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    News

    State of Cybercrime

    Join us for State of Cybercrime, where experts discuss the latest trends and developments in the world of cybercrime and provide insights into how organizations can protect themselves from potential threats.

    Sponsored by Varonis

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    Latest Episodes:
    The Anatomy of a Cybercriminal Startup Oct 12, 2017
    Show notes

    Outlined in the National Cyber Security Centre’s “Cyber crime: understanding the online business model,” the structure of a cybercrime organization is in many ways a lot like a regular tech startup. There’s a CEO, developer, and if there are enough funds, an IT department.

    However, one role outlined on an infographic on page nine of the report that was a surprise and does not exist in legitimate businesses. This role is known as a “money mule.” Vulnerable individuals are often lured into these roles with titles such as “payment processing agents” or “money transfer agents.”

    But when “money mules” apply for the job and even after they get the job, they’re not aware that they are being used to commit fraud. Therefore if cybercriminals get caught, “money mules” might also get in trouble with law enforcement. The “money mule” can expect a freeze on his bank account, face possible prosecution, and might be responsible for repaying for the losses. It might even be on your permanent record.

    Other articles and threads discussed:

    • Avoiding phish scams, with @swiftonsecurity
    • Equifax CEO says one IT pro caused the breach, with @patio11
    • How secure is iphoneX?
    Tool of the week: SPF Translator

    Panelists: Cindy Ng, Mike Buckbee, Kilian Englert, Mike Thompson

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    How Weightless Data Impacts Data Security Oct 05, 2017
    Show notes

    By now, we’re all aware that many of the platforms and services we use collect and store information about our data usage. Afterall, they want to provide us with the most personalized experience.

    So when I read that an EU Tinder user requested information about her data and was sent 800 pages, I was very intrigued with the comment from Luke Stark, a digital technology sociologist at Dartmouth University, “Apps such as Tinder are taking advantage of a simple emotional phenomenon; we can’t feel data. This is why seeing everything printed strikes you. We are physical creatures. We need materiality.”

    He is on to something. We don’t usually consider archiving stale data until we’re out of space. It is often through printing photos, docs, spreadsheets, and pdfs that we would feel the weight and space consuming nature of the data we own.

    Stark’s description of data’s intangible quality led me to wonder how weightless data impacts how we think about data security.

    For instance, when there’s a power outage, some IT departments aren’t deemed important enough to be on a generator. Or when Infosec is often seen as a compliance requirement, not as security. Another roadblock security pros often face is when they report a security vulnerability – it’s not usually well received.

    Podcast panelists: Cindy Ng, Mike Buckbee, Kilian Englert, Mike Thompson

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    Penetration Testers Sanjiv Kawa and Tom Porter Sep 29, 2017
    Show notes

    While some regard Infosec as compliance rather than security, veteran pentesters Sanjiv Kawa and Tom Porter believe otherwise. They have deep expertise working with large enterprise networks, exploit development, defensive analytics and I was lucky enough to speak with them about the fascinating world of pentesting.

    In our podcast interview, we learned what a pentesting engagement entails, assigning budget to risk, the importance of asset identification, and so much more.

    Regular speakers at Security Bsides, they have a presentation on October 7th in DC, The World is Y0ur$: Geolocation-based Wordlist Generation with Wordsmith.

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    Ofer Shezaf, Varonis Director of Cyber Security, Part II Sep 26, 2017
    Show notes

    Ofer Shezaf is Director of Cyber Security at Varonis. A self-described all-around security guy, Ofer is in charge of security standards for Varonis products. He has had a long career that includes most recently a stint at Hewlett-Packard, where he was a product manager for their SIEM software, known as ArcSight. Ofer is a graduate of Israel's elite Technion University.

    In this second part of the interview, we explore ways to improve data security through security by design techniques at the development stage, pen testing, deploying Windows 10s, and even labeling security products!

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    Ofer Shezaf, Varonis Director of Cyber Security, Part I Sep 20, 2017
    Show notes

    Ofer Shezaf is Director of Cyber Security at Varonis. A self-described all-around security guy, Ofer is in charge of security standards for Varonis products. He has had a long career that includes most recently a stint at Hewlett-Packard, where he was a product manager for their SIEM software, known as ArcSight. Ofer is a graduate of Israel's elite Technion University. In this first part of the interview, Ofer shares his thoughts on the changing threat landscape.

