Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Latest Episodes:

Ketubot 87 - Shabbat October 1, 6 Tishrei Sep 30, 2022

Show notes

The Mishna discusses a case where a husband exempted his wife from swearing and vows. What type of swear is being referred to? Two opinions are brought. Rav Ashi's version is that one of the opinions was referring to a different case in the Mishna. There are four different opinions as to which languages exempt her from vows to him, which exempt her from vows to the heirs and which do not exempt her at all. In which cases does a woman need to swear to receive her ketuba money. Are these obligations to swear by Torah law or by rabbinic law?

Ketubot 86 - September 30, 5 Tishrei Sep 30, 2022

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hebrew Hadran zoom learners in honor of the 1,000th daf of this cycle! "In honor of Rabbanit Michelle who paves the way for us by making the Talmud and its concepts accessible, by learning with us day in-day out, with a woman's perspective, unphased by difficulties along the way, and always with a smile." Rav Nachman had a female relative whose mother had sold her ketuba to someone else. He advised her to forgo the ketuba payment so that her father would keep the money and she would eventually inherit it. He later regretted advising her as he thought it was not befitting a prominent person to give this kind of advice to his relatives. If one buys a promissory note, what can be done to protect oneself from the creditor forgoing the loan? If one does forgo the loan, does the creditor need to compensate the one who purchased the promissory note? That depends on whether one holds that one is liable for causing damage indirectly. If a man who dies leaves money and land, and there are creditors and a widow who gets her ketuba, the creditor takes the money and the widow takes the land. If there is only one piece of land and not enough for both, the creditor gets it, so as not to prevent people in general from loaning money. Women don't need the same kind of encouragement to get married as women usually prefer to be married, even if it means they may have difficulty getting their ketuba money. Rav Papa had heard that Rav Chama had said in the name of Rava that a creditor can insist that the debtor sell his land and pay him in cash. However, it was incorrectly inferred from a particular situation that happened which had unique circumstances. If one holds that paying back a loan is only a mitzva, how can the courts enforce payment? Rav Papa explained that the law is more severe for one who does not fulfill a positive mitzva than for one who transgresses a negative commandment. If one gave a get to his wife to be valid in thirty days and the get was in the side of the public domain (and not in the wife's domain) on the thirtieth day, is the get valid? Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rav Nachman on this issue. What cases does each side bring to support their opinion? If a man appoints his wife to work in his store or manage his possessions, he can make her take an oath regarding financial issues whenever he wants. According to Rabbi Eliezer, he can even make her swear about wool she spun or dough she prepared (regular household duties). In what situation is Rabbi Eliezer referring to - a case where she needs to swear about something else for him (gilgul shevu'a) or even if not? The Mishna discusses a case where a husband exempted his wife from oaths and vows. Different wordings are mentioned as each one includes other situations, such as not allowing his heirs to make her take an oath or not permitting him to make her heirs take an oath.

Ketubot 85 - September 29, 4 Tishrei Sep 29, 2022

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by Heather Stone in loving memory of her grandmother, Rose Shivak, Rachel Leah bat Aharon v'Golda on her 37th yahrzeit. "We use her brass candlesticks on Shabbat. May her neshama have an aliyah." More cases are brought that relate to cases where someone seized items that they believed they were owed. One has to do with a woman who had seized documents she had been watching. Since that case had to do with a woman, two other unrelated cases are brought where a disagreement about money was with a woman. The issues brought up in these other cases relate to trust/distrust of particular people, writing a document verifying something before it happens. Another series of cases are brought where one was watching an item and the person watching died without telling his heirs about the ownership of the item he was watching. The heirs wanted to prove it was theirs and the original owner wanted to prove it was his. In each case, they allowed the original owner to claim back their item. On what basis did they rule in his favor? How did they know that he was the actual owner? In a similar situation where different people come forward and claim rights to the item, who takes precedence for receiving the item - a relative, neighbor or Torah scholar? If one sold a promissory note to another and then forgave the debt, is that effective? If a wife brought a promissory note into a marriage, can she forgive the debt?

Ketubot 84 - Tzom Gedalia - September 28. 3 Tishrei Sep 28, 2022

Show notes

Study Guide Ketubot 84

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a man's right to inherit his wife's property is a Torah law and he cannot make a stipulation against a law in the Torah. It was said Rav held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel but not for the same reason. The Gemara brings four explanations for Rav - about what that Rashbag said did he agree and about what did he not agree? The first three suggestions are rejected. If someone dies and is owed money by someone or has an object being watched by someone, and there are a number of people who are owed money by the deceased, such as his widow (ketuba), a creditor and the heirs. Who has the first right to collect the money/object from the third party? If there are fruits detached from the ground and not on the property of one of the heirs, who has the first right to collect them? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon debate what is the law in these cases. Even though Rabbi Akiva doesn't allow the creditor or the widow to seize the money/object, that is limited to a case where the husband dies, but if they seized it when he was still alive, they can claim rights to it after his death. Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon - where do the possessions need to be in order to allow one of them to take it for themselves? A case was brought where they ruled like Rabbi Tarfon and when Reish Lakish heard this, he made them return the money to the heirs. Rabbi Yochanan disagreed with overturning the ruling. What was the basis for their disagreement? The Gemara first suggested that it is a debate regarding judges who rule incorrectly regarding something stated explicitly in a Mishna - do they need to undo the judgment and return the money or not? This suggestion is rejected and three other possible explanations are suggested. Rabbi Yochanan's relatives were owed money from a deceased man and they seized his cow. They went to Rabbi Yochanan for advice and he supported them. However, the case was brought before Reish Lakish and he ruled like Rabbi Akiva and made them return the cow to the heirs. Three other actual cases are brought - what was the ruling in each case?

