time limit on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a timely claim is entitled to damages for infringement, no matter when the infringement occurred. The Court’s decision in Petrella also does not support a three-year damages cap. There, the Court noted that the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations allows plaintiffs “to gain retrospective relief running only three years back from” the filing of a suit. 572 U. S., at 672. Taken out of context, that line might seem to address the issue here. But that statement merely described how the limitations provision worked in Petrella, where the plaintiff had long known of the defendant’s infringing conduct and so could not avail herself of the discovery rule to sue for infringing acts more than three years old. The Court did not go beyond the case’s facts to say that even if the limitations provision allows a claim for an earlier infringement, the plaintiff may not obtain monetary relief. Unlike the plaintiff in Petrella, Nealy has invoked the discovery rule to bring claims for infringing acts occurring more than three years before he filed suit. The Court granted certiorari in this case on the assumption that such claims may be timely under the Act’s limitations provision. If Nealy’s claims are thus timely, he may obtain damages for them. Pp. 4–7. 60 F. 4th 1325, affirmed. KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman. From 2008 through 2017, Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer in the Department’s specialized Intelligence Division. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander asked to transfer Muldrow out of the unit so he could replace her with a male police officer. Against Muldrow’s wishes, the Department approved the request and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed job elsewhere in the Department. While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not. After the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking officials on the departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division, instead supervising the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrol officers. She also lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle and had a less regular schedule involving weekend shifts. Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the transfer. She alleged that the City, in ousting her from the Intelligence Division, had “discriminate[d] against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The District Court granted the City summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th 680, 688. Muldrow’s lawsuit could not proceed, the court said, because the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working conditions.”
Held: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant. Pp. 5–11.
Read by Jeff Barnum
McIntosh v. United States
Petitioner Louis McIntosh was indicted on multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses. The indictment set forth the demand that McIntosh “shall forfeit . . . all property . . . derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the [Hobbs Act] offenses.” The Government also later provided McIntosh with a pretrial bill of particulars that included as property subject to forfeiture $75,000 in cash and a BMW that McIntosh purchased just five days after one of the robberies. After a jury convicted McIntosh, the District Court imposed a forfeiture of $75,000 and the BMW at the sentencing hearing. Although the District Court also ordered the Government to submit an order of forfeiture for the court’s signature within a week from the hearing, the Government failed to do so. On appeal, the Government moved for a limited remand to supplement the record with a written order of forfeiture. The Second Circuit granted the unopposed motion. Back in District Court, McIntosh argued that the failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)—which provides that “[u]nless doing so is impractical,” a federal district court “must enter the preliminary order [of forfeiture] sufficiently in advance of sentencing to allow the parties to suggest revisions or modifications before the order becomes final as to the defendant”—meant that the District Court could not proceed with forfeiture at all. The District Court overruled McIntosh’s objections, finding that the Rule is a timerelated directive, and that the failure to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before sentencing did not prevent the court from ordering forfeiture because the missed deadline did not prejudice McIntosh. The Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Held: A district court’s failure to comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s requirement to enter a preliminary order before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.
(a) Although the District Court did not comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) when it failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before McIntosh’s initial sentencing, the District Court retained its power to order forfeiture against McIntosh.
(b) McIntosh’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. He points to he Rule’s use of the word “must” to highlight its mandatory character, but such language standing “alone has not always led this Court to interpret statutes to bar judges . . . from taking action to which a missed statutory deadline refers.”
(c) Noncompliance with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is a procedural error subject to harmlessness review. Because McIntosh did not challenge the lower courts’ harmlessness analysis in either his certiorari petition or his opening brief, this Court need not revisit it. P. 13.
Read by Founder RJ Dieken
Petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the United States Army in 2000 and served a total of eight years over three separate periods of military service. He became entitled to Montgomery Bill benefits as a result of his first period of service. Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree and used 25 months and 14 days of Montgomery benefits to finance his education. Through his subsequent periods of service, Rudisill also became entitled to more generous educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits to finance a graduate degree. Rudisill understood that such benefits would be limited to 22 months and 16 days under §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. But the Government informed Rudisill that he was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits (the length of his unused Montgomery benefits) due to §3327, a provision in the Post-9/11 Bill designed to coordinate benefits for those servicemembers meeting the criteria for both Montgomery benefits and Post-9/11 benefits. Section 3327 provides that a servicemember meeting the criteria for both GI bills can elect to swap Montgomery benefits for the more generous Post-9/11 benefits, up to a total of 36 months of benefits. §3327(d)(2)(A). Ultimately, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, sided with the Government, explaining that when Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits, he had made an “election” under §3327(a)(1) to swap his Montgomery benefits for Post 9/11 benefits, making his benefits subject to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month limit.
Held: Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to §3695(a)’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. Pp. 8–18.
(a) The Government claims that someone in Rudisill’s position is subject to §3322(d)’s mandatory coordination clause, so, to receive any Post-9/11 benefits, he must make an election under §3327(a), which in turn subjects him to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month benefit limit. Rudisill counters that §3322(d) does not apply to him because he has earned two separate entitlements to benefits. Rudisill further maintains that §3327(a)’s election mechanism is optional in any event, and that he does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make a §3327(a) election. The statutory text resolves this case in Rudisill’s favor.
(b) Section 3322(d), which creates a mechanism for certain servicemembers to “coordinate” their benefits, does not limit Rudisill’s entitlement. First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefits. Section 3322(d) does not mention the receipt of benefits but addresses instead the “coordination of entitlement.” Because Rudisill is already entitled to two separate benefits, he has no need to coordinate any entitlement under §3327. As used in the statute, the word “coordination” denotes a swap. Section 3327, to which §3322(d) points, describes coordination as making an election that permits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefits “instead of” Montgomery benefits. §3327(d)(1).
(c) The contention that Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits by invoking §3327 is contradicted by that provision’s text.
Reversed and remanded.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BARRETT, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
DEVILLIER v. TEXAS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Argued Jan. 16, 2024—Decided Apr. 16, 2024
Richard DeVillier and more than 120 other petitioners own property north of U. S. Interstate Highway 10 between Houston and Beaumont, Texas. The dispute here arose after the State of Texas took action to use portions of I–10 as a flood evacuation route, installing a roughly 3- foot-tall barrier along the highway median to act as a dam. When subsequent hurricanes and storms brought heavy rainfall, the median barrier performed as intended, keeping the south side of the highway open. But it also flooded petitioners’ land to the north, causing significant damage to their property. DeVillier filed suit in Texas state court. He alleged that by building the median barrier and using his property to store stormwater, Texas had effected a taking of his property for which the State must pay just compensation. Other property owners filed similar suits. Texas removed the cases to federal court, where they were consolidated into a single proceeding with one operative complaint. The operative complaint includes inverse condemnation claims under both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As relevant, Texas moved to dismiss the federal inverse-condemnation claim, arguing that a plaintiff has no cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. The District Court denied Texas’ motion, concluding that a property owner may sue a State directly under the Takings Clause. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding “that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.” 53 F. 4th 904 (per curiam).
Held: DeVillier and the other property owners should be permitted to pursue their claims under the Takings Clause through the cause of action available under Texas law. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Court has explained that “a property owner acquires an irrevocable right to just compensation immediately upon a taking” “[b]ecause of ‘the self-executing character’ of the Takings Clause ‘with respect to compensation.’ ” Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 192 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 315). The question here concerns the procedural vehicle by which a property owner may seek to vindicate that right. Constitutional rights do not typically come with a built-in cause of action to allow for private enforcement in courts, see Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 490–491, and so they are asserted offensively pursuant to an independent cause of action designed for that purpose, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §1983. DeVillier relies on First English and other cases to argue that the Takings Clause creates by its own force a cause of action authorizing suits for just compensation. But those cases do not directly confront whether the Takings Clause provides a cause of action. It would be imprudent to decide that question without first establishing the premise in the question presented that no other cause of action exists to vindicate the property owner’s rights under the Takings Clause. Texas state law does provide an inverse-condemnation cause of action by which property owners may seek just compensation against the State based on both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause. This case therefore does not present the circumstance in which a property owner has no cause of action to seek just compensation. The Court therefore remands so that DeVillier and the other property owners may proceed through the cause of action available under Texas law. 53 F. 4th 904, vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
George Sheetz was required by the County of El Dorado to pay $23,420
George Sheetz tried to get a residential building permit from El Dorado County. To do so, the County made him pay a $23,420 "traffic impact fee." The fee was part of the County's "General Plan" -- this plan was intended to address the impact that development has on public services.
This fee was calculated based on a standard schedule, rather than any actual impact resulting from his development. Sheetz paid the fee under protest. He sued in state court, claiming that the fee amounted to an "exaction" that violated the Takings Clause. Sheetz argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, require the County to make an individualized determination. The County argued that these cases only apply to individual decisions by administrators, but not by legislative bodies.
Held: The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions.
a) The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay "just compensation" when property is taken. This Clause also stands for the notion that public costs should be paid by the public, not individual people. Yet, States do have substantial authority to generally regulate land use. Land use regulations are generally acceptable so long as they are “reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose” -- so long as it does not take too much value or frustrate the investment backed expectations of the owner. The government may also deny a building permit within its police power purpose when the ends match it. The government can prevent development if it is related to the issues (i.e. giving land to widen a road when congestion will be increased), but this needs to be related to the government interest, otherwise, it amounts to extortion. To be constitutional, permit conditions must have an 1) essential nexus to the government interest; and 2) must have rough proportionality to the public use.
b) The decisions below upheld the traffic impact fee because they reasoned that Nolan and Dolan do not apply to legislative fees (but instead, only administrative), nothing in the constitutional text or history suggests this reading. There is no reason why the Nolan and Dolan tests should not apply to legislation, but only to administrative actions.
c) Building permit conditions are not exempt from Nolan or Dolan scrutiny only because they were imposed by a legislative body.
