Supreme Court Oral Arguments &#8211; scotusstats.com

Argued on Oct 16, 2024.

Petitioner: Joshua E. Bufkin.
Respondent: Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

Advocates:

Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton were each denied benefits despite evidence that appeared to be in “approximate balance.” The benefit-of-the-doubt rule, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), provides that, “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” However, in reviewing the Veterans Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Section 7261(b)(1), which requires the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “take due account of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule “does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond” performing the usual review of the underlying factual findings for clear error—a basic procedural requirement that was already in place before enactment of the Veterans Benefits Act.

Question

Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1)?

[23-753] City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency Oct 16, 2024

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency

Argued on Oct 16, 2024.

Petitioner: City and County of San Francisco, California.
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency.

Advocates:

Tara M. Steeley (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The city of San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects both sewage and stormwater runoff. During heavy rains, the system can exceed its capacity, resulting in combined sewer overflows (CSOs) that discharge pollutants into the Pacific Ocean. The Clean Water Act requires cities like San Francisco to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for such discharges. San Francisco has been implementing a CSO control plan since the late 1960s and completed construction of its current CSO control facilities in 1997.

In 2019, the EPA and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a new NPDES permit for San Francisco's Oceanside treatment facility. San Francisco is challenging two provisions in this permit: (1) narrative prohibitions against violating water quality standards, and (2) a requirement that San Francisco update its long-term CSO control plan. San Francisco argues that these provisions are inconsistent with the Clean Water Act and EPA regulations. The EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board denied San Francisco's administrative appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition for review, holding that the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to include in the Oceanside NPDES permit the challenged provisions, and that EPA's decision to do so was rationally connected to evidence in the administrative record.

Question

Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?

[23-365] Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Oct 15, 2024

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn

Argued on Oct 15, 2024.

Petitioner: Medical Marijuana, Inc.
Respondent: Douglas J. Horn.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners)
Easha Anand (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In February 2012, Douglas J. Horn was involved in a car accident that caused injuries to his hip and right shoulder. While seeking alternative natural remedies, he discovered an advertisement for Dixie X CBD Dew Drops Tincture, which claimed to contain 0% THC and be compliant with federal law. As a commercial truck driver subject to random drug testing, Horn carefully investigated these claims before purchasing and consuming the product in October 2012. However, he subsequently failed a drug test and lost his job, wages, and benefits. Independent lab tests confirmed that Dixie X contained THC, contrary to the advertisement's claims.

On August 6, 2015, Horn sued the companies who allegedly falsely marketed the product—Medical Marijuana, Inc., Dixie Holdings, LLC, and Red Dice Holdings, LLC—in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which included a civil RICO claim and eight state law claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Horn lacked RICO standing because he sued for the loss of earnings, which was derivative of an antecedent personal injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated, concluding that nothing in the text of RICO’s civil-action provision, or in its structure or history, supports a rule that bars plaintiffs from suing simply because their otherwise recoverable economic losses happen to have been connected to a non-recoverable personal injury.

Question

Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

[23-583] Bouarfa v. Mayorkas Oct 15, 2024

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas

Argued on Oct 15, 2024.

Petitioner: Amina Bouarfa.
Respondent: Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security.

Advocates:

Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2014, Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, submitted Form I-130 to petition for her husband, Ala’a Hamayel, to be classified as her immediate relative under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Secretary approved the petition in 2015 but later notified Bouarfa of an intent to revoke the approval, stating that Hamayel had entered into a previous marriage solely to evade immigration laws. Despite Bouarfa’s response, the Secretary revoked the approval, and Bouarfa’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was unsuccessful.

Bouarfa sued in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the officials’ actions as arbitrary and capricious. The Secretary and Director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the revocation decision was unreviewable because it was a discretionary action. The district court granted the motion, concluding that while the action was based on nondiscretionary criteria, the action itself was discretionary and thus that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

May a visa petitioner obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria?

[22-7466] Glossip v. Oklahoma Oct 09, 2024

Glossip v. Oklahoma

Argued on Oct 9, 2024.

Petitioner: Richard Eugene Glossip.
Respondent: Oklahoma.

Advocates:

Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Richard Glossip was sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of Barry Van Treese, the owner of the Oklahoma City motel where Glossip worked as a manager. Critical to Glossip’s conviction was testimony from Justin Sneed, a handyman at the hotel, who told jurors that Glossip paid him $10,000 to kill Van Treese. After Glossip’s conviction, he received information that Sneed had testified falsely about his mental health and whether he had seen a psychiatrist. Glossip asked the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to set aside his conviction, but the court rejected that request, and the state’s Pardon and Parole Board turned down Glossip’s request for clemency.

All told, Glossip has spent 26 years behind bars, faced nine execution dates, and had multiple independent investigations that raised serious doubts about his conviction. Ahead of his execution date of May 18, 2023, Glossip asked the Supreme Court to stay his execution and consider whether Oklahoma violated Glossip’s constitutional rights when prosecutors suppressed evidence that their key witness was under a psychiatrist’s care; the Court granted his motion to stay and granted his petition, as well.

Question

May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?

[23-852] Garland v. VanDerStok Oct 08, 2024

Garland v. VanDerStok

Argued on Oct 8, 2024.

Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland.
Respondent: Jennifer VanDerStok.

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
Peter A. Patterson (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

ATF, created in 1972, is responsible for regulating firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). The GCA requires federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to conduct background checks, record firearm transfers, and serialize firearms when selling or transferring them. The GCA’s regulation of firearms is based on the definition of “firearm,” which includes the “frame or receiver.” However, ATF’s 1978 definition of “frame or receiver” became outdated due to changes in modern firearm design, such as the AR-15 and Glock pistols. Furthermore, the rise of privately made firearms (PMFs) or “ghost guns” posed challenges to law enforcement because they were not regulated under the GCA and did not require serialization. In response, ATF issued a Final Rule in 2022, updating the definitions of “frame,” “receiver,” and “firearm” to better capture modern firearm designs and regulate PMFs. The Final Rule took effect on August 24, 2022.

The respondents in this case challenged the Final Rule’s redefinition of “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” arguing that it exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and vacated the Final Rule in its entirety. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the two provisions exceeded ATF’s statutory authority.

Question

Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?

[23-621] Lackey v. Stinnie Oct 08, 2024

Lackey v. Stinnie

Argued on Oct 8, 2024.

Petitioner: Gerald F. Lackey.
Respondent: Damian Stinnie.

Advocates:

Erika L. Maley (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Brian D. Schmalzbach (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Under the so-called “American Rule,” each litigant pays their own attorney’s fees, regardless of whether they win or lose. However, certain statutes permit the payment of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing party” in litigation; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is one such statute, permitting the payment of attorney’s fees to parties that prevail in civil rights litigation.

Several indigent Virginia residents challenged in federal court a state statute that required automatic suspension of the driver’s licenses of those who failed to pay certain court fines and fees. Finding the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the state to remove the plaintiffs’ suspensions. The state did not appeal the injunction, so the plaintiffs were able to drive again. Before the case could go to trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the statute. The plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under Section 1988, but the district court rejected that request, citing a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit holding that a grant of a preliminary injunction does not render a plaintiff a “prevailing party.” The plaintiffs appealed. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but, on rehearing, the en banc 4th Circuit reversed.

Question

Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988?

[23-191] Williams v. Washington Oct 07, 2024

Williams v. Washington

Argued on Oct 7, 2024.

Petitioner: Nancy Williams, et al.
Respondent: Fitzgerald Washington, Alabama Secretary of Labor.

Advocates:

Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioners)
Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Dissatisfied with the Alabama Department of Labor’s handling of their unemployment benefits applications, 26 plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for injunctive relief against Secretary Fitzgerald Washington and the Department. The plaintiffs, each having filed applications for benefits, alleged various grievances against the Department’s processing methods. Subsequently, Secretary Washington and the Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, which resulted in the omission of several initial claims and the exclusion of the Department as a defendant.

The remaining allegations in the suit were federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Secretary Washington of implementing policies and procedures that violated both the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including multiple permanent and preliminary injunctions to expedite the handling of unemployment compensation applications and improve communication clarity, as well as attorney fees. Secretary Washington again moved to dismiss the case, citing reasons such as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, absence of a private cause of action, and the substantive meritlessness of the claims. The court granted the dismissal without stating the basis for it. The plaintiffs moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, but the court denied their motion. They then appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted mandatory administrative remedies.

Question

Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies?

[23-677] Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger Oct 07, 2024

Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger

Argued on Oct 7, 2024.

Petitioner: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc.
Respondent: Anastasia Wullschleger.

Advocates:

Katherine B. Wellington (for the Petitioners)
Ashley C. Keller (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Anastasia Wullschleger filed a class-action complaint in Missouri state court against Royal Canin and Nestle Purina, alleging that their requirement for a prescription for specialized dog food was misleading and led to higher prices. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court, and then they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which determined that the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims raised substantial federal issues and belonged in federal court. Upon returning to the district court, Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove references to federal law, dropped the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims, and added a civil-conspiracy claim. Despite these changes, the district court exercised federal-question jurisdiction and ultimately granted the manufacturers’ motion to dismiss, leading to a second appeal. Reviewing the case de novo, the Eighth Circuit concluded that amending a complaint to eliminate the only federal questions destroys subject-matter jurisdiction and thus returned the case to state court.

Question

Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law?

[23-939] Trump v. United States Apr 25, 2024

Trump v. United States

Argued on Apr 25, 2024.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

D. John Sauer (for the Petitioner)
Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Former President Donald Trump was indicted in August 2023 on four counts arising from Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation into the January 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. Trump claimed that he cannot be prosecuted for his official acts as president and that a former president cannot be prosecuted unless he has first been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate.

U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan initially set Trump’s trial for March 4, 2024, but later vacated this date pending resolution of Trump’s immunity claims. Judge Chutkan denied Trump’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, and Smith asked the Supreme Court directly to expedite review and bypass a decision by the D.C. Circuit. The Court declined, deferring instead to the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. On February 6, the D.C. Circuit upheld Chutkan’s decision, and Trump requested a stay of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to expedite the case.

Question

Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent?

[23-726] Moyle v. United States Apr 24, 2024

Moyle v. United States

Argued on Apr 24, 2024.

Petitioner: Mike Moyle, et al.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Joshua N. Turner (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In August 2022, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the Biden administration brought a legal challenge to a restrictive Idaho abortion law. The Biden administration argued that the state law, which criminalizes providing an abortion except in a few narrow circumstances, including to save the life of the mother, is preempted by a federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires hospitals receiving Medicare funding to offer “necessary stabilizing treatment” to pregnant women in emergencies.

The district court ruled in favor of the Biden administration and barred Idaho from enforcing its law to the extent that it conflicted with EMTALA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to stay the district court's ruling while the state appealed.

Question

Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?

[23-334] Department of State v. Munoz Apr 23, 2024

Department of State v. Munoz

Argued on Apr 23, 2024.

Petitioner: Department of State, et al.
Respondent: Sandra Munoz, et al.

Advocates:

Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners)
Eric T. Lee (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, an El Salvadoran citizen, in 2010. They have a U.S. citizen child. Asencio-Cordero, who arrived in the U.S. in 2005 and has multiple tattoos, applied for an immigrant visa after Muñoz filed an approved immigrant-relative petition and waiver for his inadmissibility. In 2015, he returned to El Salvador for his visa interview, denying any gang affiliations. However, in December 2015, the U.S. Consulate denied his visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), suggesting his potential involvement in unlawful activities. Muñoz sought intervention from Congresswoman Judy Chu, but the State Department upheld the decision. A declaration from a gang expert, Humberto Guizar, stated that Asencio-Cordero’s tattoos were not gang-related. Despite this and further appeals, including to the State Department's Office of Inspector General, the decision remained unchanged, with authorities confirming the inadmissibility and indicating no grounds for appeal.

Following the government’s denial of Asencio-Cordero’s immigrant visa application, the plaintiffs sought judicial review, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, invoking the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to prevent judicial scrutiny of the visa decision. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the government failed to provide the constitutionally required notice within a reasonable time after the visa application was denied. As a result, the appellate court determined that the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and vacated the district court's decision.

Question

Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?

[23-367] Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney Apr 23, 2024

Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney

Argued on Apr 23, 2024.

Petitioner: Starbucks Corporation.
Respondent: M. Kathleen McKinney.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In early January 2022, Nikki Taylor, a supervisor at a Memphis Starbucks, initiated union-organizing efforts, contacting Buffalo, New York, Starbucks employees and the Union for guidance. Conversations with colleagues about unionizing led to managerial scrutiny and disciplinary actions against Taylor for alleged insubordination and a dress code violation. Despite this, Taylor and coworkers held a meeting with Union representatives and drafted a letter to Starbucks's CEO announcing their intent to unionize.

On January 18, following the public release of the unionization letter, the Memphis store was closed early by management under the pretext of understaffing, coinciding with a media event covering the unionization efforts. Subsequent investigations by Starbucks led to the February 8 firing of seven employees, including key organizing committee members, for policy violations during the media event. These terminations led to a reduced display of union support among the remaining staff and increased anxiety about unionizing in other Starbucks locations. However, the Memphis store voted to join the Union in June.

The Union filed charges against Starbucks for unfair labor practices. Following an investigation, a district court ordered a temporary injunction, demanding the reinstatement of the terminated employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the NLRB satisfied its burden of showing “‘reasonable cause’ to believe that employers engaged in unfair labor practices and that an injunction protects the Board’s remedial power.”

Question

What test must courts use to evaluate requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act?

[23-175] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson Apr 22, 2024

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson

Argued on Apr 22, 2024.

Petitioner: City of Grants Pass, Oregon.
Respondent: Gloria Johnson, et al.

Advocates:

Theane D. Evangelis (for the Petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The city of Grants Pass in southern Oregon has a population of approximately 38,000, and of that population, somewhere between 50 and 600 persons are unhoused. Whatever the exact number of unhoused persons, however, it exceeds the number of available shelter beds, requiring that at least some of them sleep on the streets or in parks. However, several provisions of the Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibit them from doing so, including an “anti-sleeping” ordinance, two “anti-camping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance.

In September 2018, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Martin v. City of Boise, holding that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” While the Grants Pass Municipal Code provisions impose only civil penalties, they still can mature into criminal penalties.

A district court certified a class of plaintiffs of involuntarily unhoused persons living in Grants Pass and concluded that, based on the unavailability of shelter beds, the City’s enforcement of its anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc.

Question

Does a city’s enforcement of public camping against involuntarily homeless people violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

[22-1218] Smith v. Spizzirri Apr 22, 2024

Smith v. Spizzirri

Argued on Apr 22, 2024.

Petitioner: Wendy Smith, et al.
Respondent: Keith Spizzirri, et al.

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioners)
E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Plaintiffs Smith and others were current and former delivery drivers for Intelliserve. They sued Intelliserve in Arizona state court alleging that “Intelliserve violated federal and state employment laws by misclassifying them as independent contractors, failing to pay them required minimum and overtime wages, and failing to provide paid sick leave.”

Intelliserve removed the case to federal court, then moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case. While both parties agreed that, under the FAA, all claims were subject to mandatory arbitration, they disagreed on how the district court was supposed to handle the lawsuit. Intelliserve argued that Section 3 of the FAA permitted the district court to dismiss the action, while the plaintiffs argued that the FAA required the district court to stay the action pending arbitration. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act give district courts discretion to dismiss a lawsuit when all claims are subject to arbitration?

[22-982] Thornell v. Jones Apr 17, 2024

Thornell v. Jones

Argued on Apr 17, 2024.

Petitioner: Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
Respondent: Danny Lee Jones.

Advocates:

Jason D. Lewis (for the Petitioner)
Jean-Claude Andre (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In Bullhead City, Arizona, on March 26, 1992, Danny Lee Jones and Robert Weaver engaged in a day of drinking and using crystal methamphetamine. A violent altercation ensued, resulting in Jones fatally striking Weaver with a baseball bat. Jones also attacked Weaver’s grandmother, Katherine Gumina, and his seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, the latter of whom he also strangled or suffocated. Jones fled to Las Vegas but was arrested and indicted in Arizona on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. His public defender, inexperienced in capital cases, received limited funding for expert witnesses. Jones was convicted on all counts, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled.

At sentencing, testimony revealed Jones’s troubled childhood, including substance abuse, head injuries, and abuse by his first stepfather. Dr. Jack Potts, a forensic psychiatrist, assessed Jones, citing a history of substance abuse, possible mood disorders, and susceptibility to aggression due to drug use. Potts’s report, submitted late due to delayed receipt of the Presentence Information Report, suggested Jones’s impaired capacity to conform to the law at the time of the offenses. Despite a request for a continuance for further psychological testing, the judge found multiple aggravating factors for the murders and sentenced Jones to death for both murders and an additional twenty-five years for the attempted murder.

The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, and Jones filed a federal petition for habeas relief. After protracted litigation and appeals, the district court dismissed Jones’s habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that application of the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") meant that Jones was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

Question

What is the proper methodology for assessing prejudice, for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

[23-5572] Fischer v. United States Apr 16, 2024

Fischer v. United States

Argued on Apr 16, 2024.

Petitioner: Joseph W. Fischer.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On January 6, 2021, while Congress was convening to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, thousands of supporters of the losing candidate, Donald Trump, converged on the United States Capitol to disrupt the proceedings. The Trump supporters swarmed the building, overwhelming law enforcement officers who attempted to stop them. The chaos wrought by the mob forced members of Congress to stop the certification and flee for safety. Congress was not able to resume its work for six hours.

Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang, and Garret Miller were indicted for various offenses related to their involvement in the Capitol riot on January 6. All three were charged with felony offenses of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, and misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct in a Capitol building and in restricted grounds, involving the intent to disrupt congressional sessions and government functions. Additionally, each faced a count of obstruction of an official proceeding. The defendants challenged this obstruction charge, claiming that the statute does not prohibit their alleged conduct on that day. The district court agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to assaultive conduct, committed in furtherance of an attempt to stop Congress from performing a constitutionally required duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the natural, broad reading of that provision is that it applies to forms of obstructive conduct, not just those related to investigations and evidence.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

[23-108] Snyder v. United States Apr 15, 2024

Snyder v. United States

Argued on Apr 15, 2024.

Petitioner: James E. Snyder.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

James Snyder formerly served as mayor of Portage, Indiana. He was convicted of federal funds bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for soliciting and accepting $13,000 in connection with the city’s purchases of garbage trucks, among other federal crimes.

Before, during, and after trial, Snyder argued that the evidence did not support a finding that there was an agreement to exchange money for the truck contracts before they were awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argued, § 666 cannot apply. Interpreting the plain language of the statute and Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court rejected his interpretation of that provision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?

[23-50] Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio Apr 15, 2024

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio

Argued on Apr 15, 2024.

Petitioner: Jascha Chiaverini, et al.
Respondent: City of Napoleon, Ohio, et al.

Advocates:

Easha Anand (for the Petitioners)
Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Megan M. Wold (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Jascha Chiaverini, manager of the Diamond and Gold Outlet in Napoleon, Ohio, bought a men's ring and diamond earring from Brent Burns for $45. He recorded the transaction, including copying Burns' ID and photographing the items. Subsequently, David and Christina Hill contacted Chiaverini, claiming the jewelry was stolen from them. Chiaverini advised them to report to the police but denied buying their described items. After multiple calls, Chiaverini ended the conversation. Both parties contacted the police. Chiaverini expressed his suspicion about holding stolen property and requested police, not the Hills, to visit. When the police arrived, Chiaverini cooperated, providing information and photographs of the jewelry.

The situation escalated when Chiaverini received a conflicting "hold letter" from the police, instructing him to keep the items as evidence but also to release them to the Hills. Chiaverini refused to release the items, citing legal concerns and advice from his counsel. His confrontation with Police Chief Weitzel revealed Chiaverini's lack of a precious-metal-dealer license, prompting a new investigation angle. Officer Steward updated the police report to include Chiaverini's suspicion about the stolen nature of the items, which Chiaverini disputed. Based on these developments, warrants were issued for Chiaverini's arrest and the search of his store, leading to his temporary detention. Although a court later dismissed the criminal case against Chiaverini, he filed a complaint against the officers and the city, alleging various legal violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, citing probable cause for Chiaverini's arrest and dismissing his claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause?

[23-370] Erlinger v. United States Mar 27, 2024

Erlinger v. United States

Argued on Mar 27, 2024.

Petitioner: Paul Erlinger.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioner)
D. Nick Harper (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Paul Erlinger received a 15-year prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for illegally possessing a firearm. This sentence was based on his three prior convictions for violent felonies, all being Indiana burglaries. Erlinger challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary extends beyond the federal statute, making it non-applicable as a predicate offense under ACCA. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that Indiana's definition of burglary is “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1990) is no broader than the federal definition of general burglary, which is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.”

Secondly, Erlinger argued that these burglaries did not occur on separate occasions, and claimed that the determination of this fact should be made by a jury, not a judge, as per the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States (2022). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that under binding circuit precedent, the government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions, only to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence.

Question

Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

[23-146] Connelly v. United States Mar 27, 2024

Connelly v. United States

Argued on Mar 27, 2024.

Petitioner: Thomas A. Connelly, as Executor of the Estate of Michael P. Connelly, Sr.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)
Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Brothers Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When Michael died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value included the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. Michael’s estate argued otherwise and sued for a tax refund.

The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding that the stock-purchase agreement did not affect the valuation and furthermore, that a proper valuation of the corporation must include the life insurance proceeds used for redemption because they were a significant asset of the company. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Should the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax?

[23-235] Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine Mar 26, 2024

Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine

Argued on Mar 26, 2024.

Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration, et al.
Respondent: Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Petitioners)
Jessica L. Ellsworth (for Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C)
Erin M. Hawley (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Medication abortion in the U.S. is commonly conducted using a combination of mifepristone and misoprostol. Mifepristone was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September 2000 and is used in over half of all U.S. abortions. Initially, its distribution was limited to hospitals and medical facilities under FDA regulations. The 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act introduced Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), reinforcing FDA's control over drug approvals. Despite REMS review in 2011, mifepristone's distribution remained restricted. In March 2016, the FDA expanded access, allowing medical practitioners to prescribe it and extending the usage period in pregnancy. In April 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA permitted mail distribution from certified sources, and in January 2023, approved pharmacies also began distributing it.

However, following the Supreme Court's June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to abortion, several states sought to restrict mifepristone’s sale. The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other anti-abortion groups challenged the FDA’s approval, claiming inadequate consideration of evidence in 2000. In April 2023, a federal district court judge sided with the plaintiffs, suspending the FDA’s approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially stayed this decision, maintaining the original 2000 approval but striking down the 2016 REMS changes that eased access. After a hearing on the merits, in August 2023, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ban on changes made in 2016. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and stayed the lower court’s injunction.

Question

1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use?

2. Were the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious?

3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?

[23-250] Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe Mar 25, 2024

Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe

Argued on Mar 25, 2024.

Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
Respondent: San Carlos Apache Tribe.

Advocates:

Caroline A. Flynn (for the Petitioners)
Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Respondent in 23-253)
Lloyd B. Miller (for the Respondent in 23-250)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Indian Health Service (IHS) manages healthcare for Native tribes, billing Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance for services and retaining the revenue. To enhance tribal sovereignty, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), allowing tribes to administer their healthcare programs. These programs were funded by the IHS, equivalent to what IHS would spend on tribal healthcare. However, tribes faced financial challenges in running these programs due to the lack of bureaucratic and legal support available to the federal government. To address this, Congress mandated IHS to provide tribes with contract support costs (CSC), ensuring they could offer services at par with IHS. Despite this assistance, tribes still struggled with parity issues with IHS, primarily due to slow billing processes and imperfect remittance of funds by IHS. To remedy this, Congress permitted tribes to bill outside insurers directly and retain the third-party revenue, which the Tribe was required to spend on healthcare. The San Carlos Apache Tribe, exercising its sovereignty in Arizona, managed its healthcare programs and billed outside insurers directly. However, the Tribe encountered difficulties in funding the additional healthcare services from third-party revenue without corresponding CSC from IHS.

The Tribe sued the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, IHS, and the United States, for the CSC for the years 2011–2013. The district court dismissed the Tribe’s claim for the third-party-revenue-funded portions of the Tribe’s healthcare program from CSC reimbursement, and the Tribe appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statutory text of 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a) warranted a reversal of the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, highlighting ongoing challenges in achieving true parity and financial sustainability for tribal healthcare programs under the existing legislative framework.

Question

Must the Indian Health Service pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties?

[23-21] Harrow v. Department of Defense Mar 25, 2024

Harrow v. Department of Defense

Argued on Mar 25, 2024.

Petitioner: Stuart R. Harrow.
Respondent: Department of Defense.

Advocates:

Joshua P. Davis (for the Petitioner)
Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Stuart R. Harrow was a federal employee who was furloughed in 2013. He appealed the furlough decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but due to short staffing, the MSPB did not rule on Harrow’s appeal for more than five years, during which Harrow changed his email address. On May 11, 2022, the MSPB affirmed the agency’s furlough action and attempted to inform Harrow that he had 60 days to seek judicial review. However, because he had changed email addresses, Harrow did not learn of the MSPB’s denial until after 60 days had elapsed. On September 8, 2022, Harrow moved the Board for an extension of time to appeal, but the Board denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the timely filing of a petition from the Board's final decision is a jurisdictional requirement and “not subject to equitable tolling.”

Question

Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling?

[22-1025] Gonzalez v. Trevino Mar 20, 2024

Gonzalez v. Trevino

Argued on Mar 20, 2024.

Petitioner: Sylvia Gonzalez.
Respondent: Edward Trevino, II, et al.

Advocates:

Anya A. Bidwell (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sylvia Gonzalez, a resident of Castle Hills, Texas, was elected to the city council in 2019. During her campaign, she learned of widespread dissatisfaction with the current city manager. After taking office, she organized a nonbinding petition calling for the manager's removal. The petition was presented at a contentious council meeting, after which Mayor Edward Trevino questioned Gonzalez about the petition's location, found in her binder. Two days later, Trevino initiated a criminal complaint against Gonzalez for allegedly stealing the petition. Despite an atypical legal process involving Chief-of-Police John Siemens and special detective Alex Wright, Gonzalez was arrested and spent a night in jail. She is no longer on the council and has refrained from public political activity.

Gonzalez sued Trevino, Siemens, Wright, and the city (collectively, the Defendants) for violating her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She argued that the arrest was in retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment, but she conceded that there was probable cause for the arrest. In support of her retaliation claim, she cited a decade-long review of misdemeanor and felony data in Bexar County that showed no similar cases.

The Defendants moved to dismiss her lawsuit on grounds of the independent-intermediary doctrine and qualified immunity, but the district court allowed Gonzalez’s claims to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the outcome was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett, holding that, in general, the existence of probable cause will defeat a retaliatory arrest claim. The Fifth Circuit noted that Gonzalez’s facts did not trigger the narrow exception recognized in Nieves, under which a plaintiff need not plead lack of probable cause “where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”

Question

1. Can the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened?

2. Is Nieves limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests?

[22O141] Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado Mar 20, 2024

Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado

Argued on Mar 20, 2024.

Petitioner: Texas.
Respondent: New Mexico and Colorado.

Advocates:

Frederick Liu (for the United States)
Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas)
Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for New Mexico)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This is a continuation of an action involving a dispute over the waters of the Rio Grande Basin and Elephant Butte. The Supreme Court previously held that the United States may intervene in the action, which it did. When the Special Master filed the Third Interim Report, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico moved for entry of a proposed "Consent Decree" that would resolve the dispute without the consent of the United States. The United States claims that the Court should deny the motion because (1) a court's approval of a consent decree cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors—i.e., the United States in this case; (2) the consent decree would impose obligations on a party, to wit, the United States, without that party's consent; and (3) the consent decree would be "contrary to the Compact."

Question

May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?

[141-Orig] Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado Mar 20, 2024

Oral argument for Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, argued on March 20, 2024.

Once a transcript is available on oyez.org, the recording and this description will be replaced by more detailed information.

[23-14] Diaz v. United States Mar 19, 2024

Diaz v. United States

Argued on Mar 19, 2024.

Petitioner: Delilah Guadalupe Diaz.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On August 17, 2020, Delilah Guadalupe Diaz was returning to California from Mexico. At the border, a “crunch-like sound” was heard when she rolled down the car window, leading the border agent to call for backup and check the car's door panels using a density measuring device. Inspectors found 27.98 kilos of methamphetamine hidden in these panels. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs in the car, explaining that she had initially traveled to Mexico with her daughter, who returned early. Diaz stayed back to visit her boyfriend, and used his car to return home. She stated her boyfriend had told her he would retrieve the car from her in a few days.

The government charged Diaz with importation of methamphetamine in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. One of the elements of that offense is that the defendant knew she was transporting drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1). To prove that element, the government called an expert to testify that “narcotic traffickers do not entrust large and valuable quantities of narcotics to unknowing couriers.” Diaz sought to exclude the expert evidence, arguing that it would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by providing “a direct comment on the ultimate issue—Ms. Diaz’s knowledge.” However, the district court allowed the evidence, the jury found Diaz guilty, and the district court sentenced her to seven years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?

[22-1079] Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. Mar 19, 2024

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.

Argued on Mar 19, 2024.

Petitioner: Truck Insurance Exchange.
Respondent: Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., et al.

Advocates:

Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
C. Kevin Marshall (for the debtor respondents)
David C. Frederick (for the claimant respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, allows a Chapter 11 debtor with significant asbestos liabilities to channel all current and future asbestos claims into a trust funded by the debtor. This provision aims to treat future claimants equitably, given the long latency period of some asbestos-related illnesses, while also enabling the debtor to exit bankruptcy as a viable economic entity. To obtain relief under this section, the debtor must meet several criteria designed to protect the due process rights of claimants, especially future ones. These criteria include the appointment of a representative for future claimants and court determination that the plan is fair to both current and future claimants. Additionally, 75% of current claimants must vote to approve the plan.

In the face of over 38,000 asbestos-related lawsuits since 1978, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., collectively known as the "Debtors," filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016. As part of their proposed reorganization Plan, the Debtors negotiated with multiple parties—including insurance companies, creditors, government agencies, and representatives of both current and future asbestos claimants—to establish a § 524(g) trust. This trust aimed to channel both existing and future asbestos-related claims away from the Debtors. The trust's financial viability heavily depended on primary liability insurance policies issued by Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") between the 1960s and 1980s, which obligated Truck to investigate and defend each asbestos claim against the Debtors up to a per-claim limit of $500,000. The Debtors would assign their rights under these Truck policies to the § 524(g) trust as part of the Plan's funding.

Truck opposed the Plan, arguing it failed to provide anti-fraud measures for insured claims that would be litigated in the tort system, thereby potentially exposing Truck to fraudulent claims. Despite Truck's objections, the bankruptcy court recommended confirmation of the Plan, finding it to be "insurance neutral" and therefore not impacting Truck's rights or obligations under the existing policies. The district court upheld this decision, confirming the Plan and thereby nullifying Truck's objections. Importantly, 100% of the asbestos personal-injury claimants had approved the proposed Plan, making Truck the sole objector.

The district court confirmed the Plan over Truck’s objections, finding Truck lacked standing to challenge the Plan because it was not a “party in interest” under § 1109(b). The U.S. Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?

[23-411] Murthy v. Missouri Mar 18, 2024

Murthy v. Missouri

Argued on Mar 18, 2024.

Appellant: Vivek H. Murthy, U.S. Surgeon General, et al.
Appellee: Missouri, et al.

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners)
J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Multiple plaintiffs, including epidemiologists, consumer and human rights advocates, academics, and media operators, claimed that various defendants, including numerous federal agencies and officials, have engaged in censorship, targeting conservative-leaning speech on topics such as the 2020 presidential election, COVID-19 origins, mask and vaccine efficacy, and election integrity. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants used public statements and threats of regulatory action, such as reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, to induce social media platforms to suppress content, thereby violating the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The States of Missouri and Louisiana also alleged harm due to the infringement of the free speech rights of their citizens.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from meeting with social media companies or otherwise seeking to influence their content-moderation policies. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s motion for an emergency stay and granted certiorari to review the case on the merits.

Question

Did the federal government’s request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users’ First Amendment rights?

[22-842] National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo Mar 18, 2024

National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo

Argued on Mar 18, 2024.

Petitioner: National Rifle Association of America.
Respondent: Maria T. Vullo.

Advocates:

David D. Cole (for the Petitioner)
Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In October 2017, following a referral from the New York County District Attorney's Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), under the leadership of Maria T. Vullo, initiated an investigation into NRA-endorsed insurance programs suspected of violating New York law. This scrutiny resulted in three insurance companies acknowledging their fault through consent decrees in 2018. Concurrently, after the Parkland school shooting, Vullo issued guidance and statements encouraging banks and insurers to assess and potentially end their affiliations with gun promotion organizations like the NRA, citing reputational risks. The fallout led to several firms cutting ties with the NRA, prompting the association to file a lawsuit against Vullo and other state officials, asserting violations of its free speech and equal protection rights.

The district court dismissed most of the claims but allowed the First Amendment allegations against Vullo to proceed, citing unresolved factual questions about her qualified immunity. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court reasoned that while the First Amendment protects against the abridgment of free speech by government officials, these officials also have the responsibility to address public concerns. Here, the NRA failed to show that Vullo’s conduct sought to coerce, rather than merely to convince. Furthermore, even if her actions were coercive, Vullo’s conduct as a regulator and public official did not infringe upon any clearly established law, as she appeared to act reasonably and in good faith in performing her duties.

Question

Does a New York regulator’s discouragement of companies from doing business with the National Rifle Association after the Parkland school shooting constitute coercion in violation of the First Amendment?

[22-976] Garland v. Cargill Feb 28, 2024

Garland v. Cargill

Argued on Feb 28, 2024.

Petitioner: Michael Cargill.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al.

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners)
Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

For over a decade, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) maintained that bump stocks were not machineguns as defined by statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), and issued interpretation letters confirming this position. Following the October 1, 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where a shooter used bump stocks in a massacre, public demand for a ban on bump stocks surged, leading to proposed legislation. Before Congress could act, the ATF, responding to the tragedy and public sentiment, reversed its stance in 2018, reclassifying bump stocks as machineguns and exposing owners to criminal liability. Respondent Michael Cargill surrendered his bump stocks due to this new regulation and filed a lawsuit challenging the ATF regulations, arguing that the ATF exceeded its authority in defining bump stocks as machineguns.

The district court for the government, finding that the government’s new interpretation of “machinegun” is the best interpretation of the statute. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed. The en banc court found the definition of "machinegun" as unambiguously not applying to bump stocks, but even if it were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would compel a construction of the statute in Cargill’s favor.

Question

Is a bump stock device a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)?

[23-3] Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski Feb 28, 2024

Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski

Argued on Feb 28, 2024.

Petitioner: David Suski, et al.
Respondent: Coinbase, Inc.

Advocates:

Jessica L. Ellsworth (for the Petitioner)
David J. Harris (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In June 2021, Coinbase, an online cryptocurrency exchange, launched a Dogecoin Sweepstakes that required participants to opt into "Official Rules" with a forum selection clause stipulating exclusive jurisdiction of California courts for related disputes. Respondent David Suski and three other users, who had agreed to the “Coinbase User Agreement” containing an arbitration provision when they created their accounts, entered the sweepstakes. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit against Coinbase and Marden-Kane, Inc., the company engaged by Coinbase for the sweepstakes management, alleging violations of California’s False Advertising Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Coinbase sought to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement, but the district court denied Coinbase’s motion, interpreting the contractual documents to conclude that the Sweepstakes’ Official Rules, with their forum selection clause, took precedence over the User Agreement’s arbitration clause.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the dispute should be resolved within the California court system as per the Official Rules of the Sweepstakes, not through arbitration as Coinbase had sought.

Question

When parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, does an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

[22-7386] McIntosh v. United States Feb 27, 2024

McIntosh v. United States

Argued on Feb 27, 2024.

Petitioner: Louis McIntosh.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Steven Y. Yurowitz (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On August 22, 2013, a jury convicted Louis McIntosh of multiple Hobbs Act robbery-related offenses and gun charges, leading to a near-life sentence of 720 months. The district court granted some relief by vacating specific counts but imposed a forfeiture amount inconsistently between oral and written judgments. On appeal, the government belatedly submitted a forfeiture order, which both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld despite its tardiness. The appellate court vacated one of the §924(c) counts but reinstated others, rejecting the petitioner's arguments. After a Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. __ (2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) the Court granted certiorari, leading to a remand. However, the Second Circuit mostly upheld its prior rulings, making only minor changes.

Question

May a district court enter a criminal forfeiture order when the time limit specified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has already passed?

[22-529] Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. Feb 27, 2024

Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A.

Argued on Feb 27, 2024.

Petitioner: Alex Cantero, et al.
Respondent: Bank of America, N.A.

Advocates:

Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Petitioners)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) established a dual banking system in the United States, allowing both federal and state governments to charter and regulate banks. National banks are subject to federal authority and have broad powers, including the ability to make real estate loans and provide escrow services. Alongside the NBA, other significant federal statutes regulate national banks: The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) limits the amount banks can require borrowers to deposit into escrow accounts related to home mortgages; the Dodd-Frank Act sets the standards for when state consumer financial laws are preempted by federal law; and it also amends the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to require the creation of escrow accounts for certain mortgages and mandates interest payment on those accounts if prescribed by state or federal law. The state law in question, New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, mandates a minimum interest rate for escrow accounts held by mortgage institutions, which was later adjusted in 2018 to create “parity” between state-chartered and national banks.

Alex Cantero purchased a house in Queens Village, New York, with a mortgage from Bank of America (BOA) in August 2010. His mortgage required him to deposit money into an escrow account for property taxes and insurance premiums, and BOA paid no interest on these funds. Cantero’s mortgage specified that it is governed by federal law and the law of the property’s jurisdiction. Cantero alleged that BOA refused to pay interest on escrow funds, contrary to New York State law.

The district court determined that New York's General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, was not preempted by the NBA based on its minimal “degree of interference” with national banking powers. Citing Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as supportive of this compatibility, the court denied BOA’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, asserting that both federal and state laws could be read “harmoniously.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the NBA does preempt New York’s GOL because the minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the federal government, thereby impermissibly interfering with national banks’ exercise of that power.

Question

Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

[22-277] Moody v. NetChoice, LLC Feb 26, 2024

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC

Argued on Feb 26, 2024.

Petitioner: Attorney General, State of Florida, et al.
Respondent: NetChoice, LLC, et al.

Advocates:

Henry C. Whitaker (for the Petitioners)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Social-media platforms collect third-party posts, including text, photos, and videos, and distribute them to other users. Importantly, they are private enterprises, not governmental entities, and thus are not subject to constitutional requirements for free speech. Users have no obligation to consume or contribute to the content on these platforms. And unlike traditional media, social-media platforms primarily host content created by individual users rather than the companies themselves (although they do engage in some speech of their own, such as publishing terms of service and community standards). They are not merely conduits of that content, however; they curate and edit the content that users see, which involves removing posts that violate community standards and prioritizing posts based on various factors.

The State of Florida enacted S.B. 7072 to address what it perceives as bias and censorship by large social media platforms against conservative voices. The legislation imposes various restrictions and obligations on social media platforms, such as prohibiting the deplatforming of political candidates and requiring detailed disclosures about content moderation policies. It aims to treat social media platforms like common carriers and focuses on those platforms that either have annual gross revenues exceeding $100 million or at least 100 million monthly individual participants globally. Enforcement mechanisms include substantial fines and the option for civil suits.

NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—are trade associations that represent internet and social-media companies like Facebook, Twitter, Google (which owns YouTube), and TikTok. They sued the Florida officials charged with enforcing S.B. 7072 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the law's provisions (1) violate the social-media companies’ right to free speech under the First Amendment and (2) are preempted by federal law.

The district court granted NetChoice’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the provisions of the Act that make platforms liable for removing or deprioritizing content are likely preempted by federal law, specifically 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), and that the Act’s provisions infringe on platforms’ First Amendment rights by restricting their “editorial judgment.” The court applied strict scrutiny due to the Act's viewpoint-based purpose of defending conservative speech from perceived liberal bias in big tech. The court found that the Act does not survive strict scrutiny as it isn't narrowly tailored and doesn't serve a legitimate state interest. The State appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed these conclusions.

Question

Do Florida S.B. 7072’s content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment, and do the law’s individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment?

[22-555] NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton Feb 26, 2024

NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton

Argued on Feb 26, 2024.

Petitioner: NetChoice, LLC, et al.
Respondent: Ken Paxton, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The State of Texas enacted HB 20 to regulate large social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), and YouTube. The law purports to prohibit large social media platforms from censoring speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker.

NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association filed a lawsuit against the Attorney General of Texas, challenging two provisions of the law as unconstitutional: (1) Section 7, which prohibits viewpoint-based censorship of users’ posts, except for content that incites criminal activity or is unlawful. (2) Section 2, which requires platforms to disclose how they moderate and promote content, publish an "acceptable use policy," and maintain a complaint-and-appeal system for their users.

The district court issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Section 7 and Section 2 are facially unconstitutional. The court argued that social media platforms have some level of editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment, and HB 20 interferes with that discretion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, rejecting the idea that large corporations have a “freewheeling” First Amendment right to censor what people say. It reasoned that HB 20 does not regulate the platforms’ speech but protects other people’s speech and regulates the platforms’ conduct.

Question

Do Texas HB 20’s provisions prohibiting social media platforms from censoring users’ content and imposing stringent disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment?

[22-1078] Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy Feb 21, 2024

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy

Argued on Feb 21, 2024.

Petitioner: Warner Chappell Music, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Sherman Nealy, et al.

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
Joe Wesley Earnhardt (for the Respondents)
Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In the early 1980s, Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler formed Music Specialist, Inc. (MSI), a Florida corporation involved in the music industry. Nealy, a newcomer to the sector, financed the operation while Butler, an experienced disc jockey, authored or co-authored the musical works at the heart of the case. MSI released an album and several singles from 1983 to 1986 before dissolving as a corporation, although its business activities continued until 1989. During Nealy’s subsequent incarceration for drug offenses, Butler formed a new company, 321 Music, LLC, and began licensing rights to MSI’s musical works. This included an agreement in 2008 with Atlantic to interpolate one of MSI’s works into a song by artist Flo Rida.

Upon his release, Nealy discovered third-party usage of MSI’s catalog but took no decisive action. He was unaware of ensuing litigation over the works among various entities including Warner Chappell Music, Inc., Artist Publishing Group, LLC, Atlantic Recording Corporation, and Butler's 321 Music. It wasn't until post-release from a second prison term that he learned of the prior litigation and alleged unauthorized transfers of rights. Finally, in December 2018, Nealy and MSI filed a lawsuit alleging copyright infringement by Atlantic, Artist, and Warner for activities dating back to 2008. Following a pre-trial stipulation framing the case as an “ownership dispute,” the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. On an interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that when a copyright plaintiff has a timely claim under the discovery accrual rule for infringement that occurred more than three years before the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiff may recover damages for that infringement.

Question

Under the discovery accrual rule applied by the circuit courts and the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), may a copyright plaintiff recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit?

[23A349] Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency Feb 21, 2024

Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency

Argued on Feb 21, 2024.

Petitioner: Ohio, et al.
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Advocates:

Mathura J. Sridharan (for the State Applicants)
Catherine E. Stetson (for the Industry Applicants)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Federal Respondents)
Judith N. Vale (for the State Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

None

Question

None

[22-1008] Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Feb 20, 2024

Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Argued on Feb 20, 2024.

Petitioner: Corner Post, Inc.
Respondent: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Advocates:

Bryan K. Weir (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The case concerns the interchange fees associated with debit card transactions, which generate billions of dollars in revenue for issuing banks. The regulatory agency, the Board of the Federal Reserve System, promulgated a rule (“Regulation II”) to govern these fees. Regulation II caps the fees that banks can charge for each debit card transaction. Petitioners in the case include Corner Post, a convenience store, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA), and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA), all of whom accept debit card payments and are thus affected by interchange fees.

On April 29, 2021, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA) challenged Regulation II as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the Board moved to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations, NDRA and NDPMA amended their complaint to add Corner Post, Inc. as an additional plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the 2015 clarification to Regulation II did not reset the statute of limitations, that Corner Post's statute of limitations began in 2011 with the original publication of Regulation II, and that none of the plaintiffs’ claims warranted equitable tolling. The Merchants appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a plaintiff’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff?

[23-51] Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC Feb 20, 2024

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC

Argued on Feb 20, 2024.

Petitioner: Neal Bissonnette, et al.
Respondent: LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, et al.

Advocates:

Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Petitioners)
Traci L. Lovitt (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Flowers Foods, Inc. is a holding company that owns subsidiaries responsible for producing and distributing baked goods like breads, buns, rolls, and snack cakes. Two of the independent distributors for Flowers in Connecticut are Neal Bissonnette and Tyler Wojnarowski. Both entered into Distributor Agreements with Flowers in 2017 and 2018, respectively. According to these agreements, they pick up baked goods from local warehouses and distribute them to stores and restaurants, earning the difference between the acquisition and selling prices. They are also responsible for sales promotion, stock management, and other operational tasks. While they can sell non-competitive products, they primarily work full-time for Flowers.

The Distributor Agreement includes an appended Arbitration Agreement, which states that any disputes must be submitted to binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, except for certain specified issues. Pursuant to that arbitration agreement, the district court compelled arbitration. Bissonnette and Wojnarowski claimed that they are not subject to the FAA because they are “transportation workers” within the meaning of Section 1 of the FAA, which excludes contracts with “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision ordering arbitration and dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant for unpaid or withheld wages, unpaid overtime wages, and unjust enrichment, concluding that Bissonnette and Wojnarowski did not qualify as transportation workers because they were not employed by a company in the transportation industry.

Question

To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

[23-719] Trump v. Anderson Feb 08, 2024

Trump v. Anderson

Argued on Feb 8, 2024.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.
Respondent: Norma Anderson, et al.

Advocates:

Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Petitioner)
Jason C. Murray (for Respondents Anderson, et al.)
Shannon W. Stevenson (for Respondent Griswold)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President, serving for four years. In the 2020 election, Joe Biden was elected as the 46th President, despite Trump's refusal to accept the results. The Electoral College confirmed Biden's victory with 306 votes to Trump's 232. Trump continued to challenge the outcome in court and media. On January 6, 2021, during a Congressional session to certify the election, Trump held a rally, claiming victory and urging supporters to protest at the Capitol. The next day, Vice President Pence certified Biden's win. Trump is currently seeking the Colorado Republican Party’s nomination for the 2024 presidential election.

A group of Colorado electors, consisting of both registered Republicans and unaffiliated voters, filed a petition in the Denver District Court to prevent Trump from appearing on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. Citing Colorado’s Uniform Election Code, they requested the court to direct Secretary of State Jena Griswold to exclude Trump’s name. Their argument centered on Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming Trump was disqualified due to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, insurrection, violating his presidential oath to support the U.S. Constitution.

The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Trump engaged in insurrection as those terms are used in Section Three but that Section Three does not apply to the president. Thus, the court denied the petition. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that Section Three disqualifies Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus that it would be unlawful under Colorado law to list him on the ballot.

Question

Does Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualify Donald Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus from appearing on Colorado’s 2024 presidential primary ballot?

[22-1219] Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce Jan 17, 2024

Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce

Argued on Jan 17, 2024.

Petitioner: Relentless, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Department of Commerce, et al.

Advocates:

Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Atlantic herring fishery is regulated by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), aimed at preventing overfishing and promoting conservation. The MSA sets up regional councils, including the New England Fishery Management Council, which oversees the Atlantic herring fishery. These councils create fishery management plans (FMPs) to set conservation measures, which must align with ten National Standards and other laws.

The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), reviews and publishes these plans for public comment. In 2000, the New England Council established an FMP for Atlantic herring, updated with an industry-funded monitoring program in 2020. The program partially shifts the cost of at-sea monitoring to vessel owners but aims for a 50% target of monitored herring trips, which will cause reduced profits for the fishing industry and communities.

Owners of two fishing vessels, Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC, challenged the Rule, arguing that the monitoring requirement disproportionately burdens them because of their longer trips and inability to qualify for exemptions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Agency, ruling that the MSA’s ambiguity on industry-paid monitors allows for agency interpretation under Chevron deference, that the Rule complies with the MSA’s National Standards and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and does not violate the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

Question

1. Should Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council be overruled?

2. Does statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?

[22-451] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo Jan 17, 2024

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

Argued on Jan 17, 2024.

Petitioner: Loper Bright Enterprises, et al.
Respondent: Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A group of commercial fishermen who regularly participate in the Atlantic herring fishery sued the National Marine Fisheries Service after the Service promulgated a rule that required industry to fund at-sea monitoring programs at an estimated cost of $710 per day. The fisherman argued that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 did not authorize the Service to create industry-funded monitoring requirements and that the Service failed to follow proper rulemaking procedure.

The district court granted summary judgment for the government based on its reasonable interpretation of its authority and its adoption of the rule through the required notice-and-comment procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed.

Question

1. Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs?

2. Should the Court overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?

[22-1165] Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. Jan 16, 2024

Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P.

Argued on Jan 16, 2024.

Petitioner: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp., et al.
Respondent: Moab Partners, L.P., et al.

Advocates:

Linda T. Coberly (for the Petitioners)
David C. Frederick (for the Respondent)
Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

For years, Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. had been lauded as a “total return opportunity” thanks to its strong dividend history, diversified business operations, and favorable growth rates. One of its most significant assets, International-Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”), was a substantial driver of its profit, with a major focus on storing No. 6 fuel oil. However, Macquarie and its leadership allegedly hid crucial information from investors, specifically about IMTT’s heavy reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, a commodity facing stringent upcoming regulations and declining demand. Even after international regulations on sulfur levels in fuel were confirmed to drastically affect the market for No. 6 fuel oil, the company continued to misrepresent its exposure, allegedly misleading investors about IMTT's flexibility and downplaying the impending effects on revenue.

On February 21, 2018, Macquarie first announced a sharp decline in IMTT utilization, earnings falling short of analysts’ expectations, and a 31% cut to the company’s dividend. The company admitted for the first time that it would need to spend hundreds of millions to repurpose IMTT's storage tanks due to the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil. As a result, the stock price plummeted, and Macquarie’s management faced a credibility crisis. Questions arose about the company’s transparency and honesty, harming investor trust and the company’s overall reputation.

On behalf of a class of plaintiffs, Moab Partners, L.P., sued Macquarie, alleging that it made material omissions and false and misleading statements about IMTT in violation of various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that while many of the alleged misstatements are not actionable, the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded material omissions and facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.

Question

May a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K support a private claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement?

[22-913] Devillier v. Texas Jan 16, 2024

Devillier v. Texas

Argued on Jan 16, 2024.

Petitioner: Richard Devillier.
Respondent: State of Texas.

Advocates:

Robert J. McNamara (for the Petitioners)
Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioners Devillier and others own property in Texas along Interstate Highway 10 (IH-10). The State of Texas, through the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), elevated IH-10 and installed a solid concrete median barrier, which acted as a “weir” to obstruct natural water flow and led to the flooding of the petitioners’ properties. Despite being aware of the potential for flooding, the State proceeded with the construction and even extended the barrier, causing extensive damage to the petitioners’ properties.

The petitioners sued the state, directly invoking the Taking Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which they argued applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated, finding the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against the state.

Question

May a party sue a state directly under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

[22-899] Smith v. Arizona Jan 10, 2024

Smith v. Arizona

Argued on Jan 10, 2024.

Petitioner: Jason Smith.
Respondent: State of Arizona.

Advocates:

Hari Santhanam (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Alexander W. Samuels (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In December 2019, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Jason Smith's father's property, which had multiple structures. They detected a strong odor of marijuana from a shed, where they found Smith and later discovered various drugs and paraphernalia. Smith was charged with multiple felonies related to drug possession. During the trial, a forensic scientist testified that the seized substances were indeed illegal drugs. Smith's defense argued he was merely at the property to care for his ill father and was not involved in any illegal activities. Smith was found guilty on several counts, including possession of marijuana for sale, and was sentenced to four years in prison.

Smith appealed the decision, claiming, among other things, that the admission of drug-analysis testimony violated his confrontation rights because the testifying expert relied on data generated by a non-testifying expert. The appellate court affirmed.

Question

Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permit the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst?

[22-1074] Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California Jan 09, 2024

Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California

Argued on Jan 9, 2024.

Petitioner: George Sheetz.
Respondent: County of El Dorado, California.

Advocates:

Paul J. Beard II (for the Petitioner)
Aileen M. McGrath (for the Respondent)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The County of El Dorado, California, has a Traffic Impact Mitigation (TIM) Fee Program that imposes a traffic-impact fee on any property owner applying for a building permit. The fee consists of two components: the “Highway 50 Component” and the “Local Road Component,” and is determined by the geographic zone in which the project is located and the type of construction proposed. The fee is mandatory regardless of the actual impact the project may have on existing or future roads. The TIM Fee Program stipulates that new developments bear the full cost of road construction and widening, even though these roads are used and benefitted from by existing residents and non-residents alike. In 2012, the County Board passed a resolution establishing new TIM Fee rates, which were subsequently applied to George Sheetz’s project.

Sheetz applied for a building permit in July 2016 to construct a 1,854-square-foot manufactured house for his family. The County required him to pay $23,420 in traffic-mitigation fees based on the type and location of his project, even though no individualized assessment was made to correlate the fee with the project’s actual impact on local or state roads. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and later filed a legal action against the County, alleging the fee was an unconstitutional condition under the Nollan and Dolan standards and seeking a refund of the fee paid.

Under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” The U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan (1987) and Dolan (1994) recognized that land-use permit applicants “are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits.” Under those cases, the government may condition approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s dedication of property to public use if the government can prove that an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” exist between the demanded property and the impacts of the owner’s project.

The superior court ruled against Sheetz, concluding that legislative exactions are exempt from Nollan/Dolan review. The California Court of Appeal affirmed.

Question

Is a monetary exaction imposed by a local government as a condition for a building permit exempt from the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements established in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, simply because the exaction is authorized by local legislation?

[22-1238] Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC Jan 09, 2024

Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC

Argued on Jan 9, 2024.

Petitioner: Office of the United States Trustee.
Respondent: John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, et al.

Advocates:

Masha G. Hansford (for the Petitioner)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In the U.S., bankruptcy proceedings are administered through two systems: the Trustee Program managed by the Department of Justice for 88 judicial districts, and the Bankruptcy Administrator Program for six districts in Alabama and North Carolina, overseen directly by the courts. This dual system originated in 1978, with Alabama and North Carolina eventually gaining a permanent exemption from the Trustee Program in 2000. Both programs have different funding models, with the Trustee Program financed primarily through debtor fees and the Administrator Program funded through the general judicial budget. Over the years, Congress has enacted various amendments to balance the fee structures between the two systems, but disparities have remained, most notably with the 2017 Amendment which significantly raised fees in Trustee districts.

Seventy-six Chapter 11 debtors associated with John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts (Debtors) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Kansas, a Trustee district, in June 2016. Their cases were still pending when a 2017 Amendment took effect in January 2018, which significantly increased their quarterly Chapter 11 disbursement fees. By the end of December 2019, they had paid over $2.5 million more in fees than they would have if they had filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district, such as those in North Carolina and Alabama.

The Debtors challenged the fee increase in bankruptcy court, arguing it was unequally applied and retroactive without clear congressional intent. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.

Question

Must the U.S. Trustee issue refunds for the extra fees paid by debtors in certain districts to address the lack of uniformity identified in Siegel v. Fitzgerald?

[22-674] Campos-Chaves v. Garland Jan 08, 2024

Campos-Chaves v. Garland

Argued on Jan 8, 2024.

Petitioner: Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.

Advocates:

Charles L. McCloud (for the United States)
Easha Anand (for the Petitioner in 22-674 and the Respondent in 22-884)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Moris Campos-Chaves, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States illegally on January 24, 2005, and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) on February 10, 2005. He was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). When Campos-Chaves did not appear for his hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia.

Years later, on September 18, 2018, Campos-Chaves moved to reopen his case, arguing that the NTA he had initially received was defective. The immigration judge concluded that the NTA was not defective, and Campos-Chaves had actually received both the NTA and the Notice of Hearing. Thus, the immigration judge denied his petition for review and also denied all pending motions. The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a final order of removal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for rehearing.

Question

Does the government provides adequate notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information?

[22-1178] Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre Jan 08, 2024

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre

Argued on Jan 8, 2024.

Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.
Respondent: Yonas Fikre.

Advocates:

Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners)
Gadeir Abbas (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2010, Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen of Eritrean descent, was placed on the FBI’s No Fly List while he was traveling to Sudan. FBI agents questioned him about his ties to a mosque in Portland, Oregon, and informed him he was a flight risk. Fikre was offered removal from the list in exchange for becoming an FBI informant, an offer he declined. Subsequently, Fikre was imprisoned and tortured in the United Arab Emirates, allegedly at the request of the FBI. Unable to return to the U.S., Fikre sought asylum in Sweden, but was ultimately denied and returned to Portland via private jet after his petition to be removed from the No Fly List was also denied. While still in Sweden, Fikre filed a lawsuit against the FBI, claiming violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. While the lawsuit was pending, the FBI removed him from the No Fly List.

A federal district court in Oregon dismissed Fikre's case as moot, given that he had been removed from the No Fly List. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the lawsuit, stating that under the voluntary cessation doctrine, it was not “absolutely clear” that Fikre would not be placed back on the list for the same reasons. The case returned to the district court where an FBI official filed a declaration that Fikre would not be put back on the list based on current information. Despite this declaration, the court once again dismissed the case. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that the FBI’s declaration did not indicate a change in the policies or procedures that put Fikre on the list in the first place.

Question

Are respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List moot, given that he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information”?

[22-193] Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri Dec 06, 2023

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri

Argued on Dec 6, 2023.

Petitioner: Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow.
Respondent: City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.

Advocates:

Brian Wolfman (for the Petitioner)
Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sergeant Muldrow, initially assigned to the Intelligence Division where she worked on various high-profile cases and was deputized by the FBI, was transferred to the Fifth District by Interim Police Commissioner Lawrence O'Toole's appointee, Captain Deeba. This change led to a different work schedule, responsibilities, and loss of special FBI-related privileges including a potential $17,500 in annual overtime pay. After her transfer, Sergeant Muldrow was asked to return FBI-issued equipment, which she did, and her Task Force Officer status was revoked. She filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba, later filing an action in Missouri state court alleging Title VII violations.

The case was removed to federal court, where the district court granted summary judgment against her Title VII claims and dismissed her state law claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the employment decisions she alleged did not constitute “adverse employment action” and thus did not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII, nor were they “materially adverse action” as required for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.

Question

Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a signification disadvantage?

[22-800] Moore v. United States Dec 05, 2023

Moore v. United States

Argued on Dec 5, 2023.

Petitioner: Charles G. Moore and Kathleen F. Moore.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Andrew M. Grossman (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2005, the Moores invested $40,000 in KisanKraft, an Indian company that supplies tools to small farmers, in exchange for 11% of the common shares. KisanKraft is a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), meaning it is majority-owned by U.S. persons but operates abroad. Prior to 2017, U.S. shareholders of CFCs were typically taxed on foreign earnings only when those earnings were repatriated to the United States, according to a provision called Subpart F. However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 significantly changed this, introducing a one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) that retroactively taxed CFC earnings after 1986, regardless of repatriation. This increased the Moores’ 2017 tax liability by approximately $15,000 based on their share of KisanKraft’s retained earnings. The Moores challenged the constitutionality of this tax, but the district court dismissed their suit, holding that the MRT taxed income and, although it was retroactive, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the 16th Amendment authorize Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states?

[23-124] Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. Dec 04, 2023

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P.

Argued on Dec 4, 2023.

Petitioner: William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2.
Respondent: Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.

Advocates:

Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner)
Gregory G. Garre (for Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.)
Pratik A. Shah (for Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Sackler family, who purchased Purdue Pharma in the 1950s, heavily influenced the company’s direction and was instrumental in the development and marketing of OxyContin. Despite initial claims of low addiction risk, growing evidence of widespread abuse led to legal battles across the United States, with multiple stakeholders including individuals, state governments, and federal agencies suing Purdue. In 2004, the board of Purdue entered into an expansive Indemnity Agreement to protect its directors and officers from financial liability related to lawsuits. This protection was especially broad, extending even after their official tenure at Purdue, but contained a bad faith carveout. From 2007 onwards, the Sacklers began shielding assets, anticipating litigation against them personally. By 2019, Purdue faced weakened financial prospects, and the Sacklers had stepped down from the board.

In the same year, the DOJ brought criminal and civil charges against Purdue, resulting in a plea agreement in 2020 that prioritized the DOJ’s claims in Purdue’s bankruptcy proceedings. The plea stipulated a $2 billion forfeiture judgment but allowed for the release of $1.775 billion if certain conditions were met. Although Purdue declared bankruptcy in 2019, the Sacklers did not, and litigation against both parties was temporarily halted. The estate of Purdue is estimated to be around $1.8 billion, while claims against both Purdue and the Sacklers are estimated to exceed $40 trillion.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed a proposed bankruptcy plan on September 17, 2021. This plan included a “shareholder release” that, in effect, permanently enjoined certain third-party claims against the Sacklers. Several parties objected to the plan, but the bankruptcy court rejected their claims. On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the district court overturned the bankruptcy court's confirmation, holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the forced release of direct claims against non-debtors. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit nonconsensual third-party releases of direct claims, and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the plan.

Question

Does the Bankruptcy Code authorize a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by non-debtors against non-debtor third parties, without the claimants’ consent?

[22-859] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy Nov 29, 2023

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy

Argued on Nov 29, 2023.

Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission.
Respondent: George R. Jarkesy, Jr., et al.

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner)
S. Michael McColloch (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

George Jarkesy established two hedge funds, with Patriot28 as the investment adviser, managing $24 million in assets from over 100 investors. The SEC initiated an investigation in 2011, eventually bringing an in-house action alleging fraud under multiple acts. Jarkesy challenged the SEC’s proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, citing constitutional infringements, but both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the injunction, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

After an evidentiary hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Jarkesy was found guilty of securities fraud. Jarkesy sought review by the Commission, and while that petition was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, holding that SEC ALJs were improperly appointed. Jarkesy, however, waived his right to a new hearing. The Commission affirmed the fraud findings, imposed penalties, and rejected several constitutional arguments. He then filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed and remanded, finding multiple constitutional violations.

Question

Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U.S. Constitution?

[22-721] McElrath v. Georgia Nov 28, 2023

McElrath v. Georgia

Argued on Nov 28, 2023.

Petitioner: Damian McElrath.
Respondent: Georgia.

Advocates:

Richard A. Simpson (for the Petitioner)
Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2017, a Georgia jury found Damien McElrath guilty but mentally ill as to felony murder but not guilty by reason of insanity as to malice murder after an encounter between McElrath and his mother. The trial court did not recognize the verdicts as repugnant and accepted them, but the Georgia Supreme Court held that the verdicts were repugnant and vacated the verdicts, remanding McElrath’s case for retrial. On remand, McElrath alleged that retrial was precluded on double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied his motion.

On a second appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, McElrath argued that the court should have reversed rather than vacated his felony murder conviction in his previous appeal. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling on his double jeopardy claim, arguing that retrial on all of the counts is barred because the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder count. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.

Question

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

[22-666] Wilkinson v. Garland Nov 28, 2023

Wilkinson v. Garland

Argued on Nov 28, 2023.

Petitioner: Situ Kamu Wilkinson.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.

Advocates:

Jaime A. Santos (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Situ Wilkinson, originally from Trinidad and Tobago, overstayed his tourist visa in the U.S., built a life, and fathered a U.S.-citizen son. In 2019, after being arrested for selling crack cocaine, he faced deportation proceedings. Wilkinson conceded his deportability but sought either cancellation or withholding of removal based on the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” it would cause his son and the threat to his own life or freedom if he returned to Trinidad due to his “membership in a particular social group,” specifically people who have filed complaints against Trinidadian police.

The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected both of Wilkinson's claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the hardship claim because was discretionary. The Third Circuit also concluded that Wilkinson’s claim of belonging to a “particular social group” did not meet the requirements for withholding of removal, as it was not socially distinct within Trinidadian society. Therefore, the Third Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Wilkinson’s petition for review.

Question

Is an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)?

[22-6389] Brown v. United States Nov 27, 2023

Brown v. United States

Argued on Nov 27, 2023.

Petitioner: Justin Rashaad Brown.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner Justin Rashaad Brown)
Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner Eugene Jackson)
Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Justin Rashaad Brown was indicted in York County, Pennsylvania, for multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to one charge of drug possession and distribution as well as the § 922(g) offense. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced him to concurrent terms of 180 months’ imprisonment due to prior convictions triggering the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Brown appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that his prior state marijuana convictions should not serve as predicates under the ACCA because those crimes are no longer a categorical match to their federal counterpart. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense?

[22-888] Rudisill v. McDonough Nov 08, 2023

Rudisill v. McDonough

Argued on Nov 8, 2023.

Petitioner: James R. Rudisill.
Respondent: Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

Advocates:

Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The case involves the interpretation of education benefits under two different programs for veterans: the Montgomery GI Bill enacted in 1984 and the Post-9/11 GI Bill enacted in 2008. Both programs offer a maximum of 36 months of education benefits. Congress has implemented various provisions to limit the benefits under these two programs, including a 48-month cap for benefits generally and the prohibition against receiving benefits from both programs concurrently.

James Rudisill, who served three periods of active-duty service, initially used the Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate education. Later, he applied for Post-9/11 benefits to attend Yale Divinity School. The VA granted him only the remaining Montgomery benefits, and he appealed that decision to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Board denied the appeal, so Rudisill appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, where a split panel held that § 3327(d)(2) does not apply to veterans with multiple periods of service. ruled in his favor, finding the statute ambiguous. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs appealed the Veterans’ Court decision to the Federal Circuit, where a split panel affirmed, but then the court sitting en banc reversed, holding that the plain language of § 3327(d)(2) applies to veterans with multiple periods of service.

Question

Is a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit?

[22-915] United States v. Rahimi Nov 07, 2023

United States v. Rahimi

Argued on Nov 7, 2023.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Zackey Rahimi.

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner)
J. Matthew Wright (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Between December 2020 and January 2021, Zackey Rahimi was involved in a series of violent incidents in Arlington, Texas, including multiple shootings and a hit-and-run. Rahimi was under a civil protective order for alleged assault against his ex-girlfriend, which explicitly prohibited him from possessing firearms. Police searched his home and found a rifle and a pistol, leading to Rahimi’s indictment for violating federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful for someone under a domestic violence restraining order to possess firearms. Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds but was denied, as his argument was foreclosed by United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020).

Rahimi pleaded guilty but continued his constitutional challenge on appeal. As the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 579 U.S. __ (2022). Rahimi argued that Bruen overruled McGinnis and thus that § 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violate the Second Amendment?

[22-846] Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz Nov 06, 2023

Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz

Argued on Nov 6, 2023.

Petitioner: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service.
Respondent: Reginald Kirtz.

Advocates:

Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Petitioner)
Nandan M. Joshi (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1970, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to regulate credit reporting and protect consumer privacy. The Act was amended in 1996 to impose additional obligations on entities like creditors and lenders that furnish information to credit reporting agencies. These amendments allowed consumers to dispute inaccuracies in their credit files and mandated furnishers to investigate and correct such inaccuracies. Reginald Kirtz filed a lawsuit in 2020 against Trans Union, AES, and the USDA, alleging both negligent and willful violations of the FCRA. Kirtz claimed that despite his loans being closed with a zero balance, both AES and the USDA continued to report him as “120 Days Past Due,” damaging his credit score. While Trans Union and AES responded to the lawsuit, the USDA sought dismissal, citing sovereign immunity. The district court granted the USDA’s motion, reasoning that the FCRA did not clearly express Congress’s intent to waive sovereign immunity, despite the Act’s language stating that it applies to “any person,” including government agencies. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that when Congress has clearly expressed its intent, as through the FCRA, even when the meaning is implausible, courts may neither second-guess its choices nor decline to apply the law as written.

Question

Do the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States?

[22-704] Vidal v. Elster Nov 01, 2023

Vidal v. Elster

Argued on Nov 1, 2023.

Petitioner: Katherine K. Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: Steve Elster.

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2018, Steve Elster attempted to register the phrase “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on various types of shirts, intending the mark to serve as political commentary on President Donald Trump and his policies. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiner rejected the application, citing two sections of the Lanham Act: Section 2(c), which prohibits registering a mark that identifies a living individual without their consent, and Section 2(a), which bars marks that falsely suggest a connection with living or dead persons. Elster appealed, arguing that the provisions infringed on his First Amendment rights and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Board upheld the examiner's decision based solely on Section 2(c), asserting that the statute is constitutional and serves compelling government interests, including the protection of individual rights and consumer protection. Elster appealed the decision, and the Federal Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

[22-324] O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier Oct 31, 2023

O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier

Argued on Oct 31, 2023.

Petitioner: Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff, et al.
Respondent: Christopher Garnier, et ux.

Advocates:

Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Pamela S. Karlan (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioners Christopher and Kimberly Garnier are parents of children in the Poway Unified School District in the city of Poway, California, just north of San Diego. The Garniers frequently posted comments critical of the District’s Board of Trustees on the social media pages of the Trustees, including Respondents Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T.J. Zane. For their school-board campaigns, O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane created personal Facebook and Twitter pages, which they updated with their official titles once elected and continued to use to post about school-district business and news. The Trustees began to hide or delete the critical and often repetitive comments by the Garniers, and then around October 2017, they blocked the Garniers from their social media pages.

After the Trustees blocked the Garniers, the Garniers sued them, arguing that their social media pages constitute public fora and that by blocking them, the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the Garniers but found that the Trustees’ had qualified immunity from the damages claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a public official engage in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social media account, which the official uses to communicate about job-related matters with the public?

[22-611] Lindke v. Freed Oct 31, 2023

Lindke v. Freed

Argued on Oct 31, 2023.

Petitioner: Kevin Lindke.
Respondent: James R. Freed.

Advocates:

Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner)
Victoria R. Ferres (for the Respondent)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

James Freed created a private Facebook profile that was originally intended to connect with family and friends. Eventually, he grew too popular for Facebook's 5,000-friend limit on profiles. So Freed converted his profile to a "page," which has unlimited "followers" instead of friends and is public so that anyone may "follow" it. Freed designated the page category as "public figure."

In 2014, Freed was appointed city manager for Port Huron, Michigan, so he updated his Facebook page to reflect that new title. On his page, he shared both personal updates about himself and his family and professional updates, including directives and policies he initiated in his official capacity.

Kevin Lindke came across Freed’s page and did not approve of how Freed was handling the pandemic. He posted criticism of Freed in response to Freed’s Facebook page, and Freed deleted the comments and ultimately “blocked” Lindke.

Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights by deleting his comments and blocking him. The district court granted summary judgment to Freed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

When does a public official’s social media activity constitute state action subject to the First Amendment?

[22-585] Culley v. Marshall Oct 30, 2023

Culley v. Marshall

Argued on Oct 30, 2023.

Petitioner: Halima Tariffa Culley, et al.
Respondent: Steven T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, et al.

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners)
Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondents)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On February 17, 2019, Halima Tariffa Culley’s son was pulled over by police while driving a car registered to his mother. Police arrested him, charged him with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and seized the vehicle. Culley unsuccessfully tried to retrieve the vehicle, and on February 27, 2019, the State of Alabama filed a civil asset forfeiture action in state court. After 20 months, the state court granted Culley summary judgment, finding that she was entitled to the return of her vehicle under Alabama’s innocent-owner defense.

Culley filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the failure of the state and local officials to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled for the defendants, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed as to those claims that were not moot.

Question

What test must a district court apply when determining whether and when a post-deprivation hearing is required under the Due Process Clause?

[22-807] Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Oct 11, 2023

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP

Argued on Oct 11, 2023.

Appellant: Thomas C. Alexander, in His Official Capacity as President of the South Carolina Senate, et al..
Appellee: The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al..

Advocates:

John M. Gore (for the Appellants)
Leah C. Aden (for the Appellees)
Caroline A. Flynn (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

After the 2020 Census, South Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature adopted a new congressional map that moved tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, effectively making the district a safe seat for Republicans.

The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP sued, and a three-judge panel concluded that the district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The legislators appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the map was actually a political gerrymander (which is permissible) that merely had a racial effect.

Question

Does the South Carolina legislature’s redistricting map, which has the effect of moving tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander, even if the legislators’ purported intent was merely a political gerrymander?

[22-660] Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC Oct 10, 2023

Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC

Argued on Oct 10, 2023.

Petitioner: Trevor Murray.
Respondent: UBS Securities, LLC, et al..

Advocates:

Easha Anand (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Eugene Scalia (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2011, UBS hired Trevor Murray as a strategist in its commercial mortgage-backed securities business. Under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and that they accurately reflected his own views. According to Murray, two leaders at UBS improperly pressured him to skew his research. Murray repeatedly reported this conduct to his supervisor, who declined to take action. UBS terminated Murray in 2012.

Murray sued UBS in 2014 alleging that his former employer terminated him in response to his complaints about fraud on shareholders in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's antiretaliation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The district court ruled for Murray, and UBS appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that Murray had to prove UBS's retaliatory intent to prevail on his section 1514A claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with UBS and vacated the judgment of the district court.

Question

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief?

[22-500] Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC Oct 10, 2023

Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC

Argued on Oct 10, 2023.

Petitioner: Great Lakes Insurance SE.
Respondent: Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC.

Advocates:

Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioner)
Howard J. Bashman (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Raiders Retreat Realty Co., a Pennsylvania company, insured a yacht for up to $550,000 with Great Lakes Insurance (GLI), a company headquartered in the United Kingdom. In June 2019, the yacht ran aground, incurring at least $300,000 in damage. Raiders submitted a claim to GLI for loss of the vessel, but GLI rejected it, claiming that, although none of the damage was due to fire, the entire policy was void because Raider had failed to timely recertify or inspect the yacht's fire-extinguishing equipment.

GLI asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that Raiders’ omission voided the policy, and Raiders raised five counterclaims based on Pennsylvania law. The district court dismissed those counterclaims, finding that the policy’s choice-of-law provision required the application of New York law. The court also rejected Raiders’ argument that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable under the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which held that under federal admiralty law, a forum-selection provision is unenforceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding The Bremen controlled the outcome in this case.

Question

Is a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract unenforceable if enforcement would conflict with the “strong public policy” of the state whose law is displaced?

[22-429] Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer Oct 04, 2023

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer

Argued on Oct 4, 2023.

Petitioner: Acheson Hotels, LLC.
Respondent: Deborah Laufer.

