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    Government

    Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

    We Read The Supreme Court’s own Syllabus or Per Curium word for word, then maybe say hin then shut the microphone back off.
    We are the Antidote to Mainstream News and Entertainment-Hype Style coverage of the Supreme Court…What they do in the words of the RJD (Recorder of Judicial Decisions) Read by RJ Dieken and friends

    Visit Montana’s famous Loki Esq Law @ LokiEsq.Law (website) A Criminal Defense and Mediation Lawfirm Operating Statewide.

    Be Kind to one another, say hi someday.

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    *Note this podcast is for informational and educational purposes only.

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    Copyright: © 2026 Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

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    United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC (Bankruptcy Fee Remedy) Jun 20, 2024
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    United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC
    Two Terms ago, in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 596 U. S. 464, the Court held that a statute violated the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement because it permitted different fees for Chapter 11 debtors depending on the district where their case was filed. In this case, the Court is asked to determine the appropriate remedy for that constitutional violation. As noted in Siegel, there are three options: (1) refund fees for the thousands of debtors charged higher fees in districts administered by the U. S. Trustee Program, (2) retroactively extract higher fees from the small number of debtors charged lower fees in districts administered by the Bankruptcy Administrator Program, or (3) require only prospective fee parity. See id., at 480. As in Siegel, this case arises from a case filed in a U. S. Trustee district. In 2016, 76 legal entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Kansas. In 2018, under the amended fee statute the Court later found unconstitutional in Siegel, the debtors began paying higher fees than they would have if their case had been filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district. In 2020, the debtors challenged the constitutionality of those fees. The Bankruptcy Court found no constitutional violation, but the Tenth Circuit, anticipating Siegel, reversed. To remedy the constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit ordered a refund of the debtors’ quarterly fees to the extent they exceeded the lower fees paid in the Bankruptcy Administrator districts. This Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case in light of Siegel, and the Tenth Circuit reinstated its original opinion without alteration.
    Held: Prospective parity is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel.

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    Campos-Chavez v. Garland (Immigration) Jun 20, 2024
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    Campos-Chavez v. Garland
    To initiate the removal of an alien from the United States who is either “inadmissible” under 8 U. S. C. §1182 or “deportable” under §1227, the Federal Government must provide the alien with “written notice” of the proceedings. §§1229(a)(1), (2). Two types of “written notice” are described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of §1229(a): Paragraph (1) provides that the alien be given a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” or NTA, which must set out, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” Paragraph (2) states that “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” the agency must provide “a written notice” specifying “the new time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences” of failing to attend. An alien who fails to attend a hearing despite receiving notice “shall be ordered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that “the written notice” was provided and that “the alien is removable.” §1229a(b)(5)(A). Three scenarios permit the rescinding of an in absentia removal order, one of which is when an alien “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” of §1229(a). §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). In these consolidated cases (one from the Fifth Circuit, and two from the Ninth), aliens Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, each moved to rescind his in absentia order of removal on the ground that he did not receive proper notice of the removal hearing. In each case, the Government provided an initial NTA, but the NTA did not specify the time and place of the removal hearing. Eventually, the Government provided each alien with a notice of hearing under §1229(a)(2) which set out the specific time and place of the removal hearing. None of the aliens showed up for his hearing, and each was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. Each then sought to rescind the removal order, arguing that he did not receive a proper NTA under §1229(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit considered and denied one of the petitions, but the Ninth Circuit granted the other two.
    Held: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper §1229(a)(2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).

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    Garland v. Cargill (2nd Amendment) Jun 20, 2024
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    The National Firearms Act of 1934 defines a “machinegun” as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U. S. C. §5845(b). With a machinegun, a shooter can fire multiple times, or even continuously, by engaging the trigger only once. This capability distinguishes a machinegun from a semiautomatic firearm. With a semiautomatic firearm, the shooter can fire only one time by engaging the trigger. Using a technique called bump firing, shooters can fire semiautomatic firearms at rates approaching those of some machineguns. A shooter who bump fires a rifle uses the firearm’s recoil to help rapidly manipulate the trigger. Although bump firing does not require any additional equipment, a “bump stock” is an accessory designed to make the technique easier. A bump stock does not alter the basic mechanics of bump firing, and the trigger still must be released and reengaged to fire each additional shot. For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) consistently took the position that semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks were not machineguns under §5845(b). ATF abruptly changed course when a gunman using semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks fired hundreds of rounds into a crowd in Las Vegas, Nevada, killing 58 people and wounding over 500 more. ATF subsequently proposed a rule that would repudiate its previous guidance and amend its regulations to “clarify” that bump stocks are machineguns. 83 Fed. Reg. 13442. ATF’s Rule ordered owners of bump stocks either to destroy or surrender them to ATF to avoid criminal prosecution. Michael Cargill surrendered two bump stocks to ATF under protest . . .
    Held: ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies a bump stock as a “machinegun” under §5845(b).
    THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
    Read by RJ Dieken.

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    FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (Birth Control) Jun 17, 2024
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    FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
    In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration approved a new drug application for mifepristone tablets marketed under the brand name Mifeprex for use in terminating pregnancies up to seven weeks. To help ensure that Mifeprex would be used safely and effectively, FDA placed additional restrictions on the drug’s use and distribution, for example requiring doctors to prescribe or to supervise prescription of Mifeprex, and requiring patients to have three in-person visits with the doctor to receive the drug. In 2016, FDA relaxed some of these restrictions: deeming Mifeprex safe to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks; allowing healthcare providers, such as nurse practitioners, to prescribe Mifeprex; and approving a dosing regimen that required just one in-person visit to receive the drug. In 2019, FDA approved an application for generic mifepristone. In 2021, FDA announced that it would no longer enforce the initial in-person visit requirement. Four pro-life medical associations and several individual doctors moved for a preliminary injunction that would require FDA either to rescind approval of mifepristone or to rescind FDA’s 2016 and 2021 regulatory actions. Danco Laboratories, which sponsors Mifeprex, intervened to defend FDA’s actions. The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and in effect enjoined FDA’s approval of mifepristone, thereby ordering mifepristone off the market. FDA and Danco appealed and moved to stay the District Court’s order pending appeal. As relevant here, this Court ultimately stayed the District Court’s order pending the disposition of proceedings in the Fifth Circuit and this Court. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing. It concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their challenge to FDA’s 2000 and 2019 drug approvals, but were likely to succeed in showing that FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions were unlawful. This Court granted certiorari with respect to the 2016 and 2021 FDA actions.
    Held: Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge FDA’s actions regarding the regulation of mifepristone. Pp. 5–25.
    Read by Jeff Barnum.

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    Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney (NLRB / Labor) Jun 17, 2024
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    After several Starbucks employees announced plans to unionize, they invited a news crew from a local television station to visit the store after hours to promote their unionizing effort. Starbucks fired multiple employees involved with the media event for violating company policy. The National Labor Relations Board filed an administrative complaint against Starbucks alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor practices. The Board’s regional Director then filed a petition under §10( j) of the National Labor Relations Act seeking a preliminary injunction for the duration of the administrative proceedings that would, among other things, require Starbucks to reinstate the fired employees. The District Court assessed whether the Board was entitled to a preliminary injunction by applying a two-part test that asks whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred,” and whether injunctive relief is “just and proper.” McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 875 F. 3d 333, 339. Applying this standard, the District Court granted the injunction, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Held: When considering the NLRB’s request for a preliminary injunction under §10( j), district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7. Pp. 4–11.
    Read by RJ Dieken.

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    Vidal v. Elster (First Amendment / Trademark) Jun 17, 2024
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    Drawing on a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange between thencandidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio, respondent Steve Elster sought to federally register the trademark “Trump too small” to use on shirts and hats. An examiner from the Patent and Trademark Office refused registration based on the “names clause,” a Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent,” 15 U. S. C. §1052(c). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed, rejecting Elster’s argument that the names clause violates his First Amendment right to free speech. The Federal Circuit reversed.
    Held: The Lanham Act’s names clause does not violate the First Amendment.
    Read by Jeff Barnum.

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    Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum (Bankruptcy) Jun 17, 2024
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    Petitioner Truck Insurance Exchange is the primary insurer for companies that manufactured and sold products containing asbestos. Two of those companies, Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Hanson Permanente Cement (Debtors), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after facing thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits. As part of the bankruptcy process, the Debtors filed a proposed reorganization plan (Plan). That Plan creates an Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (Trust) under 11 U. S. C. §524(g), a provision that allows Chapter 11 debtors with substantial asbestos related liability to fund a trust and channel all present and future asbestos-related claims into that trust. Truck is contractually obligated to defend each covered asbestos personal injury claim and to indemnify the Debtors for up to $500,000 per claim. For their part, the Debtors must pay a $5,000 deductible per claim, and assist and cooperate with Truck in defending the claims. The Plan treats insured and uninsured claims differently, requiring insured claims to be filed in the tort system for the benefit of the insurance coverage, while uninsured claims are submitted directly to the Trust for resolution. Truck sought to oppose the Plan under §1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits any “party in interest” to “raise” and “be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Among other things, Truck argues that the Plan exposes it to millions of dollars in fraudulent claims because the Plan does not require the same disclosures and authorizations for insured and uninsured claims. Truck also asserts that the Plan impermissibly alters its rights under its insurance policies. The District Court confirmed the Plan. It concluded, among other things, that Truck had limited standing to object to the Plan because the Plan was “insurance neutral,” i.e., it did not increase Truck’s prepetition obligations or impair its contractual rights under its insurance policies. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Truck was not a “party in interest” under §1109(b) because the plan was “insurance neutral.”
    Held: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a “party in interest” under §1109(b) that “may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 case.
    SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except ALITO, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

