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With Trump, the Chaos Is the Point Mar 17, 2025

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U.S. President Donald Trump's foreign policy is chaotic. This may be by accident or else the result of stupidity. But it is also partially by design. In his ghost-written books about business, Trump describes the benefits of keeping the other side off guard with unexpected negotiating tactics. Similarly, beyond the world of business negotiations, Trump believes in the "madman theory" of foreign policy, in which being less predictable helps him gain concessions because other foreign leaders do not know how credibly to take his threats. In other words, the chaos is part of the policy. The world has seen this play out over the first eight weeks of Trump's new term in office. On tariffs, Trump threatened Canada and Mexico, with which he renegotiated a free trade deal during his first term, with a blanket 25 percent tariff. He has now backed down twice in two months on following through, once at the very last moment and once after having briefly imposed the import duties. The uncertainty this has created with regard to the North American business environment has led to lower consumer confidence, declining U.S. stock markets and concerns about a potential recession. Meanwhile, Trump has slowly ratcheted up tariffs on China, threatened the European Union with far-reaching trade restrictions and moved to increase tariffs on metal imports, resulting in counter-tariffs and popular anger targeting U.S. businesses all across the globe. Is Trump hoping to use these tariffs to raise revenue or to move manufacturing back into the United States? Or alternatively, does he hope the threat of tariffs will change other countries' behavior before he actually has to impose them? Nobody knows. Trump has claimed all three competing rationales at various points, adding to the maelstrom. The uncertainty is not restricted to trade. On the war in Ukraine, Trump opened direct talks with Moscow and directed the U.S. to vote against a United Nations resolution condemning Russia for the invasion. Later that week, Trump appeared to change course and invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the White House to sign a deal on Ukraine's critical minerals. That deal was canceled after the two leaders' disastrous Oval Office press conference, leading Trump to suspend military aid and intelligence-sharing that the U.S. has provided to Kyiv since the February 2022 invasion. He then had U.S. negotiators meet with their Ukrainian counterparts in Saudi Arabia, where they agreed on a potential ceasefire deal. As of this writing, military assistance and intelligence-sharing with Ukraine has resumed, and Trump is now floating the imposition of hard-hitting sanctions on Russia to get Moscow to go along with the ceasefire. Foreign leaders cannot just plan for facing Trump's worst possible policies. Rather they must be ready for policies that never stop changing and even reversing. On Venezuela policy, Trump's special envoy Richard Grenell traveled to Caracas in late January to meet with President Nicolas Maduro, who blatantly stole the country's presidential election last year and was the target of a "maximum pressure" campaign seeking regime change during Trump's first term. As a result of Grenell's visit, Maduro agreed to accept Venezuelan migrants deported back to the country from the U.S., in exchange for an implicit guarantee that the Trump administration would not reimpose oil sanctions that former President Joe Biden had stopped enforcing as part of his own diplomatic efforts to ensure that last year's election would be more free and fair. A few weeks later, however, Trump reversed course, revoking a special license that had allowed Chevron to drill in the country and giving the company just 30 days to wind down operations. Yet, late last week, Maduro began accepting deportation flights again, suggesting another quiet under-the-table deal had been reached. Then over the weekend, Trump deported Venezuelan citizens he accused of being members of Tren de Ara...