Vacated and remanded.
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor filed a concurrence, which was joined by Jackson. Gorsuch filed a concurrence. Kavanaugh filed a concurrence, in which Kagan and Jackson joined.
Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation owns a subsidiary that operates terminals to store bulk liquid commodities, including No. 6 fuel oil, which has almost 3% sulfer. The UN adopted IMO in 2016, which set in in 2020. This regulation capped the sulfur content on fuel oil used in shipping to 0.5%. Macquarie did not discuss this IMO in its public documents, but in February 2018, its stock fell 41% after announcing that it lost contracts in of its subsidiary. Moab partners sued for violating SEC Rule 10b-5(b) - failure to omit material facts about securities. The trial court dismissed the complaint, the Second Circuit reversed because of its duty to disclose.
Held: Pure omissions are not actionable under Rule 10b–5(b). Rule 10b– 5(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” In addition to prohibiting “any untrue statement of a material fact”—i.e., false statements or lies—the Rule also prohibits omitting a material fact necessary “to make the statements made . . . not misleading.” Ibid. This case turns on whether this second prohibition bars only half-truths or instead extends to pure omissions. A pure omission occurs when a speaker says nothing, in circumstances that do not give any special significance to that silence. Halftruths, on the other hand, are “representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information.” Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U. S. 176, 188. Rule 10b–5(b) requires disclosure of information necessary to ensure that statements already made are clear and complete. Logically and by its plain text, Rule 10b–5(b) therefore covers halftruths, not pure omissions, because it requires identifying affirmative assertions (i.e., “statements made”) before determining if other facts are needed to make those statements “not misleading.” Statutory context confirms what the text plainly provides. Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits any registration statement that “omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein.” 15 U. S. C. §77k(a). By its terms, §11(a) creates liability for failure to speak. Neither §10(b) nor Rule 10b–5(b) contains language similar to §11(a), and that omission is telling. “Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b–5.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson,. A duty to disclose, however, does not automatically render silence misleading under Rule 10b–5(b). The failure to disclose information required by Item 303 can support a Rule 10b–5(b) claim only if the omission renders affirmative statements made misleading. Moab and the United States suggest that a plaintiff does not need to plead any statements rendered misleading by a pure omission because reasonable investors know that the Exchange Act requires issuers to file periodic informational statements in which companies must furnish the information required by Item 303. But that argument reads the words “statements made” out of Rule 10b–5(b) and shifts the focus of that Rule and §10(b) from fraud to disclosure. See Chiarella v. United States, (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud”). Moab also contends that without private liability for pure omissions under Rule 10b–5(b), there will be “broad immunity any time an issuer fraudulently omits information
Congress and the SEC require it to disclose.” But private parties remain free to bring claims based on Item 303 violations that create misleading half-truths, and the SEC retains authority to prosecute violations of its own rules and regulations, including Item 303. Vacated and remanded. SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
Flowers makes baked goods that are then distributed across the country. Bissonnette owned the distribution rights in a certain part of the country. Their contract subjected them to the F.A.A.. After Bissonnette sued under Labor (wage) laws, Flowers moved to compel arbitration. Bissonnette said they're exempt because the F.A.A. exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The District Court dismissed the case, sending it to Arbitration. The Second City affirmed, finding that the exemption only applied to workers in the transportation industry, but these were workers in the bakery industry.
Held: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under §1 of the FAA.
(a) The Court has long recognized that the exemption in §1 is limited to transportation workers. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. Applying the ejusdem generis canon of statutory interpretation to §1, the Court in Circuit City read the general phrase “class of workers engaged in . . . commerce” to be “controlled and defined by reference to” the specific categories “seamen” and “railroad employees” that precede it. The Court concluded that the “linkage” between “seamen” and “railroad employees” is that they are both transportation workers, and the Court thus interpreted the class of workers in the residual clause of §1 to be limited in the same way. The Court again considered the scope of the residual clause in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon and declined to adopt an industrywide approach to §1, rejecting the employee’s claim that she was a member of a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” simply because she worked for an airline and carried out its customary work. Instead, the language of §1—referring to “ ‘workers’ ” who are “engaged” in commerce—focuses on the performance of work rather than the industry of the employer. The relevant question was what the employee does at the airline, not what the airline does generally. Saxon. Here the Second Circuit fashioned its transportation-industry requirement without any guide in the text of §1 or this Court’s precedents. The Second Circuit decided that an entity would be considered within the transportation industry if it “pegs its charges chiefly to the movement of goods or passengers” and its “predominant source of commercial revenue is generated by that movement.” But that test would often turn on arcane riddles about the nature of a company’s services. For example, does a pizza delivery company derive its revenue mainly from pizza or delivery? Extensive discovery might be necessary before deciding a motion to compel arbitration, adding expense and delay to every FAA case. That “complexity and uncertainty” would “‘breed[] litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it.’ ”
(b) Flowers argues that the §1 exemption would sweep too broadly without an implied transportation-industry requirement. Because “virtually all products move in interstate commerce,” Flowers warns that nearly all workers who load or unload goods would be exempt from arbitration. But §1 does not define the class of exempt workers in such limitless terms. Instead, as the Court held in Saxon, a transportation worker is one who is “actively” “ ‘engaged in transportation’ of . . . goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” In other words, a transportation worker “must at least play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders.” 596 U. S., at 458. These requirements “undermine[] any attempt to give the provision a sweeping, open-ended construction,” instead limiting §1 to its appropriately “narrow” scope. Id., vacated and remanded.
Respondent Yonas Fikre, a U. S. citizen and Sudanese emigree, brought suit alleging that the government placed him on the No Fly List unlawfully. In his complaint, Mr. Fikre alleged that he traveled from his home in Portland, Oregon to Sudan in 2009 to pursue business opportunities there. At a visit to the U. S. embassy, two FBI agents informed Mr. Fikre that he could not return to the United States because the government had placed him on the No Fly List. The agents questioned him extensively about the Portland mosque he attended, and they offered to take steps to remove him from the No Fly List if he agreed to become an FBI informant and to report on other members of his religious community. Mr. Fikre refused. He then traveled to the United Arab Emirates, where he alleges authorities interrogated and detained him for 106 days at the behest of the FBI. Unable to fly back to the United States, he ended up in Sweden, where he remained until February 2015. While there, he filed this suit, alleging that the government had violated his rights to procedural due process by failing to provide either meaningful notice of his addition to the No Fly List or any appropriate way to secure redress. He further alleged that the government had placed him on the list for constitutionally impermissible reasons related to his race, national origin, and religious beliefs. Mr. Fikre sought, among other things, an injunction prohibiting the government from keeping him on the No Fly List and a declaratory judgment confirming the government had violated his rights. In May 2016, the government notified Mr. Fikre that he had been removed from the No Fly List and sought dismissal of his suit in district court, arguing that its administrative action had rendered the case moot. The district court agreed with the government, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a party seeking to moot a case based on its own voluntary cessation of challenged conduct must show that the conduct cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” 904 F. 3d 1033, 1039. On remand, the government submitted a declaration asserting that, based on the currently available information, Mr. Fikre would not be placed on the No Fly List in the future, and the district court again dismissed Mr. Fikre’s claim as moot. The Ninth Circuit once again reversed, holding that the government had failed to meet its burden because the declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Mr. Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. 35 F. 4th 762, 770–772.
Held: The government has failed to demonstrate that this case is moot. A court with jurisdiction has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear and resolve questions properly before it. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976). But the converse is also true as a federal court must dismiss a case that is moot. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 91 (2013). The limited authority vested in federal courts by Article III of the U. S. Constitution to decide cases and controversies means that federal courts may no more pronounce on past actions that have no “continuing effect” in the world than they may neglect their obligation to hear and resolve questions properly before them. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18. This does not imply that a defendant may “automatically moot a case” by the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it is sued. Instead, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation of a challenged practice” will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189.
Wilkinson v. Garland
Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the removal of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ must decide first whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ finds the noncitizen statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discretion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enumerated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen to “establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [the noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child,” who is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §1229b(b)(1)(D). Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United States beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. Wilkinson applied for cancellation of removal based in part on hardship to his 7-year-old, U. S.-born son, M., who suffers from a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson for emotional and financial support. To meet the hardship standard, Wilkinson had to show that M. “would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from [his] removal.” In re MonrealAguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62. Considering all of the hardship factors presented by Wilkinson in the aggregate, the IJ held that M.’s situation did not meet the statutory standard for “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship and denied Wilkinson’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit held that it lacked the jurisdiction necessary to review the IJ’s discretionary hardship determination. This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the IJ’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship determination is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) or whether that determination is discretionary and therefore unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Held: The Third Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s determination in this case. Pp. 7–16.
Read by Jake Leahy.