Ketubot 83 - 2nd Day of Rosh Hashana - September 27, 2 Tishrei Sep 25, 2022

Show notes

The Mishna brings different statements a husband can make to relinquish his rights to her usufruct (nichsei melog) property. Which language exempts him from which rights? Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees regarding his right to inherit the property upon her death and holds that his right to inherit the property is a Torah law and he cannot make a stipulation against a law in the Torah. Why does it work for him to relinquish his rights by making a declaration, when in the case of a partnership, one who declares they want no share in the property does not relinquish one's rights as it is likely one said it out of anger or frustration and didn't actually mean it? How are the cases different? In the partnership case, what if they did a kinyan? Would it be effective? Why in the first case in the Mishna does the husband relinquish his rights only to the extent that she can sell the property? Why not the other rights instead or the other ones as well? Rabbi Yehuda states that to relinquish rights to the proceeds of the proceeds and the proceeds of those proceeds and so on, one needs to be very specific with the language. What aspect of the wording is the part that is critical – the words "proceeds or proceeds" or "forever?" If one only mentioned proceeds or proceeds and not proceeds alone, are the rights to the proceeds relinquished as well? Rav held like Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel but not for the same reason. What was Rav's reason?

Ketubot 82 - First Day of Rosh Hashana - September 26, 1 Tishrei Sep 25, 2022

Show notes

A case is brought in which a yabam committed to share his brother's inheritance with his other brother but as opposed to that case in Ketubot 81, he did a kinyan to show he wanted to make sure it was effective. However, they still ruled that it was not effective as a kinyan cannot be effective when the item isn't yours to sell. The property of his brother is not his, even once he married the yavama. Once a yabam marries his brother's wife, she is his wife for all intents and purposes. Why was this necessary to say – for what halacha? Why does he not need to give her a ketuba, but she uses the one she has from his brother (the first marriage)? Shimon ben Shatach instituted that all the husband's property be liened to the ketuba. What was before he instituted this and why was it a necessary takana?

Ketubot 81 - September 25, 29 Elul Sep 25, 2022

Show notes

This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the refuah shleima of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah. "It was a zechut to be able to listen to Rabbanit Michelle's live Daf zoom during the past three weeks while I was in Jerusalem."

Today's daf is sponsored by Jason, Erica, and Raquel in honor of their mother, Patty Belkin's birthday. "Wishing a happy birthday to our amazing mother. Mom you renew and inspire us every day."

Today's daf is sponsored for the shloshim of Howie Farkas, Shalom Tzvi ben Necha Dvora.

If a woman dies while she is waiting to do yibum, does her yabam (the brother of her husband who is supposed to marry her) responsible to bury her? Abaye tries to prove that he does, as he inherits her ketuba from her first husband, and if he doesn't bury her, then he should be required to pay her ketuba to her heirs. Rava argues against this claim as the inheritance is from the brother, not from her, and he has no responsibility to pay the ketuba as a ketuba is not meant to be collected in the lifetime of the husband (when the wife is not free to marry as she pleases) and therefore, since the yabam was still alive and the wife was supposed to be married to him, the ketuba was not up for collection. This is derived from the wording of the ketuba "And when you get married to someone else, you will take what it written to you." Abaye rejects Rava's retort by pointing out that only Beit Shamai expounds the wording of the ketuba and he also holds (derived from laws of the Sotah) that a document that was meant to be collected is as if it's collected and since her ketuba was meant to be collected upon her husband's death, it is if it is hers already and that's why the yabam would be obligated to pay it in this case. In order to explain the fulfillment of the line in the ketuba "And when you get married to someone else, you will take what it written to you," according to Abaye, Rav Ashi explains that the "someone else" can be the yabam himself. Rava responds to Abaye by bringing a braita showing that one cannot claim a ketuba from a yabam. The proof is based on the fact that the braita suggests certain suggestions for a yabam who wants to access his brother's possessions. From the fact that the braita doesn't suggest to set aside money for her to get her ketuba payment, it is clear that the wife is not able to receive her ketuba in his lifetime, as Rava suggested earlier. Before answering the question, the Gemara questions why Rava didn't raise the same question from our Mishna. That question is answered by suggesting that our Mishna is just "good advice" and not the law. Then Abaye answers Rava's question by giving a different explanation as to why he can't put aside the ketuba money, as that would cause the wife to think that the husband dislikes her and wants to divorce her - and that is not good for a marriage!! What rights does a yabam have to his brother's property in the event that he married his widow? Since the woman ketuba is liened to the property, he cannot sell it or promise it to anyone else. A case was brought in which he committed to his brother half the property, however, it was not his right to do that. However, even if he was not allowed to do it, it is valid anyway? There is a debate between Rav Yosef and Abaye about this. Rav Yosef tries to prove his position (that the sale is not valid) from a braita. Rav Manyumai, in support of Abaye says that the source he quoted is not a reliable source. Why?