Facing a Moment of Crisis, Europe Rewrites Its Economic Playbook Mar 17, 2025

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During the first week of March, a major transformation in European economic policymaking took place within the short span of 48 hours. It started in Brussels, where European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an €800 billion "ReArm Europe" plan that would include the suspension of the European Union's fiscal rules for additional defense spending of up to 1.5 percent of GDP by member states as well as €150 billion in loans to supplement national defense budgets. The funding for the loans would be borrowed by the commission on capital markets and passed on to national governments, only the second time in the nearly 70-year history of the EU that collectivized debt, or Eurobonds, has been used to finance common objectives. The first time it happened, during the COVID-19 pandemic, was supposed to be a historic one-time exception rather than a precedent for future action. On its own, ReArm Europe would have signaled a major shift in thinking about the role of economic tools in advancing the EU's global interests. Yet a second striking contribution to this sea change in European fiscal policy came the following day in Berlin: Friedrich Merz - the leader of Germany's center-right Christian Democratic Union and likely future German chancellor after winning that country's elections in February - called for exempting all national defense spending above 1 percent of GDP from Berlin's constitutionally anchored "debt brake," which strictly limits government borrowing. To accompany this surge in defense outlays, Merz also proposed a €500 billion special fund to finance infrastructure investments. Both plans must still be approved by EU member states and Germany's parliament, respectively, with the latter looking likely to pass as soon as tomorrow. But if they are, they will usher in the emergence of a European defense industrial ecosystem and bring to an end a decade and a half of austerity and underinvestment in Germany in sectors ranging from high-speed internet and telecommunications to rail, road and energy networks. To be fair, this new approach in both Berlin and Brussels does not come out of nowhere. Momentum for reform had been building, albeit slowly, for some months now. Most recently, two major EU reports by former Italian prime ministers released last year were already pointing to the need for increased political courage to break policy taboos that were holding back everything from finance for tech start-ups to more efficient defense spending. The first from Enrico Letta called for further integrating the EU single market while the second from Mario Draghi, who also served as president of the European Central Bank, focused more broadly on EU competitiveness. If there is one lesson that Europe already seems to be learning from this new economic nationalism coming out of Washington, it is that it can no longer afford to anchor its own economic strategy in the institutional status quo. The backdrop to these calls was a combination of internal and external factors that were becoming hard to ignore. While the first "China Shock" immediately after the Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 primarily affected manufacturing industries in the United States, there is growing concern about a second shock that is already hitting German industries like automobiles, machine tools and renewable energy, where Chinese companies are now strong competitors and in some cases - like electric vehicles, or EVs - industry leaders. In response to Chinese-government subsidized overproduction of EVs, the EU has already imposed countervailing duties last year, and it has a number of new trade tools available to deter or respond to similar actions in the future. Beyond competition from China, the move to break Europe's dependence on affordable supplies of oil and gas from Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has raised costs for German industry, where energy-intensive sectors saw a decline in production of appr...

In Foreign Policy, Being Smart Is a Pretty High Bar Mar 14, 2025

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A couple decades ago, "smart power" was all the rage in U.S. foreign policy discussions, largely in response to the perceived foolishness of the administration of then-U.S. President George W. Bush for having become bogged down in two overseas wars. Advocates of smart power used those failed interventions to point to the limitations of hard-power instruments - like military and economic coercion - for achieving foreign policy goals. The idea of smart power seems especially relevant to foreign policy discussions in what I last week called "the era of great power stupidity." But what exactly is meant by a smart foreign policy? That's not an easy question to answer, and that tells us a lot about the making of foreign policy in general. One place to start would be to identify desirable outcomes and ask whether the policies chosen by decision-makers will achieve them. In the foreign policy realm, peace and prosperity seem like clearly desirable outcomes. So if a government's policies bring about peaceful relations with other countries and make its country wealthier, then they must be smart policies. Right? Not necessarily. Foreign policy choices don't often boil down to "choose war or peace" or "choose prosperity or poverty." Instead, in many instances the "right" foreign policy choice is not obvious. Moreover, peaceful outcomes are not always the result of the situation having been smartly handled. Flukes, even positive ones, happen. Sometimes a policymaker just gets lucky. For instance, while U.S. policymakers attributed the peaceful end of the Cold War to their own astute policies, the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely due to structural factors that were outside the control of even the most skilled policymaker. Rather than specifying desirable outcomes, another way to determine if a foreign policy is smart is to consider the idea of "rationality," which is often invoked by international relations scholars. A simple variant of this idea holds that rational governments do indeed pursue policies that maximize national wealth and citizen wellbeing. But as discussed above, that is a difficult criterion to apply. A slightly more sophisticated version holds that rational governments make use of all available information when setting policies. But of course, no government can possess all possible information, and all governments face limits in their ability to process the information that is available to them. Instead of using rationality to mean simply achieving "good outcomes" or "using all information" when making foreign policy decisions, we can alternatively use it to refer to whether decision-makers pursue a course of action consistent with whatever outcome they want to achieve. Regardless of what that outcome is, does the decision-maker act in a way that maximizes the chances of getting it? For example, take Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine. If his goal was to ensure that Kyiv is unable to exercise its full sovereignty and disrupt European security, for now, at least, he has achieved his objective. You can argue that his goal is unreasonable, immoral and even stupid, but that doesn't mean it's not rational. The fact that a foreign policy decision is rational alone doesn't help us determine if it is smart. Here it helps to think again of the circumstances that led to the emergence of "smart power" as a concept: the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Bush administration seemed determined to invade Iraq no matter what Saddam Hussein did, no matter what information was available and no matter what criticism its invasion drew internationally. That now clearly appears to have been foolish. But whether it was necessarily irrational depends on the goal. If the goal was simply to remove Saddam, it was both rational and successful, as the means achieved the desired end. Similarly, if it was to send a message to others that the U.S. cares so much about preventing nuclear proliferation that it will enga...

