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    Volts

    Volts is a podcast about leaving fossil fuels behind. I’ve been reporting on and explaining clean-energy topics for almost 20 years, and I love talking to politicians, analysts, innovators, and activists about the latest progress in the world’s most important fight. (Volts is entirely subscriber-supported. Sign up!)

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    Copyright: © David Roberts

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    Latest Episodes:
    Volts podcast: Dan Pfeiffer on the Democratic Party's megaphone problem Jun 17, 2022
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    In this episode, political communications expert Dan Pfeiffer speaks to the wide influence of right-wing media, why Democrats keep losing messaging battles, and what they need to do about it.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsYou probably know Dan Pfeiffer best as one of the hosts of the wildly successful Pod Save America podcast, part of the growing Crooked Media empire of which he is a co-founder. Or perhaps you know him as the author of the Message Box newsletter, where he dispenses communications advice to left-leaning subscribers. But before he was a new media mogul, Pfeiffer was in the thick of politics as a top aide on Obama’s campaign and then in Obama’s White House, where he ran communications and strategy.Pfeiffer has seen the media war between the parties play out, and he has seen Democrats lose messaging battles again and again. He has first-hand experience of the growing power of the right-wing media machine to spread disinformation, set the agenda for the rest of the media, and deflect accountability.Now he has written a book on the subject: Battling the Big Lie is an extended examination of the growing imbalance between the conservative movement’s massive media megaphone … and the left’s lack of one. Listeners know that I have been obsessed with this imbalance for as long as I’ve been following politics, so I was super geeked to talk with Pfeiffer about how right-wing media grew, how it successfully intimidated both mainstream media and social media companies, and how Democrats can begin building a comparable megaphone of their own, before it’s too late.Dan Pfeiffer. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Dan PfeifferThanks for having me.David RobertsCongratulations on writing a book under extreme time pressure. An extremely stressful time to be alive. I hope the psychological damage has been minimal.Dan PfeifferI think we'll only know how much damage there was many years from now, so the full cost of this endeavor will not be known.David RobertsWell, I want to talk about the current situation, but just briefly at the beginning, let's look a little bit at history. So I wonder what you think are sort of the kind of the landmarks on the road to the current situation. So for instance, tell us a little bit about when the press, the mainstream press as the enemy, became a popular thing on the right. That's sort of the first and then the second is like, what are the sort of markers of the growth of their own media apparatus? How did we get here?Dan PfeifferSure, there had been a bubbling sentiment of conservative anti-press sentiment dating back to the New Deal and FDR and Democrats sort of dominating the conversation. But it became a political strategy, primarily in Barry Goldwater's 1964 campaign. He hammered the press, he hammered Eastern elites. He handed out pins to the press on the press planes, calling them members of the Eastern establishment. The press as enemy became an explanation to the right, themselves and their voters why they kept losing elections. It wasn't that their policies were bad. It wasn't that they were unpopular. It wasn't that their rhetoric wasn't good.It was that the press hated them. Nixon took that into hyperdrive because of his own set of insecurities and grievances. And even before Watergate, like in the course of the Nixon administration, there was real thoughts on how you go about destroying the press. Richard Nixon had his enemies list, which included members of the press. He also explored with Roger Ailes and some of his other aides very specific forerunners, the Fox News. In terms of state sponsored propaganda, there was an effort where they explored creating local news pieces created by the White House that would then be under a sort of undercover that would be sent to local news stations.There was an effort to fund a pro-Vietnam War documentary to push back against the Pentagon Papers and other efforts out there. And then when the press, in the common "tell all the President's men" telling of what happened, took down Nixon, that became sort of the cause celeb in the right. "The press is out to get us. The press is out to get us." Reagan took that in the 80s. Getting rid of the Fairness Doctrine as a part of it was part of his campaign.David RobertsOne question about that, about the Fairness Doctrine thing, I'm curious what sort of the public versus private justifications for that were, like, did Reagan and his people consciously do that in order to bolster right wing voices or was there some sincere ideological motivation back there somewhere?Dan PfeifferI think there was probably some sincere ideological motivation, but the primary driving factor, as I understand the history, was the fact that the Fairness Doctrine was putting downward pressure on efforts to have an emerging right wing radio ecosystem. And that in order to have that, every time they kept trying to move towards local stations, kept trying to move towards sort of the forerunners to Rush Limbaugh, there would be pressure from the FCC for equal time, et cetera. And so ending the Fairness Doctrine basically created the environment by which right-wing radio could thrive. Which created the environment by which Fox News could thrive.The idea that the FCC and the Fairness actor and the big government were preventing conservative media was one of the motivating factors among grassroots activists that pushed Reagan to do it. And then there are a couple of moments in time where the idea of aggressive Republican Party adjacent media comes from. And I use that to distinguish between ideological media like Human Events and the Weekly Standard and sort of National Review, of which we have examples in the pre-Trump era on the right and the left, right sort of real magazines. It's pushing the party agenda, left or right, depending.And that's obviously Roger Ailes recognizing that the power was in the press and so get partnering with Rupert Murdoch to start Fox News. Fox News becomes very, very powerful over the course of time finds a real market. And then there are two other moments that I think are incredibly significant. One is right after the 2012 election, there was a view pushed primarily by Steve Bannon that the right is losing the messaging wars and they need to double and triple down in the ability to push the political conversation in their direction. Their direction. And his view was cultural wars, immigration, et cetera.And that leads to Breitbart, The Daily Caller, Free Beacon with real investment from a new set of, quote unquote, "Rupert Murdochs," like the Mercers who help start Breitbart, or take Breitbart from its previous version to the Steve Bannon pro-Trump version. You have Foster Freeze, who gives money to Tucker Carlson to start The Daily Caller. And then the moment that really sort of takes that, which would be in Supercharges, is Facebook really hits a tipping point in around 2014 where its reach, the news feed and the algorithm all sort of combine with these new right wing digital outlets to move the political conversation powerfully towards right wing extremist messaging. And that takes off and then that sort of ends in Trump, and then Trump takes the whole thing to another level from 2016 on.David RobertsI remember, even back in the day, it's sort of early, after the emergence of Fox, the situation it created, which persists to this day in mainstream sort of especially like mainstream cable news, is you have this weird form. Of balance now, where the balance is on one side, explicit ideological right wing propaganda media, and then the other side, and I'm air quoting here, is just a couple of mainstream journalists from like the New York Times or whatever. Mainstream journalists who are scrupulously, as always, attempting to appear objective and unbiased. And that's just like a bizarre form of balance, a bizarre way of drawing two sides that always struck me as surreal but now is just absolutely bog standard and no one blinks at it.That's what balance basically means now, on like a Sunday show.Dan PfeifferThat's exactly right. The right has so convinced the media itself that it is left that in order to balance itself, it must seek out a right-wing voice. Like you mentioned the idea of the Sunday shows and that is often the lineup, particularly Meet the Press is a Republican, a Democrat, some journalists and a member of the conservative media. And then Facebook took this to another level when they started putting in trusted news sources in order to, quote unquote, "balance CNN and the New York Times," they had to have Breitbart and Fox or The Daily Caller or whatever it is.And it is like this I think this is one of Roger Ailes's great insights because he is someone who came from he was in media, was a political consultant, went back to media as he understood how to exploit the cultures the mores and the insecurities of the press in a way to push conservative messaging. And he knew that they were incredibly self conscious about liberal bias because many of them are personally liberal. They may live in New York or they may live in Los Angeles and then use it simply to bludgeon them into becoming a vehicle for pushing additional right wing messaging. I mean, it must have been Roger Ailes's dream.Like, he could not believe how successful his endeavor was that after Barack Obama was elected, the New York Times assigned an editor to monitor Fox for story ideas. That The Washington Post executive ... that is a real thing. The Washington Post executive editor at the time, Marcus Brauchli, said that he wanted his paper to spend more time paying attention to Fox, to learn more. In his wildest dreams, when he started thinking about Fox, in the idea of Fox, in the 70s and 80s, the idea that his hated New York Times would be so cowed by him that they would sign an editor to watch his network in order to hold a Democratic president accountable, it must have been beyond his wildest dreams.David RobertsIt's wild. It's been one of the wildest things about the whole process is the extent to which explicit ideological right wing media has been protected at every stage by the very establishment that it is devoted to destroying. It's so surreal and one of the most infuriating chapters of the last, actually. It's more than a decade ago. I'm revealing my age here, but that you cover in your book is Obama came in, you all came in with Obama. And by that point, I mean, it's pretty obvious from the jump, I think. But certainly by the time Obama took office, it's just super obvious that one of these things is not like the others.Right? That Fox is not just another objective news network, that it's very explicitly devoted to taking Obama down, it's devoted to the Republican Party. Seems very obvious, and I'm sure seemed quite obvious to you inside the White House. But then you all consciously decided to push back on it and just reaped a shitstorm not from the right wing media, but from its defenders in the mainstream media. That drives me mad to this day. I can only imagine what it was like from the inside.Dan PfeifferI was one of the people in the White House that were in the book who pushed to go aggressively against Fox. And my mistake, I guess three mistakes. One is misunderstanding the nature of it's, sort of like the NATO defense pack among journalists, that an attack on one is attack on us all. So that's mistake one is that we weren't just fighting, we're going to fight Fox. We're going to end up fighting everyone. And that's not worth our time and energy and not a fight you're going to win. The second, I think, was in sort of in our tactics.We made some mistakes, and when we got into their access, that's where the press, I think to some extent understandably comes to everyone's defense because it's not whether we're going to do interviews with them or not. It's not whether we're going to acknowledge them or not. It's whether they get to show up and participate in sort of communal activities which they pay for.David RobertsRight.Dan PfeifferAnd then the third was that Fox would see it in their this part we sort of understood, but would see it in their interest too. Right. Obviously our attack on them became proof to their base that they were doing what they said. And now in situations like that, we can both win. Because as painful as that whole battle was, it did have at least I think and then maybe this is just me justifying my own decisions, a moderately moderating impact on how much the press was following Fox. It still obviously was a problem, but there was less like we really were in those first years of the White House would be like Glenn Beck segment.Phone call from Politico about Glenn Beck segment. Right. And that people created at least a little bit of more self conscious echoing of Fox before they came to us. But these are small victories.David RobertsYeah. And it still begs the larger question, which is why it was just super clear for me, as an outside observer looking at the media landscape, that Fox is not like other news, other news stations. It's very clear they're doing a different thing. And it just begs the question of why other journalists couldn't acknowledge that or couldn't see it or weren't. And this is what I always wonder, why they weren't pissed off about it. If you're a real journalist and you really care and you're dealing with fact checkers and editors and you're having to confirm things with two sources and et cetera, and then these people come along and just sort of, like, call themselves a news network, even though it's, like, 90% bloviating opinion and it's full of falsehoods and it's full of b******t.And they're calling themselves the same thing you're calling yourself. Where's the professional pride? Why are journalists not mad about Fox? Why instead are they defending and welcoming it? Have you ever figured that out?Dan PfeifferYeah, I think there are a couple reasons for it. Part of it is this sort of self conscious liberal bias where it's like, yeah, we are kind of liberal. Maybe it's not bad if someone balances out in the sense that this view that maybe Fox is a center right journalism entity during the day at least, as opposed to a propaganda operation. The second one is basically, up until 2012 or so, the people that Fox hired to be campaign reporters or White House reporters, they almost operated as intermediaries between the Fox higher ups and the people they were covering.And it's a pretty like people who had been at other entities and were well respected by their colleagues, like Major Garrett, Carl Cameron, and we would have conversations, I'm not going to out specific conversations with people. A lot of the people who would cover us, they'd come to you and say, look, we'd sort of kind of know this is b******t, what's your complaint? And they'll try to serve it as intermediary. So I can see in a world in which I'm not defending this, but just understanding sort of the fraternity or culture among journalism, is it's like we respect Major Garrett or we respect Carl Cameron, and he is one of us and worked with one of us.And then it began to take a transition with the sorts of people those sorts of people started leaving the network and going to other things and you end up with other people like Ed Henry or Peter Doocy or others who are you had to be all in on the scam or all in the propaganda to be there after a while. So it's like, I think it was a not a deeply naive approach from a lot of the press. It was born of subconscious liberal bias…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Volts podcast: Johannes Ackva on effective climate altruism Jun 15, 2022
    Show notes