Advocates:

Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Deborah Laufer, a prolific litigant with physical disabilities and vision impairments, sued Acheson Hotels for failing to publish information about their accessibility on their website, which is required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that Laufer lacked standing to sue because had no plans to visit the hotel and thus suffered no injury as a result of the lack of information on the website. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that Laufer’s lack of intent to book a room at the hotel operated by Acheson does not negate the fact of injury.

Question

Does an ADA “tester” have Article III standing to challenge a hotel’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she has no plans to visit the hotel?

[22-448] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America Oct 03, 2023

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America

Argued on Oct 3, 2023.

Petitioner: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al..
Respondent: Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, et al..

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
Noel J. Francisco (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In response to the financial crisis around 2007, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which, among other things, authorized the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve. The CFPB was tasked with writing and enforcing rules for financial institutions, examining financial institutions, monitoring and reporting on markets, and tracking consumer complaints.

In 2017, the CFPB adopted a rule that prohibited lenders from further attempting to withdraw funds from borrowers’ bank accounts after two consecutive attempts failed for lack of funds.

A group of lenders sued the CFPB over that rule, arguing that the agency’s funding scheme was unconstitutional. Instead of receiving money allocated to it each year by Congress, as most agencies do, the CFPB receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, which collects fees from member banks. The district court concluded the funding scheme was not unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution?

[22-340] Pulsifer v. United States Oct 02, 2023

Pulsifer v. United States

Argued on Oct 2, 2023.

Petitioner: Mark E. Pulsifer.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), Pulsifer asked the district court for a sentence lower than the otherwise applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment. That provision, permits a district court to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum upon finding that the defendant does not have: “(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”

It was undisputed that Pulsifer had a criminal history that meets the criteria in subsections (A) and (B), due to having more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point offense. The district court concluded that this history alone made him ineligible for sentencing under § 3553(f), notwithstanding that he did not also have a prior two-point violent offense that would meet the condition in subsection (C). It therefore denied his request under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).

Pulsifer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding the statutory word “and” means a defendant must not have any of the criteria, not that he must not have all of them.

Question

Must a defendant show he does not meet any of the criteria listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to qualify for a sentence lower than the statutory minimum?

[22-166] Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota Apr 26, 2023

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 26, 2023.
Decided on May 25, 2023.

Petitioner: Geraldine Tyler.
Respondent: Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al..

Advocates:

Christina M. Martin (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Minneapolis. She stopped paying her property taxes and accrued a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000, retaining the net proceeds from the sale.

Tyler sued the County, arguing that its actions violated her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Tyler’s case for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

1. Does taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause?

2. Is the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

Taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Tyler plausibly alleged that Hennepin County’s actions violated the Takings Clause and thus that her claim can go forward.

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property without “just compensation.” This does not prevent the government from collecting taxes, or from taking action to enforce the collection of taxes. However, the government may not, as Minnesota purported to do by statute in 1935, extinguish a property owner’s interest in property when she falls behind on her property taxes. English law, from which the U.S. Constitution derives much meaning, has long proscribed the taking of more from a taxpayer than she owes. Moreover, Supreme Court precedents and Minnesota law itself, in other contexts, recognize the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to the surplus in excess of the debt owed.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, addressing the second question presented, which the majority declined to address. In Justice Gorsuch’s view, Hennepin County’s actions likely also violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

[22-381] Yegiazaryan v. Smagin Apr 25, 2023

Yegiazaryan v. Smagin

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 25, 2023.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.

Petitioner: Ashot Yegiazaryan.
Respondent: Vitaly I. Smagin, et al. .

Advocates:

Vincent Levy (for the Petitioners)
Nicholas O. Kennedy (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Vitaly Smagin, a Russian citizen who resides in Russia, sued Ashot Yegiazaryan, a Russian citizen who resides in California, and eleven other defendants, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Smagin alleged that Yegiazaryan and the other defendants illegally attempted to avoid paying a judgment Smagin won against them in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for engaging in a series of fraudulent transactions between 2003 and 2009 in to steal Smagin’s shares in a joint real estate investment in Moscow, Russia.

The district court dismissed Smagin’s RICO claim, finding he did not suffer a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that Smagin did allege a domestic injury.

Question

Does a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States state a cognizable claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act when it suffers an injury to an intangible property?

Conclusion

A plaintiff alleges a “domestic injury” for purposes of filing a private civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The “domestic injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits comes from the Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. However, the RJR Nabisco Court did not explicitly define a “domestic injury,” so the Court adopted a context-specific approach that considers the injury's circumstances—an approach consistent with that case. Applying this approach to Smagin’s case, the Court found his injury to be domestic. The majority of the alleged racketeering activities that prevented Smagin from collecting his judgment occurred in the U.S., targeting a California judgment.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.

[22-210] Dupree v. Younger Apr 24, 2023

Dupree v. Younger

Argued on Apr 24, 2023.
Decided on May 25, 2023.

Petitioner: Neil Dupree.
Respondent: Kevin Younger.

Advocates:

Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner)
Amy M. Saharia (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kevin Younger was a pretrial detainee at a state prison in Baltimore, Maryland. One morning, three guards attacked Younger and other inmates at the direction of Neil Dupree, an intelligence lieutenant at the prison. Younger sued Dupree under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Dupree violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court rejected Dupree’s argument that Younger’s suit was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Dupree appealed that conclusion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Dupree was precluded from challenging the district court’s decision because Dupree raised the claim in a pretrial motion for summary judgment but did not raise it again in a post-trial motion.

Question

To preserve the issue for appellate review, must a party reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment?

Conclusion

A post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is not required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

In Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011), the Court held that a party whose sufficiency-of-the evidence challenge was rejected at the summary judgment stage must reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it for appeal. That decision was based on the reasoning that the factual record developed at trial supersedes the record existing at the time of summary judgment.

When the motion for summary judgment is based on a purely legal question—rather than on the factual record—no subsequent proceedings in the trial court supersede conclusions of law. Thus, when a pure question of law is resolved in an order denying summary judgment, the party need not reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it on appeal.

The Court did not decide whether the issue Dupree raised on appeal is purely legal, so it remanded the case for the Fourth Circuit to answer that question.

[22-227] Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin Apr 24, 2023

Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin

Argued on Apr 24, 2023.
Decided on Jun 15, 2023.

Petitioner: Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, et al..
Respondent: Brian W. Coughlin.

Advocates:

Pratik A. Shah (for the Petitioners)
Gregory G. Rapawy (for the Respondent)
Austin L. Raynor (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In July 2019, Brian W. Coughlin took out a $1,100 payday loan from Lendgreen, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (“Band”). Later that year, he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the District of Massachusetts and listed his debt to Lendgreen as a nonpriority unsecured claim. When he filed his petition, the Bankruptcy Code imposed an automatic stay enjoining “debt-collection efforts outside the umbrella of the bankruptcy case.”

Despite the stay, Lendgreen repeatedly contacted Coughlin seeking repayment of his debt. Coughlin moved to enforce the automatic stay against Lendgreen, and in response, the Band asserted tribal sovereign immunity and moved to dismiss the enforcement proceeding. The bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogate tribal sovereign immunity?

Conclusion

The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian tribes. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court.

To abrogate sovereign immunity, Congress must make its intent to abrogate “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” The statute at issue here contains such unmistakably clear language.

First, 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) expressly abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental unit[s]” for certain enumerated purposes. Section 101(27), defines “governmental unit” as “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States . . . , a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” This definition “exudes comprehensiveness from beginning to end,” and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code support this understanding as well. Federally recognized tribes are “indisputably” governments, so the § 106(a) unequivocally abrogates their sovereign immunity.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas reiterated an argument he has made before that to the extent that tribes possess sovereign immunity at all, that immunity does not extend to “suits arising out of a tribe’s commercial activities conducted beyond its territory.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s clear-statement rule requires the statute to expressly mention Indian tribes in order to abrogate their sovereign immunity. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not, he would hold that it does not abrogate federally recognized Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity.

[22-138] Counterman v. Colorado Apr 19, 2023

Counterman v. Colorado

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 19, 2023.
Decided on Jun 27, 2023.

Petitioner: Billy Raymond Counterman.
Respondent: The People of the State of Colorado.

Advocates:

John P. Elwood (for the Petitioner)
Philip J. Weiser (for the Respondent)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Billy Raymond Counterman repeatedly contacted a person over Facebook in 2014, sending her “creepy” messages from numerous different accounts even after she repeatedly blocked him. Some of the messages implied that Counterman was watching her and saying that he wanted her to die or be killed. She reported Counterman to law enforcement, who arrested him in 2016. He was charged with one count of stalking (credible threat), one count of stalking (serious emotional distress, and one count of harassment; before trial, the prosecution dismissed the count of stalking (credible threat).

Counterman claimed that the remaining charges, as applied to his Facebook messages, would violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment because they were not “true threats.” The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and a jury found him guilty of stalking (serious emotional distress). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

Question

To establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, must the government show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement?

Conclusion

To establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.

While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, it allows for restrictions of so-called “true threats.” A true threat is determined by the recipient’s perception, not the speaker’s intent. However, to prevent chilling protected speech, there must be a subjective mental-state requirement. This means that the speaker’s understanding of the threat is crucial. A recklessness standard—where a person consciously disregards a significant risk that their words might harm another—is the appropriate measure for true threats because it strikes a balance between safeguarding free speech and addressing genuine threats. In Counterman’s case, the government used only an objective standard, without considering Counterman’s understanding of his statements as threatening, in violation of the requirements of the First Amendment.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Sotomayor would not reach the question whether recklessness is sufficient for true-threats prosecutions generally.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority for relying on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan instead of applying the First Amendment as it was understood at the time of the Founding.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that true threats do not enjoy First Amendment protection, and nearly every other category of unprotected speech may be restricted using an objective standard.

[21-1326] U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. Apr 18, 2023

U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc.

Argued on Apr 18, 2023.
Decided on Jun 1, 2023.

Petitioner: Unites States of America, Ex. Rel. Schutte, et al..
Respondent: SuperValu Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Tejinder Singh (for the Petitioners)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

SuperValu owned or operated approximately 2,500 grocery stories with over 800 in-store pharmacies between 2006 and 2016. To compete with other pharmacies, SuperValu stores implemented a prescription price-matching program, under which it would match lower prescription prices of competitors. However, SuperValu did not report its price-match program prices as its usual and customary price, in violation of Medicaid regulations.

Tracy Schutte and Michael Yarberry (the “Relators”) sued SuperValu under the False Claims Act on behalf of the federal government and several states. They alleged that SuperValu knowingly caused false payment claims to be submitted to government healthcare programs between 2006 and 2016 by incorrectly reporting their drug prices. The federal government did not intervene in the case.

The district court concluded that the Relators had failed to prove the “scienter” element of their FCA claim—that is, they failed to show SuperValu that SuperValu’s interpretation of the reporting requirement was objectively unreasonable at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding about the lawfulness of its conduct relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act?

Conclusion

The False Claims Act’s scienter element refers to a defendant’s knowledge and subjective beliefs, not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Both the text and common-law origins of the False Claims Act support an understanding of the scienter as focusing on the subjective knowledge of the defendant. It describes a three-part definition of the word “knowingly” that largely tracks the common-law concept of scienter for fraud: actual knowledge, deliberate indifference, or recklessness. Each of these concepts pertains to the defendant’s lack of an honest belief in the statement’s truth when making the claim, not what a defendant might have thought afterward.

[22-174] Groff v. DeJoy Apr 18, 2023

Groff v. DeJoy

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 18, 2023.
Decided on Jun 29, 2023.

Petitioner: Gerald E. Groff.
Respondent: Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General.

Advocates:

Aaron M. Streett (for the Petitioner)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gerald Groff is a Christian and U.S. Postal Service worker. He refused to work on Sundays due to his religious beliefs. USPS offered to find employees to swap shifts with him, but on numerous occasions, no co-worker would swap, and Groff did not work. USPS subsequently fired him.

Groff sued USPS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming USPS failed to reasonably accommodate his religion because the shift swaps did not fully eliminate the conflict. The district court concluded the requested accommodation would pose an undue hardship on USPS and granted summary judgment for USPS. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is inconvenience to coworkers an “undue burden” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 such that it excuses an employer from providing an accommodation requested for religious exercise?

Conclusion

Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for the unanimous Court.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on religion, and subsequent regulations issued by the EEOC required employers to make reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would cause “undue hardship” to the employer. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer who uses a seniority system to assign shifts to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee’s religious practices. The Hardison decision also inadvertently established a “more than de minimis” test for hardship; courts interpreted that decision to mean that any cost or hardship “more than de minimis” justifies denying a religious accommodation. Revisiting that interpretation, the Court rejected the “de minimis cost” standard and adopted instead a “substantial increased costs” standard consistent with the spirit and language of Title VII.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.

[22-200] Slack Technologies v. Pirani Apr 17, 2023

Slack Technologies v. Pirani

Argued on Apr 17, 2023.
Decided on Jun 1, 2023.

Petitioner: Slack Technologies, LLC, fka Slack Technologies, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Fiyyaz Pirani.

Advocates:

Thomas G. Hungar (for the Petitioners)
Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On June 20, 2019, tech company Slack went public through a direct listing, which, unlike an initial public offering (IPO), does not involve the company issuing new shares and instead involves only filing a registration statement to allow existing shareholders to sell their shares on the exchange. Shares made available by a direct listing are sold directly to the public and not through a bank.

Fiyyaz Pirani purchased 30,000 Slack shares at $38.50 per share on the day it went public and went on to purchase another 220,000 over several months. Subsequently, the share price dropped below $25. On September 19, 2019, Pirani brought a class action lawsuit against Slack, alleging that Slack’s registration statement was inaccurate and misleading because it did not disclose information about its service disruptions and how it compensated customers for those disruptions.

The district court held that Pirani had standing to sue Slack even though he could not prove that his shares were issued under the registration statement he said was inaccurate. On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed over one dissenting vote.

Question

Do Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading?

Conclusion

To state a claim under §11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must allege the purchase of “such security” issued pursuant to a materially misleading registration statement. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 authorizes an individual to sue for a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement when the individual has acquired “such security.” Normally, the word “such” refers to something that has already been described, but because there is no clear referent in Section 11, the Court looked for clues from the statutory context.

First, the statute refers to “the” registration statement in imposing liability for false statements or misleading omissions. The definite article “the” suggests that the plaintiff must acquire the security. Second, the statute repeatedly uses the word “such” to narrow the law’s focus, suggesting “such security” refers to a specific security registered under the particular statement that allegedly has a falsehood or misleading omission. Still other provisions further support the understanding that “such security” means a security issued pursuant to the allegedly misleading security statement.

[22-23] Pugin v. Garland Apr 17, 2023

Pugin v. Garland

Argued on Apr 17, 2023.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.

Petitioner: Jean Francois Pugin.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.

Advocates:

Curtis E. Gannon (for Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General)
Martha Hutton (for the Petitioner in 22-23 (Pugin))
Mark C. Fleming (for the Respondent in 22-331 (Cordero-Garcia))

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Jean Francois Pugin is a citizen of Mauritius who has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for nearly 40 years. The government began deportation proceedings against Pugin after he was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact to a felony. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes removal upon conviction for an “aggravated felony,” including felonies relating to obstruction of justice.

Despite Pugin’s argument to the contrary, the Board of Immigration appeals concluded that Virginia’s accessory after the fact to a felony constituted an offense relating to obstruction of justice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under the Immigration and Nationality Act?

Conclusion

Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony is an offense “relating to” obstruction of justice under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of an “aggravated felony.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

An offense can be categorized as “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) without a requirement for an ongoing investigation or proceeding. This understanding is supported by dictionary definitions, federal and state laws, and the Model Penal Code. Obstruction of justice can occur even if no formal investigation or proceeding is active. The phrase “relating to” in the statute further broadens its applicability, ensuring it encompasses offenses connected to obstruction of justice, irrespective of a pending investigation. Even if certain provisions might require a pending investigation or proceeding, §1101(a)(43)(S) has a more expansive definition. Historical interpretations do not mandate a pending investigation for obstruction of justice. The rule of lenity, which favors defendants in ambiguous criminal laws, does not apply because traditional interpretation tools clearly defined the statute’s intent.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in full but concurred separately to note that when Congress inserted the phrase “offense relating to obstruction of justice” into §1101(a)(43)(S), it might well have been referencing a specific and previously designated category of offenses of obstruction, many of which do not have a pending-proceeding requirement.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Court “subverts” the commonly understood meaning of “obstruction of justice.”

[22-196] Samia v. United States Mar 29, 2023

Samia v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 29, 2023.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.

Petitioner: Adam Samia, aka Sal, aka Adam Samic.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)
Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Defendants Joseph Manuel Hunter, Carl David Stillwell, and Adam Samia were tried jointly and convicted on five counts: conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder-for-hire, conspiracy to murder and kidnap in a foreign country, causing death with a firearm during and relation to a crime of violence, and conspiracy to launder money. All three defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment.

One piece of evidence used to convict the defendants was Stillwell’s redacted confession. Samia challenged the admission of that evidence, arguing that the redactions were insufficient because jurors would immediately infer that the confession’s references to “another person” referred to Samia himself. As such, Samia argued, his inability to cross-examine Stillwell violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s evidentiary ruling on that issue.

Question

Does admitting a codefendant’s redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on context violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?

Conclusion

The admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause where the confession as modified did not directly inculpate the defendant but used the descriptor “other person” and the jury was instructed to consider the confession only as to the codefendant. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Historically, a non-testifying codefendant’s confession was permissible if the jury was instructed not to consider it against the nonconfessing defendant. The Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, recognized an exception to that general rule, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a non-testifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruction. However, the Court established certain outer limits on the Bruton rule. For example, in Richardson v. Marsh, the Court did not extend the rule to confessions that do not name the defendant, although, in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, the Court clarified that some redacted confessions might still be directly accusatory if the redaction is evident.

Here, the confession was redacted to avoid naming the defendant, aligning with the Bruton rule and differing from the confession in Gray. The Court declined to further extend the Bruton rule, reasoning that its extension would disrupt historical practices and necessitate extensive pretrial hearings, potentially leading to mandatory severance in joint trials when introducing a non-testifying codefendant's confession. This would undermine the role of joint trials and the significance of confessions in the legal system.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined the majority opinion except the historical discussion, which, in her separate concurrence, she argues is beside the point. She would limit consideration to the meaning of the Confrontation Clause at the time of the founding and reach the same conclusion.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the non-testifying codefendant’s confession in this case inculpated the defendant in the same way that the Court recognized it would in other cases. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for “permit[ting] an end-run around [the Court’s] precedent and undermin[ing] a vital constitutional protection for the accused.”

[21-1599] Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service Mar 29, 2023

Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service

Argued on Mar 29, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.

Petitioner: Hanna Karcho Polselli, et al..
Respondent: Internal Revenue Service.

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners)
Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Remo Polselli underpaid his federal taxes for over a decade, with an outstanding balance of over $2 million. In pursuit of those unpaid liabilities, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued administrative summonses to the banks of Polselli’s wife and lawyers. The IRS did not notify Polselli’s wife or lawyers of the summonses, relying on the exception in the Internal Revenue Code § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), which excludes from the notice requirement summonses issued “in aid of the collection” of tax assessments.

The district court concluded that the summonses fell within the exception and that Polselli’s wife and lawyers were not entitled to notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the exception in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the notice requirements for an Internal Revenue Service summons on third-party recordkeepers apply to a summons for anyone’s records whenever the IRS thinks that person’s records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer’s liability?

Conclusion

The exception to the notice requirements described in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies to a summons for anyone’s records, regardless of whether the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court.

The IRS has the power to pursue unpaid taxes and the people who owe them. In exercising that power, the IRS may issue a summons, including to third parties, to determine the liability of a taxpayer. In general, such summons require the IRS to give notice to any person identified in the summons. Anyone who is entitled to notice may bring a motion to quash the summons in federal district court, which ordinarily individuals may not do because of the sovereign immunity of the United States.

The statute describes three conditions under which the IRS is exempt from having to provide notice of a summons: (1) the summons must be issued in aid of collection, (2) it must aid the collection of an assessment made or a judgment rendered, and (3) it must aid the collection of assessments or judgments “against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued.”

The IRS’s summonses in this case satisfy these three conditions, so the IRS was not required to give notice to Polselli. Because Polselli was not entitled to notice, he also was not entitled to bring a motion to quash the summons. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion to quash.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, to emphasize that giving notice is the default rule and to caution that reading the exception too broadly would undermine the purpose of the notice-as-default system.

[21-1576] Smith v. United States Mar 28, 2023

Smith v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 15, 2023.

Petitioner: Timothy J. Smith.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Timothy Smith is a software engineer who lives in Mobile, Alabama, and who is an avid fisherman. He used a web application called Fiddler to obtain the coordinates of private artificial reefs from a website, StrikeLines, that sells such coordinates for between $190 and $199. Smith informed the owners of StrikeLines that he accessed their reef coordinates but refused to tell them how he did it. After negotiations between the owners of StrikeLines and Smith broke down, the owners contacted law enforcement, who executed a search warrant on Smith’s home.

A federal grand jury indicted Smith on three counts in the Northern District of Florida. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss all counts for lack of venue because (1) he was a resident of Mobile, Alabama, which is in the Southern District of Alabama, and (2) StrikeLines’s servers, where the coordinate data is stored, are in Orlando, which is in the Middle District of Florida. Thus, venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper, even though StrikeLines was headquartered in Pensacola, which is within that district.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that venue was improper as to one count but that improper venue for one count does not require vacatur of the conviction for another count.

Question

Does a criminal trial’s improper venue as to one count require vacatur of the convictions for other counts?

Conclusion

The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

When a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may normally be retried, unless retrial would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Neither text nor precedent suggests that if a defendant is tried in the wrong venue (in violation of the Venue Clause), the appropriate remedy is an exception to the retrial rule. The purpose of the Venue Clause is not the convenience for the defendant, as Smith argued, but to be near the location of the alleged crimes.

Similarly, a trial conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district (in violation of the Vicinage Clause) does not preclude retrial. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights, and nothing about the Vicinage Clause suggests it should be treated differently.

Smith’s situation does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. That Clause prohibits retrial of a criminal defendant when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s “criminal culpability had not been established” but does not affect trials that terminate “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offence of which [the defendant] is accused.” Reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses is the latter type because it does not adjudicate the defendant’s culpability.

[22-49] Lora v. United States Mar 28, 2023

Lora v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 16, 2023.

Petitioner: Efrain Lora.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Efrain Lora and three co-defendants ran an operation selling cocaine and cocaine base in the Bronx. Lora and the others allegedly conspired to murder a rival drug dealer in retaliation for threats the rival had made over drug territory.

A federal grand jury returned an indictment for aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime causing the death of a person. The government obtained a superseding indictment against Lora that added a drug trafficking conspiracy charge and a charge for causing an intentional killing in furtherance of that conspiracy. The jury found Lora guilty of all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to a five-year term of imprisonment for the first count to run consecutively with a 25-year sentence on the second two counts. Lora appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the consecutive sentences.

Question

Does federal criminal sentencing law require a man who was convicted and sentenced for his role in a drug-trafficking-related murder to serve consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences?

Conclusion

The bar on imposition of concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not apply to a sentence for a §924(j) conviction; a §924(j) sentence can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584, a federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has the discretion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, § 924(c) provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” Lora was convicted under § 924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” A violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” The limitation of subsection (c) applies only to that subsection and not to subsection (j), and Congress could not have intended subsection (j) to incorporate subsection (c)’s penalties in addition to its own. Subsection (j) covers a more serious offense, so the resulting flexibility in sentencing is consistent with the statute’s design.

The Court thus vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, which held that subsection (c)’s prohibition on concurrent sentences applies to violations of subsection (j).

[21-757] Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi Mar 27, 2023

Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi

Argued on Mar 27, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.

Petitioner: Amgen, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Sanofi, et al..

Advocates:

Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the Petitioners)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Amgen owns two patents that describe cholesterol-lowering drugs that share a common written description. In 2014, Amgen filed suit against Sanofi alleging infringement of multiple patents, including the two at issue in this case. Among the jury’s conclusions in that case was that the patents were not invalid for lack of written description and enablement.

To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that a “skilled artisan” can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. To satisfy the enablement requirement, a patent specification must contain sufficient information that a “skilled artisan” would be enabled to make and use the claimed invention.

The U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the jury instructions regarding enablement were erroneous.

On remand, the court ruled in favor of Sanofi on the issue of lack of enablement and for Amgen on the issue of lack of written description. Amgen appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted claims were invalid for lack of enablement.

Question

Do Amgen’s two patents satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause—that is, describing the invention with sufficient particularity that would enable a “skilled artisan” to “make and use” the claimed invention?

Conclusion

Amgen’s two patent applications—purporting to cover all antibodies that bind and block the PCSK9 receptor involved in LDL cholesterol metabolism—fail to satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court affirming the judgment below.

It is well established that the enablement requirement means that if a patent claims an entire class of process, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, its specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. While the specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a claimed invention, it must not be too broad. Amgen’s specification fails to enable all that it has claimed, even allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. It described 26 antibodies by their amino acid sequences, but it claims to monopolize an entire class of antibodies not described. Thus, its claim is too broad.

[22-179] United States v. Hansen Mar 27, 2023

United States v. Hansen

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 27, 2023.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Helaman Hansen.

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner)
Esha Bhandari (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Helaman Hansen ran an immigration-advising service charging undocumented immigrants for (incorrect) advice on how to achieve U.S. citizenship. Hansen was convicted and sentenced for, among other federal crimes, two counts of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i).

Two years earlier, in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a Ninth Circuit decision striking down those two statutory provisions. Its reversal was based not on the merits of the constitutional challenge, but on the procedure the Ninth Circuit had used to entertain the challenge. Hansen’s case again raises the constitutional challenge.

Question

Does the federal prohibition on encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

The federal law criminalizing “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration—forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits a significant amount of protected speech compared to its legitimate applications. The federal laws at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) prohibit “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration, but in this context, they refer to the specialized legal terms of solicitation and facilitation, not their colloquial meanings. Because (A)(iv) targets only the intentional solicitation and facilitation of specific illegal acts, and these acts are generally non-expressive conduct, it is unlikely to stifle protected speech.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority’s opinion in full but wrote separate concurrence to criticize the facial overbreadth doctrine, which he argued “lacks any basis in the text or history of the First Amendment” and “distorts the judicial role.”

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that the majority “departs from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation” to interpret the “encouraging or inducing” as meaning something much narrower than the words plainly mean.

[22-148] Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products LLC Mar 22, 2023

Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products LLC

Argued on Mar 22, 2023.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.

Petitioner: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc..
Respondent: VIP Products LLC.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Bennett E. Cooper (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

VIP Products LLC, a company that manufactures dog toys, created a plastic toy that resembles Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. Instead of “Jack Daniel’s,” the toy’s “label” says “Bad Spaniels”; and instead of “Old No. 7” and “Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” it says “The Old No. 2 on your Tennessee Carpet.”

Jack Daniel’s sued the toy company alleging violation of its trademark. The district court held that the toy is a humorous parody entitled to First Amendment protection, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead entitled to heightened First Amendment protection?

Conclusion

The parodic use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, not the threshold Rogers test, and is not automatically excluded from a claim of trademark dilution. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The Lanham Act creates federal causes of action for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. In a typical infringement case, the question is whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” In a typical dilution case, the question is whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a famous trademark. However, even before answering these questions, courts apply a threshold test developed by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) Under the Rogers test, when a trademark infringement claim targets an expressive work, the claim must be dismissed unless the complainant can show either (1) that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or (2) that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”

The Rogers test is limited, however. It does not insulate from ordinary trademark scrutiny the use of trademarks as trademarks. A primary purpose of trademark law is to protect against consumer confusion about source, and the risk of consumer confusion is highest when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark, as VIP did with Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. The parodic nature of VIP’s use may affect the ultimate determination of the likelihood of consumer confusion, but it does not automatically shield the use from claims of dilution. Thus, dismissal of the infringement and dilution claims under the Rogers test was erroneous.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, to warn courts to view surveys, such as the one provided as evidence of consumer confusion in this case, with caution and as merely one piece of a multifaceted analysis of the likelihood of confusion.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Although the Court’s decision left the Rogers test intact, Justice Gorsuch warned lower courts to view it “with care” and expressed doubt that Rogers is “correct in all its particulars.”

[21-1043] Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. Mar 21, 2023

Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 21, 2023.
Decided on Jun 29, 2023.

Petitioner: Abitron Austria GmbH, et al..
Respondent: Hetronic International, Inc..

Advocates:

Lucas M. Walker (for the Petitioners)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Matthew S. Hellman (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Hetronic International, Inc., a U.S. company, manufactures radio remote controls heavy-duty construction equipment. By agreement, Abitron, a foreign corporation, distributed Hetronic’s products, mostly in Europe.

The relationship deteriorated when Abitron decided that it, not Hetronic, owned the rights to Hetronic’s trademarks and other intellectual property. Abitron began manufacturing products identical to Hetronic’s and selling them under the Hetronic brand, mostly in Europe. Hetronic terminated their contractual relationship, but Abitron continued to manufacture and sell the products, making tens of millions of dollars.

Hetronic sued Abitron, and a jury sitting in the Western District of Oklahoma awarded Hetronic over $100 million in damages based on infringement of Hetronic’s trademarks. The district court entered a worldwide injunction barring Abitron from selling the infringing products. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the court’s conclusion that the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially but limited the court’s injunction.

Question

Does the Lanham Act permit the owner of a U.S.-registered trademark to recover damages for the use of that trademark when the infringement occurred outside the United States and is not likely to cause confusion in the United States?

Conclusion

The Lanham Act extends trademark protection only to claims where the infringing “use in commerce” is domestic. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Unless Congress explicitly states otherwise, U.S. laws are generally presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This presumption helps avoid conflicts with other countries and is premised on the idea that Congress typically legislates with domestic matters in mind. To apply the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts apply a two-step framework. First, a court must ask whether Congress has explicitly indicated that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. If not, then the second step is to ask whether the lawsuit seeks a permissible domestic or impermissible foreign application of the law.

Applying that two-step framework here, the Court concluded that the Lanham Act applies only to claims where the infringing use is domestic. First, neither § 1114(1)(a) nor § 1125(a)(1) explicitly indicates that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. They prohibit the use “in commerce” of protected marks that are likely to cause confusion. A mere reference to “foreign commerce” does not make a statute extraterritorial. Second, the focus of the statute is on the “use in commerce” that is likely to cause confusion, which is domestic conduct.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion to elaborate on what it means to “use a trademark in commerce.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, in her view the Lanham Act extends to activities carried out abroad when there is a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States.

[22-105] Coinbase v. Bielski Mar 21, 2023

Coinbase v. Bielski

Argued on Mar 21, 2023.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.

Petitioner: Coinbase, Inc..
Respondent: Abraham Bielski.

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner)
Hassan A. Zavareei (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Coinbase operates an online currency and crypto-currency exchange platform. Abraham Bielski created a Coinbase account in 2021, and shortly after opening it, he alleges that a scammer fraudulently accessed his account and stole more than $30,000 from him. Bielski alleged that Coinbase ignored his attempts at communication until he filed this lawsuit.

Bielski alleged in his lawsuit—on behalf of himself and other similarly situated persons—that Coinbase, is a “financial institution” within the meaning of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), and that it fails to comply with its responsibilities under the EFTA, including conducting a timely and good-faith investigation of fraudulent transfers. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration based on its user agreement, and the district court denied the motion to compel on the grounds that the arbitration clause and delegation clause were unconscionable. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Coinbase’s motion to stay.

Question

Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal?

Conclusion

A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to 9 U. S. C. §16(a) on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

The Court recognized in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) that an appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” The Griggs principle controls the outcome of this case. If district courts could proceed while an appeal on arbitrability is ongoing, the benefits of arbitration, such as efficiency and reduced costs, would be lost and parties could feel pressured to settle to avoid district court proceedings they initially sought to avoid through arbitration.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, and in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. Justice Jackson pointed out that when a federal court of appeals conducts interlocutory review of a trial court order, the rest of the case remains at the trial court level for the trial judge to make particularized determinations at their discretion. Justice Jackson argued that this discretionary decision-making process promotes procedural fairness, and there is no reason to remove that discretion in this case.

[21-1484] Arizona v. Navajo Nation Mar 20, 2023

Arizona v. Navajo Nation

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 20, 2023.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.

Petitioner: State of Arizona, et al..
Respondent: Navajo Nation, et al..

Advocates:

Frederick Liu (On behalf of the Federal parties)
Rita P. Maguire (On behalf of the State parties)
Shay Dvoretzky (On behalf of the Navajo Nation)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Navajo Reservation is the “permanent home” of the Navajo Nation, under the 1868 Treaty, and subsequent expansions by executive orders and acts of Congress. The Reservation includes parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, and lies almost entirely within the drainage basin of the Colorado River. Due to water scarcity, rights to the Colorado River’s waters are allocated through federal treaties, statutes, regulations, common law rulings, Supreme Court decrees, and interstate compacts—collectively known as the “Law of the River.”

In 2003, the Navajo Nation sued the U.S. Department of the Interior and other federal agencies under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and a breach of trust claim for failure to consider their water rights in managing the Colorado River. Arizona, Nevada, and several other entities intervened to protect their interests in the Colorado River waters. The district court dismissed their claim, finding the Supreme Court retained original jurisdiction over allocation of rights to the Colorado River. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the 1868 Treaty between the Navajo Nation and the United States impose an affirmative duty on the United States to secure water for the tribe?

Conclusion

The 1868 treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation reserved necessary water to accomplish the purpose of the Navajo Reservation but did not require the United States to take affirmative steps to secure water for the Tribe. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.

To succeed on a breach-of-trust claim, as the Tribe asserts here, it must establish, among other things, that the text of a treaty, statute, or regulation imposed certain duties on the United States. The 1868 treaty did not do so. While it did impose a number of specific duties, such as to construct a number of buildings on the reservation and to provide teachers for schools for at least 10 years, the treaty said nothing about any affirmative duty for the United States to secure water for the Tribe. The Court declined to infer such a duty to secure water, particularly when the treaty imposed no such duty with respect to land.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion highlighting the confusion over the definition of a “trust relationship” and calling upon the Court to clarify its meaning in future cases.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch characterized the case as the Navajo Tribe simply asking the United States to identify the water rights it holds for them, and, if the United States has misappropriated the Navajo’s water rights, to formulate a plan to stop doing so prospectively. Under this characterization, the dissenters would allow the Tribe’s case to proceed.

[156-orig] New York v. New Jersey Mar 01, 2023

New York v. New Jersey

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 1, 2023.
Decided on Apr 18, 2023.

Petitioner: New York.
Respondent: New Jersey.

Advocates:

Judith N. Vale (for New York)
Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for New Jersey)
Austin L. Raynor (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting New Jersey)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

New York and New Jersey entered into an interstate compact called the Waterfront Commission Compact to fight corruption in the Port of New York and New Jersey. New Jersey then sought to withdraw unilaterally from the compact. New York objected to New Jersey’s withdrawal.

Question

May New Jersey unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact with New York?

Conclusion

New Jersey may unilaterally withdraw from the 1953 Waterfront Commission Compact. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The Waterfront Commission Compact does not address unilateral withdrawal. Other principles of law in effect at the time the compact was entered would have informed their understanding of the Compact. One such principle is that a contract that contemplates “continuing performance for an indefinite time is to be interpreted as stipulating only for performance terminable at the will of either party.” Thus, with this understanding, either state may unilaterally withdraw. The principle of state sovereignty further supports this conclusion.

[22-506] Biden v. Nebraska Feb 28, 2023

Biden v. Nebraska

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 30, 2023.

Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden, President of the United States, et al..
Respondent: Nebraska, et al..

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
James A. Campbell (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2020, then-presidential candidate Joseph Biden promised to cancel up to $10,000 of federal student loan debt per borrower. After winning the election, the Biden administration announced its intent to forgive, via executive action, $10,000 in student loans for borrowers with an annual income of less than $125,000.

Nebraska and five other states challenged the forgiveness program, arguing that it violated the separation of powers and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the challenge, finding that the states lacked judicial standing to sue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit enjoined the forgiveness program pending the appeal.

Question

1. Do Nebraska and other states have judicial standing to challenge the student-debt relief program?

2. Does the student-debt relief program exceed the statutory authority of the U.S. Secretary of Education, or does it violate the Administrative Procedure Act?

Conclusion

The Secretary of Education does not have authority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel roughly $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.

First, the Court concluded that Missouri has standing to challenge the student-debt relief program. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Here, the Secretary’s plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government corporation created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market, an estimated $44 million a year in fees, and the harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is an injury to Missouri itself.

Second, the Court determined that the HEROES Act’s authorization of the Secretary to “waive or modify” existing statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assistance programs under the Education Act does not extend to canceling $430 billion of student loan principal. The Act permits the Secretary to “modify” statutory provisions but only “moderately or in minor fashion” as the term is ordinarily used. The “modifications” challenged here create a novel and fundamentally different loan forgiveness program that Congress could not have intended to permit. And the power to “waive” does not remotely resemble how such power has been used on prior occasions, where it was simply used to nullify particular legal requirements.

Third, the Court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic justified the unprecedented nature of the the debt cancellation plan. Citing its recent decision in West Virginia v. EPA, the Court expressed hesitance that Congress could have intended to confer such authority on the Secretary and not retain it for itself.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.

[22-535] Department of Education v. Brown Feb 28, 2023

Department of Education v. Brown

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 28, 2023.
Decided on Jun 30, 2023.

Petitioner: United States Department of Education, et al..
Respondent: Mayra Brown, et al..

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
J. Michael Connolly (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Fulfilling one of then-presidential candidate Joseph Biden’s campaign promises, the Secretary of Education invoked its authority under the HEROES Act to create a loan forgiveness program in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and national emergency. Under the program, a student borrower qualified for loan forgiveness if (1) they made less than $125,000 individually or $250,000 if married and filing jointly, and (2) they had Direct, Perkins, or FFEL loans that were not commercially held. Qualified borrowers could receive $20,000 if they received a Pell Grant and $10,000 if they did not.

Myra Brown and Alexander Taylor both have student loans. Brown is ineligible for debt forgiveness under the Program because her loans are commercially held, while Taylor is ineligible for the full $20,000 in debt forgiveness because he did not receive a Pell Grant.

They challenged the loan forgiveness program, arguing that if the Biden administration had followed proper procedures in adopting the plan, they would have been able to weigh in on the plan and urge for a plan that would have been more beneficial to them. The district court found that the program was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power vested in Congress and issued a nationwide injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to stay the injunction.

Question

Do these two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan?

Is the Plan an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the Secretary of the Department of Education?

Conclusion

Respondents lack Article III standing to assert a procedural challenge to the student-loan debt-forgiveness plan adopted by the Secretary of Education pursuant to Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act). Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

For a plaintiff to have standing, they must establish: (1) a concrete and particularized injury, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant's action, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Here, the “fairly traceable” element fails. The respondents' injury is not “fairly traceable” to the plan enacted under the HEROES Act, as they have not established a direct link between the HEROES Act plan and their desired outcome of a more favorable loan-forgiveness program under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). Any link is too tenuous and speculative to establish standing.

[22-10] Dubin v. United States Feb 27, 2023

Dubin v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 27, 2023.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.

Petitioner: David Fox Dubin.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

William Joseph Dubin was a licensed psychologist in Texas and ran a psychology practice called “Psychological A.R.T.S., P.C.” (PARTS). His son, David Dubin, worked for PARTS in a business capacity. PARTS was an enrolled Medicaid provider, which means it is required to comply with Medicaid laws and regulations. Among other alleged violations, David Dubin used patients’ Medicaid reimbursement numbers—to obtain reimbursements for services PARTS did not provide those patients. This conduct formed the basis of a charge of identity theft under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028A, which requires a two-year sentence for “[w]hoever ... knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person" during the commission of an enumerated felony.” William and David Dubin were convicted, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court granted rehearing en banc to consider the sufficiency of the evidence and affirmed the panel.

Question

Does a person commit aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense?

Conclusion

A person commits “aggravated identity theft,” if he “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of—rather than merely peripheral to—what makes the conduct criminal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The meaning of each of the two key phrases—”uses” and “in relation to”—depends heavily on context. First, the very title of Section 1028A(a)(1), “Aggravated identity theft,” suggests that identity theft is at the core of that provision, particularly in contrast to a neighboring provision with a much broader title and scope. The language of 1028A(a)(1) further supports this reading. The provision applies when a defendant “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses” another’s identification without lawful authority. From this context, it is clear that “uses” refers to conduct akin to theft, rather than its broader meaning of “virtually any function.” Finally, the list of predicate offenses suggests that the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality, not just a peripheral feature.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argues that the statute is too vague and the majority’s opinion does little to clarify its meaning.

[21-1496] Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh Feb 22, 2023

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 22, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.

Petitioner: Twitter, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Mehier Taamneh, et al..

Advocates:

Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal)
Eric Schnapper (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case arises from the same set of facts as Gonzalez v. Google.

Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a terrorist attack in Paris, France, in 2015—one of several terrorist attacks that same day. The day afterwards, the foreign terrorist organization ISIS claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and releasing a YouTube video. Gonzalez’s father filed an action against Google, Twitter, and Facebook, claiming, among other things, all three platforms were liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism by failing to take meaningful or aggressive action to prevent terrorists from using its services, even though they did not play an active role in the specific act of international terrorism that actually injured Gonzalez.

The district court dismissed the claims based on aiding-and-abetting liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Question

1. Does an internet platform “knowingly” provide substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggressive” action to prevent such use?

2. May an internet platform whose services were not used in connection with the specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff still be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333?

Conclusion

Twitter did not “knowingly” provide substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and thus cannot be said to have aided and abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack on a nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Section 2333 establishes liability for anyone “who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” To “aid and abet” requires three elements: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury, (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an illegal activity at the time he provides assistance, and (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.”

The plaintiffs (respondents) in this case satisfied the first two elements by alleging both that ISIS committed a wrong and that the defendants knew they were playing some sort of role in ISIS’s enterprise. They failed to show, however, that the defendants gave such knowing and substantial assistance to ISIS that they culpably participated in the Reina attack.

Courts use six flexible factors to assess the third element, whether a defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the principal violation: (1) “the nature of the act assisted,” (2) the “amount of assistance” provided, (3) whether the defendant was “present at the time” of the principal tort, (4) the defendant’s “relation to the tortious actor,” (5) the “defendant’s state of mind,” and (6) the “duration of the assistance” given.

Applying these factors, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that Twitter did more than transmit information by billions of people—most of whom use the platform for interactions that once took place via mail, on the phone, or in public areas. Without more, their claim that Twitter aided and abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack on a nightclub in Istanbul must fail.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion to point out the narrowness of the decision due to the stage of litigation (the motion to dismiss stage).

[21-1333] Gonzalez v. Google LLC Feb 21, 2023

Gonzalez v. Google LLC

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 21, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.

Petitioner: Reynaldo Gonzalez, et al..
Respondent: Google LLC.

Advocates:

Eric Schnapper (for the Petitioners)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case arises from the same set of facts as Twitter v. Taamneh.

Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a terrorist attack in Paris, France, in 2015—one of several terrorist attacks that same day. The day afterwards, the foreign terrorist organization ISIS claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and releasing a YouTube video. Gonzalez’s father filed an action against Google, Twitter, and Facebook, claiming, among other things, that Google aided and abetted international terrorism by allowing ISIS to use its platform—specifically YouTube—“to recruit members, plan terrorist attacks, issue terrorist threats, instill fear, and intimidate civilian populations.” Specifically, the complaint alleged that because Google uses computer algorithms that suggest content to users based on their viewing history, it assists ISIS in spreading its message.

Gonzalez claimed that all three platforms were also liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism by failing to take meaningful or aggressive action to prevent terrorists from using its services, even though they did not play an active role in the specific act of international terrorism that actually injured Gonzalez.

The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss the claim based on Section 230, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act immunize interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider?

Conclusion

Citing its decision in Twitter v. Taamneh, the Court declined to reach the question presented in this case and vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that opinion. Although this disposition technically favors Gonzalez, the practical effect on remand is dismissal of Gonzalez's claim.

[21-887] Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, et al. Jan 18, 2023

Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, et al.

Argued on Jan 18, 2023.
Decided on Mar 21, 2023.

Petitioner: Miguel L.V. Perez.
Respondent: Sturgis Public Schools, et al..

Advocates:

Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Miguel Perez is a 23-year-old deaf student in Michigan. Although the school assigned him a classroom aide, the aide was not trained to work with deaf students and did not know sign language. Shortly before Perez was supposed to graduate, the school notified his parents that he did not qualify for a diploma.

Perez filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education alleging that the school denied him an adequate education and violated numerous federal and state education laws: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and two Michigan disabilities laws. Before a hearing on the IDEA claim, the parties settled. As part of the settlement, the school agreed to pay for Perez to attend the Michigan School for the Deaf, for any post-secondary compensatory education, and for sign language instruction for Perez and his family.

Perez then sued the school district and board of education in federal court, claiming that the school discriminated against him by not providing the resources necessary for him to participate in class. The district court dismissed the ADA claim based on failure to exhaust administrative proceedings because he settled his IDEA claim before the hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Do the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require a student to exhaust his administrative proceedings against the school district even when such proceedings would be futile?

Conclusion

An Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) lawsuit seeking compensatory damages may proceed without exhausting the administrative processes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) because the remedy sought is not one IDEA provides. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Perez may pursue his ADA claim.

Section 1415(l) contains a general rule and an exception. As a general rule, IDEA does not restrict the ability to seek “remedies” under “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.” However, before filing a civil action under other federal laws “seeking relief that is also available” under IDEA, “the procedures under [§1415](f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” If a plaintiff seeks, as Perez did in this case, remedies that are unavailable under IDEA, the second provision does not require the plaintiff to exhaust other procedures for relief.

[21-1436] Santos-Zacaria v. Garland Jan 17, 2023

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland

Argued on Jan 17, 2023.
Decided on May 11, 2023.

Petitioner: Leon Santos-Zacaria.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.

Advocates:

Paul W. Hughes (for the Petitioner)
Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Santos is a native and citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States based on the likelihood of persecution due to her sexual orientation and transgender identity. An immigration judge denied her application for withholding removal, finding one prior assault was insufficient to establish past persecution. The immigration judge also denied her claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Santos appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed her appeal. Although the Board concluded her past assault was sufficient to establish past persecution and thus a presumption of future persecution, the government had rebutted that presumption. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s determination that Santos had not established eligibility for relief under the CAT.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Santos’s petition to review the Board’s determination that she was not eligible for relief under CAT and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the adequacy of the Board’s analysis because she failed to raise that argument in a motion for reconsideration.

Question

Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) bar a court of appeals from reviewing an immigrant’s claim that the Board of Immigration Appeals had engaged in impermissible factfinding because the immigrant had not exhausted that claim through a motion to reconsider?

Conclusion

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not a jurisdictional provision; it does not require an immigrant to seek a motion to reconsider, which is a discretionary form of review, only remedies available as a matter of right. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The language of § 1252(d)(1) is substantially different from jurisdictional provisions found elsewhere. Absent a clear statement that Congress intended the forfeiture rule to be jurisdictional, courts should not interpret such rules as jurisdictional because of the potentially harsh consequences of doing so. Thus, § 1252(d)(1) is best understood to require a noncitizen to exhaust only those remedies available as of right.

Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.

[21-1450] Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States Jan 17, 2023

Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 17, 2023.
Decided on Apr 19, 2023.

Petitioner: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S..
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Turkiye Halk Bankasi (“Halkbank”) is a commercial bank that is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey. A 2019 grand jury charged Halkbank with participating in a money-laundering scheme involving billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil and natural gas proceeds, in violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran.

Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunizes it from criminal prosecution because it is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey. Further, it argued that FSIA’s exceptions to immunity apply only to civil, not criminal, cases, and even if they include criminal cases, it is nevertheless entitled to immunity under common law.

The district court rejected Halkbank’s arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that even if FSIA confers immunity from criminal prosecutions, the conduct at issue falls within FSIA’s commercial activity exception.

Question

May the district courts properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution against Halkbank in this case based on the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

Conclusion

The district court has jurisdiction in this criminal prosecution; the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity in civil actions against foreign states and their instrumentalities does not cover criminal cases. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

18 U.S.C. § 3231 contains a broad jurisdictional grant: it gives district courts original jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” Absent a textual exclusion of foreign states, the most natural reading of that provision is that it includes them.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act covers only civil cases. It grants district courts original jurisdiction over “any nonjury civil action against a foreign state” as to “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity” and describes procedures and remedies applicable exclusively in civil, not criminal, cases. FSIA is silent as to criminal prosecutions. Its one provision that a “foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter” must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Act, which focuses exclusively on civil matters. However, principles of common-law immunity might preclude this criminal prosecution even if the FSIA does not. Thus, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s determination that the district court had jurisdiction, reversed as to its conclusion that FSIA granted immunity from criminal prosecution, and vacated and remanded as to the issue of common-law immunity claims.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Gorsuch argued that FSIA alone dictates the answer to the immunity questions in this case and thus agrees with the majority as to all but the judgment to vacate and remand the question of common-law immunity.

[22-96] Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. Jan 11, 2023

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.

Argued on Jan 11, 2023.
Decided on May 11, 2023.

Petitioner: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.
Respondent: Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc..

Advocates:

Mark D. Harris (for the Petitioner)
Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Sarah M. Harris (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Centro de Periodismo Investigativo (“CPI”) is a nonprofit media organization based in Puerto Rico. It seeks disclosure of documents relating to Puerto Rico’s fiscal situation from the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“the Board”). The Board has declined to release the requested documents, and CPI asked the district court to compel production. The Board asked the district court to dismiss the litigation, arguing that it is immune from suit pursuant to both the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”).

The district court disagreed with the Board, finding PROMESA abrogated any possible Eleventh Amendment immunity the Board might have enjoyed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)’s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims?

Conclusion

Nothing in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico enjoys from legal claims. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.

If Congress wishes to abrogate sovereign immunity, it must do so using “unmistakably clear” language in the statute. The Supreme Court has found such language only in two types of situations: when a statute expressly states that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity, and when a statute creates a cause of action and authorizes a lawsuit against a government based on that cause of action. There is no such language in PROMESA, nor does it create a cause of action for use against the Board or Puerto Rico. Even § 2126(a)—which provides that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise arising out of [PROMESA] . . . shall be brought” in the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico—does not amount to a clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Puerto Rico lacks state sovereign immunity, which would make the question of abrogation superfluous.

[21-1449] Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Jan 10, 2023

Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Argued on Jan 10, 2023.
Decided on Jun 1, 2023.

Petitioner: Glacier Northwest, Inc..
Respondent: International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Advocates:

Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Darin M. Dalmat (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Glacier Northwest is a Washington corporation that sells and delivers ready-mix concrete to businesses in the state. It employs approximately 80-90 truck drivers to deliver concrete, and Local 174 is the exclusive union representative for Glacier’s truck drivers in King County. In 2017, during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Glacier truck drivers went on strike, resulting in the loss of some of Glacier’s concrete.

Glacier sued Local 174 in state court for six tort claims arising from Local 174’s alleged role that resulted in Glacier’s loss of concrete. The trial court dismissed the claims arising before the CBA was reached, finding they were preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act, and it granted summary judgment dismissal of the remaining claims primarily on state law grounds. The appellate court reversed as to the pre-CBA claims, finding the NLRA did not preempt those claims. The state supreme court reversed as to the preemption issue.

Question

Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt a state-court lawsuit against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property during a labor dispute?

Conclusion

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preempt Glacier’s state-court lawsuit alleging that the union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The position of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is that while the NLRA generally recognizes the right of workers to strike, it does not protect from liability strikers who fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect their employer’s property from foreseeable harms caused by the sudden cessation of work.

At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true. Accepting the allegations here as true, the Union failed to take reasonable precautions to protect Glacier’s property, as the Union knew that concrete is highly perishable and, if left to harden in a truck’s drum, will cause significant damage to the truck. Because the Union knew of this risk—and indeed intended that result—the strike went beyond the conduct protected by the NLRA. Because the strike was not protected by federal law, the state tort claims were not preempted.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas would reach the same conclusion that the state-court claims are not preempted based on adherence to the Court’s decision in ___. He wrote separately to emphasize the “oddity” of the “broad pre-emption regime” in the case the majority relied on—San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)—and suggesting that the Court reassess its holding in that case.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which both Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would reach the same conclusion based solely on the Court’s longstanding position that the NLRA does not immunize strikers who engage in trespass or violence against the employer’s property.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, pointing out that the test in Garmon is only whether the conduct at issue is “arguably” protected by the NLRA, as determined by the Board. She criticized the Court for stepping in to make that determination instead of allowing the Board to do so.

[21-1397] In re Grand Jury Jan 09, 2023

In re Grand Jury

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 9, 2023.
Decided on Jan 23, 2023.

Petitioner: In re Grand Jury.

Advocates:

Daniel B. Levin (for the Petitioner)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A grand jury issued subpoenas to two parties—“Company” and “Law Firm”—requesting documents and communications related to a criminal investigation into the owner of Company and client of Law Firm. In response to the subpoenas, Company and Law Firm refused to disclose certain documents, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine because the primary purpose of the documents at issue was to seek legal advice, not to obtain tax advice. The government moved to compel production, and the district court granted the government’s motion in part. Company and Law Firm disagreed with the district court’s ruling and continued to withhold the documents. The district court then held Company and Law Firm in contempt. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the primary purpose of the communications was to obtain legal advice.

Question

If a communication involves both legal and non-legal advice, when is it protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege?

Conclusion

The Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.

[21-1454] The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority Jan 09, 2023

The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

Argued on Jan 9, 2023.
Decided on May 18, 2023.

Petitioner: The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department, et al..
Respondent: Federal Labor Relations Authority, et al..

Advocates:

Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioners)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the federal Respondent)
Andres M. Grajales (for the union Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2016, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General (the “Guard”) decided to end its 45-year-long relationship with the union that represents its technicians, who are civilian federal employees but are described as dual-status employees because of their hybrid civilian and military roles.

As it was terminating the relationship, the Guard informed the union that it did not have Standard Form 1187s, which federal-sector bargaining-unit members are required to submit and which the Guard was obligated to maintain. The union filed four Unfair Labor Practice charges (ULPs) with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA’s regional general counsel investigated and found that the Guard had refused to negotiate in good faith. The Guard responded that it was not an “agency” and that the technicians were not “employees” within the meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed, and a three-member FLRA panel adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision in full. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the Guard’s petition for review, finding the FLRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the collective-bargaining dispute.

Question

Does the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 empower the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of state militias?

Conclusion

The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) had jurisdiction over this labor dispute because the state militia was acting as a federal agency when it hired and supervised dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), the FLRA has jurisdiction only over labor organizations and federal agencies. The FSLMRS defines “agency” to include the Department of Defense. Dual-status technicians are defined by statute to be employees of the Department of the Air Force or Department of the Army—both of which are components of the Department of Defense and thus plainly within the jurisdiction of the FLRA. By hiring and supervising these employees, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General were acting as a federal agency.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that while the Guard may act as a federal agency, exercise the authority of such an agency, and function as an agency, is not actually an agency and thus is outside the jurisdiction of the FLRA.

[21-1271] Moore v. Harper Dec 07, 2022

Moore v. Harper

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 7, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2023.

Petitioner: Timothy K. Moore, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, et al..
Respondent: Rebecca Harper, et al..

Advocates:

David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Private Respondents)
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the State Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

After the 2020 Census, in which North Carolina gained an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and thus required redistricting of the state, North Carolina’s Republican-majority state legislature passed a partisan gerrymander.

The map was challenged in state court, and in February 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the map for violating the state constitution’s “free elections clause” and other provisions. The legislature proposed a second gerrymandered map, so the court ordered a special master to create a map for the 2022 congressional elections. The legislators asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review based on an argument that the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives state legislatures alone the authority to regulate federal elections—the so-called Independent State Legislature theory.

Question

Under the U.S. Constitution, does the state legislative body, independent of any constraints by state courts or other laws, have sole authority to regulate federal elections?

Conclusion

The Federal Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

First, the Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review the case. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to overrule its previous judgment did not moot the case because there remains a live dispute between the parties.

Second, the Court concluded that the Elections Clause does not grant state legislatures exclusive authority to regulate federal elections. Judicial review has been an accepted practice since Marbury v. Madison, and under the Court’s precedents, the Elections Clause authority of state legislatures is subject to checks and balances provided by the state constitution. State legislatures are not wholly independent bodies, and they are bound by the constraints imposed by the state constitutions.

Third, state courts have the authority to interpret state laws affecting federal elections, but they cannot sidestep federal law. The Court declined to decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court in this case overstepped its authority because that issue was not properly before it.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that while the Court need not answer the question of which standard a federal court should employ to review a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause, there are three standards from which to choose that all convey the same point—deference but not abdication.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the question presented in the case was moot, and that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.

[21-908] Bartenwerfer v. Buckley Dec 06, 2022

Bartenwerfer v. Buckley

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 6, 2022.
Decided on Feb 22, 2023.

Petitioner: Kate M. Bartenwerfer.
Respondent: Kieran Buckley.

Advocates:

Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner)
Zachary D. Tripp (for the Respondent)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

David and Kate Bartenwerfer renovated a house in San Francisco, California, and sold it to Kieran Buckley. After the sale, Buckley discovered defects in the house and sued the Bartenwerfers. A jury found for Buckley on several claims and awarded damages. The Bartenwerfers then filed for bankruptcy.

In the bankruptcy court, Buckley initiated an adversary proceeding against the Bartenwerfers arguing that the state-court judgment could not be discharged in bankruptcy because the debt was obtained through fraud. The bankruptcy court agreed, finding that the Bartenwerfers had intended to deceive Buckley, that Mr. Bartenwerfer had actual knowledge of the factual misrepresentations, and that Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent conduct could be imputed onto Mrs. Bartenwerfer because of their partnership relationship.

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) remanded the imputed liability finding with the instructions that the bankruptcy court determine whether Mrs. Bartenwerfer “knew or should have known” of Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraud. On remand, the court held that Mrs. Bartenwerfer did not know of the fraud and thus was not liable for Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent conduct, and the BAP affirmed. Buckley appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bankruptcy court applied the incorrect legal standard for imputed liability in a partnership relationship. The correct standard, based on binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, is whether the fraud was performed “on behalf of the partnership and in the ordinary course of business of the partnership.”

Question

Can a bankruptcy debtor be held liable for another person’s fraud, even when they were not aware of the fraud?

Conclusion

A debtor who is liable for her partner’s fraud cannot discharge that debt in bankruptcy, regardless of her own culpability. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion for the unanimous Court holding that Mrs. Bartenwerfer could not discharge her partner’s debt even though she lacked knowledge of his fraud.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides an exception to discharge of “any debt…for money…to the extent obtained by…false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” The passive voice of that provision eliminates the significance of who engaged in the fraud, suggesting an “agnosticism” as to the identity of the wrongdoer. Neither the fact that neighboring provisions of the Code treat debtors differently nor the Court’s precedents support an alternative reading of that provision. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to balance multiple interests, and the preclusion of faultless debtors from discharging liabilities run up by their associates is but one of those.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, to clarify that the Court’s opinion depends upon the agency relationship between Mrs. Bartenwerfer and her partner and that its decision does not consider the applicability of the provision when no such agency or partnership relationship exists.

[21-1052] U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources Dec 06, 2022

U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources

Argued on Dec 6, 2022.
Decided on Jun 16, 2023.

Petitioner: United States, ex rel. Jesse Polansky, M.D., M.P.H..
Respondent: Executive Health Resources, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for Respondent the United States)
Mark W. Mosier (for Respondent Executive Health Resources, Inc.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Dr. Jesse Polansky was an official at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) before consulting for Executive Health Resources (EHR). EHR is a company that provides review and billing certification services to hospitals and physicians that bill Medicare.

While employed as a consultant, Polansky became concerned that EHR was systematically enabling its client hospitals to over-admit patients by certifying inpatient services that should have been provided on an outpatient basis. As a result, hospitals were billing the government for care that was not “reasonable and necessary,” in violation of CMS’s guidance and regulations.

Polansky filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, and it remained under seal for two years while the government investigated. The government ultimately decided it would not participate in the case, at which point the case was unsealed and Polansky proceeded as plaintiff. Seven years after the initiation of the proceedings, and after considerable time and resources by the court and parties, the government notified the parties that it intended to dismiss the entire action. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the government have the authority to dismiss a False Claims Act lawsuit brought by an individual on behalf of the government if it initially declined to take over the case, and if so, what standard applies?

Conclusion

In a qui tam action filed under the False Claims Act, the United States may move to dismiss under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) whenever it has intervened—whether during the seal period or later on; in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator’s objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.

Section 3730(c)(2)(A) provides that “[t]he Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the [relator],” so long as the relator received notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Contrary to the government’s contention in this case, this does not mean that the government may dismiss the action without ever intervening in the case. Neither the text or subparagraph (2)(A) nor the broader context supports this understanding.

But Polanksy’s contention—that the government may dismiss only if it intervenes during the seal period—also fails. Under § 3730(c)(3), the government can intervene either during the seal period or “at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” If the government successfully intervenes, then it becomes a party to the litigation with the attendant rights, including the right to dismiss.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the default rules in civil litigation, and nothing warrants a departure from those rules here. Thus, in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator’s objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Rule 41(a).

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined, calling upon the Court to consider, in an appropriate case, whether the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II of the U.S. Constitution.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the FCA does not permit the government to dismiss a qui tam action after it has declined to take over the action from the relator at the outset.

[21-476] 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis Dec 05, 2022

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 5, 2022.
Decided on Jun 30, 2023.

Petitioner: 303 Creative LLC.
Respondent: Aubrey Elenis, et al..

Advocates:

Kristen Kellie Waggoner (for the Petitioners)
Eric R. Olson (for the Respondents)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Lorie Smith is the owner and founder of a graphic design firm, 303 Creative LLC. She wants to expand her business to include wedding websites. However, she opposes same-sex marriage on religious grounds so does not want to design websites for same-sex weddings. She wants to post a message on her own website explaining her religious objections to same-sex weddings.

The Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (“CADA”) prohibits businesses that are open to the public from from discriminating on the basis of numerous characteristics, including sexual orientation. The law defines discrimination not only as refusing to provide goods or services, but also publishing any communication that says or implies that an individual’s patronage is unwelcome because of a protected characteristic.

Even before the state sought to enforce CADA against her, Smith and her company challenged the law in federal court, alleging numerous constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the state, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does application of the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs that convey messages with which the designer disagrees. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The First Amendment exists to protect an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas” and individual liberty, which means the government generally cannot compel a person to espouse its preferred messages. The wedding websites Lorie Smith seeks to create in this case are “protected First Amendment speech.” Colorado's law, intending to enforce non-discrimination, would compel her to express messages contrary to her beliefs.

Although public accommodations play a key role in promoting civil rights, these laws must bow to constitutional imperatives and cannot be used to compel individuals to express messages they disagree with.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, lamenting that, “the Court, for the first time in its history, grants a business open to the public a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of a protected class.”

[21-1270] MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC Dec 05, 2022

MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC

Argued on Dec 5, 2022.
Decided on Apr 19, 2023.

Petitioner: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC.
Respondent: Transform Holdco LLC.

Advocates:

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sears formerly occupied a space in the Mall of America in Minneapolis, Minnesota, under a lease with MOAC. In 2019, the bankruptcy court permitted Transform to assign the Sears lease to its wholly-owned subsidiary. MOAC moved to stay assignment of the lease, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion. MOAC appealed to federal district court but did so without first obtaining from the district court a stay of the assignment pending resolution of the appeal. Transform challenged the district court’s review of the bankruptcy court’s assignment order, claiming that Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) “creates a rule of statutory mootness” barring appellate review of a sale “made to a good-faith purchaser” and not stayed pending appeal. Because MOAC had not obtained a stay, the district court dismissed as moot MOAC’s appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limit the jurisdiction of appellate courts over an order approving the sale of a debtor’s assets or instead simply limit the remedies available on appeal from such an order?

Conclusion

Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code—which restricts the effects of certain successful appeals of judicially authorized sales or leases of bankruptcy-estate property—is not a jurisdictional provision. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Congressional statutes often contain restrictions and conditions on relief, but absent a “clear statement” that a provision is jurisdictional, courts must not treat these restrictions and conditions as jurisdictional. Jurisdictional provisions limit the power of the district court, whereas other limitations bear on the rights or obligations of the parties.

Nothing in the limiting language of § 363(m)’s purports to “gover[n] a court’s adjudicatory capacity.” First, the text does not address a court’s authority or refer to the jurisdiction of district courts. Second, the structure of the Code and context of § 363(m) suggest it is not jurisdictional. The provision is separate from other provisions in the code that address federal courts’ jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters, and unlike other provisions, § 363(m) contains no “clear tie” to the jurisdictional provisions.

[21-1164] Wilkins v. United States Nov 30, 2022

Wilkins v. United States

Argued on Nov 30, 2022.
Decided on Mar 28, 2023.

Petitioner: Larry Steven Wilkins, et al..
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Jeffrey W. McCoy (for the Petitioners)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Robbins Gulch Road runs between Highway 93 and the Bitterroot National Forest, crossing the private properties of Larry Wilkins and Jane Stanton near Connor, Montana. The previous owners of each of their properties had granted the United States an easement for Robbins Gulch Road in 1962.

In 2018, Wilkins and Stanton sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) to confirm that the easement does not permit public use of the road and to enforce the government’s obligations to patrol and maintain the road against unrestricted public use. The district court granted the federal government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule?

Conclusion

The Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Wilkins's and Stanton's lawsuit may proceed.

Jurisdictional rules tend to disrupt litigation, whereas procedural rules (including claim-processing rules) seek to facilitate the litigation process. Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the jurisdictional label, courts will view a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. As a general rule, most statutes of limitations are nonjurisdictional.

The 12-year statute of limitations described in 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing in its text or context supports departing from the general rule that statutes of limitations are nonjurisdictional. Nor do any of the three cases the government cites definitively interpreted Section 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. Thus, the provision at issue is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional one.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the Court has long treated conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity, such as the one at issue in this case, as jurisdictional, and he would recognize the Court’s precedents as resolving the question.

[22-58] United States v. Texas Nov 29, 2022

United States v. Texas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 29, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2023.

Petitioner: United States of America, et al..
Respondent: State of Texas and State of Louisiana.

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In September 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued the Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law in an effort to allocate limited resources that could not feasibly deport every removable non-citizen presently in the United States. Texas and Louisiana challenged the Guidelines in federal court. The court concluded Texas had Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines because, as a result of the Guidelines, Texas would have to spend more money on law enforcement and social services. The court further concluded that the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act because they granted DHS discretion to decide who will be detained and when, and because they were issued without notice and comment. The court vacated the Guidelines nationwide, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal.

Question

1. Do the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law?

2. Do the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act?

3. Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) prevent the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)?

Conclusion

Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.

For a plaintiff to establish standing, they must show that they have suffered a real, specific injury that was caused by the defendant and that the court can remedy. While the district court had concluded that the states would suffer an injury in the form of additional costs due to the arrest policy in question, the Supreme Court pointed out that the injury also has to be "legally and judicially cognizable"—in other words, that it should be a type of dispute that courts have traditionally been involved in resolving. The states failed to point to any precedent or historical practice that supported their claim to have standing in this particular issue.

Second, the Court acknowledged that there are good reasons for federal courts to avoid these types of lawsuits, one of which is the Executive Branch’s discretion in deciding whom to arrest or prosecute, which falls under its constitutional Article II powers. Additionally, the courts generally lack the standards to judge the appropriateness of such enforcement decisions, which can be influenced by various factors like resource constraints and public safety needs. This conclusion does not mean that federal courts can never handle cases involving the Executive Branch's decisions about arrests or prosecutions. Indeed, certain circumstances might warrant a different standing analysis; for instance, if there are claims of selective prosecution based on discrimination, or if Congress has explicitly made certain injuries legally recognizable.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the states lack standing not because of the “cognizable injury” aspect of standing, but because of the redressability requirement.

Justice Barrett authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined, also arguing that the case should be resolved on redressability grounds.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Texas does have standing.

[21-1158] Percoco v. United States Nov 28, 2022

Percoco v. United States

Argued on Nov 28, 2022.
Decided on May 11, 2023.

Petitioner: Joseph Percoco.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Jacob M. Roth (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2012, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo launched an initiative, known as the “Buffalo Billion” initiative, to develop the greater Buffalo area. Alain Kaloyeros strategically secured a highly influential role in the initiative and used that role to award contracts to certain developers of his choosing based on his knowledge and control over the process. Once the scheme came to light, the participants were charged and convicted of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud. In 2018, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and the defendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying lengths.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, relying on a “right-to-control theory” of wire fraud that allows for conviction on “a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information.”

Question

Can a private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking owe a fiduciary duty to the general public such that he can be convicted of honest-services fraud?

Conclusion

A private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking can be convicted of honest-services fraud, but in this case, the jury instructions leading to Percoco’s conviction were insufficiently definite. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The jury instruction in this case required the jury to determine whether Percoco had a “special relationship” with the government and had “dominated and controlled” government business. However, these concepts are too vague to allow ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch agreed with the majority but expressed concern over the vagueness of “honest-services fraud” more generally, regardless of what jury instruction might be provided.

[21-1170] Ciminelli v. United States Nov 28, 2022

Ciminelli v. United States

Argued on Nov 28, 2022.
Decided on May 11, 2023.

Petitioner: Louis Ciminelli.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Michael R. Dreeben (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Question

Does the Second Circuit’s “right to control” theory of fraud state a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute?

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory cannot form the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes because the right to control is not grounded in a traditional property interest. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The federal wire fraud statute prohibits the use of interstate wires for “any scheme or orifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” When the statute was enacted, the common understanding of the verb “to defraud” related to property rights. Although lower courts have interpreted the statute to include interests unconnected to traditional property rights, the Supreme Court in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), held that the statutes protect only individual property rights. The right-to-control theory has no roots in a traditional property interest and thus cannot be the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes.

[21-376] Haaland v. Brackeen Nov 09, 2022

Haaland v. Brackeen

Argued on Nov 9, 2022.

Petitioner: Deb Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al..
Respondent: Chat Everet Brackeen.

Advocates:

Matthew D. McGill (for Chad Everet Brackeen, et al.)
Judd E. Stone, II (for Texas)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the federal parties)
Ian H. Gershengorn (for the tribal parties)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a federal law enacted in 1978, restricts the removal of Native American children from their families and establishes a preference that Native children who are removed from their families be placed with extended family members or Native foster homes.

Several individuals and states filed a lawsuit challenging the law as violating constitutional anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment. The plaintiffs include several couples who wished to adopt or foster Native children, a woman who wished for her Native biological child to be adopted by non-Natives, and the states of Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana.

The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, striking down portions of the ICWA. The defendants appealed, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In a fractured ruling, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc upheld portions of the district court’s decision and reversed other portions.

Question

Do the Indian Child Welfare Act’s restrictions on placement of Native American children violate anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment?

[21-1168] Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. Nov 08, 2022

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 8, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2023.

Petitioner: Robert Mallory.
Respondent: Norfolk Southern Railway Co..

Advocates:

Ashley C. Keller (for the Petitioner)
Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondent)
Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Robert Mallory sued Norfolk Southern Railway Co. in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas for claims arising under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA). According to his complaint, Mallory was exposed to harmful carcinogens while employed by Defendant in Ohio and Virginia between 1988 through 2005. He did not allege that he suffered any harmful occupational exposures in Pennsylvania but sued in Pennsylvania court on a theory that the court could exercise jurisdiction over the Virginia company because it had registered to do business in Pennsylvania.

Under Pennsylvania law, a foreign corporation “may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers” with the Department of State of the Commonwealth. State law further establishes that registration constitutes a sufficient basis for Pennsylvania courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over that foreign corporation. Norfolk Southern Railway objected to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the exercise violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court agreed and held Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Does a state registration statute for out-of-state corporations that purports to confer general personal jurisdiction over the registrant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

A Pennsylvania law requiring out-of-state companies that register to do business in Pennsylvania to agree to appear in Pennsylvania courts on “any cause of action” against them comports with the Due Process Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the main opinion of the Court.

The outcome in this case is controlled by the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917), which held that suits based on the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction do not deny the defendant due process of law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded otherwise based on its erroneous belief that the Court had “implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). However, rather than displace Pennsylvania Fire, International Shoe merely paved an additional road to jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. Thus, the facts of this case fall squarely within Pennsylvania Fire, and there is no due process violation.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion noting another precedent, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), which she finds “particularly instructive.”

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito agreed with the plurality that exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the state registration statute does not violate the Due Process Clause, but he opined that the statute might be unconstitutional on other grounds not before the Court.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Brett Kavanaugh joined, arguing that compelled state registration does not constitute “consent.”

[21-806] Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski Nov 08, 2022

Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 8, 2022.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.

Petitioner: Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, et al..
Respondent: Gorgi Talevski.

Advocates:

Lawrence S. Robbins (for the Petitioners)
Thomas M. Fisher (for Indiana, et al., as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioners)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Andrew T. Tutt (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gorgi Talevski was living with dementia and receiving care at Valparaiso Care and Rehabilitation, a state-run nursing facility in Indiana. His wife, Ivanka Talevski, filed a lawsuit on behalf of her husband alleging that Valparaiso Care failed to provide Gorgi with adequate medical care, used psychotropic medications as unnecessary chemical restraint, and improperly discharged and transferred him, among other practices, in violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA).

The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, finding that FNHRA does not provide a private right of action that may be redressed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Section 1983 has a broad purpose of providing a remedy for federal statutory and constitutional violations.

Question

May a plaintiff file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, which was enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause power?

Conclusion

A plaintiff may file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

The Court first considered whether FNHRA can create rights enforceable through Section 1983. Section 1983 allows private parties to sue for deprivations of any any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. The phrase “and laws,” without modifiers, means that the rights at issue need not fall within a specific category (e.g., civil rights) or through a specific power of Congress.

The Court then considered whether FNHRA unambiguously created a right to be enforced via § 1983 and concluded that it does. A law unambiguously creates a right enforceable via § 1983 if “the provision in question is ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’ and contains ‘rights-creating,’ individual-centric language with an “unmistakable focus on the benefited class.” The provisions at issue here addressing unnecessary restraint and predischarge notice pass that stringent test; they unambiguously confer rights on residents of nursing-home facilities.

Finally, the Court considered whether FNHRA creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. While FNHRA does have a complex enforcement scheme, that scheme is not incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983 and does not suggest Congress intended to preclude § 1983 enforcement.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion to point out two questions the petitioners could have raised but did not and called for the resolution of those questions another time in another case.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, cautioning that while she agreed with the disposition in this particular case, courts must “tread carefully before concluding that Spending Clause statutes may be enforced through § 1983.”