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    Dr. Tyrone Grandison on Data, Privacy and Security Sep 11, 2017
    Show notes

    Dr. Tyrone Grandison has done it all. He is an author, professor, mentor, board member, and a former White House Presidential Innovation Fellow. He has held various positions in the C-Suite, including his most recent role as Chief Information Officer at the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation, an independent health research center that provides metrics on the world's most important health problems. In our interview, Tyrone shares what it’s like to lead a team of forty highly skilled technologists who provide tools, infrastructure, and technology to enable researchers develop statistical models, visualizations and reports. He also describes his adventures on wrangle petabytes of data, the promise and peril of our data economy, and what board members need to know about cybersecurity. Transcript Tyrone Grandison: My name is Tyrone Grandison. I am the Chief Information Officer at the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, IHME, at the University of Washington in Seattle. And IHME is global in profit in the public health and population health space, where we're focused on how do we get people to have a long life and have that long life at the highest health capacity possible. Cindy Ng: Often times, the bottom line drives businesses forward, where your institute is driven by helping policy makers and donors determine how to help people live longer and healthier lives. What is your involvement in ensuring that that vision is sustained and carried through? Tyrone Grandison: Perfect. So I lead the technology team here, which is a team of 40 really skilled data scientists, software engineer, system administrators, project and program managers. And what we do is that we provide the base, the infrastructure. We provide tools and technologies that enable researchers to, one, ingest data. So we get data from every single country across the world. Everything from surveys to censuses to death records. No matter how small or poor or politically closed a country is. And we basically house this information. We help the researchers develop statistical models. Like, very sophisticated statistical models and tools on them that make sense of the data. And then we actually put it out there to a network of over 2,400 collaborators. And they help us produce what we called the Global Burden of Disease that, you know, shows what in different countries of the world is the predominant thing that is actually shortening lives in particular age groups, for particular genders and all demographic information. So, now people can, if they wanted to, do an apples-to-apples comparison between countries across ages and over time. So, if you wanted to see the damage done by tobacco smoking in Greece and compare that to the healthy years lost due to traffic injuries in Guatemala, you can actually do that. If you wanted to compare both of those things with the impact of HIV in Ghana, then that's now possible. So our entire thing is, how do we actually provide the technology base and the skills to, one, host the data, support the building of the models and support the visualization of it. So people can actually make these comparisons. Cindy Ng: You're responsible for a lot and let's try to break it down a bit. When you receive a bunch of data sets from various sources, take me through what your plan is for it. Last time we spoke, we spoke about obesity. Maybe is that a good one to, that everyone can relate to and with? Tyrone Grandison: Sure. So, say we get a obesity data sets from either the health entities within a particular country. It goes through a process where we have a team of data analysts look at the data and extract the relevant portions of it. We then put it into our ingesting pipeline, where we then vet it. Vet it in terms of what can it apply to. Does it apply to specific diseases? Obviously, it's going to apply to a specific country. Does it apply to a particular age group and gender? From that point on, we then include it in models. And we have our modeling pipeline that does everything from estimating the number of years lost from obesity in that particular country. Also, as I mentioned before, it actually sees if that particular statistic that we got from that survey is relevant or not. From there, we basically use it to figure out, okay, well what is the overall picture across the world for obesity? And then, we visualize it and make it accessible. And provide people with the ability to tell stories on it with the hope that at someone point, a policymaker or somebody within the public health institute within a particular country is gonna see it and actually use it in their decision making in terms of how to actually improve obesity in their particular country. Cindy Ng: And when you talk about relevant and modeling, people say in the industry that there is a lot of unconscious bias. How do you reconcile that? And how do you work with certain factors that people think is controversial? For instance, people have said that using a body mass index isn't accurate. Tyrone Grandison: That's where we actually depend a lot on the network of collaborators that we spoke about. Not only do we have like a team that has been doing epidemiology and can advance the population health metrics for, you know, over two decades. We do depend upon experts within each particular country once we actually produce, like, you know, the first estimates based upon the initial models to actually look at these estimates and say, "Nope. This does not make sense. We need to actually adjust your model to add a factor in, that same unconscious bias." Or, to kind of remove that the model says that we're seeing but that the model may need to be tweaked or is wrong about. It all boils down to having people vet what the models are doing. So, it's more along the lines of how do you create systems that are really good at human computation. Marrying the things that machines are good with and then putting in a step there that forces a human to verify and kind of improve the final estimate that you want to actually want to produce. Cindy Ng: Is there a pattern that you've seen over time where time and time again, the model doesn't count for X, Y and Z? And then, the human gets involved and then figures out what's needed and provides the context? Is there a particular concept or idea that you've seen? Tyrone Grandison: There is. And there is to the point where we basically have included it in our initial processing. So, there is this concept, right. The idea of a shock. Where a shock is an event that models cannot predict and it may have wide ranging impact essentially on what you're trying to produce. So, for example, you could consider the earthquake in Haiti as a shock. You could consider the HIV epidemic as a shock. Every single country in any one given year may have a few shocks depending upon what the geolocation is that you're looking at. And again, the shocks are different and we are really grateful to the collaborative network for providing insight and telling us that, "Op, this shock is actually missing from your model for this particular location, for this particular population segment." Cindy Ng: It sounds like there's a lot of relationship building, too, with these organizations because sometimes people aren't so forthcoming with what you need to know. Tyrone Grandison: So, I mean, it's relationship building over the work that we've been doing here has been going on for 20 years. So, imagine 20 years of work just producing this Global Burden of Disease. And then, probably another decade or two before that just building the connections across the world. Because our Director has been in this space for quite a while now. He's worked at everywhere from WHO to the MIT doing this work. So, the connections there