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    Religion & Spirituality

    Stoicism On Fire

    The practice of Stoicism as a philosophical way of life and rational form of spirituality

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    Copyright: © 2018 Chris Fisher - Traditional Stoicism

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    Latest Episodes:
    Universal Reason – Episode 44 Nov 03, 2021
    Show notes

    What defined a Stoic above all else was the choice of a life in which every thought, every desire, and every action would be guided by no other law than that of universal Reason. ~ Pierre Hadot[i] The Stoics placed a rational, divine, and providentially ordered cosmos at the center of their philosophical system and relied on it to guide their every thought, desire, and action. For the Stoic, Nature is the measure of all things. Therefore, the Stoics argued to experience well-being (eudaimonia), we must live in agreement with Nature. [i] Hadot, P., & Chase, M. (1998). The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 308 FULL TRANSCRIPT COMING SOON


    Exploring Encheiridion 12 – Episode 43 Oct 27, 2021
    Show notes

    If you want to make progress, dismiss this kind of reasoning: “If I neglect my business, I will have nothing to live on,” or “If I don’t punish my slave, he will be no good.” It is better to starve to death in a calm and confident state of mind than to live anxiously amidst abundance. And it is better also for your slave to be bad than for you to be unhappy. So make a start with the little things, like some oil being spilled or some wine being stolen. Then tell yourself: “This is the price one pays for not getting worked up, the price for tranquility. Nothing comes free of charge.” When you summon your slave, reflect that he is quite capable of not responding, or if he does respond that he may do none of the things you want. In any case he is too unimportant for your own tranquility to depend on him. (Ench 12) TRANSCRIPT COMING SOON


    Exploring Encheiridion 11 – Episode 42 Oct 20, 2021
    Show notes

    Never say about anything, “I have lost it”; but say, “I have returned it.” Has your little child died? “It has been returned.” Has your wife died? “She has been returned.” “I have been robbed of my land.” No, that has been returned as well. “But it was a bad person who stole it.” Why are you bothered about the individual the donor used to demand its return? As long as these things are given to you, take care of them as things that are not your own, just as travelers treat their lodging. (Ench 11) SHOW TRANSCRIPT COMING SOON