The African Union Is Giving Djibouti's Diplomatic Model a Try Mar 14, 2025

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Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Djibouti's long-serving foreign minister, took office as the African Union Commission's chair yesterday, four weeks after defeating Raila Odinga, Kenya's former prime minister and perennial opposition leader, in the race for the job. He succeeds Chad's Moussa Faki, who leaves after serving two four-year terms. Youssouf's victory represents a diplomatic victory for one of the continent's smallest but diplomatically agile states. But it is being seen more as a setback for Kenya's ambitious foreign policy under President William Ruto. Though recently at odds with Odinga due to their domestic political differences, Ruto took the campaign for the commission chair personally, mobilizing the entire Kenyan government in an attempt to secure the post for his former rival. Ruto likely preferred the thought of Odinga occupied with work at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, as it would bolster his own re-election prospects. If so, his calculations recall those of former South African President Jacob Zuma, who ensured that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma - his former wife and domestic political rival - was elected AU Commission chair in 2012. While the bloc's major donors - Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa - have seldom held the top position, there has been a clear pattern of success for candidates backed by respected or influential heads of state. Dlamini-Zuma hailed from the continent's economic powerhouse, for instance, and at the time the outgoing Faki first won the post in 2017, he benefited from the influential support of then-Chadian President Idriss Deby, who had just held the more prominent position of AU Chair. One might have expected the same dynamic to play in Odinga's favor. However, Ruto did not anticipate the level of opposition the prospect of a Kenyan at the head of the commission would generate. Early in the race, Youssouf received the endorsement of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which includes 27 African members, in part because Ruto's portrayal of Kenya as a staunch Western ally alienated states that were more sympathetic to Palestine. There were also doubts about whether Odinga would be fully autonomous in his approach to the role or instead serve as a proxy for Nairobi. For all the headwinds Odinga faced, Youssouf also certainly benefited from his long experience in Djibouti, which despite its small size has an active diplomatic profile as part of its efforts to secure external investment in support of its stability. Djibouti hosts the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, the regional bloc comprising eight member states that oversees trade and diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. Unlike other groups on the continent, IGAD is supported by several non-African partner nations, including France, the U.K. and the U.S., highlighting the kind of multilateral networks of support Djibouti has been cultivating. Djibouti's approach serves as a model for leveraging great power competition for its own advantage, without aligning itself with one side or the other. The degree to which Djibouti has successfully leveraged its strategic location on the Horn of Africa is a further sign of its active diplomacy. It is home to at least eight foreign military bases from diverse and even rival countries. These include Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. military's sole permanent base in Africa, as well as a French military and naval base that is among France's largest overseas contingents. But Djibouti also houses China's first overseas military base, as well as bases for Italy, Japan and South Korea, all of which were established to combat piracy and defend vital economic interests in the Red Sea. This sizable foreign presence has contributed to ensuring Djibouti's stability by incentivizing global powers to keep it insulated from other conflicts in the Horn of Africa. These bases have also resulted in significant economic investments in the country, allowing it to boast a considerably higher GDP...