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion arguing that laws passed pursuant to Congress’s spending power cannot secure rights within the meaning of § 1983.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that while FNHRA does create individual rights, the remedial scheme of the Act forecloses enforcement of those rights via § 1983.

[21-86] Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission Nov 07, 2022

Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 7, 2022.
Decided on Apr 14, 2023.

Petitioner: Axon Enterprise, Inc..
Respondent: Federal Trade Commission, et al..

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Axon Enterprises manufactures personal body cameras for law enforcement. In 2018, it acquired a competitor body camera company called Vievu. After the acquisition, the Federal Trade Commission informed Axon that the transaction raised antitrust concerns and that the Commission would be investigating.

At the end of 2019, the FTC informed Axon of its demands, which it could either accede or face administrative proceedings. Axon filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging that (1) the FTC’s administrative proceeding violates Axon’s Fifth Amendment due process rights, (2) the FTC’s structure violates Article II by providing improper insulation from the President, and (3) Axon’s acquisition of Vievu did not violate antitrust law.

The district court dismissed Axon’s complaint, holding that the FTC’s statutory scheme required Axon to raise its constitutional challenge first in the administrative proceeding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Congress impliedly barred jurisdiction in federal district court.

Question

Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedure, and existence, or must such challenges be raised first in the administrative proceeding?

Conclusion

Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC notwithstanding statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act (in 21-86) and the Securities Exchange Act (in 21-1239) did not preclude district courts’ ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to those agencies’ structure, procedure, or existence.

The Court considered three factors, known as the Thunder Basin factors, to determine whether particular claims concerning agency

action are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure,” and thus would preclude district court jurisdiction. The three factors are: (1) Could precluding district court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim? (2) Is the claim “wholly collateral” to the statute’s review provisions? (3) Is the claim “outside the agency’s expertise”?

The Court concluded that all three factors supported the conclusion that district courts retained subject-matter jurisdiction.

First, preclusion of district court jurisdiction “could foreclose all meaningful judicial review” because Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over.

Second, the claims are “wholly collateral” to the statutes’ review provisions because challenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either the enforcement-related matters the Commissions regularly adjudicate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against Axon and Cochran.

Finally, the claims are outside the agencies’ expertise because neither specializes in constitutional issues like separation of powers.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to express “grave doubts about the constitutional propriety of Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary authority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferential judicial review on the back end.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that he would reach the same conclusion as the majority by applying only 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts.

[21-1239] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cochran Nov 07, 2022

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cochran

Argued on Nov 7, 2022.
Decided on Apr 14, 2023.

Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission, et al..
Respondent: Michelle Cochran.

Advocates:

Gregory G. Garre (for Michelle Cochran)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the SEC, et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In April 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Michelle Cochran, a certified public accountant, alleging that she had failed to comply with federal auditing standards. After a hearing, an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed that Cochran had violated federal law, fined her $22,500, and banned her from practicing before the SEC for five years. The SEC adopted the ALJ’s decision, and Cochran objected.

Before the SEC could rule on Cochran’s objection, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, in which it held that SEC ALJs are officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause, who must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head. In response to that ruling, the SEC remanded all pending administrative cases for new proceedings before constitutionally appointed ALJs, including Cochran’s.

Cochran filed a lawsuit in federal district court arguing that while Lucia may have addressed one constitutional issue with ALJs, it left uncorrected another problem: because SEC ALJs enjoy multiple layers of "for-cause" removal protection, they are unconstitutionally insulated from the President's Article II removal power. The district court dismissed Cochran’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a reading of the Exchange Act as implicitly stripping district courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to ongoing SEC enforcement proceedings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed as to that interpretation of the Exchange Act.

Question

Does a federal district court have jurisdiction to consider claims challenging the constitutionality of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s administrative proceedings?

Conclusion

The Court considered three factors, known as the Thunder Basin factors, to determine whether particular claims concerning agency

The Court concluded that all three factors supported the conclusion that district courts retained subject-matter jurisdiction.

Finally, the claims are outside the agencies’ expertise because neither specializes in constitutional issues like separation of powers.

[21-1195] Bittner v. United States Nov 02, 2022

Bittner v. United States

Argued on Nov 2, 2022.
Decided on Feb 28, 2023.

Petitioner: Alexandru Bittner.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Alexandru Bittner erroneously failed to report his interests in foreign bank accounts on annual FBAR forms, as required by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA). The government fined him $2.72 million—$10,000 for each unreported account each year from 2007 to 2011. Bittner challenged the fine, and the district court reduced the assessment to $50,000, holding that the $10,000 maximum penalty attaches to each failure to file an annual FBAR, not to each failure to report an account. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on this issue, holding that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation subject to penalty.

Question

Is a “violation” under the Bank Secrecy Act the failure to file an annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (no matter the number of foreign accounts), or is there a separate violation for each individual account that was not properly reported?

Conclusion

The Bank Secrecy Act’s $10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Bittner was subject to a fine only for each report he failed to file, not for each account he failed to report over that five-year period.

The plain language of Section 5321 addresses the legal duty to file reports, not of individual accounts or their number. The penalty the statute prescribes for nonwillful violations must therefore be based on the number of reports, not on the number of accounts. In contrast, for willful violations, the statute expressly considers a penalty on a per-account basis. The government’s guidance as to these provisions, as well as the drafting history, further support this understanding.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that “the most natural reading of the statute establishes that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation.”

[21-846] Cruz v. Arizona Nov 01, 2022

Cruz v. Arizona

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 1, 2022.
Decided on Feb 22, 2023.

Petitioner: John Montenegro Cruz.
Respondent: Arizona.

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner)
Joseph A. Kanefield (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2005, a jury convicted John Montenegro Cruz of first-degree murder for the 2003 killing of a Tucson police officer and sentenced Cruz to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Cruz’s conviction and sentence, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.

In 2012, Cruz filed a petition in state court for post-conviction relief, which the court dismissed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review.

In 2014, Cruz initiated federal habeas proceedings. In 2016, while those proceedings were ongoing, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch II), holding that the Arizona Supreme Court had misapplied precedent. Cruz then filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. Ordinarily that second petition would be barred, but state law provides for an exception if there was an intervening “significant change in the the law.” Cruz argued that the decision in Lynch II was a signficant change in the law, that it applies retroactively, and would probably overturn his sentence.

The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that Lynch II was not a significant change in the law and was instead based on precedent well established at the time the defendant was convicted and sentenced.

Question

Is the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling that a state rule of criminal procedure precluded post-conviction relief an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment against him, thereby precluding review by a federal court?

Conclusion

The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding below is not an adequate state-law ground supporting that judgment and thus does not preclude federal court review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

If the judgment of a state court rests on “adequate and independent state-law grounds,” the Supreme Court will not decide a simultaneously presented question of federal law. Generally, a state’s procedural ruling is adequate to foreclose a review of a federal claim.

The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision holding that Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613, did not represent a “significant change in the law,” as it was entirely new and conflicted with existing state law. Because the interpretation was so novel and unforeseeable, it cannot constitute an adequate state procedural ground.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Court should have given the “utmost deference” to the state court’s interpretation of its own precedent and that it failed to do so.

[21-857] Jones v. Hendrix Nov 01, 2022

Jones v. Hendrix

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 1, 2022.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.

Petitioner: Marcus DeAngelo Jones.
Respondent: Dewayne Hendrix.

Advocates:

Daniel R. Ortiz (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting affirmance)
Morgan L. Ratner (court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A jury convicted Marcus DeAngelo Jones of one count of making false statements to acquire a firearm and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. Jones appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jones then filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it was illegally imposed. The district court denied his motion, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that Jones’s counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the two felon-in-possession counts as duplicative. The district court vacated one of his felon-in-possession convictions and resentenced him.

In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to convict someone under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew both that he had a prohibited status and that he possessed a firearm. Because Jones had been convicted of this offense without proof that he knew he had a prohibited status, he filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed his petition, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

May a federal inmate who did not challenge their conviction on the ground that the statute did not criminalize their activity subsequently apply for habeas relief after the Supreme Court retroactively invalidates the circuit precedent on which the inmate relied in not challenging their conviction?

Conclusion

Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a §2241 habeas petition. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The majority first clarified the relationship between §2255 and §2241 in the context of federal prisoners challenging their sentences. Congress introduced §2255 to allow prisoners to challenge their sentences in the sentencing court, rather than through a habeas corpus petition under §2241. While the saving clause in §2255(e) preserved access to §2241 in specific situations, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) added restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions. The saving clause does not permit prisoners to circumvent AEDPA's restrictions, even if they are challenging a new interpretation of a criminal statute.

The majority found unpersuasive arguments by both Jones and the federal government regarding when §2255 might be considered “inadequate or ineffective,” thus allowing recourse to §2241. AEDPA’s restrictions reflect Congress’s deliberate choice to balance finality with error correction in the justice system.

Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan jointly dissented, arguing that Jones presents the precise type of mismatch contemplated in §2255(h) and would those remand for the lower courts to consider his claim under the proper framework.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion arguing that §2255 requires that Jones’s petition alleging legal innocence should have been considered on the merits.

[20-1199] Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College Oct 31, 2022

Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College

Argued on Oct 31, 2022.

Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc..
Respondent: President & Fellows of Harvard College.

Advocates:

Cameron T. Norris (for the Petitioner)
Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondent)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued Harvard College over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against Asian American applicants in favor of white applicants. Harvard admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.

After a 15-day bench trial, the district court issued a detailed opinion in favor of Harvard. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at the University of North Carolina under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, but the Court severed the cases.

Question

May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions?

If so, does Harvard College’s race-conscious admissions process violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

[21-707] Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina Oct 31, 2022

Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 31, 2022.
Decided on Jun 29, 2023.

Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc..
Respondent: University of North Carolina, et al..

Advocates:

Patrick Strawbridge (for the Petitioner)
Ryan Y. Park (for the University Respondents)
David G. Hinojosa (for the Student Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued the University of North Carolina (UNC) over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates the Fourteenth Amendment by using race as a factor in admissions. UNC admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.

After an eight-day bench trial and litigation that spanned nearly seven years, the district court ruled that UNC’s admissions policy survived strict scrutiny and was consistent with Grutter v. Bollinger. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed to hold the case in abeyance after the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at Harvard University under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the Court subsequently severed the two cases.

Question

May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions?

If so, does UNC’s race-conscious admissions process violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

Conclusion

The University of North Carolina admissions program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

First the Court concluded that Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) had organizational standing because is a voluntary membership organization with identifable members who support its mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith.

Second, while the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was to ensure that laws apply equally to everyone, regardless of race, both the Supreme Court and the nation failed to uphold this principle, most notably in Plessy v. Ferguson, which sanctioned “separate but equal” facilities. However, the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education overturned this, and the equal protection principle has since expanded to various areas of life. Any exceptions to equal protection must satisfy “strict scrutiny”; that is, the government must show that the racial classification serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion became the touchstone for evaluating the constitutionality of race-based admissions, reasoning that diversity in the student body could be a “compelling state interest,” but that race could only be used as a “plus” in admissions and not as a quota. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court adopted Powell's viewpoint, while also setting limits to ensure race-based admissions did not result in stereotyping or harm to non-minority applicants, and stating that such race-based programs should eventually come to an end.

Harvard’s (and UNC’s, in the consolidated case) race-based admissions systems fail to meet the strict scrutiny, non-stereotyping, and termination criteria established by Grutter and Bakke. Specifically, the universities could not demonstrate their compelling interests in a measurable way, failed to avoid racial stereotypes, and did not offer a logical endpoint for when race-based admissions would cease. As a result, the programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court noted that nothing prohibits universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life, so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the university.

Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh each wrote a concurring opinion.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined (except Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case against Harvard).

Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissenting opinion.

[21-869] Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith Oct 12, 2022

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 12, 2022.
Decided on May 18, 2023.

Petitioner: Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc..
Respondent: Lynn Goldsmith, et al..

Advocates:

Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)
Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Artist Andy Warhol created a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations (“Prince Series”) based on a copyrighted 1981 photograph of the musician Prince, taken by Lynn Goldsmith. Warhol made some aesthetic changes to Goldsmith’s original photograph, but they remained “recognizably derived” from the original.

Goldsmith sued the Andy Warhol Foundation, successor to Warhol’s copyright in the Prince Series, for copyright infringement. The Foundation raised fair use as a defense. The district court granted summary judgment for the Foundation, concluding that Warhol had “transformed” the original photograph by giving it a new “meaning and message.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, holding that because the Prince Series remained “recognizably derived” from the original, it failed to transform and was thus not fair use.

Question

What is the proper test for whether a work is “transformative” under the first factor of the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine?

Conclusion

The “purpose and character” of the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF)’s particular commercial use of Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of the musician Prince does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

The fair use defense to copyright infringement promotes creativity by recognizing that some secondary works make unauthorized use of original works but serve a different purpose, add new expression, or convey new ideas. Andy Warhol’s “Orange Prince,” one of the Prince Series that was derived from the photograph by Lynn Goldsmith, appeared on the cover of a Vanity Fair magazine commemorating the late musician for a fee of $10,000—all of which to AWF and of which Goldsmith received none. In contrast, Goldsmith’s photographs were licensed and used on several other magazine covers commemorating Prince.

AWF’s use of Orange Prince on the cover of Vanity Fair served essentially the same commercial purpose as Goldsmith’s original. Thus, the first fair-use factor—the purpose and character of use, including whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit purpose—weighs against the conclusion that AWF’s use of Goldsmith’s photograph for the specific purpose of a magazine cover commemorating Prince was fair.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, emphasizing the narrowness of the majority’s opinion and its appropriate focus on the specific use challenged.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, criticizing the majority of stifling creativity and disregarding the reality that creativity relies upon the borrowing of works that came before.

[21-984] Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt Oct 12, 2022

Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 12, 2022.
Decided on Feb 22, 2023.

Petitioner: Helix Energy Solutions, et al..
Respondent: Michael J. Hewitt.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Edwin Sullivan (for the Respondent)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Michael J. Hewitt worked on an offshore oil rig managing other employees. His employer, Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., paid Hewitt based solely on a daily rate, and he often was required to work well over forty hours per week.

Hewitt sued Helix for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Helix argued that it was not required to pay Hewitt overtime because Hewitt was a “highly compensated employee,” and highly compensated employees are exempt from overtime pay. Hewitt argued that because his pay was calculated on a daily rate, he was not paid on a salary basis and thus was entitled to overtime pay regardless of the dollar amount he was paid.

The district court ruled for Helix, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.

Question

Is a supervisor who makes over $200,000 annually, calculated on a daily basis, entitled to overtime pay, despite a regulation that carves out an exception for highly paid executives?

Conclusion

Daily-rate workers, of whatever income level, qualify as paid on a salary basis only if they satisfy the three conditions outlined in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Hewitt was not an executive exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay guarantee.

Under the FLSA, an employee is considered a bona fide executive excluded from the FLSA’s protections if the employee meets three tests: (1) the salary basis test, which requires that the employee receive a predetermined and fixed salary that does not vary with the amount of time worked; (2) the “salary level” test, which requires the preset salary to exceed a specified amount; and (3) the job “duties” test, which considers whether the employee has responsibility for managing the enterprise, directing other employees, and hiring and firing other employees. It was undisputed that Hewitt satisfied (2) and (3); at issue was whether he was paid on a salary basis.

Under Section 602(a), an employee is paid on a salary basis if they regularly receive each pay period on a weekly or less frequent basis. Under the plain meaning of that provision, it does not apply to daily-rate workers. Hewitt’s pay, in contrast, was determined on a daily basis, despite receiving paychecks every two weeks. Because he did not satisfy the first part of the test, he was not an exempt executive within the FLSA and was thus entitled to overtime pay.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted because the issue originally presented was different from the issue argued and addressed.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that Hewitt was a bona fide executive based on his salary level and duties, and the fact that he was certain to make at least $963 per week for any week he worked.

[21-468] National Pork Producers Council v. Ross Oct 11, 2022

National Pork Producers Council v. Ross

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 11, 2022.
Decided on May 11, 2023.

Petitioner: National Pork Producers Council, et al..
Respondent: Karen Ross, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the California Department of Food & Agriculture, et al..

Advocates:

Timothy S. Bishop (for the Petitioners)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Michael J. Mongan (for the State Respondents)
Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the Humane Society of the United States, et al., Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2018, California voters passed Proposition 12, which amends the California Health and Safety Code to prohibit the sale of pork from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Trade associations representing the pork industry and farmers challenged the law as violating the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce or imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce.

According to the challengers, Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that it causes an impermissible “extraterritorial effect” because it effectively forces all or most hog farmers, regardless of their location, to comply with the California requirements yet mostly affects non-California transactions (because 87% of the pork produced in the country is consumed outside of California).

The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the complaint did not plausibly plead that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause under either theory.

Question

Does a California law that prohibits the in-state sale of pork from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards violate the “dormant” component of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

California’s Proposition 12 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

State laws violate the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause when they seek to “build up…domestic commerce” through “burdens upon the industry and business of other States.” An antidiscrimination principle is at the core of the dormant Commerce Clause; an “almost per se” rule against state laws that have extraterritorial effects is unsupported. A state law that does have extraterritorial effects but does not purposefully discriminate does not necessarily violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Under the balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), a court must assess “the burden imposed on interstate commerce” by the state law and prevent its enforcement if the law’s burdens are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” A majority of the Court concluded that under this test, Proposition 12 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, concluded that the petitioners failed to plausibly allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce and thus voted with the majority. Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett, concluded that the petitioners did allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce, but the benefits and burdens of Proposition 12 are incommensurable.

Chief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion, joined by Justices Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the petitioners did allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce and that the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to the court below to decide whether the petitioners had stated a claim under Pike.

Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely agreeing with the Chief Justice but pointing out also that state economic regulations like California’s Proposition 12 may raise questions not only under the Commerce Clause, but also under the Import-Export Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

[21-442] Reed v. Goertz Oct 11, 2022

Reed v. Goertz

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 11, 2022.
Decided on Apr 18, 2023.

Petitioner: Rodney Reed.
Respondent: Bryan Goertz, et al..

Advocates:

Parker Rider-Longmaid (for the Petitioner)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Rodney Reed was sentenced to death in Texas for the 1996 rape and murder of Stacey Stites. He unsuccessfully sought federal post-conviction relief, and when the state asked to set an execution date, Reed requested to have DNA testing conducted on several items on or near the victim’s body. A state trial court declined his request. Reed then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Texas law governing post-conviction DNA testing. The district court dismissed his claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that Reed’s claims are barred by the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begins to run as soon as the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury.”

Question

When does the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begin to run?

Conclusion

When a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begins to run when the state litigation ends. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that, in Reed’s case, the statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim began when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, not when the state trial court denied DNA testing.

A statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action.” When that occurs depends on the cause of action. The violation of procedural due process rights, as Reed alleged in this case, requires two elements: (1) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (2) inadequate state process. Thus, a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action” for a procedural due process violation not at the time of deprivation, but at the time the state fails to provide due process. In Reed’s case, the State’s alleged failure to provide him with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted liberty interest in DNA testing.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case for lack of standing. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case on the finding that Reed’s action presents no original Article III case or controversy between him and the district attorney.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that there are a number of points in the case at which the statute of limitations could begin to run—all before the denial by the Criminal Court of Appeals, and all leading to the conclusion that Reed’s claim is time-barred.

[21-432] Arellano v. McDonough Oct 04, 2022

Arellano v. McDonough

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 4, 2022.
Decided on Jan 23, 2023.

Petitioner: Adolfo R. Arellano.
Respondent: Dennis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

Advocates:

James R. Barney (for the Petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Adolfo R. Arellano served honorably in the Navy from November 1977 to October 1981. On June 3, 2011—more than 30 years after he was discharged—he applied for disability benefits on the basis of psychiatric disorders that rendered him 100% disabled. He sought retroactive benefits from the day after his discharge, arguing that the one-year filing deadline to submit disability claims should be extended in his case because his mental illness had prevented him from filing his claim earlier.

The VA Regional Office granted his claim, but only from the date the claim was received. The Board of Appeals rejected his argument, and the Veterans Court affirmed that decision, concluding that Mr. Arellano's claim was “squarely foreclosed by binding precedent” in Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which held that principles of equitable tolling are not applicable to the time period in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1).

Question

Can the one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged be extended under principles of equitable tolling?

Conclusion

The one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged cannot be extended under principles of equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barret authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that the effective date of Arellano’s award of disability compensation was the day the VA received his claim.

Equitable tolling can extend a deadline when a litigant diligently pursues their rights but is nonetheless prevented from bringing a timely action due to extraordinary circumstances. Courts presume that equitable tolling applies, but that presumption is rebuttable by evidence that it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The default rule of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1) establishes that the day VA receives a claim is the effective date, subject to the limited exception in § 5110(b)(1), which states that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.” Moreover, the structure of § 5110, which sets out 16 exceptions that explain when each type of benefits qualifies for an effective date earlier than the default, suggests Congress intended only certain enumerated exceptions to the default date. This statutory language and structure indicate Congress’s intent that principles of equitable tolling not apply.

[21-1086] Allen v. Milligan Oct 04, 2022

Allen v. Milligan

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 4, 2022.
Decided on Jun 8, 2023.

Appellant: Wes Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al..
Appellee: Evan Milligan, et al..

Advocates:

Edmund G. Lacour, Jr. (for the Appellants/Petitioners)
Deuel Ross (for the Appellees)
Abha Khanna (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Appellees/Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

After the 2020 census, Alabama created a redistricting plan for its seven seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. One of the districts in the plan is a majority-Black district. Registered voters and several organizations challenged the map, arguing that the state had illegally packed Black voters into a single district while dividing other clusters of Black voters across multiple districts. The challengers alleged that the map effectively minimizes the number of districts in which Black voters can elect their chosen candidates, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which bans racial discrimination in voting policies.

A three-judge district court agreed with the challengers that the map likely violated Section 2 of the VRA, granting a preliminary injunction that ordered the state to draw a new map. Alabama asked the U.S. Supreme Court to freeze the district court’s injunction, which the Court did by a 5-4 decision pending a merits decision.

Question

Does Alabama’s 2021 redistricting plan for its seven U.S. House seats violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

Conclusion

The district court correctly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to conclude that Alabama’s redistricting map likely violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) sets out a three-part framework for evaluating claims brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. First, the plaintiffs must prove that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district (measured by criteria such as contiguity and compactness). Second, the plaintiffs must show that the minority group is politically cohesive. Third, the plaintiffs must show that under the totality of the circumstances, the political process is not “equally open” to minority voters.

The majority applied that three-part framework to the facts in the record and agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their challenge. The plaintiffs submitted maps demonstrating the traditional districting criteria, and the district court found “no serious dispute” that Black voters are politically cohesive or that the challenged districts’ white majority consistently defeated Black voters’ preferred candidates.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion except for a discussion of the difference between race-consciousness and race-predominance. He concurred separately to emphasize and clarify four additional points.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in full, and Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Samuel Alito joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that Section 2 of the VRA does not require Alabama to redraw its congressional districts so that Black voters can control a number of seats proportional to Black voters in its population.

Justice Alito authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Gorsuch joined arguing that the majority’s understanding of Gingles—specifically its understanding of the phrase “reasonably configured” within the context of the first precondition—is flawed, and that a correct understanding would lead to a different result in this case.

[21-454] Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency Oct 03, 2022

Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 3, 2022.
Decided on May 25, 2023.

Petitioner: Michael Sackett and Chantelle Sackett.
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency.

Advocates:

Damien M. Schiff (for the Petitioners)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Michael and Chantall Sackett own a residential lot near Priest Lake, Idaho, and want to build a home there. However, shortly after they began placing sand and gravel, the federal Environmental Protection Agency told them that they could not build on their lot because construction on the land violated the Clean Water Act. According to the EPA, the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands that qualify as “navigable waters” regulated by the Act, so they needed to remove the sand and gravel and restore the property to its natural state.

Litigation ensued, and in 2012, the Supreme Court permitted the Sacketts to litigate their challenge to the EPA’s order in federal court. During the litigation, the EPA removed its compliance order.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA’s withdrawal of the compliance order did not render the Sacketts’ challenge moot and that the EPA does have jurisdiction over their property under the Clean Water Act. The court reasoned that, under binding circuit precedent, “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.”

Question

What is the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act?

Conclusion

The Clean Water Act extends only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with “waters” of the United States—i.e., with a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment reversing and remanding.

In 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers, which jointly enforce the Clean Water Act, initially defined “the waters of the United States” differently. By 1980, they had adopted identical definitions, which encompassed “all waters that could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” Since then, they have repeatedly sought to define and redefine “waters of the United States” through rulemaking procedures.

Despite this history, the Court found that the meaning of “waters” in the CWA encompasses “only those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water.” The mere presence of water is too broad; such a definition would include puddles and isolated ponds. Thus, wetlands are not per se “waters of the United States”; rather, only those with a continuous surface connection to traditional navigable waters fall within that category.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion in full but concurred separately, along with Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing the importance of curbing the expansion of federal authority through agency action.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh disagreed with the Court’s “continuous surface connection” test because, in his view, it “departs from the statutory text, from 45 years of consistent agency practice,” and from the Court’s own precedents.

Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Kagan lamented that, in her opinion, the majority “substitutes its own ideas about policymaking for Congress’s.”

[22O145] Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Oct 03, 2022

Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin

Argued on Oct 3, 2022.
Decided on Feb 28, 2023.

Petitioner: State of Delaware.
Respondent: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Wisconsin.

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (for Delaware)
Nicholas J. Bronni (for Arkansas et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

MoneyGram Payments Systems, which is headquartered in Delaware, returns unclaimed checks to that state. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin argue that the checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments,” which federal law requires to go to the states where they were purchased.

Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over interstate disputes, Delaware filed the case directly in the Supreme Court. The Court appointed a special master, who concluded that MoneyGram’s checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus should go to the states where they were purchased. Delaware asked the Court to review the Special Master’s findings for error.

Question

Are unclaimed MoneyGram checks “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to a federal law that remits them to the states where they were purchased?

Conclusion

Unclaimed MoneyGram checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to the Federal Disposition Act, which remits them to the states where they were purchased. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous as to its conclusion (but only 5-4 as to the discussion of legislative history supporting that conclusion).

The unclaimed checks at issue in this case are sufficiently similar to “money orders” to fall within the Federal Disposition Act (FDA) for two main reasons. First, they are similar in function in operation because they are prepaid financial instruments used to transmit a specified amount of money to a named payee. Second, because of the recordkeeping practices of the entity issuing and holding on to the prepaid funds, it would be inequitable for unclaimed checks to go to the state where the creditor is incorporated, as common law would require. For these reasons, the FDA, not the common law, applies to unclaimed MoneyGram checks.

[21-429] Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta Apr 27, 2022

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 27, 2022.
Decided on Jun 29, 2022.

Petitioner: State of Oklahoma.
Respondent: Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta.

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)
Zachary C. Schauf (for the Respondent)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, a non-Native, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of child neglect, and he was sentenced to 35 years. The victim, his stepdaughter, is Native American, and the crime was committed within the Cherokee Reservation.

Castro-Huerta challenged his conviction, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that states cannot prosecute crimes committed on Native American lands without federal approval. Oklahoma argued that McGirt involved a Native defendant, whereas Castro-Huerta is non-Native, so McGirt does not bar his prosecution by the state.

Question

Do states have the authority to prosecute non-Natives who commit crimes against Natives on Native American lands?

Conclusion

The federal government and the state have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The Court has held that States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against non-Natives on Native American lands. Native American land is not separate from state territory. And States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Native American land unless preempted. Preemption may occur either under ordinary principles of federal preemption, or when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government. Neither is present in this case, so states have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s decision reneges on the federal government’s centuries-old promise that tribes would remain forever free from interference by state authorities.

[21-511] Shoop v. Twyford Apr 26, 2022

Shoop v. Twyford

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 26, 2022.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.

Petitioner: Tim Shoop, Warden.
Respondent: Raymond Twyford.

Advocates:

Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
David A. O'Neil (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1993, an Ohio jury convicted Raymond Twyford of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. Twyford unsuccessfully pursued direct appeals and also filed a federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Twyford asked the federal district court to allow him to undergo neurological imaging to substantiate allegations of neurological problems due to childhood abuse, neglect, and injuries. The district court granted Twyford’s motion and ordered the prison warden to transport Twyford for his neurological imaging because the results might assist the court in exercising its habeas review. The warden appealed the order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

May a federal district court order the transportation of a state prisoner to help him develop evidence for his habeas petition, even before determining the admissibility of the evidence?

Conclusion

A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.

A federal court may never needlessly prolong a habeas case. For that reason, before a federal court may admit new evidence, either the claim must rely on a new and previously unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactively available by the Supreme Court, or it must rely on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

In this case, the court granted Twyford’s request for transportation under the All Writs Act. But the All Writs Act cannot be used to circumvent binding procedural rules. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is the source of binding rules and limits review to the record that was before the state court. The district court’s failure to determine how Twyford’s request for transportation would aid the adjudication of his habeas petition before granting the request was thus erroneous.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the state’s interlocutory appeal.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion stating that he would dismiss the case as improvidently granted.

[21-954] Biden v. Texas Apr 26, 2022

Biden v. Texas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 26, 2022.
Decided on Jun 30, 2022.

Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al..
Respondent: State of Texas, et al..

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2018, the Trump administration announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs), under which policy certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border of the United States were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. Known as the “remain in Mexico” policy, the MPPs faced legal challenges shortly after their enactment, but the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to enforce it.

In June 2021, the Biden administration sought to end the policy, but Texas and Missouri challenged that effort, arguing that rescinding the policy violated federal immigration law and that the policy change violated the Administrative Procedure Act. A federal district court agreed with the challengers and ordered the Biden administration to implement the MPPs in good faith or initiate new agency action in compliance with the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to block the lower court’s ruling, as did the Supreme Court.

In October 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new decision ending the policy supported by a memorandum explaining the decision. A district court again ordered DHS to continue the CPPs, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the order. The Biden administration sought expedited review as to whether federal immigration law requires it to maintain the policy and whether the October decision to end the policy has any legal effect.

Question

Must the Biden administration continue to enforce the Trump administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols, or does the Biden Department of Homeland Security decision ending the policy have legal effect?

Conclusion

The Government’s rescission of Migrant Protection Protocols did not violate section 1225 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the then-Secretary of Homeland Security’s October 29 Memoranda constituted valid final agency action. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion.

Although the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue its injunction, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the case. By using the word “may,” Section 1225(b)(2)(C) confers a discretionary authority to return nonresidents to Mexico. Historical context confirms this understanding. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) was added to the statute more than 90 years after the mandatory language that appears in a nearby provision. And since its enactment, every presidential administration has interpreted section 1225(b)(2)(C) as purely discretionary. Interpreting the provision as mandatory would impose a significant burden upon the Executive’s ability to conduct diplomatic relations with Mexico, which Congress likely did not intend. Once the district court vacated the original attempt to rescind the policy, DHS properly “issue[d] a new rescission bolstered by new reasons” absent from the original rescission.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch joined.

[21-418] Kennedy v. Bremerton School District Apr 25, 2022

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 25, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2022.

Petitioner: Joseph A. Kennedy.
Respondent: Bremerton School District.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Richard B. Katskee (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, engaged in prayer with a number of students during and after school games. His employer, the Bremerton School District, asked that he discontinue the practice in order to protect the school from a lawsuit based on violation of the Establishment Clause. Kennedy refused and instead rallied local and national television, print media, and social media to support him.

Kennedy sued the school district for violating his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that because the school district suspended him solely because of the risk of constitutional liability associated with his religious conduct, its actions were justified. Kennedy appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is a public school employee’s prayer during school sports activities protected speech, and if so, can the public school employer prohibit it to avoid violating the Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The District disciplined Coach Kennedy after three games in October 2015, in which he “pray[ed] quietly without his students.” In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s prayers, the District sought to restrict his actions because of their religious character, thereby burdening his right to free exercise. As to his free speech claim, the timing and circumstances of Kennedy’s prayers—during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities—confirm that Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. The District cannot show that its prohibition of Kennedy’s prayer serves a compelling purpose and is narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose.

The Court’s Lemon test, and the related endorsement test, are “abandoned,” replaced by a consideration of “historical practices and understandings.” Applying that test, there is no conflict between the constitutional commands of the First Amendment in this case.

Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito filed concurring opinions.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined.

[21-439] Nance v. Ward Apr 25, 2022

Nance v. Ward

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 25, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.

Petitioner: Michael Nance.
Respondent: Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections and Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison.

Advocates:

Matthew S. Hellman (for the Petitioner)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1993, Michael Wade Nance robbed a bank, and, in the process of fleeing, killed a person. In 1997, a jury convicted Nance of murder, and he was sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence and rejected a petition for collateral relief. Nance then filed a federal habeas petition; the district court denied the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Then, in 2020, Nance filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the State’s lethal-injection protocol was unconstitutional as applied to him because of two medical issues. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Nance’s complaint, concluding that it was untimely and failed to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that because the relief Nance sought implied the invalidity of his death sentence, his complaint must be construed as a habeas petition, and because he had already filed an earlier habeas petition, it was properly considered a “successive” petition, over which a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

Question

What is the proper legal procedure for a death-row inmate’s challenge to the method by which the state intends to execute?

Conclusion

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the procedural vehicle appropriate for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim even if an order granting the relief requested would necessitate a change in state law. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Both Section 1983 and the federal habeas statute allow a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” However, Section 1983 has an implicit exception for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus”—that is, relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” In two prior cases, the Court allowed a prisoner to bring a method-of-execution claim under Section 1983, but those cases did not require a change in state law, only in an agency’s uncodified protocol. In contrast, here, Nance’s requested relief would require Georgia to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by

firing squad. However, this requirement is not a substantial impediment, nor would it necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence. Thus, Section 1983 remains the proper vehicle for his method-of-execution claim.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Court erroneously considered the law as it could exist, rather than as it is. Justice Barrett argued that because the relief Nance requests precludes his execution under current state law, habeas is the proper vehicle for seeking that relief.

[21-499] Vega v. Tekoh Apr 20, 2022

Vega v. Tekoh

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 20, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.

Petitioner: Carlos Vega.
Respondent: Terence B. Tekoh.

Advocates:

Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Paul L. Hoffman (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Terence Tekoh worked as a patient transporter in a hospital in Los Angeles. After a patient accused him of sexual assault, hospital staff reported the allegation to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Carlos Vega went to the hospital to ask Tekoh some questions and to take Tekoh’s statement. Although the parties described vastly different accounts of the nature of the interaction between Tekoh and Vega, it is undisputed that Vega did not advise Tekoh of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him or taking his statement.

Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court, but a jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Following the acquittal on the criminal charge, Tekoh sued Vega under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Vega violated Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by taking his statement without first advising him of his Miranda rights.

Based on the district court’s instructions, a jury found for Vega. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Question

Is the use of an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal case sufficient to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action?

Conclusion

A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules requiring that police officers issue warnings before a custodial interrogation and disallowing the use of statements obtained in violation of those rules. A Miranda violation is not necessarily a Fifth Amendment violation. Expansion of Miranda rules to provide a right to sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would provide very little benefit and would impose substantial costs on the judicial system.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that the Court’s precedents recognize Miranda as conferring a constitutional right, and as such, violation of that constitutional right should be sufficient to support a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983.

[21-5726] Kemp v. United States Apr 19, 2022

Kemp v. United States

Argued on Apr 19, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.

Petitioner: Dexter Earl Kemp.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Dexter Kemp and several co-defendants were charged and convicted of drug and firearms offenses. Kemp and some of the co-defendants appealed, but their sentences were affirmed. Some of the co-defendants, without Kemp, filed petitions for rehearings, rehearings en banc, and certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Over a year later, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied his motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Kemp argued that his petition was timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.3, which provides that if a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court, the time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of the denial of rehearing. The court denied his motion, finding that it fell under Rule 60(b)(1) because it alleged the court made a “mistake,” and that such motions must be filed within one year.

Question

Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorize relief based on a district court’s error of law?

Conclusion

The term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law, but Kemp’s motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.

When the Rule was adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any “misconception,” “misunderstanding,” or “fault in opinion or judgment” as to any law or fact. The text, structure, and history of the Rule support the understanding that it applies to judicial mistakes, not just party mistakes.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion clarifying that the Court’s opinion does not disturb establish precedent or break new ground.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

[21-234] George v. McDonough Apr 19, 2022

George v. McDonough

Argued on Apr 19, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.

Petitioner: Kevin R. George.
Respondent: Denis R. McDonough.

Advocates:

Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kevin R. George and Michael B. Martin are both military veterans who sought and were denied disability benefits several decades ago based on the straightforward application of a regulation. Since then, the regulation was overturned, so George and Martin sought revision of those denial decisions based on the “clear and unmistakable error” (CUE) by the VA.

The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the motions, holding that it was not clear and unmistakable error to faithfully apply a regulation that existed at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Question

When the Department of Veterans Affairs denies a veteran’s claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of “clear and unmistakable error” that the veteran may invoke to challenge the VA’s decision?

Conclusion

The invalidation of a Department of Veterans Affairs regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief permitting revision of that decision based on “clear and unmistakable error.” Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The “clean and unmistakable error” doctrine evolved over several decades. Its history reveals that this category of error does not encompass a subsequent change in law or in interpretation of law. Because the invalidation of a prior regulation constitutes a “change in interpretation of law,” this type of error does not encompass a claim like George’s.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the history of “clear and unmistakable error” is not so clear as the majority suggests.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court erroneously excuses an agency’s departure from its statutory commands.

[21-441] Siegel v. Fitzgerald Apr 18, 2022

Siegel v. Fitzgerald

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 18, 2022.
Decided on Jun 6, 2022.

Petitioner: Alfred H. Siegel.
Respondent: John P. Fitzgerald, III.

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Curtis E. Gannon (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Since 1978, bankruptcy courts in the United States have operated under two programs for the handling of their proceedings — the Trustee program and the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Eighty-eight of the 94 judicial districts operate within the Trustee program, while the other districts (in Alabama and North Carolina) are under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. The former is part of the Department of Justice, while the latter is overseen by the Judicial Council of the United States.

Each program is also funded differently. The Bankruptcy Administrator program is funded by the judiciary's general budget, whereas the bankruptcy debtors in Trustee districts primarily fund the Trustee program. All Chapter 11 debtors, regardless of district, paid quarterly fees under a consistent formula until January 1, 2018, at which time the Trustee program experienced a funding deficit. To remedy that deficit, Congress passed the 2017 Amendment, which increased the quarterly fees for larger Chapter 11 cases in the Trustee program.

In 2008, Circuit City—then a national chain of consumer electronics retail stores throughout the United States—filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Virginia, which is a Trustee district. As part of its liquidation plan, Circuit City was to pay fees to the U.S. Trustee until the close of bankruptcy. However, after the quarterly fees increased, Circuit City refused to pay the increased fees, arguing that the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutional because it creates nonuniform bankruptcy laws in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled for the Circuit City trustee, finding the 2017 Amendment violated the Bankruptcy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Question

Does the 2017 Amendment (part of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act) violate the uniformity requirement of the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in districts under the U.S. Trustee program and not in those under the Bankruptcy Administrator program?

Conclusion

The 2017 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act, which imposed a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States, violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The 2017 Act increased fees differently for Chapter 11 debtors in different regions. That difference was due not to an external and geographically isolated need, but from Congress's creation of a dual bankruptcy system which allowed certain districts to opt into a system more favorable for debtors. The Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause does not permit Congress to treat identical debtors differently based on artificial distinctions Congress itself created. Thus, the 2017 Amendment violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.

[21-404] United States v. Washington Apr 18, 2022

United States v. Washington

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 18, 2022.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: State of Washington, et al..

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner)
Tera M. Heintz (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Hanford site was a federal nuclear production site in Washington State that operated between 1944 and 1989, producing substantial amounts of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste. The U.S. Department of Energy now oversees cleanup of the site, which is largely conducted by private contractors and subcontractors.

In 2018, Washington amended its state workers’ compensation laws specifically for these cleanup workers. The amended law creates a rebuttable presumption that certain conditions and cancers are occupational diseases.

The federal government challenged the law as violating the principle of intergovernmental immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for Washington, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a Washington state workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to certain federal workers in that state violate the principle of intergovernmental immunity?

Conclusion

Washington’s workers’ compensation law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it facially discriminates against the federal government and does not fall within the scope of the federal waiver of immunity. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The Supremacy Clause prohibits states from interfering with or controlling the operations of the federal government, also known as the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Washington’s law explicitly treats federal workers differently from state and private workers, and imposes costs upon the federal government that state and private entities do not bear. As such, it is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Contrary to Washington’s claims, no federal law “clearly and unambiguously” waives federal immunity from workers’ compensation laws.

[20-1573] Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana Mar 30, 2022

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 30, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.

Petitioner: Viking River Cruises, Inc..
Respondent: Angie Moriana.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Scott L. Nelson (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking River Cruises, Inc., and agreed to submit any dispute arising out of her employment to binding arbitration. Notwithstanding that agreement, Moriana sued Viking on behalf of herself and similarly situated workers under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Moriana relied on a 2014 decision by the California Supreme Court, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, which held arbitration agreements that waive the right to bring PAGA representative actions in any forum (such as the one between Moriana and Viking) are unenforceable. Viking moved to compel Moriana’s claims to arbitration, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis overruled Iskanian. The trial court denied Viking’s motion. The appellate court affirmed.

Question

Does the Federal Arbitration Act require enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims?

Conclusion

The Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to bring representative claims. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion holding that the FAA preempts the rule in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles to the extent that Iskanian precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.

The California Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian, holding unenforceable any arbitration agreement that waives the right to bring a PAGA representative action, presents parties with an impermissible choice: either arbitrate disputes using a form of class procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. The FAA protects bilateral arbitration from undue state interference. To the extent that Iskanian precludes bilateral arbitration, it is preempted by federal law.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the FAA does not apply to state-court proceedings.

[20-603] Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety Mar 29, 2022

Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 29, 2022.
Decided on Jun 29, 2022.

Petitioner: Le Roy Torres.
Respondent: Texas Department of Public Safety.

Advocates:

Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Leroy Torres enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1989. In 1998, he was employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) as a trooper, where he served until his deployment to Iraq in 2007. In 2008, he was honorably discharged and sought reemployment by DPS. However, due to a lung condition he acquired in Iraq, Torres requested employment with DPS in a position different from the one he held before. Instead, DPS offered Torres only a “temporary duty offer,” which he declined.

Torres sued DPS in 2017, alleging that the agency’s failure to offer him a job that would accommodate his disability violated the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which prohibits adverse employment actions against an employee based on the employee’s military service. The trial court ruled in favor of Torres, finding that USERRA properly abrogated DPS’s sovereign immunity under Congress’s constitutional war powers. The appellate court reversed.

Question

Did Congress properly abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)?

Conclusion

Congress properly exercised its power to raise and support the Armed Forces when it authorized private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court.

In PennEast, the Court held that Congress could, pursuant to its eminent domain power, authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting States because, upon entering the federal system, the States implicitly agreed that their “eminent domain power would yield to that of the Federal Government.” Under PennEast, the test for structural waiver is whether the federal power is “complete in itself, and the States consented to the exercise of that power—in its entirety—in the plan of the Convention.” Congress’s power to build and maintain the Armed Forces fits PennEast’s test. Thus, in joining together to form a Union, the States agreed to sacrifice their sovereign immunity for the good of the common defense.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined.

[21-309] Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon Mar 28, 2022

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 28, 2022.
Decided on Jun 6, 2022.

Petitioner: Southwest Airlines Co..
Respondent: Latrice Saxon.

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner)
Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Latrice Saxon is a ramp supervisor, which entails managing and assisting workers to load and unload airplane cargo for Southwest Airlines. Unlike ramp agents, supervisors like Saxon are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and instead are required to arbitrate wage disputes, in accordance with their employment contract.

Notwithstanding the arbitration requirement, Saxon, on behalf of herself and other ramp supervisors, sued Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay overtime work. Southwest moved to stay the suit pending arbitration, or to dismiss it altogether in light of the arbitration agreement. Saxon argued that the Arbitration Act did not apply to her lawsuit because she and other ramp supervisors were “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt under Section 1 of the Act.

The district court ruled for Southwest, finding that a transportation worker must actually transport goods, not merely handle them at one end or the other of a network. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, and thus Saxon and the class of workers she represents are exempt from the Act.

Question

Is an airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the Arbitration Act and therefore exempt from the Act’s arbitration requirement?

Conclusion

An airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor, frequently loading and unloading airplane cargo, belongs to the “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and is therefore exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act’s arbitration requirement. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous 8-0 opinion of the Court.

The “class of workers” language of Section 1 refers not to what Southwest does generally, but what Saxon, as a worker, does specifically: physically loading and unloading cargo on and off airplanes. This work qualifies as being “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” as these workers are directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders. Thus, Saxon falls within Section 1’s exception.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[20-807] LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company Mar 28, 2022

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

Argued on Mar 28, 2022.
Decided on Apr 28, 2022.

Petitioner: Bradley LeDure.
Respondent: Union Pacific Railroad Company.

Advocates:

David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
J. Scott Ballenger (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Bradley LeDure is a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In August 2016, LeDure reported for work at a rail yard in Salem, Illinois, to assemble a train for a trip to Dexter, Missouri. Three locomotives were coupled together on a sidetrack, and LeDure decided only one locomotive would be powered on. On an exterior walkway on his way to shut down one of the locomotives, LeDure slipped and fell down the steps. Upon investigation, LeDure noticed a “slick” substance, which Union Pacific later reported to be a “small amount of oil” on the walkway.

LeDure sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Locomotive Inspection Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, arguing that Union Pacific failed to maintain the walkway free of hazards. The district court dismissed LeDure’s claims, finding the locomotive was not “in use” and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, and LeDure’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable because they resulted from a small “slick spot” unknown to Union Pacific. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is a train that makes a temporary stop in a railyard as part of its unitary journey in interstate commerce “in use” and therefore subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act?

Conclusion

The judgment of the Seventh Circuit, affirming that the train was not "in use" and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[21-401] ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. Mar 23, 2022

ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.

Argued on Mar 23, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.

Petitioner: ZS Automotive US, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Luxshare, Ltd..

Advocates:

Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners in 21-401)
Joseph T. Baio (for the Petitioners in 21-518)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Andrew R. Davies (for the Respondent in 21-401)
Alexander A. Yanos (for the Respondent in 21-518)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In August 2017, Luxshare entered into a large-scale business deal with ZF Automotive US, and the deal closed in April 2018. Luxshare allegedly discovered that ZF fraudulently concealed certain material facts, inflating the purchase price.

The parties’ purchase agreement required that all disputes be settled by three arbitrators in Germany, and Luxshare intended to bring claims for the losses as a result of ZF’s allegedly wrongful conduct. However, it first sought to obtain discovery from ZF and its senior officers and asked a federal district court to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a).

Question

Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which gives federal district courts authority to order litigants subject to their jurisdiction to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a foreign or international tribunal,” apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals?

Conclusion

Although 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) permits a district court to order discovery “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body may qualify as such a tribunal, and the arbitration panels in these cases are not such adjudicative bodies. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The word “tribunal” in the context of § 1782, with modifiers “foreign or international” is best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. The statute’s history confirms this understanding, as does analogy to the Federal Arbitration Act. The adjudicative bodies in these cases are not governmental or intergovernmental and thus are not subject to § 1782(a).

[20-1034] Golan v. Saada Mar 22, 2022

Golan v. Saada

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 22, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.

Petitioner: Narkis Aliza Golan.
Respondent: Isacco Jacky Saada.

Advocates:

Karen R. King (for the Petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
Richard Min (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Isacco Saada and Narkis Golan married in Italy in 2015 and had a son. From the very start of their relationship, Saada was violently abusive toward Golan, including in front of their son (though allegedly not toward the son). In 2018, Golan and their son traveled to the United States and remained there.

Saada asked a court to return their son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court found that Italy was the child’s country of habitual residence for the purposes of the Hague Convention. However, it also found that returning the child to Italy would subject him to a grave risk of psychological harm based on Saada’s abuse of Golan. Under binding precedent, the district court was also required to determine whether there were any ameliorative undertakings it could impose on Saada that would mitigate the risk of harm in returning the child to Italy. The district court ordered Saada to stay away from Golan, to pay her $30,000, and to visit their son only with Golan’s consent. After the district court coordinated with an Italian court to enforce the orders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, musts courts consider all measures that might mitigate the grave risk of harm if the child were to return to their country of habitual residence?

Conclusion

A court is not required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention gives a court the discretion to grant or deny return of a child to a foreign country if it finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm. Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this discretion.

[21-328] Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. Mar 21, 2022

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.

Argued on Mar 21, 2022.
Decided on May 23, 2022.

Petitioner: Robyn Morgan.
Respondent: Sundance, Inc..

Advocates:

Karla A. Gilbride (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In September 2018, Robyn Morgan sued Sundance, Inc. for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that Sundance failed to pay her for overtime work. The district court denied Sundance’s motion to dismiss. Sundance then answered Morgan's complaint but did not assert its right to arbitrate Morgan's claims. After filing its answer, Morgan participated in a settlement mediation with plaintiffs in another similar lawsuit in Michigan. The Michigan case settled, but Morgan's case moved forward. Nearly eight months after the filing of Morgan's complaint, Sundance moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding Sundance's participation in the litigation waived its right to arbitration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate the Supreme Court’s instruction that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts”?

Conclusion

Federal courts may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Outside of the arbitration context, a federal court assessing whether a party has waived a right does not generally ask about prejudice. Rather, waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” It focuses on the actions of the person who held the right, not the effects on the opposing party. Although the FAA may express policy favoring arbitration, that policy does not authorize federal courts to invent special arbitration-preferring procedural rules. Federal courts thus may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule requiring that a party show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim of waiver.

[21-248] Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Mar 21, 2022

Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 21, 2022.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.

Petitioner: Philip E. Berger.
Respondent: North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al..

Advocates:

David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners)
Elisabeth S. Theodore (for the NAACP Respondents)
Sarah Boyce (for the State Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP challenged a North Carolina voter-ID law, arguing that it violates the Constitution and the federal Voting Rights Act. Although the state attorney general, a Democrat, is already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court, Republicans Phil Berger, president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, speaker of the state house representatives, sought to intervene to also represent the interests of the State.

The district court twice rejected their requests to intervene, and the full (en banc) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also rejected their request.

Question

Do the two North Carolina legislators have a right to intervene in this case to defend a state voter-ID law?

Conclusion

North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that one has a right to intervene in litigation if they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and are “so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede” their ability to protect their interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.

When a State chooses to divide its sovereign authority among different officials and authorize their participation in a suit challenging state law, full consideration of the state’s interests may require the involvement of various officials. Intervention by the legislators neither violates the North Carolina Constitution nor gives them authority beyond what the law already provides them. The existing parties do not adequately represent the legislators’ interest, as the presumption of adequate representation applies only in cases where interests fully overlap, which is not the case here. Thus, the legislators have a right to intervene in the litigation.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court erroneously presumed that a State is inadequately represented in federal court unless whomever state law designates as a State’s representative is allowed to intervene and incorrectly implied that the attorney general’s defense of the constitutionality of the voting law at issue here fell below a minimal standard of adequacy.

[21-147] Egbert v. Boule Mar 02, 2022

Egbert v. Boule

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 2, 2022.
Decided on Jun 8, 2022.

Petitioner: Erik Egbert.
Respondent: Robert Boule.

Advocates:

Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Felicia H. Ellsworth (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Patrol Agent, went to the Smugglers Inn, which sits at the U.S.-Canada border, and approached a car carrying a guest from Turkey. The inn’s owner, Robert Boule, asked Egbert to leave, and when Egbert refused to do so, Egbert pushed Boule to the ground. After Boule complained to Egbert’s supervisors, Egbert suggested to the IRS that it investigate Boule.

Boule filed a Bivens lawsuit (so called because of the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which first recognized the right of plaintiffs to sue federal officials for damages arising from violations of their constitutional rights) against Egbert arguing that the agent had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled against Boule, finding his claims beyond the scope of those permitted under Bivens. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the full (en banc) Ninth Circuit denied Egbert’s petition for rehearing.

Question

Does a plaintiff have a right to sue federal officers for First Amendment retaliation claims or for allegedly violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights while engaging in immigration-related functions?

Conclusion

A plaintiff does not have a right to sue Border Patrol officers engaged in immigration-related functions for First Amendment retaliation claims or for alleged excessive force. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Although Bivens permits suits against federal officials for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, its application to Border Patrol officers raises national security concerns. Thus, “judicial intrusion” would be harmful or inappropriate in this arena. As to the First Amendment, Boule’s claim is a novel concept and no factors weigh in favor of judicial extension of Bivens to that claim. Moreover, for both claims, Congress is better suited to authorize a damages remedy.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch would overrule Bivens entirely.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, concurring in the judgment as to the First Amendment claim but dissenting as to the Fourth Amendment claim. Justice Sotomayor argued that Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim was squarely within the scope of Bivens and only his First Amendment claim was in a new context.

[20-1410] Ruan v. United States Mar 01, 2022

Ruan v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 1, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2022.

Petitioner: Xiulu Ruan.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Lawrence S. Robbins (for the Petitioner in 20-1410)
Beau B. Brindley (for the Petitioner in 21-5261)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A federal jury in Alabama convicted Xiulu Ruan and several other pain management physicians of running a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of several federal statutes, including provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Ruan allegedly prescribed medicines, including Schedule II drugs (many of which are opioids), outside the standard of care for his practice. At trial, prosecutors showed that Ruan and other physicians in his practice prescribed medications for their own financial gain rather than for the benefit of their patients. Ruan and other defendants challenged their convictions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

May a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) regardless of whether he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice?

Conclusion

The crime of prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court.

In general, criminal law seeks to punish conscious wrongdoing. Thus, when a criminal statute is silent as to the mental state required, courts infer a requirement of knowledge or intent. When it is not silent, the general mental state provision applies to each term of the provision. Thus, the “knowingly or intentionally” requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841 applies to the phrase “except as authorized.” As such, once the defendant proves their conduct was “authorized,” the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in an unauthorized manner.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Alito looked to the Harrison Act, which preceded the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Regarding the Harrison Act, the Court held that a registered physician acts “in the course of his professional practice” when the physician writes prescriptions “in good faith.” Justice Alito would thus hold that this rule applies under the CSA and vacate the judgments below and remand for further proceedings.

[20-1641] Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc. Mar 01, 2022

Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc.

Argued on Mar 1, 2022.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.

Petitioner: Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan, et al..
Respondent: DaVita, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

John J. Kulewicz (for the Petitioners)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal)
Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

DaVita is the leading provider of dialysis treatment in the United States. Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan is a self-funded plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Patient A is an anonymous individual with end-stage renal disease who is a member of the plan and has been receiving treatment by DaVita since April 15, 2017.

The Plan defines three tiers of reimbursement, and dialysis providers are categorically in the lowest tier and are considered out of network, entitling them to the lowest level of reimbursement relative to all other providers.

DaVita challenged the Plan as violating the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which prohibits health plans from treating individuals with kidney failure differently in eligibility or access to benefits. The district court dismissed all of DaVita’s claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that DaVita had plausibly alleged that the Plan engaged in unlawful discrimination.

Question

Did the Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan violate the Medicare Secondary Payer Act’s non-discrimination provisions through its reimbursement structure for dialysis providers?

Conclusion

The Marietta Plan’s coverage terms for outpatient dialysis do not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C) because those terms apply uniformly to all covered individuals, and the Medicare Secondary Payer statute does not authorize disparate-impact liability. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

Section 1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii) prohibits a plan from differentiating in benefits between individuals with and without end-stage renal disease. The language of the provision cannot fairly be read to authorize liability for disparate-impact claims. Because the Marietta Plan provides the same outpatient dialysis benefits to all Plan participants, whether or not they are eligible for Medicare, it does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C).

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that because outpatient dialysis is an almost perfect proxy for end-stage renal disease, differentiation on the basis of one is equivalent to differentiation on the basis of the other.

[20-1530] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency Feb 28, 2022

West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 28, 2022.
Decided on Jun 30, 2022.

Petitioner: West Virginia, et al..
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al..

Advocates:

Lindsay S. See (for the state Petitioners)
Jacob M. Roth (for the private Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Respondents)
Beth S. Brinkmann (for the power company Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Trump administration repealed the 2015 Clean Power Plan, which established guidelines for states to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, and issued in its place the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, which eliminated or deferred the guidelines. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule as arbitrary and capricious. One of the challengers, North American Coal Corporation, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to so broadly regulate greenhouse gas emissions.

Question

Does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in virtually any industry, so long as it considers cost, non-air impacts, and energy requirements?

Conclusion

Congress did not grant the Environmental Protection Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act the authority to devise emissions caps based on the generation shifting approach the Agency took in the Clean Power Plan.

Under the “major questions doctrine,” there are “extraordinary cases” in which the “history and the breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted,” and the “economic and political significance” of that assertion, provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant to confer such authority. This is one such case, so the EPA must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the authority it claims. It cannot do so.

The EPA has admitted that issues of electricity transmission, distribution, and storage are not within its traditional expertise, yet it claims that Congress implicitly tasked it with the regulation of how Americans get their energy. Without “clear congressional authorization” for the EPA to regulate in such a manner, the agency lacks authority to implement the Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined.

Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined.

[20-1775] Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco Feb 23, 2022

Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 23, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.

Petitioner: Arizona, et al..
Respondent: City and County of San Francisco, California, et al..

Advocates:

Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the federal Respondents)
Helen H. Hong (for the state Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Although federal immigration law uses the term “public charge,” referring generally to recipients of federal benefits, it lacks a precise and clear definition. Under the Clinton administration, it referred only to a noncitizen who received cash benefits (as opposed to other types of benefits). In 2019, the Trump administration issued a final rule defining “public charge” as a noncitizen who would likely need cash benefits and/or government-provided housing, food assistance, or medical insurance for more than twelve months.

The rule was subject to legal challenges, and the Biden administration stopped defending the rule and dismissed all the cases challenging the rule. The federal government also took additional steps to revert the definition to that of the Clinton administration. Several states sought to intervene in the litigation and take up the defense of the rule where the federal government left off. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the states’ motion to intervene.

Question

Can states with interests intervene to defend a rule when the United States ceases to defend it?

Conclusion

Dismissed as improvidently granted.

[20-493] Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas Feb 22, 2022

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 22, 2022.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.

Petitioner: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al..
Respondent: State of Texas.

Advocates:

Brant C. Martin (for the Petitioners)
Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Lanora C. Pettit (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally recognized tribe with a reservation near El Paso, Texas. Under the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, passed by Congress in 1987, the Pueblo agreed that its gaming activities would comply with Texas law. Another law, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, also regulates tribal gaming operations. The Pueblo engaged in gaming activity that violated state law but not the IGRA, and Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the tribe’s gaming operations. The district court ruled in favor of the State of Texas, finding that the more restrictive Restoration Act controlled and prohibited the gaming operations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Which federal law governs the legality of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s gaming operations, the Restoration Act or the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act?

Conclusion

The Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act applies to the case at hand and bans on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court

Section 107 of the Restoration Act directly addresses gaming on the lands of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, providing that “gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas law] are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.” Activities that Texas law merely regulates and does not prohibit are outside the scope of the Act.

Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined.

[20-7622] Denezpi v. United States Feb 22, 2022

Denezpi v. United States

Argued on Feb 22, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.

Petitioner: Merle Denezpi.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Merle Denezpi, a member of the Navajo tribe, pleaded guilty to an assault charge in the Court of Indian Offenses. That court is a trial court that exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans where there are no tribal courts to do so. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi on a charge of aggravated sexual assault based on the same underlying events. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.

Denezpi challenged his prosecution in federal court, arguing that it violated the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause because the Court of Indian Offenses is a federal agency. The district court ruled against Denezpi, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a prosecution in the Court of Indian Offenses trigger the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause?

Conclusion

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecuting a person twice “for the same conduct or actions,” but for the same “offence.” Under the dual-sovereignty principle, two offenses arising from the same act can therefore be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. Denezpi’s single act constituted assault and battery under the Ute Mountain Ute Code and aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country under the U.S. Code. His prosecution for both crimes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined in part, arguing that the same prosecuting authority charged the same defendant twice for the same crime—the very definition of double jeopardy proscribed by the U.S. Constitution.

[20-1650] Concepcion v. United States Jan 19, 2022

Concepcion v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 19, 2022.
Decided on Jun 27, 2022.

Petitioner: Carlos Concepcion.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Charles L. McCloud (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2008, Carlos Concepcion pleaded guilty to crack cocaine charges, and in 2009 he was sentenced to 228 months in prison. While he was serving his sentence, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the statutory penalties for most federal crimes involving crack cocaine. In 2018, Congress made these changes retroactive, and Concepcion moved for resentencing. The district court denied his motion, and Concepcion appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the district court was not obligated to update and reevaluate the sentencing factors.

Question

Must or may a district court consider intervening legal and factual developments when deciding whether to “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018?

Conclusion

The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.

District courts enjoy substantial discretion to consider all relevant information at a sentencing hearing. That discretion extends to subsequent hearings modifying sentencing, as well. The First Step Act preserves this discretion, allowing the district court to reduce sentences based not only on the changes to sentencing ranges, but also on other legal or factual changes that have occurred since the original sentencing.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the text of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce sentences based only on changes to the crack-cocaine sentencing ranges, not on other unrelated changes that have occurred since the original sentencing.

[21-12] Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate Jan 19, 2022

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

Argued on Jan 19, 2022.
Decided on May 16, 2022.

Petitioner: Federal Election Commission.
Respondent: Ted Cruz for Senate, et al..

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Appellant)
Charles J. Cooper (for the Appellees)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The day before Election Day in 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned Ted Cruz for Senate (“Cruz Committee”) two campaign finance loans totaling $260,000. After Election Day, the Cruz Committee used the funds it had on hand to pay vendors and meet other obligations instead of repaying the loans to Senator Cruz. Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations place a $250,000 limit on the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to pay back a candidate's pre-election loans more than 20 days after Election Day. After 20 days had elapsed, the balance of those loans that exceeded BCRA's $250,000 statutory cap on post-election contributions ($10,000)—converted into a campaign contribution. The Cruz Committee filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations as violating constitutional and administrative laws.

A three-judge court ruled for Cruz, finding that the restrictions place a burden on political speech without adequate justification.

Question

Do appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j), and does the limit unconstitutionally burden political speech without justification?

Conclusion

Appellees have standing to challenge Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and that section—which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign—violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and their campaigns to engage in political speech. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

As to standing, appellee’s injuries are directly inflicted by the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC’s) threatened enforcement of the provisions at issue. That appellees intentionally triggered the application of the provisions does not undermine their standing to challenge them. Additionally, although the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement of a statute (as opposed to a regulation), the enforcement is traceable to the operation of the statute itself. Thus, the appellees may challenge the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation through its implementing regulation.

As to the merits, the loan-repayment limitation burdens candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. By seeking to deter candidates from loaning money to their campaigns, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry thus abridging political speech. The Government fails to describe how the limitation furthers a permissible interest—namely, the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. Although the Government argues that the types of contributions at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to repay a candidate’s personal loans, it does not identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption as a result of these types of contributions.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan argued that the majority overstates the the First Amendment burdens Section 304 imposes and understates the anticorruption values Section 304 serves. Because the regulated transactions personally enrich those already elected to office, they threaten both corruption and the appearance of corruption, “bring[ing] this country’s political system into further disrepute.”

[20-1566] Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation Jan 18, 2022

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation

Argued on Jan 18, 2022.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.

Petitioner: David Cassirer.
Respondent: Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation.

Advocates:

David Boies (for the Petitioners)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Thaddeus J. Stauber (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

David Cassirer and others filed a lawsuit to recover a painting by French Impressionist painter Camille Pissarro, which was stolen from their ancestors by the Nazi regime in 1939. The district court originally granted summary judgment in favor of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the court needed to determine, as a threshold matter, whether TBC had actual knowledge the painting was stolen. If it had such knowledge, then it could be an accessory after the fact under Spanish Civil Code Article 1956.

On remand, the district court determined that TBC did not have actual knowledge that the painting was stolen when it purchased the painting in 1993. Cassirer again appealed, arguing among other things the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision erred in holding that Spanish law governs the substantive claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding no factual or legal developments that would justify revisiting its original holding.

Question

Should a federal court hearing state law claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue?

Conclusion

A federal court hearing state-law claims under the FSIA should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion holding that, in this case, that means applying the forum state’s choice-of-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law.

Although the FSIA generally recognizes foreign sovereign immunity absent a statutory exception, it does not affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state when the entity is not immune from suit. Rather, in that situation, the foreign state is subject to the same substantive law as a private party. In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-of-law rule.

[20-1800] Shurtleff v. Boston Jan 18, 2022

Shurtleff v. Boston

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 18, 2022.
Decided on May 2, 2022.

Petitioner: Harold Shurtleff, et al..
Respondent: City of Boston, Massachusetts, et al..

Advocates:

Mathew D. Staver (for the Petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal)
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The City of Boston owns and manages three flagpoles in front of City Hall, the seat of Boston’s municipal government. Ordinarily, the City raises the United States flag and the POW/MIA flag on one flagpole, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag on the second flagpole, and its own flag on the third flagpole. Upon request and after approval, the City will occasionally fly another flag for a limited period of time instead of its own flag.

Gregory T. Rooney, Commissioner of Boston’s Property Management Department, reviews applications for flag-raising events to ensure the flag is consistent with the City’s message, policies, and practices. The City has approved 284 flag-raising events over a 12-year period, and Rooney had never denied a flag-raising application.

Camp Constitution is an organization that seeks “to enhance the understanding of the country’s Judeo-Christian moral heritage” and applied to fly a “Christian flag” for its event. Rooney denied Camp Constitution’s flag-raising request, finding it was the first time any entity or organization had requested to fly a religious flag. Camp Constitution sued, and the district court found for the City. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does Boston’s refusal to fly a private religious organization’s flag depicting a cross on a city flagpole violate the organization’s First Amendment rights?

Conclusion

Boston’s flag-raising program does not constitute government speech, so its refusal to fly the private religious organization’s flag violates the organization’s First Amendment rights. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The Court first considered whether Boston’s flag-raising program is government speech. The test for government speech is a holistic inquiry that considers, among other things, the history of the expression at issue, the public’s perception as to who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has controlled the expression. Although the history of flag displays favors Boston, the other two factors outweigh the first factor. The public would not necessarily associate a flag’s message with the City, and, most importantly, the City has exercised almost no control over flag content. In fact, the City has no record of denying a request until the Petitioner’s in this case. Thus, on balance, the flag-raising program is not government speech.

The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment disallows the government from engaging in “impermissible viewpoint discrimination.” When it is not speaking for itself, the government may not exclude speech based on “religious viewpoint.” Thus, Boston’s refusal to allow Shurtleff and Camp Constitution to raise their flag based on “religious viewpoint” violated the First Amendment.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to reiterate that the government does not violate the Establishment Clause when it treats religious persons or organizations equally with secular persons or organizations, but it does violate the Free Speech Clause when it excludes religious persons or organizations.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, disclaiming the three-factor test used by the majority. Rather, when faced with a question whether speech constitutes government speech, Justice Alito would ask “whether the government is actually expressing its own views or the real speaker is a private party and the government is surreptitiously engaged in the ‘regulation of private speech.’”

Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined, criticizing the so-called Lemon test the Court adopted for resolving Establishment Clause disputes. Justice Gorsuch argued that Boston erroneously relied on the now-abandoned Lemon test, leading it to believe that flying the flag would violate the Establisment Clause.

[20-1472] Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jan 12, 2022

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Argued on Jan 12, 2022.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.

Petitioner: Boechler, P.C..
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Advocates:

Melissa Arbus Sherry (On behalf of the Petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (On behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On June 5, 2015, the Internal Revenue Service sent Boechler, P.C., a letter noting a discrepancy between prior tax document submissions. After not receiving a response, the IRS imposed a 10% intentional disregard penalty, which Boechler did not pay. The IRS mailed Boechler a notice of intent to levy. Boechler timely responded but failed to establish grounds for relief. On July 28, 2017, the Office of Appeals mailed a determination sustaining the levy to Boechler's last known address in Fargo, North Dakota. The notice of determination, delivered on July 31, stated that Boechler had 30 days from the date of determination, i.e. until August 28, 2017, to submit a petition for review.

Boechler mailed a petition for a CDP hearing on August 29, 2017, one day after the 30-day filing deadline had expired. The Tax Court received Boechler's untimely petition, and the IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Boechler argued that the 30-day time limit in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the time limit should be equitably tolled, and calculating the time limit from issuance rather than receipt violates due process. The tax court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Boechler appealed.

Question

Is the 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the commissioner of internal revenue in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling?

Conclusion

The 30-day time limit of 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

A procedural requirement is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” it is. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a “person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” Thus, the meaning of this provision turns on the meaning of “such matter.” Because the phrase “such matter” in that sentence lacks a clear antecedent, the text does not “clearly” mandate a jurisdictional reading. Nonjurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling, and nothing in the facts of this case rebuts that presumption.

[20-322] Garland v. Gonzalez Jan 11, 2022

Garland v. Gonzalez

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 11, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.

Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al..
Respondent: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez, et al..

Advocates:

Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners)
Matthew H. Adams (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Gutierrez Sanchez are natives and citizens of Mexico who reside in the United States. The federal government had initiated removal proceedings against them, but asylum officers determined that each had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. Gonzalez and Sanchez both requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge after they had been detained for 180 days, but both requests were denied.

Question

Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond?

Conclusion

District courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion reversing the judgment of the lower court.

Section 1252(f)(1) generally strips lower courts of “jurisdiction or authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Although that section includes one exception, to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated,” that exception does not apply to claims on behalf of an entire class.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, dissenting from the Court’s holding as to the interpretation of Section 1252(f)(1) but concurring in the judgment insofar as it concludes the government prevails on the merits.

[19-896] Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez Jan 11, 2022

Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 11, 2022.
Decided on Jun 13, 2022.

Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..
Respondent: Antonio Arteaga-Martinez.

Advocates:

Austin L. Raynor (for the Petitioners)
Pratik A. Shah (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection. In May 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and detained him and initiated removal proceedings. Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding and deferral of removal based on fear of violence in Mexico. Six months after the start of his detention, he requested a bond hearing and challenged his continued detention without one.

Question

Conclusion

The Government is not required to provide noncitizens detained for six months with bond hearings in which the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.

No plausible construction of the text of 9 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to provide bond hearings with the procedures mandated by the Third Circuit. It says nothing about bond hearings before immigration judges or burdens of proof.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurrring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, he would hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause does not apply to removal of noncitizens, and Zadvydas v. Davis should be overruled.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that Zadvydas control the outcome in this case.

[20-1263] Gallardo v. Marstiller Jan 10, 2022

Gallardo v. Marstiller

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 10, 2022.
Decided on Jun 6, 2022.

Petitioner: Gianinna Gallardo, an Incapacitated Person, By and Through her Parents and Co-Guardians Pilar Vassallo and Walter Gallardo.
Respondent: Simone Marstiller, In Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.

Advocates:

Bryan S. Gowdy (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Henry C. Whitaker (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gianinna Gallardo suffered catastrophic injuries when she was hit by a truck after getting off her school bus, and she remains in a persistent vegetative state. She eventually recovered $800,000 in a court-approved settlement, which applied to her past medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, and other damages. However, the settlement amount covered only a fraction of each type of damages.

Medicaid had paid $862,688.77 toward her past medical expenses, so in an attempt to recover reimbursement for its payments, pursuant to Florida law, the State of Florida asserted a lien over the compensation for past medical expenses, which Medicaid had paid, as well as the compensation for future medical expenses.

Gallardo’s counsel filed a lawsuit asking the court to enjoin the state from asserting its lien over the portion of her tort recovery compensating for future medical expenses and to declare that Florida’s reimbursement statute violates the Medicaid Act. The district court ruled for Gallardo, finding that the Medicaid Act preempted the Florida law to the extent that the law allows the State to satisfy its lien for past medical expenses from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the federal Medicaid Act provide for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid’s payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses?

Conclusion

The Medicaid Act permits a state to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

Section 1396p(a)(1) of the Medicaid Act prohibits states from recovering medical payments from a beneficiary’s “property,” that is, from settlement amounts other than those allocated for past medical care paid for by Medicaid. But that provision does not apply to state laws expressly authorized under the Act. Florida’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act falls squarely within this exception to Section 1396p(a)(1). The plain text of the provision, as well as the statutory context, support this interpretation. The language granting rights to payment of “any medical care” includes both past medical payments and future medical payments.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “read[s] one statutory provision in isolation while giving short shrift to the statutory context, the relationships between the provisions at issue, and the framework set forth in precedent. As such, Justice Sotomayor argued, its holding “is inconsistent with the structure of the” Medicaid program and will cause needless unfairness and disruption.

[21A240] Biden v. Missouri Jan 07, 2022

Biden v. Missouri

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 7, 2022.
Decided on Jan 13, 2022.

Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden.
Respondent: Missouri, et al..

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (On behalf of the Applicants)
Jesus A. Osete (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A240)
Elizabeth Murrill (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A241)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

None

Question

Does the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to enforce a rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption?

Conclusion

The Department of Health and Human Services has the authority to enforce its rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the applications to stay the two injunctions barring the Secretary of Health and Human Services from enforcing the regulation.

The Court reasoned that a core function of HHS is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety, and the interim rule at issue here seeks to do precisely that.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. The dissenters found no statutory support for such an exercise of authority.

[21A244] National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Jan 07, 2022

National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 7, 2022.
Decided on Jan 13, 2022.

Petitioner: National Federation of Independent Business, et al..
Respondent: Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Advocates:

Scott A. Keller (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A244)
Benjamin M. Flowers (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A247)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (On behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

None

Question

Did the Occupational Safety & Health Administration exceed its authority in promulgating a rule mandating that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing?

Conclusion

The challengers to the OSHA rule requiring that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing are likely to succeed on the merits. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the application to stay the OSHA rule.

Congress created OSHA to set workplace safety standards. The challenged rule goes well beyond that and is effectively a broad public health measure. Even the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic do not justify such an expansion in the agency's authority.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, reiterating that the States and Congress—not OSHA—have the authority to decide how to respond to the pandemic.

Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan filed a joint dissent, arguing that the pandemic directly affects the safety of workplaces and thus that OSHA has the authority to issue regulations to curb the effects of the pandemic in workplaces. The dissenters argue that by granting the stay, the Court acted outside of its competence and without legal basis, displacing the judgments of officials who have the responsibility and expertise to respond to workplace health emergencies.

[20-1009] Shinn v. Ramirez Dec 08, 2021

Shinn v. Ramirez

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 8, 2021.
Decided on May 23, 2022.

