Stay ConnectedLearn the lessons of military history by looking at the great battles through the lens of the Principles of War. Part of the enduring nature of war, all good Generals follow the 10 Principles of War. The great Generals of history have the ability to know which of the principles are most important at the decisive moments of the campaign.
We study the great battles to draw the lessons on strategy, tactics and leadership.
This episode continues our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series.
This episode is Part 5 of our interview with Dr with Dr Adrian Threlfall, an expert in how the Australian Army learned to learn about combat in the jungles of Malaya, Singapore, Papua, New Guinea, and many other islands to the north of Australia.
This episode looks at the introduction of the Jungle Scales Division into the Australian Army, the development of the Owen Gun and finally how the Japanese adapted to Australian tactically improvements in Jungle Warfare.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode continues our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series.
This episode is Part 4 of our interview with Dr with Dr Adrian Threlfall, an expert in how the Australian Army learned to learn about combat in the jungles of Malaya, Singapore, Papua, New Guinea, and many other islands to the north of Australia.
This episode discusses the development of the Jungle Warfare Training Centre, Canungra, the role that it played in preparing soldiers for combat in the Jungle and the legacy it created for the Australian Army as experts in jungle warfare.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode continues our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series.
This episode looks at Jungle Warfare Doctrine Development, with Dr Adrian Threlfall, an expert in how the Australian Army learned to learn about combat in the jungles of Malaya, Singapore, Papua, New Guinea, and many other islands to the north of Australia.
We look at how the soldiers prepared for combat in the Jungle against the Imperial Japanese Army. What were the barriers to the lessons learnt process? We look at the British Army and allies in Burma, the Marines on Guadalcanal and the Australian Army in New Guinea.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode continues our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series.
This episode looks at Jungle Warfare Doctrine Development, with Dr Adrian Threlfall, an expert in how the Australian Army learned to learn about combat in the jungles of Malaya, Singapore, Papua, New Guinea, and many other islands to the north of Australia.
We discuss how the Australian Army learnt to learn, starting to collate the lessons learnt from combat with the Japanese in the Jungles, and the process to turn that into doctrine.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
We return to the fetid jungles of New Guinea and our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series, looking at the 53rd Battalion and it's combat performance at Isurava.
This episode is the start of a series looking at Jungle Warfare Doctrine Development, with Dr Adrian Threlfall, an expert in how the Australian Army learned to learn about combat in the jungles of Malaya, Singapore, Papua, New Guinea, and many other islands to the north of Australia.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This special episode is an interview with Sam Bendett from the Center for a New American Security and is an expert on UAS Combat between Ukraine and Russia. This interview covers the lessons learnt so far in the rapidly evolving UAS combat. We discuss how drone combat has evolved from the point of view of the Russian and Ukrainian forces, how it is impacting manouvre on the battlefield and how the combined arms effect is generated with a range of UAS platforms. From FPV (First Person View) drones through to LRF (Long Range Fires) UAS, we discuss the changing character of war.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
How did air power influence the Kokoda Campaign? We review the employment of air power and compare it with the Milne Bay operation, where Air Power's effect was described as 'decisive' by both MAJGEN Clowes and LTGEN Rowell.
The episode picks up the story with the elevation of Les Jackson to CO of No 75 Squadron after the death of his brother, John. We discuss the importance of training pilots for the responsibilities for Squadron Command and the requirement for a panel of potential candidates, before looking at the Battle of Milne Bay.
This is Part 18 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and the fourth and final episode as we look at Air Power, RAAF Leadership and doctrine development during the Kokoda Campaign.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
What was RAAF Leadership like in No. 75 Squadron at Port Moresby. We look at the career and Leadership of Squadron Leader John Jackson, a great RAAF pilot who lead from the front. We look at the tactics that he developed to fight the more agile Japanese Zeroes and what was it that caused him to ignore his own tactics on the day that he was shot down and killed.
This is Part 17 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level.
This episode looks at the combat leadership of John Jackson.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
How did the P-40E compare against the Japanese Zero? We look at how Australia was prepared for the war in the air over Port Moresby. How well were the pilots prepared and how well was the squadron bought up to operational standard?
This is Part 16 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level.
This episode looks at the first combats fought over the skies of Port Moresby and how the Squadron Leader of No 75 Squadron, John Jackson, took the fight to the Japanese.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
It was 900 days from the declaration of war against Germany in 1939 to the bombing of Darwin. When Darwin was bombed, there were no RAAF fighters to defend, and it was three weeks before Darwin was had fighter coverage (and they were US fighters). We look at how the RAAF was prepared for war, prepared for war for Japan and prepared to defend Australia.
This is Part 15 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level.
This episode looks at how No 75 Squadron contributed to the Joint Battle during the Kokoda Campaign. We focus on how the RAAF looked to mobilise and scale up. We discuss EATS,
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part 14 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level.
This episode looks at how the Australians and the Japanese generated combined arms on the Kokoda Track.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part 13 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level.
This episode looks at the tragic friendly fire incident that occured during the Battle of Isurava, where the 2/14th C Company attacked into the Battalion Headquarters. What were the factors in this and how could it have been avoided?
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part 12 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level.
The Kokoda Campaign for the Japanese is a manifestation of the effects of the manourvrist approach.
We then discuss MAJGEN Basil Morris - at the time he took over command of the 8th Military District he was a substantive Colonel.
We look at the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment for the Kokoda Campaign. What was the decisive terrain in the Morris' plan and how did he use his available resources? We discuss the 49th Battalion and how they were employed.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part 11 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level.
This episode commences our assessment of the operational level, but before we start, we will look at the psychiatric cost of training and fighting in the jungle. David Woolley has done an excellent job in documenting issues on the Kokoda Track and suggests some solutions to increasing resilience for troops.
We look at what the operational level of war is along with the events within MAJGEN Basil Morris' Area of Operations during the Kokoda Campaign.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the third episode in a three part interview with Dr Robert Lyman about 'Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-40', a book he co-wrote with Lord Dannatt, who served as the Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009.
This episode looks at how lessons are learnt from victories and defeats and the difficulties in developing doctrine when not in combat. We discuss the lessons from logistics doctrine development along with why it took so long for doctrine to be combat ready - for the British in was 2nd El Alamein. Finally we look for the lessons from the interwar period for the contemporary strategic environment.Check out the show notes for this Professional Military Education podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. There is also a catalogue of episodes on Leadership, the Principles of War, military history, and Mission Command.
This is the second in a three part interview with Dr Robert Lyman about 'Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-40', a book he co-wrote with Lord Dannatt, who served as the Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009.
This episode looks at how the lessons learnt in the victories of 1918 with Combined Arms were forgotten in the interwar period. Robert discusses the impact of the desire to avoid another Second World War, the resistance to creating an Expeditionary Army for continental Europe, the economy for the Great Depression and the lack of a Grand Strategy and Endstate led to a British Army that struggled for the first two years of the Second World War.
He also examines the role of Nevile Chamberlain in developing a Strategy for Britain.
How does an Army know if its doctrine is capable of winning battles?
Check out the show notes for this Professional Military Education podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. There is also a catalogue of episodes on Leadership, the Principles of War, military history and Mission Command.
This is the first in a three part interview with Dr Robert Lyman about 'Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-40', a book he cowrote with Lord Dannatt, who served as the Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009.
This episode looks at the doctrine development that occurred in the First World War as the British Army developed it's skills in Combined Arms, culminating in the ability to fight and win the battles of the 100 days.
We look to answer the question - how does an Army learn to learn, whilst in contact.
Check out the show notes for this Professional Military Education podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. There is also a catalog of episodes on Leadership, the Principles of War, military history and Mission Command.
This is Part 10 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, looking at the combat performance of the 39th Battalion.
The 39th Battalion was one of Australia's best Battalions. Formed in Victoria, it's story is similar to that of the 53rd Battalion- but with some key differences. We look at those differences with Dr David Cameron, an expert on the Battles of the Kokoda campaign.
Have a listed Dr David Cameron, an expert on the Kookoda Campaign as he discusses the history and performance of the 39th Battalion.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
Dr David Cameron's Biography
David Cameron received first class Honours in Prehistory, University of Sydney and a PhD in Palaeoanthropology, Australian National University. He has written over twenty books covering Australian Military History, Colonial History, and Evolutionary Science with over 70 internationally peer reviewed papers published in various journals and book chapters. He is a former Australian Research Council Post Doctoral Fellow, School of Archaeology, Australian National University; and an Australian Research Council QEII Fellow in the Department of Anatomy and Histology, University of Sydney. He has conducted and led several international fieldwork projects in Europe (Hungary), Asia (Vietnam, India, and Japan), and the Middle East (Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates) and conducted extensive museum studies and conferences (United States, Europe, and Asia). Before retiring in 2023, he was a senior analyst in the Australian Intelligence Community.
Books on the Papua Campaign by Dr Cameron:
Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – December 2024.) The Battle for Milne Bay, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – August 2024) Sanananda, Bastard of a Place: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (in press – November 2023) Bloody Buna: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2023) Gona’s Gone: The Battle for the Beachhead 1942, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2022) Retaking Kokoda: The Australian Advance Across the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2022) Saving Port Moresby: Fighting at the End of the Kokoda Track, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2022) The Battle for Isurava: Fighting on the Kokoda Track in the heart of the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2020) The Battles for Kokoda Plateau: Three Weeks of Hell Defending the Gateway to the Owen Stanleys, Allen & Unwin Australia
This is Part 9 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, looking at the combat performance of the 39th Battalion.
This episode discusses the formation of the 39th Battalion, it's preparation for combat and how it performed on the Kokoda Trail. The 39th Battalion is one of the Australian Army's most famous Battalion, a militia battalion that bore the brunt of the Japanese attacks down the Kokoda track. What enabled it to fight so well?
Have a listed Dr David Cameron, an expert on the Kookoda Campaign as he discusses the history and performance of the 39th Battalion.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
Dr David Cameron Biography
David Cameron received first class Honours in Prehistory, University of Sydney and a PhD in Palaeoanthropology, Australian National University. He has written over twenty books covering Australian Military History, Colonial History, and Evolutionary Science with over 70 internationally peer reviewed papers published in various journals and book chapters. He is a former Australian Research Council Post Doctoral Fellow, School of Archaeology, Australian National University; and an Australian Research Council QEII Fellow in the Department of Anatomy and Histology, University of Sydney. He has conducted and led several international fieldwork projects in Europe (Hungary), Asia (Vietnam, India, and Japan), and the Middle East (Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates) and conducted extensive museum studies and conferences (United States, Europe, and Asia). Before retiring in 2023, he was a senior analyst in the Australian Intelligence Community.