    Exploring Encheiridion 10 – Episode 41 Oct 13, 2021
    Show notes

    In all circumstances keep in mind to turn in to yourself and ask what resources you have for dealing with these things. If you see a good-looking man or woman, you will find self-control the appropriate power; if pain afflicts you, you will find endurance; if rudeness, you will find patience. By developing these habits, you will not be carried away by your first impressions. (Ench 10) While this passage deals directly with the discipline of assent, it also entails the disciplines of desire and action. When we pull this passage apart, we get a glimpse into how quickly assents to impressions can create desires and aversions and lead to impulses to act. The primary point of this lesson from Epictetus is to show us we possess the resources necessary to stop the quick progression from assent to impulse to act. Epictetus highlights three impressions in this passage and provides specific resources we can use to deal with each. Here’s the process as it applies in each of these three examples: In Step 1, an impression presses itself upon our mind. All of the impressions listed in this passage arise from sources external to our mind. I just saw a good-looking man or woman I feel a pain in my body, or I’m facing some other hardship. I just encountered a rude person. In Step 2, we immediately attach a value judgment to that impression: That good-looking man or woman is something “good” for me. That pain in my body is something “bad” for me. That person’s rude behavior is “bad” for me. In Step 3, that judgment creates a desire or aversion and a subsequent impulse to act. I desire that good-looking man or woman; I’m going to reach out to them. I fear this pain in my body or this hardship; I’m going to avoid it. That rude person offended me; I’m going make them stop, or I’m going to retaliate. If we were sages, we wouldn’t get past Step 1 because we would not place the value judgment on the impression. However, we are not sages, and neither were Epictetus’ students. That is why he is informing us we possess powers or resources we can use to interrupt this sequence after we’ve assented to the value judgment and before the impulse to act leads us into bad behavior. Before I tackle each of these examples, I want to make one point clear. Epictetus’ goal for this lesson is to help us develop habits that prevent us from being carried away by impressions into a state of emotional distress (pathos). The goal is not to turn us into Dr. Spoke-like, emotionless, disconnected observers of events. Epictetus is not telling us we should not find a good-looking man or woman attractive. He is not telling us to ignore the pain in our bodies or the effects of hardships. He is not telling us to be oblivious to rude behavior. Instead, Epictetus teaches us we have resources within ourselves to judge these impressions correctly and respond appropriately. This lesson is important because we frequently allow the initial judgment of an impression to carry us away and cause us to spiral out of control emotionally. Too often, this leads to an entirely inappropriate response. With that in mind, let’s look at each of the impressions Epictetus uses in this lesson and how we can use the resources we have to deal with them. The good-looking man or woman Let’s start with the impression of a good-looking man or woman. Observing and appreciating beauty is natural. There is nothing wrong with observing a man or woman and assenting to the judgment they are good-looking. Nature created us to appreciate beauty. The problem starts when we allow that first impression and initial judgment of beauty to carry us away with desire. We are mistaken if we assent to the impression that having that good-looking man or woman as a life companion or sexual partner is “good” and will bring us well-being (happiness). Their presence in our life could be a preferred indifferent at best. Alternatively, as many of us have experienced, it may lead to some real dispreferred indifferents we did not foresee when this good-looking man or woman initially captured our attention. Epictetus tells us we possess the power of temperance or moderation as a resource to deal with this impression before it becomes an impulse to act. But, how and when do we use this resource? We likely already attached the value judgment of “good” to the impression of a good-looking man or woman, and a desire may be starting to take control. If we let it take control, we may begin to fantasize about that good-looking person mentally. Then, we may be overcome by an impulse to act, which can lead to immoral behavior. In Encheiridion 10, Epictetus is referring to scenarios where the impulse to act would be immoral. We can think of numerous scenarios where assent to a person’s good looks might lead one to seek their company as a preferred indifferent without it being an immoral act. That is not the lesson Epictetus is presenting