and the connections from the executive team have been invaluable in making sure that people actually speak candidly and honestly about what's going on. Because we are the impartial arbiters of the best data on what's happening in population health. Cindy Ng: And it certainly really helps when it's not driven by the bottom line. It's the most important thing is to improve everyone's health outcome. What are the challenges of working with disparate data sets? Tyrone Grandison: So, the challenge is the same everywhere, right? The set challenges all relate to, okay, well, are we talking about the same things? Right. Are talking the same language? Do we have the same semantics? Basic challenge. Two is, well, does the data have what we need to actually answer the question? Not all data is relevant. Not all data is created equal. So, just figuring out what is gonna actually give us insight into, you know, the question as to how many years do you lose for a particular disease? And the third thing which is pretty common to, you know, every field that is trying tot push into the data open data areas. Do we have the right facets in each data set to actually integrate them? Does it make sense to integrate them at all? So, the challenges are not different from what the broader industry is facing. Cindy Ng: You've developed relationships for over 20 years. Back then, we weren't able to assess so many different, I'm guessing billions and trillions of data sets. Have you seen the transition happen? And how has that transition been difficult? And how has it made your lives so much better? Tyrone Grandison: Yeah. So, the Global Burden of Disease actually started on a cycle that was, you know, when we had considered we had enough data to actually make those estimates, we would actually produce the next Global Burden of Disease. Right, and we just moved starting this year to an annual cycle. So, that's the biggest change. The biggest change is because of the wealth of data that exists out there. Because of the advances of technology, now we can actually increase the production of this data asset, so to speak. Whereas before, it was a lot of anecdotal evidence. It was a lot of negotiation to get the data that we actual need. Now, in other far more open data sets. So, lots more that's actually available. A willingness due to prior past demonstrations of the power of home data for governments and people to actually provide and produce them, because they know that they can actually use them. It's more of the technology hand-in-hand with the cultural change that's happened. That's been the biggest changes. Cindy Ng: What have you learned about wrangling petabytes of data set? Tyrone Grandison: A lot. In a nutshell, it's very difficult and if I was to say that I give advice to people, I would start with, so what's the problem you're trying to solve? What's the mission you're trying to achieve? And figure out what are the things that you need in your data sets that would help you answer that question or mission. And finally, as much as possible, stick with standardize and simplify kind of methodology. Leverage a standard infrastructure and a standard architecture across what you are doing. And make it dead simple because if it's not standard or simple, then getting to scale is really difficult. And scale meaning processing tens, hundreds of petrabytes worth of data. Cindy Ng: There are a lot of health trackers, too, where they're trying to gather all sorts of data in hopes that they might use it later. Is that a recommended best practice approach for figuring your solution or the problem out? Because, you know, what if you didn't think of something and then a new idea popped into your head? And then there's a lot of controversy with that. What is your insight... Tyrone Grandison: A controversy is, in my view, actually very real. One, what is the level of data that you are collecting, right? So, at IHME, like, we're lucky to be actually looking at population level data. If you're looking at or collecting individual records, then we have a can of worms in terms of data ownership, data privacy, data security. Right. And, especially in America, what you're referring to is the whole argument around secondary use of health data. The concern or issue is just like with HIPAA, the Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability Act. You're supposed to just have data for one person for a specific purpose and only that purpose. The issue or concern, like, you just brought up is, one, a lot of companies actually view data that is created or generated on the particular individual as being their own property. Their own intellectual property. Which you may or may not agree with. At some point, there's no tack list that says the person who this data is about should actually have a say in this in the current model, the current infrastructure. Right. And I can just say it like, personally, I believe that if the data is about you, that data's created by you, then technically you should own it. And the company should be good stewards of the data. Right. Being a good steward simply means that you're going to use the data for the purpose that you told the owner that you're going to use if for. And that you will destroy the data after you finish using it. If you come up with a secondary use for it, then you should ask the person again, do they want to actually participate in it? So, the issue that I have with it is basically is the disenfranchisement of the data owner. The neglection of like consent or even asking for it to be used in a secondary function or for a secondary purpose. And the fact that there are inherent things in that scenario with that question that are still unresolved and are just assumed to be true that people just need to look at. Cindy Ng: When you say when the project is over, how do you know when the project is over? Because I can, for instance, write a paper and keep editing and editing and it will never feel completed and done. Tyrone Grandison: Sure. So, it's... I mean, put it this way. If I say to the people that are involved in a particular study or that gave me their data, that I want to use this data to test a hypothesis and the hypothesis is that drinking a lot of alcohol will cause liver damage. Okay, obvious. And I, you know, publish my findings on it. It gets revised. You know, that at the very end, there has to be a point where either the papers published in the journal are somewhere or not. Right. I'm assuming. If that's the case and, you know, I publish it and I found out that, hey, I can actually use the same data to actually figure out the affects of alcohol consumption on some other thing. That is a secondary purpose that I did not have an agreement with you on, and so I should actually ask for your consent on that. Right. So, the question is just not when is the task done, but when have I actually accomplished the purpose that I negotiated and asked you to use your data for. Cindy Ng: So, it sounds like that's the really best practice when you're gathering or using someone's personal data. That that's the initial contract. If there is a secondary use that they should also know about it. Because you don't want to end up in a situation like Henrietta Lacks and they're using your cells and you don't even know it, right? Tyrone Grandison: Yup. But Henrietta Lacks actually is like a good example. It highlights what the current practices of the industry. Right. And again, luckily published health does not have this issue because we have aggregated data on different people. But like in the general healthcare scenario where you do have individual health records, what companies are doing and what they did within, in the Henrietta Lacks case was they may have actually specified in some legal document that, "Hey, we'r…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    When Hackers Behave Like Ghosts Sep 07, 2017
    Show notes