Petitioner: David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry.
Respondent: David Martinez Ramirez.

Advocates:

Brunn W. Roysden III (for the Petitioner)
Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

David Ramirez was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death by a judge for the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, including the trial court’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposition of the death sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Ramirez filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court, alleging various claims, but did not claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state court denied his petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Ramirez then filed a petition for habeas relief in federal district court. The court substituted his counsel “due to concerns regarding the quality of representation” and allowed Ramirez to amend his petition to add the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, the court ultimately found the claim procedurally defaulted because Ramirez had not raised it earlier.

In 2012, while Ramirez’s appeal was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that a federal court cannot consider evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, but “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.”

In light of Martinez, the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of whether post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness was cause to overcome the procedural default of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court again determined that Ramirez’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally barred and denied Ramirez’s request for more evidence. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Ramirez demonstrated cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.

Question

Does the Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan render the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act inapplicable to a federal court’s merits review of a claim for habeas relief?

Conclusion

Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

Federal habeas relief is narrowly available because it overrides a state’s power to enforce criminal law and incurs certain costs. For example, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner overrides the state’s power to enforce “societal norms through criminal law,” and federal intervention imposes significant costs on state criminal justice systems. Thus, federal habeas relief is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.”

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. The doctrine of procedural default generally prevents federal courts from hearing any federal claim not presented in state court according to the state’s own procedural rules. A federal court may excuse procedural default only in narrow circumstances: the prisoner must demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Attorney error cannot generally serve as such “cause.” Specifically, state postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the record is attributed to the prisoner, as there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court “guts” the reasoning of two key precedents establishing that a habeas petitioner is not at fault for any failure to bring a trial-ineffectiveness claim in state court and “arrogates power from Congress” by “reconfigur[ing] the balance Congress struck [in AEDPA] between state interests and individual constitutional rights.”

[20-1088] Carson v. Makin Dec 08, 2021

Carson v. Makin

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 8, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.

Petitioner: David Carson, as Parent and Next Friend of O. C., et al..
Respondent: A. Pender Makin.

Advocates:

Michael Bindas (for the Petitioner)
Christopher C. Taub (for the Respondent)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The State of Maine relies on local school administrative units (SAUs) to ensure that every school-age child in the state has access to a free education. Not every SAU operates its own public secondary school. To meet the state requirements, an SAU without its own public secondary school may either (1) contract with a secondary school to provide school privileges or (2) pay the tuition of a secondary school at which a particular student is accepted. In either circumstance, the secondary school must be either a public school or an “approved” private school.

To be an “approved” school, a private school must meet the state’s compulsory attendance requirements (which can be demonstrated by accreditation by a New England association of schools and colleges or by approval by the Maine Department of Education), and it must be “nonsectarian in accordance with the First Amendment.”

The Carsons, Gillises, and Nelsons live in SAUs that do not operate a public secondary school of their own but instead provide tuition assistance to parents who send their children to an “approved” private school. The three families opted to send their children to private schools that are accredited but do not meet the nonsectarian requirement because they are religiously affiliated. Because the schools are not “approved,” they do not qualify for tuition assistance. The families filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the “nonsectarian” requirement violates the Constitution on its face and as applied. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the State and denied judgment to the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, noting that it had twice before rejected similar challenges, and even though the U.S. Supreme Court had decided two relevant cases in the interim, those cases do not produce a different outcome here.

Question

Does a state law prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or “sectarian,” instruction violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments to parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Jonh Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Two cases resolve the dispute in this case. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not permit Missouri to discriminate against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. And in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Court held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause because it prohibited families from using otherwise available scholarship funds at religious schools. Applying those precedents to this case, Maine may not choose to subsidize some private schools but not others on the basis of religious character.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the majority gives “almost exclusive” attention to the Free Exercise Clause while paying “almost no attention” to the Establishment Clause. In Justice Breyer’s view, Maine’s nonsectarian requirement strikes the correct balance between the two clauses.

Justice Sotomayor dissented separately, as well, to highlight the Court’s “increasingly expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause” that “risks swallowing the space between the Religion Clauses.”

[20-1459] United States v. Taylor Dec 07, 2021

United States v. Taylor

Argued on Dec 7, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2022.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Justin Eugene Taylor.

Advocates:

Rebecca Taibleson (for the Petitioner)
Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Justin Eugene Taylor and a co-conspirator intended to rob a drug dealer, who ended up being shot during the transaction. The Government’s indictment charged Taylor on seven counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

The indictment also alleged two predicate crimes of violence: the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and the attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Taylor was convicted of using a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

On habeas review, Taylor asked the court to vacate his conviction and remand for resentencing based on the argument that the two predicate offenses are not “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s § 924(c) conviction, finding that because the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not invariably require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” the offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c).

Question

Does the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) exclude attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which may be completed through an attempted threat alone?

Conclusion

Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

To convict a defendant of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward that end. Neither element requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force (even though, in many cases, force is present). As such, attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot constitute a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A).

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that under the facts of this case, Taylor did in fact threaten violence, so his attempted Hobbs Act robbery was a “crime of violence” even if that incomplete crime might not be a crime of violence in some other hypothetical situation.

Justice Samuel Alito also dissented, rejecting the majority’s categorical approach as disregarding the real world.

[20-979] Patel v. Garland Dec 06, 2021

Patel v. Garland

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 6, 2021.
Decided on May 16, 2022.

Petitioner: Pankajkumar S. Patel, et al..
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.

Advocates:

Mark C. Fleming (for the Petitioners)
Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent supporting reversal)
Taylor A.R. Meehan (for the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Pankajkumar Patel is a citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security charged Patel as removable for being present without inspection. At a hearing, Patel conceded that he was removable but sought discretionary relief from removal on the grounds that he had an approved I-140 employment authorization document. To be eligible for discretionary relief from removal, a noncitizen must show, among other things, “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is not inadmissible. However, Patel’s admissibility is in doubt because, when he applied for a Georgia driver’s license in 2008, he falsely represented himself when he checked a box indicating he is a U.S. citizen. At his removal hearing, Patel argued that it was simply a mistake and was immaterial since citizenship was not required to obtain the driver’s license.

The immigration judge (IJ) rejected Patel’s arguments and denied his application for adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding no clear error in the factual findings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of the IJ, based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” for certain enumerated categories of discretionary relief, including the relief for which Patel applied.

Question

Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) preserve the jurisdiction of federal courts to review a nondiscretionary determination that a noncitizen is ineligible for certain types of discretionary relief?

Conclusion

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of any judgment relating to the granting of discretionary-relief in immigration proceedings enumerated under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under § 1255. Best understood, the word “judgment” in that phrase refers to any authoritative decision relating to the granting or denying of discretionary relief. Although this interpretation prohibits review of some factual determinations made in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made elsewhere in removal proceedings, that distinction reflects Congress’s choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the majority’s opinion permits a bureaucratic factual mistake to have life-changing consequences for an immigrant applying for legal residency and is an assertion of “raw administrative power” that neither the agency nor the Executive Branch endorses.

[19-1401] Hughes v. Northwestern University Dec 06, 2021

Hughes v. Northwestern University

Argued on Dec 6, 2021.
Decided on Jan 24, 2022.

Petitioner: April Hughes, et al..
Respondent: Northwestern University, et al..

Advocates:

David C. Frederick (for the Petitioners)
Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Northwestern University offers two employee investment plans that are at issue in this case, a Retirement Plan in which Northwestern makes a matching contribution and a Voluntary Savings plan in which the University does not match. Laura Divane and other plaintiffs are beneficiaries of one or both of the employee investment plans.

The plaintiffs sued Northwestern University for allegedly breaching its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. The plaintiffs alleged that Northwestern breached its fiduciary duty by offering a stock account option with excessive fees and a history of underperformance. The district court found no breach, noting that participants could have avoided any problems with the undesirable funds by simply choosing other options. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Are allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)?

Conclusion

An allegation that fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry involves assessing the fiduciaries’ duty to monitor all plan investments and remove any imprudent ones, which the Seventh Circuit below failed to do.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous (8-0) Court. ERISA imposes a duty of prudence on fiduciaries that includes, among other things, a duty to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones. The mere fact that participants could have chosen lower-priced investments neither refutes nor supports whether fiduciaries fulfilled their duty of prudence. The court of appeals’ reliance on investor choice in reaching its conclusion for the University failed to make the proper inquiry.

Justice Amy Cony Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[19-1392] Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization Dec 01, 2021

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 1, 2021.
Decided on Jun 24, 2022.

Petitioner: Thomas E. Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health, et al..
Respondent: Jackson Women's Health Organization, et al..

Advocates:

Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioners)
Julie Rikelman (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2018, Mississippi passed a law called the “Gestational Age Act,” which prohibits all abortions, with few exceptions, after 15 weeks’ gestational age. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the only licensed abortion facility in Mississippi, and one of its doctors filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the law and requesting an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO). After a hearing, the district court granted the TRO while the litigation proceeded to discovery. After discovery, the district court granted the clinic’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the law, finding that the state had not provided evidence that a fetus would be viable at 15 weeks, and Supreme Court precedent prohibits states from banning abortions prior to viability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is Mississippi’s law banning nearly all abortions after 15 weeks’ gestational age unconstitutional?

Conclusion

The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, are overruled. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The Constitution does not mention abortion. The right is neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential component of “ordered liberty.” The five factors that should be considered in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled support overruling Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey: (1) they “short-circuited the democratic process,” (2) both lacked grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent, (3) the tests they established were not “workable,” (4) they caused distortion of law in other areas, and (5) overruling them would not upend concrete reliance interests.

Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh concurred.

Chief Justice John Roberts concurred in the judgment.

Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan dissented.

[20-1114] American Hospital Association v. Becerra Nov 30, 2021

American Hospital Association v. Becerra

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 30, 2021.
Decided on Jun 15, 2022.

Petitioner: American Hospital Association, et al..
Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al..

Advocates:

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the Petitioners)
Christopher G. Michel (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The federal government reimburses hospitals for providing outpatient care to patients insured by Medicare Part B. Until recently, the government reimbursed all hospitals at a uniform rate for providing covered drugs. In 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reduced the reimbursement rates for certain types of hospitals (known as “340B hospitals”) because those hospitals can obtain the covered drugs far more cheaply than other hospitals can. HHS reasoned that it should not reimburse hospitals more than they paid to acquire the drugs.

Several 340B hospitals and hospital associations affected by the decision filed a lawsuit challenging HHS’s decision to lower reimbursement rates. The district court ruled that HHS had exceeded its statutory authority by reducing drug reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that HHS’s decision is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

Question

1. Is the Department of Health and Human Services’ decision to lower drug reimbursement rates for certain hospitals based on a reasonable interpretation of the Medicare statute?

2. Does 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12) preclude the petitioners’ challenge to HHS’s adjustments?

Conclusion

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 does not preclude judicial review of the reimbursement rates set by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for certain outpatient prescription drugs that hospitals provide to Medicare patients. Here, because HHS did not conduct a survey of hospitals’ acquisition costs in 2018 and 2019, its decision to vary reimbursement rates only for 340B hospitals in those years was unlawful. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

There is a general presumption that judicial review is available, and the relevant provision of the Medicare act contains nothing precluding judicial review.

HHS may not vary the reimbursement rates only for certain hospitals and not others without a survey. Permitting it to do so is contrary to the text and structure of the statute. Thus, its decision to change reimbursement rates only for 340B hospitals without conducting a survey was unlawful.

[20-219] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. Nov 30, 2021

Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 30, 2021.
Decided on Apr 28, 2022.

Petitioner: Jane Cummings.
Respondent: Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C..

Advocates:

Andrew Rozynski (for the Petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Jane Cummings has been deaf since birth and is legally blind. In 2016, she contacted Premier Rehab Keller to treat her chronic back pain and requested that Premier provide an ASL interpreter. Premier refused and told her she could communicate with her therapist using written notes, lipreading, gesturing, or provide her own ASL interpreter. Cummings ultimately went to another physical therapy provider but found the alternate provider “unsatisfactory.”

Cummings sued Premier for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, and the Texas Human Resources Code § 121.003. In her complaint, she sought injunctive relief and damages. The district court granted Premier’s motion to dismiss, finding that “[t]he only compensable injuries that Cummings alleged Premier caused were ‘humiliation, frustration, and emotional distress,’" and emotional distress damages are unavailable under the statutes Cummings relied on. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Do the compensatory damages available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, include compensation for emotional distress?

Conclusion

Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

Pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress enacted statutes—including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Affordable Care Act—prohibiting recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of certain protected characteristics. The Supreme Court has recognized implied rights of action for private individuals seeking enforcement of those statutes, but because the rights of action are implied, the remedies available under the statutes are unclear.

The Supreme Court uses the analogy of contract law to decide whether a remedy is available in these situations. Under this approach, a particular remedy is available “only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature.” Because damages for emotional distress are not usually available under contract law and serious emotional disturbance is not a particularly likely result of violation of these statutes, federal funding recipients have not consented to be subject to such damages.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, suggesting that the separation of powers principle, rather than contract law, is better suited for determining remedies for this implied cause of action.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the contracts most analogous to these anti-discrimination statutes did allow for recovery of emotional distress damages, as emotional disturbance is the likely result of invidious discrimination.

[20-1312] Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation Nov 29, 2021

Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 29, 2021.
Decided on Jun 24, 2022.

Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Respondent: Empire Health Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center.

Advocates:

Jonathan C. Bond (for the Petitioner)
Daniel J. Hettich (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services promulgated a rule eliminating the word “covered” from 42 C.F.R. § 412.106(b)(2)(i), effectively amending HHS’s interpretation of the phrase “entitled to [Medicare]” in a subsection of the Medicare Act. This amendment affects the way HHS calculates its reimbursement to certain hospitals that serve low-income patients.

Plaintiff Empire Health Foundation challenged the 2005 Rule as part of a larger challenge to HHS’s calculation of its 2008 reimbursement. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Empire based on a finding that HHS did not follow correct procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because of numerous mistakes that occurred during the notice-and-comment process. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding that HHS did follow the correct procedures under the APA, but the rule is substantively invalid because it directly conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the phrase “entitled to [Medicare] is unambiguous.”

Question

Did the Department of Health and Human Services follow the correct procedures when it promulgated a rule changing the way it calculates Medicare reimbursement rates for hospitals?

Conclusion

HHS followed the correct procedures; in calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

The phrase “entitled to benefits” means the same thing as “qualifying for benefits.” By counting everyone who qualifies for Medicare benefits in the Medicare fraction—and no one who qualifies for those benefits in the Medicaid fraction—HHS is following the statutory procedures that seek to capture two different segments of a hospital’s low-income patient population. Thus, HHS is correct in counting everyone regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh focused on the text of the statute, arguing that a patient who, by statute, cannot have payment made by Medicare that day is not “entitled to” have payment made by Medicare for that day.

[20-1029] City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc. Nov 10, 2021

City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc.

Argued on Nov 10, 2021.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.

Petitioner: City of Austin, Texas.
Respondent: Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Michael R. Dreeben (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Reagan National Advertising of Austin and Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company own and operate signs and billboards that display commercial and non-commercial messages. They filed applications with the City of Austin to digitize existing billboards, but the City denied the applications because its sign code does not allow the digitization of off-premises signs.

Reagan and Lamar sued, arguing that the code’s distinction between on-premise signs and off-premise signs violates the First Amendment. The district court held that the sign code was content-neutral and thus that it need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny—it must further an important government interest through means that are substantially related to that interest. The court found the code satisfied this test and entered judgment for the City. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the code’s distinction is content-based, therefore subject to scrutiny, and that it cannot withstand strict scrutiny.

Question

Does the Austin city code’s distinction between on-premise signs, which may be digitized, and off-premise signs, which may not, constitute facially unconstitutional content-based regulation?

Conclusion

The City of Austin’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content-neutral under the First Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.

When the government regulates speech based on its content, the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. A regulation of speech is content based if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” The City’s off-premises distinction is agnostic as to content. It does not single out any topic or subject matter for differential treatment, and its focus on location is akin to ordinary time, place, or manner restrictions, which are also not subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, it is facially content neutral.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a concurrring opinion arguing that while Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) is binding precedent that determines the outcome in this case (as the majority acknowledges), he disagrees with the Court’s reasoning in that decision.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He would reverse the lower court’s holding that the signs are facially unconstitutional but disagrees with the majority that the provisions defining on- and off- premises signs do not discriminate on the basis of content, at least as applied in some situations.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the majority misinterprets Reed’s rule for content-based restrictions and replaces it with “an incoherent and malleable standard.”

[20-303] United States v. Vaello-Madero Nov 09, 2021

United States v. Vaello-Madero

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 9, 2021.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Jose Luis Vaello-Madero.

Advocates:

Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner)
Hermann Ferré (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Congress established the Supplemental Security Income program in 1972 to provide cash benefits to low-income people who are 65 or older and have disabilities. The program extends to residents of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the unincorporated territory of the Northern Mariana Islands, but not to those living in Puerto Rico.

Jose Luis Vaello-Madero was born in Puerto Rico in 1954 and moved to New York in 1985. In 2012, he started receiving SSI payments after he experienced severe health problems, and in 2013, he moved back to Puerto Rico to help care for his wife. In 2016, the Social Security Administration (SSA) informed Vaello-Madero that because he had moved back to Puerto Rico, it was terminating his SSI benefits. Moreover, the federal government filed a lawsuit in federal court in Puerto Rico to recover over $28,000 in benefits it had paid Vaello-Madero between 2013 and 2016 when he was living in Puerto Rico. The district court ruled for Vaello-Madero, finding, among other things, that the exclusion of Puerto Rico violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

Question

Did Congress violate the Fifth Amendment by establishing the Supplemental Security Income program in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, but not in Puerto Rico?

Conclusion

The Constitution does not require Congress to make Supplemental Security Income benefits available to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court reversing the lower court.

Two precedents dictate the answer to the question presented in this case. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978), the Court held that Congress’s decision not to extend Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to Puerto Rico did not violate the constitutional right to interstate travel because Congress had a rational basis for that decision (that residents of Puerto Rico were exempt from paying federal taxes). And in Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), the Court held that Congress’s differential treatment of Puerto Rico did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it had the same rational basis for doing so. Applying these two precedents to the present case, the Court concluded that because Congress had a rational basis for the differential treatment, it was not required to extend SSI benefits to the residents of Puerto Rico.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is a better basis for prohibiting the federal government from discriminating on the basis of race than the so-called equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion noting that although no party asked the Court to overrule the Insular Cases, in which the Court held that the federal government could rule Puerto Rico and other territories without regard to the Constitution, those cases are based on racial stereotypes and “deserve no place in our law.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that there is no rational basis for treating needy citizens living within a territory of the United States so differently from others.

[21-5592] Ramirez v. Collier Nov 09, 2021

Ramirez v. Collier

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 9, 2021.
Decided on Mar 24, 2022.

Petitioner: John H. Ramirez.
Respondent: Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al..

Advocates:

Seth Kretzer (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

State laws differ and have vacillated as to whether and to what extent spiritual advisers may be present in the execution chamber. In 2019, the Court upheld Alabama’s refusal to allow an imam present at the execution of a Muslim man, even though the state at the time permitted a Christian chaplain to be present. A month later, the Court prohibited Texas from executing a Buddhist inmate unless he was allowed to have a Buddhist priest present. As a result, Texas passed a law prohibiting all spiritual advisers from the execution chamber but then after another legal challenge reversed course to allow their presence. The Court subsequently prohibited another Alabama death-row inmate’s execution without his pastor present, so the state executed him eight months later with his pastor at his side, praying with him and touching his leg.

John Ramirez, a Texas death-row inmate, brought a lawsuit asking that he be permitted to have his pastor present at his execution and that his pastor be allowed to pray audibly and touch him while he is being executed.

Question

Does Texas’s decision to allow Ramirez’s pastor to enter the execution chamber but not to lay hands on the parishioner as he dies, sing, pray, or read scripture violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act?

Conclusion

Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) because they burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 8-1 majority opinion holding that Ramirez satisfied the test for a preliminary injunction and reversing the court below.

As a threshold matter, Ramirez properly exhausted his administrative remedies before seeking a judicial remedy.

As to the merits, Ramirez satisfied all of the requirements of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits, risk of irreparable harm, and balance of equities and public interest. First, Ramirez demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. RLUIPA prohibits the state from imposing a substantial burden on an inmate unless imposition of that burden is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. Texas’s ban on audible prayer and touch imposed a substantial burden on Ramirez because the laying on of hands and prayer are significant parts of his religious exercise. Although the state has compelling interests in monitoring an inmate’s condition during the lethal injection process and in preventing disruptions in the execution chamber, the State failed to show that its refusal to grant Ramirez’s request is the least restrictive means of achieving those interests. Further, even though the State has compelling interests in security in the execution chamber, preventing unnecessary suffering of the prisoner, and avoiding further emotional trauma to the victim’s family members, it failed to show that a categorical ban on touch is the least restrictive means of accomplishing any of these goals.

Second, Ramirez is likely to suffer irreparable harm because without injunctive relief, he would be prohibited from engaging in protected religious exercise in the final moments of his life. Finally, the balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez’s favor because it is possible to accommodate Ramirez’s sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding his execution.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion to underscore the importance of the legal obligation of prison officials to set clear grievance processes.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh also joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion to point out the need for states to treat all religions equally; to highlight how difficult it is under RLUIPA to determine whether a state interest is “compelling” and whether a particular rule is the “least restrictive means”; and to call upon states to clarify their processes to ensure efficient executions in the future.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that Ramirez was simply seeking to further delay his execution and that his claims either do not warrant equitable relief or are procedurally barred.

[20-915] Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. Nov 08, 2021

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 8, 2021.
Decided on Feb 24, 2022.

Petitioner: Unicolors, Inc..
Respondent: H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P..

Advocates:

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioner)
Melissa N. Patterson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Peter K. Stris (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Unicolors, Inc., a company that creates art designs for use on fabrics, created and copyrighted as part of a collection of designs a two-dimensional artwork called EH101 in 2011. In 2015, retail clothing store H&M began selling a jacket and skirt with an art design called “Xue Xu.” Unicolors sued H&M for copyright infringement, alleging that the Xue Xu design is identical to its EH101 design.

The district court rejected H&M’s argument that Unicolors’ copyright was invalid because it had improperly used a single copyright registration to register 31 separate works. The court noted that invalidation of a copyright requires an intent to defraud, and no such evidence was presented in this case. Further, it concluded that the application contained no inaccuracies because the separate designs in the single registration were published on the same day. A jury returned a verdict for Unicolors, finding that it owned a valid copyright in EH101, that H&M had infringed on that copyright, and that the infringement was willful.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that there is no intent-to-defraud requirement for registration invalidation, and the district court failed to refer the matter to the Copyright Office, as required under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2), when it was informed of inaccuracies in the copyright registration.

Question

Does 17 U.S.C. § 411 require a district court to request advice from the Copyright Office when there are questions about the validity of a copyright registration but no evidence of fraud or material error?

Conclusion

Lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

The Copyright Act safe harbor, 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A) says that a certificate of registration is valid regardless of whether it contains inaccurate information unless the inaccurate information was included “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” The statutory language makes no distinction between lack of legal knowledge or lack of factual knowledge. The U.S. Court of Appeals thus erred in holding that a copyright holder cannot benefit from the safe harbor if its lack of knowledge stems from a failure to understand the law.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case as improvidently granted because the Court granted certiorari on a question of fraud but Unicolors put forth a different argument that the court below did not meaningfully consider.

[20-828] Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga Nov 08, 2021

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 8, 2021.
Decided on Mar 4, 2022.

Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al..
Respondent: Yassir Fazaga, et al..

Advocates:

Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioners)
Catherine M.A. Carroll (for the Agent Respondents)
Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for Respondents Fazaga, et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Respondents Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, Ali Uddin Malik, and Yasser AbdelRahim are three Muslim residents of Southern California who regularly attended religious services at the Islamic Center of Irvine. They filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the FBI had used a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program for at least fourteen months to gather information at the Islamic Center based solely on their Muslim religious identity. Their claims included violations of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Fourth Amendment; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1810; and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.

The U.S. Attorney General asserted the state secrets privilege with respect to evidence in the case and moved to dismiss the discrimination claims based on that privilege. It did not move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment or FISA claims based on privilege, but on other grounds. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence in camera to determine whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful under FISA. The appellate court then denied a petition for a rehearing en banc.

Question

Does Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 displace the state-secrets privilege and authorize a district court to resolve the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence?

Conclusion

Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) does not displace the state secrets privilege. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

First, the text of FISA lacks any reference to the state secrets privilege, suggesting that its passage did not alter the privilege at all. Regardless of whether the privilege arises from common law or the Constitution, Congress could not have abrogated it without clear statutory language.

Second, § 1806(f), which provides a procedure under which a trial-level court may consider the legality of electronic surveillance conducted under FISA, is not incompatible with the state secrets privilege. They involve different inquiries, award different forms of relief, and different procedures.

[20-843] New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen Nov 03, 2021

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen

Argued on Nov 3, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2022.

Petitioner: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Kevin P. Bruen, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New York State Police, et al..

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Barbara D. Underwood (for the Respondents)
Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The state of New York requires a person to show a special need for self-protection to receive an unrestricted license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home. Robert Nash and Brandon Koch challenged the law after New York rejected their concealed-carry applications based on failure to show “proper cause.” A district court dismissed their claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does New York's law requiring that applicants for unrestricted concealed-carry licenses demonstrate a special need for self-defense violate the Second Amendment?

Conclusion

New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense.

The right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense is deeply rooted in history, and no other constitutional right requires a showing of “special need” to exercise it. While some “sensitive places” restrictions might be appropriate, Manhattan is not a “sensitive place.” Gun restrictions are constitutional only if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion arguing that the effect of guns on American society is irrelevant to the issue.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, noting that many state restrictions requiring background checks, firearms training, a check of mental health records, and fingerprinting, are still permissible because they are objective, in contrast to the discretionary nature of New York’s law.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion noting two methodological points the Court did not resolve.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that states should be able to pass restrictions in an effort to curb the number of deaths caused by gun violence, and the Court’s decision “severely burdens the States’ efforts to do so.”

[20-804] Houston Community College System v. Wilson Nov 02, 2021

Houston Community College System v. Wilson

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 2, 2021.
Decided on Mar 24, 2022.

Petitioner: Houston Community College System.
Respondent: David Buren Wilson.

Advocates:

Richard A. Morris (for the Petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Michael B. Kimberly (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Houston Community College (HCC) System operates community colleges throughout the greater Houston area. HCC is run by a Board of nine trustees, each of which is elected by the public to serve a six-year term without remuneration. David Wilson was elected to the Board as a trustee on November 5, 2013. Starting in 2017, Wilson criticized the other trustees, alleging that they had violated the Board’s bylaws, and made various other criticisms of the Board. As a result, the Board censured Wilson and barred him from holding officer positions on the Board or from receiving travel reimbursements.

Wilson sued HCC, alleging that the censure violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled against him, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In holding for Wilson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment precludes community college boards from censuring members for their speech.

Question

Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member’s speech?

Conclusion

A purely verbal censure does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that Wilson lacked an actionable First Amendment claim against the Houston Community College System.

The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech,” which includes a prohibition on “retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech. However, elected bodies have long exercised the power to censure their members, and the Court’s precedents affirm that mere censure does not afoul of the First Amendment. That Wilson was an elected official and that the censure itself was mere speech by other members within the same elected body support the conclusion that the censure was not a materially adverse action and thus did not give rise to a First Amendment claim.

[20-1143] Badgerow v. Walters Nov 02, 2021

Badgerow v. Walters

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 2, 2021.
Decided on Mar 31, 2022.

Petitioner: Denise A. Badgerow.
Respondent: Greg Walters, et al..

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Denise Badgerow was employed as an associate financial advisor with REJ Properties, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, from January 2014 until July 2016, when she was terminated. During her employment with REJ, Badgerow signed an agreement to arbitrate any disputes that may arise between her and the three principals of the corporation.

After her termination, Badgerow initiated an arbitration proceeding against the three principals before an arbitration panel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), seeking damages for tortious interference of contract and for violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower law. The panel dismissed all of her claims with prejudice.

Badgerow then brought a new action in Louisiana state court, asking the court to vacate the dismissal because the whistleblower claim was obtained by fraud. The principals removed the action to federal court, and Badgerow filed a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to vacate and denied remand. On the merits, the court found no fraud and denied vacatur of the FINRA arbitration panel’s dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Circuit affirmed.

Question

Do federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question?

Conclusion

Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award because the “look-through” approach recognized in the context of Section 4 does not apply in the context of Sections 9 and 10. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion.

In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), the Court recognized that in the context of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a federal court may “look through” the petition for arbitration to the “underlying substantive controversy” to decide whether it has jurisdiction. Its decision in that case relied on “distinctive” language in Section 4 that directed the “look through” approach. Sections 9 and 10, at issue in this case, do not contain that same language, so the “look through” approach does not apply.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority’s narrow focus on the statute’s literal words “creates unnecessary complexity and confusion,” while consideration of the statute’s purposes would lead to a better and clearer outcome.

[21-463] Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson Nov 01, 2021

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 1, 2021.
Decided on Dec 10, 2021.

Petitioner: Whole Woman's Health, et al..
Respondent: Austin Reeve Jackson, Judge, District Court of Texas, 114th District, et al..

Advocates:

Marc A. Hearron (for the Petitioners)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Question

Can the petitioners in this case pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to Texas Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), which prohibits providers from performing or inducing an abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected and which allows for direct enforcement of the law through private civil actions?

Conclusion

The petitioners in this case may proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage only as to the defendants who are state medical licensing officials. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the petitioners cannot sue defendants Penny Clarkston and Austin Jackson (a state-court clerk and state-court judge, respectively) because states are generally immune from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment, and even the limited exception recognized in Ex Parte Young does not permit an ex-ante injunction preventing state courts from hearing cases. Additionally, state-court clerks and judges are not “adverse litigants” and thus a pre-enforcement challenge against those parties does not constitute a “case or controversy” as required under the Constitution.

The same five Justices also concluded that the petitioners cannot sue Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton because the attorney general lacks authority to enforce the challenged law.

All nine Justices agreed that the petitioners cannot sue the individual private defendant Mark Lee Dickson because they cannot establish an injury “fairly traceable” to his unlawful conduct, as required by the Constitution.

All but Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that the petitioners may proceed in their lawsuit against the state licensing officials because each may or must take enforcement actions against the abortion providers if the providers violate SB 8.

In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that SB 8 has the purpose and effect of “nullify[ing]” the Court’s rulings and thus threatens the entire constitutional system.

Writing on behalf of herself and Justices Breyer and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor extended the Chief Justice’s concerns, pointing out that the Court’s narrow ruling “effectively invites” other states to follow Texas’s example in nullifying constitutional rights.

[21-588] United States v. Texas Nov 01, 2021

United States v. Texas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 1, 2021.
Decided on Dec 10, 2021.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Texas, et al..

Advocates:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner)
Judd E. Stone, II (for the state Respondent)
Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the private Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge, as did the federal government. A federal district court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the law, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction. The Department of Justice asked the Court to reinstate the district court's judgment.

Question

Can the United States sue the State of Texas in federal court to prohibit enforcement of an unconstitutional abortion law?

Conclusion

The court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and denied the application to vacate the stay.

[20-480] Babcock v. Kijakazi Oct 13, 2021

Babcock v. Kijakazi

Argued on Oct 13, 2021.
Decided on Jan 13, 2022.

Petitioner: David Bryon Babcock.
Respondent: Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security.

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

David Babcock enlisted in the Michigan National Guard in 1970 and served for 3.5 years. After his service, Babcock went to flight school and received his pilot’s license, then returned to work as a National Guard dual-status technician, where he worked for over 33 years, including an active-duty tour in Iraq between 2004 and 2005. (Under 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1), a National Guard dual-status technician “is a Federal civilian employee” who “is assigned to a civilian position as a technician” while a member of the National Guard.)

Babcock retired from his position in 2009, at which time he began receiving Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) payments and, separately, military retirement pay from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. He fully retired in 2014 and at that point, applied for Social Security retirement benefits. On his application, he confirmed that he was receiving monthly CSRS payments. The Social Security Administration (SSA) granted his application but reduced his benefits because of his CSRS pension. Babcock asked the SSA to reconsider the reduction, noting that members of a uniformed service were not generally subject to the reduction in benefits (under the Windfall Elimination Provision, or WEP), and that as a dual-status technician, he qualified for that exception. SSA refused to change its initial determination, an administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the determination, and then the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision. A federal district court entered judgment against Babcock, and the appellate court affirmed.

Question

Is a civil service pension received for federal civilian employment as a “military technician (dual status)” considered “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the Social Security Act’s windfall elimination provision?

Conclusion

Civil-service pension payments based on employment as a dual-status military technician are not payments based on “service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the windfall elimination provision.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. While the National Guard of the United States is a uniformed service, prior to 1984, it hired technicians (including Babcock) as civil servants. These technicians possess characteristically civilian rights and were properly considered civilians rather than service members. Although Babcock did serve at other times as a member of the National Guard, his civil-service pension payments were not based on that service. Therefore, those payments are not payments based on “service as a member of” the National Guard and are thus not subject to the exception Social Security Act’s uniformed-services exception.

Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented, arguing that National Guard technicians hold a unique position in federal employment because they must maintain membership in the National Guard and wear a Guard uniform, they should be considered “members.”

[20-443] United States v. Tsarnaev Oct 13, 2021

United States v. Tsarnaev

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 13, 2021.
Decided on Mar 4, 2022.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev.

Advocates:

Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner)
Ginger D. Anders (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother detonated two homemade pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the race, killing three and injuring hundreds. He was sentenced to death for his role in the bombings, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit threw out his death sentences on the grounds that the district court should have asked potential jurors what media coverage they had seen about Tsarnaev’s case, and the district court should not have excluded from the sentencing phase evidence that Tsarnaev’s brother was involved in a separate triple murder.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit err in vacating the death sentence for the district court’s failure to ask prospective jurors for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage they had seen, heard, or read, and for its exclusion of evidence at the sentencing phase of trial that Tsarnaev’s brother had been involved in different crimes two years before the bombing?

Conclusion

The First Circuit improperly vacated Tsarnaev’s capital sentences. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The district court did not abuse its discretion during jury selection when it declined to ask every prospective juror what they learned from the media about the case. The district court has substantial discretion during jury selection, and it was reasonable for the court to conclude that the proposed question wrongly emphasized what a juror knew before coming to court rather than revealing potential bias. The “supervisory authority” of federal courts does not allow them to “create prophylactic supervisory rules that circumvent or supplement legal standards” established by the Supreme Court.

Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded from sentencing the evidence that Tsarnaev’s brother was possibly involved in an unsolved triple homicide. A district court has the discretion to exclude evidence “when its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” The bare inclusion of this evidence risked producing a “confusing mini-trial” about an unsolved crime in which all witnesses were dead.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, noting her skepticism about the “supervisory authority” of federal courts of appeals.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the brother’s involvement in the unsolved triple homicide because, in his view, the record does not adequately support the court’s conclusions that the evidence lacks probative value, is insufficient to corroborate the brother’s role in the murders, is a waste of time, and would confuse the jury.

[20-659] Thompson v. Clark Oct 12, 2021

Thompson v. Clark

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 12, 2021.
Decided on Apr 4, 2022.

Petitioner: Larry Thompson.
Respondent: Pagiel Clark, et al..

Advocates:

Amir H. Ali (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
John D. Moore (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Camille Watson was staying with her sister and her sister’s husband, Larry Thompson, when she dialed 911 after seeing a diaper rash on the couple’s infant daughter and mistaking the rash for signs of abuse. In response, two Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) arrived at Thompson’s apartment building to investigate. The EMTs saw nothing amiss, and, unaware of Camille’s 911 call, Thompson told the EMTs that no one in his home had called 911. He asked the EMTs to leave, and they did.

Four police officers followed up to investigate the alleged child abuse and insisted on seeing Thompson’s daughter. Thompson asked to speak to the officers’ sergeant, and after being denied that request, asked whether the officers had a warrant (which they did not). Nevertheless, they physically tried to enter Thompson’s home, and when Thompson attempted to block the doorway, the officers tackled and handcuffed him. He was arrested and taken to jail, where he spent two days. He was charged with resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration, and about three months later, the prosecution dropped the charges against him, stating that “People are dismissing the case in the interest of justice.”

Thompson filed a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the police officers involved. A federal district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on Thompson’s malicious prosecution claim due to his failure to establish favorable termination of his criminal case, which is required under binding Second Circuit precedent. The appellate court affirmed.

Question

Must a plaintiff who seeks to bring a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process show that the criminal proceeding against him “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence”?

Conclusion

A plaintiff wishing to bring a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that Thompson satisfied that requirement and reversing the judgment of the lower court.

To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the suit or proceeding was instituted without probable cause, (2) the motive in instituting the suit was malicious—that is, for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice, and (3) the prosecution terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused. The purposes of this third element—favorable termination of the underlying criminal case—are: (a) to avoid parallel civil and criminal litigation, (b) to prevent inconsistent civil and criminal judgments, and (c) to prevent civil suits from being improperly used as collateral attacks on criminal proceedings.

Most American courts have considered a favorable termination to mean simply a prosecution that ends without conviction and cannot be revived. Thus, if the prosecutor abandons the case or the court dismisses the case without stating a reason, these satisfy the third element of a malicious prosecution claim. Acquittal of the defendant is not required. Respondents’ claims to the contrary are not persuasive.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito argued that the majority’s analysis is cursory and erroneously relies on lower court cases “heavily influenced by a mistaken reading of the plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).”

[20-601] Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center Oct 12, 2021

Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center

Argued on Oct 12, 2021.
Decided on Mar 3, 2022.

Petitioner: Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky.
Respondent: EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al..

Advocates:

Matthew F. Kuhn (for the Petitioner)
Alexa Kolbi-Molinas (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Dilation and extraction (D&E) is the standard method of abortion used in the second trimester of pregnancy, accounting for 95% of second-trimester abortions nationwide. Kentucky House Bill 454 requires patients to undergo a procedure to end potential fetal life before they may receive an abortion using the D&E method.

Kentucky’s only abortion clinic and two of its doctors filed a lawsuit challenging the law, arguing that it violates patients’ constitutional right to abortion prior to fetal viability. All defendants except then-Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Adam Meier, and Commonwealth Attorney Thomas B. Wine, were voluntarily dismissed prior to trial. After a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction. In the meantime, governor Matt Bevin was replaced by Andy Beshear and Meier was replaced by Eric Friedlander.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, and the new Health Secretary declined to continue defending the law. Daniel Cameron, the Kentucky attorney general, asked the Sixth Circuit for permission to intervene to defend the law, but the court declined.

Question

Should a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law?

Conclusion

The Kentucky attorney general should have been permitted to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf in litigation concerning Kentucky House Bill 454. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion on behalf of the 6-3 majority. Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer concurred in the judgment but did not join the majority opinion.

No provision of law limits the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts to allow intervention by a party who was not part of the litigation—the state attorney general in this case. Nor is there a mandatory claims-processing rule that precludes the attorney general’s intervention. Contrary to the conclusion of the court below, the attorney general’s motion to intervene was not “untimely,” as he filed as soon as the secretary for Health and Family Services decided not to defend the law. Finally, allowing the attorney general to intervene would not cause unfair prejudice to the parties, so the appellate court erred in denying the attorney general’s motion to intervene.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion making the additional point that the attorney general was not a “party” to the district court’s final judgment thus negating a premise of the respondents’ jurisdictional argument.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment because, in their view, granting the attorney general’s motion to intervene would not be an “end-run around the timely-appeal rule” but a product of the timing of the litigation and a new need for the attorney general to enter the suit.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that while the majority acknowledges that courts have “sound discretion” to permit or disallow intervention, it “nonetheless bends over backward to accommodate the attorney general’s reentry into the case.” Justice Sotomayor expressed concern that the decision would broadly allow government officials to “evade the consequences of litigation decisions made by their predecessors of different political parties.”

[20-827] United States v. Zubaydah Oct 06, 2021

United States v. Zubaydah

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 6, 2021.
Decided on Mar 3, 2022.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka Abu Zubaydah, et al..

Advocates:

Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner)
David F. Klein (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Zayn Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, is a former associate of Osama bin Laden. U.S. military forces captured him in Pakistan and detained him abroad before moving him to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, where he is currently being held. Zubaydah alleged that, before being transferred to Guantanamo, he was held at a CIA “dark site” in Poland, where two former CIA contractors used “enhanced interrogation techniques” against him. Zubaydah intervened in a Polish criminal investigation into the CIA’s conduct in that country, and he sought to compel the U.S. government to disclose evidence connected with that investigation.

The government has declassified some information about Zubaydah’s treatment in CIA custody, but it has asserted the state-secrets privilege to protect other information. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s assertion of state-secrets privilege based on its own assessment of potential harms to national security and allowed discovery in the case to proceed.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err in rejecting the federal government’s assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on its own assessment of the potential harms to national security that would result from disclosure of information pertaining to clandestine CIA activities?

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit erred in holding, based on its own assessment, that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

To invoke the state secrets privilege, the government must show a reasonable danger of harm to national security. In a declaration supporting its claim of privilege, the Government submitted a declaration from the Director of the CIA stating that a response to the discovery requests would significantly harm our national security interests by confirming or denying the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland. Although some publicly available sources claim that such a site exists, the CIA has made no official statement. The specific language of Zubaydah’s discovery requests would elicit information that tends to confirm or deny the existence of such a site, so the government is entitled to invoke the state secrets privilege in response to those requests. Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and four other Justices, would dismiss the application for discovery.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas argued that Zubaydah’s “dubious” need for discovery requires dismissal of his discovery application regardless of the government’s reasons for invoking the state secrets privilege.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh clarified the process by which a court assesses invocation of the state secrets privilege, with great deference to the Executive Branch.

Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that even when the government meets its burden of showing a “reasonable danger” of harm to national security (as she agreed it did in this case), that does not require dismissal of the case. Rather, it is possible to segregate the classified location information from the unclassified treatment information and allow discovery of the latter.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the events took place two decades ago and have since been declassified and the subject of numerous books, movies, and official reports. As such, while dismissing the suit might save the government “embarrassment,” doing so will not “safeguard any secret.”

[20-826] Brown v. Davenport Oct 05, 2021

Brown v. Davenport

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 5, 2021.
Decided on Apr 21, 2022.

Petitioner: Mike Brown, Acting Warden.
Respondent: Ervine Davenport.

Advocates:

Fadwa A. Hammoud (for the Petitioner)
Tasha Bahal (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A Michigan jury convicted Ervine Lee Davenport of first-degree murder in 2008. He challenged his conviction in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because at trial he was restrained at the waist, wrist, and ankles, although there was a privacy curtain around the defense table. The State admitted that the visible restraints were unconstitutional but argued that the error was harmless. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed, finding that while it was error for the trial court to order the defendant to be restrained without justification, Davenport had not shown that his restraints were visible to the jury and thus failed to show prejudice. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded, and on remand, five jurors testified that they saw the shackles and two others had heard comments about the shackles.

Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that although some jurors saw the shackles, the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling did not affect the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Davenport challenged the conviction in federal court, and the district court denied the petition and certificate of appealability. Davenport petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a certificate of appealability, which the court granted. Noting that “shackling is inherently prejudicial,” the Sixth Circuit concluded that the State had not met its burden to show that the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” and reversed.

Question

What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief?

Conclusion

A federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief must apply both the test the Supreme Court outlined in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, and the one Congress prescribed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that the Sixth Circuit erred in granting relief based solely on its application of the Brecht standard.

Since the founding, Congress has authorized (but not required) federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus “as law and justice require.” In response to an evolving use of the writ, the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson held that a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must show that the constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict.” Congress subsequently further reformed the writ in passing AEDPA, which is a constitutionally valid rule of decision. AEDPA instructs that federal courts shall not grant relief for a claim adjudicated in state court unless the state court’s decision was (1) contrary to clearly established law or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Notably, Congress left intact the tradition whereby federal courts have discretion to grant relief if “law and justice require.”

The test outlined in Brecht is different from the requirements of AEDPA; proof of prejudice under Brecht does not satisfy AEDPA. Moreover, the materials a court may consult when considering each test are different. As such, a court must apply both tests when reviewing a habeas claim.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan argued that the Court twice, in 2007 and again in 2015, stated that the Brecht standard “obviously subsumes” the “more liberal” AEDPA standard and that if a defendant meets the former, he will “necessarily” meet the latter, too. Justice Kagan pointed out that every Justice has subscribed to that position in prior decisions and that requiring courts to apply both tests is unnecessarily burdensome and “will never lead to a different result” from application of the Brecht test alone.

[20-637] Hemphill v. New York Oct 05, 2021

Hemphill v. New York

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 5, 2021.
Decided on Jan 20, 2022.

Petitioner: Darrell Hemphill.
Respondent: New York.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Gina Mignola (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In April 2006, two men got into a fight with several other people on a street in the Bronx. Shortly thereafter, someone opened fire with a 9 millimeter handgun, killing a child in a passing car. Three eyewitnesses identified Nicholas Morris as the shooter. Police searched Morris’s home and found a 9 millimeter cartridge and ammunition for a .357 revolver. They arrested him the next day. He was indicted for the child’s murder and for possession of a 9 millimeter handgun, but the prosecution ended in a mistrial. Instead of trying him again, the State offered Morris a deal: If Morris pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm at the scene of the shooting, the State would request that the murder charge be dismissed with prejudice. Morris accepted the plea deal. However, the State charged Morris with possessing a .357 revolver at the scene of the shooting, rather than a 9 millimeter established as the murder weapon. The prosecution lacked sufficient evidence to establish possession of the .357 revolver, so Morris supplied the evidence through his own statement.

In 2013, the state charged Darrell Hemphill, the petitioner in this case who was also present at the fight in the Bronx, with the murder. At trial, Hemphill elicited testimony that police had recovered the 9 millimeter cartridge on Morris’s nightstand hours after the shooting. In response, the prosecution sought to introduce into evidence Morris’s statement that he possessed a .357 revolver at the scene. Based in part on this evidence, Hemphill was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. An appellate court affirmed the conviction, as did New York’s highest court.

Question

When, if ever, does a criminal defendant who “opens the door” to evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence also forfeit his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause?

Conclusion

A criminal defendant does not forfeit his confrontation right merely by making an argument in his defense based on a testimonial out-of-court statement like a plea allocution.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses against them, and the Court has recognized no open-ended exceptions to this requirement—only those exceptions established at the time of the founding. In People v. Reid, New York’s highest court held that a criminal defendant “opens the door” to evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause if the evidence was “reasonably necessary” to correct a misleading impression made by the defense’s argument. Contrary to the State’s contention, the Reid rule is not merely procedural, but a substantive principle of evidence that dictates what material is relevant and admissible. Such an exception is antithetical to the Confrontation Clause.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined, to note different circumstances under which a defendant can be deemed to have waived the right to confront adverse witnesses.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that because Hemphill did not raise his Sixth Amendment claim in the New York Court of Appeals, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review its decision.

[20-5279] Wooden v. United States Oct 04, 2021

Wooden v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 4, 2021.
Decided on Mar 7, 2022.

Petitioner: William Dale Wooden.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1997, William Wooden broke into a mini-storage facility in Georgia and stole from 10 different units, resulting in 10 counts of burglary, to which he pled guilty. Then, in 2014, a plainclothes officer went to Wooden’s home, where he witnessed Wooden in possession of a rifle. Wooden was arrested and charged in state court with being a felon in possession of a firearm, but the case was dismissed when the district attorney noted that there was no probable cause for Wooden’s arrest. Wooden was subsequently charged by federal indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(e). After Wooden was found guilty, the district court found during his sentencing hearing that Wooden qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on his conviction for the 10 counts of burglary, and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment accordingly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Wooden’s prior burglaries were separate from each other, despite occurring as part of a single criminal spree.

Question

Are offenses committed as part of a single criminal spree but sequentially in time “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Conclusion

Offenses committed as part of a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one offense for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion that was unanimous in the judgment to reverse the lower court.

The ordinary meaning of the word “occasion” does not require occurrence at precisely one moment in time. For example, an ordinary person would describe Wooden as burglarizing ten units “on one occasion” but would not say “on ten occasions, Wooden burglarized a unit in the facility.” And indeed “Wooden committed his burglaries on a single night, in a single uninterrupted course of conduct.” The history of the ACCA confirms this understanding, as Congress added an “occasions clause,” which requires that prior crimes occur on “occasions different from one another.” This interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of the ACCA, which is to address the “special danger” posed by the “armed career criminal”—a concern not presented by the situation of a single criminal episode.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurrence noting that on the facts, she agreed with the majority that Wooden’s prior convictions did not take place on “occasions different from one another” but also with Justice Neil Gorsuch’s point that the rule of lenity provides an independent basis for ruling in favor of a defendant in a closer case.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurrence explaining why the rule of lenity has played a limited role in the Court’s criminal case law and why the presumption of mens rea addresses Justice Gorsuch’s concern about fair notice.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Barrett agreed with the majority about the ordinary meaning of the word “occasion” but disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the statutory history.

Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Sotomayor joined in part. Justice Gorsuch argued that the rule of lenity provides a definitive rule of decision in these types of cases, in contrast to a list of factors to consider, which could lead to inconsistent outcomes in cases where the facts are less clear.

[143-orig] Mississippi v. Tennessee Oct 04, 2021

Mississippi v. Tennessee

Argued on Oct 4, 2021.
Decided on Nov 22, 2021.

Petitioner: State of Mississippi.
Respondent: State of Tennessee, et al..

Advocates:

John V. Coghlan (On Behalf of the Plaintiff)
David C. Frederick (On Behalf of the Defendant)
Frederick Liu (for the United States as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Overruling Plaintiff's Exceptions)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The State of Mississippi sued the State of Tennessee in 2014, alleging that Tennessee was taking Mississippi’s groundwater by allowing a Tennessee utility company to pump large amounts of groundwater from the Middle Claiborne Aquifer, which is located at the Mississippi-Tennessee border. Mississippi argues that the groundwater stored in the aquifer lies entirely within Mississippi and would never flow into Tennessee if it were not for the pumping. Mississippi expressly disclaims any equitable apportionment remedy, arguing that the principle does not apply to this dispute. Instead it seeks only damages and related relief. The Special Master recommended that the Court dismiss the complaint but grant Mississippi leave to amend its complaint to seek equitable apportionment.

Question

Is Mississippi entitled to damages, injunctive, and other equitable relief for the groundwater taken by Tennessee?

Conclusion

Mississippi is entitled only to the remedy of equitable apportionment, and since its complaint expressly disclaimed equitable apportionment, its complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Equitable apportionment is a judicial remedy that seeks to fairly allocate a shared water resource between two or more states. Although the Court has not previously considered whether the doctrine of equitable apportionment applies to interstate aquifers, it has applied the remedy when transboundary water resources were at issue, and the same reasoning applies. First, like other transboundary water resources, the Middle Claiborne Aquifer has a “multistate character.” Second, it contains water that naturally flows between the states. And third, actions taken in Tennessee affect the portion of the aquifer that underlies Mississippi. For these reasons, equitable apportionment applies to the waters of the Middle Claiborne Aquifer.

[20-5904] Terry v. United States May 04, 2021

Terry v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 4, 2021.
Decided on Jun 14, 2021.

Petitioner: Tarahrick Terry.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting reversal)
Adam K. Mortara (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “detectable” amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment with 6 years’ supervised release.

Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841(b)(1)(C), Terry’s offense was not a “covered offense.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Do pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act?

Conclusion

Crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) do not have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act because a sentence reduction under the Act is available only if an offender’s prior conviction of a crack cocaine offense triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.

An offender is eligible for a sentence reduction only if he previously received “a sentence for a covered offense,” which the Act defines as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by” certain provisions in the Fair Sentencing Act. The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties only for offenses that triggered mandatory-minimum penalties. Because Terry was convicted for an offense that does not have a mandatory minimum, his offense was not a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the Act.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. She expressly declined to join the majority’s “sanitized” description of the history of penalties for crack offenses and pointed out that because Terry was both convicted under subparagraph (C) and sentenced as a career offender, he never had a chance to ask for a sentence that reflects today’s understanding of the lesser severity of his crime, and he never will get that chance without action by the political branches.

[20-255] Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. Apr 28, 2021

Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 28, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.

Petitioner: Mahanoy Area School District.
Respondent: B. L., a Minor, By and Through Her Father, Lawrence Levy, and Her Mother, Betty Lou Levy.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
David D. Cole (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year.

B.L. sued the school under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the First Amendment prohibit public school officials from regulating off-campus student speech?

Conclusion

The First Amendment limits but does not entirely prohibit regulation of off-campus student speech by public school officials, and, in this case, the school district’s decision to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for posting to social media vulgar language and gestures critical of the school violates the First Amendment. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.

Although public schools may regulate student speech and conduct on campus, the Court’s precedents make clear that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression” when they enter campus. The Court has also recognized that schools may regulate student speech in three circumstances: (1) indecent, lewd, or vulgar speech on school grounds, (2) speech promoting illicit drug use during a class trip, and (3) speech that others may reasonably perceive as “bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school,” such as that appearing in a school-sponsored newspaper. Moreover, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held that schools may also regulate speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”

The school’s interests in regulating these types of student speech do not disappear when the speaker is off campus. Three features of off-campus speech diminish the need for First Amendment leeway: (1) off-campus speech normally falls within the zone of parental responsibility, rather than school responsibility, (2) off-campus speech regulations coupled with on-campus speech regulations would mean a student cannot engage in the regulated type of speech at all, and (3) the school itself has an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular off-campus expression because the free marketplace of ideas is a cornerstone of our representative democracy.

In this case, B.L. spoke in circumstances where her parents, not the school, had responsibility, and her speech did not cause “substantial disruption” or threaten harm to the rights of others. Thus, her off-campus speech was protected by the First Amendment, and the school’s decision to suspend her violated her First Amendment rights.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, explaining his understanding of the Court’s decision. Justice Alito argued that a key takeaway of the Court’s decision is that “the regulation of many types of off-premises student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns, and school officials should proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.”

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that schools have historically had the authority to regulate speech when it occurs off campus, so long as it has a proximate tendency to harm the school, its faculty or students, or its programs. Justice Thomas viewed the facts of this case as falling squarely within that rule and thus would have held that the school could properly suspend B.L. for her speech.

[19-1039] PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey Apr 28, 2021

PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 28, 2021.
Decided on Jun 29, 2021.

Petitioner: PennEast Pipeline Co. LLC.
Respondent: New Jersey, et al..

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast’s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state’s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA.

The district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government’s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast’s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Question

Does the Natural Gas Act delegate the federal government’s eminent-domain power, and does it abrogate state sovereign immunity in such cases?

Conclusion

Section 717(h) of the Natural Gas Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to delegate to a private company the power to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

States are generally immune from lawsuits unless they have consented or Congress has abrogated their immunity. With respect to the federal eminent domain power, the states waived their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution. That power carries with it the ability to condemn property in court. Because the Natural Gas Act delegates the federal eminent domain power to private parties, those parties can initiate condemnation proceedings, including against state-owned property. This understanding is consistent with the nation’s history and the Court’s precedents. Thus, PennEast’s condemnation of New Jersey land to build the pipeline does not offend state sovereignty.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Joining Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in full, Justice Gorsuch added only a clarification that states have two federal-law immunities from suit: structural immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The lower court should consider whether either type of immunity bars the suit.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett argued that Congress’s power to strip states of their sovereign immunity is extremely limited, and there is no reason to treat private condemnation actions as within one of those limited exceptions.

[20-472] HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association Apr 27, 2021

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association

Argued on Apr 27, 2021.
Decided on Jun 25, 2021.

Petitioner: HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al..
Respondent: Renewable Fuels Association, et al..

Advocates:

Peter D. Keisler (for the Petitioners)
Christopher G. Michel (for the federal Respondent)
Matthew W. Morrison (for the private Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011.

Question

To qualify for a hardship exemption under Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) of the Renewable Fuel Standards, must a small refinery have received uninterrupted, continuous hardship exemptions for every year since 2011?

Conclusion

A small refinery that previously received a hardship exemption may obtain an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse in exemption coverage in a previous year. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

Although the key term “extension” is not defined in the statute, three textual clues indicate that it means an extension in time. The plain meaning of the word “extension” in a temporal sense does not require unbroken continuity. Without modifiers like “successive” or “consecutive,” nothing in the statute suggests that a lapse in coverage precludes the extension.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Barrett argued that the question before the Court is simply whether the provision limits the EPA to prolonging exemptions currently in place, or instead allows the EPA to provide exemptions to refineries that lack them. Justice Barrett concluded that the text and structure of the statute make clear that the EPA cannot “extend” an exemption that a refinery no longer has.

[20-437] United States v. Palomar-Santiago Apr 27, 2021

United States v. Palomar-Santiago

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 27, 2021.
Decided on May 24, 2021.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Refugio Palomar-Santiago.

Advocates:

Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner)
Bradley N. Garcia (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Refugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013).

Palomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a § 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all.

The district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and that he was wrongfully removed from the United States. On appeal, the federal government disputed that circuit precedent required the result the district court reached but argued that the precedent is wrong. Lacking authority to overturn circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed without addressing the merits of the government’s claims.

Question

Is a defendant who has been charged with unlawful reentry into the United States after removal automatically entitled to the defense of invalid removal if he was removed for a crime that would not be considered a removable offense under current law in that circuit?

Conclusion

A defendant seeking dismissal of a prior deportation order must prove each statutory requirement for bringing such a collateral attack. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Section 1326(d) requires that defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation to the contrary—that the first two elements are not required if the noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable—is incompatible with the text of that provision. The first element, exhaustion of administrative remedies, exists “precisely so noncitizens can challenge the substance of immigration judges’ decisions.” Additionally, all of the requirements apply regardless of whether the defendant alleges the removal order was procedurally flawed or substantively invalid.

[19-251] Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta Apr 26, 2021

Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 26, 2021.
Decided on Jul 1, 2021.

Petitioner: Americans for Prosperity Foundation.
Respondent: Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California.

Advocates:

Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand)
Aimee A. Feinberg (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law.

In response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing demands were not the “least restrictive means” of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy “strict scrutiny.”

A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that “exacting scrutiny” rather than “strict scrutiny” was the appropriate standard, and “exacting scrutiny” requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.

Question

Does the policy of the California attorney general’s office requiring charities to disclose the names and addresses of their major donors violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court.

Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy is a type of restraint on freedom of association. Such a restraint is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Though the government-mandated disclosure regime need not be the “least restrictive means” of achieving the government’s interest, it must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve it.

California’s disclosure requirement is “dramatically mismatch[ed]” to the state’s interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing, imposing an unjustifiable “widespread burden on donors’ associational rights.”

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny to the disclosure requirement, leading to the same conclusion that it is facially invalid. However, Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s opinion that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito disagreed with the majority that precedents establish that exacting scrutiny applies in these types of cases. He noted that the outcome is the same under either level of scrutiny, so he would not decide what level of scrutiny applies.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority accepts, without requiring the plaintiffs to show, an actual First Amendment burden. In effect, Justice Sotomayor argued, the majority allows regulated entities to avoid obligations “by vaguely waving toward First Amendment ‘privacy concerns.’”

[20-382] Guam v. United States Apr 26, 2021

Guam v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 26, 2021.
Decided on May 24, 2021.

Petitioner: Territory of Guam.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner)
Vivek Suri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.”

In the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean.

In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill.

In 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011.

In 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump’s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam’s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a “cost-recovery” action and Section 113(f) allows for a “contribution” action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam’s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.

Question

Can Guam sue the Navy under CERCLA Section 113(f) over its contribution to the environmental hazards arising from the Ordot Dump?

Conclusion

Guam can pursue its lawsuit against the federal government over the cleaning costs associated with the Ordot Dump. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Subsection 113(f) allows a party to seek contribution “from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA” and provides that “a person who has resolved its liability to the United States . . . may seek contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in § 113(F)(2).” The language and structure of this statute support the interpretation that the right of contribution is predicated on CERCLA liability. Because the statutory language is best understood only in reference to CERCLA, the most natural reading of the provision is that a party may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a CERCLA-specific liability, not resolving environmental liability under some other law. Thus, the agreement between the EPA and Guam did not trigger the statute of limitations for seeking contribution.

[20-334] San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P. Apr 21, 2021

San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P.

Argued on Apr 21, 2021.
Decided on May 27, 2021.

Petitioner: City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities.
Respondent: Hotels.com, L.P., et al..

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
David B. Salmons (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel.

Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties." The OTCs’ proposed order stated that "costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39." San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order.

Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite.

Question

Do district courts have the discretion to deny or reduce appellate costs deemed “taxable” in district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e)?

Conclusion

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Rule 39 gives the courts of appeals discretion over the allocation of appellate costs, setting default rules that apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” These default rules and the language and structure of Rule 39 suggest that the appeals court makes all determinations as to the costs. This comprehensive scheme leaves no room for the district court to modify the appeals court’s allocation of costs, and indeed to read the Rule as giving the district court such power would undermine the authority of the appeals court to make the determination in the first place.

[20-440] Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. Apr 21, 2021

Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 21, 2021.
Decided on Jun 29, 2021.

Petitioner: Minerva Surgical, Inc..
Respondent: Hologic, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Robert N. Hochman (for the Petitioner)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Matthew M. Wolf (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding.

Both of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States.

Truckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system.

In 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement.

Question

May a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits?

Conclusion

A defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent can be barred under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from asserting a defense of invalidity if, and only if, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations the assignor made in assigning the patent. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

The doctrine of assignor estoppel dates back to late 18th-century England, and the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized and approved it in American jurisprudence in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924). The doctrine is grounded in a principle of fairness, that an inventor should not be able to assert invalidity of a patent he assigned but can merely argue about how to construe the patent’s claims.

The Court refused to abandon the doctrine of assignor estoppel entirely, finding that doing so would have broad effects that contradict many of the Court’s precedents. Moreover, the principle of fairness that originally grounded the doctrine applies equally still. Specifically, when an inventor warrants that a patent claim is valid and then assigns it to another, his denial of the validity violates norms of equitable dealing. However, to fully serve that purpose of fairness, the doctrine has its limits. If the assignor did not make explicit or implicit representations that conflict with the invalidity defense, there is no ground for applying assignor estoppel. In this case, the Federal Circuit erred by not considering whether Hologic’s new claim was materially broader than the ones Truckai had assigned, which would mean that Truckai could not have warranted its validity when making the assignment.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority avoids answering the essential threshold question whether Westinghouse should be overruled and thus cannot answer the question presented in the petition in this case. Justice Alito would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the majority recrafted a rule of assignor estoppel entirely different from that in Westinghouse. Because the Patent Act of 1952 does not incorporate the doctrine of assignor estoppel, Justice Barrett would hold the doctrine no longer applies.

[19-8709] Greer v. United States Apr 20, 2021

Greer v. United States

Argued on Apr 20, 2021.
Decided on Jun 14, 2021.

Petitioner: Gregory Greer.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

M. Allison Guagliardo (for the Petitioner)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment.

In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif.

On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer’s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review.

Question

May a federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.

Conclusion

A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion.

Rule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant can preserve a claim of error “by informing the court” of the claimed error when the relevant “court ruling or order is made or sought.” Rule 52(b) allows an appellate court to review for “plain error” “even though it was not brought to the court’s attention” if it “affects substantial rights.” Thus, the defendant must show that, if

the district court had correctly instructed the jury on the mental culpability element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted. If the defendant does not dispute the fact of his prior convictions, he has not met this burden. Such is the case here. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record—not just the record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor noted that the Court’s analysis does not extend to harmless-error review and that the knowledge-of-status element is an element just like any other, which the government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, while defendants seeking relief based on Rehaif errors bear must prove only plain error. She joined the majority as to Greer’s case but as to Gary in the consolidated case would vacate the judgment below and remand so the Fourth Circuit below could address the question whether Gary can prove that the error affected his substantial rights.

[20-444] United States v. Gary Apr 20, 2021

United States v. Gary

Argued on Apr 20, 2021.
Decided on Jun 14, 2021.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Michael Andrew Gary.

Advocates:

Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the Petitioner)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2017, Michael Andrew Gary was driving with his cousin when police pulled them over for running a red light. Gary admitted he was driving on a suspended license, so he was placed under arrest. Upon a search of his car, police found a loaded gun. He was charged under state law with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Five months later, Gary had another encounter with police, and upon consenting to a search, police found him in possession of a stolen firearm which Gary admitted was his. Gary was arrested and charged under state law with possession of a stolen firearm.

A federal grand jury indicted Gary on two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The state charges were dropped, and Gary pleaded guilty to the two federal charges. The district court advised Gary that if he proceeded to trial, the government would have to prove four elements, but did not mention that the government would also need to prove Gary was aware that he was a felon. Gary agreed with the prosecutor’s summary of the facts and entered a guilty plea.

Gary then appealed his sentence but did not challenge the conviction itself. While the appeal was pending, in 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, holding that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. Gary then submitted a letter raising the relevance of the Rehaif decision. After receiving supplemental briefings from the parties on the relevance of Rehaif, the court of appeals vacated Gary’s convictions and remanded to the district court. Because Gary had not challenged the validity of his plea in the district court, the court of appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision for plain error. The court found not only that the error was plain, but also that it was structural and thus necessarily affected the outcome of the proceedings, even without a showing of as much.

Question

Is a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a), automatically entitled to plain-error relief if the district court did not advise him that one element of that offense is knowledge of his status as a felon, regardless of whether he can show that the district court’s error affected the outcome of the proceedings?

Conclusion

A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion in the consolidated case, Greer v. United States, No. 19-8709.

[20-315] Sanchez v. Mayorkas Apr 19, 2021

Sanchez v. Mayorkas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 19, 2021.
Decided on Jun 7, 2021.

Petitioner: Jose Santos Sanchez, et al..
Respondent: Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al..

Advocates:

Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioners)
Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status (TPS) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General.

In 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally.

Question

Does the conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255?

Conclusion

The conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a does not constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, so recipients of such status are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Section 1255 provides a way for a “nonimmigrant”—that is, a foreign national who is lawfully present in the United States for a designated, temporary basis—to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR). One requirement for eligibility is an “admission” into the country, and “admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”

Entering the country via a provision of humanitarian law that bypasses the inspection and authorization procedure does not meet the requirement for “admission,” so those who are present in the country by that means are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents.

[20-543] Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation Apr 19, 2021

Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 19, 2021.
Decided on Jun 25, 2021.

Petitioner: Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury.
Respondent: Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, et al..

Advocates:

Matthew Guarnieri (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Jeffrey S. Rasmussen (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs).

In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.”

In 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any "Indian Tribe" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds.

Six federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not “Indian Tribes” within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not “recognized” as Indian tribes.

Question

Are Alaska Native regional and village corporations established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act “Indian Tribes” for purposes of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act?

Conclusion

Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) are “Indian tribe[s]” under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) and thus eligible for funding available to “Tribal governments” under Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

The majority determined that under the plain meaning of the ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) is the only statute the ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, so eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause. The respondents failed to demonstrate that the phrase “Indian tribe” is a term of art that should exclude ANCs, and none of their other arguments for reading “Indian tribes” as exclusive of ANCs were persuasive.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the plain language and construction of the ISDA suggest that ANCs are not “Indian tribes,” supported by analogy to another statute with “nearly identical language in remarkably similar contexts,” and that the majority overlooked the critical statutory word “recognized.”

[20-512] National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston Mar 31, 2021

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 31, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2021.

Petitioner: National Collegiate Athletic Association.
Respondent: Shawne Alston, et al..

Advocates:

Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioners)
Jeffrey L. Kessler (for the Respondents)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports.

Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits,” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA’s interest in “preserving amateurism,” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law.

Question

Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)’s prohibition on compensation for college athletes violate federal antitrust law?

Conclusion

The NCAA’s rules restricting certain education-related benefits for student-athletes violate federal antitrust laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch upheld the trial court’s ruling. The Court affirmed that the traditional “rule of reason” standard was appropriate in this case and rejected the NCAA’s call for a more deferential standard. Because the student-athletes who brought the lawsuit did not appeal the Ninth Circuit’s ruling upholding the NCAA’s rules “untethered to education,” the Court did not pass judgment on that aspect of the case.

In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Court clarified that a prior statement made in the 1984 case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma noting that the NCAA’s role in maintaining the “revered tradition of amateurism” was “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act” was not a shield against all challenges to compensation restrictions, as such rules were not even at issue in that case. Instead, there was nothing so unique about the NCAA or amateur sports to alter the traditional method of analysis applied to claims of antitrust violations.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that while other rules limiting student-athlete compensation unrelated to academics remain in place because they were not properly before the Court, this decision makes clear that the same traditional “rule of reason” analysis would apply. He concluded, “there are serious questions whether the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny.”

[20-297] TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez Mar 30, 2021

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 30, 2021.
Decided on Jun 25, 2021.

Petitioner: TransUnion LLC.
Respondent: Sergio L. Ramirez.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Samuel Issacharoff (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom U.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. “a terrorist list”). Ramirez and his wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez.

On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company’s actions violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a “potential match” for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party.

The jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million.

TransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first.

Question

Does either Article III of the Constitution or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permit a damages class action when the majority of the class did not suffer an injury comparable to that of the class representative?

Conclusion

Only a plaintiff concretely harmed by a defendant’s violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act has Article III standing to seek damages against that private defendant in federal court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion.

To have Article III standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show that she suffered concrete injury in fact, that the injury was fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling by the court. To show a concrete injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted harm is similar to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—i.e., a close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury.

Of the 8,185 class members, TransUnion provided third parties with credit reports containing OFAC alerts for only 1,853 individuals; these individuals have standing. The remaining 6,332 class members stipulated that TransUnion did not provide their credit information to any potential creditors during the designated class period and thus have failed to demonstrate concrete harm required for Article III standing. Mere risk of future harm is insufficient to establish standing.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Thomas argued that injury in law to a private right has historically been sufficient to establish “injury in fact” for standing purposes, and each class member in this case has demonstrated violation of their private rights.

Justice Kagan authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor arguing that Congress expressly allowed these plaintiffs to bring their claim of violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, yet the majority disallows them from doing so. Justice Kagan noted her slightly different understanding of the “concrete injury” requirement for Article III standing that Justice Thomas described in his dissent but suggested such a difference would not lead to a different outcome.

[20-222] Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System Mar 29, 2021

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Argued on Mar 29, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2021.

Petitioner: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al..

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Thomas C. Goldstein (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Shareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the company’s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did not apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that the shareholders relied on Goldman’s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman’s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption.

Question

1. May a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security?

2. Does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

Conclusion

While a defendant in a securities class action may point to the generic nature of the alleged misrepresentations to show that those statements had no impact on the price of the security in overcoming the Basic presumption, that defendant bears not only the burden of production, but also the burden of persuasion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion of the Court, in which she was joined in full by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Neil Gorsuch—joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito—concurred in part and in the judgment, while Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in part but dissented from the judgment.

Justice Barrett wrote, “The parties now agree, as do we, that the generic nature of a misrepresentation often in important evidence of price impact courts should consider at class certification” and not just at the merits phase of securities litigation. Because the Court concluded that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may not have properly considered the generic nature of the alleged statements, it vacated that court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. As for which party bears the burden of persuasion, the Court held that the Second Circuit properly allocated the burden to the defendant but noted that “the burden of persuasion should rarely be outcome determinative” at the class certification stage.

While concurring in the decision to remand the case because the Court of Appeal did not sufficiently consider the generic nature of the alleged misstatements, Justice Gorsuch disagreed that the defendant should bear the burden of persuasion in overcoming the Basic presumption.

Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, dissented from the Court’s judgment because she believed the Court of Appeal had, in fact, adequately considered the generic nature of the alleged misstatements before granting class certification. In other words, while she agreed with the entirety of the Court’s analysis of how to proceed, she believed that the Second Circuit had met that standard and would not have vacated its ruling.

[20-157] Caniglia v. Strom Mar 24, 2021

Caniglia v. Strom

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 24, 2021.
Decided on May 17, 2021.

Petitioner: Edward A. Caniglia.
Respondent: Robert F. Strom, et al..

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner)
Marc Desisto (for the Respondent)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Edward Caniglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Caniglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of “shoot me now.” Fearing for her husband’s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself.

Kim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Caniglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Caniglia agreed to. While Caniglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Caniglia’s guns, despite knowing that Caniglia did not consent to their seizure.

Caniglia was evaluated but not admitted as an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia’s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “community caretaking” as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the context of a vehicle search, whether that concept applies in the context of a private home was a matter of first impression within the First Circuit. The appellate court held that the doctrine does apply in the context of a private home and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Question

Does the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extend to the home?

Conclusion

The “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, described in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), does not extend to the home. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion, holding that police officers’ seizure of the petitioner’s guns from his home violated his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures.

The lower court’s conclusion that the “community caretaking” exception permitted the officers to seize the petitioner’s guns relied on an extension of Cady, which held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that vehicle searches are different in kind from home searches, the latter of which are subject to the highest level of protection the Constitution affords. The Court has repeatedly declined to expand the scope or number of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home, and it declined to do so here.

Chief Justice John Roberts authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, to clarify that the Court’s decision does not disturb the Court’s holding in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), that a peace officer does not need a warrant to enter a home in situations where there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion to note that while he agrees with the Court’s opinion, there are certain related questions the Court did not decide.

[19-1414] United States v. Cooley Mar 23, 2021

United States v. Cooley

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 23, 2021.
Decided on Jun 1, 2021.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Joshua James Cooley.

Advocates:

Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner)
Eric R. Henkel (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to be non-Native.”

Cooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native.

Question

May a police officer for a Native American tribe detain and search a non-tribe member within a reservation on suspicion of violating a state or federal law?

Conclusion

A tribal police officer has the authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-tribe member traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Native American tribes are “distinct, independent political communities” exercising a “unique and limited” sovereign authority within the United States. Among the limitations is the general lack of inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. However, the Court recognized two exceptions to this rule in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). First, a tribe may regulate the activities of non-tribal members “who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Second, a tribe may “exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” The authority at issue in this case aligns with the second exception “almost like a glove.” None of the policing provisions Congress has enacted fit the circumstances of this case as well as the Court’s understanding in Montana, and particularly the second exception. Rather, legislation and executive action appear to assume that tribes retain the detention authority presented in this case.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion noting that his agreement is limited to a narrow reading of the Court’s holding.

[20-107] Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid Mar 22, 2021

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 22, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.

Petitioner: Cedar Point Nursery, et al..
Respondent: Victoria Hassid, et al..

Advocates:

Joshua P. Thompson (for the Petitioners)
Michael J. Mongan (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances.

Cedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union ("the UFW") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not.

Sometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice.

Cedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Cedar Point appealed. Reviewing the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss de novo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the access regulation does not violate either provision, and it affirmed the lower court.

Question

Does the California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for unionization constitute a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

The California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for unionization constitutes a per se physical taking. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property for public use “without just compensation.” There are two types of takings: physical appropriations of land and imposition of regulations that restrict the landowner’s ability to use the land. Physical takings must be compensated. Use restrictions are evaluated using a flexible test developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which balances factors such as the “economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.”

In this case, the California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property is a physical taking. The regulation does not restrict the growers’ use of their own property, but instead appropriates the owners’ right to exclude third parties from their land, “one of the most treasured rights” of property ownership. By granting access to third-party union organizers, even for a limited time, the regulation confers a right to physically invade the growers’ property and thus constitutes a physical taking.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion describing another way the Court could have arrived at the same conclusion, using a different precedent.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the regulation does not physically appropriate growers’ property; rather, it temporarily regulates their right to exclude others and as such should be subject to the “flexible” Penn Central rule.

[19-1442] Carr v. Saul Mar 03, 2021

Carr v. Saul

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 3, 2021.
Decided on Apr 22, 2021.

Petitioner: Willie Earl Carr, et al..
Respondent: Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security.

Advocates:

Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioners)
Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Willie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his claim and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court.

While his case in the district court was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs are “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency.

In response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA’s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.

The district court agreed, vacating the SSA’s decision and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right to raise an Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court.

Question

Does a person seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act forfeit their ability to challenge the appointment of an administrative law judge under the Appointments Clause if they fail to present that challenge during administrative proceedings?

Conclusion

Persons seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act need not argue at the agency level that the administrative law judges hearing their disability claims were unconstitutionally appointed for that argument to be preserved on appeal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion.

Generally, administrative review schemes require parties to give the agency an opportunity to address an issue before seeking judicial review of that question, known as “issue exhaustion.” However, if there is not a statute or regulation that imposes an issue-exhaustion requirement, courts decide whether to require issue exhaustion in a manner consistent with “the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.” In this case, issue exhaustion was not necessary.

First, agency adjudications are not well suited to address structural constitutional challenges because such issues usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical expertise. Second, issue exhaustion is generally not required when the agency is unable to provide meaningful relief to resolve the issue. As such, the Courts of Appeals erred in imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement on petitioners’ Appointments Clause claims.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that there was no need for an exhaustion rule based solely on the conclusion that the proceedings bear little resemblance to adversarial litigation.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, noting that in his view, the “nonadversarial nature” of the agency’s procedures is generally irrelevant to whether the ordinary rule requiring issue exhaustion ought to apply.” However, the Appointments Clause challenges at issue fall into the well-established exceptions for constitutional and futile claims.

[19-1257] Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee Mar 02, 2021

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 2, 2021.
Decided on Jul 2, 2021.

Petitioner: Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al..
Respondent: Democratic National Committee, et al..

Advocates:

Michael A. Carvin (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1258 (Arizona Republican Party, et al.))
Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1257 (Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.))
Jessica R. Amunson (for Respondent Secretary Hobbs)
Bruce V. Spiva (for Respondents Democratic National Committee, et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location.

Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter’s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adversely and disparately affects Arizona’s Native American, Hispanic, and African American citizens.

Arizona law has permitted early voting for over 25 years, allowing voters to request an early vote-by-mail ballot either on a per-election basis or on a permanent basis. Some counties permit voters to drop their early ballots in special drop boxes, but all counties permit the return of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote center, or authorized election official’s office. Many voters (particularly minorities) who vote early use third parties to collect and drop off voted ballots, which, until 2016, was permissible. Despite “no evidence of any fraud in the long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona,” Republican legislators in 2016 passed H.B. 2023, which criminalized the collection and delivery of another person’s ballot. The DNC challenged H.B. 2023 as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was enacted with discriminatory intent.

After a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in favor of Arizona on all claims. The DNC appealed, and a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A majority of the full Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and the court reversed, finding the district court “clearly erred.”

Question

1. Does Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

2. Does Arizona’s H.B. 2023 violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Neither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

As a threshold matter, the petitioner, Arizona Attorney General Brnovich, has standing to appeal the decision below because he is an authorized representative of the state. Additionally, the Court declined to establish a test to govern all VRA § 2 challenges; its decision applies only to the facts of the cases below.

This is the first time the Court has considered how Section 2 of the VRA applies to time, place, or manner voting rules. The text of that provision prohibits a state from abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Although the statute requires equal openness and equal opportunity to vote, they are not separate requirements; equal openness is the “core.” This openness is assessed using the “totality of the circumstances.”

Neither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023, the ballot-collection law, violates Section 2 of the VRA. Neither imposes burdens on voters that exceed the “usual burdens of voting,” and any racial disparity in burdens is “small in absolute terms.” The state has legitimate and important interests in ensuring even distribution of voters among polling places and preserving the integrity of election procedures. Finally, the Court accepted the district court’s finding that H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose.

Justice Neil Gorsuch concurred with the majority opinion in full but wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, to note that the parties did not raise the question (and therefore the Court did not decide) whether the VRA provides an implied cause of action under Section 2.

Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan argued that the majority’s decision narrowly reads the language of Section 2 of the VRA in a way that undermines its essential purpose to guarantee that members of every racial group have equal voting opportunities.

[19-1434] United States v. Arthrex, Inc. Mar 01, 2021

United States v. Arthrex, Inc.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 1, 2021.
Decided on Jun 21, 2021.

Petitioner: United States.
Respondent: Arthrex, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States)
Mark A. Perry (for Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al.)
Jeffrey A. Lamken (for Arthrex, Inc.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a “hybrid proceeding” with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.”

Arthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem.

Question

1. Are administrative patent judges principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or inferior officers who may be appointed by a department head?

2. If they are principal officers, can they be rendered inferior officers by severing the portion of the Patent Act restricting their removal?

Conclusion

The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during inter partes review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined in that holding by Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.

Having found a constitutional violation, Chief Justice Roberts cured the defect by requiring that the Director of the USPTO hold the ultimate authority to review the final outcome of inter partes review proceedings--a departure from the statutory scheme passed by Congress. Though only Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined this part of the opinion, a concurring opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan approved of the remedy despite disagreeing with the holding that made it necessary.

Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. While he was part of the majority that held APJs wielded unconstitutional authority, his remedy would have been to invalidate the statutory scheme and send the problem to Congress for a fix that complied with the Constitution.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the majority’s approach. He concluded both that the APJs were inferior officers under the Constitution under the statutory scheme approved by Congress, and that the appropriate remedy once the Court held otherwise was to have vacated the decision of the APJs at the heart of the dispute.

[20-18] Lange v. California Feb 24, 2021

Lange v. California

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 24, 2021.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.

Petitioner: Arthur Gregory Lange.
Respondent: California.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner)
Samuel T. Harbourt (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur)
Amanda K. Rice (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car “playing music very loudly,” and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer activated his overhead lights, and Lange “failed to yield.” Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction.

Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable cause, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s garage. Lange’s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange’s motion to suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. Lange pled no contest and then appealed the denial of his suppression motion a second time. The appellate division affirmed Lange's judgment of conviction.

In the meantime, Lange filed a civil suit, asking the court to overturn the suspension of his license, and the civil court granted the petition after determining Lange's arrest was unlawful. The court reasoned that the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not justify the warrantless entry because when the officer entered Lange's garage, all the officer knew was that Lange had been playing his music too loudly and had honked his horn unnecessarily, which are infractions, not felonies.

Based on the inconsistent findings of the courts, Lange petitioned for transfer to the California Court of Appeal, which concluded that Lange's arrest was lawful and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Question

Does the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement apply when police are pursuing a suspect whom they believe committed a misdemeanor?

Conclusion

Pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not categorically qualify as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a police officer to obtain a warrant to enter a home, but under settled law, an officer may enter a home without a warrant under certain specific circumstances, including exigency. The Court has recognized exigent circumstances when an officer must act to prevent imminent injury, the destruction of evidence, or a felony suspect’s escape.

That a suspect is fleeing does not categorically create exigency. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Court recognized that the “hot pursuit” of a felony suspect created exigency that justified warrantless entry into a home. However, that case did not address hot pursuit of misdemeanor suspects. Rather, the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents support a case-by-case assessment of the exigencies arising from a particular suspect’s flight.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that the reasoning of the majority and that of Chief Justice John Roberts in his opinion concurring in the judgment are not so dissimilar as they might seem at first. Rather, cases involving fleeing misdemeanor suspects “will almost always” involve a recognized exigent circumstance” such that warrantless entry into a home is justified.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted that the general case-by-case rule described by the majority is subject to historical, categorical exceptions. Joined by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas also noted that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence discovered in the course of pursuing a fleeing suspect.

Chief Justice Roberts authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Samuel Alito joined. The Chief Justice argued that it is well established that the flight, not the underlying offense, justifies the “hot pursuit” exception.

[19-1155] Garland v. Dai Feb 23, 2021

Garland v. Dai

Argued on Feb 23, 2021.
Decided on Jun 1, 2021.

Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.
Respondent: Ming Dai.

Advocates:

Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent in No. 19-1156 (Alcaraz-Enriquez))
David J. Zimmer (for the Respondent in No. 19-1155 (Dai))

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility.

This case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156.

Question

Can a court of appeals presume that an immigrant’s testimony is credible and true if an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals did not specifically find that he was not credible?

Conclusion

A court of appeals cannot presume that an immigrant’s testimony is true or credible simply based on an absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that a court reviewing a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) accept “administrative findings” of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Coupled with the established principle that a reviewing court is “generally not free to impose” additional judge-made procedural requirements on agencies, this requirement means that so long as the record contains “contrary evidence” that a reasonable factfinder could find sufficient, a reviewing court may not overturn the agency’s factual determination.

Although another provision of the INA does describe a presumption of credibility on appeal, it notes that outside the appeal, there is no such presumption of credibility. However, a court’s review of decisions by the BIA is not an appeal in this context. The only “appeal” is from the immigration judge (IJ) to the BIA. Subsequent judicial review is not an appeal but a “petition for review”; as such, there is no presumption of credibility at that stage of review.

[142-orig] Florida v. Georgia Feb 22, 2021

Florida v. Georgia

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 22, 2021.
Decided on Apr 1, 2021.

Petitioner: Florida.
Respondent: Georgia.

Advocates:

Gregory G. Garre (for the Plaintiff)
Craig S. Primis (for the Defendant)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin.

Question

Is Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of fresh water into the Apalachicola Region?

Conclusion

Florida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.

To succeed on its claim, Florida must show by the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” that the harm it suffered—collapse of its oyster fisheries—was caused by Georgia’s overconsumption. The record evidence establishes at most that increased salinity and predation contributed to the collapse of Florida’s fisheries, not that Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity and predation. Thus, Florida failed to meet its burden of persuasion, so its exceptions to the findings of the Special Master’s report are overruled, and the case is dismissed.

[19-1189] BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Jan 19, 2021

BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 19, 2021.
Decided on May 17, 2021.

Petitioner: BP P.L.C., et al..
Respondent: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
Brinton Lucas (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Victor M. Sher (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against 26 oil and gas companies that Maryland says are partly responsible for climate change. The complaint asserted eight causes of action, all founded on Maryland law, and sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief. Two of the defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting eight grounds for removal. Baltimore then moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court rejected all eight grounds for removal and granted Baltimore’s motion for remand back to state court.

The defendants appealed the remand order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal of the suit.

Question

Does federal law permit a court of appeals to review any issue included in a district court’s order remanding a case to state court, or only the ground for removal?

Conclusion

A federal appellate court has jurisdiction to consider all of a defendant’s grounds for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-1 majority opinion of the Court.

Section 1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” In this case, the defendants had relied on the federal officer removal statute in § 1442, which is precisely one of the situations in which § 1447(d) permits an appeal. While the Fourth Circuit interpreted the provision as authorizing only the part of the district court’s order discussing § 1442, the ordinary meaning of § 1442—particularly the use of the word “order”—does not support that interpretation. Rather, § 1447(d) permits appellate review of the district court’s remand order without qualification. This conclusion is consistent with the Court’s most analogous precedent, Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), in which it held that another provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows a district court to certify “an order,” is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court. Finally, the Court found Baltimore’s policy arguments “cannot overcome a clear statutory directive.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court’s holding allows defendants to “sidestep” § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review simply by “shoehorning a § 1442 or § 1443 argument into their case for removal.” This, Justice Sotomayor argued, “lets the exception swallow the rule.”

Justice Samuel Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[19-1231] FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project Jan 19, 2021

FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 19, 2021.
Decided on Apr 1, 2021.

Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al..
Respondent: Prometheus Radio Project, et al..

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1231)
Helgi C. Walker (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1241)
Ruthanne M. Deutsch (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a collection of rules governing ownership of broadcast media, intended to promote “competition, diversity, and localism.” In 1996, in response to sentiment that the rules were overly restrictive, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, of which Section 202(h) required the Commission to review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis. The FCC’s performance of its duties under that section has been the subject of extensive litigation.

In 2017, the FCC issued an order eliminating altogether newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership rules, and making other substantial changes. It also announced its intention to adopt an incubator program, calling for comment on various aspects of the program. In August 2018, the FCC established a radio incubator program. Numerous parties filed petitions for review challenging various aspects of the FCC’s order. Among them, Petitioner Prometheus Radio Project argued that the FCC did not adequately consider the effect its rule changes would have on ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the FCC did “ostensibly” consider this issue, its analysis was “so insubstantial” that it cannot provide a “reliable foundation” for the FCC’s conclusions. As such, the Third Circuit vacated the bulk of the agency’s actions over the past three years as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit err in vacating as arbitrary and capricious the FCC’s orders that substantially changed its approach to regulation of broadcast media ownership?

Conclusion

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)’s 2017 decision to repeal or modify three of its media ownership rules was not arbitrary or capricious for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court.

The FCC has broad authority to regulate broadcast media “as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.” In considering whether to repeal or modify its existing ownership rules, the agency considered evidence in the record and reasonably concluded that the three ownership rules at issue were no longer necessary to serve the agency’s public interest goals of competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity, and that the rule changes were not likely to harm minority and female ownership. The FCC acknowledged the gaps in data on which it relied and noted that despite requesting data supporting the contention that harm would result to minority- and female-owned media companies, it received no such data. Because its decision was based on the record and was reasonable, its decision to repeal or modify three of its rules was not arbitrary or capricious.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to argue that the Third Circuit improperly imposed nonstatutory procedural requirements on the FCC by forcing it to consider ownership diversity in the first place.

[19-508] AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission Jan 13, 2021

AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission

Argued on Jan 13, 2021.
Decided on Apr 22, 2021.

Petitioner: AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al..
Respondent: Federal Trade Commission.

Advocates:

Michael Pattillo (on behalf of the Petitioners)
Joel R. Marcus (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Scott Tucker owned several companies that provided high-interest, short-term loans via several websites. The loans allegedly required customers to agree to terms that were obscured in several long, cross-referenced agreements. In April 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) filed a lawsuit against Tucker and his businesses in federal court in Nevada. The Commission alleged that Tucker’s loan business violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The Commission asked the court to enjoin Tucker from engaging in consumer lending and to order him to disgorge his profits from the scheme.

The court granted the Commission’s requested relief, enjoined Tucker from providing loans, and ordered him to pay approximately $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief to the Commission. The court instructed the Commission to direct “as much money as practicable” to “direct redress to consumers,” then to “other equitable relief” related to the practices described in the Commission’s complaint, and finally to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Tucker appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that the FTC Act authorizes district courts only to enter “injunctions,” and that the district court’s order to pay “equitable monetary relief” is not an injunction. The Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent squarely holds that § 13 of the FTC Act “empowers district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice.”

Question

Does Section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorize the FTC to demand monetary relief such as restitution?

Conclusion

Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Congress established the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 to enforce the Act’s prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” by initiating administrative proceedings under Section 5 of the Act. Section 13(b) of the Act, which Congress added in 1973, authorizes the Commission to obtain “in proper cases” a permanent injunction in federal court against “any person, partnership, or corporation” that the Commission believes “is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law” that the Commission enforces. In the late 1970s, the Commission began using Section 13(b) to obtain court orders in consumer protection cases without the prior use of the administrative proceedings in Section 5 of the Act, and in the 1990s, it extended that practice to seek monetary awards in antitrust cases. Today, the Commission frequently uses Section 13(b) to seek equitable monetary relief directly in court.

The Court concluded that the Commission’s practice effectively bypasses the process set forth in Section 5 and was not the intent of the Congress that enacted Section 13(b). The provision does not explicitly authorize the Commission to obtain court-ordered monetary relief, and such relief is foreclosed by the structure and history of the Act.

[19-968] Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski Jan 12, 2021

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 12, 2021.
Decided on Mar 8, 2021.

Petitioner: Chike Uzuegbunam, et al..
Respondent: Stanley C. Preczewski, et al..

Advocates:

Kristen Kellie Waggoner (on behalf of the Petitioners)
Hashim M. Mooppan (Counselor to the Solicitor General, for the United States, as amicus curiae)
Andrew A. Pinson (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In July 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), began distributing religious literature in an outdoor plaza on GGC’s campus. The campus police stopped him, however, citing GGC’s “Freedom of Expression Policy,” which stated that students were generally permitted to engage in expressive activities only in two designated speech zones, and only after reserving them.

Later, Uzuegbunam reserved one of the designated speech zones to speak to students about his religious beliefs, and campus police again stopped him. According to the police, he was exceeding the scope of his reservation by speaking in addition to handing out literature. After this incident, neither Uzuegbunam nor Joseph Bradford—another GGC student who wishes to speak publicly on campus about his religious beliefs—have attempted to speak publicly or distribute literature on campus.

Uzuegbunam and Bradford filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the school’s policies, both facially and as-applied, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also sought nominal damages for the violation of these rights. GGC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and while that motion was pending, GGC revised its “Freedom of Expression Policy” to allow students to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit, except in limited circumstances. It also removed the portion of its student code of conduct that Uzuegbunam and Bradford had challenged. After making these changes, the school filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot.

The district court dismissed the case as moot, concluding that the claims for nominal damages could not save otherwise moot constitutional challenges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Can an award of nominal damages by itself redress a past injury, or does revision of the unconstitutional policy render moot the constitutional challenge?

Conclusion

A constitutional challenge to a school policy that seeks nominal damages is not rendered moot if the constitutional policy is revised during litigation because an award of nominal damages can redress the past injury. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the 8-1 majority.

To satisfy the Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) they suffered an injury in fact, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) that the remedy sought from the Court would redress the injury. The parties did not dispute that Uzuegbunam had established the first two elements, leaving only the question whether the remedy he sought—nominal damages—can redress the constitutional violation that Uzuegbunam alleged occurred.

Common law demonstrates that while early English courts required a plaintiff to prove monetary damages, they later “reasoned that every legal injury necessarily causes damage,” so courts award nominal damages even if there is no evidence of other damages. At the time of the Constitution’s ratification, courts were already following the latter approach. Thus, an award of nominal damages does redress any legal injury.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority in full but wrote separately to note his agreement with the Chief Justice and the U.S. Solicitor General that “a defendant should be able to accept the entry of a judgment for nominal damages against it and thereby end the litigation without a resolution of the merits.”

Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the case is moot because the plaintiffs are no longer students, the challenged restrictions no longer exist, and the plaintiffs have not alleged actual damages. The Chief Justice noted that if nominal damages can preserve a live controversy to establish Article III standing, future plaintiffs have every incentive to “tack[] on a request for a dollar” to ensure that federal courts resolve their disputes.

[19-897] Johnson v. Guzman Chavez Jan 11, 2021

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 11, 2021.
Decided on Jun 29, 2021.

Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..
Respondent: Maria Angelica Guzman Chavez, et al..

Advocates:

Vivek Suri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Petitioners)
Paul W. Hughes (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Respondents are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders, which generally are not open to challenge. However, if a noncitizen has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders, the person may pursue withholding of removal. That is the remedy the respondents in this case sought, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of those withholding-only proceedings.

The respondents requested individualized bond hearings, which could lead to their release during the withholding-only proceedings. The government argued that they are not entitled to individualized bond hearings because they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and bond hearings were denied.

The noncitizens argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1231, governs their detention. Section 1226 provides for detention "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States" and allows for discretionary release on bond.

The district court ruled in favor of the noncitizens, finding that the text of the two statutes made clear that § 1226 applied. The court held that § 1231 does not come into play until the government has “the present and final legal authority to actually execute that order of removal.” A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Are the respondents—who were subject to reinstated removal orders, but with pending claims for withholding of removal—detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or under 8 U.S.C. § 1231?

Conclusion

Section §1231, not §1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Section 1231 authorizes detention “when an alien is ordered removed” and enters the “removal period,” which begins on “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” The presence of the word “administratively,” means DHS does not need to wait for the alien to seek or exhaust judicial review of that order. Even if the alien pursues withholding-only relief, the removal order remains in full force, and DHS retains the authority to remove the alien to any other authorized country. The validity of removal orders is not affected by the outcome of withholding-only proceedings. The statutory structure confirms this interpretation.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, concurring except as to the majority’s determination that it has jurisdiction to review the decision below. Justice Thomas argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear challenges to detention during the removal process but otherwise agreed with the majority’s opinion.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that it is unreasonable to infer, and statutory language does not support, that Congress intended to deny a bond hearing to individuals who reasonably fear persecution or torture, and who, as a result, face proceedings that may last for many months or years.

[19-422] Collins v. Yellen Dec 09, 2020

Collins v. Yellen

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 9, 2020.
Decided on Jun 23, 2021.

Petitioner: Patrick J. Collins, et al..
Respondent: Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury, et al..

Advocates:

Hashim M. Mooppan (on behalf of the federal parties)
Aaron L. Nielson (Court-appointed amicus curiae)
David H. Thompson (on behalf of the petitioners in 19-422 and the respondents in 19-563)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages, buy and sell mortgage-backed securities, and guarantee many of the mortgages in the United States. In 2005 and 2006, as the housing market was reaching its peak, Fannie and Freddie over-invested in risky mortgages in an attempt to compete with large investment banks and mortgage lenders. In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, during which Fannie and Freddie required billions of dollars in federal bailouts, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency to oversee the two GSEs. FHFA was to be led by a single director who could be fired by the President “for cause.”

Upon its creation, FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie in a conservatorship with itself as the conservator and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury. Under the agreements, the Treasury would invest billions of dollars in the GSEs in return for compensation consisting in part of fixed dividends. For several years, the GSEs’ dividend obligations exceeded their total earnings, requiring them to draw even more money from the Treasury. FHFA and Treasury negotiated and came up with the “Third Amendment,” which replaced the fixed dividend with a variable quarterly dividend equal to the GSEs’ net worth minus a specified capital reserve.

Collins and others are shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. They filed a lawsuit challenging the actions of FHFA, claiming the agency had destroyed the value of their ownership interests. The shareholders argued that FHFA had exceeded its authority under two federal statutes and that the structure of FHFA violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The district court dismissed the statutory claims and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claim. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the statutory claims but reversed the judgment as to the constitutional claim, finding that the structure of FHFA was unconstitutional but the remedy was to invalidate the provision addressing removal of FHFA’s director. In a deeply divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, affirmed as to one statutory claim, reversed as to the other statutory claim, held that FHFA’s structure violated the Constitution, and held that the appropriate remedy was to declare unconstitutional the removal provision, not to invalidate the Third Amendment.

Question

1. Did the shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac properly bring a claim under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008?

2. Does the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) structure violate the separation of powers?

3. If FHFA’s structure violates the separation of powers, what is the proper remedy for a final agency action that FHFA took when it was unconstitutionally structured?

Conclusion

1. Because the FHFA did not exceed its authority under the Recovery Act as a conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the anti-injunction provisions of the Recovery Act bar the statutory claim brought by shareholders of those entities.

2. The structure of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which restricts the President’s power to remove the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Director, violates the separation of powers.

3. It is unnecessary to set aside the entire Third Amendment, but the case is remanded for the lower court to determine the proper remedy based on the harms suffered.

Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.

The Court first considered whether the shareholders were barred from bringing their statutory claim. The Recovery Act contains a provision known as the anti-injunction provision, stating that unless review is specifically authorized by a provision or requested by the Director, “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” This provision applies only when the FHFA exercised its “powers or functions” “as a conservator or a receiver,” and not when it exceeds those powers or functions. When the FHFA agreed to the Third Amendment, it was acting in the best interests of the regulated entity or the Agency, as required by statute, and thus it was exercising authority granted to it by the Recovery Act. As such, the shareholders are barred from bringing their statutory claim.

The Court then considered the shareholders’ constitutional claim—that the Recovery Act violated the separation of powers by restricting the President’s power to remove the Director. As a threshold matter, the Court determined that the shareholders had standing to bring their claim and that their claim is not moot. Turning to the merits, the Court noted that its decision in Seila Law is “all but dispositive”; there, the Court held Congress could not limit the President’s power to remove the single director of an independent agency (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in that case). Just as the CFPB was in Seila Law, the FHFA is led by a single director, so Congress similarly cannot limit the President’s power to remove the director of the FHFA.

Finally, the Court considered the relief to which shareholders were entitled based on the success of their constitutional claim. Because the head of the FHFA apparently had the authority to carry out the functions of the office, the Court declined to hold that the Third Amendment must be completely undone and differentiated directors unconstitutionally appointed from those unconstitutionally insulated from removal. The parties disputed whether the unconstitutional restriction caused harm, so the Court remanded the issue for the lower courts to resolve.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but authored a concurring opinion to clarify that “the government does not necessarily act unlawfully even if a removal restriction is unlawful in the abstract.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the majority opinion except as to the question of retrospective relief. In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court should vacate the judgment below with instructions requiring the appellate court to set aside the Director’s ultra vires actions as “contrary to constitutional right” and criticized the Court’s attempt to differentiate unconstitutionally appointed directors from those unconstitutionally insulated.

Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan agreed with the majority that the FHFA acted within its statutory authority but argued that the Court could have reached the conclusion that the FHFA’s for-cause removal provision violates the Constitution on stare decisis alone, rather than using “faulty theoretical premises” that go “further than it needs to.”

Justice Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justice Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Court’s decision in Seila Law expressly distinguished the FHFA from the CFPB on the ground that the FHFA does not possess “regulatory or enforcement authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB.” As such, Seila Law should not determine the outcome in this case.

[19-963] Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Dec 08, 2020

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.

Argued on Dec 8, 2020.
Decided on Jan 25, 2021.

Petitioner: Henry Schein Inc..
Respondent: Archer and White Sales Inc..

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2019, the Court unanimously held in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. that under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court may not decide whether an arbitration agreement applies to the particular dispute if the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the question to an arbitrator, even if the court believes that the argument for arbitrability is “wholly groundless.” On remand the U.S. Court of Appeals again refused to compel arbitration, finding that the parties had delegated at least some questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Notably, the Fifth Circuit held that because the arbitration agreement included a provision exempting certain claims from arbitration, the agreement did not “clearly and unmistakably” delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator.

Question

Does an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negate an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator?

Conclusion

The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.

[19-511] Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid Dec 08, 2020

Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 8, 2020.
Decided on Apr 1, 2021.

Petitioner: Facebook, Inc..
Respondent: Noah Duguid.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Bryan A. Garner (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Noah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account.

Duguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid’s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook’s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an ATDS as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS “need not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers,” only that it “have the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.”

Question

Does the definition of an "automatic telephone dialing system" in the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 encompass any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “use a random or sequential number generator”?

Conclusion

Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” a device must have the capacity either to store or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion of the Court.

Section 227(a)(1) defines an autodialer as “equipment which has the capacity...to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such numbers.” Contrary to Duguid’s contention, the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies both verbs to “store” and to “produce” telephone numbers. Because Facebook’s notification system neither stores nor produces numbers “using a random or sequential number generator,” it is not an autodialer.

Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to caution about the majority’s overreliance on a canon of statutory construction, that “when there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”

[19-351] Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp Dec 07, 2020

Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 7, 2020.
Decided on Feb 3, 2021.

Petitioner: Federal Republic of Germany, et al..
Respondent: Alan Philipp, et al..

Advocates:

Jonathan M. Freiman (for the petitioners)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Nicholas M. O'Donnell (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (“SPK”), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then.

In 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers—respondents in this case—participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the “Advisory Commission”). In what the heirs describe as a “predetermined conclusion, and against the evidence,” the Advisory Commission recommended against restitution of the collection.

The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany and SPK appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s and SPK’s argument based on principles of international comity.

Question

1. Does the “expropriation exception” of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provide jurisdiction over claims that a foreign sovereign has violated international human-rights law when taking property from its own national within its own borders?

2. Does the doctrine of international comity preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in this case?

Conclusion

The expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3), incorporates the domestic takings rule, which recognizes that a foreign sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property is not a violation of international law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court.

FSIA immunizes foreign sovereigns from the jurisdiction of United States courts, subject to several specific exceptions, including the so-called expropriation exception, which abrogates immunity in any case “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3). The taking of property by a foreign sovereign from its own nationals, at issue in this case, does not violate international law because it does not interfere with relations among states. Known as the domestic takings rule, this principle has endured, notwithstanding developments in other areas of international human rights law. The text of FSIA’s expropriation exception supports this interpretation, as do other provisions of FSIA. Because Germany took property from its own citizens, that act did not violate international law and thus cannot be the basis for an exemption to sovereign immunity under the FSIA’s expropriation exemption.

[18-1447] Republic of Hungary v. Simon Dec 07, 2020

Republic of Hungary v. Simon

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 7, 2020.
Decided on Feb 3, 2021.

Petitioner: Republic of Hungary, et al..
Respondent: Rosalie Simon, et al..

Advocates:

Gregory Silbert (for the petitioners)
Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Sarah E. Harrington (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Rosalie Simon and other respondents in this case are Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Hungary. They sued the Republic of Hungary and other defendants in federal court in the United States seeking class certification and class-wide damages for property taken from them during World War II. Importantly, they did not first file a lawsuit in Hungary. Rather, they invoked the expropriation exemption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in claiming the federal court had jurisdiction, though their substantive claims arose from federal and D.C. common law.

The district court dismissed the suit, holding that FSIA's treaty exception grants the Hungarian defendants immunity, that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting the plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed under FSIA would conflict with the peace treaty's terms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the non-property claims and reversed as to the property-based claims. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether, as a matter of international comity, it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims until the plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies in Hungary.

On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, holding that international comity required that the plaintiffs first exhaust their claims in Hungary. Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed, noting that its intervening decision in Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany (2018) “squarely rejected” the comity-based ground for declining to exercise jurisdiction.

Question

Was it proper for the district court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons of international comity, because the plaintiffs made no attempt to exhaust local Hungarian remedies?

Conclusion

The Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings consistent with Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. ___ (2021).

[19-5807] Edwards v. Vannoy Dec 02, 2020

Edwards v. Vannoy

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 2, 2020.
Decided on May 17, 2021.

Petitioner: Thedrick Edwards.
Respondent: Darrel Vannoy, Warden.

Advocates:

Andre Belanger (for the petitioner)
Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent)
Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards’s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards’s conviction became final in 2010.

On April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana.

Question

Does the Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts, apply retroactively to cases on federal collateral review?

Conclusion

The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.

A decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral (habeas) review. Applying constitutional rules retroactively undermines the principle of finality, which is “critical to the operation of our criminal justice system.” However, two questions are relevant to the consideration whether a rule may be applied retroactively: (1) whether it is a new rule or applies a settled rule, and (2) whether it is a “watershed” procedural rule. New rules, as opposed to application of settled rules, ordinarily do not apply retroactively unless they are “watershed.” The “watershed” exception is “extremely narrow” and applies only when the new rule “alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” In fact, the only time the Court has recognized a new rule as being watershed was in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established the right to counsel.

First, the Ramos rule is new because it was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Second, Ramos presents none of the considerations for a watershed rule. The situation in Ramos does not support a different outcome from (1) other jury-unanimity cases that the Court did not apply retroactively, (2) other cases decided based on original meaning that the Court did not apply retroactively, and (3) other cases involving race discrimination that the Court did not apply retroactively.

As a new rule of criminal procedure, the jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas noted that the Court could alternatively have resolved the case by applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, in his view, leaves no room for a court to grant relief under the present facts.

Justice Gorsuch also filed his own separate concurring opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that the Court’s decision correctly eliminated the “watershed” exception that was never really an exception at all.

Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for not only misapplying the “watershed” exception in this case but also for going further and eliminating the exception altogether, preventing any procedural rule from ever benefiting a defendant on habeas review.

[19-930] CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service Dec 01, 2020

CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service

Argued on Dec 1, 2020.
Decided on May 17, 2021.

Petitioner: CIC Services, LLC.
Respondent: Internal Revenue Service, et al..

Advocates:

Cameron T. Norris (for the petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any "reportable transactions." IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors.

On November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties.

On March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

Question

Does the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bar challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates that are not taxes?

Conclusion

A lawsuit seeking to enjoin IRS Notice 2016–66 as an unlawful regulatory mandate does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act, even though a violation of the Notice may result in a tax penalty. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the filing of lawsuits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” CIC’s lawsuit challenged Notice 2016–66’s reporting obligations, which, alone, would place it clearly beyond the scope of the Act. However, a consequence for failing to report as required under the Notice is a tax penalty, which makes the result in this case less clear. However, when considering a “suit[’s] purpose,” a court looks not at the taxpayer’s subjective motive, but at the relief the suit requests. If the relief sought is an injunction against the collection or assessment of a tax, the Act prohibits it. Because CIC’s suit contests the legality of Notice 2016–66, not the statutory tax penalty, it is not prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. This conclusion is supported by public policy; allowing the lawsuit to proceed will not open the floodgates to pre-enforcement tax litigation.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Court’s conclusion might be different if CIC Services were a taxpayer instead of a tax advisor because of the slightly different role tax penalties play with respect to individual taxpayers.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion observing that, in his view, the Court’s ruling in this case established a rule that pre-enforcement suits challenging regulatory taxes or traditional revenue-raising taxes are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, but pre-enforcement suits challenging regulations backed by tax penalties are not barred, even if those suits might preclude the collection or assessment of a tax.

[19-416] Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I Dec 01, 2020

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I

Argued on Dec 1, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.

Petitioner: Nestlé USA, Inc..
Respondent: John Doe I, et al..

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (on behalf of the petitioners)
Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Paul L. Hoffman (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case).

Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor.

The children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and absolute” can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is “universal.” It did not address the defendants’ argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the claims alleging aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS.

In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute.

Question

1. May an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that activity?

2. Does the judiciary have the authority under the Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations?

Conclusion

To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity; the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding is reversed, and the case is remanded. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court concluded that the respondents here improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS.

The Court’s precedents establish “a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” First, a court must presume that a statute applies only domestically and ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication” that rebuts this presumption. Second, where the statute does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.” The ATS does not rebut the presumption, so the question is whether the relevant conduct occurred in the United States.

Nearly all the conduct that the respondents describe as aiding and abetting forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. As the Court made clear in Kiobel, “mere corporate presence” and activity are not sufficient to support domestic application of the ATS. As such, the respondents did not plead sufficient facts to support domestic application of the ATS.

Joined only by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas wrote that the respondents’ suit fails for a separate reason: the Court cannot create a cause of action—only Congress may do that.

Justice Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, which Justices Alito and Justice Kavanaugh joined in (different) parts. Justice Gorsuch, joined only by Justice Alito, argued that nothing in the ATS supports the notion that corporations are immune from suit. Then, joined only by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch argued that courts lack discretion to create new causes of action under the ATS and should stop doing so.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that Justice Thomas’s interpretation of ATS as limited to the three international law torts that were recognized in 1789 contravenes the Court’s express holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), as well as the text and history of the ATS.

Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic corporation.

[19-783] Van Buren v. United States Nov 30, 2020

Van Buren v. United States

Argued on Nov 30, 2020.

Petitioner: Nathan Van Buren.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Nathan Van Buren was a sergeant with the Cumming, Georgia, Police Department. In that capacity, he came to know a man named Andrew Albo, who allegedly paid young prostitutes to spend time with him and then accused the women of stealing the money he gave them. Van Buren asked Albo for a loan, falsely claiming that he needed over $15,000 to settle his son’s medical bills. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, Albo recorded the conversation in which Van Buren requested the loan. Albo presented the recording to a detective in the Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office, alleging that Van Buren was “shaking him down for his money.” As a result, the FBI conducted a sting operation to test how far Van Buren was willing to go for money. As part of the sting operation, Albo asked Van Buren to look into a woman Albo named, to see whether she was an undercover officer before he would provide Van Buren with the full amount of money Van Buren requested. Van Buren searched the woman’s information in a government database maintained by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and the FBI. The next day, FBI and GBI agents confronted Van Buren, and Van Buren admitted to the fake story about his son to get the loan from Albo, his use of the government database to search for the woman Albo mentioned might be an undercover officer, and that he understood the purpose of searching the database was to discover and reveal to Albo whether the woman was an undercover officer.

A federal grand jury charged Van Buren with one count of honest-services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, and one count of felony computer fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. A jury convicted Van Buren on both counts, and Van Buren appealed his convictions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the jury instructions as to the honest-services count were fatally flawed and remanded that charge for a new trial. It found no deficiencies in the conviction for computer fraud and affirmed that conviction, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a person with authority to access a computer can be guilty of computer fraud if that person subsequently misuses the computer.

Question

Does a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violate Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses that information for an improper purpose?

[20-366] Trump v. New York Nov 30, 2020

Trump v. New York

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 30, 2020.
Decided on Dec 18, 2020.

Appellant: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al..
Appellee: New York, et al..

Advocates:

Jeffrey B. Wall (on behalf of the Appellants)
Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of the State Appellees)
Dale E. Ho (on behalf of the private Appellees)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of "aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status." The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number.

Immediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the "Governmental Plaintiffs"); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws.

The federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as “persons in” a “State” as Congress used those words.

Question

1. Does a group of states and local governments have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a July 21, 2020, memorandum by President Donald Trump instructing the secretary of commerce to include in his report on the 2020 census information enabling the president to exclude noncitizens from the base population number for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives?

2. Is the memorandum is a permissible exercise of the President’s discretion under the provisions of law governing congressional apportionment?

Conclusion

In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the plaintiffs in this case had not shown standing and that their claims were not ripe for adjudication. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

For a federal court to have jurisdiction to hear a case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they have standing, which requires “an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Further, the case must be “ripe”—that is, it must not depend on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”

Although the President clearly expressed his desire to exclude unlawfully present noncitizens from the apportionment base “to the extent practicable,” it remains mere conjecture whether and how the Executive Branch might eventually implement this general statement of policy. Moreover, the plaintiffs had suffered no concrete harm from the policy itself, because the policy “does not require them ‘to do anything or to refrain from doing anything.’” As such, the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated Article III standing or that the case is ripe for review.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plaintiffs did have standing based on its own precedents in census cases, which have recognized standing based on a substantial risk of anticipated apportionment harm. Justice Breyer also argued that the question is ripe for resolution, and as such, that the plaintiffs should prevail on the merits because “the plain meaning of the governing statutes, decades of historical practice, and uniform interpretations from all three branches of Government demonstrate that aliens without lawful status cannot be excluded from the decennial census solely on account of that status.”

[19-840] California v. Texas Nov 10, 2020

California v. Texas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 10, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.

Petitioner: The State of California, et al..
Respondent: The State of Texas, et al..

Advocates:

Michael J. Mongan (for California, et al.)
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the U.S. House of Representatives)
Kyle D. Hawkins (for Texas, et al.)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate.

The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review.

Question

Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which now has a penalty of zero for not buying health insurance?

If the plaintiffs have standing, is the individual mandate unconstitutional?

If the individual mandate is unconstitutional, is it severable from the remainder of the ACA?

Conclusion

The plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s minimum essential coverage provision. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

To have standing to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” No plaintiff in this case has shown such an injury.

With respect to the individual plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged—past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires—not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly unlawful conduct. There is no penalty for noncompliance, only the statute’s unenforceable language, which alone is insufficient to establish standing.

With respect to the state plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged not traceable to the government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. The state plaintiffs alleged direct and indirect injuries. The states alleged indirect injuries in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs, but they failed to show how an unenforceable mandate would cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. The states alleged direct injuries in the form of increased administrative and related expenses, but those expenses are the result of other provisions of the Act, not §5000A(a) and are thus not fairly traceable to the conduct alleged.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, praising Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in this case (describing the “epic Affordable Care Act trilogy”) but stopping short of agreeing with his opinion in its entirety because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs lack standing in this case.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that Texas and the other state plaintiffs have standing and that because the “tax” imposed by the individual mandate is now $0, the mandate cannot be sustained under the taxing power.

[19-546] Brownback v. King Nov 09, 2020

Brownback v. King

Argued on Nov 9, 2020.
Decided on Feb 25, 2021.

Petitioner: Douglas Brownback, et al..
Respondent: James King.

Advocates:

Michael R. Huston (for the petitioners)
Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges.

King then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim.

The district court found that King failed to prove one of the six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King’s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King’s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Question

Does the judgment bar provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) prevent a plaintiff whose FTCA claim against the government failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction from filing another action, against the same defendants and arising from the same set of facts and injuries, under Bivens?

Conclusion

The district court’s order dismissing King’s FTCA claims was a judgment on the merits and thus triggered the Act’s judgment bar to block his Bivens claims. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The FTCA’s judgment bar was drafted “against the backdrop doctrine of res judicata,” or claim preclusion, and so a judgment on the merits will trigger that bar. A dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a “quintessential” merits decision because it signifies that the undisputed facts fail to establish all the elements of the FTCA claims. Although the question is “complicated” by the jurisdictional effect of a failure to state a claim, the Court noted that when the pleading of a claim and the pleading of jurisdiction coincide, as in this case, “a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to note that the Court “does not today decide whether an order resolving the merits of an FTCA claim precludes other claims arising out of the same subject matter in the same suit.

[19-863] Niz-Chavez v. Garland Nov 09, 2020

Niz-Chavez v. Garland

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 9, 2020.
Decided on Apr 29, 2021.

Petitioner: Augusto Niz-Chavez.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.

Advocates:

David J. Zimmer (for the petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture.

After a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board.

Question

Under Section 1229(a), must the government serve a specific document that includes all required information, or may the government serve that information over the course of multiple documents?

Conclusion

The government must serve a single document that includes all the required information for the notice to appear to trigger the IIRIRA’s stop-time rule. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

Section 1229b(d)(1) states that the stop-time rule is triggered “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a),” and Section 1229(a) states that “written notice...shall be given...to the alien...specifying” the time and place of his hearing, among other listed items. The singular article “a” (as in “a notice”) means, to an ordinary reader, a single document containing the required information, not a series of such document with the information spread across them.

The IIRIRA’s statutory structure confirms this interpretation. For example, it refers to “the Notice” and “the time of the notice” in other nearby provisions (emphasis added). Its history, too, supports this reading. In passing the IIRIRA, the Congress intentionally changed the law from authorizing the government “to specify the time and place for an alien’s hearing ‘in the order to show cause or otherwise’” to requiring that the “time and place information...be included in a notice to appear, not ‘or otherwise.’”

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, arguing that the government’s provision of notice in two documents, as was the case here, should be sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule.

[19-123] Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Nov 04, 2020

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 4, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.

Petitioner: Sharonell Fulton, et al..
Respondent: City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al..

Advocates:

Lori H. Windham (for the petitioners)
Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for respondents Philadelphia et al.)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents Support Center for Child Advocates and Philadelphia Family Pride)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children.

The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion.

Question

1. To succeed on their free exercise claim, must plaintiffs prove that the government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views, or only provide sufficient evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable?

2. Should the Court revisit its decision in Employment Division v. Smith?

3. Does the government violate the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs?

Conclusion

The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Philadelphia’s actions burdened CSS’s religious exercise by forcing it either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, in violation of its stated religious beliefs. Although the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that neutral, generally applicable laws may incidentally burden religion, the Philadelphia law was not neutral and generally applicable because it allowed for exceptions to the anti-discrimination requirement at the sole discretion of the Commissioner. Additionally, CSS’s actions do not fall within public accommodations laws because certification as a foster parent is not “made available to the public” in the usual sense of the phrase. Thus, the non-discrimination requirement is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.

The Court pointed out that the question is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an exception to CSS. The Court concluded that it did not.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined and in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined as to all but the first paragraph. Justice Barrett acknowledged strong arguments for overruling Smith but agreed with the majority that the facts of the case did not trigger Smith.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would overrule Smith, replacing it with a rule that any law that burdens religious exercise must be subject to strict scrutiny.

Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, criticizing the majority’s circumvention of Smith.

[19-5410] Borden v. United States Nov 03, 2020

Borden v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 3, 2020.
Decided on Jun 10, 2021.

Petitioner: Charles Borden, Jr..
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompass crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness?

Conclusion

The “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) does not encompass reckless aggravated assault. Justice Elena Kagan authored the four-justice plurality opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment to reverse and remand the case.

The elements clause of the ACCA defines “violent felony” as an offense requiring the “use of physical force against the person of another.” According to the plurality, the phrase “against another” requires conduct directed at another individual. Recklessness, which is the disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, cannot be directed at another individual and so cannot meet the definition of a violent felony.

Justice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, reasoning that reckless aggravated assault is not a violent felony under the ACCA because the “use of physical force...has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm.” Justice Thomas argued that the reckless conduct at issue in this case falls within the ACCA’s residual clause, which the Court (erroneously, in his view) struck down.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the plurality “disregards bedrock principles and longstanding terminology of criminal law, misconstrues ACCA’s text,” and “overrides Congress’s judgment about the danger posed by recidivist violent felons.”

[18-1259] Jones v. Mississippi Nov 03, 2020

Jones v. Mississippi

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 3, 2020.
Decided on Apr 22, 2021.

Petitioner: Brett Jones.
Respondent: Mississippi.

Advocates:

David M. Shapiro (for the petitioner)
Krissy C. Nobile (for the respondent)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment require a sentencing authority to find that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before it may impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole?

Conclusion

A sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who committed a homicide when they were under 18. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “a sentencer [must] follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.” And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the Court stated that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.” Taken together, these two cases refute Jones’s argument that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of life without parole. The Court noted that it expresses neither agreement nor disagreement with Jones’s sentence, and its decision does not preclude states from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving juvenile commission of homicide.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court should have reached the same outcome by declaring that Montgomery was incorrectly decided.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority effectively circumvents stare decisis by reading Miller to require only “a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth is considered.” Under Montgomery, sentencing discretion is necessary, but under Miller, it is not sufficient. Rather, a sentencer must actually make the judgment that the juvenile is one of those rare children for whom life without parole is a constitutionally permissible sentence.

[19-199] Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board Nov 02, 2020

Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board

Argued on Nov 2, 2020.
Decided on Feb 3, 2021.

Petitioner: Manfredo Salinas.
Respondent: United States Railroad Retirement Board.

Advocates:

Sarah M. Harris (for the petitioner)
Austin L. Raynor (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (“the Board”) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board’s denial became a final decision on February 9, 2007.

Nearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas’s petition.

Question

Does a decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim constitute a “final decision” subject to judicial review?

Conclusion

A decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim is subject to judicial review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion.

The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA) “makes judicial review under the RRA available to the same extent that review is available” under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA). The RUIA allows any person “aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section” to “obtain a review of any final decision of the Board.” Because Salinas’s 2006 application was the “terminal event” in the Board’s administrative review process and substantively affected Salinas’s benefits and the Board’s obligations under RRA, the denial was a “final decision of the Board” under RUIA and thus subject to judicial review. This conclusion is bolstered by the plain text of § 335(f), which authorizes judicial review of “any” final decision, and even if the text were ambiguous, there is a “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.”

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas argued that while the majority may correctly interpret RUIA, the RRA’s provision is critically different. RUIA explains how to obtain judicial review, but RRA separately defines what may be reviewed. The dissent argued that the statutory language of RRA limits judicial review to Board decisions determining rights or liabilities, so its denial of Salinas’s claim was outside the scope of review.

[19-547] U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club Nov 02, 2020

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 2, 2020.
Decided on Mar 4, 2021.

Petitioner: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al..
Respondent: Sierra Club, Inc..

Advocates:

Matthew Guarnieri (for the petitioners)
Sanjay Narayan (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Industrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially cause significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action.

The Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA’s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the “deliberative process privilege.” The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records.

Question

Does Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, by incorporating the deliberative process privilege, protect against compelled disclosure of a federal agency’s draft documents that were prepared as part of a formal interagency consultation process under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and that concerned a proposed agency action that was later modified in the consultation process?

Conclusion

The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) an agency’s in-house draft biological opinions that are both predecisional and deliberative, even if the drafts reflect the agencies’ last views about a proposal. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

The deliberative process privilege of Exemption 5 of FOIA protects from disclosure “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” The rationale behind the exemption is to encourage officials to communicate candidly with each other during the deliberative process. However, it does not apply to documents reflecting the final agency decision. Documents are “predecisional” if they were generated before the agency’s final decision on the matter and “deliberative” if prepared to help the agency formulate its position.

The documents at issue in this case were drafts of biological opinions because “more work needed to be done.” As such, they could not have been generated before the agency’s final decision had been made. That the recommendations ultimately proved to be the last word does not affect their status as “predecisional.”

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that in the specific context of the rulemaking processes of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, so-called Draft Biological Opinions reflect “final” decisions regarding the “jeopardy” the EPA’s then-proposed actions would have caused, and as such, would normally fall outside, not within, Exemption 5.

[19-292] Torres v. Madrid Oct 14, 2020

Torres v. Madrid

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 14, 2020.
Decided on Mar 25, 2021.

Petitioner: Roxanne Torres.
Respondent: Janice Madrid, et al..

Advocates:

Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Petitioner)
Rebecca Taibleson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand)
Mark D. Standridge (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.

In October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Must physical force used to detain a suspect be successful to constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion.

Under the Court’s precedents, common law arrests are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and the application of force to the body of a person with intent to restrain constitutes an arrest even if the arrestee escapes. The use of a device, here, a gun, to effect the arrest, makes no difference in the outcome; it is still a seizure. There is no reason to draw an “artificial line” between grasping an arrestee with a hand and using some other means of applying physical force to effect an arrest. The key consideration is whether the conduct objectively manifests the intent to restrain; subjective perceptions are irrelevant. Additionally, the requirement of intent to restrain lasts only as long as the application of force. In this case, the officers’ conduct clearly manifested intent to restrain Torres and was thus a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that “neither the Constitution nor common sense” support the majority’s definition of a seizure.

[19-438] Pereida v. Wilkinson Oct 14, 2020

Pereida v. Wilkinson

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 14, 2020.
Decided on Mar 4, 2021.

Petitioner: Clemente Avelino Pereida.
Respondent: Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General.

Advocates:

Brian P. Goldman (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida’s petition for review.

Question

Does a criminal conviction bar a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is ambiguous as to whether it corresponds to an offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act?

Conclusion

A nonpermanent resident seeking to cancel a lawful removal order must show that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense when the statutory conviction on his record is ambiguous regarding whether a disqualifying offense formed the basis of his conviction. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-3 majority opinion.

The Court first looked to the text of the relevant provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A), which states that “an alien applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish” that he “satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements” and thus deserves a favorable exercise of discretion to cancel the removal order. One of these requirements is that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense, such as crimes involving “moral turpitude.” Failure to show even one of these requirements is a failure to meet one’s burden, so Pereida’s failure to prove that the basis of his conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude meant he failed to meet his burden. This interpretation is supported as well by the context of the INA and a similar requirement of noncitizens who seek admission.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should apply the so-called “categorical approach” to determine the nature of a crime that a noncitizen was convicted of committing—an approach the Court has “clearly and repeatedly” embraced in the INA context. That approach would require a judge to look only at certain specified documents, and unless those documents show the crime of conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, the judge must find the conviction was not such a crime. Following that approach in this case would result in a finding that Pereida was not convicted for a disqualifying crime.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[19-108] United States v. Briggs Oct 13, 2020

United States v. Briggs

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 13, 2020.
Decided on Dec 10, 2020.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Michael J.D. Briggs.

Advocates:

Jeffrey B. Wall (for the petitioner)
Stephen I. Vladeck (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be “tried and punished at any time without limitation.” In contrast, other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not “punishable by death” and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge below. Briggs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces err in concluding—contrary to its own longstanding precedent—that the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows prosecution of a rape that occurred between 1986 and 2006 only if it was discovered and charged within five years?

Conclusion

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in concluding that the five-year statute of limitations applies to the prosecution of rape. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion on behalf of a unanimous (8-0) Court.

The UCMJ exempts offenses “punishable by death” from the statute of limitations for prosecutions. Even though the offense of rape is no longer punishable by death, the context of that phrase implies that the offense itself is still not subject to the statute of limitations that applies to other offenses. First, the UCMJ is a “uniform” code, which means that it generally refers only to other provisions within the UCMJ itself, rather than external sources of law. The “most natural place” to determine whether rape was “punishable by death” and thus exempt from the statute of limitations is the UCMJ itself. Second, statutes of limitations are intended to provide clarity, and having to consider “all applicable law” to determine whether an offense is punishable by death obscures, rather than clarifies, the filing deadline. Finally, it is “unlikely” that lawmakers would want a statute of limitations to refer to judicial interpretations of such provisions, given that the purposes of statutes of limitations differ from the ends served courts’ Eighth Amendment analysis.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion to opine that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the CAAF but expressing agreement with the majority on the merits.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[19-357] City of Chicago v. Fulton Oct 13, 2020

City of Chicago v. Fulton

Argued on Oct 13, 2020.
Decided on Jan 14, 2021.

Petitioner: City of Chicago, Illinois.
Respondent: Robbin L. Fulton, et al..

Advocates:

Craig Goldblatt (for the petitioner)
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Eugene R. Wedoff (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton’s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. The City filed an unsecured proof of claim, and the bankruptcy court confirmed Fulton’s plan. The City then amended its proof of claim and asserted its status as a secured creditor. It refused to return Fulton’s vehicle, and Fulton filed a motion for sanctions against the City.

The bankruptcy court held that the City was obligated to return the vehicle under Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), a binding case in which the Seventh Circuit had held that a creditor must comply with the automatic stay and return a debtor’s vehicle upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition. The City moved to stay the order in federal district court, and the court denied its request. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment denying the City's request.

Question

Does the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C § 362, require that an entity that is passively retaining possession of property in which a bankruptcy estate has an interest return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition?

Conclusion

The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits only affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, not the mere passive retention of possession of the debtor’s property. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous (8-0) opinion of the Court.

Section 362(a)(3) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. The most natural understanding of that language is that it prohibits affirmative acts that would affect the estate property. To read it as the Respondents propose would render superfluous the § 542’s “central command”—that an entity in possession of certain estate property “shall deliver to the trustee … such property.” Additionally, the Respondents’ proposed interpretation would mean that § 362(a)(3) required turnover at the same time that § 542 exempted it.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[18-956] Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc. Oct 07, 2020

Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc.

Argued on Oct 7, 2020.
Decided on Apr 5, 2021.

Petitioner: Google LLC.
Respondent: Oracle America, Inc..

Advocates:

Thomas C. Goldstein (for the petitioner)
E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the respondent)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

When Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google’s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).

Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Google’s petition for certiorari.

Upon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law.

Question

1. Does copyright protection extend to a software interface?
2. If so, does the petitioner’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitute fair use?

Conclusion

Assuming a software interface may be subject to copyright protection, Google’s limited copying of the Java SE Application Programming Interface constituted a fair use of that material under copyright law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-2 majority opinion.

Copyright law aims to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by simultaneously granting creators exclusive copyrights and limiting the scope of such rights through the fair use doctrine. To decide no more than necessary to resolve the case, the Court assumed that software code is subject to copyright protection.

Courts consider four statutory factors in evaluating whether a secondary use is fair. First, Google’s use of the Java APIs is transformative. Google copied only what was necessary to allow programmers to work in a different computing environment but with a familiar programming language. Second, the copied lines are “inherently bound together with uncopyrightable ideas,” suggesting that the application of fair use to this context is unlikely to undermine the general copyright protection that Congress provided for computer programs. Third, Google copied only .4% of the entire API, weighing in favor of fair use. Finally, the record shows that Google’s new smartphone platform is not a market substitute for Java SE. Because all four factors support a finding of fair use, Google’s limited copying constituted fair use.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the Court should have addressed the question whether Oracle’s code is copyrightable. Justice Thomas would have concluded that it is, and then he would have found that Google’s use of that copyrighted code was not fair. By copying Oracle’s code, Google “erased 97.5% of the value of Oracle’s partnership with Amazon, made tens of billions of dollars, and established its position as the owner of the largest mobile operating system in the world.”

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[19-368] Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court Oct 07, 2020

Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 7, 2020.
Decided on Mar 25, 2021.

Petitioner: Ford Motor Company.
Respondent: Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al..

Advocates:

Sean Marotta (for the petitioner)
Deepak Gupta (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch.

The personal representative of Gullett’s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.

For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant’s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities within the state.

Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana.

The district court denied Ford’s motion to dismiss, finding a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there.

This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19-369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question.

Question

May a state court, consistent with the Due Process Clause, exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when none of the defendant’s contacts with that state caused the plaintiff’s claims?

Conclusion

The state courts in this case properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of the connection between plaintiffs’ product-liability claims arising from car accidents occurring in each plaintiff’s state of residence and Ford’s activities in those states. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a state court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Such exercise requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum state that the maintenance of a suit there is reasonable. Despite Ford’s argument to the contrary, this requirement establishes no “causation” requirement. That is, for jurisdiction to attach, it is not necessary that the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. Rather, the Court’s precedents require only that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford’s substantial presence in the states (advertising, selling, and servicing those two car models, even if not the two specific vehicles involved in this case) establishes minimum contacts, and it does not matter that those contacts did not cause the plaintiffs’ injuries.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court need not focus on the words “relate to” as an independent basis for specific jurisdiction, and that doing so “risks needless complications.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch argued against the majority’s focus on the phrase “relate to” and elaborated on the “needless complications” referenced by Justice Alito in his concurrence.

[19-71] Tanzin v. Tanvir Oct 06, 2020

Tanzin v. Tanvir

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 6, 2020.
Decided on Dec 10, 2020.

Petitioner: FNU Tanzin, et al..
Respondent: Muhammad Tanvir, et al..

Advocates:

Edwin S. Kneedler (for the petitioners)
Ramzi Kassem (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the U.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national “No Fly List,” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in U.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”

The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges.

Question

Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, permit lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal employees?

Conclusion

The express remedies of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permit litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous (8-0) Court.

RFRA states that persons may sue and “obtain appropriate relief against a government,” including officials of the United States. In using this language, RFRA adopts a meaning of the word “government” different from its ordinary meaning—one that encompasses individual officials. The phrase “appropriate relief” is “open-ended,” and monetary damages have long been awarded as an appropriate form of relief. Thus, the best understanding of RFRA is that it permits lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal officials.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[18-540] Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association Oct 06, 2020

Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association

Argued on Oct 6, 2020.

Petitioner: Leslie Rutlege, Arkansas Attorney General.
Respondent: Pharmaceutical Care Management Association.

Advocates:

Nicholas J. Bronni (for the petitioner)
Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Seth P. Waxman (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2015, the legislature of Arkansas passed a law regulating the conduct of pharmacy benefits managers ("PBMs")—the entities that serve as intermediaries between health plans and pharmacies—in an attempt to address the trend in that state of significantly fewer independent and rural-serving pharmacies. PBMs perform numerous functions in this rule, including creating a maximum allowable cost ("MAC") list which sets reimbursement rates to pharmacies dispensing generic drugs. As a result of contracts between PBMs and some pharmacies, some other pharmacies might actually lose money on a particular prescription transaction. The Act sought to address this and other situations where the conduct of PBMs could cause harm to pharmacies.

Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA), a pharmacy trade association, filed a lawsuit on behalf of its members claiming, among other arguments, that Arkansas Act 900 is preempted by both ERISA and Medicare Part D. The district court found that ERISA did preempt some portions of the Act but that Medicare Part D did not preempt the Act.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Act 900 was preempted by both ERISA and Medicare Part D. The appellate court noted that ERISA broadly preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plans." Because Act 900 “both relates to and has a connection with employee benefit plans,” ERISA preempts it.

Question

Does ERISA preempt an Arkansas law regulating pharmacy benefit managers’ drug-reimbursement rates?

[19-309] Carney v. Adams Oct 05, 2020

Carney v. Adams

Argued on Oct 5, 2020.
Decided on Dec 10, 2020.

Petitioner: John C. Carney, Governor of Delaware.
Respondent: James R. Adams.

Advocates:

Michael W. McConnell (for the petitioner)
David L. Finger (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

James R. Adams is a resident of Delaware and member of that state’s bar. Adams considered applying for a judicial position but ultimately decided not to because the state required the candidate to be a Republican, and Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat.

Adams filed a lawsuit against the governor, challenging the provision of the Delaware Constitution that limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. First, the district court held Adams had Article III (“constitutional”) standing as to some, but not all of the provisions, but that because he had prudential standing to the other provisions, it would consider his challenge as to all of them. Turning to the merits, the district court noted that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel, a government employer may not make employment decisions based on political allegiance except with respect to policymakers. The court found that a judge’s job is to apply, rather than create, the law, and thus that judges do not fall within the policymaking exception of Elrod and Burns. As such, the court found the provision unconstitutional in its entirety.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed only as to the provisions for which Adams lacked Article III standing.

Question

1. Does the plaintiff in this case have Article III standing to challenge Delaware’s judicial service requirements?

2. Does a state law that effectively limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican parties violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Because Adams had not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to demonstrate Article III standing to challenge the Delaware Constitution’s political balance requirement for appointments to the State’s major courts. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous (8-0) opinion of the Court.

Article III standing requires that an “injury in fact” be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” In this context, Adams needed to show that he was likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future, which required a showing that he was “able and ready” to apply. He did not adequately make this showing, supporting his claim only with two statements he made that he wanted to be a judge without other supporting evidence of his intent to do so. As such, his grievance is generalized and does not meet the requirement for an “injury in fact.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion expressing her agreement that Adams did not demonstrate Article III standing. In anticipation that the constitutional questions raised in the case were likely to be raised again, she highlighted two considerations that “may inform their answers”: the possibility of material difference between the “major party” requirement and the “bare majority” requirement, and a question of the severability of those two requirements.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[65-orig] Texas v. New Mexico Oct 05, 2020

Texas v. New Mexico

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 5, 2020.
Decided on Dec 14, 2020.

Petitioner: Texas.
Respondent: New Mexico.

Advocates:

Kyle D. Hawkins (for the State of Texas)
Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for the State of New Mexico)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting New Mexico)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination.

In 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico.

When the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30-day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss.

Question

1. Did the River Master err in retroactively amending the River Master Manual?

2. Did the River Master err in charging Texas for evaporative losses?

Conclusion

Texas’s motion to review the Pecos River Master’s determination is denied. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.

New Mexico’s motion for credit for the evaporated water was not untimely. As Texas and New Mexico agreed to postpone the River Master’s resolution of the evaporated water issue, neither party may now object to the negotiation procedure the River Master outlined for resolving the dispute. Additionally, Texas’s request that Net Mexico store water at a facility in New Mexico was based on Texas’s understanding that the water belonged to Texas.

Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the Court’s rejection of Texas’s argument that New Mexico forfeited any objection to the River Master’s 2014 report because it did not file an objection by the deadline imposed by the amended decree. However, he would vacate and remand the case for the River Master to redo his analysis in accordance with the relevant terms of the amended decree and the manual.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[19-465] Chiafalo v. Washington May 13, 2020

Chiafalo v. Washington

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 13, 2020.
Decided on Jul 6, 2020.

Petitioner: Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John.
Respondent: State of Washington.

Advocates:

Lawrence Lessig (for the petitioners)
Noah Purcell (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $1,000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “winner-take-all” electoral system, which means that all of a state’s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state.

In the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton/Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $1,000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law.

The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed.

This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19-518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020.

Question

Does a state law requiring presidential electors to vote the way state law directs or else be subject to a fine violate the electors’ First Amendment rights?

Conclusion

A state may constitutionally enforce a presidential elector’s pledge to support his party’s nominee—and the state voters’ choice—for President. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion that was unanimous in the judgment.

Article II, §1 gives the States the authority to appoint electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” which the Court has interpreted as conveying to the states “the broadest power of determination” over who becomes an elector. The Twelfth Amendment, which also addresses the Electoral College, only sets out the electors’ voting procedures. Thus, the appointment power of the states is extensive, and nothing in the Constitution prohibits states from taking away the discretion of presidential electors’ discretion, as Washington does. The history of voting in this country supports the conclusion that electors do not have the discretion to vote however they like; indeed “long settled and established practice” of voting in this nation requires finding that electors are required to vote for the candidate whom the state’s voters have chosen.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, but for a different reason. Justice Thomas disagreed with the Court that Article II determines the outcome in this case; he would resolve this case by simply recognizing the principle enshrined in the Tenth Amendment that “[a]ll powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the States are controlled by the people of each State.” Justice Neil Gorsuch joined as to the discussion of the Tenth Amendment.

[19-518] Colorado Department of State v. Baca May 13, 2020

Colorado Department of State v. Baca

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 13, 2020.
Decided on Jul 6, 2020.

Petitioner: Colorado Department of State.
Respondent: Micheal Baca, et al..

Advocates:

Philip J. Weiser (for the petitioner)
Jason Harrow (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Michael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich were appointed as three of Colorado’s nine presidential electors for the 2016 general election. Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for the winner of the popular vote in the state for President and Vice President. When Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in that state, instead of casting his vote for her, Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich. The Colorado Secretary of State discarded his vote and removed him as an elector. As a result, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton, despite their desire to vote for John Kasich.

The three presidential electors sued the Colorado Department of State, alleging that the law requiring presidential electors to vote for the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in that state violates their constitutional rights under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed the action, finding the electors lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and in the alternative, because the electors failed to state a legal claim because the Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring electors to vote for the winner of the state’s popular vote. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court as to Mr. Baca’s standing, but reversed as to the standing of the other two electors who did not cast their votes in violation of the law. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding the state’s removal of Mr. Baca and nullification of his vote were unconstitutional.

Question

1. Do the petitioners in this case, the presidential electors, have judicial standing to sue the state of Colorado over a law requiring them to vote in the Electoral College for the winner of the popular vote in that state?

2. Is that Colorado law unconstitutional?

Conclusion

In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court reversed the judgment of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit below, for the reasons stated in Chiafalo v. Washington. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in that case, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor took no part in the decision of this case.

[19-715] Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP May 12, 2020

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 12, 2020.
Decided on Jul 9, 2020.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, et al..
Respondent: Mazars USA, LLP, et al..

Advocates:

Patrick Strawbridge (for the petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Douglas N. Letter (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, the accounting firm for Donald Trump (in his capacity as a private citizen) and several of his businesses, demanding private financial records belonging to Trump. According to the Committee, the requested documents would inform its investigation into whether Congress should amend or supplement its ethics-in-government laws. Trump argued that the information serves no legitimate legislative purpose and sued to prevent Mazars from complying with the subpoena.

The district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding the Committee possesses the authority under both the House Rules and the Constitution.

In the consolidated case, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19-760, two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives—the Committee on Financial Services and the Intelligence Committee—issued a subpoena to the creditors of President Trump and several of his businesses. The district court denied Trump’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent compliance with the subpoenas, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part and remanded in part.

Question

Does the Constitution prohibit subpoenas issued to Donald Trump’s accounting firm requiring it to provide non-privileged financial records relating to Trump (as a private citizen) and some of his businesses?

Conclusion

The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

The Court first acknowledged that this dispute between Congress and the Executive is the first of its kind to reach the Court and that the Court does not take lightly its responsibility to resolve the issue in a manner that ensures “it does not needlessly disturb ‘the compromises and working arrangements’ reached by those branches. Each house of Congress has “indispensable” power “to secure needed information” in order to legislate, including the power to issue a congressional subpoena, provided that the subpoena is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.” However, the issuance of a congressional subpoena upon the sitting President raises important separation-of-powers concerns. The standard advocated by the President—a “demonstrated, specific need”—is too stringent. At the same time, the standard advocated by the House—a “valid legislative purpose”—does not adequately safeguard the President from an overzealous and perhaps politically motivated Congress.

Rather than adopt either party’s approach, the Court proposed a balancing test that considers four factors. First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose requires involving the President and his papers, or whether the information is available elsewhere. Second, courts should consider whether the subpoena is no broader than reasonably necessary in scope so as to still serve Congress’s legislative purpose. Third, courts should evaluate the evidence Congress has offered to “establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose”—the more “detailed and substantial,” the better. Finally, courts should assess what burdens a subpoena imposes on the President.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that Congress can never issue a legislative subpoena for private, unofficial documents.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that even accepting the balancing test adopted by the majority, the House subpoenas should fail without a greater showing from the House as to each of the four considerations outlined by the majority.

[19-635] Trump v. Vance May 12, 2020

Trump v. Vance

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 12, 2020.
Decided on Jul 9, 2020.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.
Respondent: Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al..

Advocates:

Jay Alan Sekulow (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Carey R. Dunne (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The district attorney of New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did not apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue and remanded the case to the lower court.

Question

Does the Constitution permit a county prosecutor to subpoena a third-party custodian for the financial and tax records of a sitting president, over which the president has no claim of executive privilege?

Conclusion

Article II and the Supremacy Clause neither categorically preclude, nor require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. All nine justices agreed that a President does not have absolute immunity from the issuance of a state criminal subpoena, but a seven-justice majority voted to affirm the decision of the Second Circuit below.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice noted from the outset that the Supreme Court has long held that the President is subject to subpoena in federal criminal proceedings. In this case, the question was whether the President has absolute immunity from state criminal subpoenas. The Court held in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), that federal criminal subpoenas do not rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions, and here, it rejected the President’s argument that state criminal subpoenas pose a unique and greater threat. A properly tailored state criminal subpoena will not hamper the performance of a President’s constitutional duties, there is nothing inherently stigmatizing about a President performing a normal citizen’s duty of furnishing information relevant to a criminal investigation, and the risk that subjecting sitting Presidents to state criminal subpoenas will make them targets for harassment is minimal given that federal law allows for a President to challenge allegedly unconstitutional influences. For these reasons, the Constitution does not categorically preclude the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.

Next the Court turned to the question whether a state grand jury subpoena must satisfy a heightened need standard, finding that it does not, for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Burr v. United States (1807) made clear that a President “stands in nearly the same situation with any other individual” with respect to production of private papers. Second, the President in this case did not show that the protection of a heightened need standard is necessary to allow him to fulfill his Article II functions. Third, absent a need for protection, the public interest in fair and effective law enforcement weighs in favor of comprehensive access to evidence. Still, the President has multiple avenues to challenge the subpoena under state law if it is issued in bad faith or is unduly broad. Thus, the Constitution does not require a heightened need standard for a state grand jury subpoena.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, noting that he would apply the standard articulated in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)—that the prosecutor demonstrate a specific need for the President’s information.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which he looked to the text of the Constitution to find no support for the President’s claim of absolute immunity from the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. However, he drew a distinction between immunity from issuance of the subpoena and relief against its enforcement. Based on this distinction, Justice Thomas would vacate and remand.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion in which he characterized the issue in the case as necessarily implicating the broader question whether the Constitution imposes restrictions on a State’s deployment of its criminal law enforcement powers against a sitting President. Justice Alito would grant the President greater protection from state law enforcement powers than the majority’s opinion does.

[18-9526] McGirt v. Oklahoma May 11, 2020

McGirt v. Oklahoma

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 11, 2020.
Decided on Jul 9, 2020.

Petitioner: Jimcy McGirt.
Respondent: Oklahoma.

Advocates:

Ian H. Gershengorn (for the petitioner)
Riyaz A. Kanji (for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Mithun Mansinghani (for the respondent)
Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.

Question

Can a state prosecute an enrolled member of the Creek Tribe for crimes committed within the historical Creek boundaries?

Conclusion

Land reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th century remains “Indian country” under the Major Crimes Act (MCA), which grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to try certain major crimes committed by enrolled members of a tribe on that land. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Jimcy McGirt.

The Court first noted that all parties agreed that McGirt’s crimes were committed on lands described as belonging to the Creek Nation in an 1866 treaty and federal statute. Though the early treaties did not refer to the Creek lands as a “reservation,” the Court has held that similar language in treaties from the same era was sufficient to create a reservation. An 1856 treaty promised that “no portion” of Creek lands “would ever be embraced or included within, or annexed to, any Territory or State” and that the Creek Nation would have the “unrestricted right of self-government,” with “full jurisdiction” over enrolled Tribe members and their property.

Once a federal reservation is established, only Congress can diminish or disestablish it through a “clear expression of congressional intent.” The Court acknowledged that Congress has broken many promises to the Tribe but none has manifested “clear expression of congressional intent” to disestablish the Creek Reservation. The Court rejected Oklahoma’s argument that Congress never established a reservation in the first place, finding that such a conclusion “would require willful blindness to the statutory language.” The Court also rejected Oklahoma’s argument that the Oklahoma Enabling Act transferred jurisdiction from federal courts to state courts as contrary to the plain terms of the MCA. The mere fact that Oklahoma has been exercising jurisdiction in these cases does not make it in any more correct. Indeed, “unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law.”

Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. The dissent accused the majority of examining the statutes in isolation rather than considering a broader inquiry, which would have led to the conclusion that a reservation did not exist when McGirt committed his crimes.

Justice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion to argue that the Court had no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals because it rests on adequate and independent state ground.

[19-267] Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru May 11, 2020

Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 11, 2020.
Decided on Jul 8, 2020.

Petitioner: Our Lady of Guadalupe School.
Respondent: Agnes Morrissey-Berru.

Advocates:

Eric C. Rassbach (for the petitioners)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru was an teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School and brought a claim against the school under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school on the basis that Morrissey-Berru was a “minister.” In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court first recognized a ministerial exception, which exempts religious institutions from anti-discrimination laws in hiring employees deemed “ministers.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Morrissey-Berru was not a “minister”; she had taken one course on the history of the Catholic church but otherwise did not have any religious credential, training, or ministerial background. Given that she did not hold herself out to the public as a religious leader or minister, the court declined to classify her as a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.

Question

Do the First Amendment’s religion clauses prevent civil courts from adjudicating employment-discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer, when the employee carried out important religious functions but was not otherwise a “minister”?

