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    Judaism

    Daf Yomi for Women – Hadran

    Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women.

    Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download.

    Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.

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    Copyright: © Copyright Michelle Cohen Farber 2012-2020 All rights reserved

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    Latest Episodes:
    Yevamot 38 - April 14, 13 Nissan Apr 14, 2022
    Show notes

    Today's daf is sponsored by Elisa Hartstein in honor of her oldest daughter finishing her army service today "also in tremendous appreciation for all of our Chayalot and Chayalim, present and past, who make our lives here in Israel possible every single day."

    Today's daf is sponsored by Mona & David Schwartz and family in loving memory of Mary Horowitz, Miriam Etel bat Aharon Halevi & Mirel Meltzer on her 28th yahrzeit. "She was a woman whose home exemplified hachanasat orchim".

    Today's daf is sponsored by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her maternal grandmother, Betty Egert Landesman, Baila Toibe bat Avraham Aryeh ve-Tsirel Devorah, and her paternal grandfather, Jacob Katchen, Yaakov ben Meyer Zev ve-Malka Rashe, on their 40th yahrzeit. "Though we lost them too soon, and did not have an official shiva period that snowy Erev Pesach in 1982, their legacy of the centrality of family, commitment to community, tradition, and so much more, has stayed with us all these years. Yehi zichram baruch."

    In a case where the child was potentially born to the first husband or to the yabam (if yibum was performed within three months of the death and she was pregnant soon after), in what cases can the child inherit from one father or the other or the grandfather? Mostly his claims are unsubstantiated, however, in cases where he has a definitive claim, he can collect. When a woman is waiting for yibum, what is the status of her property? Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree that she can sell her property at her will as her potential yabam has no rights to her possessions. But if she dies, they disagree about who inherits her property – does it go back to her family or does it go to the yabam? Four different explanations are brought to explain the Mishna and the difference between the two parts of the Mishna – why do they both agree about the first case that the woman has clear rights to the property, but disagree about the second? According to Ulla, they are each referring to a different situation – the first part is a woman who was only engaged to the man who died and the second part is one who is married. Her relationship to the yabam in the first part is considered safek (a case of doubt) engaged to her and in the second part, safek married. According to Raba, in both cases she was married; the difference is that in the first part she was still alive, in which case her claim to the property is stronger than in the second part when she is no longer alive and the people claiming rights to it each don't have a clear claim to the property (even though the yabam is the one with a better claim on it as it is in his possession). Therefore, in the second part, Beit Shamai rules that they split the property. Abaye questions Raba - does Beit Shamai really hold that in a case where one has a definitive claim and the other's claim is not definitive (safek), does the one with a definitive claim have full rights to the object in question? This question is strengthened by a Mishna in Bava Batra 157 regarding a house that falls and kills a man and his father, and it is unclear who died first and a dispute ensues between the heirs of the son and those to who he owes money. Beit Shamai rules that they split it. Why wouldn't the heirs be considered as if they have a definitive claim while the creditors do not? Beit Shamai gives them rights to it for a different reason, which is proven by laws of a Sotah whose husband dies before drinking the Sotah waters. Beit Shamai rules that she can collect her ketuba even though she does not have a definitive claim. It seems it can be collected because a document that is ready to be collected is considered as if it is already collected. Why didn't Abaye question Raba from the Sotah case? Perhaps a ketuba is different as it was instituted to protect the women in order to encourage them to get married and therefore it is able to be collected even without a definitive claim. Why didn't Abaye question Raba from the ketuba in our Mishna where the woman's family has a non-definitive claim to her money while the yabam has a definitive claim (as the property is in his possession) and yet they split the proceeds according to Beit Shamai? To answer that question, they reread the Mishna and claim that Beit Shamai wasn't relating to that case. Abaye brings a third explanation of the two parts of the Mishna by distinguishing between when the property came to the woman. The first part is referring to property given to her when she was waiting for yibum, therefore the yabam has no claim to the property. The second was property that was given to her when she was married to the first husband, which would then go by default to the yabam upon the husband's death.


    Yevamot 37 - April 13, 12 Nissan Apr 13, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Yevamot 37

    This month's learning is sponsored by Dora Chana Haar and family for the refuah shleima of Chava Naami bat Daba Chana.