    In this episode, Johannes Ackva of Founders Pledge discusses his thinking on the most effective forms of climate philanthropy.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsSay you’re a private individual (or a company, or a foundation) who cares about climate change and has some money to spend on it. What’s the best way to spend that money? How can you ensure the largest possible impact?Similar questions about maximizing philanthropic impact have led to an entire field of study and practice known as “effective altruism,” which seeks to apply logical and empirical rigor to do-gooderism. But it is only very recently that effective altruists have turned their attention to climate change. One of the leading EA voices on climate is Johannes Ackva. He’s a researcher at Founders Pledge, an organization through which business owners and entrepreneurs donate a portion of their earnings to charity. For years, Ackva has been thinking through the puzzle of how best to channel climate philanthropy, given the structure of the problem and the politics around it. If you’re interested in what groups Founders Pledge has chosen for its donations, you can find a list on the website, but I was more interested in the thinking that led Ackva to those recommendations. Given the enormous spatial and temporal scales involved in climate change, the many social and political complexities, the extensive and irreducible uncertainties, how can a well-meaning donor have any confidence in their choices? I found our conversation quite enlightening — a new lens through which to view this familiar problem — it and I think you will too.Johannes Ackva, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Johannes Ackva:Yeah, thank you, David. Thanks for having me. It's an honor and pleasure to be here.David Roberts:Let's start a few steps back since I'm not entirely sure that the Volts audience will be familiar with the effective altruism movement, even though it gained quite a bit of press attention recently. So to start with, just tell us briefly, what is effective altruism and what is it trying to do?Johannes Ackva: So effective altruism is really a social and intellectual movement that tries to answer the question, “how can we do the most good possible?” And, not only answer that question in a theoretical way, but in a very practical way, actually trying to do as much good as possible. There are two components to it. The first one that I would stress is, of course: altruism, which is about trying to be really serious about helping other people and other beings. So, effective altruists usually take a global take, including all humans, also all future humans, also all animals. So, having a really expansive form of altruism. And many effective altruists donate a large part of their income to the global poor or change their careers. So this is the altruism piece of it. And then there's this effectiveness piece, which is like thinking really hard and long, and trying to use as much evidence as possible to think about “how can we have the most impact?”, the most positive impact. And one thing about impact here that I think is crucial, because I think it will come up throughout our conversation, is that a lot of what I'm saying on climate is motivated by this notion of counterfactual impact. Given what everyone else is doing, what is the thing that is additional, should be done next? So, not only trying to have impact, but trying to have impact that otherwise would not happen in the world. And I think that's really key to how we think about climate.David Roberts:And this is the concept of additionality, doing something that would not otherwise be done?Johannes Ackva: Yeah, doing something that would not otherwise be done. Yes, that's the concept of additionality.David Roberts:I won't claim any deep familiarity with the ins and outs of the movement, but my impression over the last few years is that some of the most prominent spokespeople for effective altruism are relatively down on climate change as a target for philanthropic giving. I think the idea is that they're trying to think about all humans today and all humans that will ever be. They're thinking about what might cause the extinction of the human race, and they say climate is unlikely to cause extinction, whereas, you know, a terrible pandemic or an asteroid or an AI that becomes sentient and does a terminator on us are much greater threats of extinction. So why, within the context of effective altruism, do you think that climate change is a worthy target for people's giving and attention?Johannes Ackva: First, I would say you're broadly right there. And it’s funny, because I was a climate person before I was an effective altruist, before I encountered effective altruism. So, it was the first instance of having to justify myself. Why am I working on climate? Growing up in Germany this was something I never had to justify. So I think that's broadly right, most effective altruists do not focus on climate and I think the reason that you’ve outlined as to why is broadly right. Climate is a really big threat, and I think effective altruists acknowledge that there are very serious threats from extreme climate change, so the view is not that climate isn't a serious problem. I think effective altruists take it very seriously. But seeing a broad set of problems of similar magnitude (like nuclear war, advanced artificial intelligence that you mentioned, or bio risk) where many of those issues receive far, far less attention than climate change is the reason that many effective altruists would not first go to climate.David Roberts:But you think they're wrong about that, that climate is a worthy target of giving and philanthropy? What is the effective altruism justification for focusing on climate?Johannes Ackva: Yeah, okay, so I think the effective altruism justification for caring about climate has two different aspects. One comes from thinking about humans alive today, or humans alive in the near future. So obviously, I think we know from the literature on climate impacts, that vulnerable populations in the Global South will suffer the most from climate change, and helping them can be quite effective, also because solving climate change is related to solving some other really big problems, in particular air pollution and energy poverty. So, if you think about clean energy abundance as one possible solution for climate change, that would actually solve all of those issues.David Roberts:Right. So you're solving three problems in one when you solve this problem?Johannes Ackva: Yeah, that's the first piece. I think the second piece comes if you think about global catastrophic risk or if you think about the importance of geopolitical stability and good international cooperation. If you think about how climate change can go wrong, how climate change can cause migration, international attention, etc. I think that's another set of reasons to care about climate change, just making the world in general less fragile, more resilient, and trying to reduce geopolitical pressure.David Roberts:Yeah, because they say climate is a “threat multiplier”, right? That's the term that you use. So in a sense, by decreasing the threat of climate, you are also decreasing all those other risks. Johannes Ackva: To add one little bit of nuance here, I'm not saying to effective altruists: “do more on climate, do less of these other things”. I just want to be very clear about this. What I gave you is what I see as the strongest case for caring about climate change, but it is true that there are other risks of similar order of magnitude, in terms of risk, that we're spending a 100th or less of the attention on. So I think it's probably right to think about climate not as the most neglected issue, globally speaking.David Roberts:So even you would say, from an effective altruism point of view: while climate is worthy of attention, there are other risks worthy of attention that are getting less attention than climate. Is that what you’re saying?Johannes Ackva: I think that's what I would say if we only think about the importance and neglectedness of those problems. There is, however, another dimension. And I think that's also really important in making the case for climate. And that dimension is tractability, or the ability to make additional progress, and I think climate looks extraordinarily good on that dimension compared to many of those other problems that I mentioned for a couple of reasons.David Roberts:Tell us about that then. Tell us why, in terms of tractability (meaning there's progress to be made), there's “low hanging fruit” available, you might say. Why should we think that climate philanthropy in particular can produce results?Johannes Ackva: Yeah, great question. So I think there are essentially three reasons why I would believe that to be true. The first one is that attention to climate overall, like societal attention including policy, economics, etc. is actually really high, and is at an all time high. We're now spending about a trillion or so in the global economy, and climate policy has been a really important part of Biden's agenda, and has been really important in Europe for a long time. So, there's a lot of attention to climate, I think that's the first piece. The second piece is that a lot of that attention is not spent optimally, in terms of the ultimate goal (or, what I see as the ultimate goal) of acting on climate, which is reducing climate damage as much as possible. And there are some very predictable biases. For example, the US and Europe maybe represent around 15% of future emissions, so effective climate action should always think about global emissions, but there are lots of political incentives to focus locally. There's lots of ideological issues, there's lots of special interests, so a lot of the attention on climate is not spent optimally. That's the second piece. And the third piece comes if you think about climate philanthropy as a whole and the role that climate philanthropy can play. If you conservatively assume that you can only shift how the public response is improved by something like a 10th of a percent, or something like that, that can still be extraordinarily valuable. So essentially, it’s about leveraging the attention on climate to try and help steer the climate momentum that exists in a way that’s more useful for global decarbonisation.David Roberts:Right. So you’ve sort of got the raw material there, you've got the attention and the will to do something, and you think a little bit of nudging in a better direction could have a big positive effect.Johannes Ackva: Yeah.David Roberts: I want to focus in on one of the things you said, and this is a quote from one of your papers: “the goal of high impact climate philanthropy is not to maximize emission reductions, but to minimize climate damage”. It might not be obvious to people what the distinction is there, so explain that a little bit and explain what those two different approaches would imply?Johannes Ackva: Yeah, no, that's not obvious at all, and it wasn't obvious to me for a long time. I only really fully grappled with this last year when I wrote the paper. So, I guess the first intuition when thinking about maximum impact and climate philanthropy would really be: okay, we want to maximize emissions reductions. But, there's something particular about the climate challenge that I think makes this intuition wrong, and that’s the fact that climate damage is highly nonlinear. So, if we think about a 3 degree world, this is much worse than twice as bad as a 1.5 degree world. Again, a 6 degree world is much worse than twice as bad as a 3 degree world. If we think about it in terms of a concept like the social cost of carbon, the social cost of carbon at different levels of temperature is very different. It's much more valuable to avoid an additional tonne of carbon in the 6 degree world than in the 1.5 degree world. And this is standard climate science and I would say this is really one of the most uncontroversial facts about climate. But the key thing here is that we actually “know” things that must be true if we're in a 4 degree world compared to a 1 degree world. For example, if we're in a 4 degree world, Zeke Hausfather, the climate scientist, has said “we're not in a 4 degree world and renewables have succeeded beyond all expectations.”David Roberts:Right.Johannes Ackva: This means that in this 4 degree world, there are solutions or hedges which can be extremely valuable. One of them would be, for example, advanced nuclear, which to some degree is a hedge against failure of renewables. It might not play a big role in the best case world, right? Maybe we’re in the best case world where renewables succeed beyond all expectations, but if not, there's an extraordinary hedging value from those kinds of solutions. Maximizing emission reductions will not lead you to this conclusion, whereas minimizing climate damage leads you to other kinds of conclusions.David Roberts:Right. So if you're trying to maximize emission reductions, you would just go for the cheapest, most obvious reductions available now, which will generally be renewables or something like that. But it sounds like you're describing something more like trying to reduce risk rather than emissions.Johannes Ackva: Yes.David Roberts:And risk rises nonlinearly, so you think philanthropy should be hedging against failure, hedging against the failure of mainstream approaches basically. Does that sound right?Johannes Ackva: Alright, let me answer this in two parts. First, it's not really about time. It's not really about spending now versus long term. It's not about spending on renewables now for the cheapest buckets, it’s more about thinking about what correlates with different climate futures. So for example, if you think about one thing that's often described as very cost effective: forestry, avoiding deforestation. Having agreements between Europe and Brazil to avoid deforestation, that’s very cost effective in the best of worlds where international cooperation and the quality of agreements is stronger than it actually is right now. If we're in that kind of setting we're not going to have a lot of climate damage. So, even though that might maximize emissions reduction in expectation, it wouldn't minimize damage. So it's not about the timing, but what correlates with different kinds of scenarios. So, what I'm talking about is always counterfactual impact, and what to do given what everyone else is doing. So I'm absolutely not saying we shouldn't focus on renewables, or we shouldn't focus on natural climate solutions. It's more that given we have a large focus on this now, what should we do next? And then, my argument would always be about the value of hedging against the failure of mainstream solutions, because right now we're in a situation where mainstream solutions get a lot of attention. We can also see the success of that, right? Future emission trajectories have gone down a lot because of the success of renewables, more than I think most people appreciate. So there have been really big successes, and if we think about how things can go wrong (how “s**t can hit the fan”) it’s not because we spent 1% less additional climate philanthropy attention on renewables, it's because something goes wrong there or something goes wrong with another solution. Let's say international climate policy falls apart, which looks more realistic now than a couple of months ago. If something like that happens, this is how we get into those worst worlds, right? And so we want to hedge aga…

    Full show notes at the publisher

    Volts podcast: Dr. Ye Tao on a grand scheme to cool the Earth Jun 08, 2022
    Show notes

