Supreme Court Oral Arguments

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**Supreme Court Oral Arguments**

A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court.
* Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov
* Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information.
* Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available when an aligned transcript is ready).
Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

Latest Episodes:

[23-21] Harrow v. Department of Defense Mar 25, 2024

Show notes

Harrow v. Department of Defense

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Mar 25, 2024.

Petitioner: Stuart R. Harrow.
Respondent: Department of Defense.

Advocates:

Joshua P. Davis (for the Petitioner)
Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Stuart R. Harrow was a federal employee who was furloughed in 2013. He appealed the furlough decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but due to short staffing, the MSPB did not rule on Harrow’s appeal for more than five years, during which Harrow changed his email address. On May 11, 2022, the MSPB affirmed the agency’s furlough action and attempted to inform Harrow that he had 60 days to seek judicial review. However, because he had changed email addresses, Harrow did not learn of the MSPB’s denial until after 60 days had elapsed. On September 8, 2022, Harrow moved the Board for an extension of time to appeal, but the Board denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the timely filing of a petition from the Board's final decision is a jurisdictional requirement and “not subject to equitable tolling.”

Question

Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling?

[22-1025] Gonzalez v. Trevino Mar 20, 2024

Show notes

Gonzalez v. Trevino

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Mar 20, 2024.

Petitioner: Sylvia Gonzalez.
Respondent: Edward Trevino, II, et al.

Advocates:

Anya A. Bidwell (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sylvia Gonzalez, a resident of Castle Hills, Texas, was elected to the city council in 2019. During her campaign, she learned of widespread dissatisfaction with the current city manager. After taking office, she organized a nonbinding petition calling for the manager's removal. The petition was presented at a contentious council meeting, after which Mayor Edward Trevino questioned Gonzalez about the petition's location, found in her binder. Two days later, Trevino initiated a criminal complaint against Gonzalez for allegedly stealing the petition. Despite an atypical legal process involving Chief-of-Police John Siemens and special detective Alex Wright, Gonzalez was arrested and spent a night in jail. She is no longer on the council and has refrained from public political activity.

Gonzalez sued Trevino, Siemens, Wright, and the city (collectively, the Defendants) for violating her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She argued that the arrest was in retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment, but she conceded that there was probable cause for the arrest. In support of her retaliation claim, she cited a decade-long review of misdemeanor and felony data in Bexar County that showed no similar cases.

The Defendants moved to dismiss her lawsuit on grounds of the independent-intermediary doctrine and qualified immunity, but the district court allowed Gonzalez’s claims to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the outcome was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett, holding that, in general, the existence of probable cause will defeat a retaliatory arrest claim. The Fifth Circuit noted that Gonzalez’s facts did not trigger the narrow exception recognized in Nieves, under which a plaintiff need not plead lack of probable cause “where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”

Question

1. Can the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened?

2. Is Nieves limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests?

[22O141] Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado Mar 20, 2024

Show notes

Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 20, 2024.

Petitioner: Texas.
Respondent: New Mexico and Colorado.

Advocates:

Frederick Liu (for the United States)
Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas)
Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for New Mexico)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This is a continuation of an action involving a dispute over the waters of the Rio Grande Basin and Elephant Butte. The Supreme Court previously held that the United States may intervene in the action, which it did. When the Special Master filed the Third Interim Report, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico moved for entry of a proposed "Consent Decree" that would resolve the dispute without the consent of the United States. The United States claims that the Court should deny the motion because (1) a court's approval of a consent decree cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors—i.e., the United States in this case; (2) the consent decree would impose obligations on a party, to wit, the United States, without that party's consent; and (3) the consent decree would be "contrary to the Compact."

Question

May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?

[23-14] Diaz v. United States Mar 19, 2024

Show notes

Diaz v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Mar 19, 2024.

Petitioner: Delilah Guadalupe Diaz.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On August 17, 2020, Delilah Guadalupe Diaz was returning to California from Mexico. At the border, a “crunch-like sound” was heard when she rolled down the car window, leading the border agent to call for backup and check the car's door panels using a density measuring device. Inspectors found 27.98 kilos of methamphetamine hidden in these panels. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs in the car, explaining that she had initially traveled to Mexico with her daughter, who returned early. Diaz stayed back to visit her boyfriend, and used his car to return home. She stated her boyfriend had told her he would retrieve the car from her in a few days.