O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier
In 2014, Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T. J. Zane created public Facebook pages to promote their campaigns for election to the Poway Unified School District (PUSD) Board of Trustees. While O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane (whom we will call the Trustees) both had personal Facebook pages that they shared with friends and family, they used their public pages for campaigning and issues related to PUSD. After they won election, the Trustees continued to use their public pages to post PUSD-related content, including board-meeting recaps, application solicitations for board positions, local budget plans and surveys, and public safety updates. They also used their pages to solicit feedback and communicate with constituents.
Their Facebook pages described them as “Government Official[s]” and noted their official positions. O’Connor-Ratcliff also created a public Twitter page, which she used in much the same way. Christopher and Kimberly Garnier, who have children attending PUSD schools, often criticized the board of trustees. They began posting lengthy and repetitive comments on the Trustees’ social-media posts—for instance, nearly identical comments on 42 separate posts on O’Connor-Ratcliff ’s Facebook page and 226 identical replies within a 10-minute span to every tweet on her Twitter feed. The Trustees initially deleted the Garniers’ comments before blocking them from commenting altogether. The Garniers sued the Trustees under 42 U. S. C. §1983, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged violation of their First Amendment rights.
At summary judgment, the District Court granted the Trustees qualified immunity as to the damages claims but allowed the case to proceed on the merits on the ground that the Trustees acted “under color of ” state law when they blocked the Garniers. §1983. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that §1983’s stateaction requirement was satisfied because there was a “close nexus between the Trustees’ use of their social media pages and their official positions.” 41 F. 4th 1158, 1170 (2022). The court cited its own state-action precedent, which holds that an off-duty state employee acts under color of law if she (1) “purports to or pretends to act under color of law”; (2) her “pretense of acting in the performance of [her] duties had the purpose and effect of influencing the behavior of others”; and (3) the “harm inflicted on plaintiff related in some meaningful way either to the officer’s governmental status or to the performance of [her] duties.” Ibid. (citing Naffe v. Frey, 789 F. 3d 1030, 1037 (CA9 2015); internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Applying that framework, the court found state action based largely on the official “appearance and content” of the Trustees’ pages. 41 F. 4th, at 1171. We granted certiorari in this case and in Lindke v. Freed, ___ U. S. ___ (2024), to resolve a Circuit split about how to identify state action in the context of public officials using social media. 598 U. S. ___ (2023). Because the approach that the Ninth Circuit applied is different from the one we have elaborated in Lindke, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in that case. It is so ordered.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
James Freed, like countless other Americans, created a private Facebook profile sometime before 2008. He eventually converted his profile to a public “page,” meaning that anyone could see and comment on his posts. In 2014, Freed updated his Facebook page to reflect that he was appointed city manager of Port Huron, Michigan, describing himself as “Daddy to Lucy, Husband to Jessie and City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed continued to operate his Facebook page himself and continued to post prolifically (and primarily) about his personal life. Freed also posted information related to his job, such as highlighting communications from other city officials and soliciting feedback from the public on issues of concern. Freed often responded to comments on his posts, including those left by city residents with inquiries about community matters. He occasionally deleted comments that he considered “derogatory” or “stupid.” After the COVID–19 pandemic began, Freed posted about it. Some posts were personal, and some contained information related to his job. Facebook user Kevin Lindke commented on some of Freed’s posts, unequivocally expressing his displeasure with the city’s approach to the pandemic. Initially, Freed deleted Lindke’s comments; ultimately, he blocked him from commenting at all. Lindke sued Freed under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that Freed had violated his First Amendment rights. As Lindke saw it, he had the right to comment on Freed’s Facebook page because it was a public forum. The District Court determined that because Freed managed his Facebook page in his private capacity, and because only state action can give rise to liability under §1983, Lindke’s claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Held: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official’s social-media page engages in state action under §1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts. Pp. 5–15.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Read by Jeff Barnum.
PULSIFER v. UNITED STATES
No. 22–340. Argued October 2, 2023—Decided March 15, 2024 After pleading guilty to distributing at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, petitioner Mark Pulsifer faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. At sentencing, he sought to take advantage of the “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law, which allows a sentencing court to disregard the statutory minimum if a defendant meets five criteria. Among those is the requirement, set out in Paragraph (f)(1), that the sentencing court find that—
(1) the defendant does not have—
(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and
(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.
The Government argued that Pulsifer could not satisfy that requirement because he had two prior three-point offenses totaling six criminal-history points. In the Government’s view, each of those prior offenses disqualified him under Subparagraph B and the six total points disqualified him under Subparagraph A. But Pulsifer claimed he remained eligible. He pointed out that his criminal record lacked a two-point violent offense, as specified in Subparagraph C. And in his view, only the combination of the items listed in the subparagraphs could prevent him from getting safety-valve relief. The District Court agreed with the Government, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: A defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U. S. C. §3553(f)(1) only if he satisfies each of the provision’s three conditions—or said more specifically, only if he does not have more than four criminal-history points, does not have a prior three-point offense, and does not have a prior two-point violent offense. Pp. 6–28.
Read by Jeff Barnum
Trump v. Anderson
A group of Colorado voters contends that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year’s election, from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secretary of state to exclude the former President from the Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him. Former President Trump challenges that decision on several grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, we reverse.
Read by Jake Leahy.
Trump v. Anderson
DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO [March 4, 2024] JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I and II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presidential candidates. That principle is sufficient to resolve this case, and I would decide no more than that. This suit was brought by Colorado voters under state law in state court. It does not require us to address the complicated question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced. The majority’s choice of a different path leaves the remaining Justices with a choice of how to respond. In my judgment, this is not the time to amplify disagreement with stridency. The Court has settled a politically charged issue in the volatile season of a Presidential election. Particularly in this circumstance, writings on the Court should turn the national temperature down, not up. For present purposes, our differences are far less important than our unanimity: All nine Justices agree on the outcome of this case. That is the message Americans should take home.
Read by RJ Dieken.
Trump v. Anderson
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment.
"“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamental principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized “to say what the law is” only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases . . . must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, deciding not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colorado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation’s federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though “[a]ll nine Members of the Court” agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case, five Justices go on. They decide novel constitutional questions to insulate this Court and petitioner from future controversy. Ante, at 13. Although only an individual State’s action is at issue here, the majority opines on which federal actors can enforce Section 3, and how they must do so. The majority announces that a disqualification for insurrection can occur only when Congress enacts a particular kind of legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the majority shuts the door on other potential means of federal enforcement. We cannot join an opinion that decides momentous and difficult issues unnecessarily, and we therefore concur only in the judgment."
Read by Jeff Barnum.
MCELRATH v. GEORGIA
Damian McElrath was charged with malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault -- all related to the death of his mother. A jury returned a split verdict. For the malice-murder charge, finding him “not guilty by reason of insanity” and “guilty but mentally ill” to the other counts. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that because these findings were inconsistent by finding different mental states, he should be retried under the Georgia "repugnant" doctrine. McElrath argued he could not be re-tried because of the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy.
"Held: The jury’s verdict that McElrath was not guilty of malice murder by reason of insanity constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury’s other verdicts.
(a) The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 5th Amendment. “[I]t has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and . . . is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence.” Green v. United States. The Court’s “cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v. Michigan. Once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate. The principle “that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise,’ ” is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.. Whatever the basis for a jury’s verdict, see Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal.
(b) Georgia law specifically provides that a defendant who establishes an insanity defense “shall not be found guilty of [the] crime.” Ga. Code. Here, the jury concluded that McElrath was not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the malice-murder charge. That verdict was unquestionably a “ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense,” Evans, and thus an acquittal. Georgia argues that there was no valid verdict pursuant to Georgia law, and thus no acquittal. But whether an acquittal has occurred for double jeopardy purposes is a question of federal law, and a State’s characterization of a ruling is not binding on the Court. Smalis v. Pennsylvania. While States have the power “to regulate procedures under which [their] laws are carried out,” Patterson v. New York, the ultimate question remains whether the Double Jeopardy Clause recognizes an event as an acquittal. The jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity here constituted such a determination, and it is of no moment that the verdict was accompanied by other verdicts appearing to rest on inconsistent findings. An acquittal is an acquittal, even when a jury returns inconsistent verdicts. Bravo-Fernandez. Georgia argues that the bar to second-guessing an acquittal applies only to general verdicts, but the Court’s cases prohibit any speculation about the reasons for a jury’s verdict of acquittal—even when, as here, specific jury findings provide a factual basis for such speculation. To do otherwise “would impermissibly authorize judges to usurp the jury right.” Smith v. United States. "
Reversed and Remanded. JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion noting that he believes this decision is limited only to review of an acquittal (as the trial judge found here), but it does not apply when a trial judge refuses to accept an inconsistent verdict at trial.
Read by Jake Leahy.
Great Lakes v. Raiders
Great Lakes Insurance (organized in Germany and HQ in UK) entered into a maritime insurance contract with Raiders Retreat Realty Company (HQ in PA). The contract included a provision to apply New York law. A Raiders vessel had an incident in Florida, Raiders then filed a claim. Great Lakes filed for declaratory judgment in a Pennsylvania federal court. Raiders responded in that case. The PA federal court applied New York law and denied the Raiders claims under Pennsylvania law. On appeal, the Third Circuit recognized that choice of law provisions in Maritime contracts were presumptively valid, but that there must be a valid public policy reason to allow for it. The Third Circuit remanded back to the federal district court, instructing the court to consider the public policy interests of Pennsylvania in the maritime insurance context. Held: Choice of law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions, not applicable here. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a unanimous court, explains that this strong presumption exists, in part, to support uniformity across maritime law, he reasons that the Court's precedent about venue selection clauses further demonstrates this.
