Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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Ketubot 17 - Shabbat July 23, 24 Tamuz Jul 22, 2022

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What do they sing when they dance before a kallah? Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel have different approaches. Stories are told of words of praise they would say to rabbis as well. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak would juggle before brides – was this viewed as a positive act or not? Other rabbis would carry brides on their shoulders – how was this permitted? Could everyone do this as well? Can and should one stop learning Torah to go to a wedding or a funeral? On what does it depend? What goes on at a wedding of a woman who is a virgin that can later be used as testimony that she was a virgin at her wedding and therefore had a ketuba of 200 zuz. Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer that one is believed in a case where they claim that they are living in a property that was owned by someone's father, but that he purchased it from them. Why did the Mishna choose a case regarding a purchase from one's father and not directly from the seller?

Ketubot 16 - July 22, 23 Tamuz Jul 22, 2022

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There is a case where Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with Rabban Gamliel - if one is in possession of land and says to the other claimant, "It was your father's but I purchased it from him," the claim is accepted, as "the mouth that forbade (admitted that it belonged to the other) is the mouth that permitted (but I purchased it)." This is true only if there were no witnesses attesting to the fact that it originally belonged to his father. In the first case in the Mishna, regarding a woman whose ketuba is lost and she claims she was a virgin and should get 200 zuz and the husband claims she was not and only gets 100, the ruling is that only is she brings witnesses, can we accept her claim. Is this not according to Rabban Gamliel or would he agree with Rabbi Yehoshua in this case? Can one prove from the language of the second case "Rabbi Yehoshua admits" that in the first case, Rabban Gamliel agreed with Rabbi Yehoshua? No! As that language is referring back to the previous chapter. To which case in the previous chapter? Why does Rabbi Yehoshua agree in our Mishna that since there is a migo (since a better claim could have been made and it wasn't, it is likely they are telling the truth), we can accept the claim, but in the case in Chapter One, he does not accept a migo claim? If we assume that most women are virgins, why do we need witnesses? If her ketuba is lost, why aren't we concerned that she is claiming her ketuba for the second time after she already collected it in a court earlier and now is lying that her ketuba is lost? Two answers are given. What were other customs that were practiced at the wedding of a virgin?

Ketubot 15 - July 21, 22 Tamuz Jul 21, 2022

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Rav assumes that the Mishna ruled that the story of the rape in the Mishna took place on the day of the shuk in Tzippori when there were not only a majority of Jews in the city but also a majority of Jews passing through to sell their wares and the ruling followed Rabbi Yehoshua who ruled that in a case where there are two majorities, we can assume the rapist was Jewish and the woman can marry a kohen. The majority of those who pass through the city should be enough to permit the woman to marry a kohen as they are a passing majority, as opposed to the majority of the city which is set in its place and therefore, regular laws of majority do not apply. However, the rabbis made a decree not to permit passed on a majority of passersby so that we don't come to accidentally permit based on the majority of the city's inhabitants. This is different from law of nine kosher stores and one non-kosher store and there is a piece of meat that we are unsure from which store it came. If a piece of meat is on the street, we follow the majority of stores and permit it, even though we only have one majority. The reason for the stringency in our case if because the rabbis were strict when it came to who kohanim can marry. Rabbi Zeira held that when an item is in its place (like a piece of meat was purchased from one of the stores and we don't know from which one), we cannot follow rules of majority - instead, we say it is either kosher or not kosher - 50/50 chance, both to be strict and to be lenient, depending on the case. The Gemara finds a case where we rule leniently. They bring a verse from the Torah Devarim 19:11 as the source for this rule. Rav Chiya bar Ashi says that Rav ruled like Rabbi Yosi that the girl who was raped was permitted to marry a kohen. Rav Chanan bar Rava says in the name of Rav that it was a unique case and one cannot learn halacha from there to permit based on a majority. Rabbi Yirmia assumes at this point that Rav Chiya bar Ashi held that Rav ruled like Rabbi Yosi even in the case of only one majority and raises a difficulty against this from a statement Rav himself made regarding the Mishna in Machshirin 2:7 indicating that for marriage with a kohen, one needs two majorities. However, the Gemara reminds him that Rav himself understood that the case where Rabbi Yosi ruled was one with two majorities. If so, then Rav Chanan in the name of Rav must be ruling more leniently - in which case, he holds that Rabbi Yosi permitted only based on two majorities in this particular case, but in general, one majority is enough. This understanding does not fit in with the statement Rav made regarding the Mishna in Machshirin. The Gemara explains that Rav Chanan must have not held by Rav's explanation of the Mishna that it was in the day of the market, but held that there was only one majority and that's why the ruling here was unique - as otherwise, one would need two majorities. The Gemara delves into Shmuel understanding of the Mishna in Machshirin as well. If after death or divorce, the woman does not have her ketuba in hand and she and the husband make different claims regarding whether she was a virgin when she married and whether her ketuba was 200 zuz or 100, how do we resolve this?

