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SUPREME COURT TERM ENDING
DOBBS V. JACKSON - STATES CAN MAKE ABORTION ILLEGAL
Missouri is first in the nation: https://www.newsweek.com/missouri-bans-all-abortions-minutes-after-scotus-ruling-overturning-roe-1718967
Josh Hawley Wants You To Move Out: https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article262849238.html
What is a “D&C”
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/dilation-and-curettage-d-and-c
Missouri statute Sec. 1.205: Life Begins At Conception, unborn have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being, natural parents have protectable interest in the life, health and well being of unborn child - those are real actual words in missouri law
MO Stat, Sec. 188.015 defines abortion, 188.017 makes them illegal, updated June 24, 2022
"Conception", the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a male;
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a woman, except in cases of medical emergency. Any person who knowingly performs or induces an abortion of an unborn child in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B felony, as well as subject to suspension or revocation of his or her professional license by his or her professional licensing board. A woman upon whom an abortion is performed or induced in violation of this subsection shall not be prosecuted for a conspiracy to violate the provisions of this subsection.
3. It shall be an affirmative defense for any person alleged to have violated the provisions of subsection 2 of this section that the person performed or induced an abortion because of a medical emergency. The defendant shall have the burden of persuasion that the defense is more probably true than not.
"Medical emergency", a condition which, based on reasonable medical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert the death of the pregnant woman or for which a delay will create a serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman;
THOMAS’S CONCURRANCE: “For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including:
Griswold - contraceptive use
Lawrence - right to engage in private sexual acts (same sex)
Obergefell - marriage equality
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/dobbs-v-jackson-womens-health-organization/
MAINE - PUBLIC MONEY TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/carson-v-makin/
Holding: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments to parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own violates the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
Actual opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Maine residents in places with schools that don’t provide secondary education can use tuition assistance for kids to attend other schools - previously could NOT use that money for religious schools
Ruling is that it violates the free exercise clause
Allows for use of public funds for religious instruction
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.”
Missouri case Trinity Lutheran v. Comer about using public money for playground equipment in 2017
The “unremarkable” principles applied in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza suffice to resolve this case. Maine offers its citizens a benefit: tuition assistance payments for any family whose school district does not provide a public secondary school. Just like the wide range of nonprofit organizations eligible to receive playground resurfacing grants in Trinity Lutheran, a wide range of private schools are eligible to receive Maine tuition assistance payments here. And like the daycare center in Trinity Lutheran, BCS and Temple Academy are disqualified from this generally available benefit “solely because of their religious character.” 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). By “condition[ing] the availability of benefits” in that manner, Maine’s tuition assistance program—like the program in Trinity Lutheran—“effectively penalizes the free exercise” of religion. Ibid. (quoting McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 626 (plurality opinion)).
BREYER: The First Amendment begins by forbidding the government from “mak[ing] [any] law respecting an establishment of religion.” It next forbids them to make any law “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The Court today pays almost no attention to the words in the first Clause while giving almost exclusive attention to the words in the second.
In a word, to interpret the two Clauses as if they were joined at the hip will work against their basic purpose: to allow for an American society with practitioners of over 100 different religions, and those who do not practice religion at all, to live together without serious risk of religion-based social divisions.
We have previously found, as the majority points out, that “a neutral benefit program in which public funds flow to religious organizations through the independent choices of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause.” Ante, at 10 (citing Zelman, 536 U. S., at 652– 653). We have thus concluded that a State may, consistent with the Establishment Clause, provide funding to religious schools through a general public funding program if the “government aid . . . reach[es] religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of . . . individual [aid] recipients.” Id., at 652. But the key word is “may.” We have never previously held what the Court holds today, namely, that a State must (not may) use state funds to pay for religious education as part of a tuition program designed to ensure the provision of free statewide public school education. What happens once “may” becomes “must”? Does that transformation mean that a school district that pays for public schools must pay equivalent funds to parents who wish to send their children to religious schools? Does it mean that school districts that give vouchers for use at charter schools must pay equivalent funds to parents who wish to give their children a religious education? What other social benefits are there the State’s provision of which means—under the majority’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause—that the State must pay parents for the religious equivalent of the secular benefit provided?
NEW YORK - STATES CANNOT REGULATE GUNS
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/new-york-state-rifle-pistol-association-inc-v-bruen/
NEW YORK LAW required permit for conceal and carry
Ruling is that BASED ON THE 14TH AMENDMENT (YEAH THAT SAME ONE) it is an individual liberty interest protected by the 14th (that’s not a joke)
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Twitter: @TheHeartlandPOD
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