here. The Stoics did not advocate celibacy; however, they did teach moderation in all things. So how do we apply the power of temperance or moderation to this scenario? We must begin with the practice I taught in Episode 9. When the impression of a good-looking man or woman is presented to our mind, we need to “Stop it,” “Strip it” bare, and “See it” from the cosmic viewpoint. Refer to Episode 9 if you are unclear about this three-step practice to deal with impressions. The good news is this: as long as we engage in this process before we act upon the impulse, we can circumvent the bad action. In other words, we may have already assented to the idea this good-looking person is “good” for us, and we may already be driven by desire and feel the impulse to act. As long as we say STOP to ourselves before we act, it’s not too late. If we can “Stop it” before we act, we have time to “Strip it” bare. In case anyone is confused at this point, “Strip it bare” applies to the impression, not the good-looking man or woman. Please don’t strip them bare. That is not part of this Stoic practice, and it will likely get you into some serious trouble. So, we tell ourselves to “Stop it.” This is where the teacher within us from Episode 36 steps in to guide the child within us. When we “Stop it,” we create a gap that allows us enough time to consider this impression for what it is. That gap gives us time to “Strip” the impression bare. It gives us time to realize this good-looking man or woman is a potential preferred indifferent rather than something that is “good” and can affect our well-being. Finally, we “See it” from the cosmic perspective. How did this good-looking man or woman come into my awareness? Are they a stranger passing by on the street? Or, did you meet them under circumstances that might cause you to give more consideration to them as a preferred indifferent in your life? Sometimes, a confluence of events creates synchronicities that deserve our consideration. This is where we can apply the power of temperance and moderation. After we “Stop it” and “Strip it,”we can use the power of temperance and moderation as we See this impression from the cosmic perspective. We can ask ourselves: Is this desire for this good-looking person consistent with our values and goal of living in agreement with Nature? What might happen, good or bad, if I follow this impulse to act? Are my thoughts and behaviors moderated by a desire to act appropriately? Ultimately, the goal of Stoic practice is to move the “Stop it” step farther back in the chain of events. At first, we may only be able to “Stop it” at the impulse to act stage; before we act. Then, with practice, we can move the “Stop it” step back to where we first feel the desire or aversion taking hold of our psyche with practice and habituation. Finally, we can move it back further and learn to say “Stop it” to ourselves as soon as we recognize we have attached a value judgment to the impression. Pain or labor Like beauty, pain in our body serves a purpose. It’s a warning sign that something may be wrong. We would be foolish to ignore it completely. Unfortunately, we frequently allow pain to control our lives even when it’s minor; we don’t like pain and will do almost anything we can to avoid it altogether. I note that some translations use the word labor or hardship instead of pain in this passage. So, the problem starts when we allow the initial judgment of pain or hardship as “bad” to carry us away with aversion. We are mistaken if we assent to the impression that pain or hardship is “bad” for us and will detract from our well-being in any way. Epictetus tells us we possess the power of endurance as a resource to deal with pain or labor. But, how and when do we use this resource? The same way we did with the good-looking man or woman. We say “Stop it” to ourselves. “Stop it;”it’s just pain. “Stop it;” it’s just a hardship. It’s doubtful this is going to kill me. Then we “Strip it.” We recognize that pain is a signal, and we diagnose the urgency of the signal. It may be urgent enough that we need immediate medical attention. If that’s the case, we can still proceed calmly. A little premeditatio malorum may be helpful. What is the worst that can happen; I may die. If I am going to die, I can choose to die nobly and keep my good character intact. On the other hand, if this is just a minor pain or impediment to my body, I already learned how to deal with that in Encheiridion 9. Now, that we move to the “See it” from the cosmic perspective. We can ask ourselves: Is this pain or hardship really that bad? Can I endure this pain or hardship and be a stronger person as a result? Pain and hardship are not bad for our moral character. The Stoics argue that hardships actually help develop our character. Absent trials, struggles, and tests, how can we develop our moral character? In Discourses 1.6, Epictetus uses the mythological figure of Hercules to make this point....