    In this episode, Dr. Ye Tao discusses his vision for combatting climate change by using fields of mirrors that reflect solar radiation.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsGeoengineering — using large-scale engineering projects to directly cool the Earth’s atmosphere — is an intensely controversial topic in climate circles. On one hand, such schemes strike many people as dangerous hubris, interfering with large-scale systems we don’t fully understand, risking catastrophic unintended consequences. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that even a wildly successful program of decarbonization will not be enough to avoid devastating levels of heat in the atmosphere.Dr. Ye Tao was early in his career as a researcher at Harvard’s Rowland Institute, working on nanotechnology, when he became gripped by the problem of climate change. As he dug into the research, he concluded that even rapid decarbonization — especially insofar as it reduces the aerosol pollution that temporarily cools the atmosphere — would leave the Earth roasting in levels of heat hostile to most life forms.As he reviewed available options for carbon capture and geoengineering, he realized that none of them were safe or scalable enough to do the necessary cooling work in time. So he came up with a technique of his own: mirrors.The MEER project — Mirrors for Earth’s Energy Rebalancing — is a nonprofit established to advance Tao’s vision, which involves covering some mix of land and ocean with fields of mirrors. The mirrors would reflect solar radiation, and thus heat, back up out of the atmosphere. If 10 to 15 percent of developed agricultural land could be covered with mirrors, Tao has calculated, it would return Earth’s heat to safe preindustrial levels, providing a range of local benefits to agriculture and water in the meantime.It’s a brash idea, somewhere between crazy and obvious, and I was excited to hear more from Tao about why he thinks it’s necessary, how it would work, the materials that would be required, and how the MEER framework changes the way we view carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Alright. Ye Tao. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming on.Ye TaoYeah, thanks for inviting.David RobertsYe I have to confess when I first invited you on the pod, I had not yet really done a deep dive into into the MEER Project, and I was just sort of thinking, "Oh, a bunch of mirrors. How novel. That sounds fun. Let's talk about that." But I've spent a while now digging in and listening to more of your presentations and reading more, and there's really a lot going on here. There's a lot going on here. The mirrors are at the end of a sort of chain of reasoning that in many, many ways contradicts conventional wisdom about climate change.So I do want to get to the mirrors. I'm excited to talk about the mirrors, but let's do a little background building first. So I want to start with, it seems like the key to understanding your whole framework here is the distinction between CO2 and heat. We sort of conflate carbon and heat. When we talk about climate change, what's the problem? It's more carbon, and carbon causes heat. How do we reduce heat? We reduce the carbon dioxide emissions. We sort of have those coupled in our mind. And you say it's important to decouple them. So talk a little bit about why we need to keep them conceptually distinct, and then also decouple them in terms of the physics of the system.Ye TaoOkay, yeah, that's a good place to start. It's true that we created this problem by emitting CO2, and it's important to shut it down as quickly as we can manage, practically. And in the Earth system, everything is basically linked. So it's only natural that when you perturb one important component to a very significant extent, such as CO2 concentrations, you should expect some downstream consequences — and the most urgent of which is overheating of the planet. And heat is really the driver of weather patterns and precipitation patterns. So when you have excess thermal energy that's really different from the state Earth was before the CO2 perturbation, that you can expect downstream extreme events and also perturbation to the biochemical cycle.And if we look at the responses of different organisms and plants, insects, and mammals, and how they respond to individual perturbations in CO2 versus temperature, universally they really suffer when temperature gets ramped up to a few degrees above their normal temperature niche values. But in terms of CO2, essentially most species, like 90% plus or more, are actually not perturbed really by the current increase in CO2 levels. So basically, we initiate this avalanche by burning CO2. But the real environmental stressor that's really creating havoc are a combination of overheating and the resulting drying of land and moisture.David RobertsSo what we talk about as the effects of climate change are the effects of heat, basically, our heat playing its way through the system. And is it safe to say then that we care about CO2 in the atmosphere more or less only as it relates to heat? Only insofar as it brings more heat, right. Because in and of itself, as you say, it's not, I mean, I'm sure there's some level of concentration that's dangerous, but the levels of concentration we're talking about are not dangerous in and of themselves. Is that fair?Ye TaoWell, we'd have to be a little bit more careful and include a timeline. I would say, like in the near future, next 50 years, assuming that we're emitting and growing economy on current trajectory, then the predominant parameter is heat. That's going to basically shut everything down before we're able to continue. But if we were, somehow, we're able to manage to prolong this fossil fuel economy then by the 2070s, 2080s, ocean acidification would then also become a potentially dangerous environmental stressor for marine ecosystems. But the logic is that it's very highly unlikely for society, or civilization, to really survive to that point on our current emission trajectory.Therefore, we really need to focus on both decarbonizing safely and also dealing with heat. So I mentioned that we initially started this heating process by turning up CO2. And that there are many parameters in Earth system are interlinked. But it's logically just not correct to say that the best way is to use this single CO2 knob to address the heat or moisture. There are other knobs that are higher leverage, essentially, for the same input in resources, energy, and time. And we're stressed on all those fronts. There's much better ways to address the most imminent danger of environmental overheating than looking at conventional CO2 or methane mitigation.David RobertsRight. So CO2 is the knob that turned heat up, but it's not necessarily the ...Ye TaoOnly knob that we have.David RobertsOr most efficient knob for turning it down. And you go beyond that to say, that even if we switched to 100% renewable energy tomorrow, you think we would still pass heat thresholds, that would be devastating. Explain that a little bit.Ye TaoSo currently Earth is on a heating trajectory, and when something is heating, that's because there's more thermal power or more heat that's been put into the system than is coming out. So let's say somehow we could selectively just shut down emission of greenhouse gases, while somehow maintaining economy going, the Earth will continue to heat. The reason is if you make a measurement of how much sunlight is coming in, and how much IR radiation is going out, currently, there is a 1.5 watts per meter squared of power net energy input into the Earth system. So essentially the past emission debt, even in the current state has not been fully paid.So the Earth will continue to heat up, even if we were to shut down. And I need to explain a little bit what this 1.5 watts per meter squared means. So "watts" is a unit of power, basically how much energy gets passed through per unit of time. And "per meter squared" is an average value that scientists, climate scientists like to use to get some common metric. So basically, you have LED at every square meter of land surface on Earth, that's currently how much heat is coming in continuously.So to translate this power into an eventual equilibrium temperature, we have to multiply by a factor that converts this weird unit to a degree unit. And that factor has a value that's roughly one. So it's very convenient. So for every watt per meter squared of radiative forcing or this heating power per square area, we can expect at equilibrium a temperature increase of about one degrees. So therefore, we should expect another 1.5 degrees of temperature increase at equilibrium, if we were to just shut down further damage at this point. So that's point number one.But this 1.5 degrees will not realize instantaneously. It's going to take some time, years, decades, to centuries to realize. And there's different components, different part of this 1.5 will manifest itself over different length scales, but overall, we're looking at order one-degree increase.So that's assuming that we could somehow selectively shut down CO2 emissions. But when we burn fossil fuel, there are other pollutants that are co-emitted, which includes these aerosols.David RobertsI love this. I've been waiting for someone to say something. I've had this question idly in my mind for a long time, and I was so glad that you answered it in your presentation. And it's such a fascinating irony, I guess you'd call it, or paradox or something, and I'm glad to have it measured. So I just want to put a pin in this. So you say if we're burning coal, we're sort of steadily burning coal. And part of what that is doing is putting aerosol pollution in the air, which is blocking some of that solar radiation.So to some extent offsetting the heating of the atmosphere. And if we stopped burning coal, those aerosols fall out of the air quickly. Unlike CO2, they quickly fall out. So whatever heating they were blocking would very rapidly make its way in. So I guess what I want to ask is, would that more than offset whatever reduction in heat you get from the reduction of CO2?Ye TaoThat's an excellent question, and let's go into a little bit of semi-quantitative detail. So I previously mentioned that even overlooking this temporary cooling effect, the Earth is currently experiencing a heating power density of 1.5 watt per meter squared. So this quantity is called the Earth's energy imbalance, basically how much surplus heat we're getting right now. And this value has been fluctuating around 0.7 to maybe 1 watt per meter squared in most of the past 10, 20 years. Except for more recently. In the recent few years, it really went up to maybe 1.3, 1.5, even like last year, based on the most recent measurements.So I won't speculate on why recently there has been an increase in this heating power. Okay, let's leave that Earth energy imbalance aside for a moment and address how much additional heating is currently masked by these aerosols. So the latest IPCC, if you really delved into the technical parts, they put the number at about 1.2, 1.3 watts per meter squared. So it's an important number to remember, 1.2 to 1.3. So essentially, let's now assume that in addition to shutting down the CO2, we also shut down all the aerosol emissions, which comes naturally anyways. We would then induce a Earth's energy imbalance, which is no longer 1 or 1.5, but that number plus 1.2 or 1.3, which brings the total energy imbalance to most likely around 2 watts per meter squared, or somewhere slightly above that.And if we then translate this heating power to an equilibrium temperature increase, it will be like more like two degrees Celsius.David RobertsAnd that's on the timescale of the aerosols going away, like by when?Ye TaoOkay, so the fraction that will be added when aerosols fall out, the 1.2, 1.3 watt per meter squared, that fraction, half of that would be realized very quickly, within a couple of years. So recently, I gave a presentation summarizing a dozen peer-reviewed papers that came out since the first batch of COVID lockdowns. So COVID, despite all the inconvenience it created and all the havoc it created, offered climate science a rare opportunity to really assess and confirm this warming that's hidden by aerosols.David RobertsRight. Because we stopped emitting them pretty abruptly.Ye TaoThat's right. And we know exactly when the measures or rules were put in place. So it's a sort of very controlled experiment.David RobertsRight.Ye TaoAnd there's a lot of most paper, I think all the paper, experimental measurements confirm that, say, in the area of East Asia or China, there was temperature increase over land of about 0.5 degrees just over the very short weeks to months of the 2020 lockdowns.David RobertsRight. That wasn't even a year, right. That was a matter of months. And there was an immediate rise in heat in the area.Ye TaoYes. So when we talk about this global average temperature increase, you have to average over the oceans and land. But of course, the primary driver in that process will be land, because it's the one that's the lowest heat capacity. And that's a component that also responds most instantaneously to an increase ramping up in heating power. And then, this land temperature increase will then drive atmospheric circulation patterns, which bring the warm air to the oceans and also bring the oceans up to temperature. So it's to be expected that the fastest response component is land surface temperature.David RobertsRight. So where does that leave us by 2050? Say we switched to renewables tomorrow and just had the sort of legacy, 1.5 per watts per meter, and then the additional 1.2 that we would get from dropping aerosols out, what temperature, global average temperatures that put us at in, say 2050.Ye TaoYeah, thank you for bringing me back to answering those questions. But now let's remember that the aerosols are masking 1.3 watts per meters squared So essentially, as we decarbonize, we'll lose that component. And now let's just remind ourselves of how much our annual emissions is adding to this heating power. So I'm quoting some presentations, I had to track down the source, but our annual CO2 emissions at about 0.06 watts per meter squared of heating power. So over 20 years, 0.06 times 20 gives you roughly about 1.2 watts per meter squared, which just happens to be comparable to how much aerosols are masking.So in a very simple model of decarbonization, linear decarbonization, from now until 2040 something, we would have avoided creating 1.2 watt of per meter squared of heating, but at the same time, we would have unveiled or unmasked about 1.2. So the two at this point, just magically happens to balance out, which allows us to have very high confidence of the heating trajectory of the Earth system from now until 2040, 2050s. So the two-degree mark will most certainly be surpassed in that decade. And that will happen regardless of what we do on the emissions front. Because of this coincidence of the annual heating contributed by current emissions and how much is currently masked if we continue to have this emissions.David RobertsYou never gave me a temperature for 2050. Is three possible?Ye TaoIn my personal opinion, I think that will be quite difficult to reach due to the thermal lag and things in the system. Like for such a gigantic system, things move slowly. And if you just look at, disregard all the underlying mechanisms, just look at the temperature versus time data, t…

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    Volts podcast: Chris Hayes on how his politics have changed since 2015 Jun 03, 2022
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    In this episode, Chris Hayes of MSNBC discusses how American politics and society changed after the Obama years, where things might head in the future, and how his own views have shifted along the way.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsI often reflect on a particular moment in the summer of 2015. It was not long after the Supreme Court made gay marriage legal across the nation in Obergefell v. Hodges. And America was in the middle of one of its regular fights over Confederate monuments and flags, which were being pulled down by progressives across the country.One afternoon I ran across a cartoon — I think it was on Facebook? — showing a Confederate flag being lowered and the LGBTQ flag being raised in its stead.Hot damn, I thought. Maybe we really do get it right eventually.I now think back on that moment as the peak of my belief in what you might call the Obama creed, which the nation's first black president repeated in one way or another in virtually every speech: that the essence of America is its continuous struggle toward the egalitarian ideals of its founding. Again and again it delays and falls short and takes two steps back, but it never stops striving, improving, bit by hard-fought bit. The arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice.To a first approximation, everything that has happened since then has sucked. We fell into the ugly 2016 Democratic nomination fight, followed by the ugly presidential election, then four years of daily insults to dignity and compassion by Trump, then a plague that we bungled in countless ways and that has killed more than a million of us, and now, the Supreme Court is systematically dismantling the pillars of the modern administrative state while Biden and the Democrats fumble their way through a slow-motion catastrophe, setting up an openly seditious Republican Party to seize near-total power in the coming two elections.To put it mildly, these developments have been rough on the Obama creed, at least for me and many people I know. Much of what Obama himself did was crushed or reversed by Trump, and Biden has barely begun rebuilding from the wreckage. More than that, America's reactionary minority seems ascendent. And its intentions are clear: to follow Viktor Orban's lead in Hungary. To whittle democracy down until it's entirely hollow, one-party rule in all but name. It finds echoes in similar reactionary backlashes currently rising in nations across the globe.Is America redeemable? Is white Christian patriarchy ready and willing to destroy the country before it gives up power? Is the arc of history bending, or is it merely flailing back and forth, with no larger purpose or pattern? Is modern multi-racial, multi-cultural democracy still a viable long-term project?To help ponder these weighty questions, I've turned to the inimitable Chris Hayes, who, as they say, needs no introduction. You've seen his shows on MSNBC, you've listened to his podcast, you've read his essays and books, you know that he is one of the leading liberal voices of our time. He’s also a friend. We are part of the same generation of journalists, living through the same dumpster fires, seeing the same patterns, and our paths have crossed regularly over the years. I’ve also been on several of his shows! We go way back.I’ve always felt that Chris and I share similar political and intellectual instincts — one of the few people at the commanding heights of US journalism and punditry about whom I can say that — so I’m curious to hear how his political outlook has changed since 2015, whether he still believes in the Obama creed, and what he thinks is coming in America’s near future. So with that portentous wind-up, let's bring him into the conversation.Chris HayesThat was great. I love that. I found that very moving.David RobertsOh, great. Alright, well, thanks for coming on Volts.Chris HayesI should say I'm a Volts reader, too.David RobertsThank you. Thank you. I appreciate it. We're talking during a very dark time. Dark. I mean, it's all shades of dark these days. It's particularly dark in the wake of the latest ...Chris HayesChild murder?David RobertsChild murder. Yes, child mass murder. That we're all going through the motions as we always do, until that fades and something else horrible comes up in the news. But let's pull the lens back. I want to do some big picture talking, and then a little bit more close in, like proximate, what's our proximate future talk? But let's start with the big picture. So I just want to start by asking you in the most general possible terms, if you think back to 2015, which I mark as sort of the last normal year, how has your political outlook changed?I think of you as basically sort of a Left liberal, Scandinavian, welfare-state kind of guy. Has any of that fundamentally changed? Or if not, have you changed your mind about any big things? How have you evolved since then?Chris HayesYeah, I think my basic orientation, which is like, a Social Democrat, a Rawlsian liberal, a mixed economy, freedom plus groceries, adherent — freedom plus groceries, a great quote from a New Deal congressman describing the New Deal, which has never been improved upon for basically Social Democratic, mixed economy, rule of law. Broadly, I'm a liberal, and I'll talk about that in a second because I actually think that I'm more that in a specific philosophical sense than I ever was before, actually. But, yeah, that hasn't really changed. But things have changed. So one, I do think I'm a little less, I don't know what I feel about progress.What I do feel with age, and with now going through having been a sort of professional working journalist for 20 years now, just like that, there are reformist moments and reactionary moments, and they kind of alternate and being able to recognize when you're in one almost the way that an athlete can recognize a defense. It's like, "Oh, yeah, no, right now we're in a reactionary moment." I just know what a reactionary moment feels like because I've been through a bunch of them. And in some ways there's a little bit of some comfort, I find, in that, because there's a little of "this too shall pass" about the nature of reactionary moments.First sort of reformist moments, radical moments, even. I mean, I think there were moments in the Trump administration where we're almost sort of revolutionary in some ways, a level of sort of radical thirst for and exuberant enthusiasm for taking on Patriarchy and White Supremacy that I'd never seen before in my life. I mean, the the sort of both "Me Too" and the Women's March and then the George Floyd protests. So I think I've gotten more, just like a little, again, I think a little wisened or sanguine about the fact that you go through different periods in the life of a society, in a democracy.I also think things are more tangibly perilous than they've ever been. I think that's informed by actual hard facts. And it really is the case that January 6th hadn't ever happened before. It really is the case that one of the two parties is openly seditious, or contains a faction that's openly seditious. It really is the case that we've pissed away 20 years that we could have been doing stuff on carbon, and now have a much tougher road ahead. It really is the case that, whatever you want to call it, populist ethnonationalism, 21st-century sort of authoritarian models are on the rise, and there's and there's democratic retreat in a lot of places in the world.David RobertsMy experience since 2015 has been sort of comprehensive, 360-degree, sort of disillusionment. It's one of those things like when you do yoga for years, you're like, "Oh, I didn't even know there were ... I had muscles there." I still had illusions.Chris HayesRight.David RobertsYet they're falling. But one of the things I want to talk about is history because it's odd. I'm not sure why the timing worked out this way, but it seems like one of the things that's happened since then is a lot of people on sort of the broad Left have been getting a little bit more interested in reconstruction and looking more closely into that period of American history right after the Civil War, which is not taught very well in schools. I did not learn, I did not get the full picture in small-town Tennessee, in the 1980s when I was learning history.But through the lens of that, and then looking more at American history, it's sort of come to me that it seems like American history is not so much reactionary moments followed by reformist moments, as very brief reformist moments followed by long swaths of reactionary moments. Like, if you throw a dart at a timeline, the odds are you're going to hit a period of horrible, reactionary backlash. Most of it is horrible, reactionary backlash. What we learned about in school are these brief periods where the reactionary backlash somehow gets out over its skis or goes too far, or causes some rupture, and then there's this sort of reformist burst.But really, most of it is dark. So in that light, one of the things you often hear, there's a sort of like, "everybody calm down" faction in the punditry. I know you're familiar with them. And one of the things people like that often say is, "Oh, you know, like, think about the '60s and '70s there were bombings in the cities, and leaders being assassinated, and blah, blah, blah." Or think back to like, you know, the 1910s, or think back to the 1890s, citing these periods of American history which were genuinely awful, in which things genuinely did seem to be falling apart.But you say, flat out, it's as bad as it's ever been. So how do you think about those historical comparisons?Chris HayesThat's a great question. So, yeah, I would agree, probably in terms of sheer years on the dartboard, you're probably right. I think I started reading, getting really into Reconstruction right after Trump's election, and spent several years reading a ton, including the Du Bois classic on it.David RobertsIt's so infuriating. It's impossible to exaggerate how infuriating it is. The deeper you get into the details.Chris HayesIt's also like one of those things ... sometimes you read, like, you encounter some text and you're like, "It just feels like it could have been written yesterday." There's just aspects of that that you're just like, "Holy crap, like, wow. This doesn't feel like the Dead Sea Scrolls. This does not feel like this got cracked out of some vault."David RobertsThis feels the dynamics, change the rhetoric a little bit, the dynamics are so similar.Chris HayesYeah. And I think the reason that's useful, I think the reason I got into Reconstruction, I think it's useful is just because it got covered up, because it is so inimical to the view of progress, right? Because we had a huge amount of progress and then this enormous backlash, right? So things move backwards. I always describe it as like the lost city of Atlantis, of American multi-racial democracy, where there was a civilization that got built, and then just flooded, and then completely like, everyone just floats on the surface and it's like, "Wait a second."David RobertsYeah, lost to history.Chris Hayes"Wait a second. There was a majority Black state legislature in South Carolina in 1869. Wait, what?" never been replicated before. Like, we've never had a majority Black legislature in any state since then. So I think, yes, I think that the reason a lot of people have gone to that. I think precisely because when you feel like history is being wrenched backward, or reactionary forces are ascended, that's a real touchstone. And I think also your point about ... I have some sympathy to the Just Countdown Caucus insofar as there was tumultuous stuff going on in the 1960s and 70s, and think the way that I square the circle.And this comes back around, in some ways, to answering the first question, which is that the biggest change is appreciating the difficulty and preciousness of liberal democracy. That I just took it for granted. There's the old David Foster Wallace, who has a very famous graduation speech he gives called "This is Water", which opens with him citing the old joke about the big fish that swims by the two younger fish and says to them, "beautiful day, boys. Enjoy the water." And the big fish swims away, and one the little fish says, the other, "What's the water?"David RobertsRight?Chris HayesAnd democracy is the water for us. It's just like, "Oh, right, yeah. That's how we have a liberal democracy." And there's, like, a court system. There's a rule of law. There's inalienable rights. There are means of redressing grievance through nonviolent adjudication of grievance and accountability.There is ...David RobertsPeaceful transition of power.Chris HayesPeaceful transition of power. Like, all this stuff is just like, "That's the water." And then all of a sudden, it's not.David RobertsYeah.Chris HayesAnd that is the big thing for me, the understanding the preciousness and the vulnerability of it and the real profound recency of it as a project, which is to say actual, genuine multi-racial democracy. I mean, 1965, basically, when we get the Voting Rights Act, is like when you can really plausibly start the clock on it.David RobertsYes, younger than many living Americans.Chris HayesYounger than many living Americans, and I mean, younger than, like, my parents. And that's also true around the world. I mean, you know, India starts the clock in in '48, and, you know, Brazil, you know, starts the clock probably earlier, but then has multiple military dictatorships, and sort of its modern incarnation of, like, a durable liberal democracy is, what, 40 years old, probably.David RobertsThink about Franco in Spain. That wasn't that long ago.Chris HayesNo, not at all. And I think that also the other connection that that gives me. The other thing I think about is thinking about the generation that survived fascism, and saw fascism and also Stalinism and authoritarianism in different stripes, and the appreciation that gave them of how thin it was, how fragile, and also that they had watched it collapse in on itself. I mean, that's the other thing I think that ... that experience, which is, like, the fascists came to power in environments of, quote-unquote "liberal democracy and elections".David RobertsYeah, talking about hearing echoes. Go back and read about people living through that, and the sort of like, it's the conservative moderates that didn't step in and restrain the extremists. It's those center Leftists who were too comfortable and didn't worry when they went after this group and that group. I mean, it's just all ...Chris HayesIt's the Leftists who said after Hitler, "Us, the worse, the better." There's a lot of blame to go around.David RobertsBut it's all happening again. It's all like mirror image happening again right now. And this is part of my despair, is like, yes, we had not just a generation of Americans who sort of lived through this kind of thing happening, but all of modern history is full of this kind of thing happening. And full of people like Hannah Arendt, and on and on, sort of doing these incredibly, erudite, deep dives into the mentality of it and the psychology of it and the sociology of it, and really, forensically laying out, like, here's what happens with, pres…