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    Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe Jun 17, 2024
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    The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U. S. C. §5301 et seq., enables an Indian tribe to enter into a “self-determination contract” with the Indian Health Service to assume responsibility for administering the healthcare programs that IHS would otherwise operate for the tribe. §5321(a)(1). When IHS administers such programs itself, it funds its operations through congressional appropriations and third-party insurance payments. Healthcare programs administered by a tribe under a self-determination contract have a parallel funding structure. First, IHS must provide to the tribe the Secretarial amount, which “shall not be less” than the congressionally appropriated amount that IHS would have used to operate such programs absent the self-determination contract. §5325(a)(1). Second, like IHS when it runs the healthcare programs, a contracting tribe can collect revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers. See 42 U. S. C. §§1395qq(a), 1396j(a); 25 U. S. C. §1621e(a). These third-party funds are called “program income” and must be used by the tribe “to further the general purposes of the contract” with IHS. §5325(m)(1). The Secretarial amount and program income, however, do not place a contracting tribe on equal footing with IHS. That is because the tribe must incur certain overhead and administrative expenses that IHS does not incur when it runs the healthcare programs. To remedy this funding shortfall, Congress amended ISDA to require IHS to pay the tribe “contract support costs” to cover such “reasonable costs for activities which must be carried on by a [tribe] as a contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the [self-determination] contract.” §5325(a)(2). Contract support costs eligible for repayment include “direct program expenses for the operation of the Federal program” and “any additional administrative or . . . overhead expense incurred by the [tribe] in connection with the operation of the Federal program, function, service, or activity pursuant to the contract.” §5325(a)(3)(A). Such costs are limited, however, to those “directly attributable to” selfdetermination contracts. §5326. And no funds are available for “costs associated with any contract . . . entered into between [a tribe] and any entity other than [IHS].” Ibid. These cases involve self-determination contracts between IHS and two tribes—the San Carlos Apache Tribe and the Northern Arapaho Tribe. Both Tribes sued the Government for breach of contract, contending that although they used the Secretarial amount and program income to operate the healthcare programs they assumed from IHS under their self-determination contracts, IHS failed to pay the contract support costs they incurred by providing healthcare services using program income. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits concluded that each Tribe was entitled to reimbursement for such costs. Held: ISDA requires IHS to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.
    ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
    Read by RJ Dieken.

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    Connelly v. United States (Tax) Jun 14, 2024
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    Connelly v. United States

    Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders in Crown C Supply, a small building supply corporation. The brothers entered into an agreement to ensure that Crown would stay in the family if either brother died. Under that agreement, the surviving brother would have the option to purchase the deceased brother’s shares. If he declined, Crown itself would be required to redeem (i.e., purchase) the shares. To ensure that Crown would have enough money to redeem the shares if required, it obtained $3.5 million in life insurance on each brother. After Michael died, Thomas elected not to purchase Michael’s shares, thus triggering Crown’s obligation to do so. Michael’s son and Thomas agreed that the value of Michael’s shares was $3 million, and Crown paid the same amount to Michael’s estate. As the executor of Michael’s estate, Thomas then filed a federal tax return for the estate, which reported the value of Michael’s shares as $3 million. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the return. During the audit, Thomas obtained a valuation from an outside accounting firm. That firm determined that Crown’s fair market value at Michael’s death was $3.86 million, an amount that excluded the $3 million in insurance proceeds used to redeem Michael’s shares on the theory that their value was offset by the redemption obligation. Because Michael had held a 77.18% ownership interest in Crown, the analyst calculated the value of Michael’s shares as approximately $3 million ($3.86 million x 0.7718). The IRS disagreed. It insisted that Crown’s redemption obligation did not offset the life-insurance proceeds, and accordingly, assessed Crown’s total value as $6.86 million ($3.86 million + $3 million). The IRS then calculated the value of Michael’s shares as $5.3 million ($6.86 million x 0.7718). Based on this higher valuation, the IRS determined that the estate owed an additional $889,914 in taxes. The estate paid the deficiency and Thomas, acting as executor, sued the United States for a refund. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government. The court held that, to accurately value Michael’s shares, the $3 million in life-insurance proceeds must be counted in Crown’s valuation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
    Held: A corporation’s contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation’s value for purposes of the federal estate tax.

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    Cantero v. Bank of America (Banking) Jun 10, 2024
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    In Cantero v. Bank of America, the Supreme Court reviewed a Second Circuit decision that struck down a New York bank regulation, finding that the State's authority was preempted by federal law. The Court held that Dodd-Frank requires a nuanced analysis -- rather than a bright line test -- on the issue of federal preemption. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed and remanded with instructions on the analysis required to determine preemption.

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