Justice Thomas Concurrence. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, but writing that he believed the Court's reliance on Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, 348 US 310 (1955) to be wrongly placed. In that case, Thomas writes, the Court chose to apply state law, rather than applying the presumption about the choice of law provisions, after applying a two-party test, this test asks: “(1) Is there a judicially established federal admiralty rule governing these warranties? (2) If not, should we fashion one?” Id., at 314. Answering both questions in the negative, this Court concluded that state law governs the effect of a breach of warranty in a marine-insurance policy." Although the Court has limited this primarily "local disputes," he cautions that the Court's reasoning in that case is "deeply flawed."
Read by Jeff Barnum.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERVICE v. KIRTZ
Reginald Kirtz obtained a loan from the Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service. According to Kirtz, the USDA later told one of the major credit agencies (TransUnion) that Kirtz was behind on his payments. Kirtz says this was false and these false statements hurt his credit report and score. He sued the USDA under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The USDA moved to dismiss in District Court because on sovereign immunity grounds. The FCRA defines "person" to include government agencies -- but the statute does not expressly abrogate sovereign immunity otherwise. The District Court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss on these grounds. The Third Circuit reversed. The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether the federal government can be sued for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or if this is precluded on sovereign immunity grounds. Held: A consumer may sue a federal agency for defying the FCRA’s terms.
Justice Gorsuch writing for a unanimous Court.
TREVOR MURRAY, PETITIONER v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC, ET AL.
As part of Trevor Murray's job at UBS, he had to file reports to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In these reports, he had to certify that the reports reflected his personal and independent views. Despite physical separation from the rest of the unit, Murray claimed that he was receiving pressure from higher ups to skew his reports. He reported these conversations and stated that he thought the pressure was illegal. Evidently during internal discussions, UBS supervisors stated that Murray needed to be either fired or taken off the trading desk.
About six weeks after first reporting these concerns, Murray was fired. He sued UBS for retaliatory discharge under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A federal jury ruled for Murray. The jury was not instructed that UBS must have some sort of retaliatory intent. UBS appealed. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing for a new trial with a jury instruction requiring a finding of "retaliatory intent." The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether the statutory language "discriminate against an employee . . . because of ” places the burden on the whistleblower to prove that the employer acted with “retaliatory intent" -- as the Second Circuit held. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the plain language of the not require a proving of this intent. Affirmed. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit split -- whether Deborah Laufer has Article III standing to sue hotels that fail to include information about accessibility accommodations as required by the ADA. She sued hundreds of hotels, most of which she never intended on trying to stay at. After her lawyer faced sanctions, Laufer decided to voluntarily dismiss her case/s. She asked the Supreme Court to vacate her case as moot. Justice Barrett, writing for the Court, agreed. The judgment is vacated and remanded to the First Circuit for dismissal. Read by Jake A. Leahy. Acheson Hotels, LLC. v. Laufer.
In Biden v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the HEROES Act authorized the Secretary of Education to unilaterally forgive $10,000 of student loans for most borrowers. The Court held that the Secretary does not have this power under HEROES Act, despite the language that allows the Secretary to "waive or modify" certain student loan provisions. Read by Jake A. Leahy.
In Department of Education v. Brown, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a person who was expecting student loan forgiveness, but not the maximum amount, had Article III standing to sue. The Court found that those individuals lacked standing to bring their challenge to the student loan forgiveness plan. Read by Jake A. Leahy.
In 303 Creative v. Elenis, the Supreme Court considered whether a Colorado based website designer could be compelled to speak in a manner that violates her religious beliefs--that is, whether she could be compelled to create custom website designs for same-sex weddings. The Supreme Court held for the designer, finding that anti-discrimination laws did not prevent her from refusing to create website design services for same-sex weddings. Read by Jeff Barnum.
In Groff v. DeJoy, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a postal worker was entitled to a religious accommodation that would allow him to not be scheduled on Sundays. The Court held that an employer who denies a religious accommodation is required to show a substantial burden if it had decided to accept the request. Read by Jeff Barnum.
In Abitron v. Hetronic, the Supreme Court answered whether certain sections of the Lanham Act were unconstitutionally extraterritorial. To decide this issue, the Court applies a two-part test. It first looks to: 1) whether “Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed for the statute to regulate foreign conduct; and if part-one finds it is not extraterritorial, the analysis turns to 2) whether the statute seeks a (permissible) domestic or (impermissible) foreign application of the statute in question. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held that the Lanham Act is not extraterritorial, it did not adopt the position that any claim under the Lanham Act could be domestic, wherever it takes place, if there is a likelihood of causing confusion in the United States. Read by Jake A. Leahy.
In Students for Fair Admissions, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the admissions systems used by Harvard College and the University of North Carolina are constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: The universities' race-based affirmative action admissions programs are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Read by Jeff Barnum.
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from requiring an out of state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction in order to do business in the state. Mallory, a Virginia resident, brought suit against Norfolk Southern Railway Company under Pennsylvania Law -- claiming carcinogen exposure in Ohio and Virginia. Norfolk Southern rebutted the suit with a constitutional argument, arguing that the Pennsylvania court lacked personal jurisdiction against the Virginia company. Although Pennsylvania law requires a registered foreign corporation to answer any suit brought against it within the Commonwealth. The Pennsylvania court ruled that the claim was constitutionally precluded, disagreeing with precedent from supreme courts elsewhere. Held: The Due Process Clause allows states to require foreign corporations to consent to suit in exchange for the right to do business in the State. sThis case is controlled by well-established law (Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. (1917)) -- the Pennsylvania court incorrectly stated that Pennsylvania Fire had been implicitly overruled. Vacated and remanded. Opinion delivered by Justice Gorsuch.
Read by: Jake Leahy
In Counterman v. Colorado, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a conviction for stalking based on "true threats" requires an objective or subjective test. The Court ruled that to government must prove true threats based on a subjective test. Under this test, the Court writes, the speaker need not intend harm, and that recklessness is enough. Justice Kagan writes for the 7-2 majority. Read by Jeff Barnum.
In Moore v. Harper, the Supreme Court reviewed whether acts by the state Legislature regarding the regulation of federal elections can be subject to state-level judicial review. Government actions are presumptively subject to judicial review, the Constitution's elections clause does not create a carveout to this expectation. In Moore, the North Carolina General Assembly passed new Congressional maps. The North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the maps due to partisan gerrymandering. Members of the Generaly Assembly sued in federal court, alleging that the North Carolina Supreme Court did not have authority to strike down Congressional maps due to the Elections Clause. Chief Justice Roberts writes for a 6-3 majority. Read by Jeff Barnum.
In United States v. Hansen, the Supreme Court considered whether a statute that forbids purposeful facilitation and facilitation of certain acts in overbroad and unconstitutional. To be over broad, a statute must criminalize such an unreasonable amount of protected speech that it cannot be applied to anyone. Hansen incorrectly promised hundreds of people American citizenship through adult adoption - amassing two million dollars from the hopeful non-citizens. He was charged with a statute that makes it illegal to encourage a non-resident to enter or stay in the United States, while either knowing or with reckless disregard that staying is a violation of the law. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Barrett ruled against Hansen, reasoning that the statute does not fail for overbreadth. Read by Jeff Barnum.
In Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a district court must stay proceedings while an interlocutory appeal is pending regarding the arbitrability of the claim is ongoing. Writing for an (in part) 5-4 and (in part) 6-3 majority, Justice Kavanaugh answers in the affirmative, stating that while an interlocutory appeal is pending about whether the case should go to arbitration, the district court must stay proceedings. Read by Jake Leahy.
In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court reviewed whether Texas and Louisiana have Article III standing to challenge the Biden Administration's new immigration guidelines. Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Kavanaugh ruled no, the states do not have standing to challenge the actions. Read by Jeff Barnum.
In Samia v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the confrontation clause is violated when a confession one of the co-defendants that implicitly implicates one of the other co-defendants violates the confrontation clause. The Court held that it does not. Read by Jake Leahy.
In Pugin v. Garland, the Court reviewed "whether an offense 'relat[es] to obstruction of justice' under §1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Dictionary definitions, federal laws, state laws, and the Model Penal Code show that the answer is yes: An offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending." Jake Leahy, Host.
In Arizona v. Navajo Nation, the Supreme Court answers whether the Navajo Nation has reserved water rights pursuant to the agreement that established the reservation for the Navajo people. Held: While the Navajo Nation has certain water and mineral rights, the United States is not required to take affirmative steps to provide for water rights to the Navajo people. Jeff Barnum, Guest Host.
In Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the United States district court has jurisdiction over a Civil RICO claim where the plaintiff is a foreign national (who resides in Russia) who has pleaded an injury based on his "his efforts to execute on a California judgment in California against a California resident were foiled by a pattern of racketeering activity that largely occurred in California and was designed to subvert enforcement of the judgment there. " Held: A plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a domestic injury when the circumstances surrounding the injury took place in the United States. Read by Jake Leahy.
In Jones v. Hendrix, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a prisoner can bring a habeas petition after the Supreme Court retroactively overruled Circuit Court precedent that would have allowed him to previously challenge his conviction. Held: The prisoner cannot circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, by filing a habeas petition after a change in the law based on the interpretation of a statute.