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    Volts podcast: Danny Cullenward on California's shaky climate plans Jun 01, 2022
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    In this episode, policy analyst Danny Cullenward of CarbonPlan talks about the disconnect between California’s ambitious climate goals and its actual practical plans for achieving them.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsCalifornia has long been known, nationally and internationally, as a leader on climate policy. The sheer scale of its economy and the stringency of its emissions targets have made it a model for other states with climate ambitions. As a role model, its successes (and failures) reverberate far beyond its borders.So it matters a great deal whether California has a practical plan to meet its aspirations. This year offers something of an answer, and … it’s not great. Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Every five years, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) issues a “scoping plan,” laying out how it intends to meet the state’s targets. The last one, in 2017, raised serious questions about whether the state’s cap-and-trade system could do the emission-reduction work that the state planned to require of it through 2030. This year’s draft scoping plan (there’s still time for public comment) answers none of those questions, and instead, looking out to 2045, raises new questions about whether carbon-dioxide removal (CDR) can do the work the state plans to require of it.That’s a lot of questions. To hash through them, and get a sense of just how prepared California is to meet its climate targets, I called up Danny Cullenward, a long-time policy analyst in the state. (Volts fans will remember him from one of the very first Volts posts.) He is currently policy director at the nonprofit CarbonPlan and a research fellow at American University’s Institute for Carbon Removal Law & Policy. Cullenward and I discussed what policies have worked to reduce emissions in California, whether the cap-and-trade program can do what’s asked of it, why the current scoping plan leans so heavily on CDR, and whether there’s still time to improve the plan before it’s locked in for five years.Without any further ado, Danny Cullenward. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Danny CullenwardThanks for having me on, Dave.David RobertsDanny, you were the first interview I ever did for Volts a couple of years ago. And as far as I know, now you're the first return guest.Danny CullenwardAnd the first to pivot to audio. This is fun.David RobertsYeah, the first to pivot to audio. I'm sure this is the kind of accomplishment you used to dream about as a young man.Danny CullenwardIf I were still an academic, it would be going on my CV.David RobertsAlright, so the purpose of our conversation here today is to get a handle on California and climate, sort of where it's been, where it says it's going, and whether it is in fact prepared to go where it says it's going. Before we get there, though, let's do just a little sort of scene setting, a little background. I think everybody hears about laws coming out of California all the time. California is doing this, doing that, and it becomes a little bit of a blur. So let's just sort of clarify what are the targets to which California is committed by statute, and sort of what are its other targets which are less statutory.Danny CullenwardI think that's the formal legal definition. That's great.David RobertsSemi statutory.Danny CullenwardWell, so there's a reason people talk about California and also why people, I think, sometimes get confused about exactly what's going on. And the reason that it matters is California was one of the first states to move forward on some of the macro climate policy issues, and many states are either copying or learning from its experience. So what it does turns out to matter a lot to sort of what other people start to do. I think the story begins in earnest in climate policy with the passage of AB 32. Our famous climate law back in 2006.David RobertsUnder Arnold.Danny CullenwardUnder Arnold Schwarzenegger, and a progressive Democratic legislature came together, found common ground on this bill, did a couple of things.It set a target to reduce emissions back down to 1990 emissions, by the year 2020. And it empowered the climate regulator, the California Air Resources Board, with the authority to undertake new regulations, including a cap-and-trade program, as well as to coordinate with other agencies, like our clean energy regulators that had already been pushing on renewables in the past. And that sort of set up the meta-framework and delegated the planning exercise to this regulator. So that's target number one. Target number two is about a decade later. In fact, one of the same principal legislators, then-Senator Fran Pavley, led a bill called SB 32, which codified a target of 40% below 1990 levels by the year 2030.So both of those are statutory targets. They're legally binding. The regulator is obligated to plan to and meet those targets. And then in 2018, we had the passage of SB 100, our zero-carbon grid bill. That was much celebrated. At the signing ceremony for that bill, Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order that said, let's go carbon neutral by the year 2045 on a statewide basis as well. And it's under the auspices of that executive order, and some more recent executive order and direction activity from the current governor, Gavin Newsom, that the state of California is thinking about its long-term climate goals.So we have statutory target for 2030, and we have non-binding aspirational executive orders for the post-2030 period.David RobertsSo, just to be clear, those executive orders are hotatory. Is that the word? They're meant to inspire action, but they have no legal force, there's no penalty.Danny CullenwardThat's right. You can't create new policies or programs from those executive orders that aren't separately authorized by existing law. And it's really easy to say, "That that's dumb. It means they're nothing." On the other hand, the statutory targets we have followed from earlier executive orders, so there's a history in this state, and in many other jurisdictions, you set the aspirational goal and you codify the parts of it you can, you sort of push ahead and you iterate in ratchet. So I don't want to discount the importance of that. But the practical takeaway is that nothing can be done to implement those targets other than talking and using existing authorities.You can't create new law with an executive order.David RobertsRight, so the legislature will have to follow up on that. So the first target you mentioned was by 2020, that was returned to 1990 levels. Did California hit that?Danny CullenwardNot only hit it, hit it a few years early. So it's a good story. And getting down to 1990 levels, maybe two things to say for your listeners. 1990 is a baseline that was really common to talk about 15, 20 years ago. We now talk about baselines like 2005, that's just sort of an artifact of when people locked into all of this. It doesn't sound like a particularly impressive target, in some respects, that's true, but at the time it was set, we were looking at emissions going ever up, and the idea that they would flatline and come back down a little bit was actually really ambitious at the time.And the state met it a couple of years early, which is great. Could talk about why. We got a little lucky. We also worked really hard, and we got there a couple of years early.David RobertsLet's briefly talk about it. So I'd like to get a sense of sort of — there's these two families of policies in California that have been passed in pursuit of these targets. There is the cap-and-trade system that was set up, as you say, by the Arnold Bill. And then alongside that, there's this sort of more sector-specific rules and regulations and investments, sort of, I guess what you would group under "industrial policy". So you have this sort of price-based mechanism on one hand, and then these sort of more old-fashioned regulatory tools on the other hand.So what has worked to put California ahead of schedule for its 2020 goal?Danny CullenwardMaybe the other thing to mention here is for these macro state targets, like the 2020 target and the 2030 target, AB 32, that original climate law asked the regulator to come up with what's called a "Scoping Plan". So every five years, the regulator is supposed to put together an official strategy. We're in the middle of a process for updating that strategy. And so you can look to those strategy documents to answer your question. And the first such document that was put together, basically, said that the expectation was that about 80% of the work to get to our 2020 target would be done by regulations and what today we now call things like industrial policy.David RobertsThat was in what year the first Scoping Plan came out?Danny CullenwardIt should have been December of 2008, end of 2008.David RobertsGot it.Danny CullenwardAnd the state said 80% regs 20% cap-and-trade. And that's a combination of policies that I think reflects the historical role that traditional sector-specific regulations and industrial policy have played in cutting emissions. Think renewable portfolio standard, think CARB's leadership on mobile source emissions, trying to set rules for cleaner cars. Those are the kinds of efforts that have historically delivered the tons. And the initial plan was about 80% in that traditional route and put on top of that an economy-wide carbon price that would do some of the lifting, but maybe not the lion's share.David RobertsAnd did that prediction, I guess, in 2008, turn out to more or less accurately reflect what happened through 2020?Danny CullenwardThat's a place where I think there's a little bit of nuance. So if you look at the data in terms of how we actually got to our target early, it turns out that there was a substantial boost from the financial crisis, right? So, like, the world economy collapsed, and people stopped driving. We didn't have like a boom time, and that exogenously pushed emissions lower. When you look at the sectors where the work has been done, it turns out that we struggled to keep pace in the transportation sector, struggled to keep pace in the industrial sector, but our electricity sector decarbonized much more quickly than even the optimistic plans in the original Scoping Plan suggested.And that's a combination of the fact that renewables and efficiency have performed in some respects better than we thought and moved faster than we hoped. It's also a reflection of the fact that at the time the plans were set, California was importing a lot of coal power. And it's a long story, but they eventually created a process by which the utilities in the state stopped importing that coal power. So we shed that liability from our books, and it's that electricity sector transition, moving off coal and starting to move on to clean energy, which is just beginning to really show up in the inventory.That's where the real progress has come. The rest of the sectors have struggled and electricity is most of the work.David RobertsGot it. And so you hit the 2020 target early. The 2030 target is 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. Is California on track to hit that target?Danny CullenwardI don't think there's a case to be made that we're anything close to it right now. I think it's entirely feasible and doable, but I don't think we're on that track right now. And part of the reason why reflects a pretty big shift in the state's official strategy for its climate policy. So I told you that the first Scoping Plan in 2008 said 80% regulations, 20% markets.David RobertsRight.Danny CullenwardTo make a long story short, there was a crisis in the cap-and-trade program starting in about 2016. The program was only authorized through the end of 2020. There was a crisis about the state of supply and demand in the program, the upcoming expiration of its clear legal authority, and that was ultimately resolved with a bill that passed in 2017 to extend the cap-and-trade program to 2030. So now we have the authority for cap-and-trade aligned to our state goal.David RobertsRight. I remember that fight. That was Brown, wasn't it? Who?Danny CullenwardThat was right. And I think it's fair to say Governor Brown had a singular role in that bill and that approach. So the bill passes and extends the authority it requires for state constitutional reasons. It needed a two-thirds vote, which is extraordinarily difficult to pull off anywhere.David RobertsEven in California.Danny CullenwardEven in — anywhere.And it led to a number of concessions to industry. So it shut down the ability of our local air pollution regulators to regulate CO2. It shut down the ability, at least temporarily, of the state climate regulator to regulate CO2 emissions from the oil and gas sector, including refining and production, other than through existing policies and the cap-and-trade program. And it led to a compromise in the implementation of the cap-and-trade program that made it a not particularly strict policy. Now, if you want to make a plan that's 80% regs and 20% cap-and-trade, a "not particularly strict policy" can maybe deliver that right.But that's not what the climate regulator decided to do. So they decided in 2017, in their most recent Scoping Plan.Like just in the wake of the program being renewed through 2030, right?That's right. So the cap-and-trade legislation said, "You got to finish your Scoping Plan, and here's some of the constraints on that planning process." And in that plan, the regulator adopted a set of policies, or a set of strategies, that would put that emphasis much closer to 50/50 for the year 2030. So it was a pretty big departure. And if you ask an economist that sounds like a good thing. If you ask a political scientist, or somebody in the policy scene, "What's going on?" There's a lot more questions.David RobertsRight. This is a classic real-world running of this sort of experiment, this long-running sort of dispute. I'm sure listeners are probably familiar with the basic outlines, but then you sort of have economists who are like, "Pricing is the most efficient way, über alles. Absolutely. The cheapest way to do this, and most effective." And then you have sort of people from the political realm, you might say a political scientist, who point to, "Well, in the past, what has worked? And in the past what has worked are these more blunt weapons, these sort of regulations and mandates and investments," and things like that.So it's interesting that California is really running a real-time experiment. So now in 2017, for its Scoping Plan, it says, we're going to put these on more or less 50/50 basis.Danny CullenwardLet me pause you right there. Yes. And then, here's maybe the most interesting part of this. So the plan is settled at the end of 2017, the rulemaking to implement the program doesn't finish till 2018. So ask me in 2017 what I think about this. I say, "I might have some concerns about the balance. I don't know if that's the wisest approach, but you can absolutely design a program to deliver in that way if that's what you want to do."David RobertsRight.Danny CullenwardAnd we can come back to this, to the extent this is interesting, but the design of the program in 2018 was a pretty universal sort of shift in a direction of not really addressing the supply-demand balance in the program very explicitly. And I think it's fair to say some decisions were made that led…