The government charged Diaz with importation of methamphetamine in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. One of the elements of that offense is that the defendant knew she was transporting drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1). To prove that element, the government called an expert to testify that “narcotic traffickers do not entrust large and valuable quantities of narcotics to unknowing couriers.” Diaz sought to exclude the expert evidence, arguing that it would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by providing “a direct comment on the ultimate issue—Ms. Diaz’s knowledge.” However, the district court allowed the evidence, the jury found Diaz guilty, and the district court sentenced her to seven years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?

[22-1079] Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. Mar 19, 2024

Show notes

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Mar 19, 2024.

Petitioner: Truck Insurance Exchange.
Respondent: Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., et al.

Advocates:

Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
C. Kevin Marshall (for the debtor respondents)
David C. Frederick (for the claimant respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, allows a Chapter 11 debtor with significant asbestos liabilities to channel all current and future asbestos claims into a trust funded by the debtor. This provision aims to treat future claimants equitably, given the long latency period of some asbestos-related illnesses, while also enabling the debtor to exit bankruptcy as a viable economic entity. To obtain relief under this section, the debtor must meet several criteria designed to protect the due process rights of claimants, especially future ones. These criteria include the appointment of a representative for future claimants and court determination that the plan is fair to both current and future claimants. Additionally, 75% of current claimants must vote to approve the plan.

In the face of over 38,000 asbestos-related lawsuits since 1978, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., collectively known as the "Debtors," filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016. As part of their proposed reorganization Plan, the Debtors negotiated with multiple parties—including insurance companies, creditors, government agencies, and representatives of both current and future asbestos claimants—to establish a § 524(g) trust. This trust aimed to channel both existing and future asbestos-related claims away from the Debtors. The trust's financial viability heavily depended on primary liability insurance policies issued by Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") between the 1960s and 1980s, which obligated Truck to investigate and defend each asbestos claim against the Debtors up to a per-claim limit of $500,000. The Debtors would assign their rights under these Truck policies to the § 524(g) trust as part of the Plan's funding.

Truck opposed the Plan, arguing it failed to provide anti-fraud measures for insured claims that would be litigated in the tort system, thereby potentially exposing Truck to fraudulent claims. Despite Truck's objections, the bankruptcy court recommended confirmation of the Plan, finding it to be "insurance neutral" and therefore not impacting Truck's rights or obligations under the existing policies. The district court upheld this decision, confirming the Plan and thereby nullifying Truck's objections. Importantly, 100% of the asbestos personal-injury claimants had approved the proposed Plan, making Truck the sole objector.

The district court confirmed the Plan over Truck’s objections, finding Truck lacked standing to challenge the Plan because it was not a “party in interest” under § 1109(b). The U.S. Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?

[22-842] National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo Mar 18, 2024

Show notes

National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Mar 18, 2024.

Petitioner: National Rifle Association of America.
Respondent: Maria T. Vullo.

Advocates:

David D. Cole (for the Petitioner)
Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In October 2017, following a referral from the New York County District Attorney's Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), under the leadership of Maria T. Vullo, initiated an investigation into NRA-endorsed insurance programs suspected of violating New York law. This scrutiny resulted in three insurance companies acknowledging their fault through consent decrees in 2018. Concurrently, after the Parkland school shooting, Vullo issued guidance and statements encouraging banks and insurers to assess and potentially end their affiliations with gun promotion organizations like the NRA, citing reputational risks. The fallout led to several firms cutting ties with the NRA, prompting the association to file a lawsuit against Vullo and other state officials, asserting violations of its free speech and equal protection rights.

The district court dismissed most of the claims but allowed the First Amendment allegations against Vullo to proceed, citing unresolved factual questions about her qualified immunity. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court reasoned that while the First Amendment protects against the abridgment of free speech by government officials, these officials also have the responsibility to address public concerns. Here, the NRA failed to show that Vullo’s conduct sought to coerce, rather than merely to convince. Furthermore, even if her actions were coercive, Vullo’s conduct as a regulator and public official did not infringe upon any clearly established law, as she appeared to act reasonably and in good faith in performing her duties.