    How do we rule with a baby who dies within the first month - is the baby considered viable and exempts the mother and brother from yibum or is it a case of doubt? What are the consequences for a woman who was betrothed to a man and hadn't done yibum? Is there a difference between one who was betrothed to a kohen or not? If they married immediately after the husband's death and did not wait the necessary three months and a child was born, the couple brings a hanging guilt offering? Why not go with the presumption that most women give birth after nine months and therefore require a definite sin offering? If a child is possibly a mamzer, but not definitively, can he marry a mamzeret (female mamzer)? Different opinions are presented. What are inheritance laws for this child who is potentially the son of either the first husband or his brother? The Gemara gives various examples where there will be an argument for each side to inherit and determines what is the law in each case.


    Yevamot 36 - April 12, 11 Nissan Apr 12, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Yevamot 36

    Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta Jaroslawicz-Neufeld "Thank you to my Hadran family for your care and concern after my recent accident. May we all share Smachot in good health!"

    After rejecting Abaye's resolution to the difficulty against Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding yibum and chalitza of a pregnant woman, Rava answers the difficulty in a different manner. A braita is brought to support his position, which is then used to question Reish Lakish's position. That difficulty is resolved as well. Rabbi Elazar finds a Mishna that supports Reish Lakish's position, however, the support is rejected by the Gemara. A braita is brought to strengthen Reish Lakish's opinion and Rava paskens like Reish Lakish on this issue and on two others, relating to monetary law. Our Mishna said that if the child was not viable, then the couple could stay married. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and says they must divorce. Is this the same as Rabbi Meir's opinion regarding a man who marries a pregnant or nursing woman?


    Yevamot 35 - April 11, 10 Nissan Apr 11, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Yevamot 35

    Two different versions of Shmuel's statement are brought regarding what case does a woman not need to wait three months before marrying. Is it regarding a Canaanite slave and a gentile who are minors or is referring to them, but over 12? If his statement is referring to older women, then one can infer that Jewish girls who are minors also do not have to wait three months and that it is regarding cases of znut, licentious relations. If so, why are we not concerned about gentile women engaging in licentious behavior? We assume they use birth control, as is found in the opinion of Rabbi Yosi. Why can we assume that? The Mishna mentioned that kohanot who were accidentally switched after the marriage are disqualified from the kehuna. What does this mean? The fourth chapter begins with a case where chalitza or yibum was performed and then they realized the woman was pregnant. Normally we wait three months before doing yibum or chalitza for this reason, but the Mishna discusses a case where they didn't wait. If the baby does not survive, the chalitza or yibum was retroactively valid. If the baby survived, it is invalid and has no ramifications for forbidding relationships with each of their relatives. However, if yibum was performed, they will need separate (without divorce, as the marriage was invalid) and bring a sin offering. If it is unclear to whom the child belongs, we make the couple separate, the child is fine no matter what as either way was born to a legitimate father and the couple needs to bring a hanging guilt offering. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate about whether the woman needs to do chalitza again if she was pregnant when she did chalitza and the baby didn't survive. Each explains their approach and questions are raised against each opinion from our Mishna.


    Yevamot 34 - April 10, 9 Nissan Apr 10, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Yevamot 34

    This week's learning is sponsored by Sharon Hirsch in honor of her daughter, daughters-in-law and granddaughters.

    Today's learning is sponsored by Rikki and Alan Zibitt in loving memory of Rikki's mother, Frieda Carlin, Fraidl bat Meir v'Rivka on the occasion of her 7th Yahrzeit. May her neshama have an Aliyah.