Ketubot 80 - Shabbat September 24, 28 Elul Sep 23, 2022

Show notes

A husband has rights to the proceeds of his wife's usufruct property (nichsei melog). However, once the marriage ends, he has no rights at all. He can get back the money invested only if he was not able to benefit at all from the proceeds. How much does he need to benefit to have it considered that he did not benefit? In the event that he does get back his investment, he needs to swear about how much he spent. Rav Asi says only if the investment is equal to the gain. What did he mean by this? Abaye and Rava each have different explanations. If a husband brought in sharecroppers and then the marriage is dissolved, do they have the exact same rights as the husband or not? On what does it depend? Can a husband sell his rights to the proceeds? If land is inherited or gifted to a woman while she is waiting for yibum, both Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree that she can sell it. What happens to her possessions if she dies? On what does it depend? A yabam or husband cannot designate items for the woman for her ketuba collection to free up their land. Who is responsible to bury a woman waiting for yibum?

Ketubot 79 - September 23, 27 Elul Sep 23, 2022

Show notes

A woman gifted her property to her daughter in order that her husband not gain rights to the produce. When the marriage ended, she wanted her property back. Did the daughter need to return the property to the mother? Would the same hold true if she had gifted it to someone who wasn't her relative? On what does this depend? If the woman gets money or moveable items, she needs to sell them and buy land so that she retains the principle and the husband can have the produce from it. There is a debate regarding the status of produce attached to the ground at the time of the marriage - is it considered produce and given to the husband or is it considered the principle and they would need to evaluate its worth and purchase land with that amount. The Gemara raises issues with a number of different items - are they considered the principle or the produce? Who gets the double payment of a robber in a case where one robs the offspring of a melog animal? How does this correspond to a debate regarding the ownership of offspring of slaves and animals that are melog? There are proceeds that she can demand to get back when the marriage dissolves, as long as she pays for them, as they are important to her family. What happens with slaves that are old or trees/vines that are old? Do they need to be sold or can she claim that they are important to her family? Can the husband receive his investment expenditures back after the marriage if the profits didn't exceed the expenses? On what does it depend?

Ketubot 78 - September 22, 26 Elul Sep 22, 2022

Show notes

Today's daf is sponsored by Malka Abraham. " Thank you to Rabbanit Michelle and the entire Hadran community. Shana Tova!"

Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel both agree that if a woman received usufruct property before she was betrothed, she had the rights to sell it. But they disagree regarding the usufruct property of a woman that comes to her possession when she is betrothed. Can she sell it? And if the answer is no, if she does it anyway, is the sale a valid sale? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a discussion ensued between the rabbis and Rabban Gamliel debating whether the husband during the betrothal should or should not be able to prevent his wife from being able to sell her property. In the case where she receives usufruct property during the marriage, all agree that if she were to sell it, the sale is not valid. However, Rabban Gamliel holds that if she received the property during or before the betrothal and sold it after she was married, the sale is valid. Rabbi Chanina ben Akavia holds explained that a discussion ensued between the rabbis and Rabban Gamliel debating whether the husband during the marriage should have full rights to the property she inherited before or not. Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property the husband knew of (sale is not valid) and property he did not know of (sale is valid, even though ideally, she should not sell it). Why do Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree in the case before the betrothal but disagree after the betrothal? Was Rabbi Yehuda's description of the discussion between Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis referring to her ability to sell the property ab initio (Beit Shamai) or post facto (where both Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree)? To answer the question they quote the Tosefta Ketubot 8:1. In that source Rabbi Chanina is quoted there with a different version of the line of argumentation of Rabban Gamliel against the rabbis. Also there, he has a different opinion regarding the sale of property received before the wedding but sold during the marriage - he says it can be done ab initio. This contradicts our Mishna that says the sale is valid only after the fact, but ideally, she can't sell it. The contradiction is resolved by explaining that Rabbi Yehuda (the Mishna) and Rabbi Chanina (the Tosefta) disagree about what Rabban Gamliel held in this case. Rav and Shmuel have a third approach that in this case, the sale would be invalid. As this corresponds with no opinion we have seen thus far, how can they say that? Once she is married and inherits property, all agree that the sale is not valid. Is this the same as the takana they instituted in Usha? What did Rabbi Shimon mean by "property he knew about" and "property he did not know about"? Two explanations are brought.

Our TOPPODCAST Picks

Follow Us

Stay Connected

Daf Yomi for Women – Hadran

Related Podcasts

Links

Stay Connected