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    Volts podcast: Abigail Hopper on the trade case that is crushing the US solar industry May 25, 2022
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    In this episode, Abigail Hopper of the Solar Energy Industries Association discusses the trade complaint that has cast a pall over the US solar industry, why she believes it should be dismissed, and the complexities of tariff policy.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsBack in 2012, the Obama administration levied tariffs on solar panels from China, to punish the country for unfairly subsidizing its panels in an attempt to corner the market. In the ensuing years, US imports from China fell off sharply and imports from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam rose just as quickly.Early this year, a tiny California-based solar manufacturer, Auxin, filed a trade complaint with the US Department of Commerce, alleging that China is effectively laundering its solar supply chain through third-party countries, thereby illegally circumventing tariffs. It asked Commerce to apply commensurate tariffs on imports from those countries. (Canary Media has extremely thorough coverage of the case, if you want to catch up.)Commerce is investigating. Meanwhile, the industry has been thrown for a loop — imports have fallen off, projects are being cancelled, and projections of growth are being revised radically downward. The tariffs could be anywhere from 30 to 250 percent, which would radically change the economics of big solar projects, and if applied, will be retrospective over the past two years, which means even existing contracts are in jeopardy. The uncertainty has cast a pall over the entire sector.The Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) has been advocating against tariffs from the beginning and is calling on Commerce to dismiss the complaint. I contacted Abigail Hopper, the head of SEIA, to talk about the merits of the case, whether building a domestic solar supply chain is a good goal, whether tariffs work, and what other policies might be preferable. With no further ado, Abigail Hopper of SEIA. I'm not going to say the whole thing. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Abigail HopperThanks for having me. I'm glad to be here.David RobertsSo this is a knotty and complicated issue we're going to get in here.Abigail HopperIs that the K-N-O-T-T-Y naughty?David RobertsYes, exactly.Abigail HopperOkay, just checking.David RobertsAlso, perhaps naughty, we'll see at the end. So I want to kind of go through it piece by piece, before we get to the tariff dispute, the tariff case that's at issue here, let's go back a little bit and just talk about the tariffs. These date back to Obama, the Obama era. So why don't maybe you just tell us sort of what tariffs are in place, and what is the rationale for tariffs, like when Obama put these in place in 2012? What is the sort of stated rationale? What are they meant to accomplish?Abigail HopperSure. And you already have displayed more knowledge than the average person around the multiple layers of tariffs that the solar industry is dealing with. So, yes, these go back to 2012. And at that time, there was an allegation and then a finding, that China was dumping its product into United States. That meant that the Chinese government was unfairly subsidizing production of solar cells and solar modules and then selling them into the United States below cost. So if it cost $10 to make it, they would sell it in for $5, and the Chinese government would suck up the other $5.David RobertsAnd presumably this is not just, like, unfair or unsporting. This violates some law or treaty.Abigail HopperYes, it violates the trade laws, and therefore the tariffs were put in place to address that unfair practice.David RobertsAnd then there were more under Trump. What did he add?Abigail HopperSo the ones we just talked about, people refer to usually as the ADCBD, Anti-Dumping Countervailing Duties cases, and those are from 2012, and those apply to products coming out of China. In 2017, a case was initiated, and then in 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs. And those are the Section 201. That's the section of the statute it applies to. And those were placed on cells and modules coming from any country in the world. There were a couple of specific exceptions, but generally, any country in the world, these tariffs applied and they started at 30% and stepped down.There's a whole drama around the bifacial modules and that exclusion, I'm happy to talk about. But those were additive to whatever ADCBD tariffs that were already in place.David RobertsSo specifically, then, imports from China would face both of these tariffs added together.Abigail HopperCorrect.David RobertsI mean, the rationale for the first set makes sense. If China is doing something illegal under trade law, that makes sense. But what is the rationale for just slapping tariffs on all imports? That can't be that all importers are breaking trade laws. What's the rationale there?Abigail HopperYeah, it's a totally different theory of the case. It is not a claim based on fault or anyone being nefarious or violating laws. Rather, the finding is, the allegation and the finding is that the US domestic market has been harmed by competition, and they basically need a pause. They need a pause. They need a break. "Give me a second. I got to get it together." And so the best way that one of my trade lawyers explained it to me, as I was not well versed in trade law when I started this gig.David RobertsLittle did you know you were going to get a PhD.Abigail HopperLittle did I know, right. He explained it as basically putting an umbrella over the United States.David RobertsRight.Abigail HopperSo there's this protection, right. And the goal of those Section 201 tariffs is to provide an opportunity for the US solar domestic manufacturing base to recover and to build back.David RobertsSure. But what I don't get is that seems like the mirror image of Chinese subsidies. In other words, that seems like giving the US domestic market an unfair advantage. It seems like that would also be illegal under trade law for the same reasons.Abigail HopperSo it's not illegal under US trade laws, right. It's certainly, I think a lot of people think smacks of protectionism of US industry. There were complaints taken to the World Trade Organization, right, to allege, that the imposition of the Section 201 tariffs violates World Trade Organization rules, or I don't know what they're called there, actually. Whatever, they're not allowed.David RobertsIt literally is just a subsidy to US manufacturers, just like China is subsidizing its own manufacturers.Abigail HopperI think that's a very fair argument to make. I think what we saw, which I think is important, is it didn't actually have the same impact, though, right? Like, there were definitely a couple of facilities that were built in the United States after the 201 tariffs were announced, but it certainly wasn't enough to supply the US market, right. It did not create a robust domestic manufacturing base. And so round two of the Section 201 tariffs just took place in 2021. And in early 2022, President Biden extended the Section 201 tariffs.David RobertsYeah. And I don't think I'm alone here, don't get that. It seems like I mean, you know, we can talk later about the question of a domestic supply chain. I want to get into that. But it seems like a crude and not particularly effective tool. And I had thought that sort of the conventional wisdom was that this is a sort of slightly crazy thing Trump did. So what on earth, what reason did the Biden administration give for continuing these tariffs?Abigail HopperSo the Biden administration gave a couple of reasons. One was that the US manufacturing industry had not recovered sufficiently, and they said, partly, that was due to COVID, right. That as the entire economy kind of was jolted for a year, year and a half, that they too were. And so they sort of lost out on this time of protection.David RobertsRight. So they need a break. They just need a little longer break. They're not quite refreshed and ready yet.Abigail HopperExactly. I mean, I know that feeling.David RobertsYes, I know. I'm very relatable.Abigail HopperI just don't usually get government assistance with it. They did do two important things, though, in the February 2022 decision. One was to exclude from Section 201 bifacial modules that were being imported. That was a significant development.David RobertsTell us what bifacial panels are and why that's significant.Abigail HopperSo bifacial panels are solar panels used primarily, almost exclusively, in the utility scale sector that have the ability to reflect light and create energy from both sides of the panel. So there's material on the back of the panel that allows it to create more energy, and therefore be more efficient and produce more electrons, obviously changing the economics of energy production.David RobertsAnd that's the bulk. I mean, that's utility scale. So that's like the bulk sort of by number, by weight, but that's the bulk of imports. So then what's the rationale there for slapping a tariff on everything except the main import? Like, I'm losing track of what substantive goal is served here.Abigail HopperWell, so the bifacial exclusion was originally requested shortly after the imposition of the 2018 201 tariffs. And at that time, bifacial modules did not represent a large portion of the US market, the import markets. It really was a newer technology that was more in the R&D phase. And so if you think about kind of the theory of the case, the theory of the case is to allow the domestic market the opportunity to really recover and continue to develop. No one in the US was producing bifacial modules. And so allowing bifacial exclusion made sense because it wasn't competing with the US marketplace.And that's still primarily the case. There really aren't manufacturers of bifacial modules, certainly not at scale in the United States.David RobertsSo the original tariffs, the Obama tariffs, the rationale there is that, "China is breaking trade laws." The rationale for Trump's tariffs is, "we want to make room for the domestic manufacturing, domestic solar manufacturing industry to grow a little and get more robust." So before we get into the rest of it, I guess the question here, I have sort of a twofold question. One is, is it the case that once these tariffs were put in place, domestic solar manufacturing grew and flourished as intended? The larger question there is the reason, I think everybody at this point sort of gets this, the reason there's a huge solar manufacturing sector in China is not just because the government subsidizes it, although it does, but it's got cheap materials, and it's got cheap labor. It just has advantages, all the same advantages that got manufacturing offshore in the first place. Is a tariff, of the size being discussed here, enough to close that gap between the sort of costs of manufacturing abroad and the costs of manufacturing in the US?Abigail HopperNo.David RobertsIt's not big enough to close the gap.Abigail HopperNo. The simple answer is that the tariffs alone did not incent the kind of investment that the proponents of those tariffs articulated it would, right. There were certainly a couple of companies that made the decision to invest in the United States, and that's great, but it did not bring the scale of investment that would support our entire marketplace. And so I'm excited about the conversation about what would it take to develop at that scale. But tariffs, I agree with you wholeheartedly that they are a crude and inefficient tool to create domestic manufacturing in the United States.David RobertsAlright, well, we're going to return to that later, but sort of sticking with the tariffs. So the Obama tariffs are in place. The Trump tariffs are in place. Biden extends the Trump tariffs, and then we get this case. This US solar manufacturer, Auxin, files a complaint, basically saying, as I understand it, that China is circumventing these tariffs. It's basically just exporting its materials to nearby countries and then manufacturing the stuff there. And we're importing from those countries. But in all but name, we're still importing from China. Basically, China is using Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam to launder its solar cells and panels, and thereby dodging the tariffs.This is the case Auxin is making. I think there's been a lot of focus on Auxin. And this is, if people care, it's a pretty tiny company, as these things go, does not appear to be particularly robust or growing. There's been a lot of focus on Auxin. But I'd rather just skip all that and talk about the case itself. So I guess where I'd like to start is, just on the merits of the case, is this true? Is China guilty of circumventing tariffs by laundering its materials through these other countries?Abigail HopperNo, it's not, and I can tell you why. So there is a statute, right? There's a statute on point that they have alleged that China has violated. And I think the evidence will show that they have not. And the key piece of that statute says that in order for it to qualify the actions you're described, you described well, to qualify a circumvention, the manufacturing or the processing in the third party country, the third country. So the Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam has to be minor and insignificant. Like, those are terms that are in the statute.David RobertsSo, in other words, those countries would just be taking the material and cranking it out and not really doing, not really adding value?Abigail HopperRight. Like, in my mind, it's sort of like it all gets there, they slap a sticker on the back, and then it's like, boom, now it's from Vietnam and not from China. But that's not what's happening. I do not claim to be a supply chain expert, but I certainly have a lot of them that are consulting for us, as you could imagine. And certainly cell manufacturing, the manufacturing of solar cells is far from minor and insignificant, right. It is a very complex, very technologically advanced process that adds a ton of value to the product. The United States Department of Commerce has determined in four different cases already that the country of origin is where the cell is manufactured.But as they have looked at other cases and considered other claims, they have made that determination, because, "where do you apply the tariff? Oh, you apply it where the cell is manufactured, okay." So the cell is manufactured in these four countries. And so, no, I do not think, and our council certainly doesn't think, that the requirements needed to demonstrate Circumvention have been met in this case.David RobertsBut another way of looking at this, sort of intuitive way of looking at this, is you got these Chinese companies that are receiving all these subsidies from the Chinese government, which is the whole sort of issue here. And then they open subsidiaries in Cambodia, et cetera, and manufacture there. So in a sense, they're not manufacturing in China, but in another sense, they are still subsidized in the way that caused the original tariffs, right? Do you see what I'm saying? Like, the sort of unfair subsidies still seem to apply, even if a Chinese company opens a satellite company in Cambodia, it's still getting the subsidies.Do you know what I mean?Abigail HopperI understand the point that you are making. I don't agree with it wholeheartedly. I think two points. One is that some of the companies that we're talking about that are impacted by this Circumvention Petition are not Chinese-owned companies. They're other companies,…