Books on the Papua Campaign by Dr Cameron:
Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – December 2024.) The Battle for Milne Bay, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – August 2024) Sanananda, Bastard of a Place: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (in press – November 2023) Bloody Buna: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2023) Gona’s Gone: The Battle for the Beachhead 1942, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2022) Retaking Kokoda: The Australian Advance Across the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2022) Saving Port Moresby: Fighting at the End of the Kokoda Track, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2022) The Battle for Isurava: Fighting on the Kokoda Track in the heart of the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing
Cameron, D.W. (2020) The Battles for Kokoda Plateau: Three Weeks of Hell Defending the Gateway to the Owen Stanleys, Allen & Unwin Australia
This is Part 8 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, Battle of Isurava, the 53rd Battalion, how they fought and how they were prepared to fight.
This episode looks at the Principles of Training and how they were(n't) applied by New Guinea Force. We compare it with the preparation of the 6th Division in preparation for it's first battle at Bardia. Bardia illustrates what right looks like for preparing troops for combat.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part 7 of our series looking at the Battle of Isurava, the 53rd Battalion, how they fought and how they were prepared to fight.
This episode looks at the arrival of both the 39th and 53rd Battalions to Port Moresby, the conditions that they encountered and how that impacted their preparation for combat.
What was a day in the life of the soldiers like? How well were the soldiers trained? What were their weapon handling skills like? How well prepared were they for combat in the Jungle?
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the fifth episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion. The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men. Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle-hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world. This episode looks at the fall of Isurava. Japanese troops in increasing numbers, with increasing persistence and increasing ferocity forced Australian troops to withdraw. Australian efforts to retake Kokoda will need to wait for another day. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the sixth episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion. The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men. Virtually untrained, poorly equipped and with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle-hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.
This episode looks at the mistakes in mobilisation that we made that sowed the seeds for the performance of the Battalion on the Kokoda Track at the Battle of Isurava. What are the similiarities between the formation of the 53rd Battalion and the mobilisation of Russian Reserves for the war in Ukraine?
How was the Battalion formed? What was the Shanghai incident? How did they get to Port Moresby? Why were so many of the troops surprised on the Aquatania after it left port? What lessons are their we can learn from the 53rd Battalion if Australia was required to mobilise rapidly for war in the future?
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the fourth episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion. The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men. Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.
This episode looks at the events on the 27th of August, 1942. We discuss how the CO, LT COL Kenneth Ward was killed and the impact it had on the 53rd Battalion and Maroubra Force as they fought desperately to defend Isurava.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is part 2 of our interview with Dr Jim Storr, the author of Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century.
We discuss the correct size for a Headquarters. We discuss the selection and training of officers within the Wehrmacht. How do we affect cultural and doctrinal change within Armies to support the effective use of Mission Command?
Jim Storr was an infantry officer in the British Army for 25 years. He served in the British Army of the Rhine for five years in the 1980s. A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, he also worked in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and wrote high-level doctrine.
He was a professor of war studies at the Norwegian Military Academy for four years. His published works include ‘The Human Face of War’, ‘The Hall of Mirrors’ and 'Something Rotten'.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode is with Dr Jim Storr, the author of Something Rotten.
Preparing a set of orders is a core function of a Headquarters. Why have today's procedures changed from the what was done in WW2, what have we learnt and are modern HQs fit for purpose?
We discuss the form and functioning of Headquarters, looking at people, processes, products and purpose, comparing WW2 doctrine with what is happening today.
Jim Storr was an infantry officer in the British Army for 25 years. He served in the British Army of the Rhine for five years in the 1980s. A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, he also worked in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and wrote high-level doctrine.
He was a professor of war studies at the Norwegian Military Academy for four years. His published works include ‘The Human Face of War’, ‘The Hall of Mirrors’ and 'Something Rotten'.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the third episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion. The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men. Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.
This episode continues to story of the 53rd Battalion as they start patrolling the jungle around Isurava.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the second episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion. The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men. Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.
This episodes looks at just 4 weeks in the history of the Battalion, from when the started up the track, during their contact with the Japanese and through till the time the were order to leave the battlefield. There is much to learn from their experience.
We look for lessons in training, leadership, strategic surprise and mobilisation from the 53rd on the Kokoda Trail.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episodes starts a new series looking at the Kokoda Track at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. This series will look for lessons from the experience of the 53rd Battalion. The 53rd is a sister Battalion to the 49th and the excellent 39th Battalions. There is a marked difference between the 39th and 53rd. Despite incredible bravery, the 53rd struggled to achieve some of that tasks assigned to it (through no fault of their own.) Indeed, many of the men went on to fight bravely in the 55th/53rd and 39th Battalion after the 53rd was disbanded.
We look for lessons in training, leadership, strategic surprise and mobilisation from the 53rd on the Kokoda Trail.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episodes looks at PLA doctrine in 1950 and how it was used to surprise the UN forces on the Yalu River as well as looking at how deception is employed in contemporary PLA doctrine.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
Stunning intelligence failures, rigidity of mind and excellent Chinese tactical camouflage led to a stunning reversal of fortunes for the UN forces in late 1950 on the Yalu River?
A fascinating look at Chinese military deception and American intelligence failings.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode looks at the the principles of employment for artillery 2nd Alamein and is part of our Battles of Alamein series.
We discuss
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode looks at the Counter Battery battle at 2nd Alamein and is part of our Battles of Alamein series.
Ramsay and Kirkman denied Axis Artillery the ability to interfere with the commencement of Op Lightfoot. How did they do it and what role did the 4th Survey (Durham) Regiment play, along with the Desert Air Force and Engineers in constructing a process to find and neutralise Axis Artillery.
How was the fire plan developed to support the infantry as they crossed the LD?
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode looks at the development of artillery doctrine leading up to 2nd Battle of El Alamein.
2nd Alamein was the apogee of Australian Artillery in the Second World War and we will look at the role that BRIG Ramsay from 9th Div Arty built a team and capability to support the 9th Div and MAJ GEN Morshead.
Montgomery, who had fought in WW1, understood the impact that artillery can have and was keen to restore it's capability to delivery decisive effects on the battlefield. How did he do this?
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
We look at the roles of Artillery, including how it integrated with all of the Forces within 8th Army.
2nd Alamein is the apogee of Australian Artillery in the Second World War and we will look at the role that BRIG Ramsay from 9th Div Arty built a team and capability to support the 9th Div and MAJ GEN Morshead.
We will look at:
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode is an interview with Professor Andrew Lambert about Sir Julian Corbett, the premier maritime strategist in the 20th century.
We discuss Corbett, Maritime and Grand Strategy, Churchill and the Dardenelles Campaign.
We also look at his contribution to PME.
If you would like to know more about the impact the Corbett had in Maritime and Grand Strategy, please read Professor's Lambert's excellent book - 'The British Way of War'.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
Andrew Lambert is Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies at King's College. After completing research in the Department he taught at Bristol Polytechnic,(now the University of West of England), the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and also Director of the Laughton Naval Unit. In 2020 he was made a Fellow of Kings College London (FKC).
This is the 6th episode in our El Alamein series.
This episode looks at the conduct of the 2nd Battle of El Alamein, the impact that it had on the Second World War and the lessons learnt.
This episode looks only at Operation Lightfoot, and examines the battle predominantly from the viewpoint of the 9th Australian Division and the critical role that they played in the fighting.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is our 5th episode of our 2nd Battle of El Alamein series. This episode looks at Rommel's attack at Alam Halfa just 17 days after Monty took command.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is our 4th episode of our 2nd Battle of El Alamein series. This episode looks at when LT GEN B L Montgomery took command of 8th Army. He didn't like what he saw, so using the concept of Fighting Power, we look at the changes that he took to get the Army ready to take on the Desert Fox.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is part of a 2 part military deception miniseries looking at why Rommel placed his Divisions where he did and how his mobility was limited by deception.
We look at Op Bertram, the Operational Deception plan for 2nd El Alamein and provide a checklist for deception planners.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is part of a 2 part military deception miniseries looking at why Rommel placed his Divisions where he did and how his mobility was limited by deception.
We review doctrine on Surprise and Security. Deception is often a critical partner to Surprise, but without Security, your deception measures are unlikely to be effective.
We look at the large contribution to the battle (and the war) made by the 2/24th Battalion at the battle of Tel el Eisa when they captured the German Sigint company.
This episode is part of our series looking at decisive artillery battles in the history of Australia and is part of our 150 years of Australian Army commemoration.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This episode looks at the lead up to the 2nd Battle of El Alamein, including the Gazala Gallop, the 'Flap' and Ash Wednesday in Cairo.
This episode is part of our series looking at decisive artillery battles in the history of Australia and is part of our 150 years of Australian Army commemoration.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is a special miniseries on Vimy Ridge to celebrate 150 years of Permanent Artillery since the formation of A and B Batteries, Royal Canadian Artillery.
This episode discusses the 4 phases of the artillery support and discusses how it set the conditions for the infantries successful assault of Vimy Ridge.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is a special miniseries on Vimy Ridge to celebrate 150 years of Permanent Artillery since the formation of A and B Batteries, Royal Canadian Artillery.
This episode looks at Flash Spotting, the work of Andrew McNaughton and the role of the CBSO.
We look at the development of the 'dark art' of artillery and in particular Counter Battery fires.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is a special miniseries to celebrate 150 years of Permanent Artillery since the formation of A and B Batteries, Royal Canadian Artillery.
This episode details the conduct of the Battle of Vimy Ridge, a stunning success for the Canadian Corps.
This follows on from our Bullecourt series. The Battle of Bullecourt occured 48 hours later and 30 km south of the Battle of Vimy Ridge. We will compare and contrast Vimy Ridge with Bullecourt to highlight to real cost of failing to correctly plan and resource an attack.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is a special miniseries to celebrate 150 years of Permanent Artillery since the formation of A and B Batteries, Royal Canadian Artillery.
Vimy Ridge is seen as the birth of the Canadian nation. It is a model of a well planned Corps attack. Well resourced, well planned and very well rehearsed we look to understand what went right at Vimy Ridge.
This episode details the planning for Vimy Ridge.
This follows on from our Bullecourt series. The Battle of Bullecourt occured 48 hours later and 30 km south of the Battle of Vimy Ridge. We will compare and contrast Vimy Ridge with Bullecourt to highlight to real cost of failing to correctly plan and resource an attack.
This is part of our 150th Anniversary of the Royal Australian Artillery series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the 4th episode in our Bullecourt series.
"With artillery support we can keep the position till the cows come home."
So wrote CAPT Harry Murray, VC, OC A Coy after the 4th and 12th Brigades had fought their way into the Siegfried Line - they didn't get it and were forced to conduct an extremely difficult withdrawal under heavy machine gun fire.
Why didn't he get the support that he needed?
This is part of our 150th Anniversary of the Royal Australian Artillery series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
What mistakes occurred at the operational level in the planning of the Battle of Bullecourt?
What role did Gough play in the debacle?
Why did he make such grievous errors of judgement?
'Bullecourt, more than any other battle, shook the confidence of Australian soldiers in the capacity of the British command; the errors, especially on April 10th and 11th, were obvious to almost everyone'.