France's Reset With New Caledonia Could Hit Some Roadblocks Mar 13, 2025

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France has restarted negotiations toward defining its future relationship with New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the southwest Pacific that is home to about 293,000 people. The move ends nine months of political limbo following violent protests, including roadblocks and riots, that erupted across the territory in May 2024. The protests came in reaction to French President Emmanuel Macron's plan to add more than 25,000 people to the territory's electoral roll to reflect inhabitants who have arrived, mainly from mainland France, over the past two decades. The rolls had been restricted as part of an agreement ending an armed independence movement in New Caledonia in 1988. The largely pro-independence indigenous islanders, who comprise about 41 percent of the population, feared the change would have diluted their influence in future elections. During his visit to New Caledonia to announce the reopening of negotiations in late February, French Overseas Minister Manuel Valls referred to the protests, saying, "There is a before and an after." He characterized negotiations as an "opportunity" and said it was his "responsibility … to find a way" toward an agreement that satisfies everyone. But that won't be easy. The islands of New Caledonia were first colonized by France in the mid-19th century. After World War II, they were designated an "overseas territory" with greater citizenship rights. But entrenched poverty and disenfranchisement in Kanak communities ignited an armed rebellion against French rule in the 1980s. Subsequent talks between the French government and island leaders resulted in the 1988 Matignon Accord and the 1998 Noumea Accord, which together outlined provisions for greater autonomy for New Caledonia, recognition of indigenous rights and investment in rural development, while guaranteeing that three referendums on independence would be held. An additional measure meant to prevent Kanaks from being politically marginalized restricted the electoral roll for the referendums as well as local elections to indigenous voters and inhabitants residing in the territory prior to 1998. The accords led to some progress in bridging the development gap, but significant disparities between the Kanak and non-Kanak populations remain. New Caledonia has one of the highest GDP per capita in the region, at $33,516 in 2022, compared to $5,405 in Fiji, for instance. Yet at 38 percent, the unemployment rate among Kanaks is more than three times the rate of 11 percent for the general New Caledonian population. And according to a recent study in North Province and Loyalty Islands, where communities are mainly indigenous, 62 percent and 77 percent of people respectively have lower than average living standards. Political frustrations also increased in 2021, after the third and final referendum under the Noumea Accords resulted in another defeat for the pro-independence movement. The first two votes, in 2018 and 2020, had shown a narrowing margin of victory for the pro-France majority, at 57 percent and 53 percent respectively. But Kanaks sought to postpone the final referendum, as it was scheduled to take place during the pandemic at a time when their cultural mourning rites would prevent many who had lost family members from going to the polls. When the vote went ahead as planned, they boycotted, resulting in a 98 percent victory for the pro-France position. As a result, the pro-independence movement has refused to accept the referendum's outcome, and many maintain calls for full self-determination. A major test will be when negotiations again broach the subject of electoral reforms, which French authorities have announced are back on the table. Two years later, Macron's proposed electoral reforms, on top of his refusal to countenance a rerun of the referendum, inflamed existing grievances, and when those reforms were passed by a parliamentary vote in 2024, large numbers of Kanak youth took to the streets. Yet while protesters ...

Hegseth's Patriarchal Vision Will Make the U.S. Military Less Effective Mar 13, 2025

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In a major and unprecedented shakeup to the U.S. military's leadership, U.S. President Donald Trump removed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Brown in late February, while announcing his intention to replace Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the head of the U.S. Navy. The personnel changes have been framed as part of an effort to eradicate "woke ideology" from the U.S. military. It is not a coincidence, then, that Brown is Black and Franchetti is the first woman ever to command a U.S. military service branch. But the Trump administration's attack on efforts to address historical injustices for minorities and women - known as Diversity, Equity and Inclusion, or DEI, initiatives - goes beyond purging people of color and high-ranking women officers from the chain of command. As part of this agenda, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has also proposed a radical departure from the U.S. military's approach over the past decade. Though a slow-moving institution that is far from progressive, the Defense Department has undertaken a series of reforms to be more representative of the country it serves. That has included things like adopting a plan to implement the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, updating its harassment policies and protecting its employees from discrimination. Since taking over as defense secretary in late January, Hegseth has articulated his commitment to "restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military, and reestablishing deterrence." Along those lines, he announced the creation of a Restoring America's Fighting Force Task Force charged with "overseeing the Department's efforts to abolish DEI offices and any vestiges of such offices that subvert meritocracy, perpetuate unconstitutional discrimination, and promote radical ideologies related to systemic racism and gender fluidity." This task force and other envisaged reforms are all aimed at eradicating "wokeness" from the U.S. military and Defense Department. This agenda reflects Hegseth's retrograde and patriarchal vision of the U.S. military. But his justifications for all of these measures are often invented or based on false premises. These misrepresentations are aimed at portraying the U.S. military as hamstrung by politically correct overreach. In both his public comments and his highly critical book about the U.S. military, Hegseth has castigated "woke" generals and policies that, he argues, undermine the military's effectiveness. For example, during his Senate confirmation hearings in January, Hegseth cited personal interviews conducted while writing his book to assert that commanders are expected to "meet quotas" in order to increase the number of women in the ranks. That practice, he added, was one of many "direct, indirect, overt and subtle" ways that the U.S. military has changed its standards to accommodate women recruits. Hegseth had previously asserted that women should not be present in ground combat operations, stating in November, "It hasn't made us more effective. Hasn't made us more lethal. Has made fighting more complicated." Hegseth's statements make it seem as if women have been coddled by the military in order to goose their numbers, to the detriment of readiness. Hegseth's remarks play well to Trump's base, but they aren't just for public consumption. They have real implications for the well-being of U.S. servicewomen, as well as for women in countries where the U.S. military is active. On both counts, however, he is demonstrably wrong. As Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand pointed out during his confirmation hearing, there are no quotas for women in the infantry. That is a politically expedient lie for Hegseth and his allies. With regard to standards, for instance, retired Army Lt. Col. Ellen Haring told NPR, "Not only have standards not been lowered, but when they first decided that … they were going to open combat jobs to women, the services were given three years to actually set standards because up until that point in time, standards had...