    After discussing the different opinions of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi regarding actions that could possibly incur multiple prohibitions, the Gemara associates our Mishna with the opinion of Rabbi Meir who holds that in cases of prohibitions that are inclusive (issur kollel) and ones that are expanded (issur mosif) and ones that happen at the same time, one is obligated for each one (issur chal al issur). This is proven by a Mishna in Keritot regarding an impure person who ate on Yom Kippur forbidden fats from a sacrifice that were leftover beyond their time (notar) – they are obligated to bring four sin offerings and one guilt offering. Rabbi Meir there adds that if it was Shabbat and the person was eating it as they walked out on one domain and into another, they would be obligated as well for carrying on Shabbat. This case includes all three types. How does the ruling regarding the mistake in the kiddushin relate to a debate regarding one who makes a mistake while performing a mitzva? The Gemara suggests that the Mishna could also be explained according to Rabbi Shimon if it can be explained that all the prohibitions came simultaneously. Rav Amram brings a possible scenario in which this could be. There is an assumption that women can't (or likely do not) get pregnant the first time they have sexual relations. If so, why does the Mishna rule that the woman needs to wait three months before going back to her actual husband? An answer is brought to resolve the question. Didn't Tamar get pregnant during her first time having relations? Firstly, the Gemara establishes how they know she was still a virgin. Then they resolve the question. Another issue regarding impurity that relates to the assumption that women don't get pregnant from their first time having relations is discussed. Rabbi Yochanan said that a woman who was married and the marriage ended and she waited more than ten years before getting remarried, could no longer bear children. However, Rav Nachman limits this to one who did not have a desire to get remarried during that time. A few cases of this are brought including Rav Chisda's daughter's marriage to Rava which was after ten years of her being married to Rami bar Hama, and yet she bore children from that marriage. What women do not have to wait three months before remarrying?


    Yevamot 33 - Shabbat April 9, 8 Nissan Apr 08, 2022
    Show notes

    There are three different interpretations brought to explain what the issue of debate was between Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kapara in the three cases in the braita. Were they debating whether issur chal al issur regarding an issur kollel according to Rabbi Yosi? Or was it regarding a case when both prohibitions came about at the same time and according to Rabbi Yosi? Or both at the same time, but according to Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara analyzes the different options and rejects the first two. What is the Shabbat prohibition in the case of a non-kohen who works in the Temple on Shabbat? If two men betrothed two women and they switched them after the kiddushin, what happens if each one takes home the other's wife? The Gemara establishes that the Mishna must have been referring to a case where it was unintentional.


    Yevamot 32 - April 8, Nissan 7 Apr 08, 2022
    Show notes

    Study Guide Yevamot 32

    Presentation in PDF format

    Today's daf is sponsored by Belinda Kreike in loving memory of Esther Kreike, Esther Bas Yehuda Nossan Hacohen on her 8th yahrzeit. "She is remembered fondly by her family in Manchester and Israel."

    Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Baumel-Schwartz in honor of her daughter, Beki's birthday! "I am constantly amazed by her enthusiasm for learning new things, and am thrilled that she has joined the Hadran Daf Yomi community. May all her dreams come true. Happy Birthday!"

    If a woman does maamar in order to subsequently fulfill yibum with her deceased husband's brother, and then he dies, can she do yibum with a third brother? The rabbis say no as she is falling to yibum from two different men and this is not permitted. Rabbi Shimon permits as he does not view maamer as significant and therefore she is only performing yibum for her first husband. What if the husband undoes the maamar by giving a get, is she then permitted according to the rabbis or not? If two brothers marry two sisters and after the first brother dies childless, the sister married to the other brother dies. The first one's wife cannot do yibum as she was prohibited at the time she fell to yibum. Why is this Mishna mentioned - we already learned this in the Mishna on Yevamot 30?! If one has relations with a woman who is both his brother's wife and his wife's sister, is he obligated on two counts or one? Rabbi Shimon says one, Rabbi Yosi holds two. But elsewhere Rabbi Yosi says one only receives one punishment even if there were two transgressions as a prohibition cannot apply when there is another prohibition already there. How can we resolve this? Two answers are brought. Rabbi Avahu holds that Rabbi Yosi only holds this way in the case of issur mosif and not in the case of issur kollel. Rava explains it differently. Is this a source of debate among tannaim as well?


    Yevamot 31 - April 7, 6 Nissan Apr 07, 2022
    Show notes

    Presentation in PDF format

    Today's daf is sponsored by Daniel and Sara Berelowitz in honor of their granddaughter, Chamutal Matalon's Bat Mitzvah.