Charles Bean, Official Historian.
This is part of our 150th Anniversary of the Royal Australian Artillery series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
What planning was done for the First Battle of Bullecourt and why was it so flawed? We discuss artillery logistics and planning, mission analysis and how the plan came about in the time available.
This is part of our 150th Anniversary of the Royal Australian Artillery series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This Episode looks at the lessons for the employment of Artillery at the 1st Battle of Bullecourt. CEW Bean, the author of the official History wrote that Australian troops braved the odds in numerous battles, but that Bullecourt was the most
brilliant of these achievements, impressing both enemy and friends alike.
This Bullecourt miniseries is part of our 150th Anniversary of the Royal Australian Artillery series.
We look at the strategic picture in 1917, with Germany realising that time is on the side of the Allies. The commencement of unrestricted warfare is an attempt to deny Great Britain the resources required to remain in the war, setting the conditions for the war to be won, before the United States mobilisation makes victory impossible.
The last of the ANZAC Divisions arrived on the Western Front in November 1916 - this was Monash's 3rd Australian Infantry Division. On the 23rd of February, German troops started thinning out the line and Operation Alberich, the withdrawal to the Siegfried Line.
The Germans termed the withdrawal Operation Alberich, after Alberich the dwarf who fashions a ring out of Rhine Gold. The ring he forges grants the power to rule the world. The Siegfried Line was named after a legendary hero of Germanic legend who slew a dragon and was later was later murdered. He may have been based on Arminius of the Tuetoburg Forest. These legends were featured in Wagner's Ring Cycle, an epic Opera over 4 nights with the last night entitled Gotterdammerung, The Twilight of the Gods. The winter of 1916-17 was the worst in the last 40 years and the conditions took a terrible toll on the soldiers in the front lines. Here Australian Army Medical Corps members evacuate cold casualties.In December 1916, Joffre was replaced with General Robert Nivelle. Originally Lloyd George wanted to place Haig under Nivelle, which would have simplified command arrangements, but Haig would not countenance the idea. Haig was keen to create his own breakthrough if possible, but this would be difficult with the main effort, the Nivelle Offensive, receiving the majority of the guns and ammunition.
Supporting the French Nivelle Offensive was the reason for the Arras Offensive. The British would draw German troops into the Arras area, and potentially trigger the German committal of their Reserve, setting the conditions for the French breakthrough further North. Gough, was termed the Thruster. Commander of Fifth Army. A cavalry Officer, he exhibited the best and worst tendencies of cavalry officers.Bullcourt, in the Queant area was to support Allenby's Third Army's attack at Arras. Allenby's attack was also supported at Vimy by the Canadian Corps under LT GEN Byng. This will be the subject of another podcast partially to celebrate 150 years of Canadian Artillery - UBIQUE!, and partially to compare and contrast with Bullecourt. The Battle at Bullecourt literally became the textbook example of how not to conduct a battle - it was taught in British Staff Colleges of the dangers of poor planning. Vimy Ridge is almost the perfect juxtaposition - Byng vs Gough, detailed planning vs big hands small map, artillery vs no artillery, CBSO vs little effective counter battery effects, ammunition allocation (50,000 tons were fired in pre H-Hour fires), vs an inadequate allocation, enough guns vs clearly insufficient numbers of batteries, and coordination and cooperation across corps vs little coordination. The Vimy Ridge battle was an exemplar of how to attack a strongly defended objective in the First World War and many of the techniques developed at Vimy would be used by Monash in 1918 in his first Battle as Corps Commander in the Battle of Hamel.
The Bullecourt Battle was a support effort to Allenby's Third Army Arras Offensive.This is the fifth part of our CoG analysis for the Battle of France series.
We discuss the task before Panzergruppe Kleist as it becomes the German Schwerpunkt.
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the fourth part of our CoG analysis for the Battle of France series.
We discuss the Center of Gravity for Germany. An interesting case as the Strategic Center of Gravity was unable to defeat France, so the Wehrmacht developed a highly risky operational Center of Gravity to defeat France in just 46 days - something that they could not achieve in all of WW1.
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the third part of our CoG analysis for the Battle of France series.
We discuss the Centre of Gravity for the French.
What was their CoG? Was it effective and why did the Wehrmacht strike right at the heart of it?
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the second part of our CoG analysis for the Battle of France series.
We discuss the Centre of Gravity under the Churchill Government.
What was Churchill trying to achieve and what was the one entity that was going to achieve it?
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the first of a 4 part miniseries on Centre of Gravity analysis for the Battle of France, 1940.
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
Battle of France II - Campaign Overview.
This episode is the second part of our overview of the Battle of France Campaign.
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
Battle of France II - Campaign Overview.
This episode is the first part of our overview of the Battle of France Campaign.
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
The German Army's tanks were outnumbered 1.7:1 and most of the tanks were inferior, and yet the French were defeated extremely quickly.
This podcast series will focus on the counter attack at Arras, but we will look at a large number of issues throughout the Battle of France.
Thank you to the British Army's Lessons Exploitation Centre for the assistance with getting the resources for this podcast series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the first of a special series of podcasts commemorating 150 years of permanent Artillery in Australia.
This episode looks at A Bty's deployment to the Boer War, the action that it saw and the firing of the first shot of the First World War.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the first of a special series of podcasts commemorating 150 years of permanent Artillery in Australia.
This episodes looks at the early years.
The birth of 'A' Battery The range of batteries, and their equipment and how they trained The first deployment The birth of the School of Artilllery
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part II of our interview with Sir Max Hastings, the author of Vietnam, An Epic Tragedy.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part I of our interview with Sir Max Hastings, the author of Vietnam, An Epic Tragedy.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part V of our look at Lord Horatio Nelson and the practice of Mission Command. Check out episode 1 of our Nelson and Mission Command series.
This covers the amphibious raid on Tenerife and what went wrong in Nelson's worst defeat.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part IV of our look at Lord Horatio Nelson and the practice of Mission Command. Check out episode 1 of our Nelson and Mission Command series.
This covers the lead up to the Battle of Tenerife - Nelson's worst defeat.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part V of our interview with LT COL Harry Smith, the OC of Delta Coy / 6 RAR at the Battle of Long Tan. If you missed the first episode, check it out here.
He reflects on Delta's performance during the battle and also gives us his thoughts on the Danger Close movie about the Battle.
We've also interviewed Dave Sabben about the Battle of Long Tan.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part IV of our interview with LT COL Harry Smith, the OC of Delta Coy / 6 RAR at the Battle of Long Tan. If you missed the first episode, check it out here.
We've also interviewed Dave Sabben about the Battle of Long Tan.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, is the final session of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This episode is the Q&A session from the Breaching the Hindenburg Line session.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This episode is presented by BRIG Craig Furini, Head of Regiment and he discusses the lessons for Artillery from the World War 1.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
The episode brings together the lessons learnt from the Great War for Artillery.
This episode is presented by LT COL Nick Floyd.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
It looks at the career of MAJ GEN Walter Coxen.
This episode is presented by COL Jason Cooke.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This episode is presented by Mr Adam Rankin.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part III of our interview with LT COL Harry Smith, the OC of Delta Coy / 6 RAR at the Battle of Long Tan. If you missed the first episode, check it out here.
We've also interviewed Dave Sabben about the Battle of Long Tan.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part II of our interview with LT COL Harry Smith, the OC of Delta Coy / 6 RAR at the Battle of Long Tan. If you missed the first episode, check it out here.
We've also interviewed Dave Sabben about the Battle of Long Tan.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part I of our interview with LT COL Harry Smith, the OC of Delta Coy / 6 RAR at the Battle of Long Tan. This episode has Harry discussing his career at 2 Commando Company and his training philosophy.
We've also interviewed Dave Sabben about the Battle of Long Tan.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part III of our look at Lord Horatio Nelson and the practice of Mission Command. Check out episode 1 of our Nelson and Mission Command series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part II of our look at Lord Horatio Nelson and the practice of Mission Command. Check out episode 1 of our Nelson and Mission Command series.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is Part I of our look at Lord Horatio Nelson and the practice of Mission Command.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Air Commodore Mark Lax (Retd)
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This panel is hosted by Dr Tim McKenna and features discussion with Ellen Creswell, Dr Meleah Hampton, MAJ GEN Paul Stevens, RAA (Retd) and Air Commodore Mark LAX, RAAF (Retd)
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
MAJ GEN Paul Stevens highlights the evolution of artillery tactics as they were in 1918.
How was artillery controlled in the advance?
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Dr Meleah Hampton.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Ellen Creswell.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the first part of our study of the raid on Salamaua.
We look at the genesis of SF in the Australian Army. Why were they formed in the first place? What was the detailed planning process that saw the formation of the Independent Companies and what were the likely tasks that they would undertake.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Professor Peter Stanley.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by MAJ Darryl Kelly RAA (Retd).
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Dr Elizabeth Greenhalgh.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Dr William Westerman.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Dr Roger Lee.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Dr Tim McKenna.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by LT COL Chris Gardiner, RAAC.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Dr Jean Bou.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Professor Michael Evans.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This Plenary Session is conducted by MAJ GEN Michael Crane, DSC and Bar, AM.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series is presented by Dr Jean Bou.
Dr Jean Bou looks at the equipment the artillery used and how it was organised in order to support the Desert Mounted Corps.
He also looks at the role of artillery during the Battle of Beersheeba.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series is presented by Dr Albert Palazzo and looks at the birth of the Artillery Intelligence fusion capability in WW1.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series is presented by Dr Roger Lee and looks at the Australian Artillery at Menin Road.
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This is the fourth part of our Battle of the Bismarck Sea Podcast series.
This episode discusses how GEN Kenney fostered a culture of military innovation in the Fifth Air Force.
Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
This is the third part of our Battle of the Bismarck Sea Podcast series.
This episode discusses how GEN Kenney fostered a culture of military innovation in the Fifth Air Force.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This Plenary Session is conducted by BRIG Philip Winter AM, CSC (Retired)
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
The presentation was authored by MAJ Darryl Kelly, OAM (Retired) and is presented by LT COL Jim Catchlove RAA (Retired)
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by COL Gerhard Gross of the Bundeswehr Centre for Military History.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
This session is presented by Dr Roger Lee.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series. The MC for this panel discussion is BRIG John Cox RAA (retd).
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by COL Chris Hunter.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by MAJ Ian Finlayson RAAOC.
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Why was the 5th Air Force different in the way that it innovated tactically, mechanically and organisationally?
We look at how GEN Kenney lead the 5th Air Force and prepared it for the Battle of the Bismarck sea. What was it that marked it out as one of the most innovative Air Forces in the Second World War?
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We look at the crucial at what was probably the most important 15 minutes in the entire New Guinea campaign - the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.
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With such difficult terrain and being outnumbered, how could Palliers Hill have been a victory for 9 Platoon from the 2/14th?
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We discuss the considerations for the defense of Palliers Hill.