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    Volts podcast: Lauren Melodia and Kristina Karlsson on energy inflation and how to tame it May 23, 2022
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    In this episode, Lauren Melodia and Kristina Karlsson of the Roosevelt Institute explain why it’s counter-productive to increase domestic oil and gas production when energy prices rise, and how building out clean-energy infrastructure is the actual best way to address the price volatility of fossil fuels. (PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsAmericans are struggling with two related problems: one, there’s general inflation, which means pretty much everything is expensive; two, there’s energy price inflation, which means that energy in particular (specifically, oil and gas) is expensive.This has led some politicians, mainly Republicans-and-Joe-Manchin, to propose a dual solution: cut back on government spending (to tame inflation) and increase domestic oil and gas production (to tame energy prices). This approach is wrong-headed and counter-productive on both counts. The reasons why are laid out in a new issue brief from the Roosevelt Institute, the first in a series called “All Economic Policy Is Climate Policy” (which, hell yes).Lauren Melodia, deputy director of macroeconomic analysis at the Roosevelt Institute, and Kristina Karlsson, the institute’s program manager for climate and economic transformation, argue that fossil fuel prices are inherently volatile, and that volatility has serious macroeconomic effects; on the flip side, electricity prices — specifically renewable electricity prices — tend to be far more stable and manageable.It follows that government spending to build out clean-energy infrastructure is itself anti-inflationary; it removes a source of price instability and replaces it with stability. This argument is my favorite kind — it put words to something that’s been rattling around in my head for years — so I was excited to talk to Melodia and Karlsson about the volatility of fossil fuels, why we’ve come to accept it as an inevitable fact of life, and why it is, in fact, a choice that we could make differently. With no further ado, Lauren Melodia and Kristina Karlsson from the Roosevelt Institute. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Kristina KarlssonThanks for having us.Lauren MelodiaThanks so much for having us.David RobertsYou have written this report about energy and inflation. It's one of my favorite kinds of reports, in that, after I read it, I was like, "Oh, well, duh, of course that's true." But it's like it hadn't occurred to me before. It's one of those things where just hearing it stated clearly, I think is very eye-opening. So let's walk through a little bit, the pieces of it, and then we'll get into what it means for policy. So to start with, something I found interesting and didn't really know, which is that these traditional measures of inflation, which are gently sort of like bundles of products through which inflation is measured and tested, exclude energy.Typically, energy is not included in them because energy is sort of inherently volatile and is swinging up and down all the time. And so the idea, I think, is if we include that, it's going to sort of obscure what we're trying to look at. So we'll set that aside and look at another bundle of products, and if they are going up, then it's real inflation. This is sort of how things are typically done. But as you say, this can be somewhat misleading since energy price volatility plays a huge role in inflation, and, specifically, is playing a huge role in current inflation.So explain briefly sort of the role of energy prices in the inflation we are currently experiencing.Lauren MelodiaSure, absolutely. I mean, I think that there's two ways that they're at play, despite the fact that the Fed or certain macro analysts might not want to think about energy prices in the overall inflation rate. One is simply that people spend a lot of money on energy. And so even if the core CPI, Consumer Price Index, or other indicators show that there's price stability, people are experiencing rising gasoline prices. And we've seen over the past year, that really fuel the conversation around inflation.David RobertsConsumers definitely don't hold energy as some separate category, right. Like they experience it as inflation when prices rise.Lauren MelodiaExactly. So if we're talking about rising prices in society and trying to ground that conversation and connect with consumers, people who are consuming the media, your constituents, these are the prices that people are going to be talking about. The other way that they really do influence kind of the overall economy is that these energy price volatility, the changes in energy prices, actually do have a huge impact on our economy overall even if we don't want to be thinking about them when it comes to inflation. And that simply is because energy is foundational to business operations and household consumption.If there's a spike in gasoline prices or other energy prices, it is something that people just have to deal with. You can't delay consuming energy, you have to pay the higher price, and it means that you're going to have less money to spend in other parts of the economy. So we've seen actually, historically, that ten out of the last twelve economic recessions in the United States were actually preceded by a spike in crude oil prices. Meaning that you've got this rise in prices there, people have to pay it, they can't pay for other things in the economy, and it leads to kind of a slowdown of economic growth.David RobertsI want to sort of put an exclamation point on this because I feel like it's super important to understanding the rest of it is. It's not like cars or bread or something, where if the prices rise you can buy less of it or switch to an alternate product. Energy is a non-negotiable. You have to heat your house, you have to run your business. So rises in energy prices just mean you're spending more on energy, which automatically means you're spending less on other consumer categories.Lauren MelodiaYeah, absolutely. One of the concepts we try to really highlight here is the concept of energy insecurity. When the price of energy rises and people just have to pay it, it means that they can't pay for other basic necessities, not to mention other things that fuel economic growth and productivity. Those other things where we've got people out there working, making those things to produce and sell to consumers who have disposable income to spend.David RobertsRight. And can you quantify sort of how big a role energy volatility is playing in the current inflation relative to ... we've seen all these other consumer goods rising in prices, too. So is there some way sort of dividing the responsibility?Lauren MelodiaYeah, I mean, people are aware of gasoline prices rising a dollar or two in their communities. The way that inflation is calculated is based on the change in price of an item, but it's weighted based on how much people spend on that item. So energy prices are one of the biggest ticket items for the average household. The average household is spending roughly 11% of their annual budget on energy consumption. And so that gets weighted in the calculation of what inflation is. So inflation, the number that we hear monthly when the numbers come out is rather abstract.Like last month it came in at 8.3% over the past year.David RobertsRight.Lauren MelodiaBut we can attribute 2.1% of that to energy prices alone, and largely gasoline price increases.David RobertsYeah, you said in the report, gasoline price increases specifically responsible for 75% of energy inflation. So gasoline is the big ticket here. And just, aside from the economics of inflation, gasoline is also probably the single consumer price of which US consumers are most aware, most hyper aware. They see it advertised to them every day. So insofar as part of inflation is sort of the psychology of it, the consumer psychology of it, that is also a big piece.Lauren MelodiaFor sure.David RobertsSo you say, you lay out a couple of reasons why fossil fuels are not accidentally volatile, but sort of intrinsically volatile. Could you lay those out insofar as this is not like a solvable problem? So explain why fossil fuel — what is it about fossil fuels that make their price fluctuations kind of out of our hands?Kristina KarlssonAbsolutely. I think you started that question with the exact takeaway. This problem is not solvable, so long as we are continually reliant on fossil fuels. And that comes from a few things. I mean, the most obvious place to start is that these are hard to find hydrocarbons buried deep underground. They require significant investment in production up front, and they also happen to be located in different places around the world that sort of tie us into a default geopolitical web. And as we can see right now, with Russia's invasion of the Ukraine, geopolitical conflict has a huge impact on our domestic oil prices.And that has been the case for a very long time, not just in current situations. And I think that's very well exemplified in that graph that we share, where we show that ten of the past twelve economic recessions are preceded by an oil spike. A lot of those oil spikes come from geopolitical conflict. And beyond that, I mean, beyond just the fact that there's conflict in this international market, the fact that it is international, and that we are one player in a much bigger market than we would be for other types of goods that we consume, is another part of this volatility.I mean, when we are faced with situations like we are in now, where international conflict is driving changes in our domestic prices, we have very little ability to mitigate those supply chain blockages by boosting our own domestic production.David RobertsI wanted to ask about that specifically. This, I think, is a lot of people's initial instinct or intuition, and not just a lot of random people, but a lot of members of Congress in both parties. This idea is, like, if this international volatility, these international problems are causing oil prices to go up, it makes intuitive sense to people, I think, that if we just produce more of our own oil and gas, we will to some degree protect ourselves from that volatility. And that just turns out to be...Kristina KarlssonNot the case.David Roberts... very straightforwardly wrong. Explain why.Kristina KarlssonYeah, I think there's two things, I think, one, even if we increase our domestic supply, the way that — especially crude oil — is priced is through an international sort of price cartel, which is OPEC. They have a strong price setting power, and any changes that the US makes will still be influenced by the prices that are coming from that organization.David RobertsRight. And if they want, they want to set prices, and if the US boosts its production, such as to lower prices more than OPEC wants them lowered, OPEC is perfectly capable of dialing back production in other places ...Kristina KarlssonExactly.David Roberts... to get the price they want.Kristina KarlssonWe can't beat them.David RobertsExactly. Theoretically, there's some limit. If we were a big enough producer, if we had like 50% of the world's, or 80% of the world's oil, or something like that, there's some size we could reach where we could have a bigger influence.Kristina KarlssonBut we don't want that.David RobertsBut a. we don't have it and b. probably couldn't get it even if we sort of maxed out.Kristina KarlssonExactly. I mean, and the second reason, which is even in this imaginary world where the US becomes the mega producer of crude oil, it's not going to help domestic consumers, because our current domestic producers are very heavy exporters at the moment. Most of our domestic production is actually being exported, even in times of elevated demand at home, even when we're having price crises at the pump in the US, we can't make oil companies choose to sell their product domestically, especially if there's a profit incentive for selling abroad. And that's exactly the case.David RobertsYes. Like taking care of like "Oh, our people, our domestic people are suffering. Let's divert some of our oil and take care of them." It's just not really a thought process that like your Exxon execs ...Kristina KarlssonThey get a lot of undue patriotism put on them because, in these moments, when this is really hitting the fan, we can see where their priorities are. And this ties to the nature of fossil fuels again, which I think will contrast with renewables later on, is that these energy products are transportable overseas. The reason that they are exported so much is because we can. And early on, when natural gas came online in the US it was supposed to be the solution to US energy independence. That was all well and good until liquefied natural gas happened.David RobertsYes. I want to lay this out a little bit because the conventional wisdom, and I think probably a lot of people still have this in their heads, I think, insofar as they're paying attention to energy, the conventional wisdom is: yes, oil is this sort of perfectly fungible international market, and the domestic supply is almost irrelevant to the prices. But natural gas is different. It's harder to transport, it's harder to send overseas. So insofar as we're boosting domestic production, we are satisfying domestic demand. But as you say in the report, the sort of growth of the liquid natural gas technology and industry means that more and more natural gas is starting to sort of mirror oil.Kristina KarlssonAbsolutely.David RobertsIn being international, an international market.Kristina KarlssonRight. I think, we can observe sort of similar skyrocketing trends in exports around the same time between liquefied natural gas and crude oil, which is when the crude oil export ban was lifted and during the time that liquefied natural gas technology was really coming online. And now we're at the point where we are the number one liquefied natural gas exporter in the world, and we are actually exporting faster than domestic production at the moment.David RobertsOh, wow.Kristina KarlssonWhich is very concerning.David RobertsSo we're exporting more than we're producing.Kristina KarlssonYeah, we have reserves, but we are exporting at a pace that is higher than our domestic production, and that is actually causing us to draw down inventories, at this moment, when we are really struggling, to maintain our export commitments.David RobertsSo then this idea, because there's a lot of congresspeople who are real hot on the idea that building more LNG terminals is the way ... like, that's how we can get our "freedom gas" to Europe, so they can stop using the "autocrat gas" and start using the "freedom gas." But that, again, fundamentally mistakes how international markets work. Like the market is fluid. Once the LNG is out there circulating in the natural gas market, it's just part of the gas market. It's not marked. You don't have a little "F" on the "freedom gas," and a little "A" on the "autocrat gas," it just all becomes gas that you buy on an open market.Kristina KarlssonExactly. I mean, it's important to remind ourselves also when we play out these potential scenarios, if we invest further in our own fossil fuel dependence, even if the sake is to export "freedom gas," we are now further entrenching ourselves to our vulnerability to price fluctuations from gasoline, which are still not going anywhere, is just further and further entrenched. The more infrastructure we bring online, the more we are tied to international dynami…