    We’re a month away from Halloween, but when a police detective aptly described a hotel hacker as a ghost, I thought it was a really clever analogy! It’s hard to recreate and retrace an attacker’s steps when there are no fingerprints or evidence of forced entry.

    Let’s start with your boarding pass. Before you toss it, make sure you shred it, especially the barcode. It can reveal your frequent flyer number, your name, and other PII. You can even submit the passenger’s information on the airline’s website and learn about any future flights. Anyone with access to your printed boarding pass could do harm and you would never know who your perpetrator would be.

    Next, let’s assume you arrive at your destination and the hotel is using a hotel key with a vulnerability. In the past, when hackers reveal a vulnerability, companies step up to fix it. But now, when systems need a fix and a software patch won’t do, how do we scale the fix for millions of hardware on hotel keys?

    Other articles discussed:

    • Make metrics and influence people
    • Keylogging with an iphone and android
    Tool of the week: Gost: Build a local copy of Security Tracker.

    Panelists: Cindy Ng, Kilian Englert, Forrest Temple, Mike Buckbee

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    Security Doesn’t Take a Vacation Aug 30, 2017
    Show notes

    Do you keep holiday photos away from social media when you’re on vacation? Security pros advise that it's one way to reduce your security risk. Yes, the idea of an attacker mapping out a route to steal items from your home sound ambitious. However, we’ve seen actual examples of a phishing attack as well as theft occur.

    Alternatively, the panelists point out that this perspective depends on how vulnerable you might be. If attackers need an entry and believe that you’re a worthy target is vastly different from the general noise of regular social media sharers.