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What was Shell Shock and how did it manifest itself in WW1?
What treatments were available and how successful were they?
GPCAPT Sany McFarlane AO discusses these issues along with the long term impact of Shell Shock and it's evolution in diagnosis and treatment through WW2 and the Vietnam War.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by Doctor Roger Lee.
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We look at the considerations for the attack as LT Pallier assaults the hill that would come to bear his name.
Please visit the show notes, the drone footage of the hill will provide a much better understanding of the terrain and why this was such a difficult mission.
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How did LT Pallier attack this seemingly impossible objective. A dug in enemy, minimal OS, limited time and very, very difficult terrain?
Please visit the show notes, the drone footage of the hill will provide a much better understanding of the terrain and why this was such a difficult mission.
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This assault conducted by troops of 9 Pl, C Coy, 2/14 Bn is a classic infantry platoon attack. Visit the Principles of War website to see maps, UAV footage and more from the battlefield.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by BRIG Phillip Winter CSC.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by Rear Admiral James Goldrick (retd).
We look at the technological and tactical advances that led to the Battle of Jutland.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by Air Commodore Mark Lax RAAF, OAM, CSM, (retd).
We look at how techniques for the cooperation between air and ground elements were developed in the First World War.
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We conduct Mission Analysis in order to determine the desired endstate for the deployment of 1 ATF to Nui Dat and the orders for D/6 as they patrolled out to Long Tan.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by MAJ Trevor Watson RAA.
Without the ability to learn and adapt to new and emerging circumstances a military organisation will be unable to achieve success in combat. Military organisations must be agile in their ability to learn and adapt to main an advantage over their adversary.
This looks at artillery command and control and the change from the emphasis on destruction to nuetralisation.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company, is the plenary session, with MC MAJ GEN Tim Ford.
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This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company, is by Keith Glyde and is presented by LT COL Nick Floyd.
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Dr William Westerman presents this episode on the career of LT GEN Sir Joseph John Talbot Hobbs, KCB, KCMG, VD, who served as both commander of Australian Artillery and then as the Commander of the Australian 5th Division.
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We continue our look at women’s service in the Great Patriotic War with the book by Svetlana Alexievich. If you haven’t already listened to it, please listen to the first episode that looks at some of the history of women in war.
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This podcast looks at the contribution of Soviet women to the military in the Great Patriotic War.
Based on the The Unwomanly Face of War, by Svetlana Alexievich which received a Nobel Prize for Literature.
We discuss:
What does the female contribution to Total War mean for a moral centre of gravity.
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This lecture by LT COL David Brooks is presented by BRIG John Cox.
We look at the changes in the technology and the industrial base as Britain and Australia moved to an industrial war footing for the production and development of artillery ammunition.
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Dr Garth Pratten looks at the how the BEF was developing it's organisation, doctrine and weapons in preparation for the Somme Offensive.
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The is the latest episode in our long interview with Dave Sabben, Pl Comd 11 Pl at the Battle of Long Tan. There is a lot of valuable experience shared about what made D Coy different and how they were trained and prepared for war.
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We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben, PL COMD of 11 Pl at Long Tan.
We discuss hand overs and the long term impact of the Long Tan victory by D Coy 6 RAR.
We look at how MAJ Harry Smith prepared the Coy - the training, the techniques and the mindset that set them up for success.
What had his experiences been and how did that help set D Coy up for success on the battlefield?
What was the reaction to the US forces to the reports of the battle that had been sent by the Task Force and why did they get the Presidential Unit Citation?
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This is the Plenary Session in the 2nd Seminar of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Society's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series. This is a panel discussion about some of the issues with the employment of Artillery at Gallipoli.
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This is the 5th episode in the 2nd Seminar of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Society's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series. Dr Rhys Crawley discusses how logistics were handled at Gallipoli.
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This is the fourth session of the second seminar in the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower Seminar Series.
This presentation looks at the conduct of counter battery fire at Gallipoli.
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This is the third session of the second seminar in the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Association's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series.
How was the Turkish artillery organised at Gallipoli?
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What were the artillery tasks at ANZAC?
How was artillery employed?
How did the fireplans for Lone Pine and The Nek differ in implementation and effect?
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We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben about the Battle of Long Tan.
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This is the next episode in our Long Tan Series with Dave Sabben. Our last episode discussed the final defensive position.
This episode starts a 4 part Q+A with Dave, looking at the conduct of the battle.
The show notes have all of details on what is discussed. Please check them out.
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We look at the current doctrine around Mission Command.
This follows on from our podcast interview with BRIG Ulf Henricsson and the performance of Nordbat 2 in Bosnia.
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Our guest on the podast today is BRIG Ulf Henricsson from the Swedish Army. He was the commander of Nordbat 2, which was recognised as one of the most successful units that where committed to UNPROFOR for the peacekeeing effort in Bosnia.
I first read about Nordbat 2 in an Article on Strategy Bridge.
We start with the discussion about how Mission Command has been used in the Swedish Army, and how it is taught within the Swedish Army, including the way that Mission Command is used in barracks.
We discuss the composition of Nordbat 2. The composition is the start of the success of Nordbat 2 and the composition was driven by the Mision Analysis that was conducted.
Of the 1,300 members of Nordbat 2, around 1,000 were reservists who had volunteered for service in Bosnia.
The Mission is a critical part of Mission Command, including the intent, so we look at explicit and implied tasks in the mission that was given. He found that within Bosnia, the discussion about the mission was a lot easier than the discussions between countries.
This leads to a discussion about the Rules of Engagement and how they were used. BRIG Henricsson has a relatively free interpretation of the rules of engagement with that interpretation devolved down the chain of command.
We discuss some of the examples of Mission Command that lead to the success of Nordbat 2, including the incident at Stupni Do.
The use of Mission Command and robust peacekeeping lead to a reputation that assisted Nordbat 2 in the accomplishment of their mission.
We look at Mission Analysis and how it lead to a composition for Nordbat 2 that set some of the conditions for success. Another component was the rules of engagement that were provided by nations providing troops to UNPROFOR. The RoE and the interpretation of the RoE was often manipulated by warring forces and lead to some units being ineffective in their role.
BRIG Henriccson discusses support he received from his Commander in Bosnia, and he also discusses the risks that he ran with the use of Mission Command.
We finish with a look at some of the reasons that Mission Command is difficult to practice and what some of the conditions are required for the successful use of Mission Command.
He finishes off with his advice for commanders today on how to use Mission Command to enhance your chances of mission success.
Some questions that are raised are:
Are some societies better placed to enact Mission Command?
How often is there a clear intent in orders that you receive?
Is their a difference between the employment of Mission Command in barracks vs on Operation or Exercise?
We continue our examination of the Battle of Long Tan with Dave Sabben.
12 Pl has returned to the D Coy position, with some of the survivors of 11 Pl and the Coy prepares to receive the next assault.
BRIG Jackson is faced with the dilemma of trying to divine the true intentions of the enemy. Is it a diversion in preparation for a move against the Task Force base, or is it an attempt to destroy a Coy outside the base.
B Coy is ordered to return to the D Coy location and 10 APCs are loaded with troops from A Coy at Nui Dat and dispatched to reinforce the D Coy position.
6 RAR CO, LT COL Townsend recalls the APCs because he wants to go out with the APCs. How does LT Roberts respond to a call to return for the CO, when he knows that D Coy is in a critical situation with low ammunition.
At 18:30 what is enabling the Coy to survive in the face of ongoing assaults?
What air support was available, how was it used and how effective was it?
The enemy starts to mass and commences further assaults against the position. The pace of the assaults increases and the troops don’t have enough time to fully reload their magazines. The sun has set and it is becoming increasingly dark. At 18:55 increase numbers of waves assault the position, around the perimeter. Troops, controlled by whistle blasts walking in firing from the hips. It is now dark and the only illumination available to the defenders is the flashes from the artillery.
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For an information operation that is fought of Facebook, how do you identify the Avenues of Approach?
We use OCOKA to conduct the terrain analysis for Information Analysis. We look to orientate everyone to the human terrain in an information operation that is conducted using social media.
Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation is no longer blocked by terrain nor limited by range. The Internet Research Agency is located in Russia, but they are able to conduct operations as if they were based in Washington DC. Tools like Twitterfall. We look at spearfishing email attacks. Facebook has tools inbuilt to enable adjusting the fall of shot for each of the posts that you are using.
Cover and Concealment: In a Social Media war, cover comes from the privacy settings. Cover is asymmetric in a Social Media war. We compare Op Tidal Wave 2, a conventional propaganda campaign with leaflet drops, compared to how it could be conducted with Social Media.
Obstacles: We look at culture and language – grammar in particular. These are the real barriers for operations conducted on Social Media.
Key and Decisive Terrain: The concept of key terrain is fundamentally changed when operations move onto social media. We compare the 228 massacre in Taiwan and the Key Terrain there with disintermediation that social media creates.
Avenues of Approach: Traditionally the enemy is canalised into an engagement area, before they can reach their objective. Social Media war can strike directly at civilians in a target country. There is no physical terrain to defend. The avenues of approach now depend on the target demographic – Linkedin, vKontact, Facebook or Snapchat. We briefly discuss the evolution of avenues of approach for information operations.
This concludes the ground brief for social media operations. Are there any questions?
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We look at some of the actions that were used in an attempt to influence the US democratic system through the use of social media.
Using the military to conduct regime change is extremely expensive in terms of blood and treasure - we look at some of the measures that can be used with non-kinetic means to create regime change. We look at the use of Social media from the point of view of how marketers use social media, because Social Media Warfare is often about using marketing tools to sell an idea, rather than more conventional uses for Social Media.
To win the 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill, but to subdue the enemy without fight is the acme of skill. If this is the case, then the use of Social Media to achieve regime change would definitely qualify as the acme of skill.
We compare kinetic strikes above the detection threshold with non-kinetic strike below the detection threshold. We also look at an example of a pre-emptive strike to achieve regime change before a state has become an enemy of the state. The pre-emptive strike starts the war before the enemy has a chance to prepare for war, which is important if you believe that if you find yourself in a fair fight, then you have done something wrong.
Kinetic strikes are by their very nature above the detection threshold. Non-kinetic means have a much lower signature, and therefore could be below the detection threshold.
We look at FDR’s speech following the strike on Pearl Harbour.
What if there are now tools to allow regime change that does not require the use of military force?
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This episode of the podcast sees the transition from the encounter battle through to D Coy moving to being completely on the defensive.
11 Pl becomes decisively engaged, with enemy flanking to the north whilst being engaged by 3 MGs from the front. As 11 Pl starts the call for fire, MAJ Smith calls for reinforcements in order to regain the initiative.
As the tempo of the artillery support increases, the audience at the Little Patty concert moves away to support the Coy in contact.
10 Pl moves towards the foot hills to the north, observing a force attempting to flank 11 Pl.
The Task Force initially refuses to reinforce the NZ 161 Bty, requiring time consuming switching between targets and adjustment. On later is 161 reinforced with 2 further batteries.