Romania's Presidential Election Drama Has a New Twist Mar 12, 2025

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In a scenario that evokes memories of the period immediately following the end of the Cold War, a Central European nation is locked in a battle to fend off Russian influence while safeguarding its democracy. But this time around, there is a critical twist: As Romania strives to maintain the integrity of its representative government, one of the states seemingly working against it is the United States. This weekend, Romania's election authority, the Central Electoral Bureau, disqualified far-right populist candidate Calin Georgescu from participating in May's rerun of the presidential election, ruling that he had "violated the fundamental obligation to defend democracy." Georgescu won the first round of the election in November, but Romania's Constitutional Court later annulled the results after intelligence reports alleged that he had benefited from an aggressive Russian-sponsored propaganda campaign on the social media platform TikTok. Almost immediately after Sunday's announcement, Georgescu appealed the election authority's decision, calling it a "direct blow to the heart of democracy around the world." His supporters took to the streets of Bucharest in protest, attempting to storm the election authority's headquarters. The demonstration quickly descended into violence, leaving four police officers hospitalized. In just a few months, Georgescu has gone from being a political outsider unknown outside of Romania to being a key figurehead of the global far-right populist movement. His rise has been fueled by savvy online engagement: He has amassed over 700,000 followers on TikTok and 400,000 on Facebook since starting his campaign, allowing him to harness nationalist sentiment, exploit the legacy of Romania's fascist and antisemitic past, and use the ongoing war in Ukraine to push a protectionist agenda. Georgescu has accused the European Union and NATO of conspiring to block his path to office and has openly praised Romania's historical fascist leaders. His rhetoric has resonated with Romanians who are disillusioned with the country's political elite, while his social media presence has strengthened his appeal among younger voters. In the aftermath of his disqualification, some of Europe's leading far-right political figures quickly rallied behind Georgescu. Matteo Salvini, Italy's deputy prime minister and leader of the far-right Lega party, condemned the election authority's decision as a "soviet-style EU coup." But Georgescu's most vocal support has come from the United States. In the aftermath of Georgescu's disqualification, some of Europe's leading far-right political figures quickly rallied behind him. But his most vocal support has come from the United States. Among his key defenders is Elon Musk, the billionaire owner of the social media platform X, formerly Twitter, and a senior adviser to U.S. President Donald Trump. Taking to X, Musk questioned how a judge could "end democracy in Romania" following the election authority's decision. This was not the first time Musk intervened on Georgescu's behalf. In late February, Romanian prosecutors launched a criminal investigation into Georgescu, charging him with six offences, including campaign finance violations, support for fascist organizations - illegal in Romania - and fraudulent use of digital technologies. In response, Musk falsely claimed that "the person who won the most votes in the Romanian presidential election" had been arrested, misleading his millions of followers. U.S. Vice President JD Vance also took a hardline stance, telling the Republican party faithful at the Conservative Political Action Conference in February that Romania no longer shared the United States' values. "You don't have shared values if you cancel elections because you don't like the result," he declared, accusing the Romanian government of silencing its people. Vance staked out a similar position in early February at the Munich Security Conference, where he shocked those in attendance...