Ketubot 14 - July 20, 21 Tamuz Jul 20, 2022

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Today's daf is sponsored by Avi Yonitzman for the refuah shleima of Moshe David ben Tzvia.

A case came before Rav Yosef with a pregnant fiancé - both she and the fiancé claimed that the child was his. Rav Yosef believed them since the man agreed with the woman and since we hold like Rabban Gamliel, even in a case where he didn't agree, we believe the woman as we rely on her presumptive status (permitted to a kohen). Abaye raises a difficulty as Shmuel ruled like Rabban Gamliel only when there until there is a kosher majority. Rabbi Yosef replied Shmuel must have said that only ab initio but not post facto and our case is post facto as they are already betrothed and she is already pregnant. Abaye cites a Mishna in Eduyot 8:3 where Rabbi Yehushua had an opinion contradictory to his opinion here – regarding a widow isa (widow of a safek chalal). Raba resolves the contradiction, but Rava points out that he did not take into consideration that in the same Mishna, Rabban Gamliel also has an opinion that contradicts his opinion here. Therefore, Rava resolves the contradiction in a different manner. The Gemara brings a braita with a dispute between three regarding the almanat isa. The Gemara raises three questions in understanding the braita and then explains all three opinions in a way that solves all the difficulties. The Mishnah brings up a case of a young woman that was raped and ruled that she should only be permitted to marry a kohen if the majority of people in the area are "kosher". How can this be because it does not conform to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel who allows even if the majority are not kosher and not Rabbi Yehoshua who forbids even if the majority are kosher?!

Ketubot 13 - July 19. 20 Tamuz Jul 19, 2022

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If the husband claims his wife is not a virgin and she says that it was from an injury (mukat etz) and he accuses her of having been with another man, again we have a debate between Rabbi Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer on one side and Rabbi Yehoshua on the other. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether the man claims 100 zuz and woman 200 zuz or the man claims that she deserves nothing and she claims 100 zuz. Their debate is based on the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding a mukat etz - whether she gets a ketuba or 100 or 200. It is also based on a disagreement regarding a man who finds out after the marriage that his wife was not a virgin, does she receive a ketuba or 100 or none at all. If a woman was "talking" to another man and there is concern she had relations with him, if she claims he was of "kosher" lineage, can we rely on her testimony and permit her to marry a kohen? Again, the same rabbis as above debate this issue. They also debate a case where the woman was pregnant and she testifies that the father is "kosher". What is the meaning of "talking" - was it that she went into a room alone with him or is it that we know she had intercourse with him? Zeiri and Rav Asi debate this issue and several sources are brought to raise difficulties against each of them and each difficulty is resolved, other than the last one which is left as a difficulty against Rav Asi. The last source was from the Tosefta Ketubot 1:9 which had a more detailed conversation between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer which ended with a confusing exchange regarding the differences/similarities between a woman taken into captivity and a pregnant woman or a woman who was seen in a secluded area with a man. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree regarding whether each side holds their position also regarding the woman's testimony regarding the status of her daughter. Rabbi Eliezer raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan from the Tosefta. Rabbi Yochanan responds by limiting what was meant by the designation in the Tosefta of the child being a shtuki.

Ketubot 13 - July 19. 20 Tamuz Jul 19, 2022

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Ketubot 12 - July 18, 19 Tamuz Jul 18, 2022

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Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Weil in loving memory of Adina Hagege's beloved mother-in-law, Ketti (Kamuna) Peretz Hagege, who passed away yesterday on the 18th of Tamuz. "May Adina and Eric know no more sorrow."

If a man marries a woman who was already married but still a virgin, he cannot take her to court and claim that he believed she was a virgin. The braita mentions that even if there are witnesses that she was not alone with him enough time to have intercourse, he still cannot take her to court regarding her virginity. Is it possible to learn from these sources that whoever believed his wife that she was a virgin and then found out she is not, would still have to give her a ketuba of 100 zuz? The customs in Judea and Galilee were different regarding the status of the engagement and whether the couple would be secluded in a room during the time of the engagement. Even in Judea, where they this would happen, there were different customs in the matter and not all permitted this. If they were to have secluded, though, the man would not be able to claim in the court after the wedding that his wife was not a virgin. In the court of the kohanim, they would give ketubot of 400 zuz to daughters of kohanim who were not previously married and sages did not object to this custom. Did the widows also receive double the amount of a regular widow? Who else deserved a bigger ketuba? Why? If a man does not find his wife is a virgin and when they come to court, she claims that she was raped at the time of the engagement and he claims that she was not a virgin before the engagement and wants to lower her keuba to 100 zuz, who is believed? There is a dispute between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer, who believe her, and Rabbi Yehoshua who believes him. Upon what halachic principles are their opinions based? Is this the same controversy that there is on the issue of disputed money where one claims they loaned someone money and the other claims that do not know?

Ketubot 11 - July 17, 18 Tamuz Jul 17, 2022

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This week's learning is sponsored by the Sarna Family in the zechut of a refuah shleima u'mehirah for Maayan Liba bat Bryna Mindi.