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    Volts podcast: Jesse Morris on building an operating system for distributed energy May 18, 2022
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    In this episode, Jesse Morris of international nonprofit Energy Web discusses his group’s work toward building a transparent and trusted “operating system” for distributed energy resources, with an end goal of enabling a more sophisticated and resilient energy grid.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsRecent years have seen an explosive rise in distributed energy resources (DERs) — energy devices that are located “behind the meter,” on the customer side, like solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), and smart appliances.Distributed energy has the potential to change the grid for the better, making it cleaner and more resilient, but as things stand, there’s a problem.Consider an EV. The customer has a relationship to it, a way to see its capacity and behavior; it wants to operate the EV in a way that best serves their own transportation needs. The aggregator — an entity that gathers DERs and treats them as a single entity, to sell their services — has a different relationship with the EV; it wants to operate the EV to meet contractual requirements. The distribution utility has a different relationship; it wants to operate the EV to maintain grid stability. And the market manager (ISO) has yet a different relationship; it wants to operate the EV in the way that best serves the market.All these entities want different things from the EV, but they’ve all built bespoke systems to track it — systems that do not communicate with one another. Consequently, most DERs are wildly underutilized. This can not last. Confusion and crossed wires will only grow with distributed energy. What the world needs is a common, transparent, trusted way to track DERs, their capacity and interaction with the grid. That is what Energy Web, an international nonprofit, aims to provide: “an operating system for DERs” that will assign each DER a record on the blockchain (yes, the blockchain), allowing all interested entities to have a common source of information and tracking.I am a bit of a skeptic of toward blockchain hype, but this seems like an excellent use of it, which could unlock a much more sophisticated and resilient grid. I’m eager to talk to Energy Web CEO Jesse Morris about what the product is, how it can help DERs, and where we might see it adopted next.Alright, then. With no further ado, Jesse Morris of Energy Web. Thanks for coming to Volts.Jesse MorrisThank you for having me. Looking forward to the conversation.David RobertsYou know, I want to get into the nuts and bolts of Energy Web, but I feel like we should do a little background, a little scene setting, a little contexting. So let's start, then, because Energy Web is, I think, primarily a way of solving the problems, some of the problems posed by distributed energy. And so I don't want to assume too much background knowledge on the part of listeners. So why don't you just really quickly sort of tell us what qualifies as distributed energy? What's the sort of technical definition of distributed energy? What is it? How much of it is there? How much is coming on board? And what challenge does it pose to the grid?Jesse MorrisSo I think that is a very accurate statement, in terms of our primary focus at Energy Web and the problems we're trying to solve. For us, distributed energy, and I'll add the additional word on here, distributed energy resources. What are we talking about there, at least in kind of Energy Web's world? So we're really talking about any kind of electricity using, storing, or generating device. So that could range from a battery in a home, a battery in a commercial and industrial building, an electric vehicle, a charge point, a heat pump, any kind of load that can be flexed over time.So our definition of distributed energy resources, at least in terms of the work that we're doing, is actually quite broad. And if I think about the challenges and opportunities there, these are things that anyone working kind of under the broad umbrella of the energy transition, especially you, David, would be super familiar with. We know that in many grids around the world, we're undergoing one of the biggest shifts in the 100+ year history of the grid. More and more customers are adopting these distributed energy resources. Again, I'm sitting here in California, massive amounts of rooftop solar coming online.The model three is the fastest selling and the best selling automobile in the state. So all of these distributed energy resources, in some places, are presenting problems. We do a lot of work in Australia, where they have too much solar at specific times of the day. It's literally backfeeding into the transmission system. It's unbelievable. But then we also are in places where those same resources can provide immense value to the grid. My electric vehicle can help reduce congestion at certain times of the day to prevent our overhead lines from overheating and starting more wildfires. So a little bit of the context about what we're focused on.David RobertsAs I've thought about distributed resources over the years, I think, in the beginning, most people are, I think intuitively, most people still just think solar panels, and kind of batteries, sort of the generating and storing of energy. But as you note, any energy consuming device in the house that can be controlled, really counts as an energy resource, as a distributed energy resource. So, like your water heater. Very sort of banal household appliances, we're kind of starting to think about them now as energy resources, which is really a new way of looking at things. But the one piece about distributed energy that I think is worth adding is that all these devices that you're talking about are what's called "behind the meter", which means from the utility's point of view, the utility comes and reads your meter, and that's how much energy you use.So it does not know what is going on behind the meter. I think a key part of this is just that these distributed energy resources are operating largely out of sight of utilities.Jesse MorrisExactly. That is the problem that we're trying to solve at Energy Web. We are trying to make it possible for all of these devices to be seen and be able to communicate by these utilities. And maybe a little context there. My background. I worked at RMI, or Rocky Mountain Institute, for about ten years. And my tenure there, I can't tell you how many times I walked into a boardroom or with some executives at a utility or another energy company, and we had these beautiful charts and models showing how much money different companies could make by taking all of these distributed energy resources and bidding them into wholesale markets, and eventually, with regulations changing, bidding them into local, I'd call them "distribution markets" for electricity run by local utilities.And the charts were beautiful, the performers are beautiful, but you had to make two pretty fundamental assumptions. One, that regulations would continue to evolve, which as you know, is ...David RobertsNot always something you can bet on.Jesse MorrisExactly. But the second thing, and this is why I spun Energy Web, myself and several other colleagues at RMI spun Energy Web out, is it was very clear to pull off any of these business models we were talking about, software was going to be needed. And these utilities, it's not an innovative place necessarily. Building software means using Zoom in a lot of cases. So that's really where this came from. We said, "Well, wait a minute, can we start a new organization to build open source software to crack this problem of giving grid operators visibility into these assets that sit behind the meter?"David RobertsYeah. And one more thing to add, maybe, you're referring to the many potential benefits that could come, if these things are seen and coordinated in some rational way. But I just want to emphasize one last time before we move on, that from the utilities point of view now, not being able to see them, it's not just that they're leaving benefits on the table, it's causing them severe problems because utilities turn power plants on and off to meet demand. And demand traditionally, as you know, has been pretty predictable, right? It goes up and down. It goes up when everybody gets home from work and then down at night.And it's relatively predictable for utilities how much power they're going to need. But if you've got like a solar panel generating behind the meter, from the utilities side of the meter, that just looks like demand going down, right? Demand from that household going down. Only now, because you've got all these thousands and thousands of DERs, of distributed energy resources, behind all these meters, suddenly demand is just becoming less predictable for the utilities, right? Because you got things generating and storing and timing their consumption behind the meter, you can't see any of it. So all of a sudden your sort of very predictable demand curves, that you're used to sort of orienting around, are starting to look wonky and weird.Jesse MorrisExactly. And I'd say I'd push it even further. Two examples come to mind for me. So another one in Australia, there's so much solar being exported at the distribution network that grid operators there, today, need a tool to be able to communicate directly with smart inverters and shut off those solar systems. Most cases they don't have that.If I spin around the world to Europe, so far we've been talking about customer-owned resources that sit behind the meter, they actually have this problem with their own equipment in some places. A lot of sensors that are used and a lot of automation equipment on distribution networks. They're actually using relatively analog technology to kind of track where those assets are and communicate with them. And so, even there, you might have some industrial sensors that you're using some old school technology to actually collect data from them, instead of having a nice dashboard to show you the temperature of your distribution network in different places. So it's not just customer-owned resources that are operating a little bit with kind of old school methodologies and technologies. It's also some utility-owned ones.David RobertsIt's a little wild, and I won't do all this, but many people have remarked how amazing it is that the grid works at all.Jesse MorrisShocking.David RobertsYou can't store electricity, at least you couldn't until very recently, at least very well. So you have to be generating exactly in concert with demand at all times, 24 hours of the day. And they've been doing this for a century without clear visibility into the things that are at the end of the lines, right, the edge of the grid. It's just amazing that it's been pulled off as long as it has. But the idea that, "oh, we should have some real time awareness of what's going on out there on the grid that we're trying to manage," it just seems so obvious. It's crazy that it's only just now coming along.Jesse MorrisI continue to be surprised. I mean, I can't tell you how many times I've been sitting with a grid operator and made an assumption, being a millennial in their mid-30s and has a supercomputer in their pocket. "Wait a minute, you're telling me you haven't thought about sending me a digital communication to maybe not use electricity at a certain time? And you're talking about, let's make sure we send Jesse a flyer to engage in a demand response problem." I mean, that's a real conversation I just had.David RobertsI love it. I love it. Direct mail. They're still in the direct mail phase of things. It's crazy how primitive some of the pieces of it are. So there have been some efforts to try to address this, and to try to sort of make use of distributed energy in a more coherent way, but it hasn't really taken off much. So, like, for instance, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, issued this Order 2222. I'm not sure what's the right industry way to say that. Is there some slang?Jesse MorrisI think you got it.David Roberts22-22? I don't know.Jesse MorrisSure.David RobertsMeant to sort of authorize DERs to bid into wholesale energy markets, so that all the energy that's generated that isn't self consumed by the consumer doesn't just go to waste. And there have been sort of efforts in this direction in the EU, but your sort of take is that they have fallen short. Nothing's really gotten along. So what are the efforts so far? And why haven't they done much good?Jesse MorrisUnfortunately, I kind of said there's two things you need to believe for these DERs to be being fully utilized, right. One is these regulatory barriers need to be overcome, and the second is you need technology to go out and get them. We're really focused on number two, in particular, and one of the reasons we're focused on number two is because one of the reasons, that are at least put forth by key people in some of these utilities, especially in the US, is that a grid largely relying on DERs to help balance the grid, instead of centralized thermal plants, just isn't reliable enough.And our approach there is, say "No, no, no, let's prove that wrong. Let's show that we can give grid operators near real-time visibility and, potentially, control, if a customer allows it, into exactly when, for example, an electric vehicle is charged and with how many amps." So we're really focused on the technology side, but if we want to talk, I can offer a couple of, at least, observations on the regulatory front. I'm lucky enough to be able to have conversations with every time zone on the planet pretty much every day. We're really active in Western Europe. We have some projects in Turkey. If we spin all the way around the globe, we're very active in Australia, then here in the US we've got a lot going on.So if you look globally, I mean there are opportunities for DERs to make money via either bidding into the wholesale market under some limited programs. So California is probably the best example of that. And then these local programs managed by, for lack of a better term, distribution utilities. So the companies that are running the distribution networks, and there's your traditional virtual power plant demand response programs. You hit the nail on the head though. If we're trying to generalize around the world, very few places can distributed energy resources have unfettered access to the wholesale energy market or to these, what I like to call, "distribution level markets", even though they don't really exist yet.And David, you know better than me why that's going on. I mean, you should, perhaps, offer that synthesis.David RobertsWell, there's a bunch of reasons. I assume you're referring to the fact that utilities traditionally make money off building big infrastructure, and to the extent, consumers or customers are building that infrastructure for them, basically, which is what you're doing when you put solar panels on your roof and a battery in your garage. You're building a little piece of grid infrastructure. To the extent customers build it, utilities don't make any money off the building of it. The same problem that faces DERs and efficiency and anything else that might trim consumption of central thermal plants.Jesse MorrisYes, exactly. And there are other issues too. In Europe it's a little bit more nuanced. I would say the conversation in Europe about DER provision o…

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    Volts podcast: Doug Thompson defends the deep state May 13, 2022
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    In this episode, Doug Thompson, associate professor of political science at the University of South Carolina, sings the praises of bureaucracy and its essential role in the fight against climate change.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsIt’s well-understood that the modern US conservative movement is a mix of two primary forces, fiscal and social conservatism. (See: fusionism.) Put more crudely: it’s the oligarchs and the evangelical white nationalists. The left’s pushback to social conservatism — anti-racism and civil rights more broadly — is well-developed and richly articulated. But what about the oligarchs and their stated mission to, in Steve Bannon’s words, “deconstruct the administrative state”? Where is the left’s defense of the administrative state, or as it’s less fondly known, the bureaucracy, or even less fondly, the “deep state”? Who will speak up for the deep state?The left has an ambivalent relationship with bureaucracy (which, after all, only overlapped with democracy for the last century or so) and has largely failed to articulate a coherent defense, even as Biden’s administration scrambles to rebuild the agencies Trump decimated. The right has told a clear, consistent story: government bureaucracies are corrupt, inefficient, incompetent, and expensive. It has been repeated to the point that it is folk wisdom. To this day, the left does not have a similarly clear and consistent counter-story about the merits of bureaucracy, or, to use a less loaded term, administrative capacity.State administrative capacity may not be well-theorized on the left, but it is nonetheless a necessary condition of virtually all progressives’ solutions to contemporary problems, climate change chief among them. The wealthy can not be taxed, corporations can not be forced to follow the rules, and wealth can not be transferred to those in need without a robust, competent administrative state. My guest today, Doug Thompson, an associate professor of political science at the University of South Carolina, has been thinking and writing about bureaucracy lately, as part of a larger book project on authoritarianism in America. He wondered why aspiring autocrats invariably degrade administrative capacity the second they are able — what they know about it that small-d democrats don’t seem to — which led him to an investigation of bureacracy that traced through Tocqueville and du Bois.Anyway, I’m excited to geek out with Thompson about the intense oligarchic hatred of the administrative state, America’s rich and somewhat surprising history with bureaucracy, and the kinds of positive arguments that can be made on behalf of administrative capacity as such.Without further ado, Doug Thompson, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Doug Thompson: Thank you very much for having me. It's a pleasure to be here.David Roberts: We're going to talk about bureaucracy, which many people mistakenly think is a boring subject; we're going to set them straight. One of the points you make in your writing is that bureaucracy and democracy have somewhat separate histories and only really intertwined recently. As a consequence, our ways of thinking and talking about democracy were shaped in a pre-bureaucratic age and we don't have a robust language to defend democratic bureaucracy as such. Tell us a little bit about that history and how it’s shaped political science and political views.Doug Thompson: Sure. Bureaucracy has been around for thousands of years. The first unified Chinese Empire was founded and established by putting together all of these little statelets that had been at war with each other for a few hundred years. All of these states, over the course of their development, had acquired pretty significant administrative capacity. They had a dedicated, somewhat professionalized bureaucracy that was able to levy taxes and measure the population and measure land and take all that information down to help the first Chinese emperors rule. This set China on this path that it continues to be on to this day, of the rise and fall of dynasties but the constant reconstruction of those dynasties on the basis of a pretty significantly powerful and centralized bureaucratic state. Of course, those are autocratic societies. On the other hand, democratic societies typically developed not only in the absence of bureaucracy, but in many cases because of the absence of bureaucracy. If you're a ruler and you want to demand your people pay some taxes, you can't just yell it from the treetops and expect them to pay up. If you don't have a dedicated administrative system to collect that kind of revenue – the kind of policy that nobody likes; no one wants to pay taxes – then you have to go to other elites in your society, or perhaps even a broad swath of the population if it's a relatively democratic place, and you have to consult with them and convince them to pay up and why it's in their interests. We see the development of early democratic institutions that way, because of the absence of bureaucracy. You have these two separate trajectories. It's really not until very recently, 19th but certainly in the 20th centuries, when you have large-scale democracies, like the United States, where a huge swath of the population that's able to vote is tied to pretty significant bureaucratic institutions for the first time.The founding of the US is a great example of demand for democracy because of the absence of bureaucracy. In the 1600s, if the folks running those English colonies on that stolen land (let's call it what it is) want to build a schoolhouse or a road, or irrigate their fields, or whatever it is they want to do, there's no administrative system there that can carry out those policies. They have to come together, consult with each other, debate with each other, then all vote together what to do. You can picture in early America how the absence of bureaucracy made democracy necessary.David Roberts: As you say, in the political science literature and also in folk wisdom, a lot of times bureaucracy is framed as counter to the spirit of democracy. That's probably a consequence also of bureaucracy coming late to the game.Doug Thompson: I think that's right. There's also another issue that comes up. The earliest development of modern democracies in the 19th and 20th century are larger-scale, more inclusive democracies where people vote for representatives, rather than small councils of elites debating amongst themselves, like in Athens. This time where bureaucracies begin to develop in these democratic societies happens to also coincide with probably the greatest humanitarian crimes in human history.David Roberts: Very notably bureaucratized crimes.Doug Thompson: Yes. Bureaucracy gets a bad name in many ways because of that. We think of the Nazi regime and its horribly bureaucratized system of mass murder, personified in Adolf Eichmann in Hannah Arendt’s book. We also think of the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union, which also kills millions and is known to have a centralized bureaucratic state. In the American case, Robert McNamara’s Pentagon during the Vietnam War was also a heavily bureaucratized system with all kinds of weird benchmarks, body counts and horrible stuff that also rationalized murder; Americans killed 2 million Vietnamese people. There are reasons why bureaucracy got a bad name as it was being attached to democracies, because it was put to, frankly, anti-democratic uses as well during that period.David Roberts: Clearly bureaucracy is a tool that can be used for good or bad, but it's no coincidence that aspiring authoritarians always go after bureaucracy. You sent me a paper a while back on the “authoritarian dilemma”: that any democracy is born out of something else, and the ruling class in whatever else that was is not going to like transferring to democracy; and is still going to be there in the democracy, probably willfully trying to destroy it; yet the democracy, being a democracy, has to extend equal rights to those people. I've been thinking about that recently, for obvious reasons. We have our own aristocracy that never accepted the onset of real democracy. Say a little bit about why we see this regularity throughout modern history, that autocrats always want to degrade the state.Doug Thompson: We can see this in a number of periods of American history and American political development. A great example is the antebellum South. The slave states of the South are not democracies by any stretch of the imagination; the internal politics of the states, especially in the Deep South, are dominated by massively wealthy landowning families that have huge estates, enslave hundreds of people, and make tremendous amounts of money, through the value of humans (since humans are given a financial value during this period), their land, and selling cotton like gangbusters on international markets. They're in charge of everything in those states. When you need to build a road there, if you want to take care of any kind of policy, usually it's done through highly personalized influence networks and clientelistic networks, and those at the top are at the top of those networks. So the imposition of authority from outside – like the federal government coming in and handing over the administration of roads, of schools, of tax collection, of land use and land distribution, and the monitoring and defense of people's rights – is going to look like a huge imposition and a giant loss of power that these elites enjoyed in the prior, pre-democratic era. It's not just a loss of their money and their prestige; it's a loss of their identity, too. These guys are the lords of this area. They stand to lose everything by federalization and bureaucratization, so they're going to push back against it. You do get some bureaucratization. During the Reconstruction period you have the Freedmen's Bureau, which is dedicated to implementing the policies put in place after the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments are passed. There are all kinds of problems with the Freedmen's Bureau – it's understaffed and underfunded, but it is a federal bureaucratic system that is enforced by military force; the Army is still occupying the South in the decade or so after the war. And there's a violent insurrection against that system.David Roberts: If you're on top of one of those local power structures – you're the son of the guy who owns all the car dealerships or whatever – even if it's only subconscious, you know that to the extent the playing field is made more level, you're not going to come out on top where you were. Insofar as there is a hint of meritocracy introduced, you're in trouble; you know that your reign is not justified or warranted by talent. That's why they've all put so much energy into the mythologies that justify their rule, because they're insecure about it on some level. They know.Doug Thompson: This is not really a bureaucratic question, although it can be in many cases, but think of the inclusion of women in elite parts of the workforce and the labor markets, and the incredible pushback on that. If 50 percent of the population that had been relatively forcibly excluded from the best jobs – the neurosurgeon, the high-end lawyer – now is competition, the idiot third son of your local car dealership owner who was going to get into law school now might not, because now he’s got to put up with all this competition.David Roberts: All the aristocracies are terrified on some level that if the people they treat like s**t gain some power, they’ll treat them like s**t. It's clear that the autocrats know that centralized bureaucracy works against them. Let's flip over and make the positive case for bureaucracy. If you ask 10 random lefties on the street “how do you feel about bureaucracy?” I’m not sure that they would feel positively at all, much less be able to articulate why bureaucracies are good. Let's tick through some of the reasons. One of the most interesting, and something you argue in your writing that political science has overlooked, is that centralized bureaucracies often do not only reflect the desires of voters, they also affect the way voters see things and the way voters view politics, and in some sense can create constituencies for further change. You wrote about how the Freedmen's Bureau worked that way. Say a little bit about that.Doug Thompson: There's an excellent literature on this in political science. It goes by the name of “policy feedback” – how policies, when they’re implemented, affect the process. There are a few ways that people could frame positive effects of bureaucracy; the one you mentioned is probably the most complicated, so I may get to that one last. It’ll tie your brain in knots if you think about it closely, but we'll get to it.One of the things that we can say about bureaucracy that is intuitively appealing is that it gives democratic citizens a freedom and power that they wouldn't have otherwise had. When majorities of citizens vote for representatives because those representatives promise to put in place certain policies, if there's no administrative capacity to actually carry out those policies, then it doesn't matter if you vote for them or not, because they'll never happen. If Congress puts in a law that says “I command companies not to dump toxins into the air or the water,” it's like shouting for taxes from the treetops in the year 1200. Nobody's going to comply with this. You need to have a dedicated staff with a budget and a bunch of experts who can monitor the air and water quality on a day-to-day basis and make sure that the compliance is going on.David Roberts: I talked with an expert in Chinese environmentalism recently, and one of the things he said was that the central bureaucracy in China has some ambitions about clean air and clean water and climate change, but frequently it is shouting those commands down to local parochial rulers who have other counter-incentives about making money or fast economic growth and who can just ignore it. The Chinese central party views the EPA and the system of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act with envy, precisely because it enables us to do these things that we want to do, which are not trivial.Doug Thompson: The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act are policies with huge majority support. In an abstract way, if you say “the EPA is shutting down small businesses and we all hate environmentalists telling you what to do,” you can tell a story that will get people to hate the EPA. But when you ask people “do you want your kids to have horrible asthma or get terrible cancers because of poisons in the air?” everybody says no to that question.David Roberts: The problem is the next step you want them to take, which is that the only way to do that is our big, professionalized bureaucracy. We've built a giant, complicated, very professional, very well-functioning machine that enables you to have those preferences. If we didn't have the machine, you could, as my granddad used to say, have the preferences in one hand and pee in the other and see which one fills up first. Preferences without capacity are futile.Doug Thompson: Absolutely. That's one of the intuitive stories that we can tell and broadcast publicly. Even Republicans will say they want to have clean air. Republican voters often agree with Democratic voters about specific policies; depends on how you word it, of course. You're free to express your desires in your vote and have it turn into a reality because of that administrative capacity. We can also make a case for individual bodily freedom that Americans find very appealing. Are you really free to mov…