    Why did the Mishna not mention a case of doubt in divorce when he threw her the get and it is unclear if it was closer to him or closer to her? Raba answers, but Abaye tries to ascertain why the same issues wouldn't apply to kiddushin. The cases are different as in a case of doubt about divorce, the chazaka (presumptive status) is that the woman is married and would thereby exempt the co-wife, whereas, in the case of doubt about kiddushin, the chazaka is that she is unmarried and would not exempt the co-wife. Therefore, in kiddushin we are stringent and have the co-wife do chalitza and we are not worried that perhaps one may accidentally do yibum if chalitza is permitted, as based on the chazaka, the co-wife is obligating in yibum. Abaye questions the explanation that chazaka in a divorce would lead us to assume the woman was married and the co-wife exempt, so why in a case when a house fell on a husband and wife and killed them both and we are unsure who died first, we have the co-wife do chalitza (just in case the husband died first)? There is reason to distinguish between the two cases - two different suggestions are brought. A further question is raised from an explanation on a Mishna that states that in a case of doubt of divorce - when it is unclear if the get was closer to him or her - we have the co-wife do chalitza. The answer is that the case there had two sets of witnesses - one said it was closer to him and one said it was closer to her. On account of the witnesses, we no longer rely on the chazaka. How do we know that our Mishna is only one set of witnesses? And is it really the case that with two sets of witnesses, we don't rely on the chazaka? Based on a source that indicated otherwise, we reject this line of reasoning and suggest that the Mishna in fact included the case of a doubt of divorce when it is unclear if the get was closer to him or her and require chalitza. What is left to explain is why the Mishna uses the language "this is a case of..." which seems to exclude other cases. The answer given is that it excludes cases of kiddushin that are similar to the divorce cases - like a document that doesn't have a date as a date is not important in kiddushin. Why? Two answers are given.


    Yevamot 30 - April 6, 5 Nissan Apr 06, 2022
    Show notes

    Today's daf is sponsored by Bernie & Susannnah Goldstein in gratitude for their family recovering from COVID. "לולי תורתך שעשועיי, אז אבדתי בעוניי. Daf Yomi during the pandemic has been a real source of strength. Thank you Rabbanit Michelle & Hadran team for making it accessible."

    Several different variations are brought in the Mishnayot of three brothers, each married to two sisters and a third wife, unrelated. In each situation one brother dies, another does yibum and then dies as well. The order of events is different as to who died first, was someone divorced at some point, etc. The Gemara tries to establish the differences between the cases that necessitated the Mishna to bring each one and what halakhot can be derived from each Mishna. When Rav states something that seems to be clear from the Mishsna, the Gemara infers that he must be teaching us something further, that once a woman is unable to do yibum with the brother at the moment she falls to yibum to him, she is never permitted to him, even if during the first "fall to yibum" her sister dies. From the first Mishna here, Rav Nachman infers that there is no zika, but from another Mishna, Rav Ashi infers that there is zika. How can each explain the other Mishna to fit with their approach? An inference from a Mishna here contradicts the Mishna on Yevamot 2b, as here it seems if the sister dies before the second wife marries her husband, she is not considered her co-wife, but in Yevamot 2, it's clear that as long as she dies before yibum, she is not considered a co-wife to be exempted in the case of erva on account of the other wife. Two resolutions are suggested. If there is a doubt about whether the wife who is erva is maybe betrothed or maybe not to the husband or maybe divorced, maybe not, his other wife (to whom he is certainly married) needs to do chalitza. Why?


    Yevamot 29 - April 5, 4 Nissan Apr 05, 2022
    Show notes

    Presentation in PDF format

    Study Guide Yevamot 29

    What is the law if two women who are relatives of each other (to whom a man can't marry both) fall to one brother for yibum. Are they exempt or do they need chalitza? There is a debate in the Mishna. The Mishna lists outgrowths of this case that are very similar to those in the Mishna of Yevamot 26. Why are they repeated here? Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel have a debate about the strength of maamar. Rabbi Elazar tries to figure out how strong maamar is according to Beit Shamai - is it a complete act or is it just strong enough to prevent his wife's sister from becoming connected to him if he husband were his brother and died? A different version of Rabbi Elazar is brought suggesting that perhaps it is not even enough to get rid of the zika of her sister. However, that suggestion is rejected based on the case in our Mishna. Rabba asks if maamar according to Beit Shamai is like betrothal or marriage. What is the relevance of his question? They attempt to answer it but are unsuccessful.


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