Conclusion

The “ministerial exception,” which derives from the religion clauses of the First Amendment, prevents civil courts from adjudicating the former employee's discrimination claims in this case, and in the consolidated case, St. James School v. Biel, against the religious schools that employed them. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

Courts generally try to stay out of matters involving employment decisions regarding those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions, and the Court formally first recognized this principle, known as the “ministerial exception,” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC. In that case, the Court considered four factors before reaching its conclusion that the employee was a “minister” for purposes of an exception to generally applicable anti-discrimination laws. However, the Court expressly declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.” The factors relied upon in Hosanna-Tabor were specific to that case, and courts may consider different factors to decide whether another employee is a “minister” in another context. The key inquiry is what the employee does. Educating young people in their faith, which was the responsibility of the plaintiffs in these two cases, is at the very core of a private religious school’s mission, and as such, Morrissey-Berru and Biel qualify for the exception recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that courts should “defer to religious organizations’ good-faith claims that a certain employee’s position is ‘ministerial.’”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, arguing that the Court incorrectly classified the teachers as “ministers,” given that the teachers taught primarily secular subjects, lacked substantial religious titles and training, and were not even required to be Catholic. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor argued, the majority’s approach “has no basis in law and strips thousands of schoolteachers of their legal protections.”

[19-631] Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc. May 06, 2020

Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc.

Argued on May 6, 2020.
Decided on Jul 6, 2020.

Petitioner: William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission.
Respondent: American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the petitioners)
Roman Martinez (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act—the automatic call ban—prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban: automated calls “for emergency purposes” and those made to a cell phone with “the prior express consent of the called party.” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban.

The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review (testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a "compelling state interest," that the law is "narrowly tailored" to achieving this compelling purpose, and that the law uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve that purpose) to the debt-collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt-collection exemption does not satisfy that level of review. Finding that the provision was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision.

Question

1. Does a provision of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 exempting government debt collection calls from the ban on automated calls violate the First Amendment?

2. If so, is that provision severable from the rest of the Act?

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s judgment—that the robocall restriction’s government-debt exception in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) violates the First Amendment but is severable from the remainder of the statute—is affirmed.

A majority of the justices—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh—believed that the statute at issue regulated speech based on its content and was thus subject to strict scrutiny. In their view, the law is a content-based restriction because it favors speech made for the purpose of collecting government debt over political and other speech. Under strict scrutiny, a law must be “necessary” to achieve a “compelling” state interest and must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve that interest. Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion applying strict scrutiny and concluding that the government-debt exception fails this level of scrutiny because the Government did not sufficiently justify the differentiation between government-debt collection speech and other categories of robocall speech, such as political speech, issue advocacy, etc.

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan argued in multiple opinions that the speech at issue in this case was commercial speech and thus restrictions on such speech were subject only intermediate scrutiny. Under this test, the restriction must only be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment because, in her view, the provision at issue failed intermediate scrutiny. She argued that the government did not adequately explain “how a debt-collection robocall about a government-backed debt is any less intrusive or could be any less harassing than a debt-collection robocall about a privately backed debt.” In contrast, Justice Breyer’s partial dissent argued that the provision at issue does satisfy intermediate scrutiny, noting that the effect of the law is to disadvantage non-governmental debt collectors, who are already subject to substantial regulation, and the law is narrowly tailored to protect “the public fisc”—an important government interest.

A majority of the Court—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh—found the provision severable from the rest of the Act. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented from this conclusion, arguing that the doctrine of severability amounts to rewriting legislation.

[19-431] Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania May 06, 2020

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 6, 2020.
Decided on Jul 8, 2020.

Petitioner: The Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home.
Respondent: Commonweath of Pennsylvania and State of New Jersey.

Advocates:

Noel J. Francisco (for the petitioners in 19-454)
Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner in 19-431)
Michael J. Fischer (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Women’s Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that women's health insurance include coverage for preventive health care, including contraception. The rule provided that a nonprofit religious employer who objects to providing contraceptive services may file an accommodation form requesting an exemption to the requirement, thereby avoiding paying for or otherwise participating in the provision of contraception to its employees.

In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the Supreme Court held that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), closely-held for-profit corporations were also entitled to invoke the exemption if they had sincere religious objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage. Then, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, (2014), the Court held that an entity seeking an exemption did not need to file the accommodation form; rather, its notification to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was sufficient to receive the exemption. HHS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury promulgated a final rule in compliance with these rulings.

Then, in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __ (2017), the Court considered another challenge to the rule, which asserted that merely submitting the accommodation notice “substantially burden[ed] the exercise of their religion,” in violation of RFRA. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declined to reach the merits of that question.

In 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services under the Trump administration promulgated regulations that greatly expanded the entities eligible to claim an exemption to the requirement that group health insurance plans cover contraceptive services. The new rules, which the agencies promulgated without issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking or soliciting public comment, expanded the scope of the religious exemption and added a “moral” exemption.

Pennsylvania and New Jersey challenged the rules in federal district court, alleging that they violate the Constitution, federal anti-discrimination law, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After a hearing and reviewing evidence, the district court issued a nationwide injunction enjoining the rules’ enforcement, finding the states were likely to succeed on their APA claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

This case is consolidated with a similar case, Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454, presenting the same legal question.

Question

Did the federal government lawfully exempt religious objectors from the regulatory requirement to provide health plans that include contraceptive coverage?

Conclusion

The Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury had the authority under the ACA to promulgate the religious and moral exemptions, and they promulgated those exemptions consistent with the manner required under the Administrative Procedure Act. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the five-justice majority opinion.

First, the Court considered whether the Departments had the statutory authority to promulgate the rules. The relevant provision of the ACA states requires insurers provide women “additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)].” The Court interpreted this “as provided for” language to be a broad grant of authority and discretion to decide what counts as preventive care and screenings, including the ability to identify and create exemptions. Because it found the ACA gave the Departments the authority to promulgate these exceptions, it did not need to consider whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) required or authorized the exceptions. Nonetheless, it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA because of the likelihood of conflict between the contraceptive mandate and RFRA.

Then, the Court considered whether the Departments had violated the procedural requirements of the APA. The Court rejected the argument that the procedure was defective due to the Departments’ naming the relevant document “Interim Final Rules with Request for Comments” instead of “General Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.” Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the rule was invalid because the Departments had failed to keep an open mind during the notice-and-comment period. Open-mindedness is not a requirement of the APA.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito argued that the Court should have gone further and ruled “not only that it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA, but also that the Departments were required by RFRA to create the religious exemption (or something very close to it).”

Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. In Justice Kagan’s view, the language of the ACA granting HRSA’s authority was ambiguous, and the doctrine of Chevron deference requires the Court to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute—that HRSA had the power to create exemptions from the contraceptive mandate. Though concurring in the Court’s judgment, Justice Kagan would remand the case for the lower court to determine whether the exemptions are the product of reasoned decision-making, or instead are arbitrary and capricious.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court reached the wrong conclusion, that the language of the Women’s Health Amendment authorizes HRSA to determine only the type of women’s health services, not to undermine the statutory directive to provide such services at a minimum. Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court’s decision would immediately cause “between 70,500 and 126,400 women” to lose access to no-cost contraceptive services.

[19-177] United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. May 05, 2020

United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.

Argued on May 5, 2020.
Decided on Jun 29, 2020.

Petitioner: United States Agency for International Development, et al..
Respondent: Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Christopher G. Michel (for the petitioners)
David W. Bowker (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Alliance for Open Society International and other organizations receive funding from the U.S. government to help with their mission of fighting HIV/AIDS abroad. The government provides the funds on the condition that “no funds be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” In U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., decided in 2013, the Court held that the condition compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Although the government consequently did not apply the condition to Alliance for Open Society International, it continued to apply the condition to the organization’s foreign affiliates. The organization sued, asking for permanent injunctive relief. The district court granted the requested relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the Court’s decision in U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc.—which holds that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enforcing a law that would have required U.S.-based organizations that receive federal funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad to “have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking”—imply that Congress may not enforce that law with respect to entities not directly involved in that case?

Conclusion

Because the foreign affiliates of American nongovernmental organizations possess no First Amendment rights, the federal law restricting funding to organizations with “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking,” 22 U.S.C. §7631(f), is not unconstitutional as applied to them. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-3 majority opinion.

Foreign citizens who are physically outside of the United States do not have rights under the U.S. Constitution. Foreign nongovernmental organizations are foreign citizens as a matter of corporate law, despite being affiliated with American organizations, and as such, they are separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations. Therefore, the foreign affiliates have no First Amendment rights, and Congress retains the authority to condition the aid it provides to a foreign organization.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to reiterate his position that he disagrees with the holding in the original case, in his belief, the policy requirement does not compel anyone to say anything.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. In Justice Breyer’s view, the question presented is essentially whether American organizations enjoy the same constitutional protection against government-compelled distortion when they speak through clearly identified affiliates that have been incorporated overseas.” To this question, Justice Breyer would answer “yes.”

Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[19-46] U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V. May 04, 2020

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.

Argued on May 4, 2020.
Decided on Jun 30, 2020.

Petitioner: United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: Booking.com B.V..

Advocates:

Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, for the petitioners)
Lisa S. Blatt (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Booking.com operates a website on which customers can make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING.COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) four trademark applications for the use of BOOKING.COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark.

Under the Lanham Act, marks must be “distinctive” to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected Booking.com’s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING.COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration (online hotel reservation services, among others).

The Lanham Act also allows protection for “descriptive” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking.com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection.

Booking.com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking.com’s applications. The Board found that BOOKING.COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “booking” generically refers to “a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel ticket or stay in a hotel room” and “.com” indicates a commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term “BOOKING.COM” to refer to an online reservation service for travel—the very services proposed in Booking.com’s applications. The district court reversed, ruling Booking.com had acquired secondary meaning. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal.

Question

Does the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term create a protectable trademark, notwithstanding the Lanham Act’s prohibition on generic terms as trademarks?

Conclusion

A term styled “generic(dot)com” is a generic name for a class of goods or services—and thus ineligible for federal trademark protection—only if the term has that meaning to consumers. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the 8-1 majority opinion holding that because the lower court determined that consumers do not perceive the term “BOOKING.COM” to signify online hotel-reservation services as a class, it is not a generic term and thus is eligible for federal trademark protection.

The Court first noted that a generic name is ineligible for federal trademark registration. The parties did not dispute that the word “booking” is generic for hotel-reservation services. The PTO, however, argued that the combination of a generic word and “.com” is also generic. The Court disagreed, finding that rule is not supported by the PTO’s own past practice or by trademark law or policy.

Adding “.com” to a company name is different from adding “Company” in that only one company can occupy a particular Internet domain name at a time, so even a “generic(dot)com” term could convey to consumers an association with a particular website. Moreover, a strict legal rule that entirely disregards consumer perception is incompatible with a bedrock principle of the Lanham Act.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, observing that Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissenting opinion “wisely observes that consumer-survey evidence ‘may be an unreliable indicator of genericness’” and that the PTO might well have been correct in its assessment, but that question was not before the Court in this case. Instead, the Court considered only the validity of the per se rule the PTO adopted.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Booking.com’s company name informs the consumer of the basic nature of its business and nothing more. As such, the addition of “.com” to an otherwise generic term, such as “booking,” should not yield a protectable trademark because doing so would be inconsistent with trademark principles and sound trademark policy.

[18-1323] June Medical Services LLC v. Russo Mar 04, 2020

June Medical Services LLC v. Russo

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 4, 2020.
Decided on Jun 29, 2020.

Petitioner: June Medical Services L.L.C., et al..
Respondent: Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.

Advocates:

Julie Rikelman (for June Medical Services LLC)
Elizabeth Murrill (for Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In June 2014, Louisiana passed Act 620, which required “that every physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.’”

Several abortion clinics and doctors challenged Act 620, and while that challenge was pending in the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a “nearly identical” Texas law in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH), finding that the Texas law imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion while bringing about no “health-related benefit” and serving no “relevant credentialing function.” The district court hearing the challenge to Act 620 accordingly declared Act 620 facially invalid and permanently enjoined its enforcement.

The district court made detailed findings of fact and determined that “admitting privileges also do not serve ‘any relevant credentialing function,’” and that “physicians are sometimes denied privileges … for reasons unrelated to [medical] competency.” The district court further determined that the law would “drastically burden women’s right to choose abortions.”

A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the panel majority reviewed the evidence de novo and concluded that the district court erred by overlooking “remarkabl[e] differen[ces]” between the facts in this case and in WWH. The panel concluded that “no clinics will likely be forced to close on account of the Act,” and thus, the law would not impose an undue burden on women’s right to choose abortions. A divided Fifth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.

Question

Does the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, below, upholding Louisiana’s law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital conflict with the Court’s binding precedent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt?

Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s judgment, upholding a Louisiana law that requires abortion providers to hold admitting privileges at local hospitals, is reversed. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the plurality opinion on behalf of himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.

As a threshold matter, the plurality noted that the State had waived its argument that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the law by conceding the standing issue “as part of its effort to obtain a quick decision from the District Court on the merits of the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claims.” However, even if it had not, “a long line of well-established precedents” support the conclusion that plaintiffs may assert rights on behalf of third parties when “enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.”

Turning to the merits, the plurality first reiterated the law established in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. ___ (2016)—that courts must conduct an independent review of the legislative findings given in support of an abortion-related statute and weigh the law’s “asserted benefits against the burdens” it imposes on abortion access. The plurality found that the district court faithfully applied this standard. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the lower court, not as to the legal standard, but as to the factual findings. However, an appeals court may not set aside findings of fact unless they are “clearly erroneous,” which they were not in this case. Rather, the district court’s findings had “ample evidentiary support” both as to burdens and as to benefits, so its legal conclusion that the Louisiana law was unconstitutional was proper.

Chief Justice John Robert concurred in the judgment, reasoning that the plaintiffs had standing and that because the Louisiana law was nearly identical to the Texas law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health, it imposed a burden on access to abortion just as severe as that imposed by the Texas law the Court struck down in that case. Under the principle of stare decisis, that like cases should be treated alike, the Chief Justice concurred in the judgment striking down the Louisiana law. In so concluding, however, he noted, that he disagreed with the decision in Whole Woman’s Health at the time and continued to disagree with it.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing both that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the Court lacks the authority to declare Louisiana’s “duly enacted law” unconstitutional. Justice Thomas criticized the Court’s abortion precedents as “creat[ing] the right to abortion out of whole cloth.”

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch, Clarence Thomas, and Brett Kavanaugh joined in part. Justice Alito argued that the majority “misuses the doctrine of stare decisis, invokes an inapplicable standard of appellate review, and distorts the record.” Specifically, Justice Alito criticized the plurality for abandoning the constitutional test in Casey for a new balancing test established in Whole Woman’s Health, a test the Chief Justice purported to reject.

Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion arguing that in deciding the case and striking down the law, the Court exceeded its authority.

Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion and pointed out that a 5-4 majority of the Court (himself included) rejected the balancing test of Whole Woman’s Health, while a different 5-4 majority concluded that the Louisiana law must be struck down. In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the record is not adequately developed to properly evaluate the Louisiana law. As such, he agreed with Justice Alito that the case should be remanded for additional factfinding.

[19-7] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Mar 03, 2020

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 3, 2020.
Decided on Jun 29, 2020.

Petitioner: Seila Law LLC.
Respondent: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (the Respondent, supporting vacatur)
Paul D. Clement (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment on Q1)
Douglas N. Letter (for the U.S. House of Representatives, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt-relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court’s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured.

Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for cause. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.

The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling: Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for-cause removal restriction protecting the CFPB’s Director does not “impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Question

Does the vesting of substantial executive authority in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an independent agency led by a single director, violate the separation of powers principle?
If it does, is 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) severable from the Dodd-Frank Act?

Conclusion

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s leadership by a single Director removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers, but that provision is severable from the Dodd-Frank Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court.

Article II of the federal Constitution vests the entire “executive Power” in the President alone, though lesser executive officers may assist the President in discharging his duties. The President retains the power supervise and to remove these lesser executive officers, and Congress may not restrict the President’s power to remove such officers, except in two circumstances, neither of which was present in this case.

First, Congress may grant for-cause removal protection to a multimember body of experts who were balanced along partisan lines, appointed to staggered terms, performed only “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial functions,” and were said not to exercise any executive power. Second, Congress may grant for-cause removal protection to an inferior officer—the independent counsel—who had limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.

The director of the CFPB falls within neither of these exceptions, and the Court declined to extend the exceptions to a new situation because the CFPB’s structure has no foothold in history or tradition and the CFPB’s single-director configuration is incompatible with the structure of the Constitution, which “scrupulously” avoids concentrating power in the hands of any single individual, save the President.

The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh, concluded that the Director’s removal protection is severable from the other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that establish the CFPB and define its authority.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, concurring with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the CFPB’s structure violates the separation of powers but dissenting as to the severability of the clause. Justice Thomas argued that he would repudiate entirely the first exception in which Congress may restrict the President’s power to remove lesser executive officers and that the doctrine of severability is entirely unfounded because it “involves nebulous inquir[ies] into hypothetical congressional intent.”

Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined, concurring with the Chief Justice’s conclusion as to severability but dissenting as to the conclusion that the configuration violates the separation of powers. Justice Kagan argued that for-cause removal restrictions serve to create in administrative agencies “a measure of independence from political pressure” and that “the text of the Constitution, the history of the country, the precedents of this Court, and the need for sound and adaptable governance—all stand against the majority’s opinion.

[18-1501] Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission Mar 03, 2020

Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 3, 2020.
Decided on Jun 22, 2020.

Petitioner: Charles C. Lui, et al..
Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission.

Advocates:

Gregory G. Rapawy (for the Petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Charles Liu operated an EB-5 fund, which is a fund that offers lawful permanent residence opportunities to foreigners who make significant investments in the United States. However, Liu misappropriated millions of dollars that had been invested in the fund, in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits the making of false statements in the context of a securities offering.

The district court ordered Liu to “disgorge” (pay back) $26 million, the amount investors had paid into the EB-5 fund, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In petitioning the Supreme Court’s review, Liu argued that the SEC lacked the authority to obtain disgorgement, under the Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which held that disgorgement awarded under the court’s equitable power is a penalty, not a remedial measure.

Question

May the Securities and Exchange Commission seek and obtain disgorgement from a court as “equitable relief” for a securities law violation, even though the Court has determined that such disgorgement is a penalty?

Conclusion

In a Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement action, a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5). Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion on behalf of the 8-1 majority of the Court.

To determine whether disgorgement was an available remedy, the Court first looked to traditional equitable remedies, noting that courts have long used equitable remedies (albeit by different names) to prevent parties from unjustly gaining profit from wrongdoing. Though disgorgement was not, by that name, a traditional equitable remedy, it serves the same essential purpose and works in the same way and thus is available as a remedy.

Next, the Court considered what limitations on disgorgement should exist. First, the effect should be only to return the defendant’s wrongful gains to those harmed by the defendant’s wrongdoing. Second, the remedy must be limited to the profits obtained by each individual defendant. Third, the remedy must be limited to the “net” profits, considering both receipts and expenses.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that disgorgement should be unavailable as a remedy because, in his view, “disgorgement is not a traditional equitable remedy.”

[18-1432] Nasrallah v. Barr Mar 02, 2020

Nasrallah v. Barr

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 2, 2020.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.

Petitioner: Nidal Khalid Nasrallah.
Respondent: William P. Barr, Attorney General.

Advocates:

Paul W. Hughes (for the Petitioner)
Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Nidal Khalid Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon, was 17 years old when he entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2006. He became a lawful permanent resident the following year.

In 2011, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Nasrallah pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property in interstate commerce. An immigration judge determined that one of those convictions made Nasrallah subject to removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). However, the judge also found Nasrallah had established a clear probability that he would be tortured and persecuted in Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and ISIS because of his Druze religion and western ties, so the judge granted him a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Both the government and Nasrallah appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, the BIA held that the immigration judge erred in granting Nasrallah a deferral, and it ordered his removal.

Nasrallah appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Reviewing the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, the Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Nasrallah’s petition for review. Specifically, Nasrallah had asked the court to reweigh the factors involved in the removal order, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the courts lack jurisdiction to review the factual findings underlying the denial of removal relief. The court therefore dismissed Nasrallah’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.

Question

Do the federal courts have jurisdiction to review an administrative agency’s factual findings underlying denials of withholding (and deferral) of removal relief?

Conclusion

Federal courts have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s factual challenges to an administrative order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion on behalf of the 7-2 majority.

To understand the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and D, the Court looked to three related statutes. First, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 authorizes noncitizens to obtain direct “review of a final order of removal” in a court of appeals and requires that all challenges arising from the removal proceedings be consolidated. Second, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) implements the relevant provision of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and provides for judicial review of CAT claims “as part of a final order of removal.” Third, the REAL ID Act of 2005 states that final orders of removal and CAT claims may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals. Because a factual challenge to a CAT claim, as Nasrallah brought in this case, is not a challenge to a final order of removal, FARRA provides that the denial of the CAT claim is reviewable “as part of a final order of removal.” The challenger must meet the burden of “substantial evidence”—that is, that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to arrive at a different conclusion from that at which the agency arrived.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that a so-called “zipper clause” of Section 1252(b)(9) determines the meaning of Section 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), and that clause precludes judicial review of CAT orders.

[19-161] Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam Mar 02, 2020

Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 2, 2020.
Decided on Jun 25, 2020.

Petitioner: Department of Homeland Security, et al..
Respondent: Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam.

Advocates:

Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioner)
Lee Gelernt (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka. Thuraissigiam entered the United States via its southern border, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers arrested him and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. Thuraissigiam indicated a fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, but an asylum officer determined he had not established a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal. A supervisor affirmed the officer’s finding, and an immigration judge affirmed it as well in a check-box decision.

Thuraissigiam filed a habeas petition in federal district court, arguing that his expedited removal order violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) did not authorize jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam’s claims and rejecting his argument that the removal process to which he was subjected effectively suspended the writ of habeas corpus, in violation of the Suspension Clause.

A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. Because the administrative scheme governing credible fear determinations in this context is “meager,” and § 1252(a)(2) disallows judicial review of whether DHS complied with the procedures, the process does not meet minimum constitutional requirements.

Question

Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) as applied to the respondent Thuraissigiam violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

As applied to this case, 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(2)—which limits the habeas review obtainable by an alien detained for expedited removal—does not violate the Suspension or Due Process Clauses. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

To determine the scope of the Suspension Clause, the Court first considered its meaning at the time the Constitution was adopted. The Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Habeas has traditionally provided a means to seek release from unlawful detention. However, the respondent in this case does not seek release from custody, but an additional opportunity to obtain asylum. Because this meaning was not contemplated at the time the Constitution was adopted, his claims fall outside the scope of the writ.

Turning to the question of due process, the Court noted that a noncitizen who is unlawfully in the United States has only those rights that Congress has provided him by statute. The protections of the Due Process Clause do not apply to an individual simply because he might physically be within the United States. Given that the Court’s precedents establish that “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law” for noncitizens, the respondent received all the process that was required.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to expand on the discussion of the original meaning of the Suspension Clause.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, noting that the Court’s holding should be applied only to this particular case (since that was the narrow question presented) and should not address more broadly the question whether the Suspension Clause protects people challenging removal decisions.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the majority makes asylum determinations by the Executive Branch unreviewable, “no matter whether the denial is arbitrary or irrational or contrary to governing law.” Such unchecked power, Justice Sotomayor warned, “handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to perform its constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical component of the separation of powers.”

[18-8369] Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez Feb 26, 2020

Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez

Argued on Feb 26, 2020.
Decided on Jun 8, 2020.

Petitioner: Arthur James Lomax.
Respondent: Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al..

Advocates:

Brian T. Burgess (for the Petitioner)
Eric R. Olson (for the Respondents)
Jeffrey A. Rosen (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the usual court fees) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief.

Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show cause before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show cause order, Lomax argued (among other things) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they do not count as strikes.

The district court denied Lomax’s motion as barred by the three-strikes provision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim count as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act?

Conclusion

Dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion on behalf of the majority that was unanimous except as to footnote 4 (dicta as to the provision’s applicability when a court gives a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint), which Justice Clarence Thomas did not join.

The three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis (IFP) if he has had three or more prior suits “dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The very language of that provision covers all dismissals for failure to state a claim, whether issued with or without prejudice. To read it differently would require reading the word “dismissed” in Section 1915(g) as “dismissed with prejudice,” which not only runs contrary to the plain language but would create conflicts with other parts of the Act.

[19-67] United States v. Sineneng-Smith Feb 25, 2020

United States v. Sineneng-Smith

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 25, 2020.
Decided on May 7, 2020.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Evelyn Sineneng-Smith.

Advocates:

Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner)
Mark C. Fleming (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were mostly natives of the Philippines, who were unlawfully employed in the United States and were seeking to obtain legal permanent residence (green cards). Sineneng-Smith purported to help her clients obtain permanent residence through the Labor Certification process, but that program expired on April 30, 2001. Sineneng-Smith knew that the program had expired but nonetheless continued to tell clients that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications.

Federal law prohibits encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law. Sineneng-Smith was indicted, charged, and convicted by a jury of violating this law. She appealed her conviction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals solicited supplemental briefing on several constitutional questions presented in the appeal. The court held that the statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, criminalizing a “substantial amount of protected expression in relation to the statute’s narrow legitimate sweep.”

Question

Is a federal law criminalizing the act of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain unconstitutional on its face?

Conclusion

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit panel abused its discretion when it “drastic[ally]” departed from the principle of party presentation in ruling on the issue of constitutional overbreadth. The Court found that the Ninth Circuit did not address the party-presented controversy, but instead addressed a different question that the parties did not raise, constituting a “radical transformation” of the case.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision violates “far more than the party presentation rule.” He noted that while he has joined the Court in applying overbreadth doctrine in the past, he has “since developed doubts about its origins and application.” Finding no basis in the Constitution’s text, he would urge the Court to revisit that doctrine.

[17-1268] Opati v. Republic of Sudan Feb 24, 2020

Opati v. Republic of Sudan

Argued on Feb 24, 2020.

Petitioner: Monicah Okoba Opati, et al..
Respondent: Republic of Sudan, et al..

Advocates:

Matthew D. McGill (for the Petitioners)
Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioners)
Christopher M. Curran (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1998, truck bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring over a thousand. It was later discovered that al Qaeda was behind these bombings and that Sudan allegedly provided material support to al Qaeda in the form of safe harbor and training.

Starting in 2001, victims of the bombings began to bring lawsuits against Sudan and Iran in U.S. courts under a provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that withdraws sovereign immunity and grants courts jurisdiction to hear suits against foreign states designated as sponsors of terrorism. When Sudan and Iran did not appear to defend these cases, the district court entered default judgments against them in several cases, including $4.3 billion in punitive damages. Sudan then appeared, filing appeals and motions to vacate the judgments. The district court denied Sudan’s motions to vacate, and Sudan again appealed.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that FSIA does not permit the recovery of punitive damages arising from terrorist activities that occurred before Congress amended the law in 2008 to authorize punitive damages. The court pointed out that there is a strong presumption against retroactivity unless Congress made clear its intent. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that retroactive authorization of punitive damages “would raise a serious constitutional question.” Because the FSIA terrorism exception does not contain a clear statement of retroactive effect yet operates retroactively, the Tenth Circuit vacated the award of punitive damages under the federal cause of action.

Question

Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) apply retroactively to permit recovery of punitive damages against foreign states for terrorist activities that occurred prior to the passage of the current version of the statute?

[18-1584] United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association Feb 24, 2020

United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 24, 2020.
Decided on Jun 15, 2020.

Petitioner: United States Forest Service, et al..
Respondent: Cowpasture River Association, et al..

Advocates:

Anthony A. Yang (for the Petitioner)
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
Michael K. Kellogg (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Appalachian Trail spans over 2,000 miles, from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1,000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. Under the National Trails System Act, the Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility to administer the trail and that responsibility may not be transferred to any other federal agencies. The Mineral Leasing Act grants the U.S. Forest Service the authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has the authority to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System.

In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) authorization to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline that would cross the Appalachian Trail at points located within the George Washington and Monogahela National Forests. After a review process, the Forest Service authorized Atlantic to proceed with construction of the pipeline, finding it had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way for the pipeline and that the pipeline “would have no long lasting impacts” on the Trail.

Cowpasture River Preservation Association and others filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of the Forest Service’s record of decision and special use permit. The court granted the petition, vacated the record of decision and special use permit, and remanded to the Forest Service. Notably, the court determined that the Forest Service lacked authority to grant the right-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act because the Appalachian Trail is a “unit” of the National Park System. The court determined that the Mineral Leasing Act “specifically excludes” the Trail “from the authority of the Secretary of the Interior ‘or appropriate agency head’ to grant pipeline rights of way.”

The Court consolidated this case for oral argument with U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, No. 18-1584.

Question

Does the U.S. Forest Service have the authority to grant rights-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national forests?

Conclusion

The Forest Service did have the authority to issue the special use permit because the Department of the Interior’s decision to assign responsibility for the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority of the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in full except as to the part of the majority’s discussion explaining why Cowpasture’s proposed interpretation would vastly expand the Park Service’s jurisdiction in a way inconsistent with the regulatory scheme.

The Court first noted that it is undisputed that the Forest Service has jurisdiction over the federal lands within the George Washington National Forest. At issue was whether the presence of the Appalachian Trail removes that part of the lands from the Forest Service’s jurisdiction and places them under the jurisdiction of the Park Service. The Court observed that the Forest Service entered into a “right-of-way” agreement with the National Park Service, which resulted in the Appalachian Trail. A right-of-way is a type of easement, granting only nonpossessory rights of use of the land, so the grant of the right-of-way did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the land. Thus, the Court concluded, the Secretary retained authority to issue the special use permit for the pipeline running underneath the Trail.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority complicated what should be a simple question: “Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail ‘land in the National Park System’?” Because federal law does not distinguish “land” from the Trail “any more than it distinguishes ‘land’ from the many monuments, historic buildings, parkways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park System,” the dichotomy the Court draws contravenes the text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trial.

[18-1195] Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue Jan 22, 2020

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 22, 2020.
Decided on Jun 30, 2020.

Petitioner: Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson and Jamie Schaefer.
Respondent: Montana Department of Revenue, et al..

Advocates:

Richard D. Komer (for the petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Adam G. Unikowsky (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs.

Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court.

Question

Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution?

Conclusion

The application of the Montana Constitution’s “no-aid” provision to a state program providing tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools discriminated against religious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion on behalf of the 5-4 majority.

The Court first noted that the Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers against unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” In this case, Montana’s no-aid provision excluded religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious status. As such, the law must be subject to strict scrutiny review; that is, the government must show that its action advances “‘interests of the highest order” and that the action is “narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” Montana’s interest in this case—which the Court described as creating greater separation of church and state than the federal Constitution requires—does not satisfy strict scrutiny given its infringement of free exercise. Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of Montana’s no-aid provision, the Montana Supreme Court lacked the authority to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, opining that the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause (not at issue in this case) hampers free exercise rights.

Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Gorsuch each filed their own separate concurrences. Justice Alito argued, as he did in dissenting from the Court’s decision earlier this term in Ramos v. Louisiana, that original motivation should have no bearing on the present constitutionality of a provision of law, yet even without that consideration, the majority reached the correct conclusion in this case. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s characterization of the Montana Constitution as discriminating based on “religious status” and not “religious use,” is dubious at best.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Montana Supreme Court’s decision does not place a burden on petitioners’ religious exercise and thus does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s precedents establish that neutral government action is not unconstitutional solely because it fails to benefit religious exercise.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in part. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s approach and conclusion risk the kind of entanglement and conflict that the Religion Clauses are intended to prevent. Instead, Justice Breyer opined that the Court’s decision in Locke—upholding the application of a no-aid provision in Washington State based on the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause permitted Washington to forbid state-scholarship funds for students pursuing devotional theology degrees—controlled the outcome in this case, in which the no-aid provision was “materially similar.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court in this case resolved a constitutional question not presented, thereby violating “Article III principles older than the Religion Clause” itself. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor continued, the Court answered incorrectly that question it should not have addressed in the first place.

[18-1048] GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC Jan 21, 2020

GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC

Argued on Jan 21, 2020.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.

Petitioner: GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. a Foreign Corporation Formally Known As Converteam SAS.
Respondent: Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al..

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Jonathan D. Hacker (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany.

The contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS.

Fives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute.

Outokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy’s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

Question

Does the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards permit a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel?

Conclusion

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not “alter background principles” of state law, including doctrines like equitable estoppel, which authorizes contract enforcement by a nonsignatory. Chapter 2 of the FAA provides that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that [Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention.” The relevant provision of the Convention states that courts of a contracting state “shall...refer the parties to arbitration” when the parties to the action entered into a written agreement to arbitrate and one of the parties requests the referral.

The Court then considered whether state-law equitable estoppel doctrine permitted under Chapter 1 conflicts with the Convention, concluding that it does not. Most importantly, the text of the Convention is silent as to whether nonsignatories may enforce arbitration agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel; this silence is dispositive of the matter. This understanding is consistent with the history of the Convention as well as the post-ratification understanding of signatory nations.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to note that the application of domestic doctrine like equitable estoppel must be rooted in the principle of consent to arbitrate.

[18-6662] Shular v. United States Jan 21, 2020

Shular v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 21, 2020.
Decided on Feb 26, 2020.

Petitioner: Eddie Lee Shular.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Richard M. Summa (for the petitioner)
Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well.

Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.”

Question

Does the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act require the same categorical approach used in the determination of a “violent felony” under the act?

Conclusion

The statute does not require “a generic-offense matching exercise” between the elements of the offenses listed in the federal statute and the elements of the state offense under which the defendant was convicted. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg adopted the argument of the United States, which instead would have the trial court asked “whether the state offense’s elements necessarily entail one of the types of conduct” identified in the federal statute.

The Court found that two features of the statute in question lead to this interpretation. The first is that the offenses listed in the statute are “unlikely names for generic offenses” and therefore refer to underlying conduct and not offenses themselves. Secondly, the use of the word “involving” in the statute suggests an intention to describe criminal conduct and not particular criminal offenses.

The Court noted that both parties’ interpretations of the statutory language “achieve a measure of inconsistency. Justice Ginsburg explained, “Resolving this case requires us to determine which form of consistency Congress intended: application of [the statute] to all offenders who engaged in certain conduct or to all who committed certain generic offenses (in either reading, judging only by the elements of their prior convictions).“ She continued, “For the reasons explained, we are persuaded that Congress chose the former.”

In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh stated he joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to explain that the rule of lenity advocated by Shular was not appropriately invoked where the Court found the statutory language unambiguous.

[18-882] Babb v. Wilkie Jan 15, 2020

Babb v. Wilkie

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 15, 2020.
Decided on Apr 6, 2020.

Petitioner: Noris Babb.
Respondent: Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

Advocates:

Roman Martinez (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40.

Two of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well.

Babb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion.

Babb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a “motivating factor” behind the VA’s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees’ claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a “but for” factor in the adverse personnel action.

Question

Does the provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) that protects federal employees aged 40 years from age discrimination require a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of the challenged personnel action?

Conclusion

The federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), requires that age not be taken into consideration at all in making personnel actions, but if age is a but-for cause of the personnel action, that fact may be important in determining the remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The relevant provision provides “All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” The Court found the plain meaning of the statute supports the reading that age does not need to be a but-for cause of an employment decision for there to be a violation. To reach this conclusion, the Court focused on several phrases as well as the syntax of the sentence. This interpretation is also consistent with the Court’s precedent interpreting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the ADEA’s private-sector provision, and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision because the language in those provisions is “markedly” different. The Court noted, however, that but-for causation is important in determining the appropriate remedy. For example, the plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory damages without showing that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the employment decision. Remedies must be tailored to the injury, and the injury is measured in part by the causal relationship.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, pointing out that the Court’s decision does not foreclose claims arising from discriminatory processes (as distinct from decisions) and that the same provision may also permit damages remedies even when the federal government engages in “nondispositive” age discrimination.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s reading of the statute is too broad and “disrupts the settled expectations of federal employers and employees.”

[18-1059] Kelly v. United States Jan 14, 2020

Kelly v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 14, 2020.
Decided on May 7, 2020.

Petitioner: Bridget Anne Kelly.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Jacob M. Roth (for the petitioner)
Michael Levy (for respondent William Baroni, supporting the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case arises from the scandal that became known as “Bridgegate.” Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee’s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays.

In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 U.S.C § 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a “traffic study” as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their “real reason” of political payback.

Question

Did the public officials in this case “defraud” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the decision?

Conclusion

Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws because the scheme did not aim to obtain money or property. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. First, the Court looked to the language of the federal wire fraud statute and the federal-program fraud statute, finding those statutes “limited in scope to the protection of property rights.” Thus, the government needed to prove not only that Baroni and Kelly engaged in deception, but that the object of that deception was money or property. Taking control of the lanes of the bridge does not constitute taking of government property because under Court precedent, a scheme to alter a regulatory choice does not amount to taking of property. Similarly, causing increased costs of compensating traffic engineers and back-up toll collectors is an incidental product and not the “object of the fraud,” as required by the statute.

[18-1233] Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. Jan 14, 2020

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 14, 2020.
Decided on Apr 23, 2020.

Petitioner: Romag Fasteners, Inc..
Respondent: Fossil, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner)
Neal Kumar Katyal (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil’s products, and Fossil’s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag’s consent.

A jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag’s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits “to prevent unjust enrichment” and over $6.7 million in profits “to deter future trademark infringement.” For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with “callous disregard” for Romag’s trademark rights. However, the district court struck the jury’s award, finding that “a finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants’ profits in this Circuit.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. __ (2017), that affected the patent infringement claims in this case, the Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case. On remand, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits.

Question

Does Section 35 of the Lanham Act require a showing of willful infringement for a plaintiff to be awarded an infringer’s profits for a violation of Section 43(a)?

Conclusion

Section 35 of the Lanham Act does not require a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit to show that a defendant willfully infringed the plaintiff’s trademark as a precondition to an award of profits. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 8-1 majority.

The plain language of Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) does not require a plaintiff alleging a claim under § 1125(a) to show willfulness. Rather, the statute mentions “willfulness” only in connection to § 1125(c). The Court declined to read into the statute words that are not there, particularly since Congress included the term “willfulness” elsewhere in the very same statutory provision.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan to note that while willfulness is a “highly important” consideration in awarding profits under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, it is not an “absolute precondition.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, to highlight a distinction, supported by the weight of authority, between “willful” infringement and “innocent” infringement—a distinction she criticizes the majority of being “agnostic” about.

[17-1712] Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A. Jan 13, 2020

Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

Argued on Jan 13, 2020.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.

Petitioner: James J. Thole, et al..
Respondent: U.S. Bank, N.A., et al..

Advocates:

Peter K. Stris (for the petitioners)
Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Joseph R. Palmore (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against U.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Must a plaintiff demonstrate individual financial loss or the imminent risk of financial loss in an ERISA plan in order to seek injunctive relief or restoration of plan losses caused by fiduciary breach?

Conclusion

The plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue in federal court because, win or lose this case, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits they are already entitled to receive. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority.

As participants in a defined-benefit plan (as opposed to a defined-contribution plan, such as a 401(k)), the plaintiff retirees receive a fixed payment each month, notwithstanding any changes to the value of the plan or the investment decisions of the plan’s fiduciaries. As such, the poor decisions by the fiduciaries did not cause any actual injury to the plaintiffs in this case. Without concrete injury, the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the fiduciaries’ actions.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to opine that the Court’s precedents on standing unnecessarily complicate the issue by requiring the Court to engage with petitioners’ analogies to trust law.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s decision precludes pensioners from bringing a federal lawsuit to stop or cure retirement-plan mismanagement until their pensions are on the verge of default. She cautioned that this outcome conflicts both with common sense and long-standing precedent.

[18-1086] Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc. Jan 13, 2020

Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc.

Argued on Jan 13, 2020.
Decided on May 14, 2020.

Petitioner: Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc., et al..
Respondent: Marcel Fashions Group, Inc..

Advocates:

Dale M. Cendali (for the petitioners)
Michael B. Kimberly (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Marcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel’s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its “Get Lucky” trademark through its use of “Lucky” on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties.

In 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use “Get Lucky” and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its trademarks. The two parties contest the scope of Marcel’s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued.

In litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was “free to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.” Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer and as an affirmative defense, but not again during the litigation. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Marcel, declaring that Lucky Brand infringed on Marcel’s “Get Lucky” trademark and enjoining Lucky Brand from using the “Get Lucky” mark. Lucky Brand did not appeal.

In 2011, Marcel filed another lawsuit against Lucky Brand alleging that the latter continued to use “Lucky Brand” mark after the injunction. Lucky Brand moved for summary judgment on the basis that Marcel’s claims were precluded by res judicata in light of the final disposition of the previous action. The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the allegedly barred claims “could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” On remand, Marcel filed a second amended complaint, which Lucky Brand moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the 2001 agreement barred Marcel’s claims. The district court granted the motion and rejected Marcel’s argument that Lucky Brand was precluded from raising those claims.

The Second Circuit vacated, concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or more precisely, defense preclusion) applied in situations as this one and that it barred Lucky Brand from invoking its release defense again in this action.

Question

When a plaintiff asserts new claims, can federal preclusion principles bar a defendant from raising defenses that were not actually litigated and resolved in any prior case between the parties?

Conclusion

Because the trademark action at issue challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from an earlier action between the parties, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses, including a defense that Lucky Brand failed to press fully in the earlier suit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous Court.

“Res judicata” is a term that comprises two doctrines of preclusion. First, issue preclusion (also known as “collateral estoppel”) precludes a party from litigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment. Second, claim preclusion (also known as “res judicata”) prevents parties from raising claims that could have been raised and decided in a prior action, even if they were not actually litigated. Courts define the “same claim” as meaning the claims arise from the same transaction, or involve a “common nucleus of operative facts.” In this case, the Court found the two suits “were grounded on different conduct, involving different marks, occurring at different times.” The 2005 claims arose from Lucky Brand’s alleged use of “Get Lucky,” while the 2011 claims arose from other alleged uses of the word “Lucky,” not the phrase “Get Lucky.” As such, they did not share a “common nucleus of operative facts,” and claim preclusion therefore cannot apply.

[18-1109] McKinney v. Arizona Dec 11, 2019

McKinney v. Arizona

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 11, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.

Petitioner: James Erin McKinney.
Respondent: State of Arizona.

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner)
Oramel H. Skinner (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

By way of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention.

In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.

At McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death.

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney’s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney’s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘final’ before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.

Question

After the Ninth Circuit identifies an Eddings error, may the state appellate court reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or must a jury resentence the defendant?

Conclusion

After a finding of a capital sentencing (Eddings) error during habeas corpus review, the state appellate court, rather than the jury, may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to resentence the defendant. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court.

In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Supreme Court a state appellate court may conduct the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances after a capital sentencing error was found on collateral review. Although that case involved improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, and this case involved improperly ignoring a mitigating circumstance, the Court found no meaningful difference in the context. Thus, the Court found, Clemons determined the outcome in this case. The Court found unpersuasive McKinney’s argument that because the Arizona trial court, not a jury, made the initial aggravating circumstances finding that made him eligible for the death penalty, a jury must weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the Court’s decision in Ring. Agreeing with the court below, the Court found that McKinney’s case was “final” before Ring was decided, and that case does not apply retroactively to this situation.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s precedent require the application of new rules of constitutional law to cases currently on direct review (with two exceptions, neither of which applies, by the Court’s own holding). Thus, Justice Ginsburg, argued, the “pivotal question” in this case is whether McKinney’s case is currently on direct review, in which case Ring applies (retroactively), or on collateral review, in which case Ring does not apply. McKinney’s first appeal of a criminal conviction is “the archetype” of direct review, and his renewal of that first appeal “cannot sensibly be characterized as anything other than direct review.” As such, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Arizona Supreme Court’s proceeding presently before the Court is a direct review and thus that Ring applies, making McKinney’s death sentences unconstitutional.

[18-935] Monasky v. Taglieri Dec 11, 2019

Monasky v. Taglieri

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 11, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.

Petitioner: Michelle Monasky.
Respondent: Domenico Taglieri.

Advocates:

Amir C. Tayrani (for the petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)
Andrew J. Pincus (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights.

The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc.

The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed.

Question

When an infant is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, is a subjective agreement between the infant‘s parents is necessary to establish her habitual residence under the Hague Convention?

What is the proper standard of review of a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention—de novo, a deferential version of de novo, or for clear error?

Conclusion

Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a child’s “habitual residence” depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parties. Such a determination is subject to review for clear error.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the Court that was unanimous in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined in part and concurred in the judgment. The text of the Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but the accompanying explanatory report states that a child habitually resides where she is at home. No single fact is dispositive of all cases; instead, courts must make a fact-driven inquiry “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.”

The Court found unpersuasive Monasky’s argument that an actual agreement between the parents on where to raise their child was required to determine the child’s habitual residence. None of the treaty partners interpret the treaty that way, and to do so would run counter to the principle that the inquiry is an intensely fact-driven one.

Turning to the question of the standard of review, the Court found that because the question of habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact that is heavily fact-laden, a determination by a trial court should be entitled to deferential clear-error review.

Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas would have decided this case principally on the plain meaning of the treaty’s text—which leads to the same outcome.

[18-7739] Holguin-Hernandez v. United States Dec 10, 2019

Holguin-Hernandez v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 10, 2019.
Decided on Feb 26, 2020.

Petitioner: Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Kendall Turner (for the petitioner)
Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of vacatur)
K. Winn Allen (for the court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges.

At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence.

Question

Must a criminal defendant make a formal objection after the pronouncement of his sentence to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of the sentence?

Conclusion

A criminal defendant need not make a formal objection to his issued sentence in order to preserve his right on appeal to have that sentence reviewed for “reasonableness” rather than for “plain error,” the standard that would control absent sufficient objection at the time of sentencing. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer noted a split of authority among the various federal courts of appeal and explained, “We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that defendants are required to refer to the “reasonableness’ of a sentence” to preserve their right to have that sentence reviewed for reasonableness rather than plain error. In other words, “A defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” The Court continued, “He need not also refer to the standard of review” in his argument or objection to preserve the more favorable reasonableness standard of review on appeal.

The Court also noted a pair of issues raised by the government and various amicus curiae about preserving a claim of improper sentencing procedures and also when a party has preserved particular arguments regarding an appeal over the length of a sentence. The Court refused to reach those larger issues, holding only that the appellant had preserved his right to appeal the length of his sentence as unreasonable in the particular circumstances of this case.

Justice Alito authored a concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, to further elaborate on the limited nature of the ruling.

[18-1023] Maine Community Health Options v. United States Dec 10, 2019

Maine Community Health Options v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 10, 2019.
Decided on Apr 27, 2020.

Petitioner: Maine Community Health Options.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Congress, in order to persuade the nation’s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government.

In reliance on the government’s commitment to reimburse them, the nation’s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the insurers did not receive reimbursement.

Several of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on the “cardinal rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former.

Question

Do the insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act?

Conclusion

The insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act, Congress did not repeal the obligation of the federal government to pay the carriers, and the carriers can sue for payment under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for an 8-1 majority. First, the Court considered whether the Risk Corridors program, Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act, obligated the federal government to pay participating insurers the full amount calculated by the statute. Congress may create an obligation directly through statutory language, which it did through the Risk Corridors program, in plain language. Thus, the legal duty of the government became a legal liability when the insurance carriers participated in the health care exchanges.

Second, the Court considered whether Congress impliedly repealed the obligation by passing appropriations riders. The Court first noted its “aversion to implied repeals,” especially in the context of appropriations. For an implied repeal, the government must show more than merely the failure to appropriate sufficient funds, which it did not do here.

Finally, the Court considered whether the insurance carriers properly brought suit under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. Although the federal government is immune from suit unless it unequivocally consents, it waived immunity for certain damages suits in the Court of Federal Claims through the Tucker Act. A claim falls within the Tucker Act’s immunity waiver if: (1) the claim “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained,” (2) the obligation-creating statute does not provide its own detailed remedies, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act does not provide an avenue for relief. In this case, the Court found that the insurance carriers’ claim satisfied this test and was thus properly brought under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.

Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined the majority opinion except as to the part discussing the legislative history of the appropriations riders.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority’s decision “infers a private right of action” where Congress did not expressly create one. Specifically, Justice Alito questioned the test the Court has used (and used in this case) to determine whether a claim may be brought against the United States under the Tucker Act.

[18-776] Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr Dec 09, 2019

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 9, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.

Petitioner: Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla.
Respondent: William P. Barr.

Advocates:

Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioners)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling.

On appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”).

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable.

Question

Does the phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act include the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts?

Conclusion

The phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s Limited Review Provision, 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(D), includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petitioners’ “factual” due diligence claims for equitable tolling purposes.

The Court first looked to the statute’s language, finding that nothing there precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Courts repeatedly refer to mixed questions of law and fact as “questions of law.” The Court then considered the principle of statutory construction favoring judicial review of administrative action, finding that principle supported interpreting the court of appeals as having appellate jurisdiction in cases such as this one. Next the Court looked at the language immediately surrounding the phrase at issue, finding a “zipper clause,” which consolidates judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” The Court then turned to the statutory history and relevant precedent, finding that they too supported an interpretation of “questions of law” as including the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined all but one subpart. Justice Thomas argued that despite being presented with a narrow question, the Court’s decision answers a much broader question and “effectively nullifies a jurisdiction-stripping statute” by disregarding the text and structure of the statute.

[18-916] Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP Dec 09, 2019

Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 9, 2019.
Decided on Apr 20, 2020.

Petitioner: Thryv, Inc..
Respondent: Click-to-Call Technologies, LP and Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

Advocates:

Adam H. Charnes (for the petitioner)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent, supporting reversal)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the private respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it.

The America Invents Act created “inter partes review” as a way of challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner “is served with a complaint” alleging infringement of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains “served” even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations.

Further, 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) provides that “the determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an inter partes review after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable.

Question

Does 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permit an appeal of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute an inter partes review upon finding that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply?

Conclusion

Section 314(d) precludes judicial review of a Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that §315(b)’s time bar did not apply. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the 7-2 majority opinion for the Court.

The text of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), as well as the Court’s decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. __ (2016), preclude a party from arguing on appeal that the agency should have refused “to institute an inter partes review.” A challenge under § 315(d) constitutes an appeal of the agency’s decision “to institute an inter partes review” and thus falls within the general prohibition of § 314(d). The majority (though without Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito) found further support for this understanding in the statute’s purpose and design, which is “to weed out bad patent claims efficiently.” The Court found Click-to-Call’s claims to the contrary unpersuasive.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined in large part, arguing that the majority’s decision allows a “politically guided agency” to take the rightful property of an inventor and immunizes the agency’s action from judicial review.

[18-1116] Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma Dec 04, 2019

Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 4, 2019.
Decided on Feb 26, 2020.

Petitioner: Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al..
Respondent: Christopher M. Sulyma.

Advocates:

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the petitioners)
Matthew W.H. Wessler (for the respondent)
Matthew Guarnieri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company’s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012.

Intel moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “actual knowledge” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Question

Does the three-year statute of limitations period in ERISA, which runs “from the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation”—bar a suit where the defendants disclosed all relevant information but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information?

Conclusion

The three-year statute of limitation does not run from the date where a plaintiff had access to but did not read, or could not recall reading, the information giving rise to an ERISA claim. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Alito explained that, “Although ERISA does not define the phrase ‘actual knowledge’” in setting the statute of limitations, “its meaning is plain.” After quoting a number of general and legal dictionaries (though stating the exercise was “hardly necessary to confirm the point”), the Court concluded that an individual must in fact be aware of a piece of information in order to have “actual knowledge” of it.

The Court pointed to other sections of the ERISA statute that make the distinction more clearly than that governing the statute of limitations for an ERISA claim. Because Congress repeatedly drew a distinction between “what an ERISA plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know,” the Court would not impute to knowledge to an ERISA plaintiff absent evidence of what that plaintiff was in fact aware of that gave rise to the ERISA claim.

The Court concluded by noting the limitations of its holding. It noted that its ruling did not limit any of the ways a defendant might demonstrate actual knowledge by an ERISA plaintiff sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, nor does it allow a plaintiff to disclaim actual knowledge where the evidence points to actual knowledge. Finally, the Court also clarified that its holding does not stop defendants from arguing that “willful blindness” to a potential ERISA claim should allow a defendant to avoid the actual knowledge necessary to trigger ERISA’s statute of limitations.

[18-6943] Banister v. Davis Dec 04, 2019

Banister v. Davis

Argued on Dec 4, 2019.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.

Petitioner: Gregory Dean Banister.
Respondent: Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

Advocates:

Brian T. Burgess (for the petitioner)
Kyle D. Hawkins (for the respondent)
Benjamin W. Snyder (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied in the same order.

On June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to “amend or alter” the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits on June 20, 2017.

On July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court “considered” despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister’s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that “alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.”

Question

Under what circumstances should a timely Rule 59(e) motion be recharacterized as a successive habeas petition?

Conclusion

A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment is not a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), so Banister’s appeal was timely. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority.

To determine what “second or successive application” means, the Court first turned to historical habeas doctrine and practice and the purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which governs federal habeas proceedings. In Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257 (YYYY), decided before AEDPA, the Court held that Rule 59(e) applied in habeas proceedings. Although the language of the rule has since changed, those changes did not narrow the scope of that rule. In the fifty years since the adoption of the Federal Rules, only once has a court dismissed a Rule 59(e) motion as impermissibly successive, resolving all other cases on the merits. When Congress passed AEDPA, it gave no indication it intended to change this understood meaning of a successive application, nor do its purposes suggest such a change in meaning.

The Court pointed out that its decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), applied to Rule 60(b) and that Rule 60(b) is substantially different from Rule 59(e) in critical ways. While Rule 60(b) is a means of attacking a habeas court’s judgment, a Rule 59(e) motion is a one-time effort to point out alleged errors in a just-issued decision before taking a single appeal.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, arguing that because a Rule 59(e) motion asserts a habeas claim, it must be viewed as a “second or successive habeas petition” and be treated as such.

[17-1498] Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al. Dec 03, 2019

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al.

Argued on Dec 3, 2019.
Decided on Apr 20, 2020.

Petitioner: Atlantic Ritchfield Company.
Respondent: Gregory A. Christian, et al..

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Joseph R. Palmore (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case arises from Montana’s Anaconda Smelter site—the location of a large copper concentrating and smelting operation that started in 1884 and expanded to other nearby areas in 1902. In 1977, Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda Smelter, and it shut down smelter activities in 1980. The smelter operations over the almost-century of operations caused high concentrations of arsenic, lead, copper, cadmium, and zinc to contaminate soil, groundwater, and surface water. In 1983, the EPA prioritized the Anaconda Smelter site as a Superfund site, working with Atlantic Richfield to address the contamination. Since then, Atlantic Richfield has worked with the EPA for 35 years to remediate the site, at a cost of approximately $470 million.

In 2008, landowners within the Anaconda Superfund site sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, alleging that the smelter operations between 1884 and 1980 had caused damage to their properties. Atlantic Richfield raised no objections to the plaintiffs’ claims of loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. However, it did object to the common-law claim for “restoration” damages.

To establish a claim for restoration damages in Montana, plaintiffs must prove that they will actually use the award to clean up the site. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that restoration of their property requires “work in excess of what the EPA required of Atlantic Richfield in its selected remedy.” Atlantic Richfield moved for summary judgment, arguing that the restoration claim constituted a “challenge” to the EPA’s remedy and thus was jurisdictionally barred by CERCLA § 113, which deprives courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA-selected remedies. Atlantic Richfield also argued that the landowners are “potentially responsible parties” and thus must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action. Finally, Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA preempted state common-law claims for restoration.

The trial court held that CERCLA permitted plaintiffs’ claim for restoration damages, and Atlantic Richfield sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court, which the court granted. Over a dissent, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected all three of Atlantic Richfield’s arguments, affirming the trial court’s decision permitting the plaintiffs to proceed to a jury trial on their restoration claim.

Question

Is a common-law claim for restoration seeking cleanup remedies that conflict with remedies the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ordered a jurisdictionally barred “challenge” to the EPA’s cleanup under 42 U.S.C. § 9613 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)?
Is a landowner at a Superfund site a “potentially responsible party” that must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action?
Does CERCLA preempt state common-law claims for restoration that seek cleanup remedies that conflict with EPA-ordered remedies?

Conclusion

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim for restoration, and the Montana Supreme Court erred in holding that the landowners in this case were not potentially responsible parties under CERCLA and thus did not need the Environmental Protection Agency’s approval to take remedial action.

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion.

In Part II-A, the Court unanimously held that it had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Montana Supreme Court. The Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments, and a state court judgment is a “final judgment if it is “an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein.” Because under Montana law, a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-contained case, not an interlocutory appeal, it was a final judgment subject to review.

In Part II-B, the Chief Justice, writing for the 8-1 majority, found that the Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. While § 113(b) of CERCLA provides that “the United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter,” thereby depriving state courts of jurisdiction over such actions, the landowners’ common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability claims arise under Montana law, not under the Act. Justice Samuel Alito dissented from this part of the opinion, writing in his separate opinion that the issue of whether state courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to EPA-approved CERCLA plans was “neither necessary nor prudent” to decide in this case.

In Part III, the Chief Justice, writing for the 7-2 majority, held that the Montana Supreme Court erred by holding that the landowners were not potentially responsible parties under the Act and therefore did not need EPA approval to take remedial action. To determine who is a potentially responsible party, the Court found that the Act includes as “covered persons” any “owner” of “a facility,” and that a “facility” includes “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” Under this definition, the landowners are “potentially responsible parties,” and this reading is consistent with the Act’s objective “to develop a ‘Comprehensive Environmental Response’ to hazardous waste pollution.” Justice Neil Gorsuch (joined by Justice Clarence Thomas) dissented from this part of the opinion, arguing that the majority’s holding departs from CERCLA’s terms in a way that transforms the Act “from a law that supplements state environmental restoration efforts into one that prohibits them.” Justice Gorsuch expressed concern that the Court’s reading “strips away ancient common law rights from innocent landowners and forces them to suffer toxic waste in their backyards, playgrounds, and farms.”

[18-1269] Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Dec 03, 2019

Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

Argued on Dec 3, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.

Petitioner: Simon E. Rodriguez.
Respondent: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Advocates:

Mitchell P. Reich (for the petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI’s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank’s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate.

The bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, “a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund.” Applying this rule and noting that the agreement’s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment.

Question

Does federal common law or the law of the relevant state determine the ownership of a tax refund paid to an affiliated group?

Conclusion

In an opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, a unanimous Court held that state law is “well equipped to handle disputes involving corporate property rights.” Federal common law should only exist to “protect uniquely federal interests” the Court explained. “Nothing like that exists here” it continued. While the federal government potentially has a sufficiently unique interest in rules governing the receipt of taxes from corporate entities, the court elaborated, it questioned the strength of any interest in how a tax refund, once received, is distributed among the members of that entity. The Court found that neither federal courts that have applied federal common law to this question nor the FDIC as the advocate for federal common law in this case had ever articulated a sufficient unique federal interest to justify the existence of federal common law on this point.

The Court did not decide whether the outcome of the particular dispute before it would have been different if decided under the applicable state law rather than erroneously under the federal common law it deemed improper. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal for that determination.

[18-280] New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York Dec 02, 2019

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 2, 2019.
Decided on Apr 27, 2020.

Petitioner: New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc., et al..
Respondent: City of New York, New York, et al..

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Richard P. Dearing (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The State of New York law prohibits the possession of firearms without a license. To obtain a handgun license, an individual must apply with a local licensing officer—which, in New York City, is the police commissioner—and the application process involves an investigation into the applicant’s mental health history, criminal history, and moral character. There are two primary types of handgun licenses: “carry” licenses and “premises” licenses. This case involves the latter, which permits the licensee to “have and possess in his dwelling” a pistol or revolver. The premises license is specific to a particular address, and the handguns permitted by the license may not be removed from that address except in limited circumstances prescribed by law. One such circumstance is to “transport his/her handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, and in a locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately.” All small arms ranges/shooting clubs authorized under the rule are located in New York City.

Three individuals with premises licenses sought to transport their handguns to shooting ranges and competitions outside New York City—which is prohibited by the rule. One of the individuals sought to transport his handgun between the premises in New York City for which it was licensed and his second home in Hancock, New York—which the rule also prohibits. The three individuals and petitioner New York State Rifle & Pistol Association filed a lawsuit in federal district court, asking the court to declare the city’s restrictions unconstitutional and to enjoin the city from enforcing them.

The district court found the rule “merely regulates rather than restricts the right to possess a firearm in the home and is a minimal, or at most, modest burden on the right” and thus did not violate plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. The district court also held that the rule did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, or the fundamental right to travel. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a New York City rule banning the transportation a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the constitutional right to travel?

Conclusion

In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the petitioners’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the City’s rule is moot because after the Court granted certiorari, the City amended the rule, permitting the petitioners to transport firearms to a second home or shooting range outside the city.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to express agreement with the determination that the claim in this case is moot but also to agree with the dissenting justices in their interpretation of the leading Second Amendment cases, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in full and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. Justice Alito argued that the Court incorrectly dismissed the case as moot and that the Court should have decided the case on the merits to correct lower courts' misapplication of Heller and McDonald.

[18-1150] Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc. Dec 02, 2019

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc.

Argued on Dec 2, 2019.
Decided on Apr 27, 2020.

Petitioner: State of Georgia, et al..
Respondent: Public.Resource.Org, Inc..

Advocates:

Joshua S. Johnson (for the petitioners)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Eric F. Citron (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “shall be merged with annotations,” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia.

Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites.

The Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia’s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “official” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created—finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations.

Question

Does the government edict doctrine extend to—and thus render uncopyrightable—the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated?

Conclusion

Under the government edicts doctrine, the annotations beneath the statutory provisions in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated are ineligible for copyright protection. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion.

Under the government edicts doctrine, judges cannot be authors of the works they produce in the course of their official duties, regardless of whether the material carries the force of law. The same reasoning applies to legislators and the works they produce. The “animating principle,” amply supported by precedent, is that “no one can own the law.”

First, the Court considered whether the annotations are created by legislators. Although the annotations were prepared by a private company, the work-for-hire agreement provides that Georgia’s Code Revision Commission is the sole “author” of the work. Because of the way it is created, receives funding and staffing, and operates, the Commission is an “arm” of the Georgia Legislature with “legislative authority” that includes “preparing and publishing the annotations.” This link is bolstered by the fact that the Commission brought this lawsuit “on behalf of and for the benefit of” the Georgia Legislature and the State of Georgia.

Then, the Court considered whether the annotations are created in the course of legislative duties. Although the annotations are not enacted into law through bicameralism and presentment, the Court cited a decision by the Georgia Supreme Court holding that the preparation of the annotations under Georgia law constitute an act of “legislative authority.”

The Court found unpersuasive Georgia’s arguments to the contrary. First, Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which lists “annotations” among the kinds of works eligible for copyright protection, refers only to annotations that represent an original work of authorship, which the annotations cannot be when legislators are the authors. Second, the fact that the Copyright Act excludes from copyright protection works by federal officials but does not mention state officials does not lead to the negative inference that state officials must be eligible to be authors. Neither the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, a non-binding administrative manual, nor the overall purpose of the Copyright Act, supports Georgia’s position.

The Court pointed out that if it adopted Georgia’s position and allowed “everything short of statutes and opinions” to be copyrightable, then “States would be free to offer a whole range of premium legal works for those who can afford the extra benefit.” That outcome would force many people “to think twice before using official legal works that illuminate the law we are all presumed to know and understand.”

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined and Justice Stephen Breyer joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that the Court should leave to Congress the decision whether to exclude state legislators from copyright authorship and that the majority misunderstands the word “author.”

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, arguing that the annotations are not created in a legislative capacity because of key differences between judges and legislators.

[18-1171] Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media Nov 13, 2019

Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media

Argued on Nov 13, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.

Petitioner: Comcast Corporation.
Respondent: National Association of African American-Owned Media and Entertainment Studio Networks, Inc..

Advocates:

Miguel A. Estrada (for the petitioner)
Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Erwin Chemerinsky (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter’s decision not to carry ESN’s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast’s decision not to carry ESN’s networks was based, at least in part, on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast’s decision, several other large distributors— including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T—had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN.

The district court dismissed ESN’s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that “mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981,” meaning that “even if racial animus was not the but-for cause of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.” Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contracts with “white-owned, lesser-known networks during the same period.”

The Ninth Circuit declined petitions for rehearing en banc.

Question

Does a claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 require that the plaintiff show but-for causation, or only that race is a motivating factor?

Conclusion

A plaintiff who sues for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must show—in all parts of the lawsuit—that race was the actual cause of her injury. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court noted from the outset that normally, a plaintiff suing for an injury must prove actual causation (also called “but-for” causation), and that burden of proof remains constant throughout the life of the lawsuit. The Court rejected Entertainment Studios Network (ESN)’s argument that § 1981 creates an exception to these default principles, finding that the statute’s text and history, as well as the Court’s precedent, support reading it as following the normal rules. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for a “motivating factor” causation test, the history of that statute is unique and does not apply to § 1981. Because § 1981 follows the usual rules, a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, the plaintiff would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which she noted her disagreement with a strict but-for causation standard in discrimination cases such as this one but acknowledged the Court’s own precedent otherwise. Justice Ginsburg further clarified that she rejected (and the Court did not resolve) Comcast’s narrow view of the scope of § 1981, that it applies only to the final decision whether to enter a contract and not to earlier stages of the contract-formation process.

[18-938] Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC Nov 13, 2019

Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 13, 2019.
Decided on Jan 14, 2020.

Petitioner: Ritzen Group, Inc..
Respondent: Jackson Masonry, LLC.

Advocates:

James K. Lehman (for the petitioner)
Griffin S. Dunham (for the respondent)
Vivek Suri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline.

Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract.

After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay (which Ritzen did not appeal at the time). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits.

Ritzen appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines: the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal.

Question

Is an order denying a motion for relief from the automatic stay in bankruptcy proceeding a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)?

Conclusion

A bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly denying relief from the automatic stay constitutes a final, immediately appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.

The Court first looked to its own precedent in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), in which it held that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a proposed plan was not final because it did not conclusively resolve the relevant “proceeding.” Bankruptcy court orders are final only when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the bankruptcy case. Applying that reasoning to the facts of this case, the Court found that a bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly granting or denying relief from a bankruptcy’s automatic stay conclusively resolves a discrete dispute and thus qualifies as an independent “proceeding” within the meaning of §158(a).

[18-587] Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California Nov 12, 2019

Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2019.
Decided on Jun 18, 2020.

Petitioner: Department of Homeland Security, et al..
Respondent: Regents of the University of California, et al..

Advocates:

Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)
Theodore B. Olson (for the private respondents)
Michael J. Mongan (for the state respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a program—known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—to postpone the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children and to assign them work permits allowing them to obtain social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of “mainstream” society in the United States.

In 2017, after the national election, when the Trump administration replaced the Obama administration, DHS began a phase-out of DACA. The parties do not dispute the authority of a new administration to replace old policies with new policies, but the plaintiffs in this and related challenges allege that the new administration terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law. Specifically, the Trump administration terminated DACA based on a conclusion that the Obama administration had created DACA “without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date” and thus that it was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.”

The plaintiffs in this case and the related cases challenged this conclusion of law, alleging that the recission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was arbitrary and capricious, and because it was a substantive rule that did not comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The challengers also alleged that the recission deprived DACA recipients of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process of law and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was motivated by discriminatory animus.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the DACA recission was not “committed to agency discretion by law” and that there was “law to apply.” Further, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction restoring DACA, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits of their arguments, they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs’ favor, and the injunction is in the public interest.

Question

Is the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy judicially reviewable?
Is DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy lawful?

Conclusion

The Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down DACA is reviewable, and its decision was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion.

As a threshold matter, the Court noted that the APA contains a rebuttable presumption that agency action is subject to judicial review. Because DACA was not merely a non-enforcement policy but affirmatively created a program for conferring immigration relief, it constitutes agency action subject to judicial review. Further, because the parties do not challenge any removal proceedings, the jurisdictional provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act do not apply.

Under the APA, an agency must supply “reasoned analysis” for its actions. The rescission memorandum failed to consider the possibility of eliminating benefits eligibility while continuing forbearance, relying solely on the Attorney General’s conclusion regarding the illegality of benefits. Moreover, the rescission memorandum failed to address whether there was “legitimate reliance” on the DACA Memorandum. While an agency does not need to consider all policy alternatives, it is required to assess “important aspects” of the problem before it. Given that deferred action was not only “within the ambit” of DACA, but its “centerpiece,” the failure to consider these options rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious.

Joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, The Chief Justice also opined that the respondents in this case failed to establish a plausible inference that the rescission was motivated by animus, in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. Though she joined the Chief Justice’s opinion as to the reviewability of the rescission and the conclusion that it was arbitrary and capricious, Justice Sotomayor argued that it was premature to dismiss the respondents’ equal protection claims and would thus remand the case to allow the respondents to develop those claims.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas argued that because the Obama administration’s implementation of DACA was unlawful, DHS’s decision to rescind the program is “clearly reasonable” and that the Court’s decision allows administrations to “unlawfully bind their successors by unlawfully adopting significant legal changes through Executive Branch agency memoranda” that “cannot be undone” without “sufficient policy justifications to the satisfaction of this Court.” Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment only as to the rejection of the equal protection claim.

Justice Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, to reiterate his agreement with Justice Thomas’s dissent and with Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s separate dissent.

Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the Court should have focused not on the memorandum by DHS Secretary Duke, but the one by the subsequent DHS Secretary Nielsen, which the Court “jettison[ed]” as a post hoc justification. In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the Nielsen Memorandum reasonably explained the decision to rescind DACA and thus would pass muster as an explanation for the rescission.

[17-1678] Hernandez v. Mesa Nov 12, 2019

Hernandez v. Mesa

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.

Petitioner: Jesus C. Hernández, et al..
Respondent: Jesus Mesa, Jr..

Advocates:

Stephen I. Vladeck (for the petitioners)
Randolph J. Ortega (for the respondent)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández’s friends on U.S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From U.S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him.

Hernández’s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the parents’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “clearly established” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on U.S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __ (2017), in which the Court held that for a new type of claim to be cognizable under Bivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim.

Question

Should federal courts recognize a damages claim under Bivens if plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue federal law enforcement officer violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for which there is no alternative legal remedy?

Conclusion

The Court’s decision in Bivens does not extend to claims based on a cross-border shooting by a federal law enforcement officer. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion for a 5-4 majority.

Bivens recognized an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the Court has extended that holding to cover claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments as well. When considering whether to extend Bivens, a court must ask (1) whether the claim arises in a “new context” or involves a “new category of defendants,” and if so, then (2) whether there are “special factors” that weigh against extending Bivens to that type of claim.

In this case, the Court found the claims arise from a new and “significantly” different context—a cross-border shooting. As to the second part of the test, the Court also found “multiple” separation-of-powers factors counseling hesitation before extending Bivens: (1) to extend Bivens to this context implicates foreign relations, which is beyond the reach of the Court, (2) the risk of undermining border security and the system of military discipline created by statute and regulation, and (3) Congress has “repeatedly” declined to recognize a damages award against federal officials who cause injury outside U.S. borders. For these reasons, the Court declined to recognize a Bivens cause of action for the injury in this case.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to suggest that the Court discard Bivens and its progeny of cases.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that conduct by a “rogue” federal officer is not a new context, but the very context contemplated in Bivens. Even if it were a new setting, Justice Ginsburg argued neither foreign policy nor national security would be endangered by recognizing a Bivens claim in this case, so no “special factors” counsel against recognizing the claim.

[18-260] County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund Nov 06, 2019

County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund

Argued on Nov 6, 2019.
Decided on Apr 23, 2020.

Petitioner: County of Maui, Hawaii.
Respondent: Hawaii Wildlife Fund.

Advocates:

Elbert Lin (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
David L. Henkin (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources, which the CWA defines as “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances.” In contrast, all other sources of pollution are characterized as nonpoint sources and are controlled through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other non-CWA programs. The CWA also distinguishes between groundwater and navigable waters, the latter being “waters of the United States” and exclusive of the former.

Constructed with funding by the EPA in the 1970s, the County of Maui’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility treats wastewater generated by homes and business in the western part of Maui by injecting treated wastewater (called “effluent”) into underground injection control (UIC) wells—a common method used by municipalities to dispose of effluent. Before injection, effluent is treated to meet R-1 water standards, Hawaii’s highest standards for recycled water. Some of the treated effluent is used for resort and golf course irrigation. Upon injection, effluent immediately mixes with groundwater and disperses vertically and horizontally, eventually migrating to the ocean. Over 90% of the effluent/groundwater mixture enters the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable entry point. Reports from 1973, 1991, and 1994 indicate that both the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) understood that the wastewater entered the ocean, and neither agency suggested that this result required NPDES permitting.

The district court at summary judgment held that the County violated the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater and into the ocean without the NPDES permit required by the CWA, and that the County had fair notice of its violations. The court based its ruling on findings that the County “indirectly discharged[d] a pollutant into the ocean through a groundwater conduit,” (2) the groundwater is a “point source” as defined by the CWA, and (3) the groundwater is a “navigable water” under the CWA. The County appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court.

Question

Does the Clean Water Act require a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater?

Conclusion

The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires a permit when there is a direct discharge, or a functional equivalent of a direct discharge, of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority.

The scope of the statutory language “from any point source” turns on the word “from.” The environmental groups advocated for the broad interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit, below—that a pollutant must be “fairly traceable” to the point source. In contrast, the County of Maui and the Solicitor General, as an amicus curiae, argued that the statute required a permit only if the point source is the “last conveyance” that conducted the pollutant to the navigable waters. Based on the statutory context, including inferred congressional intent and legislative history, and “longstanding regulatory practice,” the Court interpreted the phrase to mean something between the two positions advocated by the parties. Specifically, the Court found that the CWA requires a permit if there is a functional equivalent of a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters. The Court described a non-exhaustive list of seven factors to consider when deciding whether a discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge, the most important of which are the time and distance. The Court did not decide whether the facts in the case satisfied its functional equivalent test, but rather vacated the Ninth Circuits judgment and remanded the case for application of the new test.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority in full and authored a concurring opinion to note three points. First, he noted the Court’s interpretation of the CWA is consistent with the interpretation set forth in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Second, Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the statute—not the Court—is vague as to when a pollutant may be considered to have come “from” a point source. Third, with respect to Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent in this case, Justice Kavanaugh disagreed that “the Court does not commit to which factors are the most important in determining whether pollutants that enter navigable waters come ‘from’ a point source.”

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that based on the statutory text and structure, a permit is required only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority “makes up a rule that provides no clear guidance and invites arbitrary and inconsistent application.”

[18-1165] Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander Nov 06, 2019

Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander

Argued on Nov 6, 2019.
Decided on Jan 14, 2020.

Petitioner: Retirement Plans Committee of IBM, et al..
Respondent: Larry W. Jander, et al..