2LT Dave Sabbens 12 Pl detaches a section to provide security to CHQ and moves off 2 up to attempt to marry up with 11 Pl.
By now 2 hours into the battle, each Pl has a bty in support. 10 Pl is down to 50% ammunition and requests and ammo resupply. This is initially refused. The pilots who had bought up Little Patty to Nui Dat.
The US resupply would be 30 minutes which could be too late. Moral and physical courage is shown by the RAAF pilots as they ignore restrictions from Canberra about flying into contact in order to provide supply to the troops in contact.
The situation is so desperate that SGT Bob Buick, the PL SGT in 11 Pl calls in artillery on his on position. The FO refuses to bring the artillery onto their position, but brings the rounds in as close as possible.
11 Pl moves back marry up with 12 Pl and they commence to move back to CHQ.
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We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben, picking in the in the second half of July.
The base was being heavily reconnoitered. We discuss the preparation for the defences at Nui Dat. Dave suggests that Canberra believed that the base was considered to be safe and unlikely to be attacked.
The South Vietnamese intelligence was treated as suspect, as was the US intelligence because a lot of it was sourced from the South Vietnamese.
A radio intercept unit was located at Nui Dat. They were tracking the morse code communications. With direction finding, the sigint was providing some good intelligence showing a large force moving towards the east of Nui Dat 2.
The shelling on the 17th of August by mortars, RCLs and at least one artillery piece. B Coy was sent to locate the location of the mortar base plates and attempt to track down the force responsible.
Tracking the enemy was laborious, in dangerous terrain. B Coy remained out on the 17th and D Coy was sent to relieve them.
D Coy finds bullock tracks and blood stains leading into the rubber plantation. The tracks split and 10 Pl follows one and 11 Pl follows the second with 12 Pl bringing up the rear.
An minor obstacle crossing drill is conducted by the Coy as they come across a cattle fence. Sgt Bob Buick, the Pl SGT for 11 Pl sees 6 - 7 enemy soldiers with slung AK-47s, completely non tac. He opens fire with his Armalite, hitting at least one.
Six 6 vs a platoon with 30 troops is a good troop ratio orders Maj Smith gives LT Sharp to follow up the enemy. Shortly, they are engaged by a force that looks like another Pl, so the Coy needs to to reinforce 11 Pl.
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We discuss the terrain in Phuoc Tuy, including Long Tan and the defensive base at Nui Dat.
We discuss the demarcation in responsibility between the ARVN and the Australian troops and the impact of ARVN having responsibility for dealing with the roads and villages. We also discuss the strategic hamlet program and the impact of resettling the population out of Long Tan village and the creation of a free Fire zone in the area. How did the resettlement of villagers impact their lives?
The intent for the establishment of 1 ATF was to, "Help stop the fighting the South." 1 ATF turned this into "we will dominate Phuoc Tuy province in order to help stop the fighting in the South."
The plan was to secure the base and then expand the influence out from around the base and disrupt VC operating in the bush.
We discuss the impact of Lina Alpha, the 5km line out from Nui Dat that was to act as an exclusion zone,but but the time of Long Tan, there was 1 significant issue with it - we talk about the road that runs through the defensive perimeter and how the VC could conduct recon on the suspected minefields. The road was used to access Binh Ba in the north.
This sets the scene our next Episode - The Encounter Battle.
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Dave Sabben describes his experience when he joins D Coy, 6 RAR.
Dave makes an important point, many of the officers and SNCOs were newly promoted into their roles, a function of the rapid expansion of the Army.
Fifty percent of the diggers in Delta were National Servicemen.
In March 1966, 6 RAR is notified that they will be going to Vietnam. Delta left in early July,
The first birthday of 6 RAR was the 6th of June in 1966 and celebrated it's first birthday on the beach of Vung Tau. Dave and the rest of Delta Coy joined the battalion on the next day.
Training was conducted in air mobile operations and weapons training intensified. Second hand Armalites were issued to replace the Owen guns. The Owen gun was designed in 1939,
The building of the base at Nui Dat was commenced by 5 RAR in May.
6 RAR was deployed quickly to the base after intelligence suggested that an attack was being planned for the poorly defended base at Nui Dat.
We look at the creation of 1 Australian Task Force and look at the reasons behind it's placement in Phuoc Tuy Province.
The name Nui Dat, comes from the name of one of the terrain features, meaning small hill.
We discuss the importance of the Vung Tau.
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This lecture is presented by Dr Rhys Crawley, the author of Climax at Gallipoli.
Dr Crawley compares artillery at Gallipoli with the employment of artillery in 1915 on the Western Front.
Artillery was still seen as an accessory for the artillery, rather than as a separate arms distinct from the infantry.
What lessons where learnt at the Battle of Neuve Chappelle and how were those lessons applied at Gallipoli?
We look at the concentration of artillery at Gallipoli and compare it to the Western Front.
We look at troop / gun ratios and the actual guns that were deployed to Gallipoli. What was the quality like of the guns that were used?
How many men were required to move the guns? The average incline was 9% and in some places it was twice that. This significantly decreased the mobility of the guns and limited the flexibility in the employments of the guns.
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We look at the Scheyville Experience. This is important because it highlights the process required to train junior officers to be able to lead soldiers into combat and to win.
Scheyville had 1883 graduates, 1690 were National Serviceman, 355 served in Vietnam, and 8 gave there lives in Vietnam.
We look at the syllabus at OTU Scheyville, and we talk to Dave Sabben about his experience at Scheyville, from his Officer Selection Board, through to the training that he received at Scheyville.
What was the success rate of those volunteering to be officers?
What was the training like? How did they distill the concept of Leadership into the officer cadets? Given Dave's experience in Vietnam, how would he have improved it?
In just 22 weeks, Dave Sabben graduated from OTU Scheyville. We look at his recollections of the training and how he felt prepared to graduate as a Platoon Commander in 6 RAR.
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We start our look at the Battle of Long Tan, which occured on the 18th August 1966, 4km east of the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat. Outnumber 20:1, the Australians took 18 KIA and 24 WIA in one of the most important and most famous battles of the whole Australian involvement in Long Tan.
Our guide through Australian Military's History most famous rubber plantation is Dave Sabben. Dave was the Platoon Commander of 12 Platoon, Delta Company on that day at Long Tan.
Conscription has been used by many countries through history as they rapidly increase the size of their defence forces in response to changing strategic circumstances, circumstances that have changed quickly and require a faster response than could be achieved with the full time Defence Force.
How did the Australian Defence Force mobilised for operations in Vietnam? We look at conscription and the history of professional armies.
We start by looking at some of the components of a professional army and what the role of conscription is within the concept of National readiness. Professional armies are very expensive to maintain and so we look at 2 components of readiness that are used to decrease the cost of having a large standing force.
How was conscription for Vietnam different to conscription in Australia during World War 2?
Dave starts by talking us through the conscription process and his initial training at Kapooka.
We look at the reason for the conscription in the 1960's.
Dave discusses what the aim of the training program was and the skills that officers were to receive at Scheyville.
How was the training program designed and how were leadership skills developed at OTU Scheyville?
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Why did the soldiers hold short of their objectives on the first day of the landings at ANZAC?
The 3rd Brigade were the first to land at Gallipoli. Why did COL Sinclair-Maclagan hesitate? How costly was this action?
What was the Turkish dispositions on the morning of the 25th?
If third ridge had been taken, what would have the impact for the campaign been?
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Brigadier Muhammad Asgharpresents a fascinating look at the forgotten gunners of Gallipoli, the 7th Mountain Indian Artillery Brigade, comprising the 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery and 26th Jacob's Batteries. These Batteries become a part of the 1st Mountain Regiment in 1947 in Pakistan.
Jacob's Battery was the only gun in action on the 25th of April at ANZAC.
On the 26th of April Jacob's Bty was reinforced with Australian gunners, creating an amalgam battery. Jacob's and Royal Kohat batteries were the only guns in action at ANZAC on the second day.
A great story of crater analysis unearths the story of Turkish rounds marked CSF@RPA (made at Cossipore and filled at Rawalpindi). How did Indian ammunition end up being fired at Australian troops?
21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery was in action for 238 dayas and fired 12,248 round. They had 11 men killed, 134 wounded, (5 died of wounds), 35 animals killed, 199 animals wounded and 1 missing.
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In 1911 the NZ Government purchases 18 pounders and 4.5 inch howitzers as it starts to modernise.
Their first deployment was to German Somoa, as a part of the Samoa Expeditionary Force, retaking the islands from the Germans.
The ANZAC the NZ guns land, howitzers, on the 26th of April, 1915 and the field guns lands on the 27th.
Constrained by lack of suitable firing positions and ammunition, they supported Australian, New Zealand and British across the Gallipoli peninsula.
The withdrawal commenced on the night of the 11th of December and the the last guns were withdrawn on the night of the 19th of December.
What were the key lessons that were learnt?
This bonus episode of the Firepower Seminar looks at the role of Naval Gunfire Support at Gallipoli by Commander David Stevens, RANR.
What issues did NGFS have at Gallipoli?
How where targets identified and how was command and control managed?
As a secondary effort, there was to few guns at Gallipoli and the Navy attempted to make up the difference.
What was the impact the NGFS on the Gallipoli campaign and how did the terrain impact it's effectiveness?
NGFS at Gallipoli makes an early attempt at creating Joint Effects. What is the legacy for the ADF today?
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MAJ Daryl Kelly OAM looks at the human side of the Gunners at Gallipoli.
He looks at some of the stories of the individual Gunners who served at Gallipoli, looking at the conditions and at Gallipoli during the landing operations.
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We continue our discussion on the Center of Gravity with COL Dale Eikmeier.
How important is the relationship between different CoG? What impact does this relationship have for operational planning?
Does the CoG breakdown when their are multiple actors? How are they related and how does it impact in planning an operation? What is the best way to deal with the increasing complexity? Does the Centre of Gravity continue to be useful as the complexity of the environment and the number of stakeholders increases?
What is the impact of time on the Centre of Gravity? Can the CoG change over time?
We look at the application of the CoG outside of the military. Could it be used in Foreign Policy?
What are COL Eikmeier's thoughts on Moral Centers of Gravity? Are they useful in planning campaigns?
What is the future of Joint Planning? How will it change over the next 20 years? What will be the impact on a Whole of Government approach to strategy?
How will the Centre of Gravity evolve over time?
This concludes our look at the Centre of Gravity construct. Next week we will start our next major battle study as we look at the Battle of Long Tan.
We talk to retired COL Dale Eikmeier about the Ends, Ways and Means methodology for determining the Center of Gravity.
We talk about some of the problems with the Clausewitzian Centre of Gravity construct. What role do the critical factors, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities play in the discovery of the Centre of Gravity.
We discuss the new Center of Gravity definitions that are starting to be used in Joint planning and how they improve on the traditional definition.
