Stay ConnectedWDF examines how wars broke out, how they were concluded, and their consequences. Expect juicy diplomacy, sneaky intrigue, fascinating characters, and incredible drama. By Dr Zack Twamley, qualified history nerd.
Current Series: The July Crisis
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An eventful fortnight indeed, as the delegates crowd around the table to read the latest on the German peace treaty, the dominions offer their views, the Germans seem to be scheming, and the Russians remain mysterious. Still, despite the setbacks and mistrust, the lies and disappointments, one could be forgiven for wondering - is this peace at last?
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75 Years ago, our ancestors made a brave step towards the liberation of France from the most terrible of tyranny. Now, with the considerable help of Dr Peter Caddick-Adams, historian, journalist, author, reservist and more, I delve into this event, using the recently released book Sand and Steel - a New History of D-Day by the author as my guide. We get into so much detail here, and a huge thanksss must go out to Peter for being so swell and coming onto the show - I had a ball talking with him!
To get Peter's book click on the link here OR enter our competition by sharing the relevant status on Twitter or Facebook...or both! The winner will get a signed copy of Peter's whopper book sent directly to their door, so don't delay! Competition ends Monday 10th June at 12 noon GMT. Thanksss!
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The incredible story of the Paris Peace Conference addresses that all important question of: should they not really have been finished this madness by now?! The Counterproposals had by now been absorbed, and from the beginning it was clear that they were bound to cause divisions. Not mere technicians or delegates, but full blown PRIME MINISTERS were determined to lead these divisions. Lloyd George, after supporting just as many difficult clauses as his peers, was now convinced, after having met with his peers in the British Empire delegation, that the Treaty as it stood was unacceptable. If the Treaty was not changed, the PM claimed, then he would have to be allowed return to Parliament back in London, in a tactic not dissimilar to Vittorio Orlando, to justify it. In the PM's sights were arguably the most sensitive clauses which had been agreed, and he potentially had enemies in each.
The Rhineland occupation, Clemenceau's proudest achievement perhaps, was under threat from the PM's revisionist gaze. Britons, LG claimed, would never accept the occupation. Few of his delegates would even consider it, and they would not approve of British soldiers marching into Germany to enforce the peace based on this clause. Clemenceau was apoplectic, and we know this from the conversations he shortly shared with his counterparts, but the minutes of the Council of Four remained sickly polite and familiar, as though the PM wasn't angling to tear up months of work which he had played no small role in creating.
But that wasn't all - Upper Silesia would need a plebiscite, Germany must be invited into the League sooner, or perhaps instantly, and reparations must be fixed to a certain figure. These concessions, claimed Lloyd George, were the only way to fuse peace to the international order, and guarantee peace between France and Germany. That said, Lloyd George scoffed at the idea that war would return to Europe, or that Germany would pose a threat to France, for at least another 30 or 50 years. Certainly, the PM claimed, Germany and France would not be at each other's throats again in a mere 15 years, so what was Clemenceau so worried about? In fact the PM was correct, the Nazis annexed the Rhineland in 16, not 15 years, but he was bound to be wrong about virtually everything else. Whether he owned these errors or not, they threatened to undo everything which the big three had worked towards since they had first landed in Paris...
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After weeks of waiting, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau finally broke radio silence on 29th May 1919, when he communicated the full extent of Germany's answer to the draft peace treaty from 7th May. And oh boy, was this communique full in its extent. Consisting of more than 100 pages, what came to be known as the German 'counterproposals' was half a document half as large as the peace treaty itself, and it packed quite a punch. Initially, it was necessary to translate the document to discover its ramifications, so it wasn't until 31st May that true consideration of it was possible for the non-German speakers. This delayed matters, and facilitated speculation among the big three over what the Germans could be after. Before long, the document would be unwrapped - the Germans, in a very roundabout way, were saying Nein.
In this episode, we examine a forgotten answer to that forgotten question - that being, what did the Germans have to say about the allied draft peace treaty? So often we are presented with the simple narrative of A-B, where the treaty is presented on 7th May, and approved on 28th June. Here, we are reminded that matters were rarely if ever so simple. The Germans had been waiting on the sidelines, following the peace conference as best as they could. Now utterly depressed and disillusioned by what they had been given, the Germans started writing immediately after 7th May, and came to discover that they had an awful lot to get off their chests. The allies, technically, did not have to listen to their proposals, yet in the atmosphere of emotional post-war morality politics, the big three discovered that not only would they have to listen to these proposals, they would also have to absorb them, consider them, and mount a rely. This was a process which, it was feared, the vaunted unity of the big three up to this point might not survive...
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The Versailles Anniversary Project is possible because of your support and interest - make sure to spread the word, engage with the debate, and look at the different ways you can help this project succeed!
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My agora friends and others are going to be in New York for a special conference on 29th June - meet Mike Duncan, Kevin Stroud, David Crowther and more! Search Intelligent Speech Conference now! Use the code WDF to get 5% off your ticket!