    Other articles discussed:

    • Pseudo ransomware increases
    • Companies improve their security because of rise in ransomware
    • Seven things startups need to know
    • Biometrics: What’s in a face
    • What happens when you reply to spam, a TED Talk
    • $500,000 for a zero day?
    Tool of the week: https://github.com/wangyu-/udp2raw-tunnel

    Panelists: Cindy Ng, Mike Thompson, Forrest Temple, Mike Buckbee

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    The Security of Visually Impaired Self-Driving Cars Aug 24, 2017
    Show notes

    How long does it take you to tell the difference between fried chicken or poodle? What about a blueberry muffin or Chihuahua? When presented with these photos, it requires a closer look to differentiate the differences.

    It turns out that self-driving car cameras have the same problem. Recently security researchers were able to confuse self-driving car cameras by adhering small stickers to a standard stop sign. What did the cameras see instead? A 45 mph speed limit sign.

    The dangers are self-evident. However, the good news is that there are enough built-in sensors and cameras to act as a failsafe. But followers of our podcast know that other technologies with other known vulnerabilities might not be as lucky.

    Other articles discussed:

    • New law would making re-anonymizing data illegal
    • Encoding malware into physical strands of DNA
    • Wiretapping your Amazon Echo
    • Responsible ways to share a vulnerability
    Tool of the week: Macie, Automatically Discover, Classify, and Secure Content at Scale

    Panelists: Cindy Ng, Jeff Peters, Kris Keyser, Mike Buckbee

    Want to join us live? Save a seat here: https://www.varonis.com/state-of-cybercrime

    More from Varonis ⬇️

    Visit our website: https://www.varonis.com

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/varonis

    X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/varonis

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/varonislife/


    Dr. Zinaida Benenson and Phishing, Part II Aug 23, 2017
    Show notes

    Dr. Zinaida Benenson is a researcher at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, where she heads the "Human Factors in Security and Privacy" group. She and her colleagues conducted a fascinating study into why people click on what appears to be obvious email spam. In the second part of our interview, Benenson offers very practical advice on dealing with employee phishing and also discusses some of the consequences of IoT hacking. Transcript [Inside Out Security] Zinaida Benenson is a senior researcher at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. Her research focuses on the human factors connections in privacy and security, and she also explores IoT security, two topics which we are also very interested in at the Inside Out Security blog. Zinaida recently completed research into phishing. If you were at last year's Black Hat Conference, you heard her discuss these results in a session called How To Make People Click On Dangerous Links Despite Their Security Awareness. So, welcome Zinaida. [Zinaida Benenson] Okay. So my group is called Human Factors In Security And Privacy. But also, as you said, we are also doing technical research on the internet of things. And mostly when we are talking about human factors, we think about how people make decisions when they are confronted with security or privacy problems, and how can we help them in making those decisions better. [IOS] What brought you to my attention was the phishing study you presented at Black Hat, I think that was last year. And it was just so disturbing, after reading some of your conclusions and some of the results. But before we talk about them, can you describe that specific experiment you ran phishing college students using both email and Facebook? The Experiment [ZB] So in a nutshell, we sent, to over 1,000 university students, an email or a personal Facebook message from non-existing persons with popular German names. And these messages referred to a party last week and contained a link to supposed pictures from the party. In reality, this link led to an “access denied” page, but the links were individual. So we could see who clicked, and how many times they clicked. And later, we sent to them a questionnaire where we asked for reasons of their clicking or not clicking. [IOS] Right. So basically, they were told that they would be in an experiment but they weren't told that they would be phished. [ZB] Yes. So recruiting people for, you know, cyber security experiments is always tricky because you can't tell them the real goal of the experiment — otherwise, they would be extra vigilant. But on the other hand, you can't just send to them something without recruiting them. So this is an ethical problem. It's usually solved by recruiting people for something similar. So in our case, it was a survey for... about the internet habits. [IOS] And after the experiment, you did tell them what the purpose was? [ZB] Yes, yes. So this is called a debriefing and this also a special part of ethical requirements. So we sent to them an email where we described the experiment and also some preliminary results, and also described why it could be dangerous to click on a link in an email or a Facebook message. [IOS] Getting back to the actual phish content, the phish messaging content, in the paper I saw, you showed the actual template you used. And it looked — I mean, as we all get lots of spam – to my eyes and I think a lot of people's eyes, it just looked like really obvious spam. Yet, you achieved like very respectable click rates, and I think for Facebook, you got a very high rate – almost, was it 40% – of people clicking what looked like junk mail! [ZB] We had a bare IP address in the link, which should have alerted some people. I think it actually alerted some who didn't click.. But, yes, depending on the formulation of the message, we had 20% to over 50% of email users clicking. And independently on the formulation of the message, we had around 40% of users clicking. So in all cases, it's enough, for example, to get a company infected with malware! 50% Clicked on Emails [IOS] That is surprising! But then you also learned by surveying them, the reasons they were clicking. And I was wondering if you can share some of those, some of the results you found? [ZB] So the reasons. The most important or most frequently stated reason for clicking was curiosity. People were amused that the message was not addressed to them, but they were interested in the pictures. And the next most frequently stated reason was that the message actually was plausible because people actually went to a party last week, and there were people there that they did not know. And so they decided that it's quite plausible to receive such a message. [IOS] However, it was kind of a very generic looking message. So it's a little hard to believe, to me, that they thought it somehow related to them! [ZB] We should always consider the targeting audience. And this was students, and students communicate informally. Quite often, people have friends and even don't know their last names. And of course, I wouldn't send … if I was sending such a phishing email to, say employees of a company, or to general population, I wouldn't formulate it like this. So our targeting actually worked quite well. [IOS] So it was almost intentional that it looked...it was intentional that it looked informal and something that a college student might send to another one. "Hey, I saw you at a party." Now, I forget, was the name of the person receiving the email mentioned in the content or not? It just said, "Hey"? [ZB] We had actually two waves of the experiment. In the first wave, we mentioned people's names and we got over 50% of email recipients' click. And this was very surprising for us because we actually expected that on Facebook, people would click more just because people share pictures on Facebook, and it's easier to find a person on Facebook, or they know, okay, there is a student, it is a student and say, her first name is Sabrina or whatever. And so we were absolutely surprised to learn that over 50% of email recipients clicked in the first wave of the experiment! And we thought, "Okay, why could this be?" And we decided that maybe it was because we addressed people by their first names. So it was like, "Hey, Anna." And so we decided to have the second wave of the experiment where we did not address people by their first names, but just said, "Hey." And so we got the same, or almost the same, clicking rate on Facebook. But a much lower clicking rate on email. [IOS] And I think you had an explanation for that, if you had a theory about why that may be, why the rates were similar [for Facebook]? [ZB] Yeah. So on Facebook, it seems that it doesn't matter if people are addressed by name. Because as I said, the names of people on Facebook are very salient. So when you are looking up somebody, you can see their names. But if somebody knows my email address and knows my name, it might seem to some people …. more plausible. But this is just ... we actually didn't have any people explaining this in the messages. Also, we got a couple of people saying on email that, "Yeah, well, we didn't click that. Oh, well it didn't address me by name, so it looked like spam to me." So actually … names in emails seem to be important, even if at our university, email addresses consist of first name, point, second name, at university domain. [IOS] I thought you also suggested that because Facebook is a community, that there's sort of a higher level of trust in Facebook than in just getting an email. Or am I misreading that? [ZB] Well, it might be. It might