How does the CoG construct work in a complex system?
We use the Battle of the Atlantic as an example of how the Ends, Ways and Means approach can be used to better understand the process of determining the correct Center of Gravity to target.
Is the CoG construct useful at the LT / Platoon level?
The Battle of the Atlantic between the Germans and the Allies as the Germans attempted to remove Great Britain from the war, (which required 1,000,000 tons of supplies a week!), and the US attempted to build up men and materiel in Britain to launch it's attack on Occupied Europe. Analysis of the Critical Factors shows the ways to the critical vulnerabilities that can be targeted in the most economical way.
We finish with the discussion about the war in Iraq and the choice of the CoG being the Iraqi government as an example of a CoG that is incorrect.
Whilst everyone agrees that determining the Center of Gravity is really important, but there is not a lot of information on the actual process to do that.
We look at the inside out methodology by Rueschoff and Dunne as a way of determining the CoG. This methodology starts with objective, then looks at the critical capabilities that allow the achievement of the objective.
We pause to look at the role that time in CoG analysis. The CoG can change over time.
War on the Rocks had a great article on the procurement of oil in the Pacific and how a limited assessment of future critical factors can lead to issues. Who is doing a future Critical Factor analysis? What role does this have in planning?
We then look at the Eikmeier methodology. This is based on Ends, Ways and Means. The Eikmeier methodology provides a user friendly cut down version of systems theory.
We look at an example of Madonna deciding to be elected as President of the US. With that Endstate, we look at the ways she could achieve this and the means that she would need to be POTUS.
We look at the validity test to ensure that you have the right entity as being the CoG.
We look at the CoG example for Hannibal at Cannae. Have a listen to Dan Carlin's Punic Nightmare to get a great idea of what the fighting was like at Cannae.
We look at the Roman Army that faces Cannae and how he can defeat it. We look at how Hannibal structured his battle to attack the critical vulnerabilities of the Roman Army.
Hannibal was begged to march on Rome, but he only sent a delegation to Rome to discuss surrender. One hundred and fifty thousand males had died fighting Hannibal over 3 crippling losses.
What happened after Cannae?
How did the Roman moral Center of Gravity impact Hannibal? Hannibal has destroyed 3 operational level centers of gravity, yet he did not destroy the Roman moral centre of gravity.
Artillery doctrine was updated after some of the lessons from the Boer War.
What was the role of the artillery at the beginning of the war?
How was artillery integrated into the infantry plan? What was the preferred method of employment, indirect or direct, and why?
How was artillery organised?
What was the role of the CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) and what resources did he have?
What fire support was available at ANZAC and how was it controlled? How were adjustments made?
In 1915, radio was already in use - particularly with providing co-ordination with the Naval Gun Fire Support.
At 06:00 how many Turkish troops opposed the landing?
How long did the troops on the beach wait for Turkish reinforcements to arrive? (!)
The first battery to land was the 26th (Jacob's) Battery. at 10:30 on the 25th. How did it perform?
The Field Artillery didn't get into action on the 25th because Bridges feared that they would be captured.
How was the process for calling for fire refined to speed up the response from the guns and how did the role of artillery change as the campaign progressed?
Some of the issues faced at ANZAC included the guns themselves not being able to fire at high trajectory, the lack of field positions, with many on lower ground and the difficulty in observing fire with the observers being on the lower ground, and communications between the Forward Observer and gun line. The range was often under 100 meters between the lines of trenches. Enemy counter battery fire, machine gun fire and sniper fire also hampered the provision of offensive support.
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Hannibal was clearly one of the best Generals in history. How could he win 3 major battles against Rome, but he wasn't able to win the second Punic war.
We discuss the definition Center of Gravity, where it came from and why it is so confusing and why Hannibal and his staff may have struggled with the concept of Centre of Gravity.
Has the meaning of the Center of Gravity been lost in translation? How has the usage of Schwerpunkt transformed over time?
The Bundeswehr now uses the term Centre of Gravity, rather than the term in it's native German.
We look at the evolution of the definition for CoG from when it was first used in US Army doctrine.
LWD 1 gives us the following definition - The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. At the tactical level, the centre of gravity will often change as the mission progresses and will frequently be determined by the interaction of enemy and friendly intentions. The approaches to defeating the enemy’s centre of gravity are described as dislocation, disruption and destruction.
How does this relate to what Clausewitz was originally talking about? Is the characteristic in the definition part of the problem?
What about multiple Centers of Gravity? How does that work?
How are Centres and Gravities nested? Have a look at the example given in Levels of War and Iraqi CoGs from the 1991 Gulf War.
The relationship between Genters of Gravity at different levels of war by Strange and Iron.
What about the Center of Gravity in a Coalition? We look at the Scud Hunt was a major part of shielding the CoG of the Coalition.
Flexibility for commanders increases with the level of their command because there are more resources and greater scope to shape your enemy.
We look at the surfaces and gaps that need to be thought about and how you can shield your CoG and critical capabilities.
Would Hannibal had been better off using Joint Doctrine rather than the Army Doctrine for a definition of Centre of Gravity that he and his staff could use? We look at the Carthaginian navy, the development of the corvus and how the Romans took a land strength onto the open seas.
Finally - why did Hannibal cross the Alps?
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In a surprise move, we look 2,200 years to look at the Battle of Cannae, a defeat so severe that it is said that every mother in Rome mourned the death of a son. How could such a crushing defeat of a Roman Army.
In 1992 the Center of Gravity construct was introduced into LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare and it has been confusing people ever since.
What is it? How to build one to give you a list of targetable critical vulnerabilities that you can use to achieve your desired endstate.
Cannae was a double envelopment at Cannae, and has been replicated on numerous times since then.
We look at the Battle of the Trebia and also the Battle of Lake Trasimene. How did Rome respond to these crushing defeats?
How did Fabius functionally dislocate the Carthaginian Army's cavalry?
What is the difference between the tactical, operational, and strategic level? What is above the military strategic level of war?
How did Grand Strategy impact on the Fabien tactics that the Roman Army was using?
How did Varro and Paulus manage the Army after taking control from Fabius?
Hannibal has 50,000 troops, but he is faced by a Roman army 86,400. The size of the Roman Army to Gisgo was astonishing.
When it comes to unity of Command, how does having 2 consuls in command of the Roman army work?
The center of gravity is the key characteristic, capability or locality from which a force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. What was the CoG that Hannibal was targeting at Cannae?
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We look at the remaining principles of Manoeuvre Warfare in the conduct of the Malaya Campaign.
Percival attempted to be strong everywhere and was never able to generate enough combat power to slow the Japanese.
We look at the loss of Force Z and how it decreased the Allied ability to influence the war at sea and the sea lines of communication. The loss of Force Z created an exponentially deteriorating situation which denied the Allies the time required to
Deception was not really used well. The Allies were quite good at signalling their intentions and movements to the Japanese.
Recon Pull was well used by the Japanese with their recon in force. Success was reinforced and any slow down lead to a flanking manoeuvre, either by land or by sea.
Combined Arms Teams - why weren't the Allies able to use their combined arms teams to defeat the light Japanese infantry and light tanks? We look at what was lacking. The story of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure highlights the lack of training in the use of artillery for the Battalion COs. Employing the guns worked very effectively when the Allies were able to do it, but sadly, this happened to infrequently.
We look at some of issues that lead to the erosion of trust within the Allied battalions.
Operational Tempo - the Japanese were able to rotate troops through the front line and bring them out to rest. Some of the Allied COs were sent to hospital with sleep deprivation. This highlights the difference between the Allies and the Japanese.
Application of joint fires and effects - The Japanese did a better job than the Allies, however the Japanese didn't fully exploit their advantage that they had with regard to air superiority.
What could have made a difference in the Malaya Campaign?
Yamashita had culminated just prior to the Allied surrender of Singapore. What would have made a difference in the conduct of the defence?
The allocation of resources? More fighters (with trained pilots) and tanks. Tanks!
Ensuring that Allied supplies did not fall into the hands of the Japanese. Too many trucks, POL installations, rations, and ammunition fell into the hands of the Japanese.
We look at the moral implications in the campaign.
Lastly, we discuss the training and leadership of the Allies.
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In the time that we have been producing the Malaya Campaign series in The Principles of War, the Australian Army has produced a new version of the LWD 3-0, so Army Doctrine is moving faster than this podcast!
We look at the new doctrine and the application of Manoeuvre Warfare.
We look at the application of tenets of manoeuvre theory.
We discuss how the logistics tail for the Japanese could have been the critical vulnerability that the Allies could have targeted.
We discuss the question what would it have been if the 9th Division had been in Malaya rather than the 8th Division?
Got a favourite Australian military quote? Let us know, we are crowdsourcing a list of best quotes about and by Australians.
We discuss how the Japanese were able to target the Allied moral centre of gravity and how the Asia for the Asian memes undermine the effectiveness of the British Army in Malaya.
With surprise, we look at the strategic surprise that the Allies experienced with Malaya. The fact that the Singapore strategy was well understood, especially by people like MAJ GEN Lavarack, who was arguing for a better ability to defend the country.
We look at Group Captain John Lerew and his famous signal "Morituri vos salutamus". What would cause him to signal his higher headquarters "Those who about to die, salute you."
What effect did a racial bias play in the intelligence appreciation of the Japanese capabilities, especially given the kind of operations that the Japanese were conducting in places like Shanghai.
LT COL Charles Anderson was placed in a very difficult moral dilemma at Parit Sulong.
We look at his actions in WW1 in Africa and his Reserve service in the interwar period and how he comes to be the CO of the 2nd/19th Battalion.
We also briefly look at BRIG Maxwell, the previous CO of the 2nd/19th.
Check out the resources for this podcast, specifically the books by Farrell and Pratten.
We look at the events around the engagement that the 2nd/29th fought and pick up the story with the 2nd/19th moving out to hold the ground at Bakri.
BRIG Duncan attempts to consolidate his position whilst under attack from the Japanese. Anderson's counterattack sees the Japanese literally 'running around in circles'. However the Japanese are also moving to cut of the lines of retreat.
The Japanese 3rd Air Brigade starts attacking the retreating troops, striking the Brigade HQ and killing many of the staff, and wounding BRIG Duncan, making Anderson the commander of the BDE Column.
We look at Anderson's retreat of 24km to Parit Sulong from Bakri. The column moves out at walking pace and meets the first Japanese roadblock just 1.5 km down the road. Anderson displays physical courage leading an assault on the road block.
BRIG Duncan leads a counterattack with the Jats, and is killed. Anderson discovers that the bridge at Parit Sulong is held by the Japanese. This leaves Anderson needing to clear the bridge to be able to cross the river and move closer to friendly lines.
The column is unable to clear the bridge, ammunition is low and casualties are mounting. He is left with the dilemma of what to do - surrender, attack again or leave the wounded and escape in small groups.