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Samuel Bonderoff (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. __ (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) are not entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their decisions to buy or hold employer stock. Rather, for a plaintiff to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence based on inside information, the plaintiff need only “plausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position could not have concluded that [an alternative action] would do more harm than good to the fund.” Thus the Court established a “context-specific” pleading standard rather than a generalized presumption standard.

IBM offers as a benefit to its employees an ERISA-qualified ESOP, invested predominantly in IBM common stock, with Retirement Plans Committee of IBM as the fiduciary. In 2015, two substantially similar lawsuits were filed against IBM and its officers, one under securities laws and the other under ERISA. Both lawsuits alleged that IBM fraudulently concealed problems with the company’s microelectronics unit, thereby artificially inflating IBM’s reported value. By continuing to invest in IBM stock despite allegedly knowing that the market price was artificially inflated due to the fraudulent scheme, the plaintiffs in the ERISA lawsuit argued that the ESOP’s fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence under Section 404 of ERISA.

The district court dismissed the ERISA lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading standard established in Fifth Third, as they had not alleged facts showing that the fiduciaries “could not have concluded” that publicly disclosing the alleged “fraud” or halting further investments in IBM stock would be more likely to harm the fund than to help it.

The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add generic allegations that disclosure of the alleged fraud was “inevitable” and that the magnitude of the stock price correction resulting from a delayed disclosure would increase over time. The plaintiffs also added a claim that the fiduciaries could have avoided doing more harm than good by instead purchasing a “low-cost” hedging product.

The district court again dismissed the lawsuit for failing to meet the Fifth Third pleading standard and because a prudent fiduciary could reasonably find their proposed alternative likely to cause more harm than good. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that “when a ‘drop in the value of the stock already held by the fund’ is inevitable, it is far more plausible that a prudent fiduciary would prefer to limit the effects of the stock’s artificial inflation on the ESOP’s beneficiaries through prompt disclosure.”

Question

Do generalized allegations that the harm of an inevitable disclosure of an alleged fraud generally increases over time satisfy the “more harm than good” pleading standard for ERISA claims the Court established in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer?

Conclusion

In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to determine whether to entertain the parties’ arguments on ERISA’s duty of prudence.

[18-565] CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co. Nov 05, 2019

CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 5, 2019.
Decided on Mar 30, 2020.

Petitioner: CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al..
Respondent: Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al..

Advocates:

Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)
Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent)
Thomas C. Goldstein (for the private respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers.

As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million.

Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil.

At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CITGO’s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati (thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO’s liability by 50%. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims.

Question

Under federal maritime law, is a safe-berth clause in a voyage charter contract a guarantee of a ship’s safety or a duty of due diligence?

Conclusion

A safe-berth clause in a voyage charter agreement—which requires the party to designate a safe berth for a vessel to load and discharge cargo—establishes a warranty of safety. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for a 7-2 majority of the Court. The Court first looked at the text of the safe-berth clause in the charter agreement, finding that it imposes, unqualified, on the charterer a duty to select a safe berth. Although the clause does not expressly use the word “warranty,” it need not do so to be subject to such an obligation. Basic principles of contract law hold a party strictly liable for a breach of contract, regardless of fault or diligence, and those principles determine the outcome here, as well.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority’s conclusion “is the wrong rule and finds no basis in the contract’s plain text.” Because the plain language of the safe-berth clause “contains no warranty of safety,” Justice Thomas would remand the case for factfinding on whether industry custom and usage establish such a warranty.

[18-877] Allen v. Cooper Nov 05, 2019

Allen v. Cooper

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 5, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.

Petitioner: Frederick L. Allen, et al..
Respondent: Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al..

Advocates:

Derek L. Shaffer (for the petitioners)
Ryan Park (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the U.S. Copyright Office.

At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen’s works. The state then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which purportedly converted Allen’s works into “public record” materials that the state could use freely.

Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)—which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity”—abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims.

The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen’s arguments regarding the CRCA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA.

Question

Did Congress validly abrogate state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, which allows authors of original expression to sue states who infringe their federal copyrights?

Conclusion

Congress lacked the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the Court unanimous in the judgment. First, the Court considered whether, in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Congress had enacted “unequivocal statutory language” abrogating the states’ immunity from lawsuits. The Court concluded that it had. Next, the Court considered whether Congress had authority to do so. Allen argued that the Intellectual Property Clause (art. I § 8, cl. 8) of the U.S. Constitution authorized the exercise of that power, but the Court rejected that theory in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Board, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and stare decisis requires following that precedent unless there is a “special justification” to overturn it. Neither does Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment give Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. For Congress’s action to fall within its Section 5 authority, “there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end.” In the absence of any evidence of this nature, the CRCA fails this test. Thus, Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in that Act.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part and authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s conclusion but noted two disagreements. First, he argue that the Court need not “special justification” to overrule precedent; rather, the Court must correct its error if the prior decision is “demonstrably erroneous.” But the present case does not even meet that lower standard. Second, he declined to join the majority’s discussion regarding future copyright legislation.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Breyer pointed out the inherent unfairness to creators and artists that arises from the Court’s decision but concurred in the judgment because the Court’s precedent in Florida Prepaid “controls this case.”

[18-556] Kansas v. Glover Nov 04, 2019

Kansas v. Glover

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 4, 2019.
Decided on Apr 6, 2020.

Petitioner: State of Kansas.
Respondent: Charles Glover.

Advocates:

Toby Crouse (for the petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Sarah E. Harrington (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

While on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws.

Glover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference gives rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.

The state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly “stacked” assumptions and would relieve the state of its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for a stop.

Question

For purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, is it reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary?

Conclusion

When a police officer lacks information to the contrary, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officer to assume that the driver of a vehicle is its owner, and if the owner’s license is revoked, to conduct an investigative stop of the vehicle. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may make a “brief investigative traffic stop” when he has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing. Courts must permit officers to use common sense to make judgments and inferences about human behavior. In this case, the police officer’s common-sense inference was that the vehicle’s owner was most likely the driver, which provided sufficient suspicion to stop the vehicle. It does not matter that a vehicle’s driver is not always its registered owner; the officer’s judgment was based on common-sense judgment and experience. Thus he had reasonable suspicion, and the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, to point out that the license-revocation alert does not end the inquiry because, in a similar setting with slightly different facts, there might not be reasonable suspicion. Justice Kagan specifically described that most license suspensions (as opposed to revocations) do not relate to driving at all but are highly correlated with poverty.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court’s decision ignores “key foundations of our reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence and impermissibly and unnecessarily reduces the State’s burden of proof.” Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that seizing the vehicle was constitutional because drivers with revoked licenses in Kansas have demonstrated a disregard for the law, arguing that that conclusion “flips the burden of proof.”

[18-725] Barton v. Barr Nov 04, 2019

Barton v. Barr

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 4, 2019.
Decided on Apr 23, 2020.

Petitioner: Andre Martello Barton.
Respondent: William P. Barr, Attorney General.

Advocates:

Adam G. Unikowsky (for the petitioner)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges.

Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a).

The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.”

Question

Can a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States be “render[ed] . . . inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)?

Conclusion

A lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence attains “inadmissible” status for the purposes of the stop-time rule, regardless of whether he is seeking admission, and thus is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a 5-4 majority of the Court.

Looking at the text of the statute, the Court noted that cancellation of removal is precluded when the noncitizen, during the initial seven years of residence in the United States, “committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2)”, even if conviction occurred after those first seven years. Commission of such an offense renders the nonresident “inadmissible.” In this case, Barton’s offenses were serious offenses referred to in section 1182(a)(2) and occurred within the first seven years of his residence, therefore rendering him inadmissible. By being inadmissible, he was, therefore, ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “conflate[d]” the terms “inadmissible” and “deportable,” leading to the “paradox[ical]” conclusion that one can be already admitted to the country yet also “inadmissible.” Justice Sotomayor argued that for the stop-time rule to render Barton ineligible for relief from removal, the Government must show he committed an offense that made him deportable, not inadmissible.

[18-328] Rotkiske v. Klemm Oct 16, 2019

Rotkiske v. Klemm

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 16, 2019.
Decided on Dec 10, 2019.

Petitioner: Kevin C. Rotkiske.
Respondent: Paul Klemm, et al..

Advocates:

Scott E. Gant (On behalf of the Petitioner)
Shay Dvoretzky (On behalf of the Respondents)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014.

Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule,” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “delays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Question

Does the statute of limitations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begin when the violation is discovered or when the violation occurred?

Conclusion

The statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begins to run when the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not when it is discovered. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority affirming the judgment below. The Court first looked at the statutory language of the FDCPA, finding that the plain meaning of the statute of limitations unambiguously refers to the date of the alleged violation. The Court rejected Rotkiske’s argument that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule” that would delay the beginning of the limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury, finding the “atextual judicial supplementation...particularly inappropriate.” The Court declined to consider Rotkiske’s fraud-based equitable defense because he failed to preserve that argument when he appealed to the Third Circuit.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to point out that the Court has “long recognized” the equitable “discovery rule” in cases of fraud or concealment, notwithstanding the majority’s disparagement of that rule in its opinion in this case.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion in which she agrees with the majority’s determination that the “discovery rule” does not apply to the one-year statute of limitations in the FDCPA, but she disagrees with the majority that Rotkiske failed to preserve a fraud-based discovery argument in the court below. Justice Ginsburg would hold that if the conduct giving rise to the claim is fraudulent, or if fraud infects the manner in which the claim is presented, then the fraud-based discovery rule governs. Because, in her view, Rotkiske did preserve this argument on appeal, she would allow adjudication of his claim on the merits.

[17-834] Kansas v. Garcia Oct 16, 2019

Kansas v. Garcia

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 16, 2019.
Decided on Mar 4, 2020.

Petitioner: Kansas.
Respondent: Ramiro Garcia, et al..

Advocates:

Derek Schmidt (Attorney General, Kansas)
Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Paul W. Hughes (On behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue.

In State v. Garcia, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law.

In State v. Morales, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales’s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses.

In State v. Ochoa-Lara, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of identity theft under state law.

All three defendants were convicted of at least one related charge, and all three appealed their convictions.

Question

Does the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) expressly or impliedly preempt states from using information provided on a federal Form I-9 in a prosecution of any person when the same information also appears in non-IRCA documents?

Conclusion

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) neither expressly nor impliedly preempts Kansas’s application of its state identity-theft and fraud statutes to the noncitizens in this case. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 5-4 majority opinion.

The express preemption provision of IRCA applies only to employers and those who recruit or refer prospective employees and thus does not apply to state laws, such as the one at issue in this case, that impose criminal or civil sanctions on employees or applicants for employment. The Kansas Supreme Court erroneously relied on a different provision, § 1324a(b)(5), which prohibits any use of an I-9 or any information “contained in” that form; that interpretation is “contrary to standard English usage.” Thus, IRCA does not expressly preempt state law.

Further, IRCA does not impliedly preempt state law for two key reasons. First, Kansas’s prosecutions of the noncitizens in this case were based on the information provided not in the I-9, but in tax-withholding forms, which are outside of immigration-enforcement functions. Thus, the relevant provisions of the IRCA “did not create a comprehensive and unified system regarding information a State may require employees to provide.” Second, the Court found no intent by Congress to eliminate overlap between state identity-theft prosecutions and federal prosecution fraud crimes arising from the employment-verification process or tax-withholding forms. Thus, the federal laws do not conflict with the state laws, nor do they pose “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of IRCA.”

Because IRCA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts Kansas’s laws, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision, validating the convictions below.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined to express his view that the Court should explicitly abandon its “purposes and objectives” preemption jurisprudence.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part (with respect to express preemption and dissenting in part (with respect to implied preemption), in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that IRCA’s text, structure, context, and purpose, make it “‘clear and manifest’” that Congress has “occupied at least the narrow field of policing fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.” In Justice Breyer’s view, it should not matter that Kansas relied on the information in the tax-withholding forms rather than the I-9; the noncitizens were still submitting information as part of the process of verifying their employment eligibility.

[18-217] Mathena v. Malvo Oct 16, 2019

Mathena v. Malvo

Argued on Oct 16, 2019.

Petitioner: Randall Mathena.
Respondent: Lee Boyd Malvo.

Advocates:

Toby J. Heytens (On behalf of the Petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Danielle Spinelli (On behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2002, Lee Malvo and John Allen Muhammad killed 10 people in sniper attacks in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Muhammad was sentenced to death and executed in 2009. Malvo, only 17 years old at the time of the attacks, was sentenced to life in prison by judges in Virginia and Maryland. He challenged his Virginia sentences based on two recent US Supreme Court decisions.

In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016), the Court held that its decision in Miller was a “substantive rule of constitutional law” and therefore must be given “retroactive effect” in cases where direct review was complete when Miller was decided.

Malvo argued that his sentence must be vacated because Montgomery modified a “substantive rule of constitutional law” and was thus retroactively applied to his own sentencing. Under this reading, sentences that were legal when imposed, as Malvo’s was, must be vacated if they were imposed in violation of the Court’s new rules. The district court found Malvo’s arguments persuasive and vacated his four sentences of life imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana modify a “substantive rule of constitutional law” such that it must be given retroactive effect, requiring the respondent’s sentences of life without the possibility of parole to be vacated?

[18-1334] Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC Oct 15, 2019

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 15, 2019.
Decided on Jun 1, 2020.

Petitioner: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.
Respondent: Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al..

Advocates:

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (On behalf of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico)
Jeffrey B. Wall (On behalf of the United States)
Theodore B. Olson (On behalf of Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al.)
Jessica E. Mendez-Colberg (On behalf of UTIER)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Since it was ceded to the United States in 1898, Puerto Rico has accumulated substantial debt, in large part due to its ambiguous legal status as a protectorate of the United States and the economically detrimental policies the United States has enacted over the decades. Exacerbated by a series of governmental financial deficits and a recession, Puerto Rico’s debt crisis came to a head in 2015, when its governor announced that the Commonwealth was in a “death spiral” and was unable to pay its debt. In June 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which gave him authority to appoint a seven-member Financial Oversight and Management Board that would have control over Puerto Rico’s budget and would negotiate the restructuring of its $125 billion indebtedness. President Obama appointed the seven-member board in August 2016 based on lists supplied by Republic and Democratic lawmakers.

A number of creditors and elected officials of Puerto Rico have been dissatisfied with the board and its decisions and brought a lawsuit challenging President Obama’s authority to appoint the board members. The challengers alleged that the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate confirm high-level federal officers and that the board members were within the scope of this Clause. The federal district court in Puerto Rico ruled against the creditors, finding the board is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth government established pursuant to Congress’s plenary powers under the Territorial Clause and that the board members are not “Officers of the United States.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the Territorial Clause does not supersede the application of the Appointments Clause in an unincorporated territory and that the board members are “Officers of the United States” because: (1) they occupy “continuing positions,” (2) exercise “significant authority” that is the same or more than that exercised by other officers the U.S. Supreme Court has found to be “Officers of the United States,” and (3) exercise their authority “pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Moreover, these officers are “principal” officers subject to the Appointments Clause because they are answerable to and removable only by the President and are not directed or supervised by others who were appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.

Question

Does the Appointments Clause govern the appointment of members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico?
Does the de facto officer doctrine allow courts to deny meaningful relief to successful separation-of-powers challengers who are suffering ongoing injury at the hands of unconstitutionally appointed principal officers?

Conclusion

The Appointments Clause constrains the appointments power as to all officers of the United States, including those who exercise power in or in relation to Puerto Rico, but the Clause does not restrict the appointment or selection of the members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board. Based on this conclusion, the Court had no reason to address the second question presented. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment.

The Appointments Clause of the federal Constitution is intended to allocate between the President and the Senate responsibility for selecting officers to hold high federal positions. Because of this purpose, the Appointments Clause should apply to all officers of the United States, even those with powers and duties related to Puerto Rico.

However, the Appointments Clause does not restrict the appointment of local officers that Congress vests with primarily local duties. When an officer has primarily local duties, he is not an officer of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. The Board members have primarily local powers and duties, exemplified by the fact that the power of the Board is backed by Puerto Rico law rather than federal law. Indeed, the Board’s duty is to oversee the fiscal and budgetary development of Puerto Rico and to initiate bankruptcy proceedings in the interests of Puerto Rico. Consequently, the Appointments Clause does not constrain the appointments power as to the Board members.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but based on interpretation of the “original public meaning” of the phrase “Officers of the United States” within the Appointments Clause.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to explore issues the Court did not (and did not need) to address regarding the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Specifically, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the history of that relationship calls into question whether the Board members may be territorial officers of Puerto Rico when “they are not elected or approved, directly or indirectly, by the people of Puerto Rico.”

[17-1618] Bostock v. Clayton County Oct 08, 2019

Bostock v. Clayton County

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 8, 2019.
Decided on Jun 15, 2020.

Petitioner: Gerald Lynn Bostock.
Respondent: Clayton County, Georgia.

Advocates:

Pamela S. Karlan (for the petitioner in 17-1618 and the respondent in 17-1623)
Jeffrey M. Harris (for the respondent in 17-1618 and the petitioner in 17-1623)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance in 17-1618 and reversal in 17-1623)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.”

Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision.

This case is consolidated for oral argument with Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623.

Question

Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompass discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation?

Conclusion

An employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court.

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).

[18-107] R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Oct 08, 2019

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 8, 2019.
Decided on Jun 15, 2020.

Petitioner: R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc..
Respondent: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al..

Advocates:

David D. Cole (for respondent Aimee Stephens)
John J. Bursch (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent EEOC, supporting reversal)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated.

Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes.

The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Question

Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination against transgender employees based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)?

Conclusion

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).

[18-801] Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. Oct 07, 2019

Peter v. NantKwest, Inc.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 7, 2019.
Decided on Dec 12, 2019.

Petitioner: Laura Peter, Deputy Director, Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: NantKwest, Inc..

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)
Morgan Chu (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2001, Dr. Hans Klingemann filed a patent application with the US Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) describing a method for treating cancer using natural killer cells. Dr. Klingemann assigned his application to NantKwest Inc., and in 2010, the examiner rejected the application as obvious. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirmed the rejection.

When the Board affirms an examiner’s rejection of a patent application, the applicant may either appeal directly to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or challenge the Board’s decision in district court (under 35 U.S.C. § 145). Pursuant to § 145, NantKwest challenged the Board’s decision by filing a complaint in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The court granted the PTO’s motion for summary judgment, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. After its victory on the merits, PTO filed a motion for reimbursement of “the expenses of the proceedings” under § 145, including almost $80,000 in attorney’s fees and over $33,000 in expert witness fees.

Applicants who invoke § 145 are required by statute to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the PTO in defending the Board’s decision, regardless of the outcome. Historically, the PTO has used this requirement to recover payment for expenses such as travel, printing, and expert witnesses.

The district court denied PTO’s motion with respect to attorney’s fees, citing the American Rule—a “bedrock principle” in this country that “each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose” unless there is an “express grant from Congress.” A panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, and then the circuit voted to hear the appeal en banc. After requesting briefing on the single question whether § 145 authorizes award of attorney’s fees, the en banc Federal Circuit concluded that it does not, affirming the district court.

Question

Does the phrase “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” in 35 U.S.C. § 145 include attorneys’ fees?

Conclusion

The Patent and Trademark Office cannot recover the salaries of its legal personnel as “expenses” in civil actions brought by patent applicants pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Under the “American Rule,” there is a presumption that each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. That presumption is particularly important in the context of proceedings challenging the rejection of a patent application because allowing the agency to recover fees from a prevailing party would be a “radical departure” from the norm. The plain text—use of the word “expenses”—does not provide adequate basis from departing from the strong presumption that the American Rule applies. Nor does the history of the Patent Act support such an expansive reading of the term.

[18-5924] Ramos v. Louisiana Oct 07, 2019

Ramos v. Louisiana

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 7, 2019.
Decided on Apr 20, 2020.

Petitioner: Evangelisto Ramos.
Respondent: State of Louisiana.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)
Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Ramos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.

Question

Does the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict against the states?

Conclusion

The Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, requires that a jury find a criminal defendant guilty by a unanimous verdict. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the primary opinion.

In Part I, Justice Neil Gorsuch (writing for a majority: himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh) noted that the original public meaning of the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury, as well as its history, support an interpretation that it requires guilt be determined by a unanimous jury. Because this right is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” it is incorporated against the states (that is, it applies to state governments as well) by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in state court.

In Part II-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the same majority, explained how the Court’s jurisprudence came to allow Oregon and Louisiana to permit non-unanimous jury verdicts, describing the fractured plurality opinions in those cases (Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana) with a fifth vote from Justice Lewis Powell that was “neither here nor there” but effectively permitted those states to proceed with non-unanimous jury verdicts.

In Part II-B, Justice Gorsuch wrote for a plurality of the Court (himself, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor), describing the confusion surrounding the Apodaca decision and the apparent conflict in the Court’s precedent as to whether the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts.

In Part III, Justice Gorsuch, again writing for the majority, rejected Louisana’s arguments for non-unanimous jury verdicts, finding that the drafting history of the Sixth Amendment is ambiguous at best, the Apodaca plurality’s reasoning was “skimpy,” and most importantly, that the Apodaca plurality “subjected the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment.”

In Part IV-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for a plurality (himself and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer), addressed the dissent’s argument that the principle of stare decisis required the Court to stand by its decision in Apodaca and uphold Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury law. Justice Gorsuch argued that under no view can the plurality opinion in Apodaca be controlling on today’s Court.

Writing again for a majority in Part IV-B-1, Justice Gorsuch noted that even if the Court accepted the premise that Apodaca established a precedent, no one on the Court today would say it was rightly decided, and “stare decisis isn’t supposed to be the art of methodically ignoring what everyone knows to be true.”

For the four-justice plurality (Justice Kavanaugh did not join this part), Justice Gorsuch in Part IV-B-2 addressed the reliance interest Louisiana and Oregon have in the security of their final criminal judgments. Justice Gorsuch minimized the significance of the state’s reliance interests and pointed instead to the reliance interests of the American people in having a just criminal jury that uniformly requires a unanimous verdict for a finding of guilt.

Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part IV-A, writing separately to raise three points: “First, overruling precedent here is not only warranted, but compelled. Second, the interests at stake point far more clearly to that outcome than those in other recent cases. And finally, the racially biased origins of the Louisiana and Oregon laws uniquely matter here.”

Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote an opinion concurring in part to explain his view of how stare decisis applies in this case, laying out seven factors, which he argued, support overruling Apodaca in this case.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted from the outset that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes protection against non-unanimous jury verdicts and would thus resolve the question there. He would further find that the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, but would find that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates it against the states.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, and which Justice Elena Kagan joined as to all but Part III-D. Justice Alito argued that stare decisis requires following Apodaca and that in overruling that case, the majority “cast[] aside an important and long-established decision with little regard for the enormous reliance the decision has engendered.” In the part of the dissent that Justice Kagan did not join, Justice Alito argued that the reliance in this case “far outstrips” the reliance interests in other recent cases where the dissenters in those cases claimed reliance interests.

[18-6135] Kahler v. Kansas Oct 07, 2019

Kahler v. Kansas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 7, 2019.
Decided on Mar 23, 2020.

Petitioner: James K. Kahler.
Respondent: Kansas.

Advocates:

Sarah Schrup (for the petitioner)
Toby Crouse (for the respondent)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed.

In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.”

Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.”

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

Question

May a state abolish the insanity defense without violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Yes; due process does not require Kansas to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his crime was morally wrong. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a 6-3 majority of the Court. The Court acknowledged that for hundreds of years, judges have recognized that a criminal defendant’s insanity at the time of the commission of a criminal act can relieve criminal responsibility. And while the Kansas law at issue does make irrelevant the question of moral incapacity, it still permits mental illness as a defense to culpability if it prevented a defendant from forming the criminal intent required for commission of the crime. The Court has repeatedly declined to adopt one particular version of the insanity defense, and it declined to do so in this case, as well. No single version of the insanity defense has become so ingrained in American law as to be “fundamental,” and states retain the authority to define the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental illness.

Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that Kansas did not merely redefine the insanity defense; it “eliminated the core” of a defense “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” He provided several hypotheticals to illustrate his point that Kansas’s version of the insanity defense “requires conviction of a broad swath of defendants who are obviously insane and would be adjudged not guilty under any traditional form of the defense.” As such, he would conclude that Kansas’s law violates a “fundamental precept of our criminal law” and thus is unconstitutional.

[18-489] Taggart v. Lorenzen Apr 24, 2019

Taggart v. Lorenzen

Argued on Apr 24, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.

Petitioner: Bradley Weston Taggart.
Respondent: Shelley A. Lorenzen, et al..

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)
Nicole A. Saharsky (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.”

Petitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman.

Emmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees.

In November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings.

After the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts.

Brown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys’ fees on the theory that Taggart had “returned to the fray.”

While the attorneys’ fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the “Creditors”) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against him in the state court action.

The state court ruled that Taggart had “returned to the fray” as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys’ fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination.

Subsequently, the bankruptcy court denied Taggart’s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys’ fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had “knowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys’ fees.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys’ fee claim.

Back in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys’ fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys’ fees against Taggart, and the BAP’s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys’ fees.

Question

Does the bankruptcy code preclude a finding of civil contempt where a creditor’s believes in good faith that the discharge injunction does not apply?

Conclusion

The bankruptcy code allows a court to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The bankruptcy code states that a discharge order “operates as an injunction” and that a court may issue any “order” or “judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry out” other bankruptcy provisions. In other, non-bankruptcy contexts, the Court has held that civil contempt is inappropriate where there is “a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.” The Court found no reason that this principle should not apply equally in a bankruptcy context. Thus, civil contempt is appropriate only if the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order. Because the Ninth Circuit below applied a different standard in determining whether civil contempt was appropriate, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.

[17-778] Quarles v. United States Apr 24, 2019

Quarles v. United States

Argued on Apr 24, 2019.
Decided on Jun 10, 2019.

Petitioner: Jamar Alonzo Quarles.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Jeremy C. Marwell (for the petitioner)
Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration.

Under federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary.

Question

Does the generic definition of burglary, established by the US Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), require proof that intent to commit a crime was present at the time of unlawful entry or first unlawful remaining, or only that the defendant formed such intent while “remaining in” the building or structure?

Conclusion

The generic definition of burglary in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) includes, if state law permits it, any unlawful “remaining in” presence in a building or structure “when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

The Court first looked to the ordinary usage of the phrase “remaining in,” finding that it refers to a continuous activity. Additionally, a majority of state burglary statutes encompassed the “remaining in” concept at the time the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was passed, and all five of the state appellate courts that had addressed the question of timing had embraced the “at any time” position. Finally, the Court considered the purpose of the ACCA—to require enhanced imprisonment terms for repeat “armed career criminals”—would be frustrated if the Court adopted the narrower interpretation requiring intent to be present at the time of the unlawful entry.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence to reiterate his view that the Court should revisit its “categorical approach” to the enumerated-offenses clause of the ACCA.

[17-9560] Rehaif v. United States Apr 23, 2019

Rehaif v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 23, 2019.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.

Petitioner: Hamid Mohamed Rehaif.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Rosemary T. Cakmis (for the petitioner)
Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased.

A federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both.

At trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.” The government also requested the instruction that “[t]he alien’s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation”; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that “[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.” The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif’s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended).

Question

Does the “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) apply to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, or only to the possession element?

Conclusion

The “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) applies to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, under which it is a criminal offense for a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” to possess “any firearm or ammunition.” That is, to convict a defendant of this crime, the government must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he belonged to the relevant class of persons when he possessed it.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. There is a longstanding presumption that “Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Courts apply this presumption of mental state, or “scienter,” even in the absence of any scienter in the statute. The text of § 924(a)(2) provides that “whoever knowingly violates” certain subsections “shall be” subject to certain penalties. Thus, using “ordinary English grammar,” the Court read the statutory term “knowingly” as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime. The Court found further support for its interpretation in the basic principle of criminal law that criminal intent separates wrongful from innocent acts.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Alito criticized the majority for manipulating the statutory text in an unnatural manner to apply the scienter requirement—“knowingly”—to the status element of the crime. Justice Alito argued that the Court has never inferred that Congress intended to impose a mental culpability requirement on an element that concerns the defendant’s own status and should not do so in this case.

[18-6210] Mitchell v. Wisconsin Apr 23, 2019

Mitchell v. Wisconsin

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 23, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.

Petitioner: Gerald P. Mitchell.
Respondent: State of Wisconsin.

Advocates:

Andrew R. Hinkel (for the Petitioner)
Hannah S. Jurss (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222.

Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts.

Mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it.

Question

Does a statute that authorizes a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provide an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement?

Conclusion

A four-justice plurality of the Court concluded that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant. Justice Samuel Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion.

Writing for himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Alito noted that blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment. As such, a warrant is generally required before police may conduct a BAC test, unless an exception applies. The “exigent circumstances” exception allows the government to conduct a search without a warrant “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” The Court has previously held that the fleeting nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone does not automatically qualify BAC tests for the exigent circumstances exception, but additional factors may bring it within the exception. For example, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that “the dissipation of BAC did justify a blood test of a drunk driver whose accident gave police other pressing duties, for then the further delay caused by a warrant application would indeed have threatened the destruction of evidence.” Similarly, a situation involving an unconscious driver gives rise to exigency because officials cannot conduct a breath test and must instead perform a blood test to determine BAC.

Under the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless search is allowed when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” The plurality pointed to three reasons such a “compelling need” exists: highway safety is a “vital public interest,” legal limits on BAC serve that interest, and enforcement of BAC limits requires a test accurate enough to stand up in court.

The plurality suggested that on remand, Mitchell can attempt to show that his was an unusual case that fell outside the exigent circumstances exception (perhaps because police conceded that they had time to get a warrant to draw his blood).

Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment but would have applied a per se rule under which “the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk, regardless of whether the driver is conscious.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plurality “needlessly casts aside the established protections of the warrant requirement in favor of a brand new presumption of exigent circumstances.” Established precedent should determine the outcome in this case: unless there is too little time to do so, police officers must get a warrant before ordering a blood draw. The dissent also argued that the state statute “cannot create actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.”

[18-966] Department of Commerce v. New York Apr 23, 2019

Department of Commerce v. New York

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 23, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.

Petitioner: United States Department of Commerce, et al..
Respondent: State of New York, et al..

Advocates:

Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for Petitioners)
Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of Respondents, New York, et al.)
Dale E. Ho (on behalf of Respondents, New York Immigration Coalition, et al.)
Douglas N. Letter (on behalf of the United States House of Representatives, as amicus curiae, in support of the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could cause a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions.

As part of its challenge, the challengers sought—and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized—depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross’s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue.

On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government’s previous stay application without prejudice, “provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed.

The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact-finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below.

Before the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction.

Question

Did the district court err in enjoining the Secretary of Commerce from reinstating a question about citizenship to the 2020 census questionnaire?
In an action seeking to set aside agency action, may a district court order discovery outside the administrative record to probe the mental processes of the agency decision maker—including by compelling the testimony of high-ranking Executive Branch officials—when there is no evidence that the decision maker disbelieved the objective reasons in the administrative record, irreversibly prejudged the issue, or acted on a legally forbidden basis?

Conclusion

The Secretary of Commerce did not violate the Enumeration Clause or the Census Act in deciding to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire, but the District Court was warranted in remanding the case to the agency where the evidence tells a story that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the divided Court.

As to the question of standing, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the district court’s finding that reinstating a citizenship question on the census would likely result in noncitizen households responding to the census at lower rates, causing them to be undercounted and subsequently to lose federal funds, constituted a concrete and imminent injury.

Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Enumeration Clause permits Congress, and by extension the Secretary of Commerce, to inquire about citizenship on the census questionnaire. In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted the “long and consistent historical practice” of Congress to exercise “broad authority” over the census.

Then, the Chief Justice, writing for a 6-3 majority (Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan), held that the Secretary’s decision is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While The Census Act gives “broad authority” to the Secretary to administer the census, his discretion is not without limits. The APA exempts from judicial review agency actions that are discretionary, but “the taking of the census is not one of those areas.” Because the Census Act provides general requirements for agency decisionmaking, the Secretary’s decision is subject to judicial review.

Writing for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in deciding to reinstate the citizenship question. The Chief Justice noted that the Secretary conducted an analysis weighing the value of obtaining more complete and accurate citizenship data against the uncertain risk that reinstating a citizenship question would result in a lower response rate. Because his decision to reinstate the question was reasonable and reasonably explained, it was not “arbitrary and capricious.”

Again writing for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not violate the Census Act, reversing the district court’s ruling to the contrary. Section 6 of the Census Act authorizes the Secretary to acquire administrative records from other federal agencies and state and local governments and requires him to use that data rather than conducting direct inquiries, to the extent possible. Assuming that § 6 applied, the Chief Justice found that the Secretary complied with it for the same reasons he found the Secretary’s decision not “arbitrary and capricious”—that is, administrative records were insufficient to provide the requested citizenship data. Even if he had not complied with it, his decision would constitute harmless error because “he fully informed Congress of, and explained, his decision.”

Finally, writing for himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Chief Justice affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the action to the agency. A court generally is limited to the existing administrative record, but it may inquire into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers upon a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” Although the district court was premature in invoking that exception, the Chief Justice agreed with its ultimate conclusion that the decision to reinstate a citizenship question “cannot adequately be explained.” The Chief Justice pointed to evidence “that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision,” and given these “unusual circumstances,” concluded that the district court correctly remanded the action to the agency.

Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas criticized the Court for its holding, in his characterization, that “the Secretary’s stated rationale did not factor at all into his decision.”

Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Secretary’s decision to add the citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated the APA, regardless of whether the decision was pretextual.

Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely criticizing the Court for getting involved in the policy question whether a citizenship question should be included on the census and whether the reasons given by the Secretary were his only reasons or his real reasons. He argued that the Court has “no authority to decide whether the Secretary’s decision was rendered in compliance with the . . . APA.”

[18-481] Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media Apr 22, 2019

Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media

Argued on Apr 22, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.

Petitioner: Food Marketing Institute.
Respondent: Argus Leader Media, d/b/a Argus Media.

Advocates:

Evan A. Young (for the Petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of Petitioner)
Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA.

Argus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”—applied to the information sought.

For the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what “substantial competitive harm” means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that “competitive harm may be established if there is evidence of ‘actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.’” Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA’s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Question

Does the statutory term “confidential” in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 4, bear its ordinary meaning?
Or, if it does not, what constitutes “substantial competitive harm” for the purpose of determining whether information falls within FOIA Exemption 4?

Conclusion

Where commercial or financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy, the information is “confidential” within the meaning of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The Court first looked to whether the Food Marketing Institute had standing to appeal. The Institute would suffer financial injury as a result of disclosure, such injury would be the direct consequence of a judgment ordering disclosure, and a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court in this case would redress that injury. As such, the Court concluded the Institute has standing.

At the time FOIA was enacted, the term “confidential” meant “private” or “secret.” For information that is communicated from one party to another, that means that (1) the information is customarily kept private, and (2) the party receiving it has provided some assurance that it will remain private. In this case, it is uncontested that retailers customarily keep private the type of information at issue. Thus, under the plain meaning of the term, the information is “confidential.”

In giving the word “confidential” a different meaning in National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the DC Circuit inappropriately relied on legislative history rather than first going to the statute’s text and structure. The concept of “substantial competitive harm” that the DC Circuit developed is based not on statutory language but on testimony of witnesses in congressional hearings on a different bill that was never enacted. Additionally, while true that courts should “narrowly construe” FOIA exemptions, courts cannot arbitrarily constrict Exemption 4 by adding limitations found nowhere in its text.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer articulated a third condition for finding confidentiality in addition to the two described by the majority: “release of such information must cause genuine harm to the owner’s economic or business interests.” While Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the “substantial competitive harm” rule from the DC Circuit is unworkable, he argued that the majority incorrectly interpreted Exemption 4 as having no harm requirement whatsoever. According to Justice Breyer, “the language permits, and the purpose, precedent, and context all suggest, an interpretation that insists upon some showing of harm.”

[18-525] Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis Apr 22, 2019

Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis

Argued on Apr 22, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.

Petitioner: Fort Bend County, Texas.
Respondent: Lois M. Davis.

Advocates:

Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner)
Raffi Melkonian (for the Respondent)
Jonathan C. Bond (for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint.

Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment.

Davis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis’s religious discrimination claim with prejudice.

Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which the Court held that the Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.

Question

Is Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, as three circuits have held, or a waivable claim-processing rule, as eight circuits have held?

Conclusion

Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is a waivable claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Jurisdictional requirements are generally quite narrow and refer either to the classes of cases a court may hear (as in subject matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise its authority (personal jurisdiction). Claim-processing rules, in contrast, broadly require parties to take certain steps in or prior to litigation.

The requirement in Title VII that the complainant exhaust all administrative remedies appears in provisions separate and distinct from the parts of that statute that confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear such claims. The administrative-exhaustion requirement is more similar to other types of rules that the Court has held nonjurisdictional, such as the directions to raise objections in an agency rulemaking procedure before asserting them in court or to follow copyright registration procedures before suing for infringement.

[18-431] United States v. Davis Apr 17, 2019

United States v. Davis

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 17, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover.

Advocates:

Eric J. Feigin (for the petitioner)
Brandon E. Beck (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above.

On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause.

Question

Is the subsection-specific definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)—which applies only in the limited context of a federal criminal prosecution for possessing, using or carrying a firearm in connection with acts comprising such a crime—unconstitutionally vague?

Conclusion

Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which provides enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a “crime of violence,” is unconstitutionally vague. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

The Court recently decided two cases in which it was asked to interpret so-called residual clauses. In Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the Court held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. In Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16 was also unconstitutionally vague. In both of those cases, the Court interpreted the statute to require courts to use a “categorical approach” to determine “whether an offense qualified as a violent felony or crime of violence.” This categorical approach prevented judges from considering how the defendant actually committed the offense and weigh instead only the crime’s “ordinary case.” The residual clause at issue here is nearly identical to the one held to require a categorical approach in Dimaya, and the Court found no good reason to interpret it differently.

The phrase “by its nature” compels the categorical approach, and to understand the nearly identical language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 differently would “make a hash of the federal criminal code.” The history of the statute, too, supports this interpretation of the clause, and the Court has never invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance, as the government advocated, to expand the reach of a criminal statute to save it.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, and in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined in part. The dissenters argued that the residual clause in this case is fundamentally different from those struck down in Johnson and Dimaya because those cases involved sentencing based on prior convictions, whereas this one focuses only on current conduct during the presently charged crime. Justices Kavanaugh and Alito (without the Chief Justice) also warned of the dire consequences of the Court’s decision.

[18-485] McDonough v. Smith Apr 17, 2019

McDonough v. Smith

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 17, 2019.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Edward G. McDonough.
Respondent: Youel Smith.

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner)
Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae)
Thomas J. O'Connor (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged.

After the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012.

On December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim.

The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence claim when the plaintiff has “reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions.

Question

Was the Second Circuit correct in holding, contrary to the holdings of a majority of other circuits, that the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of the tainted evidence and its improper use?

Conclusion

Contrary to the holding of the Second Circuit, below, the statute of limitations for McDonough’s § 1983 fabricated evidence claim began to run when the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor—that is, when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The question of when a claim begins to accrue is presumptively when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. The claimed right here is a constitutional due process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of a government official’s fabrication of evidence. To determine when accrual begins, the Court considered the analogous tort of malicious prosecution. Under common law, malicious prosecution accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, largely because (1) this policy for accrual avoids parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter (and the resulting possibility of conflicting judgments), and (2) it also avoids collateral civil attacks on criminal judgments. Both of these rationales hold true for McDonough’s fabricated-evidence claim and thus support applying the same accrual rule.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that because McDonough did not identify the specific constitutional right that was violated, the Court should have dismissed the case as improvidently granted.

[18-389] Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton Apr 16, 2019

Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton

Argued on Apr 16, 2019.
Decided on Jun 10, 2019.

Petitioner: Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd..
Respondent: Brian Newton.

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (for the Unted States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Respondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections.

A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims.

Question

Does the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act permit the application of state law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law, or whenever state law pertains to the subject matter of the lawsuit and is not preempted by inconsistent federal law?

Conclusion

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) permits the application of state law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law; if federal law addresses the issue, state law is inapplicable. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The OCSLA extends “the Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States” to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) “to the same extent as if” the OCS were “an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.” Further, the OCSLA commands that state laws be adopted as federal law on the OCS “to the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” other federal law. Newton argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that state law is “applicable” whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue, and it is “inconsistent” only if it is incompatible with the federal scheme—that is, only if it would be preempted under the Court’s ordinary preemption principles.

The Court found this argument unpersuasive, favoring instead Parker’s argument that state law is “applicable” only if there is a gap in federal law that needs to be filled and that state law may be “inconsistent” with federal law even if it is possible for a party to satisfy both sets of laws. For example, although the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) generally gives way to more protective state wage-and-hour laws, such state laws are inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting them as surrogate federal law would produce two different standards. The Court found this approach to preemption more persuasive because the two terms “applicable” and “not inconsistent” must be read together and interpreted “in light of the entire statute.”

Under this standard, some of Newton’s claims fail for relying on California law rather than federal law. The Court remanded the remaining claims for further consideration in light of this standard.

[18-457] North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust Apr 16, 2019

North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust

Argued on Apr 16, 2019.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.

Petitioner: North Carolina Department of Revenue.
Respondent: The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust.

Advocates:

Matthew W. Sawchak (for the petitioner)
David A. O'Neil (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina.

In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed.

The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “minimum contacts” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed.

Question

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states from taxing trusts based on trust beneficiaries’ in-state residency?

Conclusion

The Due Process Clause prohibits a state from taxing trust income based solely on its beneficiaries' in-state residency. If the income has not been distributed to the beneficiaries and the beneficiaries have no right to demand that income and are uncertain to receive it, the state has no power to tax the trust income.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Due Process Clause permits a state to collect taxes only if there is “some definite link, or some minimum connection” between the state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax. The crux of this question is whether the government’s taxation action is reasonable. In the context of a trust beneficiary, the answer turns on the extent to which the beneficiary controls or possesses the property to be taxed and the relationship of that property to the state. The trust income income at issue in this case does not meet the minimum connection necessary to support the state tax because the beneficiaries did not actually receive any income from the trust during the years in question, nor could they exercise control over it.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito emphasized that the opinion in this case merely applies existing precedent and leaves unchanged the governing standard and the reasoning applied in earlier cases.

[18-302] Iancu v. Brunetti Apr 15, 2019

Iancu v. Brunetti

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 15, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.

Petitioner: Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office.
Respondent: Erik Brunetti.

Advocates:

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the petitioner)
John R. Sommer (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct,” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of “fuct” sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.

Question

Does Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

The Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. __ (2017), the Court held that a prohibition on registration of marks based on their viewpoint violates the First Amendment, and that a provision of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of “disparaging” marks was viewpoint based. A prohibition on the registration of marks that are “immoral” or “scandalous”—at issue in this case—is similarly viewpoint based and therefore violates the First Amendment. The prohibition distinguishes between ideas aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them, which is the epitome of viewpoint-based discrimination.

The Court rejected the government’s proposal that the statute is susceptible to a limiting construction that would remove its viewpoint bias. The language of the statute does not support such a reading and to interpret it as such would be to “fashion a new one.”

Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence to highlight the importance of the Court continuing to affirm the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination. Justice Alito noted that Congress can adopt “a more carefully focused statute” that would prohibit the registration of “vulgar” marks without violating the First Amendment.

Chief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Chief Justice argued that while he agreed with the majority that the “immoral” portion of the statute was not susceptible to a narrowing construction but agreed with Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s argument in favor of such a construction with respect to the “scandalous” portion.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed with the majority as to “immoral” but disagreed as to “scandalous.” Justice Breyer advocated against the categorical approach to First Amendment speech issues and for an approach that considers “whether the regulation at issue works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined. While Justice Sotomayor conceded that the majority’s construction of the statute is a reasonable one, it is not the only reasonable one and erroneously treats “immoral and scandalous” as a “unified standard.” She argued for a narrowing construction of the prohibition on “scandalous” marks to address only “obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.” Such a construction would save the provision and avoid the “rush to register [vulgar, profine, and obscene] trademarks” that the Court’s decision makes probable.

[18-459] Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian Apr 15, 2019

Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian

Argued on Apr 15, 2019.
Decided on Apr 23, 2019.

Petitioner: Emulex Corporation, et al..
Respondent: Gary Varjabedian and Jerry Mutza.

Advocates:

Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioners)
Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae)
Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Emulex Corp., a Delaware company that sold computer components, and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., announced in February 2015 that they had entered into a merger agreement, with Avago offering to pay $8.00 for every share of outstanding Emulex stock, which was 26.4% higher than the value of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., initiated a tender offer for Emulex’s outstanding stock in April 2015. (A tender offer is a type of takeover bid in which the offeror publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target company’s stock, usually at a price higher than market value.)

It is customary for the target company to issue a statement to shareholders recommending that they either accept or reject the tender offer. Before issuing such a statement, Emulex hired Goldman Sachs to determine whether the proposed merger agreement would be fair to shareholders. Goldman Sachs determined that it would be fair, despite a below-average merger premium, and Emulex issued a statement consistent with that determination. Some of the shareholders were unhappy with the merger’s terms and brought a class action lawsuit against Emulex, Avago, Merger Sub, and the Emulex Board of Directors, alleging violations of federal securities laws.

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the lead plaintiff’s claim under Section 14(e) did not plead the requisite mental culpability for claims under that section, the separate claim under Section 14(d) failed because that section does not establish a private right of action for shareholders confronted with a tender offer, and its Section 20(a) claim because its first two claims were insufficient.

Reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision as to the Section 14(e) claim (but affirmed as to the Section 14(d) claim). Citing the US Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the five other circuits that have interpreted Section 14(e). Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, claims under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) require a showing of negligence, not scienter (intent or knowledge of wrongdoing).

Question

Did the Ninth Circuit correctly hold, in contrast to the holdings of five other federal appellate courts, that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on the negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer?

Conclusion

The writ was dismissed as improvidently granted.

[18-15] Kisor v. Wilkie Mar 27, 2019

Kisor v. Wilkie

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 27, 2019.
Decided on Jun 26, 2019.

Petitioner: James L. Kisor.
Respondent: Robert L. Wilkie.

Advocates:

Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file.

Notably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed.

The VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” In the VA’s view, records are not “relevant” when they are not “outcome determinative.”

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well.

Question

Should Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), be overruled?

Conclusion

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)—which direct courts to give deference to an agency’s reasonable reading of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations—are not overruled.

Justice Elena Kagan announced the judgment and delivered an opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Chief Justice Roberts joined in part, forming a majority of the Court for those parts.

Justice Kagan, writing for the 5-4 majority, first described the history of the case before it arrived before the Court.

Then, writing for a four-justice plurality, she described other examples of ambiguous regulations and explained the history of the doctrine of Auer deference. She explained that Auer deference is “rooted in a presumption that Congress would generally want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory ambiguities” because agencies are best equipped to interpret the often-technical regulations at issue.

Writing again for the majority, Kagan continued to outline the requirements that must be met for Auer deference to apply: First, a court should not afford an agency Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, a determination the court can make only after it has exhausted all the traditional tools of construction. Second, the agency’s reading must be reasonable, under the text, structure, and history of the regulation. Notwithstanding some courts’ interpretation to the contrary, the language “plainly erroneous” from Seminole Rock does not mean that agency constructions of rules are entitled to greater deference than agency constructions of statutes. Third, the regulatory interpretation must be one actually made by the agency; that is, it must be the agency’s authoritative or official position, not merely an ad hoc statement. Fourth, the interpretation must in some way implicate the agency’s substantive expertise, and fifth, it must reflect “fair and considered judgment.”

On behalf of the plurality, Kagan went on to address Kisor’s arguments. She explained that Auer is not inconsistent with the judicial review provision of the APA, nor does it circumvent the APA’s rulemaking requirements. Contrary to Kisor’s arguments, Kagan cited empirical evidence to support her position that Auer does not encourage agencies to issue vague and open-ended interpretations of those rules they prefer. Finally, she quickly dispensed of Kisor’s argument that it violates separation-of-powers principles.

On behalf of the majority, Kagan wrote that the doctrine of stare decisis cuts strongly against Kisor’s position. There is no “special justification” to reverse Auer, and even if the Court were wrong about its presumption of what Congress would want, Congress can correct it.

Applying the principles outlined in the opinion, a redo is necessary for two reasons: The Federal Circuit “jumped the gun” in declaring the regulation ambiguous, and it also “assumed too fast” that Auer deference should apply in the event of genuine ambiguity.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurrence in part to reiterate Justice Kagan’s assertion that overturning Auer and Seminole Rock was not warranted. He also noted that the cases in which Auer deference is appropriate largely overlap with cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court to be persuaded by an agency's interpretation of its own regulation. He pointed out that the gulf between the majority’s position and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is not so great as it may initially appear.

Justice Neil Gorsuch penned a separate opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined and Justice Samuel Alito joined in part, concurring in the judgment but highly critical of Justice Kagan’s opinion. On behalf of himself and three other justices, Justice Gorsuch wrote a history of Auer deference, describing the decision and resulting doctrine “an accident.” He went on to explain that Auer is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and the separation of powers principle. On behalf of himself and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch responded to Justice Kagan’s public policy considerations and argued that while the majority gave lip service to stare decisis, it effectively changed the test set forth in precedents—which effectively overrules it in all but name.

Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. In his opinion, Justice Kavanaugh emphasizes two points: first, he reiterates the Chief Justice’s point that “the distance between” the two main opinions in this case “is not as great as it may initially appear,” and second, he expresses agreement with the Chief Justice that the decision in this case addresses only judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations, and not at all judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes.

[18-422] Rucho v. Common Cause Mar 26, 2019

Rucho v. Common Cause

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.

Appellant: Robert A. Rucho, et al..
Appellee: Common Cause, et al..

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the appellants)
Emmet J. Bondurant, II (for the appellees, Common Cause, et al.)
Allison J. Riggs (for the appellees, League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

Question

Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to pursue their partisan gerrymandering claims?
Are the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable?
Is North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander?

Conclusion

Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts.

Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues.

Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively “encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that “may irreparably damage our system of government.” She argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find.

This case was consolidated with Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726, and the Court released a single opinion resolving both cases.

[18-726] Lamone v. Benisek Mar 26, 2019

Lamone v. Benisek

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.

Appellant: Linda H. Lamone, et al..
Appellee: O. John Benisek, et al..

Advocates:

Steven M. Sullivan (for the appellant)
Michael B. Kimberly (for the appellees)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable.

After the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. __ (2018)—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

Are the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court unmanageable?
Did the three-judge district court err in granting the plaintffs’ motion for summary judgment?
Did the three-judge district court abuse its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief?

Conclusion

Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts.

Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion (consolidated under Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422). Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues.

[17-1705] PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc. Mar 25, 2019

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc.

Argued on Mar 25, 2019.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.

Petitioner: PDR Network, LLC, et al..
Respondent: Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc..

Advocates:

Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)
Glenn L. Hara (for the respondent)
Rachel P. Kovner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians’ Desk Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the PDR Network.”

On behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages.

As a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“2006 FCC Rule”), the court found that PDR Network’s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a “commercial aim.” Moreover, the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an “unsolicited advertisement.” For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss.

Carlton & Harris appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court’s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text.

Question

Does the Hobbs Act require the district court in this case to accept the Federal Communication Commission's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?

Conclusion

The extent to which a 2006 order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is binding on a district court turns on two preliminary questions: (1) whether the order is the equivalent of a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law”; and (2) whether the subject of the rule (in this case, PDR Network) had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order.

Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in its judgment. Whether an agency’s order is binding on courts depends on two preliminary considerations. First, the order must be equivalent to a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law,” as opposed to an “interpretive rule,” which merely “advises the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency action be subject to judicial review except “to the extent that a prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law.” The Hobbs Act requires certain challenges to FCC final orders to be brought in a court of appeals, so a court should determine whether this provision afforded PDR Network a prior and adequate opportunity for judicial review. The Court declined to resolve these questions, instead vacating the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanding for consideration of these preliminary questions.

Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas’s concurrence highlights, in his view, the Court’s mistaken understanding of the relationship between federal statutes and the agency orders interpreting them. Justice Thomas argues that federal courts cannot disregard the text of the governing statute when considering whether or not to treat agency orders as controlling law.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh concurred in the judgment, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Kavanaugh criticizes the majority for answering a question other than the one presented in this case. Rather than resolving a different question, Justice Kavanaugh would conclude that the Hobbs Act does not bar a defendant in an enforcement action from arguing that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is wrong. He suggests that the Fourth Circuit on remand (and other courts, when the issue arises) can employ the analysis set forth in his separate concurrence.

[18-266] The Dutra Group v. Batterton Mar 25, 2019

The Dutra Group v. Batterton

Argued on Mar 25, 2019.
Decided on Jun 24, 2019.

Petitioner: The Dutra Group.
Respondent: Christopher Batterton.

Advocates:

Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Respondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law.

The district court denied Dutra Group’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

In Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “punitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,” as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that Evich is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action.

The Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group’s argument, finding that the Court in Miles considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While Miles does limit recovery for “pecuniary loss,” punitive damages are not “pecuniary loss,” which means simply loss of money. Thus, Miles left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Evich.

Question

Are punitive damages available to a seaman in a personal injury lawsuit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel?

Conclusion

A plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a maritime claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The Court first needed to reconcile two seemingly conflicting precedents. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court held that non-economic damages were unavailable in a general maritime-law wrongful death action because such relief was unavailable under the Jones Act. But in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the Court held under maritime law that a plaintiff may seek punitive damages for an employer’s willful and wanton disregard of its obligation to pay maintenance and cure. The Court distinguished Atlantic Sounding based on the finding in that case that there was significant “historical evidence” that punitive damages had been available in maintenance-and-cure cases. In contrast, punitive damages were unavailable under the Jones Act, and there was “overwhelming historical evidence” that punitive damages were unavailable in general maritime-law unseaworthiness actions for personal injuries. The Court found “practically dispositive” the absence of recovery of punitive damages in maritime cases.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ginsburg argued that by default, punitive damages are available in maritime cases, and Miles exemplified the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the Jones Act had expanded the remedies available to seamen and did not bar punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions.

[17-9572] Flowers v. Mississippi Mar 20, 2019

Flowers v. Mississippi

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 20, 2019.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.

Petitioner: Curtis Giovanni Flowers.
Respondent: State of Mississippi.

Advocates:

Sheri Lynn Johnson (for the petitioner)
Jason Davis (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase.

In the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders.

Flowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986).

Question

Did the Mississippi Supreme Court err in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky in this case?

Conclusion

The trial court at Flowers’s sixth murder trial committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of a particular black prospective juror was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

Under Batson v. Kentucky, once the defendant has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the State must provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. The trial court judge must then determine whether the provided reasons actually motivated the peremptory strikes or instead were simply pretext for unlawful race discrimination. The Court found four categories of evidence present in Flowers’s sixth trial that the State’s peremptory strike of one juror in particular—Carolyn Wright—was based on racial discrimination.

First, the Court found that the State’s history of peremptory strikes in Flowers’s first four trials strongly supported the conclusion that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in his sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. The State appeared “relentless” in trying to strike all black jurors to have an all-white jury try Flowers. Second, the Court noted that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in the sixth trial followed the same pattern as in the first four trials. Third, the Court observed that the State spent far more time questioning the black prospective jurors than the accepted white jurors—an indicator (though not dispositive) of discriminatory intent. Fourth and finally, the Court found significant differences between the jurors who were struck and not struck. The State asked extensive questions of Carolyn Wright, a black juror who was struck, about her knowledge of the facts, witnesses, and Flowers’s family, but did not ask three white prospective jurors about their comparable connections to witnesses. The Court found these four factors, plus the overall context to support the determination that the trial court had committed clear error in concluding the State’s peremptory strike was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.

Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full but filed a concurring opinion to note how extraordinary the circumstances in this case are and that although he agrees with the Court’s judgment here, he would be disinclined to do so in the majority of cases that are “less unusual” in their facts.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissent in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, criticizing the majority for ignoring the race-neutral reasons the State gave for striking Carolyn Wright. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court should not have even granted the case, but having done so, it decided wrongly on the merits. Justice Thomas (alone) criticized Batson, arguing that it “requires that a duly convicted criminal go free because a juror was arguably deprived of his right to serve on the jury.”

[18-315] Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt Mar 19, 2019

Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt

Argued on Mar 19, 2019.
Decided on May 13, 2019.

Petitioner: Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al..
Respondent: United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt.

Advocates:

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the petitioners)
Earl N. Mayfield III (for the respondent)
Matthew Guarnieri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts—including forgery, deception, and threats—to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward.

From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup.

Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison.

After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt’s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of (1) “6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed” or (2) “3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances….” The district court granted the contractors’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt’s claim would be time-barred. Reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt (the relator) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim.

Question

May a relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene, and, if so, does the relator constitute an “official of the United States” for purposes of that section?

Conclusion

A relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene, but the relator does not constitute an “official of the United States” for purposes of that section. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Section 3731(b) establishes two limitations periods that apply to “civil action[s] under section 3730,” and both government-initiated suits and relator-initiated suits are “civil action[s] under section 3730.” Thus, the plain text of the statute imposes both limitations periods on both types of actions. To interpret the statute otherwise would violate the principle that “a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.”

Having resolved the first question, the Court then turned to whether the relator constitutes an “official of the United States” in this circumstance, finding that he does not. The relator is a private party, neither appointed as an officer nor employed by the United States, and nothing in the statute suggests an expansive interpretation of “the official” that would include such a private party.

[17-1606] Smith v. Berryhill Mar 18, 2019

Smith v. Berryhill

Argued on Mar 18, 2019.
Decided on May 28, 2019.

Petitioner: Ricky Lee Smith.
Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill.

Advocates:

Michael B. Kimberly (for the petitioner)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of reversal and remand)
Deepak Gupta (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1987, Ricky Lee Smith filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) resulting from disability. The following year, an administrative law judge (ALJ) approved his application, and Smith received benefits until 2004, when he was found to be over the resource limit.

Smith filed another application for SSI in August 2012, alleging additional medical conditions as a result of his original disability. The claim was initial denied, and denied again upon reconsideration.

Smith filed a timely request for a hearing before an ALJ, and after the hearing, an ALJ denied Smith’s claim on March 26, 2014. Smith claims to have mailed a written request for review before the Appeals Council on April 24, 2014, and followed up by fax on September 21, 2014. A claims representative spoke with Smith on October 1, 2014, to inform him that his request may not have been received and that his request was filed as of that day, October 1, 2014.

The Appeals Council dismissed the request for review as untimely, as Smith proffered no evidence showing the request for was sent within the appropriate time. Smith filed a civil action seeking review of the Appeals Council’s dismissal. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Appeals Council’s dismissal did not constitute a final decision subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Question

Is the decision of the Appeals Council dismissing a disability claim on the grounds that it is untimely constitute a “final decision” subject to judicial review under the Social Security Act?

Conclusion

A decision of the Appeals Counsel dismissing a disability claim on timeliness grounds is a “final decision” for purposes of determining whether judicial review is available. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

The plain language of the statute supports the interpretation that dismissal for untimeliness is a “final decision” because such a dismissal is a terminal event. Moreover, that interpretation finds support in the greater statutory context because the dismissal is an agency action that determines the rights and obligations of the parties, which, in most administrative law contexts, is the event that triggers judicial review.

[18-281] Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill Mar 18, 2019

Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 18, 2019.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.

Appellant: Virginia House of Delegates, et al..
Appellee: Golden Bethune-Hill, et al..

Advocates:

Paul D. Clement (for the appellants)
Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)
Toby J. Heytens (Solicitor General of Virginia, for Appellees Virginia State Board of Elections et al.)
Marc E. Elias (for Appellees Golden Bethune-Hill et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This civil action first arose in 2014, when 12 Virginia voters alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case ultimately went before the US Supreme Court, and in 2017, the Court held that a lower court had applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the challengers’ claims of racial gerrymandering. The Court upheld one of the districts and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the districting in the remaining 11 districts.

In June 2018, the lower court struck down the 11 districts as unconstitutional, finding that race was the main factor used to determine the boundaries for the districts. The court found that the legislature failed to prove that the districts as drawn, which attempted to put the exact same percentage of African American adults in each district, were necessary to comply with federal voting-rights laws.

The Virginia House of Delegates appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review the case, as well as the preliminary question whether the House of Delegates has judicial standing to appeal.

Question

Did the district court err in holding that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that race predominated over traditional districting factors in the construction of the 11 remaining challenged districts?
Did the district court err in holding that the Virginia House of Delegates did not satisfy its burden to show that the legislature’s use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of compliance with Section 5 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. § 10304?
Does the Virginia House of Delegates have standing to file this appeal with the Court?

Conclusion

The Virginia House of Delegates lacks standing to file this appeal, either representing the state’s interests or in its own right. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a 5-4 majority.

To bring a suit (or appeal) in federal court, the litigant must have judicial standing. That is, the litigant must show (1) a concrete and particularized injury, that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. To appeal a decision that the primary party does not challenge, as here, an intervenor must independently demonstrate standing. Here, the primary party, Virginia, does not appeal the decision of the district court, but an intervenor, the House of Delegates, does. As such, the House of Delegates must demonstrate standing, which it does not.

First, the Court considered whether the House of Delegates had standing to represent the state’s interests. Under Virginia law, the authority for representing the state’s interests in civil litigation lies exclusively with the state attorney general. Thus, the House of Delegates cannot and does not displace this authority.

Then, the Court considered whether the House of Delegates had standing in its own right, concluding again that it does not. The Court has never recognized that a judicial decision invalidating a state law inflicts a cognizable injury on the parts of the state government that were involved in the law’s passage, and it declined to do so here. Given that the state manifests an intent to end the litigation—as evidenced by its decision not to appeal the district court’s decision—the House of Delegates alone cannot carry on the litigation against the will of the state.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh joined. The dissent would find that the House of Delegates does have standing because the new redistricting plan would inflict harm on the House by changing each representative’s constituents.

[17-1717] The American Legion v. American Humanist Association Feb 27, 2019

The American Legion v. American Humanist Association

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 27, 2019.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.

Petitioner: The American Legion, et al..
Respondent: American Humanist Association, et al..

Advocates:

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner in No. 18-18)
Michael A. Carvin (for the petitioners in No. 17-1717)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Monica L. Miller (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations.

Several non-Christian residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission’s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Question

Is the display and maintenance of the cross unconstitutional?
Under what test should the constitutionality of a passive display incorporating religious symbolism be assessed?
Does the expenditure of funds to maintain the cross amount to the government’s excessive entanglement with religion?

Conclusion

The Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause.

Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Elena Kagan joined the majority opinion in part.

The Court explained that although the cross originated as a Christian symbol, it has also taken on a secular meaning. In particular, the cross became a symbol of World War I as evidenced by its use in the present controversy. The Lemon test, which the Court first articulated in 1971 as a way to discern Establishment Clause violations, does not serve its intended purpose, particularly as applied to religious symbols or monuments. Thus, when the question arises whether to keep a religious monument in place (as opposed to a question whether to put up a new one), there should be a presumption that the monument is constitutional.

Applying this presumption rather than the Lemon test, the Court found the Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause because it has historical importance beyond its admittedly Christian symbolism.

Justice Breyer joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence joined by Justice Kagan to highlight his belief that there is no single test for Establishment Clause violations. Rather, a court asked to resolve such questions must consider “the basic purposes that the Religion Clauses were meant to serve: assuring religious liberty and tolerance for all, avoiding religiously based social conflict, and maintaining that separation of church and state that allows each to flourish in its separate sphere.”

Justice Kavanaugh also joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full and also wrote his own concurring opinion. He even more harshly criticized the Lemon test, arguing that “the Court’s decisions over the span of several decades demonstrate that the Lemon test is not good law and does not apply to Establishment Clause cases in any of” five categories, which he enumerated.

Justice Kagan joined most of Justice Alito’s opinion but wrote a separate concurrence to note that, although “rigid application of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment Clause problem,” courts should still focus on the purpose and effect of government action in deciding whether it violates the Constitution.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but based on entirely different reasoning. Justice Thomas does not believe the Establishment Clause applies to state and local governments, and even if it did, it applies only to prevent coercive action by the government. Justice Thomas would overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch would dismiss the lawsuit for lack of standing, arguing that simply being offended by the cross’s presence is insufficient to meet the injury requirement of Article III standing.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the cross “is the foremost symbol of the Christian faith,” and using it as a war memorial doesn’t change that. Maryland’s decision to maintain that Christian symbol on public land “elevates Christianity over other faiths, and religion over nonreligion.” Justice Ginsburg additionally pointed out that an appropriate remedy for an Establishment Clause violation is not necessarily to destroy the memorial, as the majority suggests, but to transfer title to the land on which it sits to a private entity—in fact, a private entity owned the land when the cross was first erected.

[17-1672] United States v. Haymond Feb 26, 2019

United States v. Haymond

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 26, 2019.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Andre Ralph Haymond.

Advocates:

Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)
William D. Lunn (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Andre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 38-months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond’s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond’s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime.

The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court’s findings, arguing, among other things, that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond’s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court’s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing a mandatory minimum punishment on a criminal defendant upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in certain criminal conduct during supervised release?

Conclusion

In a 5-4 decision, the Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered an opinion for a four-justice plurality of the Court, in which he concluded that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) in this case violated Haymond’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but based on different reasoning.

Justice Gorsuch reasoned that at the time the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were adopted, judges’ power to sentence criminal defendants was limited by the jury’s finding of facts. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court held unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the judge’s finding of new facts by a preponderance of the evidence. And in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Court held that the same principle applies when a judge finds additional facts to increase the mandatory minimum. Those two cases mandate the outcome in this case: that the statutory scheme violated Haymond’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Justice Gorsuch suggested that on remand, the Tenth Circuit consider whether its remedy—declaring the last two sentences of §3583(k) “unconstitutional and unenforceable”—sweeps too broadly.

Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, characterizing the provision at issue as “less like ordinary supervised-release revocation and more like punishment for a new offense,” which requires that jury—not judge—find facts of criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Justice Breyer would reach the same conclusion without relying on Apprendi.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito argued that the terms of the Sixth Amendment and the original understanding of the scope of the jury trial, coupled with the Court’s precedents with respect to supervised-release revocation proceedings, militate toward the opposite conclusion of the plurality.

[17-8995] Mont v. United States Feb 26, 2019

Mont v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 26, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.

Petitioner: Jason J. Mont.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Vanessa F. Malone (for the petitioner)
Jenny Ellickson (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017.

While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions.

Mont challenged the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction.

Question

Is the term of supervised release for one offense paused by imprisonment for another offense?

Conclusion

Pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction tolls (pauses) a supervised-release term under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), even if the court must make the tolling calculation retrospectively, after learning whether the time will be credited. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 5-4 majority opinion affirming the lower court.

Section 3624(e) provides that a “term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” In interpreting this provision, the Court looked first to the dictionary definition of “imprisoned,” finding that definition to include pretrial detention. Then the Court noted the expansive phrase “in connection with,” giving rise to a sufficient nexus between the pretrial detention and the conviction because the pretrial detention is credited toward the sentence for that same conviction. Although under this interpretation, Section 3624(e) would require courts to retrospectively assess whether a period of pretrial detention tolls a term of supervised release, the Court determined that this retroactive crediting would not cause undue uncertainty for defendants like Mont. Finally, the Court found that “statutory context” supported this interpretation as well, given that supervised release is intended to facilitate a prisoner’s transition back into the community and a period in prison does not serve this purpose.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent argued that the plain text of the statute cannot authorize tolling when the defendant is in pretrial detention and a conviction is merely a possible future event. The present tense used in the statute precludes the majority’s interpretation. Moreover, the purpose of pretrial confinement is to ensure the defendant shows up for trial, not to punish the defendant for a crime.

[17-1702] Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck Feb 25, 2019

Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 25, 2019.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.

Petitioner: Manhattan Community Access Corporation, et al..
Respondent: Deedee Halleck, et al..

Advocates:

Michael B. de Leeuw (for the petitioners)
Paul W. Hughes (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A New York regulation requires cable-TV networks with 36 or more channels to provide “at least one full-time activated channel for public-access use.” This channel must be open to the “public on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis.” New York City awarded cable franchises for Manhattan to Time Warner, provided that Time Warner provide four public-access channels, which are designated to be overseen by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), known as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN).

Petitioners DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez have had a contentious relationship with MNN since 2011, and their feud culminated in August 2013 with MNN suspending both Melendez and Halleck from all MNN services and facilities. They filed a lawsuit against MCAC, several employees, and the City of New York, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights.

Generally, private actors cannot violate the constitutional rights of individuals; a finding of a constitutional violation requires “state action.” However, when the government creates a private entity by special law and retains authority to appoint a majority of directors, the actions of that private entity can sometimes be regarded as governmental action. Finding that the government retained authority to appoint only two of the thirteen members of MCAC’s board, the district court held that MCAC, its employees, and the City of New York did not create a public forum within the First Amendment and dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of state action. A majority of a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to the City of New York but reversed as to MCAC and its employees, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC to find that New York City had “delegated to MNN the traditionally public function of administering and regulating speech in the public forum” of public-access cable television. Thus, MNN creates a public forum and functions as a state actor.

Question

Are private operators of public access channels state actors subject to constitutional liability?

Conclusion

Private operators of public access channels are not state actors and therefore are not subject to constitutional liability. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority.

The Free Speech Clause prohibits the government from abridging a person’s speech, and the Court’s state-action doctrine determines whether an actor is the government, subject to the First Amendment, or a private entity, who is not. Under established doctrine, a private entity may qualify as a state actor if it exercises “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,” but admittedly “very few” functions fall into that category. Operating public access channels on a cable system is not a power “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”

The Court rejected the argument that “operating public access channels” is too narrow a characterization and that the activity is actually providing a traditional exclusive public forum. The provision of a forum for speech does not automatically make the provider a state actor. The Court also rejected the argument that because the state regulates MNN with respect to the public access channels, MNN is a state actor. The Court instead described the city’s regulation as analogous to a government license, which would also not convert a private entity into a state actor. Nor does the city own the channels; nothing in the agreements suggests that the city possesses any property interest in the cable system or its public access channels.

Thus, MNN does not qualify as a state actor and thus is not subject to the First Amendment’s restrictions on government.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent criticized the majority for creating and addressing a case that was not before the Court. The dissent argued that New York City secured a property interest in public-access television channels when it granted a cable franchise to a cable company. The state regulations that require the public-access channels to be made open to the public make those channels a constitutional public forum. By entering into a contract with the City to administer that forum, MNN—which would have otherwise been a private actor—becomes a state actor subject to the First Amendment.

[17-1657] Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC Feb 20, 2019

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC

Argued on Feb 20, 2019.
Decided on May 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Mission Product Holdings, Inc..
Respondent: Tempnology, LLC.

Advocates:

Danielle Spinelli (for the petitioner)
Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioner)
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Tempnology, LLC, made and owned the intellectual property to specialized products such as towels, socks, headbands, and other accessories designed to stay at a low temperature even when used during exercise. Tempnology and Mission Product Holdings executed an agreement in 2012 that (1) granted Mission distribution rights to some of Tempnology’s products, (2) granted Mission a nonexclusive license to Tempnology’s intellectual property, and (3) granted Mission a license to use Tempnology’s trademark and logo to sell and promote the products.

After accruing multi-million-dollar operating losses in 2013 and 2014, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2015. The following day, it moved to reject its agreement with Mission under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to “reject any executory contract” that is not beneficial to the company.

Although the parties do not dispute that Mission can insist that the rejection not apply to the patent licenses in the agreement, it is unsettled in the First Circuit (where the proceedings were brought) whether Mission can also insist that the rejection not apply to the trademark licenses. The bankruptcy court found that Tempnology’s rejection of the agreement left Mission with only a claim for damages for breach of contract, and no claim that Tempnology was under an obligation to further perform the license agreement. The First Circuit affirmed.

Question

Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, does a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement terminate rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor’s breach under non-bankruptcy law?

Conclusion

A bankruptcy debtor’s rejection of a contract under Section 365 has the same effect as breach outside the bankruptcy context and as such cannot rescind rights that the contract previously granted.

Justice Elena Kagan delivered the 8-1 opinion of the Court. Before turning to the merits of the case, the Court considered whether the case was moot, as Tempnology argued. It is not. Mission Product Holdings presented a plausible claim for money damages, and even if a victory in the lawsuit would not make it rich or even better off, “it remains a live controversy”—which surpasses the threshold for a case to be heard in federal court.

Turning to the merits, the Court considered the effect of a debtor’s rejection of a contract under Section 365. The text of that section provides that a debtor may, subject to court approval, “assume or reject any executory contract,” and the Code defines rejection as “a breach of [an executory] contract,” deemed to occur “immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.” As the term “breach” is neither defined in the Code nor a specialized bankruptcy term, it must be given the ordinary meaning it has outside the bankruptcy context. When breach of a contract occurs outside of bankruptcy, the parties to the contract do not go back to their precontract positions; rather, the counterparty retains the rights it has received under the agreement. That the rejection—and therefore breach—occurred in a bankruptcy context does not affect this outcome. Therefore, the rejection cannot rescind rights the contract previously granted. Even the distinctive features of trademarks and trademark law do not support a different interpretation of Section 365.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion in which she joined the Court’s opinion in full. Her concurrence highlights two features of the Court’s holding. First, the Court’s holding is limited; it does not hold that every trademark licensee has the unfettered right to continue using licensed marks postrejection. Second, in holding as it does, the Court confirms “that trademark licensees’ postrejection rights and remedies are more expansive in some respects than those possessed by licensees of other types of intellectual property.” Justice Sotomayor points out that the differences between trademark and other intellectual properties might affect the outcome in other disputes between licensors and licensees.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the writ should have been dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice Gorsuch can identify no viable legal theory for damages in this case.

[17-1594] Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service Feb 19, 2019

Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service

Argued on Feb 19, 2019.
Decided on Jun 10, 2019.

Petitioner: Return Mail, Inc..
Respondent: United States Postal Service.

Advocates:

Beth S. Brinkmann (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Return Mail, Inc. owns a US patent directed to the processing of mail items that are undeliverable due to an inaccurate or obsolete address of the intended recipient. Return Mail sought to license the patent to the US Postal Service (“USPS”) and when it was unsuccessful, it filed a lawsuit against USPS alleging unlicensed and unlawful use and infringement of the patent. USPS filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) asking that the patent be declared unpatentable on several grounds. In response, Return Mail addressed the unpatentability arguments and further argued that USPS lacked statutory standing to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).

The Board held that USPS was not statutorily barred from filing the petition for review, and on the merits determined that all of the challenged patent claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the government a “person” who may institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act?