Read by Jake Leahy.
In U.S. ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, the Supreme Court reviewed whether, in a qui tam False Claims Act action, the government can move to dismiss the case after not intervening during the so-called "seal" period. Writing for the 8-1 majority, Justice Kagan writes that the government may move to dismiss the False Claims Act action at anytime - so long as the government had intervened at some point, but regardless of the intervention was during the seal period or after. Read by Jake Leahy.
In Lora v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the Section 924(c) prohibition on concurrent sentences applies to sentences arising out of different subsections. Justice Jackson, writing for a unanimous Court, writes that it does not, that crimes from other sections are not subject to the ban on concurrent sentences. Guest Host Jeff Barnum.
In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the principle of double-jeopardy prevents a person from being retried after a trial took place in the incorrect venue and the jury was selected from the incorrect district. In a unanimous decisions, Justice Alito writes that the defendant is entitled to set aside the jury's conviction, but that a new trial in a proper venue is appropriate. Read by Jake A. Leahy.
In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin, the Supreme Court whether Congress abrogated tribal sovereignty in the Bankruptcy Code. Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan rules that Congress unequivocally abrogated tribal sovereign immunity in the Bankruptcy Code. Kagan reasons that "foreign or domestic" governments is a term such as "here or there;" meaning it encompasses all forms of governments anywhere. As the sole dissenter, Justice Gorsuch reasons that the words should construed more narrowly - that if Congress intended to abrogate tribal immunity, it would have done so. Hosted by Jake A. Leahy.
In Haaland v. Brackken, the Supreme Court reviewed whether provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act are constitutional under several portions of the Constitution. Writing for the majority, Justice Barrett writes that the Act, which (in part) prioritizes placing Indian children with Indian (rather than non-Indian families), is within the purview of Congress. Read by Founder RJ Dieken. Also included is an update from RJ Dieken - he was started the podcast and previously hosted it. *Note: This summary uses the term "Indian" for consistency, given that language is used in the decision.
In Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, the Supreme Court examines the intersection of trademark law and First Amendment rights. The dispute centers around VIP's creation of a dog toy resembling a bottle of Jack Daniel's whiskey, with humorous modifications. Jack Daniel's argues that the toy infringes and dilutes their trademarks, while VIP claims it is a parody protected under the fair use exclusion. The Court addresses the application of the Rogers test and the scope of the noncommercial use exclusion in the Lanham Act. Read by guest host Jeff Barnum.
In Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FBHRA) provides a right of action under Section 1983 against a privately owned nursing home that received Medicaid funds. Hosted by Jake Leahy.
In Dubin v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a person who commits Medicaid fraud through fraudulent billing can also be convicted for statutory aggravated identity theft. The Court ruled for Dubin, holding that the aggravated identity theft charge can only be applied when the identity theft was at the crux of the crime, not if the fraud happened to involve personal information (here, the Medicaid number). Hosted by Jake Leahy.
In Allen v. Milligan, the Supreme Court reviewed whether Alabama’s Congressional maps violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge district court panel found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a sufficient likelihood on success on the merits against Alabama. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, affirmed. Read by Host, Jake Leahy.
In Glacier Northwest v. Teamsters, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the National Labor Relations Act preempts Glacier's state tort law claims that allege the Teamsters intentionally destroyed the company's concrete trucks when the truckers did not complete their deliveries in transit. The Court held that these claims were not preempted by federal law, reasoning that it is well-established that the NLRA does not protect striking workers who fail to take reasonable precautions to protect against property damage. Read by Jake Leahy.
In Slack Technologies v. Pirani the Court held that Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires the plaintiff to prove that they purchased securities that were registered under a materially misleading registration statement. The Court rejected the argument that the term "such security" could include securities that were not registered under an allegedly misleading registration statement. Read by Jeff Barnum.
Supreme Court's decision is here.
The False Claims Act allows for private citizens to bring a cause of action on behalf of the United Sates, against a person who "knowingly" submits a "false claim" to a federal program. The defendant can meet the knowledge requirement by, 1.) actual knowledge that the reported prices were not "usual and customary," 2.) being aware of a substantial risk that the retail prices were not usual and customary, or 3.) awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk but the defendant decided to submit the claim regardless. The Court adopted a subjective standard, even if an objective test would not meet the same requirement.
In Dupree v. Younger, the Supreme Court addressed whether a post-trial motion of a purely legal issue that was resolved at summary judgment, requires a post-trial motion to be preserved on appeal. Kevin Younger sued Neil Dupree, who was a correctional officer under Section 1983. Dupree moved for summary judgment alleging that Younger had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court denied the motion. After Younger prevailed at trial by obtaining $700,000 in damages, Dupree appealed alleging the district court improperly dismissed the suit. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, that court ruled against Younger reasoning that he was required to file a Rule 50 post-trial motion to preserve the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that pure questions of law resolved in summary judgment do not require a post-trial motion to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court writes in the syllabus: "And it makes sense: Factual development at trial will not change the district court’s pretrial answer to a purely legal question, so a post-trial motion requirement would amount to an empty exercise." Read by Jake Leahy.
In Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court examines the scope the terms "waters" under the Clean Water Act. The EPA ordered the Sackets, who purchased property in Idaho, to restore the property after the family had backfilled it with dirt. The EPA claimed that putting dirt on their property violated the Clean Water Act, and threatened the family with $40,000 in penalties daily.
The Sacketts claimed that the Clean Water Act did not apply as "waters of the United states" refers only to permanent bodies of water, such as streams, rivers, lakes, and adjacent wetlands that have a continuous surface connection to those bodies of water. The EPA asked the Court for a broader interpretation of the statute. The Court ruled against the EPA, reasoning that there must be a clear connection between wetlands and traditionally navigable waters to obtain jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. Read by guest host Jeff Barnum.
In Tyler v. Hennepin County, Chief Justice Roberts writes for the majority, reversing the Eighth Circuit. The District Court and Circuit Court had rejected a taxpayer's claim that Hennepin County keeping the $25,000 surplus after a tax sale violated both the Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment and the prohibition on excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment. The Court reversed, finding that the state is not entitled to recover the surplus after a property is sold after the owner's failure to pay real estate taxes.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, reasoning that the Court of Appeals must reverse the administrative agency if it reaches the same outcome for a different reason. Once an administrative agency has made an error of law, the decision must be remanded back to the administrative agency. Per Curiam. Read by Jake Leahy.
In Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith et al., the Supreme Court ruled that the commercial licensing of a derivative artwork by Andy Warhol, based on a copyrighted photograph taken by Lynn Goldsmith, did not qualify as fair use. The case involved the licensing of Warhol's "Orange Prince" image. This well-known image includes a silkscreen portrait of musician Prince, which was derived from Goldsmith's photograph. The Court found that despite adding new expression, meaning, or message to the photograph, the purpose and character of the use were not sufficiently distinct from the original work. Held: the “purpose and character” of the Warhol' use of Goldsmith’s original photograph in commercially licensing Orange Prince to Condé Nast does not favor Warhol's fair use defense to copyright infringement. Justice Sotomayor delivered the Opinion of the Court. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting Opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Read by guest host Jeff Barnum.
In Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. FLRA, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) grants jurisdiction to the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) over labor disputes involving state National Guards when they hire and supervise dual-status technicians in their civilian roles. These technicians are both employed by the Ohio National Guard, as well as the Army and the Air Force. The Court's decision was based on three main reasons, 1.) statutory terms, 2.) the authority granted to the Ohio Adjutant General, and 3.) the historical precedent of federal agency-employee relations. Justice Thomas delivered the Opinion of the Court (7-2), Justice Alito filed a dissent, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Read by guest host Jeff Barnum.
On the same day, the Court released its decision in Twitter v. Taamneh. The Court largely disposed of the claims in Twitter, stating that Taamneh had failed to state a claim under the federal statute. Here, the Court in its per curiam opinion, writes that it need not consider the veracity of the Section 230 claims because Twitter'sreasoning requires disposal of the claims here. Read by Jake Leahy.
The patent requires certain particularity, such that any person skilled in the craft would be able to manufacture, make, construct, or use the invention. The Court held that Amgen's patent failed to provide the detail required to protect its interest, in part, because the patent applies to a wide range of antibodies and requires a certain level of trial/error for a skilled person to replicate it. A pharmaceutical patent case. Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. Read by Jake Leahy. Contact us at scotusdecisions@gmail.com.
Taamneah brought suit against social media companies, alleging that the companies were "aiding and abetting" ISIS by providing a platform and recommendations to the companies. HELD: The social media companies did not knowingly aid and abet ISIS, and therefore, no claim can be brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Chief Justice Roberts writes for the majority in this case: "As an old joke goes: 'I believe we should all pay taxes with a smile. I tried but they wanted cash.'"
The IRS is authorized by statute to issue a summons to third parties to aid in the "collection" of an assessment against a taxpayer. There are certain notice requirements and exceptions to the requirements as they pertain to summonses. The question presented is whether the statute requires notice when a summons is issued to a third-party, or if notice is only required to the taxpayer in an account where the taxpayer holds a beneficial interest. HELD: The exception to the notice requirement in §7609(c)(2)(D)(i) does not only apply if the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in summons issued by the IRS.
In National Pork Producers v. Ross, the Supreme Court reviewed whether California's Proposition 12 regulatory requirements relating to conditions for in-state pork sales unconstitutionally interfered with out-of-state businesses in violation of the dormant commerce clause.
From Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion: "Assuredly, under this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions, no State may use its laws to discriminate purposefully against out-of-state economic interests. But the pork producers do not suggest that California’s law offends this principle. Instead, they invite us to fashion two new and more aggressive constitutional restrictions on the ability of States to regulate goods sold within their borders. We decline that invitation. While the Constitution addresses many weighty issues, the type of pork chops California merchants may sell is not on that list."
Read by guest host Ryan Barnum.
"The question presented is whether the statute categorically abrogates (legalspeak for eliminates) any sovereign immunity the board enjoys from legal claims. We hold it does not. Under long-settled law, Congress must use unmistakable language to abrogate sovereign immunity. Nothing in the statute creating the board meets that high bar." (First paragraph of Justice Kagan's majority opinion).
The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) was enacted in 2016 to address Puerto Rico's financial crisis, established the Board as an entity within the territorial government of Puerto Rico. The Court held that nothing in PROMESA explicitly abrogates the Board's immunity, and Congress must clearly state if its intent to do so.
The Court emphasized that PROMESA does not provide for suits against the Board or Puerto Rico, nor does it create a cause of action. Although certain provisions in PROMESA reference judicial review and declaratory relief, they do not indicate a general abrogation of the Board's immunity. The Court concluded that the statutory language and the Board's protections are consistent with the retention of sovereign immunity.
Read by Jake A. Leahy. Feel free to shoot the podcast an email at scotusdecisions@gmail.com.
In Percoco v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether a private citizen with influence over government decision-making can be convicted for wire fraud on the theory that he or she deprived the public of its “intangible right of honest services.” Joseph Percoco, former Executive Deputy Secretary to New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, was charged with conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud. Percoco accepted payments while on hiatus from government service to assist a real-estate development company (while he was running Governor Cuomo's re-election campaign for eight months).
The trial court instructed the jury based on the Second Circuit's 1982 decision in Margiotta, which held that a private person can commit honest-services fraud if they dominate and control government decisions. The Supreme Court ruled that instructing the jury based on Margiotta was an error, stating that the Margiotta theory was overly vague and lacked sufficient clarity. Reversed and remanded. Read by Jake A. Leahy.
In Ciminelli v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Circuit's right-to-control theory of wire fraud cannot be used as the basis for a conviction under federal fraud statutes. Louis Ciminelli was convicted of federal wire fraud for his involvement in a scheme to rig the bid process for state-funded development projects under Governor Andrew Cuomo. The Government relied on the right-to-control theory, which establishes wire fraud by depriving a victim of potentially valuable economic information. The conviction turned on whether the Second Circuit's established "righto-to-control" theory is sufficient to establish federal wire fraud. The Supreme Court held that the right to valuable economic information is not a traditional property interest and therefore cannot form the basis for a wire fraud conviction under the relevant statutes. Read by Jake A. Leahy.
In Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, the Supreme Court reviewed two questions. First, whether §1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional; and second, whether a non-citizen is required to request reconsideration of an adverse board action to fully exhaust administrative remedies under the law.
HELD: Santos-Zacaria is correct and the Fifth Circuit was incorrect to find that §1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional. The statute in question is not jurisdictional, as Congress did not clearly demonstrate that it intended to make the statute jurisdictional. Second, the law does not require non-citizens to request discretionary forms of review, such as asking a Board to reconsider its ruling, because the law only requires the exhaustion of remedies as "right," while discretionary actions involve the discretion of the administrative agencies. Vacated in part and remanded.
Read the entire opinion here.
Read by Jake A. Leahy.
Section 363(m) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is not a jurisdictional provision. Courts should not construe a statute to be jurisdictional unless clearly stated. A jurisdictional provisions puts a limit on the jurisdiction of federal courts. Guest recorded by Jeff Barnum.
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. (Halkbank) vs. the United States involves the criminal prosecution against Halkbank for evading American economic sanctions against Iran. Halkbank claims immunity, as an instrumentality of a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). The Supreme Court held that the District Court has jurisdiction over this criminal prosecution of Halkbank, that the FSIA's comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity in civil actions against foreign states, and their instrumentalities does not cover criminal cases. The Court concluded that the FSIA's provisions extend only to the civil context. Guest recorded by Jeff Barnum.
In Wilkins v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed a dispute between property owners in rural Montana and the government regarding a road easement. The government claimed that the easement included public access, while the property owners disagreed. The property owners sued the government under the Quiet Title Act, but the government argued that their claim was barred by a 12-year time limit in the Act. The Court held that the time limit was a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule and not a jurisdictional bar. It concluded that the Act's text and context did not indicate a clear statement of jurisdictional consequences. The Court also determined that previous Supreme Court decisions did not definitively interpret the relevant statute as jurisdictional. Justice Sotomayor delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Syllabus read by guest reader Jeff Barnum.
Feel free to contact the show with any feedback you have to scotusdecisions@gmail.com.
New York and New Jersey entered into a compact in 1953 to establish the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to conduct regulatory and law enforcement activities at the Port, and in 2018, New Jersey sought to withdraw from the Compact, resulting in New York filing a bill of complaint in this Court. HELD: Despite New York's opposition, New Jersey is permitted to withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact. Recorded by Jeff Barnum.
Michelle Cochran and Axon Enterprise each filed a federal district court lawsuit, challenging the constitutionality of the agency proceedings against them in separate enforcement actions initiated in the SEC and the FTC. Both suits were initially dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed as to the SEC question, finding that Cochran's claim would not receive "meaningful judicial review" in a court of appeals, was "wholly collateral to the Exchange Act's statutory-review scheme," and fell "outside the SEC's expertise." The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Axon's constitutional challenges to the FTC proceeding. HELD: District court's continue to have jurisdiction over federal questions arising from constitutional challenges, notwisthstanding the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act.
Miguel Luna Perez, a deaf student who attended schools in Michigan's Sturgis Public School District, was denied graduation. his family filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education claiming that the district failed to provide him with a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The parties reached a settlement, and Perez then sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), seeking compensatory damages, but the district court dismissed the suit, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed; based on IDEA's requirement that plaintiffs exhaust administrative procedures before seeking relief that is also available under IDEA. HELD: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act does not require Perez to exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action, because IDEA does not provide for compensatory damages.
The Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler's Checks Act requires that abandoned property from a "money order . . . or other similar written instrument," be returned to the state where the property was purchased. This rule is different from the common law, which requires that unclaimed property be returned to the state of incorporation, not the state of purchase. The Supreme Court held that Agent Checks and Teller's Checks, offered by MoneyGram, were sufficiently similar to a money order to be governed by the statutory framework. As a result, these products offered by MoneyGram should be returned to the state of purchase when unclaimed, rather than the state of incorporation (most often, Delaware). Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the unanimous court (although the Court was not unanimous for a portion of the decision, there is no dissent regarding that portion).
Delaware v. Pennsylvania
Bittner, was required to file reports under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). In 2004, Congress amended the law to create a penalty for the non-willful failure to file certain reports pertaining to foreign bank accounts. After filing reports, Bittner was assessed penalties for over fifty accounts that he had failed to report over several years. The Secretary of the Treasury assessed a penalty for his non-willful failure to file in the amount of $10,000 per account per year, while Bittner claimed the amount should be $10,000 per annual report. Bittner was assessed a penalty of $2.7 million. The Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the United States. Bittner appealed. Justice Gorsuch wrote the opinion of the court reversing the Fifth Circuit, finding in favor of Bittner. Recorded by Jake Leahy.
Bittner v. United States
In Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, the Supreme Court held that the discharge exceptions under Section 523(a)(2)(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code apply to an individual debtor, regardless of said debtor's culpability in the fraud. Recorded by Jake Leahy.
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley
In Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., et al. v. Hewitt, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee paid a daily rate does not qualify for an exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime pay requirements, unless they satisfy the conditions set out in Section 541.604(b). Michael Hewitt, a former employee of Helix, sued his employer claiming overtime pay under FLSA, as he worked 84 hours a week while on the vessel, but Helix paid him a daily-rate basis with no overtime compensation. The Court concluded that Hewitt was not paid on a salary basis as defined in Section 602(a), and thus was not an executive exempt from FLSA's overtime pay guarantee.
Cruz v. Arizona is a case heard by the US Supreme Court that questioned whether the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling was an adequate ground to preclude review of a federal question. The petitioner, John Montenegro Cruz, was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death, and argued that under Simmons v. South Carolina, he should have been allowed to inform the jury that a life sentence in Arizona would be without parole. Cruz sought to raise the Simmons issue again in a state post-conviction petition under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding that Lynch was not "a significant change in the law". The US Supreme Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch was not a significant change in the law is an exceptional case where a state-court judgment rests on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state-court procedural rule that the decision is not adequate to foreclose review of the federal claim.
In Arellano v. McDonough, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Section 5110(b)(1) of the Veterans' Benefits Act is not subject to equitable tolling. The case involves the effective date of an award of disability compensation to a veteran of the United States military. Adolfo Arellano applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for disability compensation based on his psychiatric disorders approximately 30 years after his honorable discharge from the Navy. Arellano argued that his award's effective date should be governed by an exception in § 5110(b)(1), which makes the effective date the day following the date of the veteran's discharge or release if application is received within one year of such date. However, the Supreme Court held that equitably tolling the provision would depart from the terms that Congress "specifically provided."