The last few days of May 1919 were a weird time in the allied camp. Despite the fact that it was absolutely expected that Germany was about to send 'elaborate' counterproposals, which meant that Germany, therefore, would not be signalling its complete acceptance of the Peace Treaty, the big three refrained from authorising Marshal Foch to begin his preparations for war. These preparations might have turned up the heat on Germany, and demonstrated to Chancellor Scheidemann's government that the allies were serious indeed about their demand for unconditional acceptance being respected. This was a strange contradiction in the allied policy - did they not want the Germans to know they meant business? It was a strange contradiction, but it was far from the only one.
Despite the need to prepare for the arrival of these anticipated counterproposals, and the necessity in maintaining allied unity at all times, the big three decided that the time was now right to gang up on Italy like never before. In a series of scathing verbal attacks on the Italian premier who was present, Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George in their turn all claimed that Orlando had had no policy, that he had made no clear requests, that much had changed since 1915, that he was jeopardising the Entente, and a whole range of other ideas. We will measure the fairness of these jibes in the episode, but they typically followed by the claim that they meant Italy to feel no disrespect, and that they looked forward to solving these issues in the future.
Insincere though the last minute trudgings through the Italian issues, the Austrian peace and the Russian situation might appear to us here, the big three seemed to have little else to do, while they waited with baited breath to see what the Germans would say about their peace treaty. Remember - these were supposed to be the victorious allies. Notwithstanding Germany's right to make suggestions, according to the terms of the peace, the spectre of Germany making the allies wait in line for their verdict was a bizarre one. Perhaps, the big three genuinely believed that the best course was to give diplomacy another chance, and that was why they made Foch delay his plans, which might have made a difference to the German reply. Either way, the moments which filled the diaries of the big three in the final days of May were about to build towards something incredible, and the grim waiting process seemed like the very worst part of this process.
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The Versailles Anniversary Project is possible because of your support and interest - make sure to spread the word, engage with the debate, and look at the different ways you can help this project succeed!
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There was nothing simple about the allied policy towards Russia. The adventures of William C. Bullitt and a failed conference at Prinkipo were all the allies had to show for their attempts to fix Russia, which meant ridding the world of the Bolsheviks. Of course, the allies also had considerable forces of their own in the different Russian fronts, in the Northern theatre based at Archangel, in the South near the Crimea and in Siberia at Omsk. This latter theatre contained the base of one Admiral Alexander Kolchak, and on 26th May 1919, the finishing touches had finally been put on a document of incredible significance. The allies, it seemed, were willing to recognise Kolchak's government as THE government of Russia!
This was nothing less than a declaration of war on the Bolsheviks, but if you asked Lenin, he would have said without much of an effort, that the allies were at war with the Bolsheviks anyway. The impetus behind making their pro-Kolchak policy official was the successive military triumphs of his regime. The problem was, in spite of what the big three might have thought, these triumphs were very impressive, but they had been impressive a month ago. In the space of that month, while the German treaty was handed over, the Italians were peeved and the Greeks landed, a great deal had changed. This period of change was not felt in Paris though, because the big three were steadily informed of the situation. Who supplied their information? The very faction they wished to see come out on top, Admiral Kolchak.
This produced a tragic situation whereby allied help, such as it was, came far too late to make any difference. The allied recognition of Kolchak, while it was effective in bolstering the morale of him and his men, did not have much of a material impact. The allies, in other words, had moved too slowly, and not done enough, to make any difference. This was, in many respects, the story of the big three's life in the Peace Conference. In addition to their recognition of Kolchak though, the allies forwarded EIGHT demands (not seven as I say here, before going on to list eight...oops!) which Kolchak would have to adhere to if his regime was to enjoy allied support. Kolchak agreed with the terms - what did he have to lose after all, when his forces were on the backfoot, and allied help was so desperately needed? In the end, the allies treated the Russian front the same as they treated the Turkish, Eastern European, African, Middle Eastern and indeed the German front - they acted too slowly, with inadequate information, and made a giant mess in the process. We live with the consequences of their mess today, so why not have a listen and see just how much stuff you can blame the big three for today?!
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The Versailles Anniversary Project is possible because of your support and interest - make sure to spread the word, engage with the debate, and look at the different ways you can help this project succeed!
->Visit the homeland for this new project!
->Become a delegate and play the Delegation Game for just $6 a month!
->Support the podcast financially and access ad free episodes with transcripts from... Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
My agora friends and others are going to be in New York for a special conference on 29th June - meet Mike Duncan, Kevin Stroud, David Crowther and more! Search Intelligent Speech Conference now! Use the code WDF to get 5% off your ticket!
By the last week of May 1919, the focus in the allied camp had switched from Italy to Germany...for the most part. It was known that the Germans would have to send a reply to the allied peace treaty soon - they had just 15 days from the moment it was handed to them to give an answer. Thus, while in the interim the big three mostly did their own thing, by the tailend of that deadline, they were beginning to seriously worry about what the Germans would actually say. What they could agree on, at least, was that this was THE peace treaty, and like it or not, Germany would have to sign. At least, that was how it seemed.
It is up to me to explain then, if this resolute insistence on accepting the terms of the treaty was so dominant, why were the Germans allowed to procrastinate, and why were they even allowed to communicate counterproposals to the allies, making their own suggestions, and continuing their loud protest at the terms already agreed to. It was quite a sight – after four months of negotiation, the treaty reached by the allies was meant to be final. Yet, within two weeks of handing that treaty to the Germans, it was evident that they were not willing to accept it in its full form. What was more, as we will learn, some of the allies, and even some of the big three, had begun to get cold feet as to the nature of some of the terms.
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The Versailles Anniversary Project is possible because of your support and interest - make sure to spread the word, engage with the debate, and look at the different ways you can help this project succeed!
->Visit the homeland for this new project!
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In episode 16 of the game, we visit four distinct scenes, where a great deal of drama goes down. Lloyd George has some words for the British Empire Delegation; four allied figures meet to try and address their differences; the Austro-German party urge action in the creation of some peace treaty which will actually end the war, and in the American delegation, the fallout from Woodrow Wilson's stroke continues to paralyse policy, as Poles and Frenchmen look on. It's an episode packed with developments, subtle hints and the consequences of previous decisions, so I hope you enjoy it! See you next time on Saturday 8th June!
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My agora friends and others are going to be in New York for a special conference on 29th June - meet Mike Duncan, Kevin Stroud, David Crowther and more! Search Intelligent Speech Conference now! Use the code WDF to get 5% off your ticket!
The aftermath of the Greek landing was one thing, but there was no ignoring the reception which the peace treaty received in Germany either. The Big Three, sometimes joined by Italy, worked through their to-do list between 16-19 May - by the way yes, apologies for this episode being rather late... But it's no later than the British, American and French reaction to the news of German problems with their treaty. You'll be unsurprised to learn, the Germans had problems with this draft that reached to the very core of its 440 articles, and they were loud in their expressions of disgust. They were not the only ones. Despite the grave criticisms which were leveled against the Treaty, Wilson stood firmly against them. He was, he believed, fighting the good fight, even if the end result was not perfect.
The League would make things right in the world, and that was what mattered now, not the hurt feelings of the Irish, the Chinese, or especially the Italians. This latter party were the most prolific in their disappointments by far - in fact, at one point on a sunny day in mid-May, the Italians faced the full wrath of its three weary allies, who just wanted the Italians to roll over. As Vittorio Orlando knew full well though, this was not an option. He would have to hold on, to Fiume, or the Treaty of London, or whatever he could, with results that tore at the very fabric of the allied accord, but which also make for positively fascinating listening. So why not pull a chair up, make sure Italy isn't sitting on it first, and see how it was that the big four became the big three and one!
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The Versailles Anniversary Project is possible because of your support and interest - make sure to spread the word, engage with the debate, and look at the different ways you can help this project succeed!
->Visit the homeland for this new project!
->Become a delegate and play the Delegation Game for just $6 a month!
->Support the podcast financially and access ad free episodes with transcripts from just $2 a month!
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My agora friends and others are going to be in New York for a special conference on 29th June - meet Mike Duncan, Kevin Stroud, David Crowther and more! Search Intelligent Speech Conference now! Use the code WDF to get 5% off your ticket!
It's high time we considered the American angle once again. After several weeks of work, one would imagine that the American delegation and the American President would have their kinks all worked out by this stage, right? Unfortunately not. In fact, Woodrow Wilson faced several serious conflicts of interest and differences of opinion not only within the American delegation and the body politic back home, but also, so it seemed sometimes, from his old self. Wilson had undoubtedly been forced to compromise on several of his key ideals, and while he imagined that the League of Nations would justify these sacrifices for the sake of long term gains, there were those in his confidence that couldn't imagine allowing the President to get away with it.
Whether it was his inconsistency in treating the Italians over Fiume and the Japanese over Shantung, his inability to clarify what self-determination actually meant, or his consistent faux pas with each of the allied leaders, Wilson seemed a far cry from his triumphant, visionary self by mid-May 1919. In this episode, we'll get to grips with how his contemporaries and historians since weighed in on the question of Wilson's principles, from those he was willing to cling to relentlessly, and those which he seemed to throw aside as the German peace treaty loomed into view. If you want to be clued in on the latest developments in the American side, then this installment of our project is for you!
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The Versailles Anniversary Project is possible because of your support and interest - make sure to spread the word, engage with the debate, and look at the different ways you can help this project succeed!
->Visit the homeland for this new project!
->Become a delegate and play the Delegation Game for just $6 a month!
->Support the podcast financially and access ad free episodes with transcripts from just $2 a month!
Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
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