MBS' Domestic Agenda Is Also Driving Saudi Arabia's Diplomatic Blitz Mar 12, 2025

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Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a diplomatic blitz. From hosting yesterday's talks between Washington and Kyiv over the war in Ukraine to positioning the kingdom as central to the "day after" plans for postwar Gaza and offering to help deconflict tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Riyadh appears to be everywhere. This "peace push" is tethered to the political agenda of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS - namely, his effort to rehabilitate his own image while positioning the kingdom at the forefront of Middle East geopolitics and casting Saudi Arabia as a constructive player on the international stage. At its core, this international push by Saudi Arabia is intimately linked to internal politics inside the kingdom, particularly MBS' efforts to preserve and expand his own power. MBS is spearheading a new hypernationalist project designed to restructure the country's domestic "ruling bargain" and transform Riyadh's global image. Almost every Saudi policy at home and abroad is a byproduct of this new project as well as MBS' ultimate imperatives of regime preservation and power projection. Critical to this effort is the restructuring of the Saudi economy toward a sustainable footing in anticipation of a future of declining oil revenues. MBS' ambitious economic plan, Vision 2030, is the economic foundation of his new nationalist project, aimed at establishing Saudi Arabia as the major economic hub of the Middle East and a lucrative market for international capital. For MBS, the success of this nationalist project is existential. It is the new autocratic foundation on which the crown prince - the kingdom's de facto ruler who has already amassed more power than any individual in the history of the Saudi state - hopes to base his authority. But the success of this domestic vision depends on more than just absolute control at home. It is intertwined with regional and international objectives, making it also the driver of Saudi foreign policy. At the regional level, MBS needs calm to focus on his domestic agenda. This is why he has shifted from an aggressive foreign policy, epitomized by the Saudi intervention in Yemen in 2015, toward an emphasis on de-escalation beginning roughly in 2020. In particular, Saudi Arabia has focused heavily on deconfliction with Iran, its chief regional adversary with which it had severed relations in 2016. In 2023, after a period of diplomatic engagement, Riyadh and Tehran reestablished formal relations. The two sides have continued to pursue their delicate détente since then. This should not be interpreted as a cessation of long-standing strategic competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but rather as opportunistic maneuvering by both parties, given the changing regional and international contexts as well as both sides' increased concern with pressing domestic issues. The success of Mohammed bin Salman's domestic vision is intertwined with regional and international objectives, making it also the driver of Saudi foreign policy. Recently, concern in Riyadh over the prospects of a region-wide conflict have grown considerably in the wake of the war in Gaza and rising tensions between Israel, Iran and the United States. Compounding these heightened tensions are concerns over Iran's nuclear program, with Tehran now closer to being able to manufacture a nuclear weapon than any point since its uranium enrichment program was discovered in the early 2000s. Fearful that a war between Israel, Iran and the U.S. would consume and destabilize the entire region, Riyadh is offering to mediate between Tehran and Washington, hoping that it can prevent such an outcome. MBS is also keen on asserting Saudi Arabia's central role in shaping the Middle East's geostrategic landscape. This has been particularly apparent over the past year and a half, after the war in Gaza brought the Israel-Palestine conflict back to the forefront of regional geopolitics. Before Hamas' attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023...