Overnight the Japanese attack with tanks and a deadly battle between the tanks, the artillery and tank hunting parties goes on through the night.
There were only 3 survivors of the massacre at Parit Sulong. What actions did Bennett take to rescue the column?
What is the role of the Battalion Commander? When should they personally lead attacks?
We look at the role of LT GEN Takuma Nishimura in the Parit Sulong massacre.
He confided in the Medical Officer that he had never been so scared as during the retreat from Bakri, but it never showed to the men that he lead as he worked to save the column. This is the fine example of courage and leadership that he set and why he was awarded the VC for his actions.
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A lot of this story has come from an audio interview of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure. It is an amazing record of the preparation, conduct and aftermath of his participation in the Malaya Campaign.
LT McCure started out in the 53rd Ack Ack Search Light Bty and he wanted to join the 2nd AIF. The only way was for him to obtain a commission. He undertook that and was assigned to the 58th Infantry Battalion. The CMF was parading 2 nights a week.
LT McCure showed multiple examples of Moral Courage. This made it difficult for him to do his job, but he understand what was required of him, in spite of the direct orders from his CO.
We look at the Battle of Bakri, especially the initial contacts with the Gotanda Tank Detachment. The Japanese attacked without infantry support and because of the actions of LT McCure they pay the price. Too often in the Malaya campaign, the Japanese weren't held to account for paying off some of the Principles of War. The lack of cooperation of the infantry created the losses at Bakri for the Japanese tanks.
How did the 2nd/29th's CO, LT COL Robertson's training let him down when it came to combined arms training?
The withdrawal from Bakri was hellish. The Japanese had manoeuvred around the 2nd/29th and cut them off. LT COL Anderson in command of the 2nd/19th pushes forward to bring out the 2nd/29th, but Bill is stuck behind enemy lines.
He stays in Malaya for the rest of the war. He spends time attacking Japanese troop, supplies and trains. He ends up with a group of Malay Communists until the end of the war.
Bill's story is a great example of Moral Courage and and story that too few people have heard, especially considering that he was active in Malaya for the rest of the war.
As we transition to look at some vignettes of Leadership in Malaya, we pause to look at the composition of the 8th Division.
The Commander, Bennett, was a CMF soldier, as were the 3 BDE COMDs. In Malaya, only LT COL Boyes, CO of the 2/26th Bn was PMF. The 8th had more regular officers than the 6th Division, which was the first 2 AIF Division to be raised.
We look at Walter Brown VC. He was awarded his VC at Villers-Bretonneux and rejoined the Army to serve in WW2.
We discuss the 8 Bn COs to look at the differences between the COs and how that effected each of the Bns. We ponder the difference between authority and leadership.
LT COL Black Jack Galleghan was given command of the 2/30th after 4 previous attempts to get a Bn to command. Was it a case of 5th time lucky or was there a dearth of talent in the officer pool?
Was he a martinet? How did he deal with a mutiny across the entire Battalion?
He expected unwavering loyalty from below, but was scant in offering to his superiors.
The role of the 2IC, Gentleman George Ramsay and the role he played in managing Galleghan.
We moved onto the conduct of the ambush at Gemas. How were the Japanese shaped into playing into the ambush?
B Coy was chosen by lot to conduct the ambush. What actions did Galleghan take that minimised the impact of the ambush?
Was Galleghan hamstrung by the lack of training in combined arms?
We look at his moral courage in his inability to engage the Japanese with Artillery at Gemas. Why was this and is it fair?
Galleghan had abandoned his wireless equipment! Why did he do this?
He certainly was a colourful character. When he 'requisitioned' telephone cable from a passing Indian Signals SGT, he told the SGT that it had been taken by 'Colonel Ned Kelly of Australia.'
Galleghan came into his own as the Commander of Australian troops at Changi. This is an interesting example of how a leadership styles effectiveness is set in the context of the situation of where it is exercised.
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Good leadership, thorough training and success on operations will all contribute to high morale. We contrast LT COL Stewart and with other units.
The Indian and Australian armies had a lot of new troops, with varying degrees of training. This contrasts with battle hardened IJA troops, some who had many years of experience.
Kampar was the high point for the Allied morale.
The conduct of the withdrawl is difficult to do and it is difficult to maintain morale during the withdrawl. This continually eroded Allied morale with many of the Brigades.
Lack of training in tank fighting was evident in most Brigades. This led to poor performance against the Japanese tanks which eroded morale.
Too many senior officers weren't team players. Morale in BDE and DIV HQs was often poor because of the friction generated within the HQs. This impacted decision making and lead to further defeats.
The way the Japanese fought neglected many of the principles of war. Trust and co-ordination with units staying in place would have enabled fierce and effective counter attacks.
We look at the importance of fighting the battle in the enemy commanders mind and how that impacts the battle.
We look at Moral Dislocation, a concept that both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart had discussed. The moral dislocation of the Indian troops. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere wanted to deliver Asia for the Asians. The Japanese were coming as liberators of the Indian people. The Indian workers were underpaid. The evacuation of Penang helped dislocate the locals from the British morally.
Lastly the operationally tempo increased inversely with morale.
The moral dislocation by the Japanese was crowned with the creation of the Indian National Army, consisting of Indian troops wanting to fight the British.
The Japanese Army had troops, bought up on a modified Bushido code in school, that were successful, highly motivated and fighting for a cause that they all believed in.
What role does / should the education system play in a national defence strategy?
Lastly, despite Yamashita's high tempo, he was still able to rotate troops out of the front line for a few days rest. Fresh troops were able to continually harass defeated, depleted and over tired Allied troops with predictable results.
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Colourised image courtesy of Colours of Yesterday. It is a great picture showing the moral of the Australian troops.
We look at how the Japanese were able to use operational manoeuvre from the sea as a part of their approach to flexibility. We look at their history of amphib operations and how they developed their capability.
We look at the Shanghai Incident and how the IJN demonstrated their already impressive amphib capability.
The Japanese are able to launch 3 independent landings to start the offensive in Malaya.
We look at the Battle of Kampar and how the Japanese assault bogged down and how they were able to respond to a change in the tactical situation. BRIG Paris wanted a more offensive defence. How did Kampar mask the limitations of the Allied forces?
We look at the performance of the British Battalion at Kampar, which differs markedly from that exhibited from a lot of the Allied forces.
How was LT COL Stewart was able to train a Battalion that was able to operate effectively in the jungle. How did he do it? Did he use Mission Command to manage for the difficulties created by jungle fighting.
What are the requirements for mission command and were they displayed within 8th Division.
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Sustainment - often the least considered of the principles. How did logistics impact the conduct of the Malaya
We look at the interplay of logistics between the forces. There
The Japanese were operating from an amphibious operation which severely constrained their operations. The British were fighting a defensive battle, with a lot of trucks on well made roads.
What was the relationship between the two?
What were the Churchill supplies and why were they so important?
How did the conduct of the British withdrawal impact the Japanese supplies?
With constrained sea lines, what action did Yamashita take to ensure that he could supply his 4 divisions.
What was Yamashita's mobility solution that helped solve his logistics problem and enabled him to outmanoeurve the British by moving a lot quicker than the defenders could.
What are the similarities between Sherman's march to the sea with Yamashita's march to Singapore.
Malaya and Economy of Effort
We look at the definition and how the Japanese and Allies applied this principle. For the Allies there was too much economy and not enough effort.
There wasn't enough resources available to prepare the defences so Allied troops spent a lot of time digging in rather than training. The Royal Navy, Air Force and Army all allocated insufficient resources to be able to achieve the mission.
There was a lot of economy of effort in the hope that the US would be able to assist in the defence of Singapore.
By the time the perilous situation was realised, it was too late to reinforce before Singapore fell.
Synchronisation and Orchestration are implicit in cooperation, so where did the wheels fall off the wagon?
It is every commanders job to work towards cooperation, building harmonious relationships between agencies.
The base building program for the RAF was kept from the Army.
The British provided no strategic guidance provide by higher in London. Brooke Popham was the first Air Force commander of a Joint Command. How did he do?
The defence often gives the defender the ability to choice the ground that they will fight on. Percival lost that right because the locations was dictated by the location
We look at Brig Ivan Simpson, the CRE for Malaya Command. He was energetic, thoughtful and planned extensive defensive works to slow the Japanese advance. His work was largely ignored for a range of reasons.
A lack of training and understanding of the work that engineers do was replicated with other Corps. There was little understanding of the employment of Artillery, Signals was understood poorly. There was very little combined arms training. Artillery was employed by Bn COs, often in the wrong place, meaning that the troops did not receive the support that they needed.
Malaya was a secondary effort of secondary effort for both the British and the Japanese - so how does Concentration of Force work for secondary efforts?
Force Z was HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. A force too small to effect the outcome, but too large to lose.
1 Squadron RAAF conduct the first air strike against the Japanese in WW2.
How did Admiral Tom Phillips plan to interdict the Japanese landing forces? What is the role of the naval LO?
Why did CAPT Tennant disobey orders about radio silence?
RAAF support for Force Z was too little, too late.
Churchill described this as the most direct shock that he had ever received after Force Z was sunk.
Force Z was the first capital ships sunk by air power alone, this is a great example of technological surprise.
The Japanese create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation - how did this impact the British decision making.
Don't penny packet your Battleships.
The IJA stacked the deck in aircraft. More aircraft and aircraft that were better with better pilots - this helps swing the balance for the Japanese.
The force ratios for the Japanese were very low. They never achieved overwhelmingly combat power, but they achieved overwhelming success.
They had 11 Divisions for their land operations across the Pacific AO. How did Yamashita entirely pay of Concentration of Force and still succeed?
Leadership, training, doctrine, planning, morale, combined arms and audacity. Do this and pay of concentration of force at your leisure.
"Read this alone and the war can be won" was the book that built the moral case for the offensive and covered the tactics as well that would lead to victory.
How did Security and Surprise impact operations in Malaya and Singapore?
There was little security in the Malaya campaign for the Allies. The Japanese had a strong expat community.
We look at the work of Patrick Heenan, a Kiwi born British and Indian Army Officer who became a spy for the Japanese, betraying the Air Force base at Alor Star. Not sure why he did, but he took a 6 month secondment to Japan prior to the war.
We also look at how the Japanese learnt that the British had no capability to reinforce Singapore and Malaya when a highly sensitive document from the British War Cabinet for Brooke Popham was captured on the SS Automedon.
Security for the Allies created a reluctance to use wireless, which inhibited tactical flexibility.
Japanese security was tight enough to limit the time available for Brooke Popham to be able to make a decision.
Percival conducted an appreciation in 1937 that was very accurate in regards to how the Japanese would attack Singapore and yet there was little work done in the 4 years before the Japanese landing.
The Allies are surprised because they fundamentally under rated the technical and operational capabilities of the Japanese. The British were reading Japanese diplomatic messages one month before the invasion, but it still did not start ringing alarm bells.