Rodney Reed was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death in Texas. He filed a motion under Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law, requesting DNA testing on certain evidence, which he believed would help identify the true perpetrator. The state trial court denied Reed's motion, citing an inadequate chain of custody for the evidence he sought to test. Reed then sued in federal court, arguing that Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law violated procedural due process. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Reed's claim as time-barred, but the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for a procedural due process claim begins to run when the state litigation ends, in this case when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed's motion for rehearing. The Court ultimately reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Dual sovereignty exception to Double jeopardy is not implicated by the sovereignty of the court personnel, but by the sovereignty of the AUTHORITY under which that court operates.
§1782 does not authorize district courts to demand discovery for international arbitration.
Texas’ bingo laws are regulatory in nature, therefore it may not prevent the Tribe from offering bingo on reservation lands.
The decision below did not meet the “clear and unmistakable error”
Not allowed to discriminate based solely on religion.
Prisoner here can’t use the all writs act to help him develop evidence that may not be admissible.
“Crime of violence” requires the underlying crime supporting it to require the government to prove “violence” beyond a reasonable doubt.
Court declines to extend §1983 suits to violations of prophylactic rules protecting constitutional rights.
Prisoners can still challenge the death penalty using an (as yet not state authorized) substitute method.
Here the legislature can be it’s own litigational party.
“Entitled” here does not mean “to receive“
Knowingly/Intentionally applies to the “authorized” exception of this statute.
The logic of the commerce clause extends to Congress’ power to raise an army and navy.
Can be prosecuted by states.
Generation shifting of powerplant types is a “major question” that the legislature did not clearly designate to the EPA.
Striking down New York’s restrictions on concealed carry licensing.
Here a coach is allowed to pray at midfield after games.
Here A flag at city hall is not government speech.
Here Emotional distress damages are not allowed.
My limited understanding:
Sovereign entities sued under FSIA (but without a separate cause of action implicating federal jurisdiction) are subject to the choice of law provision of the courts which would otherwise be the lawsuit’s venue.
Eg. Where you would have had to bring the underlying, non-FSIA/non-federal, Lawsuit where you found the law.
The requirement to read a sign to determine it’s compliance, by reference to the sign’s location, with a city ordinance banning off premises advertising, does not infringe 1a freedom of speech.
Sections 9 and 10 do not contain “look through” provisions
Free speech not implicated by deliberative body censure.
Texas’s rule against pastor laying hands on and praying with a prisoner in his final moments during a state execution is a violation of the religious land use and institutionalized persons act of 2000.
The Wisc Supreme Court did not properly consider the race based changes to the voting map.
where where one short duration crime ends and another begins nearly simultaneously the crimes are not separate “occasions” for ACCA purposes.
This is not about abortion, it’s about procedure.
§411(a)’s safeharbor protects unknowing errors of law AND fact.
The trial court violated the Petitioner’s 6th Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
The Court stays a stay of a vaccine mandate for Medicare and Medicaid facility employees.
For purposes here Only Babcock’s National Guard service payments are payments for service “as a member of a uniformed service” not his technicians pay.
Petitioners may pursue a pre enforcement challenge against certain of the named defendants, but not others (rejecting some on standing, and some on sovereign immunity).
This case grants Officer Rivas-Villegas QI.
The lower court ruled the department of health and human services lacked the authority to continue the eviction moratorium after Congress did not extend it. The lower court, however, stayed enforcement of that order, The Supreme Court, in this case, lifted the stay which ends the eviction moratorium.
Held: The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend- ment.
-CJ Roberts
Reckless crimes do not count towards ACCA “violent felony” strikes.
Tribal law enforcement officers may detain, search, and transport non tribal members suspected of criminal activity on tribal lands.
Ramos is not applied retroactively on collateral review.
Police can not use the community caretaking exception to the 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement to enter a home after a completed mental welfare check.
Wright was not in custody pursuant to the judgement of a state court, where he had served his state sentence and was convicted in a federal court for violating the sex offender registry requirement.
Reversing the 9th Cir denial of injunctive relief.
Google’s use of a small portion of the Java SE API is “fair use”.
Florida could not carry it’s burden of proof for an adjustment/equitable apportionment.
Defining facebook’s login notification system as outside the definition provided in the TCPA.
No ineffective assistance of counsel in this case.
Personal Jurisdiction (Specific) upheld.
For 4th amendment purposes, Officers seized a woman when they shot her twice as she fled, even though she got away.
Nominal damages can satisfy the damages requirement for ART. III standing, for a completed constitutional violation of rights.
FOIA does not cover “drafts of draft biological opinions.“ because (in part) they are deliberative documents, and thus exempt.
Pereida did not carry his burden to prove he had not been convicted of certain crimes.
Opinion has a remand in the footnotes that the syllabus does not seem to mention.
Judiciary has power to review, but only for abuse of discretion.
During bankruptcy proceedings, The city does not have to return impounded vehicles held for non payment of fines.
Ark Act 900 stands in the relevant part
Holding that the term “punishable by death” in the UCMJ is basically a term of art.
Grant of relief, enjoining NY Gov Cuomo from enforcing restrictions on religious gatherings.
Reversing a preliminary injunction - allowing executions to move forward for federal prisoners.
MCA, "Indian country" and eastern Oklahoma.
Employment discrimination claims in these cases are foreclosed by the Ministerial exception.
RFRA, ACA & Contraceptives. As well as the APA & Interim Final Rulemaking.
No exception for government debt.
Can’t discriminate solely on the basis of religious affiliation (distinguishing religious conduct as different).
First Amendment argument fails.
The appointment and removal provisions for the director of the CFPB is unconstitutional, but this stuff is severable from the dodd frank act.
A Louisiana law requiring admitting privileges at nearby hospitals for abortion doctors is unconstitutional.
Habius is not useful in requesting asylum determination review, just for release from custody.
DACA can not be rescinded without further/better explanation by the DHS.
Supreme court considers the disputed land an easement to the National park service, thus in this case the pipeline permit is ok.
Title VII of the civil rights act makes it illegal to discriminate in employment against people for being gay, or transgender.
In regards to the Prison litigation reform act §1915(g)’s 3 strikes rule, qualifying dismissals count as strikes regardless as to if they are dismissed with or without prejudice.
Appealing CAT orders is allowed in this case.
The board can stay, they are primarily considered to be local officers, not federal officers.
This issue is not similar enough to qualify for defensive issue or claim preclusion.
9th Circuit can not make this case about something that the parties had not already presented.
Regarding the wore fraud charges not being appropriate.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Mostly Moot/can’t assert a new clam here.
The government obligated itself to pay in this instance. (Health insurance risk corridors)
Willfullness not specifically required under §1125(a).
Reviewability of decision to do an inter partes review.
The 6th amendment (through the 14th) requires unanimous jury to convict on serious crimes.
PC Opinion on an Injunction relating to the election in Wisconsin.
Without additional information to rebut the presumption, it is reasonable for an officer to believe a vehicle belonging to a driver with a revoked license is being driven by the owner.
Safe berth clause of sub charter agreement In this case means safe berth, not due diligence.
Court says §1981 still needs but-for causation.
the court refuses to set a constitutional bar for the insanity defense.
Court holds CRCA does not properly abrogate state sovereign immunity against copyright infringement.
In this case the question is a “question of law”
The fact info is used on the I-9 form, does not preempt that information (submitted on other forms) from being used to prosecute for fraud.
ACCA arguments, including things depending on what the definition of “is” is.
Death penalty appeal in re Clemons (because Ring and Hurst aren’t retroactive on collateral review)
Court refuses to extend Bivens to the cross border shooting of a child by a border patrol officer.
Considering the Hague convention’s definition of “habitual residence” of a child and a few other factors in re: “returning” a child
Once a case is removed to federal court, the state court can’t do anything, until federal courts are finished.
Court say ERISA and the fiduciary duty of ESOP administrators is complecated.
PTO can not recover attorney fees via §145, because ”all expenses” is not sufficient to overcome the American Rule.
refusing to read in a time of discovery exception into the FDCPA’s §1692k(d) 1-year statute of limitations.
Court isn’t to fond of Alaska’s low political contributions limits.
A case recently argued about in
Uploading to check equipment and upload ability to podcast sources before we start getting new decisions.
No help from the courts on partisan gerrymandering.
Under the 21st amendment and the dormant commerce clause, Tennessee’s two-year residency requirement for new alcohol sales licensing is unconstitutional.
Holding ”crime of voilence” to be unconstitutionally vague.
This info is confidential under part 4 of FOIA exceptions.
PTO can not refuse trademarks on grounds that they are ”immoral or scandalous”.
Punitive damages are not available for unseaworthiness claims.
NC Can not tax this trust in this instance, based on only state residence.
The sex offender registry’s registration of pre act offenders in not an issue of unconstitutional congressional delegation.
When does the limitations period clock start ticking in re a claim of fabricated evidence.
The Bladensburg cross may remain.
Remand for consideration of a few things.
The Manhattan community access corp, is not a government actor in regards to the 1st amendment right to free speech.
The separate sovereigns doctrine is not implicated by double jeopardy.
Quarles’ burglary conviction counts under the Armed Career Criminal act.
In this context, Agents of the sovereign (federal agencies) are not “persons” in this section of the AIA.