'Dual Use' Can't Justify Russia's Attacks on Ukraine's Energy Grid Mar 11, 2025

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During the night of March 7, Russian forces carried out a concerted bombing campaign against Ukraine's energy facilities. The acts were widely condemned by the international community, including U.S. President Donald Trump, who wrote on social media that he was "strongly considering large scale sanctions" based on the attack and urged both parties to the negotiating table. At the same time, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Ukraine's energy infrastructure is a legitimate target because it is "linked with Ukraine's military industrial complex and weapons production." Trump was right to call out Russia's attack and threaten sanctions, for several reasons. First, in diplomatic terms it created at least a slight veneer of even-handedness after his dressing down of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House last week, as well as his seeming alignment with Russian President Vladimir Putin in what is clearly a war of aggression in which Putin has committed the majority of war crimes. But second, international law demands calling out this particular conduct as worthy of reproach, because contrary to what Peskov claimed, a country's energy infrastructure does not become a legitimate military target just because it supports both civilian and military uses. International humanitarian law draws a clear distinction between civilian objects such as schools and hospitals, and military objectives that are meant to make an "effective contribution to military action." While the law is ambiguous in situations where a civilian object is being used in such a way as to make a direct military contribution to war, even then targeting of that object is subject to the principle of proportionality, by which harm to civilians must be weighed against military necessity. Moreover, targeting civilian objects for the purpose of terrorizing civilians is a war crime. While an argument could be made that attacks on energy infrastructure that result in power outages for a limited period of time are not comparable to collateral damage from kinetic attacks, this is clearly not the case during winter, when civilians are heavily dependent on that infrastructure for indoor heating. Moreover, such arguments generally don't take into account the knock-on effects of such strikes for the civilian population, such as the health implications of household refrigerators, municipal water sanitation systems and hospital medical equipment all losing access to power. In short, even if the language of humanitarian law makes occasional exceptions for military necessity that clearly outweighs the harm to civilians, such cases are rare. And those loopholes do not easily cover the kind of massive attacks on civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia, which would appear to instead be calculated to "spread terror among the civilian population." These rules were developed after World War II, when entire cities were burned to the ground based on the logic that they contained factories used to build munitions, thereby making them and all the civilians in them a military target. But as the postwar push to expand international humanitarian law recognized, if the fact that a civilian mobilization or infrastructure also supports a war effort transforms it into a target, the military-civilian distinction itself begins to break down. Rather, the International Committee of the Red Cross has postulated a more specific standard on the definition of "direct participation in hostilities" as applied to civilians, in which the burden of proof is on belligerents to prove beyond a doubt that any such instance meets that standard. When in doubt, under Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention, an object shall be assumed to be of a civilian character. The argument that "dual use" infrastructure constitutes a legitimate military target is often used as justification by states claiming the legal right to engage in such attacks. It's worth underscoring...

U.S. Aid Is Crucial to Defending Democracy in Latin America Mar 03, 2025

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"Why are there never coup attempts inside the United States?" an old joke among left-wing activists in Latin America goes. "Because there is no U.S. embassy there." It's a reference to U.S. actions during the Cold War to undermine democratically elected governments across the region, including Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in the 1950s and Chilean President Salvador Allende in the 1970s. Under the auspices of fighting communism, Washington backed right-wing military coups and dictatorships throughout the hemisphere. As late as the 1980s, Jeanne Kirkpatrick - a foreign policy adviser to then-President Ronald Reagan who later served as his ambassador to the United Nations - issued a defense of authoritarian regimes that she believed helped to protect their populations from even worse revolutionary ideologies. But the joke was outdated even before January 2021, when then-U.S. President Donald Trump tried to overturn the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. In fact, over recent decades, the view of the United States as a defender of authoritarianism, at least in Latin America, has become an anachronism. Eventually, Washington lent support to the Concertacion coalition that defeated then-dictator Augusto Pinochet at the polls and led to the reestablishment of democracy in Chile in 1990. And in 2001, the U.S. backed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which clearly states in its opening that "[t]he peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it," while promising to remove nondemocratic governments from various hemispheric institutions. More recently, perhaps the top three achievements of former President Joe Biden's policies in Latin America all came in defense of democracy. His administration supported a democratic transition in Honduras in 2021 after Xiomara Castro defeated the ruling National Party's candidate in the country's presidential election that year. Washington then had outgoing President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who had stolen Honduras' 2017 presidential election, extradited on drug-trafficking charges so he could no longer interfere in domestic politics. A year later, Biden's team pressured Brazil's military leadership to stay clear of a coup attempt led by outgoing President Jair Bolsonaro after Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva won that country's presidential election in 2022. And the Biden team safeguarded an incredibly difficult presidential transition in Guatemala at the end of 2023 to ensure that President Bernardo Arevalo took office, overcoming the efforts of that country's corrupt elites to keep him from power. The U.S. record is far from perfect, and this column will no doubt provoke responses detailing the many wrongs Washington has committed in the region in recent years. But the U.S. really did shift toward a more pro-democracy stance in Latin America since the end of the Cold War. As part of that shift, the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, funded numerous local NGOs that promoted human rights and anti-corruption efforts. The National Endowment for Democracy - a government-funded semi-autonomous organization - backed training for political parties and civil society that contributed to grassroots civic activism at the heart of democratic values, winning NED the hatred of authoritarian leaders who viewed those efforts as a violation of their sovereignty. Various other U.S. agencies also provide grants for research and think tank work that is critical to policy debates in the region. All those efforts go beyond the specific episodes, such as those by the Biden administration, when the U.S. government backed a democratic movement at a critical moment. They were cooked into U.S. policy in nearly every country. That is not to say that U.S. support is the only thing sustaining democracy in Latin America. Democracy can't be imposed from abroad. The biggest efforts come from the people of Latin America, who work to impr...

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