Conclusion

Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), the federal government is not a “person” capable of petitioning the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to institute patent review proceedings. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

The Court determined that the AIA does not define “person” and looked instead to the Dictionary Act, which defines “person” as including natural individuals and businesses, but not governments “unless the context indicates otherwise.” The Court then looked to whether anything in the context “indicates otherwise,” thereby rebutting the presumption that governments are not “persons.”

First, the Court cited several examples where it had applied the presumption against treating the government as a statutory person. It then looked to the use of the word “person” elsewhere in the AIA, finding that in some instances, the term plainly included the government and in other instances it plainly excluded the government. The Court found the provision at issue was not so plain and could be read either way. Finding no historic reason to permit the government to participate in post-grant review, “which was enacted just eight years ago,” the Court opined that patent infringement lawsuits against the government are not as onerous as those against non-government actors. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Congress intentionally treated government actors differently from private actors.

Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the “purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation” indicate congressional intent to include, not exclude, the government in the term “person.”

[18-96] Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas Jan 16, 2019

Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas

Argued on Jan 16, 2019.
Decided on Jun 26, 2019.

Petitioner: Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association.
Respondent: Russell F. Thomas, Executive Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission, et al..

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner)
David L. Franklin (for Illinois, et al. as amici curiae, in support of the petitioner)
Carter G. Phillips (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

To sell liquor in the state of Tennessee, one must have a license from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made to the commission,” and there is a ten-year residency requirement to renew a liquor license. The state imposes similar requirements on entities seeking a license.

Two entities did not satisfy the residency requirement when they applied for a license with the TABC, so TABC deferred voting on their applications. The Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, which represents Tennessee business owners and represented the two entities here, informed TABC that litigation was likely. In response, the state attorney general filed an action in state court seeking declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The Association removed the action to federal district court.

The district court determined that the durational-residency requirements are facially discriminatory, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the dormant Commerce Clause permit a state to regulate liquor sales by granting licenses only to individuals or entities that have met state residency requirements?

Conclusion

The dormant Commerce Clause forbids, notwithstanding the Twenty-First Amendment, a state from regulating liquor sales by granting licenses only to individuals or entities that have met state residency requirements. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 7-2 opinion of the Court.

The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence holds that “a state law that discriminates against out-of-state goods or nonresident economic actors can be sustained only on a showing that it is narrowly tailored to ‘advance a legitimate local purpose.’” Tennessee’s residency requirement favors residents over nonresidents. The Association does not defend the law under this standard, however, instead pointing to the state’s authority to regulate the “transportation or importation” of alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment.

Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment states: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” Viewing this provision “as one part of a unified constitutional scheme,” the Court examined the “basic structure of federal-state alcohol regulatory authority.” The Court noted that at the time the Eighteenth Amendment (nationwide prohibition) was ratified, it had already been established that the Commerce Clause prevented states from discriminating against the citizens and products of other states. Against this backdrop, when the Twenty-First Amendment was ratified, “the Commerce Clause did not permit the States to impose protectionist measures clothed as police-power regulations.” Thus, while § 2 of the Amendment gives states latitude with respect to the regulation of alcohol, it does not allow them to violate the nondiscrimination principle.

In light of this analysis, the Court concluded that protectionism is not a legitimate local purpose and that the residency requirement “has at best a highly attenuated relationship to public health or safety.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the original meaning of the Twenty-First Amendment was to allow states broad authority to regulate alcohol within their borders, which encompassed the authority to impose residency requirements on those seeking to sell alcohol.

[17-1484] Azar v. Allina Health Services Jan 15, 2019

Azar v. Allina Health Services

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 15, 2019.
Decided on Jun 3, 2019.

Petitioner: Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Respondent: Allina Health Services, et al..

Advocates:

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)
Pratik A. Shah (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “parts” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C.

HHS contracts with “fiscal intermediaries” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports.

The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low-income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “patient days” for patients “entitled to benefits under part A” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars.

The plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “interpretive rule” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and thus was exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an “interpretive rule” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment.

Question

Do the Administrative Procedure Act and Medicare Act require the US Department of Health and Human Services to provide notice and an opportunity to comment before implementing a rule changing its Medicare reimbursement formula?

Conclusion

The Department of Health and Human Services neglected its statutory duty to provide notice and an opportunity to comment before implementing a rule changing its Medicare reimbursement formula. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority.

The Court focused on whether the government’s announcement in 2014 established or changed a substantive legal standard (as opposed to an interpretive legal standard). Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in order to establish or change a substantive legal standard, an agency must provide notice and an opportunity to comment. A substantive legal standard is one that has the “force and effect of law,” while an interpretive legal standard merely advises the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules it administers. Specifically, under the APA, statements of policy are definitionally not substantive. The Medicare Act uses the word “substantive” in a different way. Under the Medicare Act, “statements of policy” can establish or change a “substantive legal standard.” Had Congress wanted to incorporate the same meaning for “substantive” in the Medicare Act as it did in the APA, it could have done so (and did not).

The Court looked then to the text and structure of the Medicare Act, finding that both support reading the new rule as establishing or changing a substantive legal standard. Given the clear language of the statute, HHS did not meet its statutory duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) to provide notice and comment.

Because it reached its conclusion solely under § 1395hh(a)(2), the Court did not address the question whether § 1395hh(a)(4) independently required HHS to provide notice and comment.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the language at issue in the Medicare Act, like the APA, applies only to “substantive” or “legislative” rules. Thus, Justice Breyer would remand the case to the court of appeals to consider whether the agency determination is a substantive rule (which requires notice and comment) or an interpretive rule (which does not).

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[17-1471] Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson Jan 15, 2019

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 15, 2019.
Decided on May 28, 2019.

Petitioner: Home Depot U.S.A., Inc..
Respondent: George W. Jackson.

Advocates:

William P. Barnette (for the petitioner)
F. Paul Bland, Jr. (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt-collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank-issued credit card. In responding to Citibank’s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third-party class-action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems (CWS). In these third-party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems; Jackson’s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson.

Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third-party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank.

The district court denied Home Depot’s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “antagonistic parties on the same side,” and granted Jackson’s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “defendant” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment—to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction—was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA’s removal statute.

Question

Does the Class Action Fairness Act permit removal to federal court by a third-party counterclaim defendant?
Does Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)—which holds that an original plaintiff may not remove a counterclaim against it—extend to third-party counterclaim defendants?

Conclusion

Neither the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, nor the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), permits removal to federal court by a third-party counterclaim defendant. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Clarence Thomas found that while Home Depot is a “defendant” to a “claim,” section 1441(a) refers to the defendant of a “civil action,” not a claim. If Congress intended for defendants to remove such actions to federal court, it would have done so as it has done in other contexts. Interpreting section 1441(a) to allow for removal by a party who was not a defendant to the original action defies the text of the statute, as well as the history and purpose of the removal procedure.

Nor does 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) permit removal by Home Depot in this circumstance. The Court found unpersuasive Home Depot’s argument that section 1453(b) permits removal by “any defendant” to a “class action.” This interpretation would require interpreting the term “defendant” to have different meanings in different sections of the statute, rendering the the removal provisions incoherent. The same holding in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)—that a counterclaim defendant who was the original plaintiff is not one of “the defendants”—applies equally to third-party counterclaim defendants.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh joined. The dissent argued that third-party counterclaim defendants are defendants within the language of the statute and that the distinction the Court draws between various parties leaves third-party defendants unprotected under both CAFA and section 1441. The dissent described this distinction as “irrational” and contrary to the plain meaning and context of removal laws generally.

[17-1625] Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. Jan 14, 2019

Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 14, 2019.
Decided on Mar 4, 2019.

Petitioner: Rimini Street, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Oracle USA, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Mark A. Perry (for the petitioners)
Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Paul D. Clement (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Oracle licenses its enterprise software for a substantial one-time payment and also sells maintenance contracts to licensees so they can update their software through Oracle’s support website. Rimini Street provided third-party support for Oracle’s software in lawful competition with Oracle’s direct maintenance service. To compete effectively, however, Rimini also needed to provide software updates to its customers, which would constitute copyright infringement if obtained without a proper license (which Rimini did not have). With Oracle’s knowledge, Rimini obtained Oracle software updates from Oracle’s website by a means that violated the Oracle website’s terms of use.

Oracle filed a lawsuit against Rimini and obtained a partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. The jury awarded Oracle $50,027,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs, resulting in a total monetary judgment of $124,291,396.82. Rimini appealed the judgment. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that 17 U.S.C. § 505 allows for recovery of “full costs” and the district court properly relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Twentieth Century Fox v. Entertainment Distribution in awarding $12,774,550.26 in non-taxable costs, despite ostensibly conflicting language in 28 U.S.C § 1920 identifying six categories of costs taxable against the losing party.

Question

Is the Copyright Act’s allowance for “full costs” to a prevailing party limited to taxable costs or inclusive of non-taxable costs as well?

Conclusion

The term “full costs” in § 505 of the Copyright Act means only the costs specified in the general costs statute in §§ 1821 and 1920. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in awarding non-taxable costs to the prevailing party in the copyright infringement suit. Sections 1821 and 1920 define what the term “costs” encompasses, and only Congress—not the courts—may award litigation expenses beyond those specified in those sections. The word “full” in the statutory phrase “full costs” refers only to all costs otherwise available under the law, not additional costs.

[17-1201] Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority Jan 14, 2019

Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority

Argued on Jan 14, 2019.
Decided on Apr 29, 2019.

Petitioner: Gary Thacker, et ux..
Respondent: Tennessee Valley Authority.

Advocates:

Franklin Taylor Rouse (for the petitioners)
Ann O'Connell Adams (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gary and Venida Thacker filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for its alleged negligence involving an accident on the Tennessee River. The Thackers and a friend were participating in a fishing tournament on the river at the same time the TVA was attempting to raise a downed power line in the same part of the river. An electrical component struck Gary Thacker and the friend, severely injuring Thacker and killing the friend instantly.

The district court dismissed the Thackers’ lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

The United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity by statute. This immunity extends to government agencies, as well. TVA is a corporate agency expressly authorized to engage in commercial, power-generating activities, and the TVA Act expressly provides that TVA “may sue and be sued in its corporate name,” subject to certain exceptions. Extrapolating from a principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Eleventh Circuit has held that TVA cannot be subject to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are discretionary in nature. Applying its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that TVA was engaged in exactly this type of function at the time of the accident with the Thackers and thus was immune from suit.

Question

Are governmental “sue-and-be-sued” entities subject to the discretionary-function exception to a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, or the test for immunity set forth in Federal Housing Authority v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940)?

Conclusion

The statute that waives the Tennessee Valley Authority’s sovereign immunity from suit by making it a “sue-and-be-sued” type entity is not subject to a discretionary function exception of the kind in the Federal Tort Claims Act but may be subject to an implied restriction as recognized in Federal Housing Authority v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The terms of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 contain no exception for suits based on the discretionary functions of the entity. To read the statute as implicitly allowing for an exception for discretionary functions would run contrary to the language of the statute and the express intent of Congress in passing the TVA Act, and would violate separation-of-powers principles. The courts below incorrectly inferred the discretionary function exception found in the Federal Tort Claims Act and should instead have considered whether TVA has immunity based on whether the allegedly negligent conduct was governmental or commercial in nature. If it is governmental, the lower court might find that the suit is barred under Burr to “avoid grave interference” with TVA’s important governmental functions, but if it is commercial, TVA cannot invoke sovereign immunity.

[17-1299] Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt Jan 09, 2019

Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 9, 2019.
Decided on May 13, 2019.

Petitioner: Franchise Tax Board of California.
Respondent: Gilbert P. Hyatt.

Advocates:

Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner)
Erwin Chemerinsky (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) read a newspaper about Gilbert P. Hyatt, an inventor, and the large amounts of money he was making from the patent. The auditor decided to investigate Hyatt, and, after finding some discrepancies, opened an audit on Hyatt’s 1991 state tax return. In conducting the audit, the auditor found additional discrepancies surrounding Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada and opened an audit as to his 1992 tax returns. FTB determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million in state income taxes, plus $1.4 million in penalties and $1.2 million in interest, resulted in a tax assessment of $4.5 million for Hyatt’s 1991 tax year. FTB further found that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus penalties.

Hyatt challenged the conclusions by filing protests with FTB and then in California courts. In 1998, Hyatt sued FTB in Nevada state court seeking damages for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns.

FTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment challenging the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction over Hyatt’s declaratory relief cause of action. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that the timing of Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada should be resolved via the administrative investigation. FTB also asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether it was entitled to complete immunity under several theories: it enjoyed complete immunity under California law, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and comity. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded FTB was not entitled to complete immunity under any of these principles, but was entitled to partial immunity equal to the immunity a Nevada government agency would receive. Thus, the court concluded that FTB was immune from the negligence cause of action, but not from the intentional tort causes of action.

FTB appealed to the US Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the court’s determination that FTB was entitled only to partial immunity under comity principles. Two other questions from this litigation made their way to the US Supreme Court, and the Court (1) split 4–4 as to whether it should overrule Nevada v. Hall, which provides “that one State … can open the doors of its courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State … without the other State’s consent,” and (2) held that the Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under its state law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. With these preliminary legal questions resolved, a Nevada jury finally found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy, over $1 for special damages for fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court issued upholding the damages, subject to the statutory caps to which FTB is entitled, consistent with the US Supreme Court’s holding on that issue.

FTB asked the US Supreme Court to reconsider the first question again, whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall.

Question

Should the Court overrule its prior decision in Nevada v. Hall, which permits a sovereign state to be haled into another state’s courts without its consent?

Conclusion

Nevada v. Hall, 440 US 410 (1979), is overruled; states are immune from suit in the courts of other states. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for a 5-4 majority.

The Court criticized the Hall decision as “misread[ing] the historical record and misapprehend[ing] the constitutional design created by the Framers.” The Court found that it was “well settled” at the time of the founding that states were immune from suit and the Constitution preserved this broad immunity, except in a very narrow set of circumstances. The Court further found state sovereign immunity from suit “integral to the structure of the Constitution.” Finally, given that the principle of stare decisis is “at its weakest when interpreting the Constitution” the Court determined that Nevada v. Hall should be overruled.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the Court in Hall clearly answered the very same question—whether the Constitution requires or merely permits a state to grant another state immunity from suit in its courts—and there is no good reason to overrule the decision in that case.

[17-571] Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com Jan 08, 2019

Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 8, 2019.
Decided on Mar 4, 2019.

Petitioner: Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation.
Respondent: Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al..

Advocates:

Aaron M. Panner (for the petitioner)
Peter K. Stris (for the respondents)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate.

Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “registration” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “register the claim,” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is “registration of [a] copyright claim” complete under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the copyright holder delivers the required application, fees, and materials to the copyright office, or only once the copyright office has acted on that application?

Conclusion

Registration of a copyright claim “has been made” not when an application for registration is filed, but only after the copyright office has processed the application and registered the copyright. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Fourth Estate’s application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights was not yet complete for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) because the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The Court looked to the language of the first two sentences of § 411(a) and found that under Fourth Estate’s proposed interpretation of the statute—that application alone would constitute registration—the second sentence would be made superfluous. Canons of statutory construction caution against such interpretations. The Court found that the more plausible interpretation—that registration occurs only when the copyright office finishes processing the application—is consistent with other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well.

[17-532] Herrera v. Wyoming Jan 08, 2019

Herrera v. Wyoming

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Jan 8, 2019.
Decided on May 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Clayvin Herrera.
Respondent: Wyoming.

Advocates:

George W. Hicks, Jr. (for the petitioner)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
John G. Knepper (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Clayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of Indians. Herrera and several other tribal members went elk hunting on the Crow Reservation, and at some point, followed several elk across a fence, thereby leaving the Crow Reservation and entering the Big Horn National Forest in Wyoming. They shot three bull elk and took the meat with them to Montana. None of the hunters had a license, and it was closed season.

Herrera was cited with two hunting-related misdemeanors under Wyoming law. He moved to dismiss the charges under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and the Laramie Treaty of 1868. He argued that the treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to hunt off the reservation and that the treaty was still valid and thus preempted state law. Bound by the Tenth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the state court held that Crow Tribe members do not have off-reservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of Wyoming. Herrera was tried and convicted by a jury on both counts. He appealed the lower court’s pretrial determination on the off-reservation treaty hunting right. Reviewing the lower court’s conclusions de novo, the state appeals court affirmed the lower court.

Question

Did Wyoming’s admission to the Union or the establishment of the Bighorn National Forest abrogate the Crow Tribe of Indians’ 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States,” thereby permitting the present-day conviction of a Crow member who engaged in subsistence hunting for his family?

Conclusion

Wyoming’s admission to the Union did not abrogate the Crow Tribe’s 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States,” nor did the lands of the Bighorn National Forest become categorically “occupied” when the forest was created.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the 5-4 majority opinion.

As to the question whether the Crow Tribe’s hunting rights under the 1868 Treaty expired when Wyoming became a state, the Court first found that the lower court erroneously relied on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), which relied on Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). In Race Horse, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Wyoming’s admission to the Union extinguished treaty rights of Indians under the 1868 Treaty. The Court subsequently established in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) a different rule for determining whether a treaty right was extinguished. The Court in Mille Lacs held that the “crucial inquiry” for interpreting a treaty was whether Congress “clearly expressed” an intent to abrogate an Indian treaty right. Absent such clearly expressed intent, treaty rights cannot be impliedly extinguished at statehood. Thus, while the Mille Lacs Court did not expressly overrule Race Horse, the logic of that case and its progeny, including Repsis, are invalid.

The Court found unpersuasive Wyoming’s argument that Repsis precludes Herrera from arguing that the 1868 Treaty right survived Wyoming’s becoming a state. Even when the requirements for issue preclusion are met, there is an exception if there has been an intervening “change in the applicable legal context.” While Repsis involved a the same legal question (whether the 1868 Treaty right survived Wyoming’s statehood) and essentially the same parties (Wyoming and the Crow Tribe), the Court’s decision in Mille Lacs constitutes an “intervening change” that triggers an exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion.

Applying Mille Lacs, rather than Repsis, the Court found that Congress had not “clearly expressed” an intent to abrogate the treaty’s right to hunt “unoccupied” lands when admitting Wyoming to the Union. The mere acquisition of statehood did not categorically make the lands “occupied,” nor did the creation of the Bighorn National Forest on those lands under any natural understanding of the meaning of the word “occupied.”

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito argued that issue preclusion should bar Herrera’s claim and that the Court should not reach the merits of interpreting the 1868 Treaty.

[17-290] Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht Jan 07, 2019

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht

Argued on Jan 7, 2019.
Decided on May 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp..
Respondent: Doris Albrecht, et al..

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs around the country filed personal injury lawsuits against drug manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme (“Merck”), claiming that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax had caused them to suffer severe thigh bone fractures. Under state tort law, each plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Merck’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drug label failed to include an adequate warning regarding the risk of femur fractures.

In 2011 the cases were consolidated as a multi-district litigation action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases subsequently grew to include over 1,000 plaintiffs. After discovery and a bellwether trial, the district court ruled in favor of Merck on a summary judgment motion, dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they were preempted by federal law under Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which held that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in the event that there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, holding that preemption was an affirmative defense, and that Merck had not sufficiently proven that it was entitled to that defense as a matter of law. Under Wyeth’s demanding “clear evidence” standard, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had produced adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the FDA would have approved an appropriately worded warning about the risk of femur fractures, or at least that the chances of FDA rejection were not highly probable. Pursuant to Wyeth and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this showing was sufficient to defeat summary judgment and move forward to trial.

Question

Is a state-law failure-to-warn claim preempted when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected the drug manufacturer’s proposal to warn about the risk after being provided with the relevant scientific data, or must such a case go to a jury for conjecture as to why the FDA rejected the proposed warning?

Conclusion

Whether the FDA’s rejection of a proposed drug label preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims requires “clear evidence” that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law and that the FDA informed the drug manufacturer that it would not approve that change and is primarily a legal question that must be resolved by a judge, not a factual question to be resolved by a jury.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored the Opinion of the Court (6-3 in its reasoning, but 9-0 in the judgment). Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law preempts state law when it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” Here, the state law at issue is state common law or statutes that require drug manufacturers to warn drug consumers of the risks associated with a particular drug. The federal law at issue is the statutory and regulatory scheme by which the FDA regulates the labels of brand-name prescription drugs.

In Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), the Court held that “absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change” to the label, the Court could not conclude that it was impossible to comply with both federal and state labeling requirements.” Applied to the facts of that case, that the state-law claims were preempted by federal law only if the drug manufacturer showed it “fully informed” the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law, and also that the FDA then informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve changing the drug’s label to include that warning. Justice Breyer clarified that “clear evidence” is not a heightened evidentiary standard but a requirement that the court consider “whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably conflic[t].’”

It is not enough that the FDA simply act. It must act pursuant to its congressionally delegated authority, as preemption only occurs when federal law—not all agency action—conflicts with state law. The question whether the FDA’s disapproval of the proposed label is primarily one of law and thus better suited for judges, not juries, to resolve. Judge are “better equipped” than juries “to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination...and to interpret agency decisions in light of the governing statutory and regulatory context.” Thus, the Third Circuit erred in treating the preemption question as one of fact, not law.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority and wrote separate concurring opinion to explain his understanding of preemption doctrine. Justice Thomas argued that the FDA’s response letter in this case “was not a final agency action with the force of law,” and thus could not preempt under the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring only in the judgment of the Court, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito agreed with the majority that the question of preemption in this case is a question of law, but he declined to join the majority because of concern that its discussion of the law and facts may be misleading on remand. Justice Alito argued that a standard of proof like “clear evidence” has “no place in the resolution of this question of law” and that notwithstanding the majority’s suggestion to the contrary, there are other ways in which a drug manufacturer may change a label without prior FDA approval.

[17-1307] Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP Jan 07, 2019

Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP

Argued on Jan 7, 2019.
Decided on Mar 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Dennis Obduskey.
Respondent: McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al..

Advocates:

Daniel L. Geyser (for the petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the respondent)
Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey’s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.

Upon Obduskey’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute’s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt.

In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.

Obduskey petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC.

Question

Does the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings?

Conclusion

A business engaged in no more than non-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), except for the limited purpose of § 1692f(6). In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that law firm McCarthy & Holthus LLP was not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA when it merely initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure action. The Court first looked to the primary definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA, which is “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” The Act then provides a limited-purpose definition that a debt collector “also includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” The Court found the language “also includes” strongly suggests that the limited-purpose security enforcers do not fall within the scope of the primary definition. This reading gives effect to every word of the definition. The Court then found that the purpose (to treat security-interest enforcement differently from ordinary debt collection so as to avoid conflicts with state non-judicial foreclosure schemes) and legislative history of the FDCPA (the language ultimately used in the Act was a compromise between competing versions of the bill that treated security-interest enforcement vastly differently) support this interpretation.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which she emphasizes how complex the statute is and calls upon Congress to clarify the statute if it feels the Court (understandably, given the statute’s complexity) interpreted it incorrectly. She also notes that the Court “rightly cabins its holding to the kinds of good-faith actions presented here” and does not suggest that “pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure is a license to engage in abusive debt collection practices.”

[17-646] Gamble v. United States Dec 06, 2018

Gamble v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 6, 2018.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.

Petitioner: Terance Martez Gamble.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Louis A. Chaiten (for the petitioner)
Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)
Kyle D. Hawkins (Texas Solicitor General, for Texas et al. as amicus curiae, in support of affirmance)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called “separate sovereigns” exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.

Question

Should the Court overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court declined to overturn the dual-sovereignty doctrine.

The Court first clarified that the dual-sovereignty doctrine is not an exception to the right against double jeopardy, but a corollary to the text of the Fifth Amendment. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits individuals from being “twice put in jeopardy . . . for the same offence.” Because an “offence” is determined by law, and laws are determined by a sovereign (the federal or state government), the laws of two sovereigns create two “offences.” The Court found unpersuasive Gamble’s arguments that precedents should be abandoned, including his claim that the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states eroded the theoretical foundation for the dual-sovereignty rule.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he argued for his originalist view that the proper role of stare decisis is subordinate to the text of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal law.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar “successive prosecutions for the same offense by parts of the whole USA” and that the separate-sovereigns doctrine is based upon a mere “metaphysical subtlety.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion arguing that “[a] free society does not allow its government to try the same individual for the same crime until it’s happy with the result,” yet “the Court today endorses a colossal exception to this ancient rule against double jeopardy.” Justice Gorsuch pointed out the “separate sovereigns” doctrine appears nowhere in the text of the Fifth Amendment and violates the very essence of the right against double jeopardy.

[17-1184] Biestek v. Berryhill Dec 04, 2018

Biestek v. Berryhill

Argued on Dec 4, 2018.
Decided on Apr 1, 2019.

Petitioner: Michael J. Biestek.
Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration.

Advocates:

Ishan Bhabha (for the petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert.

Question

During an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, does a vocational expert’s testimony count as “substantial evidence” of “other work” if the expert does not provide the underlying data on which that testimony is premised?

Conclusion

A vocational expert’s refusal to provide the underlying private data during a Social Security disability benefits hearing does not categorically preclude the testimony from counting as “substantial evidence” in federal court. In a 6–3 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that whether testimony amounts to “substantial evidence” requires a case-by-case determination and cannot be subject to a categorical rule as Biestek proposed in this case.

“Substantial evidence” is anything more than “a mere scintilla.” Under the categorical approach proposed by Biestek, the testimony of a vocational expert who refuses a request for supporting data would never constitute substantial evidence, which is an illogical result. If there is no demand for underlying data, the vocational expert’s testimony may count as substantial evidence even without supporting data. The mere addition of a request for that data should not render the expert’s testimony categorically inadequate.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the question presented in the case required considering not only the propriety of a categorical rule but also the narrower circumstances of Biestek’s case. In this case, Justice Sotomayor argued that the expert provided only conclusory testimony that cannot alone constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, arguing that the expert’s bottom-line testimony fails to satisfy the government’s statutory burden of substantial evidence. Justice Gorsuch argued that if “clearly mistaken evidence, fake evidence, speculative evidence, and conclusory evidence aren’t substantial evidence [and federal appellate jurisprudence says they are not], the evidence here shouldn’t be either.”

[17-1229] Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. Dec 04, 2018

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.

Argued on Dec 4, 2018.
Decided on Jan 22, 2019.

Petitioner: Helsinn Healthcare S.A..
Respondent: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al..

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
William M. Jay (for the respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102.

The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed.

The district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”

Question

Does an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualify as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention?

Conclusion

An inventor’s sale to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential constitutes invalidating prior art. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous (9–0) Court.

The patent statute in force immediately before the America Invents Act (AIA) contained an “on-sale bar” which invalidated patents that had been on sale. Applying the presumption that when Congress reenacts the same language, it adopts the earlier judicial construction of the phrase, the Court found that the AIA consequently prohibits patents that had previously been on sale. Therefore, the commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the invention confidential falls within the on-sale bar of the AIA and invalidates the patent.

[17-1077] Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission Dec 03, 2018

Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Argued on Dec 3, 2018.
Decided on Mar 27, 2019.

Petitioner: Francis V. Lorenzo.
Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission.

Advocates:

Robert Heim (for the petitioner)
Christopher G. Michel (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology.

The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million.

After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the other stated it was sent “at the request of [another broker with the firm].” Lorenzo’s name and title were at the bottom of both emails.

The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo’s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ’s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission’s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo’s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ultimate authority” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court’s definition of “maker” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011).

Question

Does a false statement by someone who does not retain “ultimate authority” over the statement nevertheless subject the person to a fraudulent-scheme claim under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5?

Conclusion

Dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud falls within the scope of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements as defined by the Court’s precedent. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the 6–2 majority opinion of the Court.

Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact…, or (c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), the Court held that the “maker” of a statement under subsection (b) is the person with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” However, one does not need to be the “maker” of a statement to be subject to subsections (a) and (b) of this rule. The Court looked to the ordinary meaning of the terms in both subsections and found that Lorenzo’s actions fall well within those subsections notwithstanding the fact that he did not “make” the statements under subsection (b). Moreover, Lorenzo’s actions are a “paradigmatic example” of securities fraud that the rule contemplates and forbids.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority “eviscerate[d]” the distinction between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases and “misconstrue[d]” the securities laws and the Court’s precedent.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[17-419] Dawson v. Steager Dec 03, 2018

Dawson v. Steager

Argued on Dec 3, 2018.
Decided on Feb 20, 2019.

Petitioner: James Dawson, et ux..
Respondent: Dale W. Steager, West Virginia State Tax Commissioner.

Advocates:

Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the petitioners)
Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Lindsay S. See (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption.

The Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed.

Question

Does the provision of the West Virginia Code that exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals, violate 4 U.S.C. § 111?

Conclusion

The West Virginia law that taxes the retirement income of federal marshal but exempts from taxation state and local law enforcement officers unlawfully discriminates against federal employees, in violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court found that the state law confers a benefit to state and local retirees that federal retirees cannot receive and that there are no “significant differences between the two classes” of employees that justify differential treatment. The Court found unpersuasive the state’s arguments that the law affects too few people to meaningfully interfere with federal government operations and that the statute is not intended to harm federal retirees. The prohibition on discrimination, 4 U.S.C. § 111, applies to any state tax, not only those that are cumbersome, and the state’s purpose in adopting the discriminatory tax is irrelevant. With no meaningful distinction between retired federal marshals and state law enforcement retirees, the state cannot treat the two classes of retirees differently for purposes of taxation.

[17-1091] Timbs v. Indiana Nov 28, 2018

Timbs v. Indiana

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 28, 2018.
Decided on Feb 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Tyson Timbs.
Respondent: Indiana.

Advocates:

Wesley P. Hottot (for the Petitioner)
Thomas M. Fisher (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January.

The state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200.

In addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed.

The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state law.

Question

Has the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause been incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the states. In an opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court found that the Excessive Fines Clause finds its origins in the Magna Carta, the historic English Bill of Rights, and state constitutions from the colonial era to the present day. As such, it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” As such, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Clause against—that is, applies to—the states with equal force as against the federal government.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion to acknowledge that, in his opinion, the appropriate vehicle for incorporation is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than its Due Process Clause.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but expressly disagreeing with the majority’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to incorporate, instead finding that the Clause must be incorporated by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

[17-1107] Carpenter v. Murphy Nov 27, 2018

Carpenter v. Murphy

Argued on Nov 27, 2018.

Petitioner: Mike Carpenter, Interim Warden.
Respondent: Patrick Dwayne Murphy.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Ian H. Gershengorn (for the Respondent)
Riyaz A. Kanji (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Patrick Dwayne Murphy, a member of the Creek Nation, was convicted in Oklahoma state court and sentenced to death for the 1999 murder of George Jacobs, who was a member of the same nation. Murphy’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Murphy then sought post-conviction relief on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), gave the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute murders committed by Indians in Indian Country, a term defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to include reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) ultimately rejected Murphy’s jurisdictional argument, ruling that the state’s jurisdiction was proper because the land where the crime occurred was not an allotment, and because Murphy had offered insufficient evidence that the land was part of a reservation or dependent Indian community. The OCCA acknowledged authority from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals stating that the Creek Reservation still existed but reserving the matter of whether its 1866 boundaries remained intact, and declined to make a finding on the boundary question if the federal courts had not done so.

Murphy then sought habeas relief in federal district court, challenging Oklahoma’s jurisdiction on the theory that the crime had occurred in Indian Country because the land at issue was part of the Creek Reservation under § 1151(a), and because the land was an Indian allotment under § 1151(c). The district court rejected his claims, and Murphy appealed to the 10th Circuit.

The federal appeals court reversed, ruling that the crime occurred on the Creek Reservation, and that the Oklahoma state courts lacked jurisdiction. As an initial matter, the court found that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the OCCA’s decisions in Murphy’s case were contrary to clearly established law, which was provided by Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). Next, applying Solem’s three-part test, the court concluded that Congress had not disestablished the Creek Reservation. The crime had therefore occurred in Indian country under § 1151(a), meaning that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction and Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction under § 1153(a). The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Murphy’s application for habeas relief under § 2254.

Question

Do the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)?

[17-1094] Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert Nov 27, 2018

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert

Argued on Nov 27, 2018.
Decided on Feb 26, 2019.

Petitioner: Nutraceutical Corporation.
Respondent: Troy Lambert.

Advocates:

John Hueston (for the Petitioner)
Jonathan A. Herstoff (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Troy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product’s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product.

Lambert believed that the product violated FDA regulations because it purported to increase sexual desire but had not been through clinical testing, and because it was not FDA-approved. He further alleged that the product illegally failed to prominently display this lack of FDA approval on its labeling, and that the labeling also failed to mention a potentially dangerous ingredient. Lambert filed a consumer class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(b)(3), alleging state law claims related to unfair competition, false advertising, and other violations.

The district court granted class certification based on the full refund damages model, which applies when a product is useless and involves calculating the average retail price and the number of units sold. The judge hearing the case retired, and Lambert’s action was reassigned to a new judge. Discovery was completed, and Nutraceutical filed a motion for decertification. The new judge granted the motion, finding that Lambert had failed to provide essential evidence to apply his classwide damages model, meaning that common issues did not predominate as required under Rule 23(b)(3).

Ten days after the order was issued decertifying the class, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court instructed him to file the motion within ten days, which was twenty days after the decertification order. In accordance with the court’s instructions, Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration ten days later, highlighting evidence from his class certification motion that could be used to support the full refund damages model. He also offered an alternative damages model for the first time, based on non-restitutionary engorgement.

Three months later, the court denied his motion for reconsideration, rejecting his proposed damages models. Lambert timely filed a petition under Rule 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s orders denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the motion for class decertification to the 9th Circuit, which conditionally granted his petition.

A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit held that Lambert’s Rule 23(f) petition for class certification had been timely filed with the appellate court. The court explained that because Rule 23(f)’s 14-day deadline was procedural rather than jurisdictional, equitable exceptions such as tolling could apply. It also held that filing a motion for reconsideration before the Rule 23(f) deadline would toll the deadline. The panel further held that other circumstances could toll the deadline. In this case, Lambert had informed the district court of his intention to file a motion for reconsideration within Rule 23(f)’s 14-day window, and had submitted the filing within the ten-day time frame set by that court. The panel concluded that under these circumstances the deadline should be tolled and Lambert’s motion for reconsideration should be considered timely filed with the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that a number of other circuits would likely reach the opposite conclusion.

Question

Did the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err when it ruled that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which sets a 14-day deadline to file a petition for permission to appeal an order granting or denying class-action certification, and can excuse a party’s failure to file timely within the deadline established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), in conflict with the rulings of the US Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits?

Conclusion

Rule 23(f) is a non-jurisdictional claim processing rule that is not subject to equitable tolling. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court first noted that the rule at issue is located within the rules of procedure, not in a congressionally enacted statute, which makes it a claim-processing rule. Then, the Court looked to the context of the governing rules, as well as to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and found that the relevant rules express clear intent that Rule 23(f) not be subject to equitable tolling.

[17-204] Apple v. Pepper Nov 26, 2018

Apple v. Pepper

Argued on Nov 26, 2018.
Decided on May 13, 2019.

Petitioner: Apple, Inc..
Respondent: Robert Pepper, et al..

Advocates:

Daniel M. Wall (for the Petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This lawsuit arose out of Apple’s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “closed system,” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “App Store.” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price.

In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale.

Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court’s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Under Illinois Brick, “only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple.

The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing.

Question

May consumers sue for antitrust damages against anyone who delivers goods to them, even where they seek damages based on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims of the alleged offense?

Conclusion

Consumers who purchase goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices from an allegedly monopolistic retailer may sue the retailer under antitrust law. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that the plaintiff iPhone owners in this case, who purchased apps through Apple’s App Store, are direct purchasers under the Court’s precedential case Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and thus may sue Apple.

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue.” The Court has previously interpreted this provision to mean that “immediate buyers” from the alleged antitrust violators may sue the antitrust violators, but “indirect purchasers” (those who are two or more steps removed from the violator in a distribution chain) may not. The plaintiff iPhone owners in this case are not so distantly removed from Apple to foreclose a lawsuit; the Court found the absence of an intermediary between the consumers and Apple to be dispositive.

This interpretation is consistent not only with the statutory text and the Court’s precedent, but also the policy behind antitrust law. To hold otherwise would “provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers” to evade antitrust law.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. The dissent argues that Illinois Brick broadly prohibits “pass on” theories of damages for antitrust violations, rather than the narrower reading based in contract embraced by the majority. As such, the dissent would find that the suit by the plaintiff consumers here is precisely the type of lawsuit proscribed in Illinois Brick.

[17-1174] Nieves v. Bartlett Nov 26, 2018

Nieves v. Bartlett

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 26, 2018.
Decided on May 28, 2019.

Petitioner: Luis A. Nieves, et al..
Respondent: Russell P. Bartlett.

Advocates:

Dario Borghesan (for the Petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Zane D. Wilson (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Russell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable cause did not preclude a claim of retaliatory arrest. The appellate court noted that in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory prosecution claim if the charges were supported by probable cause, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable cause.

Question

Does probable cause defeat a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

Conclusion

The presence of probable cause for an arrest defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion.

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, the plaintiff must show that the official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the motive was the “but-for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The Court looked to analogous situations to determine how to identify whether improper motive caused the injury: the torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Analysis of motive of these torts supports the conclusion that the presence of probable cause should defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, regardless of the subjective motive of the arresting officer. Thus, if the officer has probable cause, then even the presence of a retaliatory motive motive is irrelevant unless the plaintiff presents “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been” (an equal protection, rather than First Amendment, argument).

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion as to all but Part II-D (in which the Court described a narrow qualification for the situation in which officers have probable cause for an arrest but exercise discretion not to do so). He wrote separately to concur in part and concur in the judgment.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

[17-773] Culbertson v. Berryhill Nov 07, 2018

Culbertson v. Berryhill

Argued on Nov 7, 2018.
Decided on Jan 8, 2019.

Petitioner: Richard Allen Culbertson.
Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration.

Advocates:

Daniel R. Ortiz (for petitioner)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent, in support of reversal and remand)
Amy L. Weil (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney’s fees in those cases under 42 U.S.C. § 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under § 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context.

In ruling on Culbertson’s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both § 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the § 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on the §406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his § 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under § 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap.

In his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate fee amount awardable under both § 406(a) and (b), but instead applied that limit only to § 406(b) fees. The 11th Circuit rejected this argument, applying its prior precedent to affirm the district court’s ruling.

Question

Do fees subject to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap related to the representation of individuals claiming Social Security benefits include only fees for representation in court, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have held, or do they also include fees for representation before the agency, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits have held?

Conclusion

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap applies only to fees for court representation and not to the aggregate fees awarded under subsections (a) and (b). Section 406(b) authorizes a court rendering a favorable judgment to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” to award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent” of past-due benefits. By using the language “such representation,” the Court found, the statute refers only to the representation already described in that section—that is, representation before the court. The cap, therefore, applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency. Moreover, the Court opined that had Congress intended to cap fees for agency-stage representation, it would have included the same language that appears in § 406(b) in § 406(a).

The Court found unpersuasive the argument that the agency’s pool of 25 percent of past-due benefits supported a reading of a cap on the aggregate fees. The language of the statute provides for two pools, and the agency chose to maintain only one.

[16-1094] Republic of Sudan v. Harrison Nov 07, 2018

Republic of Sudan v. Harrison

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 7, 2018.
Decided on Mar 26, 2019.

Petitioner: Republic of Sudan.
Respondent: Rick Harrison, et al..

Advocates:

Christopher M. Curran (for petitioner)
Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
Kannon K. Shanmugam (for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sailors and spouses of sailors injured in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen filed suit in 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1130, 1602, et seq., alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda, whom they alleged was responsible for the attack. In accordance with the plaintiffs’ request, the clerk of the court served the summons and complaint on Sudan by mailing the case documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received a return receipt. Sudan did not answer the complaint within the required time frame, and the clerk of the court therefore entered a default against Sudan. In 2012, the district court entered a default judgment against Sudan in the amount of approximately $314,000, and found that service had been proper. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received confirmation that it had been delivered.

The judgment was registered in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which in late 2013 and early 2014 issued three turnover orders directing particular banks to turn over assets of Sudan to the plaintiffs. After the third turnover order was issued, Sudan filed a notice of appearance, and on the same day, appealed the turnover orders to the Second Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the orders, holding that service of process had been proper under FSIA. In 2015, Sudan sought a rehearing en banc, and the United States filed an amicus brief in support of the petition. The Second Circuit denied Sudan’s request for a rehearing en banc.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit err by holding – in direct conflict with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 5th and 7th Circuits and in the face of an amicus brief from the United States – that plaintiffs suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may serve the foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) by mail addressed and dispatched to the head of the foreign state's ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state's diplomatic mission in the United States, despite U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to preserve mission inviolability?

Conclusion

When civil process is served on a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) requires a mailing to be sent directly to the foreign minister’s office in the foreign state. In an 8–1 majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that the most natural reading of § 1608(a)(3) required that the Republic of Sudan be served by a mailing sent directly to its foreign minister’s office in Sudan, not to the Sudanese Embassy in the United States.

A federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state in limited circumstances as described in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Relevant in this case is that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state only “where service has been made under section 1608.” That section, specifically § 1608(a)(3), allows for four methods of serving civil process, one of which—at issue in this case—is service “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched . . . to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” The Court found that “addressed” means having one’s name and address placed on the outside of a letter or package, and that an “address” means “a residence or place of business.” The foreign nation’s embassy in the United States is neither “a residence” nor its “place of business.” Moreover, to “dispatch” means to “send directly” to the address of the intended recipient.

The Court then found that its interpretation of the meaning of the statute bolstered by other related provisions. The “addressed and dispatched” language is intended to be “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” to the recipient.

Further, the Court found that its interpretation leads to other logical results. If mailing a service packet to a foreign state’s embassy in the United States were sufficient, then it would be easier to serve the foreign state itself than to serve a person in that foreign state under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is an illogical result.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion arguing that FSIA “neither specifies nor precludes the use of any particular address” and that, given “the unique role that embassies play in facilitating communications between states,” service by mailing to Sudan’s embassy in Washington, D.C., should comply with the requirements of FSIA.

[17-8151] Bucklew v. Precythe Nov 06, 2018

Bucklew v. Precythe

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 6, 2018.
Decided on Apr 1, 2019.

Petitioner: Russell Bucklew.
Respondent: Anne Precythe, et al..

Advocates:

Robert N. Hochman (for petitioner)
D. John Sauer (for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely cause him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired.

The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state’s execution method “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,” and failed to propose “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew’s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.” Reviewing the district court’s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment require an inmate with a unique and severe medical condition to prove an adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state-authorized method of execution?
What evidence is required for a court to determine whether an inmate’s proposed alternative method of execution significantly reduces the risk of severe pain as compared to the state’s method?
May a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution assume that medical personnel on the execution team are competent to manage the inmate’s condition?
Did the petitioner meet his burden in proposing an alternative execution method under Glossip v. Gross?

Conclusion

A death-row inmate alleging that the state’s method of execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, either on its face or as applied to that inmate, must show (1) a feasible and readily implemented alternative method that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and (2) that the state refused to adopt the method without a legitimate penological reason. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that Bucklew did not meet his burden.

The Court first considered the proper test for challenges to lethal injection protocols as applied to a particular inmate. In Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), a plurality of the Court held that a state’s refusal to alter its lethal injection protocol could violate the Eighth Amendment only if an inmate first identified a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative procedure that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” Subsequently, in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. __ (2015), a majority of the Court clarified that the plurality opinion in Baze was controlling. The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a painless death—only punishments that “intensif[y] the sentence of death” with a “superaddition of terror, pain, or disgrace.” Anyone bringing an Eighth Amendment challenge must therefore satisfy the Baze-Glossip test. The Court rejected Bucklew’s argument that methods posing a substantial risk of suffering when applied to a particular inmate should be considered “categorically” cruel. Bucklew failed to show that Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would “superadd” to his death sentence.

The Court then considered whether Bucklew satisfied the test, finding he had not. The majority identified two reasons Bucklew failed to show his proposed alternative—nitrogen hypoxia—was viable. First, he did not produce adequate evidence that nitrogen hypoxia could be “readily implemented,” and second, he failed to show that the state lacked a legitimate reason for declining to switch from its current method of execution to one that is “untried and untested.” Finally, the Court found that even if Bucklew had satisfied his burden of showing a viable alternative, he failed to show that the alternative would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but authored a concurring opinion reiterating the position he expressed in his concurring opinion in Baze that “a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain.”

Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a separate concurrence joining the majority in full but also underscoring the Court’s additional holding that the alternative method of execution need not be authorized under current state law.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined as to all but Part III. First, Justice Breyer argued that Bucklew had provided sufficient evidence by which a fact finder could conclude execution by lethal injection would subject him to impermissible suffering. Because a genuine issue exists as to this material fact, summary judgment for the state was inappropriate. Second, even accepting that the Glossip majority opinion governs, Justice Breyer argued that the substantially different circumstances of the present case rendered the reasoning in Glossip inapplicable and that the majority’s holding unconstitutionally places a high burden on the prisoner to describe in detail an alternative method of execution. Finally, Justice Breyer expresses general concern that an expedient death penalty may be mutually exclusive of a reliable and fair death penalty.

Justice Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, as well, to criticize and clarify as “troubling dicta” the majority’s “lament[ation]” of “late-arising death penalty litigation.”

[17-1042] BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos Nov 06, 2018

BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos

Argued on Nov 6, 2018.
Decided on Mar 4, 2019.

Petitioner: BNSF Railway Company.
Respondent: Michael D. Loos.

Advocates:

Lisa S. Blatt (for petitioner)
Rachel P. Kovner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
David C. Frederick (for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Michael Loos worked as an employee of BNSF Railway Company until his termination in November 2012 for a series of attendance policy violations. Related to at least some of the attendance violations was an injury Loos sustained in 2010 when he fell in the train yard. After being terminated, Loos brought two claims against his former employer: a claim of retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and a claim of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The district court found that Loos had not established a prima facie case of retaliation under FRSA and granted BNSF's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

The FELA negligence claim proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Loos—$30,000 for lost wages and $11,212.78 for medical expenses. BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to offset the lost wages award by the amount of Loos’s share of taxes owed under the RRTA. The district court denied the motion, finding no RRTA tax was owed on the award. The Eighth Circuit reviewed this determination de novo and found that the text of RRTA is unambiguous in not including damages for lost wages in its definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling using alternate reasoning.

Question

Are damages for lost wages "compensation" under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and thus subject to employment taxes?

Conclusion

Damages for lost wages are “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) and thus are subject to employment taxes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the RRTA and the Court’s precedent require the finding that Loos must pay taxes on the portion of a jury award for compensating him for lost wages while he was unable to work due to his injury.

The Railroad Retirement Act entitles railroad workers to various benefits in a scheme similar to that described by the Social Security Act. The Court held in Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946), that the term “wages” included pay for active service as well as pay for periods of absence from active service and that backpay for time lost due to “the employer’s wrong” counted as “wages.” Similarly, in United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 141 (2014), the Court held that severance payments qualified as taxable “wages” under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA). Drawing upon these interpretations comparable terms in comparable schemes, the Court found that the term “compensation” under the RRTA includes pay for periods of absence from active service, so long as the pay stems from the “employer-employee relationship.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, opining that the compensation to Loos was for injury, rather than for services not rendered, and thus was not taxable under the language of the RRTA.

[16-1275] Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren Nov 05, 2018

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 5, 2018.
Decided on Jun 17, 2019.

Petitioner: Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al..
Respondent: John Warren et al..

Advocates:

Charles J. Cooper (for petitioners)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners)
Toby J. Heytens (for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect.

Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the federal Atomic Energy Act preempt a Virginia ban on non-federal uranium mining?

Conclusion

The federal Atomic Energy Act (AEA) does not preempt a Virginia state-law ban on non-federal uranium mining. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the three-justice plurality opinion.

Looking first at the text of the AEA, the plurality found it notably lacking in any provision expressly preempting state law and in fact that it grants the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) extensive authority to regulate nearly every aspect of nuclear fuel except mining. Thus, states are free to regulate the mining of uranium. The plurality declined to speculate as to the legislative purpose behind the AEA and found Virginia Uranium’s arguments for preemption to go far beyond the statute’s text and structure.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg agrees that Virginia’s mining ban is not preempted but declines to join the plurality’s discussion of “the perils of inquiring into legislative motive.”

Chief Justice John Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito joined. The dissent criticizes the plurality opinion for “set[ting] out to defeat an argument that no one made, reaching a conclusion with which no one disagrees.” The dissent would characterize the question as whether a state can purport to regulate a field that is not preempted as an indirect means of regulating other fields that are preempted, and to that question the dissent would answer in the negative.

[17-949] Sturgeon v. Frost Nov 05, 2018

Sturgeon v. Frost

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 5, 2018.
Decided on Mar 26, 2019.

Petitioner: John Sturgeon.
Respondent: Bert Frost, in His Official Capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service, et al..

Advocates:

Matthew T. Findley (for petitioner)
Ruth Botstein (Assistant Attorney General for Alaska as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

John Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska’s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and appellate court denied him relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service’s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration.

On remand from the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service.

Question

Is Alaska’s Nation River public land and therefore subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service?

Conclusion

The Nation River is not public land, so it is exempt under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) from the National Park Service’s regulatory authority, as are all non-public lands and navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that Alaska’s Nation River is not a public land because the United States does not and cannot have “title” to the Nation River. Under 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (“Section 103(c)”) the Park Service may exercise its authority only on public lands, so non-public lands are outside its domain. Moreover, navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks are also exempt from the Park Service’s normal regulatory authority because ANILCA expressly defines “land” to mean “lands, waters, and interests therein.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, emphasizing certain “important regulatory pathways that the Court’s decision leaves open for future exploration.” Specifically, Justice Sotomayor points out that the Court’s holding does not preclude the Park Service from exercising any regulatory authority over the Nation River, only that it may not regulate the Nation River as if it were within Alaska’s federal park system.

[17-961] Frank v. Gaos Oct 31, 2018

Frank v. Gaos

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 31, 2018.
Decided on Mar 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Theodore H. Frank, et al..
Respondent: Paloma Gaos, et al..

Advocates:

Theodore H. Frank (for petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party)
Andrew J. Pincus (for respondent Google LLC)
Jeffrey A. Lamken (for respondents Paloma Gaos et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company’s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013.

Among the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (“the Objectors”).

The district court approved the parties’ settlement in 2015, and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties’ preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of attorney fees was commensurate with the benefit to the class.

The Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s ruling approving the settlement, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion with regard to any of the four findings described above.

Question

Does a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides no direct relief to class members support class certification and comport with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and if so, in what circumstances?

Conclusion

Rather than answer the question presented, the Court issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion vacating the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court noted that there remain "substantial questions" about whether any of the named plaintiffs has standing to sue, in light of its decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. __ (2016).

[17-1011] Jam v. International Finance Corp. Oct 31, 2018

Jam v. International Finance Corp.

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 31, 2018.
Decided on Feb 27, 2019.

Petitioner: Budha Ismael Jam, et al..
Respondent: International Finance Corporation.

Advocates:

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for petitioners)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners)
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital. The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project.

The plant’s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance.

The plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the “privileges, exemptions, and immunities” conferred by the statute.

The Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit.

Question

Does the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) give international organizations the immunity that foreign governments enjoyed at the time the law was passed, or the immunity that foreign governments have at present, as described in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976?

Conclusion

The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (IOIA) affords international organizations the same immunity from suit that foreign governments enjoy today under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), not what they enjoyed when the law was passed.

In a 7–1 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the International Finance Corporation, an IOIA international organization, is immune from suit only to the extent that foreign sovereign governments are immune from suit. The Court interpreted the IOIA “same as” language as making international organization immunity and foreign sovereign immunity continuously equivalent. The Court found that this interpretation is bolstered by the “reference canon” of statutory interpretation, which provides that when a statute refers to a general subject, it adopts the law on that subject at the time a question arises, as opposed to when a statute refers to a statute by title, in which case it adopts the law as it existed at the time the statute was enacted.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which he gave greater weight to the IOIA’s “history, its context, its purposes, and its consequences” than to canons of statutory interpretation.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[17-1026] Garza v. Idaho Oct 30, 2018

Garza v. Idaho

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 30, 2018.
Decided on Feb 27, 2019.

Petitioner: Gilberto Garza, Jr..
Respondent: Idaho.

Advocates:

Amir H. Ali (for petitioner)
Kenneth K. Jorgensen (for respondent)
Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers.

Four months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.

Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights.

The Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic “presumption of prejudice” when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Question

Is a criminal defendant’s counsel presumptively ineffective if counsel declines to file an appeal of a conviction because the defendant already waived the right to appeal in his plea?

Conclusion

The presumption of prejudice for Sixth Amendment purposes recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), applies regardless of whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver.

In a 6–3 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that Garza’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal despite Garza’s repeated requests. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that the deficiency was “prejudicial to the defense.” In Flores-Ortega, the Court held that “prejudice is presumed” in certain contexts, including when counsel “deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.” Garza’s appeal waivers—and appeal waivers generally—are not an absolute bar to all appellate claims. Indeed, some appeals fall outside the scope of the waiver, and there is always a possibility that the government might forfeit or breach the agreement of which the waiver is part. Given these scenarios, Garza could have pursued an appeal had his trial counsel acceded to his requests and filed a notice of appeal. By failing to do so, Garza’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, and in which Justice Samuel Alito joined in part. The dissent opined that Garza’s counsel acted reasonably by declining to file an appeal on the grounds that doing so could jeopardize his plea bargain. The dissent characterized the majority’s holding as resulting in a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in the Court’s precedents or the Constitution.

[16-1498] Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. Oct 30, 2018

Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.

Argued on Oct 30, 2018.
Decided on Mar 19, 2019.

Petitioner: Washington State Department of Licensing.
Respondent: Cougar Den, Inc..

Advocates:

Noah Purcell (for petitioner)
Ann O'Connell Adams (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioner)
Adam G. Unikowsky (for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways." Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "any trade, traveling, and importation" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state’s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes.

Question

Does the Yakama Treaty of 1855 create a right for tribal members to avoid state taxes on off-reservation commercial activities that make use of public highways?

Conclusion

The “right to travel” provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 (between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians) preempts the state’s fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den’s importation of fuel by public highway for sale within the reservation.

Justice Stephen Breyer delivered an opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. For this plurality of the Court, Justice Breyer agreed with the Washington Supreme Court below that a provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 that guarantees the Yakama “the right . . . to travel upon all public highways” preempts a state tax triggered when motor fuel “enters into [Washington] state,” a tax exempted only for “bulk transfer,” such as pipeline or ship but not by ground transportation. A key component of the treaty was the right to travel with goods for sale or distribution, and the tax impermissibly burdened that treaty right.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the treaty was drafted by the United States in a language the Yakamas could not read, and the Yakamas relinquished large amounts of territory in exchange for their treaty rights. Under these circumstances, Justice Gorsuch argued, the treaty should be interpreted as the Yakama understood it.

Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the tax burdens possession, not travel, and that it would apply regardless of how the fuel entered the state. Under this interpretation, the tax does not impermissibly burden the treaty right.

Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the language of the treaty is best interpreted to mean that the Yakamas have the right to travel on public highways equal to the right that other U.S. citizens have. Thus, a state can apply any nondiscriminatory restrictions on travel without unduly burdening the treaty rights.

[17-988] Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela Oct 29, 2018

Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 29, 2018.
Decided on Apr 24, 2019.

Petitioner: Lamps Plus, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Frank Varela.

Advocates:

Andrew J. Pincus (for petitioners)
Michele M. Vercoski (for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Frank Varela filed a class action complaint against his employer, Lamps Plus, under theories including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract after the company released employee personal identifying information in response to a phishing scam. Varela had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. After he filed suit, Lamps Plus relied on this agreement as a basis for a motion to compel bilateral arbitration.

The district court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to whether it permitted class arbitration. It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that it had not agreed to class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed and ruled that class arbitration could move forward.

The appeals court explained that because the agreement was capable of two reasonable interpretations, the district court was correct in finding ambiguity. Under California law it was also proper to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, particularly since it was a contract of adhesion. Further, it was a reasonable interpretation of the agreement to conclude that it covered legal disputes including class-wide claims, not just individual ones. By accepting this interpretation, the district court had found the requisite “contractual basis” for agreement to class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).

Question

Does the Federal Arbitration Act foreclose a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration agreements?

Conclusion

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), an arbitration agreement that is ambiguous as to the availability of class arbitration does not manifest sufficient consent by the parties to submit to class arbitration. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the arbitration agreement between Varela and his employer, Lamps Plus, which contained only general language commonly used in arbitration agreements, did not provide the necessary contractual basis for compelling class arbitration.

The Court first determined that it had jurisdiction to review the lower court’s decision because an order that both compels arbitration and dismisses the underlying claims is a “fundamental” change in the rights of a party and thus qualifies as “a final decision with respect to an arbitration” within the meaning of the statute.

On the merits, the Court first noted that the availability of class arbitration is a matter of consent—that is, all parties must consent to class arbitration for it to be available. Because there are crucial differences between class arbitration and sole arbitration, the Court found utmost importance in giving effect to the intent of the parties. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), the Court held that a contract’s silence toward class arbitration precluded its availability, and the same holds true for ambiguity.

The Court rejected the California law that an ambiguous provision of a contract be construed against the drafter, finding that rule preempted by the FAA despite arguments by Varela and the dissenting justices that the law is nondiscriminatory.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority but wrote a separate concurrence expressing that he would not reach consideration of the California law of interpretation.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, to emphasize that the Court’s decision strays even further from the principle that “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Justice Ginsburg notes the irony that in contracts between parties with vastly unequal bargaining power, as between employers and employees, an inference that an ambiguous contract requires solo arbitration vests the employer with even greater power of coercion.

Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion expressing his individual view that both the court of appeals, below, and the Court itself lacked jurisdiction to review the case.

Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion to point out that the majority reaches its holding without actually first agreeing that the contract is ambiguous, thereby unnecessarily invading California law by invoking preemption.

Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer join, and in which Justice Sotomayor joins as to Part II. Justice Kagan pointed out that the FAA, while requiring courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, does not federalize contract law. Thus, even under the FAA, state law governs the interpretation of arbitration agreements as long as it treats other types of contracts the same way. In Justice Kagan’s view, this principle should resolve the matter in this case.

[17-1272] Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Oct 29, 2018

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.

Argued on Oct 29, 2018.
Decided on Jan 8, 2019.

Petitioner: Henry Schein, Inc., et al..
Respondent: Archer and White Sales, Inc..

Advocates:

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for petitioners)
Daniel L. Geyser (for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2012, Archer & White Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest.

After a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement.

The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit.

In the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,” except where “the argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’” This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, “the district court may decide the ‘gateway’ issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.’”

Reviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court.

Question

Does the Federal Arbitration Act permit a court to decline to enforce an agreement delegating questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator if the court concludes the claim of arbitrability is “wholly groundless”?

Conclusion

The “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, so the question of arbitrability should be resolved by an arbitrator, not a court. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court reiterated its prior decisions that parties to a contract have the ultimate say in whether to have an arbitrator or a court resolve disputes—not only the merits of disputes, but also questions of arbitrability. The Court found that in this contract, the parties had delegated to an arbitrator the question of arbitrability, so a court cannot override the contract and resolve such questions.

The Court found unpersuasive Archer & White’s arguments to the contrary, holding that neither the text of the Act nor Congress’s intent in designing it supported a reading of the Act that empowers a court to resolve the question of arbitrability against the express wishes of the contracting parties.

The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to consider the question whether the contract in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.

[16-1363] Nielsen v. Preap Oct 10, 2018

Nielsen v. Preap

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 10, 2018.
Decided on Mar 19, 2019.

Petitioner: Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al..
Respondent: Mony Preap, et al..

Advocates:

Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for petitioners)
Cecillia D. Wang (for repondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Three lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of California when immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs’ position was that they were not detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody, and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

The district court certified the class, which included “[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under § 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen’s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute’s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays.

Question

Does a noncitizen released from criminal custody become exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) if, after the noncitizen is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security does not take the noncitizen into immigration custody immediately?

Conclusion

A noncitizen does not become exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) through the failure of the Department of Homeland Security to take him into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the 5–4 majority with respect to Parts I, III-A, III-B-1, and IV (joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh), and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III-B-2 (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh).

In Part I, Justice Alito recited the facts and procedural history of the case for the 5–4 majority. In Part II, Justice Alito wrote for a minority addressing four questions regarding the court’s jurisdiction. In Part III-A, the majority looked to the plain text of § 1226(c) and found that the grammar of the provision and the meaning of the term “described” within the provision require reading the statute as meaning that the scope of “the alien” is fixed by the offenses described in subparagraphs (A)–(D), even if they were not arrested “immediately” when they were released from criminal custody.

In Part III-B-1, the majority concluded from “textual cues” that even if an alien is not arrested under authority bestowed by subsection (c)(1), he may face mandatory detention under subsection (c)(2). In Part III-B-2, the minority applied a principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates to conclude that a statutory rule that officials “shall act within a specified time” does not preclude action later.

In Part IV, the majority addressed (and rejected) the respondents’ arguments that the majority’s reading of the statute would (1) render key language superfluous, (2) lead to anomalies, and (3) violate the canon of constitutional avoidance.

Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion to emphasize the narrowness of the issue before the Court. Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the case “is not about whether a noncitizen may be removed from the United States on the basis of criminal offenses” nor is it about “whether” or “how long” a noncitizen may be detained” during removal proceedings or before removal. Finally, it is not about whether Congress may mandate that the Executive Branch detain noncitizens during removal proceedings or before removal, as opposed to merely giving it discretion to detain.

Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that courts lack jurisdiction to decide questions concerning the detention of noncitizens before final orders of removal have been entered. However, notwithstanding his opinion on jurisdiction, given that the Court exercised jurisdiction, Justice Thomas would largely agree with the majority as to the resolution of the merits.

Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s reading runs counter to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s language, the statute’s structure, and relevant canons of interpretation. Under the majority’s broad interpretation, the statute would forbid bail hearings even for noncitizens whom the Secretary detained many years after their release from prison.

[17-1104] Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries Oct 10, 2018

Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries

Argued on Oct 10, 2018.
Decided on Mar 19, 2019.

Petitioner: Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al..
Respondent: Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al..

Advocates:

Shay Dvoretzky (for petitioners)
Thomas C. Goldstein (for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “bare metal” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability.

The defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule.

The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer’s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact-specific standard rather than the bright-line rule.

Question

Can products liability defendants be held liable under maritime law for injuries caused by products that they did not make, sell, or distribute?

Conclusion

Under maritime tort law, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn if its product requires incorporation of a part produced by a third party, the resulting fully incorporated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users would be aware of that danger. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that Air and Liquid Systems owed a duty to warn the plaintiffs about the danger of the ship components even though the Navy, not the manufacturer, added the parts with asbestos. Three approaches have emerged from the duty to exercise reasonable care in warning prospective users of a product that requires later incorporation of a dangerous part for the integrated product to function as intended. Of those three, the Court chose the approach that imposes neither the narrowest nor broadest liability on manufacturers, finding it most appropriate for the maritime context, which recognizes “a special solicitude for the welfare of sailors.”

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. The dissenters would adopt the bare-metal defense approach, consistent with traditional common law of torts.

[17-5554] Stokeling v. United States Oct 09, 2018

Stokeling v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 9, 2018.
Decided on Jan 15, 2019.

Petitioner: Denard Stokeling.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

Brenda G. Bryn (for petitioner)
Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was “overcoming victim resistance.” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “violent felonies” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling’s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal.

Question

Is a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(i), when that offense has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight force to overcome resistance?

Conclusion

A state robbery offense that has as an element the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it necessitates the use of “physical force.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 5–4 majority. The ACCA’s elements clause covers any offense that has as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” A majority of states define non-aggravated robbery as requiring a degree of force sufficient only to overcome a victim’s resistance; indeed, even the “slightest offensive touching” constitutes “physical force” in a majority of states. Stokeling’s proposed definition of physical force as force “reasonably expected to cause pain or injury” is inconsistent with the degree of force needed to commit robbery at common law and therefore cannot be adopted. Under the broader interpretation of “physical force,” robbery under Florida law qualifies as an ACCA-predicate offense under the elements clause, so the decision of the Eleventh Circuit below is affirmed.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The dissent opines that in light of the Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), which held that the words “physical force” in the ACCA mean “a heightened degree of force, rather than minimal contact,” a Florida robbery, which can be committed through use of only slight force, should not be a “violent crime” under the ACCA.

[17-765] United States v. Stitt Oct 09, 2018

United States v. Stitt

Argued on Oct 9, 2018.
Decided on Dec 10, 2018.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Victor J. Stitt, II.

Advocates:

Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for petitioner)
Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt’s nine prior “violent felony” convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted “violent felonies.” The US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony.

In a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing.

The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose of oral argument. At issue in both cases is whether the elements of the state crimes of which the defendants were convicted are “the same as, or narrower than, those of the general offense.” If they are broader than those of the general offense, then they cannot serve as ACCA predicate offenses.

Question

Is the crime of residential burglary under Arkansas law, or aggravated burglary under Tennessee law, the same as or narrower than “general burglary” such that convictions for those crimes serve as predicate crimes for the purpose of the enhanced sentencing provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984?

Conclusion

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) encompasses not just “dwellings” but also any “vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.” The general definition of burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The Court previously recognized that when the ACCA was adopted in 1986, it was intended to reflect the definition of burglary used by most states. Because the statutory word “structure” is broad enough to encompass vehicles, and a majority of states in 1986 included in the definition of burglary vehicles adapted for or customarily used for lodging, the defendants’ state court convictions were for violent crimes within the meaning of the ACCA. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Stitt, No. 17-765, and vacated the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sims, No. 17-766, remanding the case for the lower court to resolve novel state law arguments.

[17-647] Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania Oct 03, 2018

Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 3, 2018.
Decided on Jun 21, 2019.

Petitioner: Rose Mary Knick.
Respondent: Township of Scott, Pennsylvania.

Advocates:

J. David Breemer (for petitioner)
Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner)
Teresa Ficken Sachs (for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that “all cemeteries within the Township … be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours” and that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the “public-access provision”). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision.

Rose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge.

Knick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an “inverse-condemnation proceeding” against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government.

The district court dismissed all but two of Knick’s claims with prejudice, and dismissed two of them (described above) without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. Knick appealed the dismissal of her claims to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that although the ordinance was constitutionally suspect, she lacks Article III standing because she failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and redressability as to her Fourth Amendment claim, and that her Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using state inverse-condemnation procedures as required in the US Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.

Question

Should the Court affirm or abrogate its holding in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, which requires property owners to exhaust state court remedies before bringing federal Takings Clause claims?
Does the ripeness doctrine established in Williamson County apply to takings claims that assert that a law is unconstitutional on its face?

Conclusion

A government violates the Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at that time; the state-litigation requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), is overruled.

Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court. The Court found that the state-litigation requirement in Williamson County “imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs” and “conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence.” Looking to the text of the Takings Clause, the Court found that the most natural reading of that provision is that the right of compensation arises at the time of the taking. Under Williamson County, the government did not need to compensate in advance or simultaneously with the taking, but only provide a “reasonable, certain, and adequate” mechanism for recovering such compensation after the fact. By forcing plaintiffs to seek compensation after the taking in state court before allowing them to proceed in federal court, Williamson County imposes an “unjustifiable burden” on these plaintiffs. Additionally, the Court expressed concern over the likelihood that a plaintiff would bring a state-court claim, lose, and therefore be precluded from bringing a claim in federal court at all.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence underscoring his opposition to the position advocated by the township, the United States (as amicus curiae), and the dissent, that there is no constitutional violation as long as there is a mechanism for receiving compensation later.

Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan argued that the Takings Clause is at its core (and in its text) different from other constitutional provisions in its qualifying phrase “without just compensation.” Justice Kagan argued that the Clause does not forbid all takings, only those without just compensation, and the majority disregards the text of the Clause in its interpretation requiring compensation at the time of taking. Justice Kagan also dismissed the majority’s concern over the preclusive effect of state-court litigation, arguing that Congress bears the burden of correcting errors that become evident from application of laws. Most importantly, the dissent noted, the majority departs from lost-established precedent and disregards the doctrine of stare decisis.

[17-340] New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira Oct 03, 2018

New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 3, 2018.
Decided on Jan 15, 2019.

Petitioner: New Prime Inc..
Respondent: Dominic Oliveira.

Advocates:

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for petitioner)
Jennifer D. Bennett (for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. (Prime), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “substantially identical” to those he had as an independent contractor.

Oliveira then brought a class-action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a state minimum-wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide.

The district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “contracts of employment of transportation workers” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime’s motion to compel arbitration.

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship.

Question

In a dispute over the whether a contract falls within the exemptions in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), must a court determine whether the FAA applies, or is that for the arbitrator to decide?
Does the Section 1 of the FAA, which exempts “contracts of employment” in certain industries, apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship?

Conclusion

In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that a court should determine whether the FAA applies and that “contracts of employment” include those that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship. Looking to the language and structure of the FAA, the Court reasoned that courts may compel arbitration only in arbitration agreements involving commerce or maritime transactions. Thus, a court must make the threshold determination whether the FAA applies to the contract at issue, notwithstanding any delegation clause.

As to the meaning of “contracts of employment,” the Court looked to the original meaning and evolution of the phrase, finding that it was not a term of art that referred only to contracts that created an employer-employee relationship, but instead broadly meant “work agreements.” Using this definition of “contracts of employment,” the Court held that Oliveira’s agreement with New Prime falls within Section 1’s exception.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion to clarify that while she would reach the same outcome, the meanings of terms or phrases can and do sometimes evolve, and courts must interpret them flexibly.

[17-6086] Gundy v. United States Oct 02, 2018

Gundy v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 2, 2018.
Decided on Jun 20, 2019.

Petitioner: Herman Avery Gundy.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

Sarah Baumgartel (for petitioner)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law.

In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release.

The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted.

Question

Does the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 violate the nondelegation doctrine?

Conclusion

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion for the four-justice plurality.

The plurality first noted that the Court had previously interpreted this provision of SORNA in Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012), to require the attorney general to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible. In light of this prior interpretation and the context of the provision and the statutory purpose, the plurality found unpersuasive Gundy’s argument that the provision gives the attorney general discretion to do whatever he wants as to pre-Act offenders. The nondelegation doctrine holds that Congress may not transfer to another branch “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative” but may delegate on executive agencies discretion to implement and enforce laws, so long as Congress has provided an “intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform. The Court’s decision in Reynolds makes clear that § 16913(d) contains an “intelligible principle”—namely, that the attorney general apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as possible—and thus the provision does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. The plurality also noted that no attorney general has used the provision in a more expansive way.

Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment, expressing that he would like to revisit the Court’s approach to nondelegation. However, under the Court’s present jurisprudence, he finds no reason to invalidate SORNA’s delegation of authority in this provision.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Unlike Justice Alito, the dissent would use this case to change its approach to the nondelegation doctrine. The dissent expresses concern that SORNA gives the attorney general “the power to write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens.”

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[17-7505] Madison v. Alabama Oct 02, 2018

Madison v. Alabama

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 2, 2018.
Decided on Feb 27, 2019.

Petitioner: Vernon Madison.
Respondent: State of Alabama.

Advocates:

Bryan A. Stevenson (for petitioner)
Thomas R. Govan, Jr. (for respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed.

In November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

Madison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment and the Court’s jurisprudence prohibit a state from executing a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him with no memory of the commission of the capital offense?
Does the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment preclude a state from executing a prisoner who suffers from severe cognitive dysfunction such that he cannot remember the crime for which he was convicted or understand the circumstances of his scheduled execution?

Conclusion

The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from executing a prisoner who cannot remember committing his crime, but it does prohibit executing a prisoner who cannot rationally understand the reasons for his execution, whether that inability is due to psychosis or dementia.

In a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court reviewed its precedents on the scope of the Eighth Amendment as applied to mentally incompetent death row prisoners. In 1986, the Court held in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing, relying on a “moral intuition” that “killing one who has no capacity” to understand his crime or punishment “simply offends humanity.” In Ford, the Court also pointed out that there is no “retributive value” in executing a person who has no comprehension of the sentence. In 2007, the Court in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, provided more specific criteria for how to identify prisoners ineligible for execution, identifying the “critical question” as whether a “‘prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness’ that he lacks a ‘rational understanding’ of ‘the State’s rationale for [his] execution.’”

Although the parties disputed in the lower courts whether the lack of memory of commiting the crime, alone, disqualified a prisoner from execution, Madison accepted Alabama’s position that it does not, under Panetti. Likewise, the parties disputed in the lower courts whether Panetti applies only to prisoners suffering from psychosis, and categorically excludes those suffering from dementia, and Alabama accepted Madison’s position that it does not. The remaining issue, then, is whether the prisoner is unable to rationally understand the reasons for his sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment forbids his execution. This is a question for the lower court on remand.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent would not have reached the second question, opining that Madison presented only the first question in its petition and that Madison’s counsel raised the other question only after concluding that the first argument was unlikely to prevail.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[17-71] Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service Oct 01, 2018

Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 1, 2018.
Decided on Nov 27, 2018.

Petitioner: Weyerhaeuser Company.
Respondent: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al..

Advocates:

Timothy S. Bishop (for petitioner)
Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits.

A divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered “essential” under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat.

The 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court.

Question

Does the Endangered Species Act prohibit designation of privately owned land as unoccupied critical habitat that is neither habitat nor essential to species conservation?
Is an agency determination not to exclude an area from critical habitat due to the economic impact of designation subject to judicial review?

Conclusion

In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held as to the first question presented that to be designated a "critical habitat" under the Endangered Species Act, the land must also be habitat for the species. The Court found unpersuasive FWS's argument that habitat can include areas that, like Unit 1, would require modification to support a given species but which do not currently serve as habitat for the species. The statute provides that when the Secretary lists a species as endangered he must also "designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat." That language on its face requires that only "habitat" of an endangered species is eligible for designation as "critical habitat." Thus, even if if an area otherwise meets the statutory definition of "unoccupied critical habitat," Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) does not authorize the agency to designate the area as critical habitat unless it is also habitat for the species.

As to the second question, the Court held that the agency's determination is subject to judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act creates a presumption that agency determinations are subject to judicial review that may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review or the action is specifically granted by law to the agency's discretion. Here, the Court found neither. Although the second sentence of Section 4(b)(2) states the Secretary "may" exclude an area from critical habitat, that section requires the Secretary to consider economic impact and relative benefits before deciding whether to exclude an area from critical habitat or to proceed with designation. Because the statute articulates a meaningful standard against which to judge the Secretary's exercise of discretion, the agency's determination is not beyond judicial review.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

[17-587] Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido Oct 01, 2018

Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido