Stay ConnectedProfessional Military Education in 30 minute sessions. Historic Battles study through current doctrine to gain lessons learned. Tactics, Strategy, Combined Arms, Military Leadership in a format for Unit PME programs.
We study the great battles to draw the lessons on strategy, tactics and leadership. Get your lessons learned here rather than in AAR format.
We look at the Scheyville Experience. This is important because it highlights the process required to train junior officers to be able to lead soldiers into combat and to win.
Scheyville had 1883 graduates, 1690 were National Serviceman, 355 served in Vietnam, and 8 gave there lives in Vietnam.
We look at the syllabus at OTU Scheyville, and we talk to Dave Sabben about his experience at Scheyville, from his Officer Selection Board, through to the training that he received at Scheyville.
What was the success rate of those volunteering to be officers?
What was the training like? How did they distill the concept of Leadership into the officer cadets? Given Dave's experience in Vietnam, how would he have improved it?
In just 22 weeks, Dave Sabben graduated from OTU Scheyville. We look at his recollections of the training and how he felt prepared to graduate as a Platoon Commander in 6 RAR.
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We start our look at the Battle of Long Tan, which occured on the 18th August 1966, 4km east of the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat. Outnumber 20:1, the Australians took 18 KIA and 24 WIA in one of the most important and most famous battles of the whole Australian involvement in Long Tan.
Our guide through Australian Military's History most famous rubber plantation is Dave Sabben. Dave was the Platoon Commander of 12 Platoon, Delta Company on that day at Long Tan.
Conscription has been used by many countries through history as they rapidly increase the size of their defence forces in response to changing strategic circumstances, circumstances that have changed quickly and require a faster response than could be achieved with the full time Defence Force.
How did the Australian Defence Force mobilised for operations in Vietnam? We look at conscription and the history of professional armies.
We start by looking at some of the components of a professional army and what the role of conscription is within the concept of National readiness. Professional armies are very expensive to maintain and so we look at 2 components of readiness that are used to decrease the cost of having a large standing force.
How was conscription for Vietnam different to conscription in Australia during World War 2?
Dave starts by talking us through the conscription process and his initial training at Kapooka.
We look at the reason for the conscription in the 1960's.
Dave discusses what the aim of the training program was and the skills that officers were to receive at Scheyville.
How was the training program designed and how were leadership skills developed at OTU Scheyville?
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Why did the soldiers hold short of their objectives on the first day of the landings at ANZAC?
The 3rd Brigade were the first to land at Gallipoli. Why did COL Sinclair-Maclagan hesitate? How costly was this action?
What was the Turkish dispositions on the morning of the 25th?
If third ridge had been taken, what would have the impact for the campaign been?
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Brigadier Muhammad Asgharpresents a fascinating look at the forgotten gunners of Gallipoli, the 7th Mountain Indian Artillery Brigade, comprising the 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery and 26th Jacob's Batteries. These Batteries become a part of the 1st Mountain Regiment in 1947 in Pakistan.
Jacob's Battery was the only gun in action on the 25th of April at ANZAC.
On the 26th of April Jacob's Bty was reinforced with Australian gunners, creating an amalgam battery. Jacob's and Royal Kohat batteries were the only guns in action at ANZAC on the second day.
A great story of crater analysis unearths the story of Turkish rounds marked CSF@RPA (made at Cossipore and filled at Rawalpindi). How did Indian ammunition end up being fired at Australian troops?
21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery was in action for 238 dayas and fired 12,248 round. They had 11 men killed, 134 wounded, (5 died of wounds), 35 animals killed, 199 animals wounded and 1 missing.
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In 1911 the NZ Government purchases 18 pounders and 4.5 inch howitzers as it starts to modernise.
Their first deployment was to German Somoa, as a part of the Samoa Expeditionary Force, retaking the islands from the Germans.
The ANZAC the NZ guns land, howitzers, on the 26th of April, 1915 and the field guns lands on the 27th.
Constrained by lack of suitable firing positions and ammunition, they supported Australian, New Zealand and British across the Gallipoli peninsula.
The withdrawal commenced on the night of the 11th of December and the the last guns were withdrawn on the night of the 19th of December.
What were the key lessons that were learnt?