CA Law needs to fill a gap in federal law to be applicable on the outer continental shelf, under the OCSLA, it can not simply be “not inconsistent”.
In re notice and comment when changing substanitive rules.
Vacate and remand, contempt findings in this context require “no fair ground of doubt”.
Prisoner does not get credit for his pre trial custody in re his supervised release for another crime.
Third party counterclaim defendants can not remove to federal court.
Explicitly stated not to be case about the right to an abortion, although i’m sure the news media will tell you so.
Still have a bit of a sore throat, so apologies on some audible swallowing noises etc.
Retaliatory arrest claim defeated by probable cause to arrest.
A clarification on what is considered clear evidence that a drug company could not fulfill it’s duty to warn in light of FDA refusals to allow label changes.
Bighorn national forest is not “occupied lands” in the context of an 1865 treaty. Said treaty did not expire upon Wyoming's statehood.
Breach of a contract under the bankruptcy code still constitutes breach of a contract in this instance.
Regarding relators filing qui tam and when is too late.
Consumers may sue apple for allegedly monopolizing app sales.
The Tennessee Valley Authority is not completely immune from suit, but there may be other exceptions.
Courts may not use ambiguous wording about consent to class arbitration to force class arbitration even over the idea of contra proferentem.
Fyi Scintilla means -
a tiny trace or spark of a specified quality or feeling.
Court declines to create a categorical rule making expert testimony given without REQUESTED supporting documentation invalid in ALJ hearings.
Lorenzo can be charged under 10b-5 (a) and (c) even if he does not meet the qualifications to be charged under subsection (b) - as understood through the lens of Janus v SEC.
The alaska hovercraft case (again).
ANILCA doesn’t give the park service authority over navigible waters.
Service to a foreign state’s minister of foreign affairs, under FISA can not be to the embassy in the US.
For purposes of the fair debt collection practices act, enforcers of security interests are NOT debt collectors.
In this specific maritime context, manufacturers have a duty to warn when they know a dangerous part will, or must be incorporated into their product, and have reason to believe that users will be unaware of the danger. (Here asbestos).
Section 1226’s order to detain without release certain classes of aliens, does not hinge upon immedate arest upon release from criminal detention.
An 1855 treaty pre-empts Washington state’s ability to Tax the Yakama nation’s importation of fuel.
The word “full” can not modify an already defined “costs”, in this statute.
Railroad retirment act - “compensation” includes payment for lost wages.
Copyright is regestered when the regester regesters it, not when the paperwork is filed.
Errors were made in a determination of competence for death.
Counsel may not refuse to file a notice to appeal, even if the defendant waived the right to appeal.
imunities of foreign corporations are the SAME as foreign government immunity TODAY.
Dead judges votes can not be counted if the opinion is filed after their death.
States can not have tax breaks that discriminate against federal employees who otherwise meet the qualifications for said tax break.
8th Amendment prohibition on excessive fines IS incorporated against states via the 14th amendment.
Rulling that Mr. Moore is intelectually disabled enough to be ineligible for the death penalty.
“On sale” exception to patents.
Also, i had no idea how to pronounce “palonosetron”, close ‘nuff i reckon.
Court holds an independent contractor truck driver can not be forced into arbitration because the 1925 arbitration act excludes transportation workers who are engaged in interstate commerce. Also holds that “independent contractors” are considered to have signed “contracts of employment” even though they are not in an explicit employer employee relationship.
Full disclosure: as a long time truck driver, i have long known companies like new prime, swift, and cr england, to be engaged in preying on brand new truck drivers with their “lease purchase, independent contractor” agreements.
Most of the industry knows it, and if you sat down at any truck stop lunch counter and said “i’m thinking of signing a lease with [one of the previously mentioned companies]” you would quite litterally hear a chorus of veterans telling you not to — an instant groan, and a bunch if people truly trying to help the new guy from making a huge mistake.
So i’m quite glad this went the way it did.
Robbery is a violent offense for purposes of the ACCAs sentence enhancments.
Arbitration agreements that contractually deligate questions of arbitrarily to an arbitrator do exactly that — no matter if the request seeking to compell arbitration is “wholy groundless”.
The 25% cap on social security attorney fees only covers in court representation, not representation before the agency.
Mostly a decision that 2254 (d) (1) apeals can not use court cases that didn’t exist at the time of the origin of the appeal.
Court rules that “right to be free of excessive force” is a bit to highly generalized to be considered “clearly established law” in regards to stripping qualified immunity.
Court also holds you can’t reinstate an excessive force claim, without any proof or even discussion, as to if the defendant even touched the plaintiff — especially after it has already been decided by another court that the defendant did not, because of body camera video footage proving no contact. (Sadly, not a joke).
Burglary can include mobile residences and or vehicles adapted for sleeping.
The Dusky Gopher Frog case.
Regarding designation of critical habitat.
Court hold that ADEA numerosity limitation does not apply to state government subdivisions.
Decision from 2016, in re gay couples and birth certificates.
Opinion from 2016, just to keep the feed active Court holds Missouri can not deny a grant to a church based on the fact it is a church. (RJ likes this one because his beloved mother was a teacher at a lutheran pre-school for most of her life).
Court addresses a pro se 1st and 4th amendment concern (Lady told to stop praying).
Court rules union agency fees are a a violation of 1st amendment.
Court upholds several districts, and does not uphold one
Amex’s anti steering provisions do not violate section one of the Sherman anti trust act.
Court rules voluntary severance of charges, does not create a double jeopardy issue in this specific instance).
Court rules requests for cellphone location data are 4th amendment searches.
Court holds notice to appear has to have a time and date in order to actually be a notice to appear.
Court says government can’t tax stock options for railroad workers.
Court reverses quill and allows states to collect taxes on internet sales.
Court determines a limited explanation of a “disproportionate” sentence reduction (vs the guidelines reduction) is appropriate.
Vacate of sentence based on incorectly calculated guidelines range
Court upholds an obvious statewide political gerrymander, for plaintiffs failure to show that they were actually harmed.
First amendment retaliation, under narrow circumstances in this case.
Court rules “bound to defer” should not be the standard of deference for submissions of foreign government agencies to US Courts.
Court strikes down MN law on political apperal inside the polling places (limited to a problem with wording ambiguity)
Ohio’s way of determining if a voter has moved or died, and subsequent removal of said person from their voting rolls is lawful.
Court upholds Minnesota law about life insurance bennificiary designation revocation upon divorce
Court affirms the below judgement because of a 4/4 Split.
Court decides what “statement respecting” means in re the bankruptcy code.
Court rules type C sentencing agreements can be considered for modification after a retroactive sentincing guidelines reduction.
1st Amendment free exercise over-rules civil rights of a gay couple in this specific instance - due to the colorado civil rights commission’s obvious hostility to a religious belief.
Restitution under MVRA 1996 may not include investigations a victim does itself.
Supreme court refuses to grant 4th autombile exception to an officer who encroaches upon a home’s curtilage for a search.
Upholding Arbitration agreements
The court rejects an argument made for the first time during the appeals process.
Case is moot because nothing could be decided because petitioners cases are over.
Rental car contract violations do not eliminate 4th amendment privacy expectations
Just because a judge tried to overstep his jurisdictional limits, does not mean that the evidence gathererd inside of his jurisdiction is inadmissable.
Court strikes down federal anti sports gambling provisions based on the 10th amendment.
Counsel may not Plead Not-Guilty, at the client's insistence, and then--at trial--admit guilt, over the objection of his client. (Sixth Amendment)
Patent review, and article 3 separation of powers.
Court holds that the ATS does not allow people to sue corporations.
Court rules patent office director can not choose which parts of an inter partes review will proceed, only that it will or will not proceed.
Court compares immigration deportation statue void for vagueness. In that it’s language was too similar to the unconstitutional language found in the ACCA.
Court rules that higher courts may should “look through” (in a narrow sense) silent appeals court decisions, to the last reasoned result.
Determination that service advisors fit into the FLSAs overtime exemption.
Determination of qualified immunity in favor of an officer in a non fatal shooting.
Court Decides once a decision has been made in an individual case which was consolidated with others under 42(a), it can be appealed before other cases associated by consolidation have been decided. (Not interlocutory).
in re funding for appeals of indigent defendants, ineffective assistance of counsel, reasonably necessary vs substantial need.
court holds that in order to obstruct the tax code under the omnibus tax code at the felony level — it requires knowing of an investigation or pending investigation.
Court holds SLUSA does not force removal of certain securities law claims from state to federal court.
case deals with who and how courts should review determinations of “arms length” transactions.
in re: supreme court rule to remove 6 month hearings for detainees of immigration proceedings, that were being required by the 9th circut.
courts must use the stipulated 25% maximum to satisfy a prisoner’s share of attorney fees (the one where everyone had a joke about the usage of “satisfy”)
a guilty plea does not remove a defendants right to question the constitutionality of a criminal statute.
In Re: whistle blower protections and the requirement to report to the SEC.
in Re: Retiree benifits, and contractual inferments of collective barganing agreements. (Refuting the 6th Circuts “yard-man” inferences).
In Re: Changing charging after a plea agreement has been signed (Three Strikes law).
Slip opinion - Nov 8 2017Appeals time limit extensions on "jurisdictional" extensions.
Supreme court reply to an appeal that regards DACA (Decided Dec 20th 2017)
WOTUS & who has jurisdiction.
in re: definition of the word “tolled” for the purpose of timely filing of appeals.
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