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    Volts podcast: Andy Frank on how to sell whole-home retrofits to skeptical consumers May 09, 2022
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    In this episode, Andy Frank, president and co-founder of Sealed, discusses his company’s pay-for-performance model for home electrification.(PDF transcript)(Active transcript)Text transcript:David RobertsOne of the greatest riddles of the decarbonization effort is the residential sector, responsible for about 20 percent of US energy-related carbon emissions. There are about 142 million housing units in the US, around 83 million of which are “owner-occupied.” Substantially changing them involves dealing with 83 million separate owners, each with their own circumstances and preferences.Residential decarbonization seems incredibly difficult to scale up, and attempts to date have not been particularly successful. At the rate we are going, it will take hundreds of years to decarbonize America’s housing stock. The crew at New York-based climate tech company Sealed is trying something new, imported from the commercial efficiency market. Rather than trying to persuade homeowners to buy and install things with their own scarce resources, Sealed covers all the upfront costs and coordinates the work with trusted contractors. Homeowners pay the retrofit back out of energy savings, which means Sealed only gets paid if there are, in fact, measurable energy savings. This kind of pay-for-performance arrangement is called an energy services agreement (ESA). Listeners of my pod with Rob Harmon will recognize the concept: customers are paying for metered energy efficiency, in the same way they would pay for energy. Sealed started small but is growing quickly, so I’m excited to talk to its president and co-founder Andy Frank about the frustrations and failures of residential energy efficiency to date, what he’s learned about homeowner preferences, and what kind of benefits come along with having a fully electrified home. Without further ado, Andy Frank of Sealed, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.Andy Frank: Thanks for having me.David Roberts: Where do residential emissions and energy use sit in the larger picture? How big of a piece of the climate puzzle are they?Andy Frank: They’re a pretty big piece of the puzzle. Home energy use represents about 20 percent of US carbon emissions. It's a big enough piece where we're really not going to be able to meet our climate goals without nailing residential efficiency and electrification. It is a large opportunity, but also one that has historically been very frustrating to make progress on.David Roberts: The arguments for home energy efficiency stand regardless of climate change; it makes sense to save money and use less energy to do so. We've talked for decades about weatherization and nation-wide retrofits, etc., but nothing ever seems to get off the ground. Why has this been such a tough nut to crack and why have previous efforts not cracked it?Andy Frank: There have been many more ambitious goals than there have been success stories. There's essentially been what I'd call 50 years of failure. The first efforts to really promote energy efficiency – they mostly called it conservation back then – were around 1973, with the first oil embargo, the first big energy crisis. Fast forward to today, we're still not in a great place. At the current pace of retrofits, it's going to take us more than 500 years to retrofit every single home. We don't have 50 years, much less 500, so we definitely need to do something.David Roberts: What have we been trying and why hasn't it been working? Andy Frank: We've tried a lot of things; not a lot of them have worked. A lot of people associate the early days of energy efficiency with Jimmy Carter asking Americans to wear a sweater. But actually, President Nixon, a Republican, was the first one to push for conservation in the early 70s – to turn down thermostats and take shorter showers and change your behavior. Obviously, we're American, we don't like conservation, we don't like having to sacrifice. So the next wave, which was through the late 70s and 80s, was led by legends of this field: Amory Lovins, who was a big inspiration to me, and Art Rosenfeld, and folks saying hey, this isn't about sacrificing; this is about producing more with less, a better quality of life. The old line “people don't want kilowatt hours, they want cold beer and hot showers” – that was the next wave, and that, of course, makes sense and has always made sense. One of the original sins of the energy efficiency industry, at least in my mind, is it was created by government for government, and through the utilities and local contractors. What that meant was you were essentially pushing largely home energy audits, very technocratic solutions, on the populace. I loved your pod recently talking about the economic style of thinking; that was very en vogue with energy efficiency. The idea was, if only we could educate people and give them exactly the right amount of information about what they're doing with home energy use and how much energy they can save, of course they would spend thousands of dollars to make their home efficient.David Roberts: They are rational interest maximizers, so why wouldn't they?Andy Frank: Exactly. The value prop of residential efficiency essentially evolved to assume that homeowners are all classical PhD economists and have a Masters in building science.David Roberts: And are willing to balance short-term investment with long-term payback and can calculate those things for themselves.Andy Frank: Perfectly rational.The sales pitch has historically been horrible. The way that energy efficiency has been sold for pretty much the last 50 years is, “Would you like to save money on your energy bills? Great, get an energy audit!” You have to schedule it, you have to take a half day off of work or at least be in your home and aware of it, and someone who you don't know trucks around your house for three hours, goes into all of the most private parts of your home – I won't even speak to all the stuff that we saw when we were doing energy audits. At the end of the day, if you're lucky, they will sit down with you and say, “This is what we found, here's how much energy we think you're wasting, here's what you can do about it, and by the way, that's going to cost you thousands of dollars to do” – to potentially save what you, as a homeowner and consumer, largely see as fake money. David Roberts: Homeowners are not carrying the one; they're not calculating their energy costs down to the penny. What are their thought processes? When they do go forward with a retrofit or something, what motivates them to do so?Andy Frank: The great news here is there's actually a lot that motivates people to move forward with these efficiency and electrification retrofit projects. But it's not energy, and it's usually not saving money on energy bills. It’s comfort, it’s health, it’s safety, it’s quality of life. For anyone who's seen the now classic movie Fight Club, the first rule of fight club is you don't talk about fight club. At Sealed, the first rule of selling energy efficiency is you don't talk about energy or efficiency. These are not things that generally resonate with real people. What you talk about is getting rid of drafty rooms and cold floors and upstairs rooms that feel like a sauna. You solve people's comfort and their quality-of-life issues, and the energy savings are a way to make it affordable to install those solutions.David Roberts: How much of this is anecdotal and how much is nailed down by research? What's the balance? Are any homeowners talking about energy and saving money?Andy Frank: There has obviously been a lot of research over the years, largely through surveys that ask people what motivates them to adopt energy efficiency measures. They're normally set up, though, in a way that doesn't actually give you great information. If I ask you “would you like to save money on your energy bills?” you'd be an idiot to tell me no. But if I then ask you “would you like to spend $10,000 to save $100 a month?” your answer is probably, “Not sure about that. Tell me a little bit more.”Part of this is around mistaking people's general desire to save money – which, if you watch any number of commercials on TV, is of course a motivation for people – with their desire to not invest money to save money. The other big problem is that the industry generally assumes, including in the research that they do, that most people actually believe in the energy savings. If you look at the data – not just in residential, but across sectors – energy efficiency is by far the biggest and most powerful energy and carbon-reduction resource we've had over the last seven years; but at the same time, it's invisible. It's the lack of something. I analogize it to dark matter – the most powerful energy resource we have, but we literally can't see and feel it. That's always been the challenge, both at the macro level in all of the fights over the years with measurement and verification, but also at the micro level with a homeowner. Very early on at Sealed we did a survey asking people, “If somebody did an energy audit in your home and projected that you would save $100 a month, how much do you think you would actually save?” The answer across the US was less than $25. In other words, people are discounting 25 cents or less on the dollar from what you tell them. So the money's not real. David Roberts: Another barrier has always been that even if you sell people on the fact that they could get a lot of energy efficiency, it's still a huge project to do so and to know what to do. Was the original vision for Sealed just to make that project easy? Is that the whole point? If I call Sealed to my house, what are you offering me that overcomes that dread of dealing with things, which I feel so acutely?Andy Frank: Sealed is a climate tech company on a mission to stop home energy waste and electrify all homes. That's what we're trying to do when we approach each home. First off, I consider myself a lazy environmentalist. I want to use as little energy as possible and reduce my carbon footprint, but I'm not a do-it-yourselfer. As my wife will probably tell you, I'm not Mr. Fix-it in the home. I need help. I actually recently got my own home sealed. After working in this space for a while and building up Sealed, I can finally, as they say in the startup industry, eat my own dog food.David Roberts: So how did you find the experience with yourself?Andy Frank: I'm a very biased source, but it was great. Basically, we design, manage, and finance home weatherization and electrification projects, and we aim to make it both easy and affordable for people to be comfortable while using less energy. We focused initially on the affordability piece, trying to make it as affordable as possible.David Roberts: Did you go in with the conventional assumption that this is mostly about money and saving money? Did you share that misapprehension at first?Andy Frank: Oh, yeah. I went into this believing all of the “best practices” and all of the received wisdom in the space. I was essentially classically trained in neoliberalism in college and took courses from all of the very smart and wonderful professors who believe in things like the preeminence of the Kyoto Protocol. So I came in with a very technocratic view. Obviously, being in the field and spending time with our contractors and with homeowners really shaped my view of how we needed to change things. Early on, my co-founders and I would go to train stations to talk to people to find out what they thought about their energy or comfort. I interviewed every single homeowner that I could in my network to really understand how people think about this; shadowed lots of energy audits; did a lot of grounding research to understand what this looks like; and came to the conclusion – which again, is not rocket science – that people are motivated to do things that improve their quality of life and make it easy and affordable to do.We have a pretty simple framework for creating value that we like to reference sometimes, which is “GAF is greater than LAF.” This is a family podcast so I won't do the full translation of that, but – everyone is greedy. We want things. We're Americans. We want to live well, but we're also a little bit lazy. Like I said, I consider myself a lazy environmentalist.David Roberts: Some of your research found that people will often say that they're looking to save money, but once the time comes, they don't actually act that way. In some sense, survey results talking about saving money are about people's identity, their image of themselves, which does not always play out in practice.Andy Frank: We focus a lot on finding the pain of people. In my case, we moved into this wonderful house, we love it, but it was not sealed. The floors were cold all the time; my wife had to literally decide when to use different bathrooms depending on what the weather was like outside because it was too cold to go into some. We were wearing slippers all the time, at least two layers at all times, including while in bed; it was just not a comfortable place to be. Of course we want to save money, we want to reduce our bills here and there, but that's not really the primary motivation. One of the things that's interesting about the space is that for the past 50 years, the industry has trained people to think about saving money on their energy bills as the equivalent of energy efficiency. A lot of times the challenge that we have with our marketing messages and our sales conversations is that we need to separate that out when we're talking to people. Most people that we talk to, of course they want to save money generally, but they also have very real comfort and quality of life problems. David Roberts: How many people even know that greater comfort is among the product offerings when they think about energy efficiency and retrofits? Andy Frank: That's a great question. We spend a lot of our marketing education investments on making that explicit. We focus a lot on explaining – through gifs, live action video, text, articles, whatever it is – the connection between people’s comfort problems and energy efficiency. Because, to your point, a lot of people don't know that. I can't tell you the number of conversations we have with customers where they call up and say, “You don't need to talk to me anymore. I know what my problem is. It's my windows.” And 90 percent of the time it's not their windows, because of what’s called in building science the stack effect. You think it's your windows, because that's what feels cold, but it's actually your lack of insulation or lack of balanced heating and cooling in your home.David Roberts: So Sealed comes to me, the homeowner, and what is the value proposition? What are the steps I go through?Andy Frank: You click on an ad on Instagram, YouTube, wherever you find us. The first step is that you give us a bunch of information about yourself, what your comfort problems are, what things you want to solve, as much information about your home as you know and can share, and your energy usage history. Then our team takes that information, pairs it with third-party information and tools, and puts together a proposal for you. Without ever going to your home, without having to roll a truck, without ever having to send a contractor to you, we can say “this is what we think is going to make sense for your home and is going to solve your problem.”David Roberts: You can get pretty close without a site visit?Andy Frank: Yeah. I remember several years ago, I was on an energy audit with one of our contractor partners. We pulle…

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