Question

Does a New York regulator’s discouragement of companies from doing business with the National Rifle Association after the Parkland school shooting constitute coercion in violation of the First Amendment?

[23-411] Murthy v. Missouri Mar 18, 2024

Show notes

Murthy v. Missouri

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Mar 18, 2024.

Appellant: Vivek H. Murthy, U.S. Surgeon General, et al.
Appellee: Missouri, et al.

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners)
J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Multiple plaintiffs, including epidemiologists, consumer and human rights advocates, academics, and media operators, claimed that various defendants, including numerous federal agencies and officials, have engaged in censorship, targeting conservative-leaning speech on topics such as the 2020 presidential election, COVID-19 origins, mask and vaccine efficacy, and election integrity. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants used public statements and threats of regulatory action, such as reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, to induce social media platforms to suppress content, thereby violating the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The States of Missouri and Louisiana also alleged harm due to the infringement of the free speech rights of their citizens.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from meeting with social media companies or otherwise seeking to influence their content-moderation policies. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s motion for an emergency stay and granted certiorari to review the case on the merits.

Question

Did the federal government’s request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users’ First Amendment rights?

[23-3] Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski Feb 28, 2024

Show notes

Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Feb 28, 2024.

Petitioner: David Suski, et al.
Respondent: Coinbase, Inc.

Advocates:

Jessica L. Ellsworth (for the Petitioner)
David J. Harris (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In June 2021, Coinbase, an online cryptocurrency exchange, launched a Dogecoin Sweepstakes that required participants to opt into "Official Rules" with a forum selection clause stipulating exclusive jurisdiction of California courts for related disputes. Respondent David Suski and three other users, who had agreed to the “Coinbase User Agreement” containing an arbitration provision when they created their accounts, entered the sweepstakes. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit against Coinbase and Marden-Kane, Inc., the company engaged by Coinbase for the sweepstakes management, alleging violations of California’s False Advertising Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Coinbase sought to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement, but the district court denied Coinbase’s motion, interpreting the contractual documents to conclude that the Sweepstakes’ Official Rules, with their forum selection clause, took precedence over the User Agreement’s arbitration clause.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the dispute should be resolved within the California court system as per the Official Rules of the Sweepstakes, not through arbitration as Coinbase had sought.

Question

When parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, does an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

[22-976] Garland v. Cargill Feb 28, 2024

Show notes

Garland v. Cargill

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Feb 28, 2024.

Petitioner: Michael Cargill.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al.

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners)
Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

For over a decade, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) maintained that bump stocks were not machineguns as defined by statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), and issued interpretation letters confirming this position. Following the October 1, 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where a shooter used bump stocks in a massacre, public demand for a ban on bump stocks surged, leading to proposed legislation. Before Congress could act, the ATF, responding to the tragedy and public sentiment, reversed its stance in 2018, reclassifying bump stocks as machineguns and exposing owners to criminal liability. Respondent Michael Cargill surrendered his bump stocks due to this new regulation and filed a lawsuit challenging the ATF regulations, arguing that the ATF exceeded its authority in defining bump stocks as machineguns.

The district court for the government, finding that the government’s new interpretation of “machinegun” is the best interpretation of the statute. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed. The en banc court found the definition of "machinegun" as unambiguously not applying to bump stocks, but even if it were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would compel a construction of the statute in Cargill’s favor.

Question

Is a bump stock device a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)?

[22-7386] McIntosh v. United States Feb 27, 2024

Show notes

McIntosh v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Feb 27, 2024.

Petitioner: Louis McIntosh.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Steven Y. Yurowitz (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On August 22, 2013, a jury convicted Louis McIntosh of multiple Hobbs Act robbery-related offenses and gun charges, leading to a near-life sentence of 720 months. The district court granted some relief by vacating specific counts but imposed a forfeiture amount inconsistently between oral and written judgments. On appeal, the government belatedly submitted a forfeiture order, which both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld despite its tardiness. The appellate court vacated one of the §924(c) counts but reinstated others, rejecting the petitioner's arguments. After a Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. __ (2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) the Court granted certiorari, leading to a remand. However, the Second Circuit mostly upheld its prior rulings, making only minor changes.

Question

May a district court enter a criminal forfeiture order when the time limit specified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has already passed?

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