The Mishna states that a convert, one taken captive, a maidservant who was converted/freed under the age of three has the presumptive status of a virgin and therefore has a ketuba of 200 zuz. Rav Huna states that a convert can be converted with the consent of the court as one can act on behalf of another if it is in the person's best interest and converting is in the best interest of the minor. Why? Can our Mishna be used as proof for Rav Huna? According to Rav Yosef, the convert can decide when they become of age that they no longer want to be Jewish. Rava and Abaye each bring sources that would seem to go against this. How are the difficulties resolved? Why did each not bring the source that the other brought? If an adult male had relations with a minor or the reverse, she also receives a ketuba of 200 zuz. Regarding a woman who tore her hymen from an accident (mukat etz), there is a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis - does she get a ketuba of 100 or 200 zuz. If she was married but never had relations, she only receives a ketuba of 100 zuz and if the husband finds that she was not a virgin, he cannot claim that he was misled. A convert, one taken captive, a maidservant who was converted/freed over the age of three is assumed not to be a virgin and her ketuba is 100 zuz. Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a minor male who had relations with an adult woman - is she considered a non-virgin or a mukat etz. How does this work with our Mishna that seemed to say the debate was only regarding the mukat etz, but not this case? Rava rereads the Mishna to resolve the issue. Do the rabbis and Rabbi Meir disagree only in a case where he knew she was a mukat etz but in a case where he didn't know before the wedding, she doesn't receive her ketuba at all? Rami bar Hama suggests this but is rejected by a Mishna. Rava says that Rabbi Meir doesn't distinguish between whether he knew or not and either way she gets 200 zuz. But the rabbis distinguish and give her 100 if she told him before and nothing if she misled him. However, Rava changed his mind and holds that either way, the rabbis hold she gets 100 zuz. The Gemara brings a braita and a discussion about that braita and Rava's rereading of it to prove that he changed his mind.

Ketubot 10 - Shabbat July 16, 17 Tamuz Jul 15, 2022

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Is the requirement of having a ketubah a Torah law or rabbinic? This is a subject of debate. Shmuel holds that since the law is rabbinic, the rabbis believe a husband to claim that he found a "petach patuach" and the woman was not a virgin. Rava explains that he is believed since he wouldn't spend all this time and money on a wedding celebration for no reason. That gives him a presumption of telling the truth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel held that ketuba is a Torah law. However, a braita is brought that contradicts and two resolutions are suggested, each requires emending the text of the braita. A number of actual cases that were brought in front of rabbis in different time periods are mentioned. In each case, the husband claimed there was no blood from the hymen and the woman claimed she was a virgin. In each case, the rabbi found a way to show that the woman was still a virgin. Each case it was proven in a different manner. The virgin's ketuba is 200 zuz and a widow's is 100, maneh. Thus the word widow in Hebrew (almana) is derived from that. If it was instituted by the rabbis, how can it be that the Torah used the word almana, referring to something that would be relevant only in the future? The meaning and source of a number of words are brought.

Ketubot 9 - July 15, 16 Tamuz Jul 15, 2022

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Today's daf is sponsored by Dr. Robin Zeiger in loving memory of her mother Helen Zeiger's yahrzeit, and the first wedding anniversary of her son Akiva to Rivka. "Mom's love and support enabled me to become religious and begin my Jewish learning at ICJA."

Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig Kones in loving memory of her mother, Sara bat David v'Vitti who passed away last Friday, 9 Tamuz. A righteous woman who survived the Holocaust and went on to build a beautiful family. Yehi Zichra Baruch.

Rabbi Elazar holds that if a man claims his wife had a "petach patuach," meaning that when they had relations for the first time, he could tell that she wasn't a virgin, he is believed to forbid her to him as once can testify in order to forbid something on oneself (shavya nafsha chatichad'isura). Why would this be be the case if it is only a sefek safeka (2 doubts) as she could have had relations before they were betrothed and she could have been raped. The Gemara brings two answers which narrow the case of Rabbi Elazar's statement either to a woman married to a kohen or one who was betrothed by her father before age 3. Why couldn't this law of Rabbi Elazar have been derived from a Mishna in Kiddushin 65a which is based on the same principle? What is the difference between the cases? Rabbi Elazar also said that a woman is only forbidden to her husband if there was a warning issued by the husband and the woman then was secluded with the man in question (like a Sotah) and like the Batsheva/David situation. What exactly does this mean and how does this correspond to Rabbi Elazar's previous statement which seems to contradict this? Why was Batsheva not forbidden to return to her husband? There are two possible answers. Abaye attempts to bring support for Rabbi Elazar's statement from our Mishna (Ketubot 2) but it is rejected by differentiating between the claim of petach patuach and a claim that there was no blood. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that if a man claims his wife had a "petach patuach" he can divorce her without having to give her the ketuba money, meaning she would get 100 zuz like a non-virgin, instead of 200 zuz. Rav Yosef questions: We can derive that law from a Mishna Ketubot 12a! The Gemara resolves his question by differentiating between the claim of petach patuach and a claim that there was no blood.

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