be like this. But we did not check for this. And actually, there are different research. So some other people did some research on how well people trust Facebook and Facebook members. And yeah, people defer quite a lot, and I think that people use Facebook, not because they particularly trust it, but because it's very convenient and very helpful for them. Curiosity and Good Moods [IOS] Okay. And so what do you make of this curiosity as a first reason for clicking? [ZB] Well, first of all, we were surprised how honestly people answered. And saying, "Oh, I was curious about pictures of unknown people and an unknown party." It's a negative personality trait, yeah? So it was very good that we had an anonymous questionnaire. Maybe it made people, you know, answering more honestly. And I think that curiosity is, in this case, it was kind of negative, a negative personality trait. But actually, if you think about it, it's a very positive personality trait. Because curiosity and interest motivate us to, for example, to study and to get a good job, and to be good in our job. And they are also directly connected to creativity and interaction. [IOS] But on the other hand, curiosity can have some bad results. I think you also mentioned that even for those who were security aware, it didn't really make a difference. [ZB] Well, we asked people if they know — in the questionnaire —we asked them before we revealed the experiment, and asked them whether they clicked or not. We asked them a couple of questions that are related to security awareness like, "Can one be infected by a virus if one clicks on an attachment in an email, or on a link?" And when we tried to correlate, statistically correlate, the answers to this question, to this link clicking question, with people's report on whether they clicked or not, we didn't find any correlation. So this result is preliminary, yeah. We can't say with certainty, but it seems like awareness doesn't help a lot. And again, I have a hypothesis about this, but no proof so far. [IOS] And what is that? What is your theory? [ZB] My theory is that people can't be vigilant all the time. And psychological research actually showed that interaction, creativity, and good mood are connected to increased gullibility. And on the other hand, the same line of research showed that vigilance, and suspicion, and an analytical approach to solving problems is connected to bad mood and increased effort. So if we apply this, it means that being constantly vigilant is connected to being in a bad mood, which we don't want! And which is also not good for atmosphere, for example, in a firm. And with increased effort, which means that we are just tiring. And when we...at some time, we have to relax. And if the message arrives at this time, it's quite plausible for everybody, and I mean really for everybody including me, you, and every security expert in the world, to click on something! [IOS] It also has some sort of implications for hackers, I suppose. If they know that a company just went IPO … or everyone got raises in the group, then you start phishing them and sort of leverage off their good moods! Be Prepared: Secondary Defenses [IOS] What would you suggest to an IT Security Group using this research in terms of improving security in the company? [ZB] Well, I would suggest firstly to, you know, to make sure that they understand the users and the humans on the whole, yeah? We security people tend to consider users as you know, as nuisance, like, ‘Okay they're always doing the wrong things.’ Actually, we as security experts should protect people! And if the employees in the company were not there, then we wouldn't have our job, yeah? So what is important is to let humans be humans … And with all their positive but also negative characteristics and something like curiosity, for example, can be both. And to turn to technical defense I would say. Because to infect a company, one click is enough, yeah? And one should just assume that it will happen because of all these things I was saying even if people are security aware. The question is, what happens after the click? And there are not many examples of, you know, companies telling how they mitigate such things. So the only one I was able to find was the [inaudiable] security incident in 2011. I don't know if you remember. They were hacked and had to change, actually to exchange all the security tokens. And they, at least they published at least a part of what happened. And yeah, that was a very tiny phishing wave that maybe reached around 10 employees and only one of them clicked. So they got infected, but they noticed, they say that they noticed it quite quickly because of other security measures. I would say that that's what one should actually expect and that's what is the best outcome one can hope for. Yes, if one notices in time. [IOS] I agree that IT should be aware that this will happen and that the hackers and some will get in and you should have some secondary defenses. But I was also wondering, does it also suggest that perhaps some people should not have access to email? I mean … does this lead to a test … .and if some employees are just, you know, a little too curious, you just think, "You know what, maybe we take the email away from you for a while?" [ZB] Well you know, you can. I mean a company can try this if they can sustain the business consequences of this, yeah? So if people don't have emails then maybe some business processes will become less efficient and also employees might become disgruntled which is also not good. I would suggest that ... I think that it's not going to work! And at least it's not a good trade off. It might work but it's not a good trade off because, you know, all this for...If you implement a security measure that, that impairs business processes, it makes people dissatisfied! Then you have to count in the consequences. [IOS] I agree that IT should be aware that this will happen and that the hackers will get in and you should have some secondary defenses. But I was also wondering, does it also suggest that perhaps some people should not have access to email? I mean ... does this lead to a test where if some employees are just, you know, a little too curious you just say, ‘You know what? Maybe we take the e-mail away from you for a while.’ [ZB] Well, you know, you can. I mean, a company can try this if they can, you know, if they can sustain the business costs and consequences of this, yeah? So if people don't have emails then maybe some business processes will become less efficient and yeah, and also employees might become disgruntled which is also not good. I would suggest that, I think that it's not going to work! And at least it's not a good trade off. It might work, but it's not a good trade off because, you know, all this for...if you implement security measure that impairs our business processes and makes people dissatisfied, then you have to count in the consequences. [IOS] I'm agreeing with you that the best defense I think is awareness really and then taking other steps. I wanted to ask you one or two more questions. One of them is about what they call whale phishing or spear phishing perhaps is another way to say it, which is just going after not just any employee, but usually high-level executives. And at least from some anecdotes I've heard, executives are also prone to clicking on spam just like anybody else, but your research also suggests that some of the more context you provide, the more likely you'll get these executives to click. [ZB] Okay, so if you get more context of course you can make the email more plausible, and of course if you are targeting a particular person, there is a lot of possibilities to get information about them, and especially if it's somebody well-known like an executive of a company. And I think that there are also some personality traits of executives that might make them more likely to click. Because, you know…

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