The British did not think that the Japanese would attack during the wet season - why were the Japanese in the wet, with the much more difficult conditions for troops and movement.
How about in the Australian Army? Were we surprised?
Where do you find the Officers and SNCO's when you raise 3 new divisions?
What impact did the death of Australia's ablest soldier on 13 August 1940 have on the Australian Army?
Gordon Bennett gets the Div Comd job that he so desperately wanted. Sixth time lucky after being rejected 5 times prior!
How did the battalions prepare for the Malaya campaign? We look at a PAR report from 6 months before the Japanese invasion.
Surprise sees Australia commit 2 BDEs to Malaya, poorly equipped and poorly trained - we look at the reasons.
How can a country improve the Whole of Government approach when moving over onto a war footing?
Lastly we look at what happens when the Japanese pay off security entirely and repeatedly.
We look at the dithering that occurred in the British Malaya Command.
We look at Operation Matador and how centralised control lead to delays and an inability to execute on an offensive defence that was planned.
How do you think a Combat Team assault would go against a prepared Divisional defensive position? We find out as we look at the Battle of Jitra.
The application of manouevre requires:
How does all of this relate to the Japanese conduct of their offensive.
We look at the Japanese driving charge and how it harnessed offensive action. At the tactical level, this looks like the filleting attack whereby tanks fight through the defensive positions on the road and push through into the rear of the defense.
The driving charge along with poor British training and decision making enabled Yamashita to attack with a 1:3 numerical inferiority and win. The strategic and tactical operational tempo created an OODA loop that was much tighter than that of the British.
The defence of Jitra was unprepared for the Japanese assault. How long did they have to prepare their defences?
We look at the Saeki Detachment, their training, their tactics and their success at Jitra. The Japanese win the Battle of Jitra and win 3 months of ammunition and 300 trucks. 75% of the Indian casualties are taken as prisoners of war. Jitra saw 500 troops against 14,000 troops.
The British are able to defend successfully at the Battle of Kampar, only withdrawing after being forced to withdraw when the Japanese are able to threaten their Main Supply Route.
We look at Slim River, where the Allies had 500 KIA and 3,200 POW, and Japanese suffered 17 KIA and 60 wounded. It was described as reckless and gallant determiniation.
LT COL Stewart admitted the position of BDE HQ was not very good and he should have used the artillery in an anti-tank roll, but he had never taken part in an exercise with an anti tank component. He was surprised at the use of tanks on a road and at night.
We look at how the British and Japanese came about to select their aims and how they got to them.
What was the British mission and what did Churchill understand of the mission to be? How did Brooke Popham understand his mission and how did that impact the troops on the ground (and pilots in the air).
We have a slight diversion to look at the Whole of Government approach to defence and how the Australian Government undermined the Air Force and it's capabilities. Why would they do that? How effective was the Beaufort Bomber? Was a defence procurement decision influenced by political needs?
What role did the 'China incident' play with Japanese decision making processes? How did COL Tsuji influence the decision to go south and east as opposed to north and west.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was using 400 tonnes of oil an hour - how would they secure the resources they needed?
What were the similarities and differences between the Japanese and British thinking?
We look at Unity of Command in both the Japanese and British forces.
How did issues with command structure effect each of the forces?
What was the relationship between Bennett and Percival? Did Bennett's micromanagement of the Brigades limit their effectiveness. How would command issues effect 22nd and 27th Brigade.
What issues did LT GEN Yamashita have? What is Gekokujo and why was Charlie Chaplin nearly assassinated?
What was the May 15th incident and why did 350,000 people sign a petition in blood?
Allied Doctrine had seen little development between the war with significant budget cuts. The Army was relegated to an Imperial policing role. It is very Command and Control way of
We look at Sir John Dill and his visit to Tannenburg and his interpretation of 'Mission Command'.
Malaya was a very laissez-faire, with some units preferring not to train in the jungle.
LT COL Ian Stewart from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. He trained one of the best battalions in Malaya. How was his training methodologies viewed at Malaya Command?
British Staff College focused on strategy, not on Brigade and Division Command, which meant that British officers struggled when commanding one up.
How did the 8th Division transition from the training for desert fighting once they landed in Malaya?
What was the thinking about Combined Arms and how was it trained for?
How did MAG GEN Gordon Bennett train the Division for the withdrawal and what where his thoughts on digging in?
How did the personalities of the individual Battalion Commanders impact each of their battalions.
The Japanese developed a Jungle Warfare in Taiwan to develop doctrine. They also conducted 10 major exercises for amphibious operations.
The reliance on the bicycle enabled rapid movements of troops with very little logistics impact.
The difference between the Japanese and British highlighted the amount of recent modern warfare experience that each Army had been subjected to.
How did the road impact the thinking for each of the commanders? How would it shape their actions and dispositions.
What is fighting for the road off the road and how did the British and Indian troops respond to this tactic?
How did the Japanese task organise for their upcoming offensive?
8th Division started from the ground up to develop their doctrine, which meant that there was still significant work to be done after first contact with the enemy.
The British planned to use Artillery and Air Power to defend Malaya.
Malaya is hot and humid and it has the 29th longest coastline (lots of areas for conducting amphibious operations). There is a steep mountain range splitting the country between the East and West, and there are very few laterals over the ranges.
The road infrastructure improved over time to support the rubber and tin industries in Malaya and this enabled easy road movement. They are often 2 lane highways and in a large number of places the roads are cut into the hills forming defiles, perfect for the defence.
The Air Force constructs a number of airfields. Little consideration was given to the provision of local defence for these airfields. This dictates the ground that the Army is required to defend.
The human terrain consists of British expats, Chinese, Malays, and Indians. The Chinese are very co-operative with the British, but the Malays, who are exploited as cheap labour, are more co-operative with the Japanese. Cheap wages for labourers create discontent among the Malays and Indians. The Indians, being exploited for labour, this increased feelings of Indian Nationalism.
Racism exacerbated the tensions between the Indians and the British. Britain relied on a massive expansion of the Indian Army. The IIIrd Indian Corps had a lot of junior, poorly trained troops.
In Australia, there was a pool of 80,000 in the Commonwealth Military Force. This pool created 6th Division, 7th Division and 8th Division. Eighth Div would provide the troops from Australia who would serve in Singapore and Malaya.
The Japanese had been our allies in WW1. We discuss the Marco Polo incident and the experience that the Japanese troops had prior to the invasion. The Japanese had been on a war footing for a long time and their Army was much better trained and equipped.
We ran out of time for Doctrine. Next episode we will try to make the doctrine interesting, if not fascinating!
The Centre of Gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight.
For the British, the CoG was the Singapore Naval Base. It was the fundamental part of the defence of the whole of South East Asia. In times of need the Royal Navy would sail out to Singapore and defeat all comers and ensure that the Empire was secure. The port at Singapore was central to the defence of Australia. The base wasn't big enough for the fleet required to keep the seas free. The fleet was unlikely to sally forth if decisively engaged in Europe, so the fleet base was too small for a fleet that was unlikely ever sail there. It turned out to be the second largest graving dock in the world at the time.
We look at how the Singapore Strategy became increasingly untenable, but no one was prepared to
In 1940 it became apparent that the Navy would not be able to sail to Singapore 'for the foreseeable future."
LT GEN Percival conducted an analysis of the defence of Singapore before the war. This dictated that the defence of Singapore would need to be conducted in Malaya and northern Malaya at that.
As the war progressed, Churchill hoped that the US would provide the Navy required to support the British in the Far East, if provoked.
With no Navy to defend the base, the defence of Malaya fell to the Air Force. With not enough planes and the planes they had being too old, the last line of defence would be the Army.
The defence of the base dictated the way that the Battle of Malaya was fought.
For the Japanese, the CoG analysis is a lot easier. It was the tank.
The tanks the Japanese had were not great and the tactics they used were not modern, but they had tanks, used them very aggressively and the British had no tanks in Malaya. The Japanese used the tanks for filleting attacks which were devastating, especially against forces that were not well versed in combined arms, or even anti tank weapons.
A Critical Vulnerability of tanks, of course, is the logistics tail required. How will Yamashita overcome this?
Our first campaign that we will look at is from Malaya.
We detail some of the key people in the Malaya Campaign:
LT Gen Percival
AVM Pulford
LT Gen Heath
MAJ Gen Gordon Heath
LT Gen Yamashita
We look at the numbers for both sides. Yamashita was fighting significantly outnumbered, so how did he make up the numbers?
Armoured warfare - who had the advantage with tanks?
In late 1941 the war is going quite badly for the Allies, the Germans are at the gates of Moscow.
The Royal Navy sends Prince of Wales and Repulse to defend Singapore and Malaya. After Japanese landings, Force Z moves out to defeat the Japanese only to be sunk. Churchill describes it as the greatest naval disaster ever in the history of the Royal Navy.
The Japanese fight at Jitra and win. Within the first 100 hours, they have achieved control of the air, control of the sea and started to dominate on the land.
Yamashita pushes aggressively south down Malaya. A series of major withdrawals continue. He leapfrogs down the Western coast of Malaya outflanking the Allies out of prepared defences.
Wavell takes command of the ABDA command and he orders a 150 mile retreat.
We look at COL Tsuji, the God of Operations and how he prepared the strategy for the Japanese attack.
Wavell meets MAJ GEN Bennett and likes the aggressive spirit that he displays. An inexperienced divisional staff takes over command of 3 divisions.
The Battle of Muar is fought and lost and significant casualties are suffered by the Allies.
The situation is so bad in the air that unarmed flying club planes are used for recon.
The Japanese advanced 740 km in one month and 1 month and 23 days with a force ratio of 1:2, not the expected 3:1. How did they manage such a marked victory?
We look at how the Principles of War podcast is going to work, what we want to do and how we are going to do it.
We discuss how terrain plays a part in the outcomes of battles and we will be looking at leadership.
What role does leadership play in battle? What about Post H-Hour Execution and leadership? We look at some examples from General Grant's experiences that lead him to be the Commander of the Army of the Potomac.
We discuss each of the principles and give a brief example of why each is important.
Selection and the Maintenance of the Aim. Probably the most important of the principles.
Concentration of Force - My strategy is 1 against 10 - my tactics 10 against 1. The
Economy of effort - if you aren't the main effort, you will be short of everything except the enemy.
Co-operation - why is this so difficult to achieve. We briefly looked at the problems with co-operation for the D-Day landings.
Security - Truth is so precious it should be attended by a bodyguard of lies.
Surprise - To surprise the enemy is to defeat them. The Germans driving through the Ardennes forest in 1940. We talk briefly about technical surprise.
Flexibility - Auftragtaktik and Mission Command. We look at Yom Kippur.
Offensive Action - Britzkrieg.
Sustainment - Supplies set the left and right of arc of what is possible. Sherman's march to the sea and the Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands.
Morale - The Army of the Potomac after the Battle of the Wilderness.
Sun Tzu said -The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
This is why we need to understand the principles of war.
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