This bonus episode of the Firepower Seminar looks at the role of Naval Gunfire Support at Gallipoli by Commander David Stevens, RANR.
What issues did NGFS have at Gallipoli?
How where targets identified and how was command and control managed?
As a secondary effort, there was to few guns at Gallipoli and the Navy attempted to make up the difference.
What was the impact the NGFS on the Gallipoli campaign and how did the terrain impact it's effectiveness?
NGFS at Gallipoli makes an early attempt at creating Joint Effects. What is the legacy for the ADF today?
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MAJ Daryl Kelly OAM looks at the human side of the Gunners at Gallipoli.
He looks at some of the stories of the individual Gunners who served at Gallipoli, looking at the conditions and at Gallipoli during the landing operations.
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We continue our discussion on the Center of Gravity with COL Dale Eikmeier.
How important is the relationship between different CoG? What impact does this relationship have for operational planning?
Does the CoG breakdown when their are multiple actors? How are they related and how does it impact in planning an operation? What is the best way to deal with the increasing complexity? Does the Centre of Gravity continue to be useful as the complexity of the environment and the number of stakeholders increases?
What is the impact of time on the Centre of Gravity? Can the CoG change over time?
We look at the application of the CoG outside of the military. Could it be used in Foreign Policy?
What are COL Eikmeier's thoughts on Moral Centers of Gravity? Are they useful in planning campaigns?
What is the future of Joint Planning? How will it change over the next 20 years? What will be the impact on a Whole of Government approach to strategy?
How will the Centre of Gravity evolve over time?
This concludes our look at the Centre of Gravity construct. Next week we will start our next major battle study as we look at the Battle of Long Tan.
We talk to retired COL Dale Eikmeier about the Ends, Ways and Means methodology for determining the Center of Gravity.
We talk about some of the problems with the Clausewitzian Centre of Gravity construct. What role do the critical factors, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities play in the discovery of the Centre of Gravity.
We discuss the new Center of Gravity definitions that are starting to be used in Joint planning and how they improve on the traditional definition.
How does the CoG construct work in a complex system?
We use the Battle of the Atlantic as an example of how the Ends, Ways and Means approach can be used to better understand the process of determining the correct Center of Gravity to target.
Is the CoG construct useful at the LT / Platoon level?
The Battle of the Atlantic between the Germans and the Allies as the Germans attempted to remove Great Britain from the war, (which required 1,000,000 tons of supplies a week!), and the US attempted to build up men and materiel in Britain to launch it's attack on Occupied Europe. Analysis of the Critical Factors shows the ways to the critical vulnerabilities that can be targeted in the most economical way.
We finish with the discussion about the war in Iraq and the choice of the CoG being the Iraqi government as an example of a CoG that is incorrect.
Whilst everyone agrees that determining the Center of Gravity is really important, but there is not a lot of information on the actual process to do that.
We look at the inside out methodology by Rueschoff and Dunne as a way of determining the CoG. This methodology starts with objective, then looks at the critical capabilities that allow the achievement of the objective.
We pause to look at the role that time in CoG analysis. The CoG can change over time.
War on the Rocks had a great article on the procurement of oil in the Pacific and how a limited assessment of future critical factors can lead to issues. Who is doing a future Critical Factor analysis? What role does this have in planning?
We then look at the Eikmeier methodology. This is based on Ends, Ways and Means. The Eikmeier methodology provides a user friendly cut down version of systems theory.
We look at an example of Madonna deciding to be elected as President of the US. With that Endstate, we look at the ways she could achieve this and the means that she would need to be POTUS.
We look at the validity test to ensure that you have the right entity as being the CoG.
We look at the CoG example for Hannibal at Cannae. Have a listen to Dan Carlin's Punic Nightmare to get a great idea of what the fighting was like at Cannae.
We look at the Roman Army that faces Cannae and how he can defeat it. We look at how Hannibal structured his battle to attack the critical vulnerabilities of the Roman Army.
Hannibal was begged to march on Rome, but he only sent a delegation to Rome to discuss surrender. One hundred and fifty thousand males had died fighting Hannibal over 3 crippling losses.
What happened after Cannae?
How did the Roman moral Center of Gravity impact Hannibal? Hannibal has destroyed 3 operational level centers of gravity, yet he did not destroy the Roman moral centre of gravity.
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