    Exploring Encheiridion 9 – Episode 40 Oct 06, 2021
    Show notes

    Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the will unless the will wants to be impeded. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will. If you tell yourself this at every occurrence, you will find the impediment is to something else but not to yourself. (Ench 9) Epictetus uses two dispreferred indifferents in this lesson, and both are related to our body: sickness and lameness. Then, he points out that each of these impairments presents a hindrance to our body but not to our will. The Greek word translated as “will” in this passage is prohairesis, and it has deep meaning in Stoicism. I discussed prohairesis briefly in Episode 34; however, I think a more detailed look at this concept will be helpful. However, before we cover prohairesis, let’s look at the concept of body in Stoic physics. This concept applies equally to all bodies, whether rocks, plants, animals, or humans, so it will shed some light on Encheiridion 9. In Stoicism, only bodies exist; therefore, everything that exists is a body. All bodies are a mixture of two principles—the passive principle (primary matter) and the active principle (logos or pneuma). The Stoic definition of a body is that which can act or be acted upon. Understanding this concept in Stoicism is essential because some people confuse it with modern reductive materialism. Some scholars even label the Stoics materialists, but they do not mean materialists in the modern sense where everything is reduced to matter. As Jacques Brunschwig points out in his chapter on Stoic Metaphysics in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, the Stoic version of ‘materialism’ is “vitalist-teleological” in contrast to the “mechanistic-antiteleological” version of the Epicureans.[1] The Epicureans were the reductive materialists in Hellenistic times. That is why it’s essential to understand when scholars refer to Stoics as materialists, they do not mean like the Epicureans or modern materialists. A.A. Long argues: It is misleading to describe the Stoics as ‘materialists’. Bodies, in the Stoic system, are compounds of ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ (God or logos). Mind is not something other than body but a necessary constituent of it, the ‘reason’ in matter. The Stoics are better described as vitalists.⁠[2] Here we see the basis of Stoic physics. Everything that exists is a body composed of matter and mind (God, logos, or pneuma). Therefore, humans are composed of matter and mind. I have more to say about this in a minute. First, let’s cover this concept of prohairesis in Stoicism. Scholars have used different English words to translate the Greek word prohairesis; here are some of them. Translations of prohairesis: will (A.A. Long; George Long) A.A. Long - WILL A favorite term in Epictetus (Greek prohairesis ) for a human being’s power of self-determination and mental disposition. The word is sometimes translated by choice, purpose, volition, or decision, but in my opinion “will” is the most natural English expression for what Epictetus seeks to convey with it.[3] choice (Robin Hard, John Sellars) Sellers - choice (prohairesis) Epictetus' name for the conscious decision-making part of the commanding faculty; what might now be called the "will" or "I".[4] moral purpose (W.A. Oldfather) moral character (Keith Seddon) prohairesis ‘moral character’; the capacity that rational beings have for making choices and intending the outcomes of their actions, sometimes translated as will, volition, intention, choice, moral choice, moral purpose. This faculty is understood by Stoics to be essentially rational. It is the faculty we use to ‘attend to impressions’ and to give (or withhold) assent to impressions. Those things which are outside the scope of one’s prohairesis are the aprohaireta, which are aprohairetos and ‘external’ (ektos), and ‘not in our power’ (ouk eph’ hêmin); Discourses30.3, 2.16.1, 3.3.14, 3.8.1–3.[5] faculty of choice (Nicholas White) mind (Robert Dobbin) decision or choice (Christopher Gill) In his introduction to the Robin Hard translation of the Discourses of Epictetus, Christopher Gill, a recognized scholar of Stoicism, notes the following: The interface between ethics and physics provides a number of important Stoic ideas, centring on the idea that the natural universe provides an informing framework for ethical life. The universe, or its shaping, or ‘divine’’, element, does so either as a paradigm of order, structure, and rationality or as a source of providential care for the component parts of the universe, especially human beings, who share its ‘divine’ rationality. A related idea is that for human beings to exercise their capacity for rational agency is to act in line with the rational (divine) direction of the universe as well as with one’s own inner, rational ‘guardian spirit’ (daimōn). This complex of ideas has a prominent place in the Discourses, as also in some other writings on Stoic practical ethics, notably, Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. Epictetus stresses especially the last idea, accentuating the idea of God as director of the universe and as the source of the divine rationality in us. Another theme stressed is that the capacity to exercise rational agency in developing towards virtue (expressed as our prohairesis) is a fundamental, or inalienable, human capacity, which is built into the natural, divinely shaped universe.[6] Now that I’ve covered both body and mind as conceived by the Stoics, it’s important to note the Stoics were not dualists. The mind is not something separated from matter in Nature. Remember that mixture of the passive and active principles. According to the Stoics, everything that exists—all the way down—is composed of both principles. Additionally, according to the Stoics, the mind is not a product of the brain. This contradicts the modern materialist theories of consciousness as an illusion or an epiphenomenon. Instead, for the Stoics, mind is there at the ground level, and its source is the same rationality (logos) that permeates the cosmos. As I pointed out in Episode 35, Pierre Hadot makes note of this in The Inner Citadel. He wrote: In fact, all the dogmas of Stoicism derive from this existential choice. It is impossible that the universe could produce human rationality, unless the latter were already in some way present within the former.⁠[7] This is consistent with a theory that is currently gaining substantial traction in the scientific and academic community. The theory is called panpsychism, and it claims consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe. Modern panpsychism shares many similarities with the physics of the ancient Stoics. Were the Stoics panpsychists? That depends on how one defines panpsychism. David Skrbina, a senior lecturer in the department of philosophy at the University of Michigan, and author of a definitive book on the topic titled, Panpsychism in the West, certainly thinks they were. He wrote The Stoics were thus thoroughly panpsychist in their outlook on the world, and they developed a theory of the cosmos that was perfectly compatible with that outlook.[8] Whether or not the Stoics should be classified as panpsychists, the idea that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe certainly provides some support for Stoic physics. Interestingly, an ever-increasing number of scientists, philosophers, and consciousness researchers are abandoning reductive materialism for panpsychism. Today, numerous prominent thinkers from various fields are ditching materialism and turning to panpsychism because it offers a coherent explanation for human consciousness. Do a little research, and you will find panpsychism is not a fringe idea anymore. Those moderns who remain committed to reductive materialism and claim Stoic physics is outdated and must be abandoned may soon be the ones left clinging to an obsolete theory. I hear Modern Stoics want to update Stoic physics based on the best available facts; in that case, we should replace the conception of a mechanical universe with the entangled cosmos discovered by quantum physics more than a century ago. Likewise, it’s time to discard the century-old promissory note from reductive materialism to solve the puzzle of human consciousness and consider the possibility an innate intelligence or rationality permeates the cosmos at every level, as panpsychism suggests. Modern Stoics who demand we “follow the facts” are relying on a rapidly waning worldview to make that demand. If we’re going to update Stoic physics, let’s do it right, with the best available facts and theories from the twenty-first century. Back to Encheiridion 9. Sickness and lameness are impediments to our body; however, they do not impede our will, purpose, volition, moral character, faculty of choice, or whatever English word we choose for prohairesis. Our ability to choose between what is up to us and what is not up to us is not impeded by impediments to our body. Obviously, we can create a list of diseases that affect the brain and inhibit or destroy our rational faculties. Epictetus is not talking about extreme cases like that. The list of sicknesses that can debilitate the body and leave the mind intact is substantially longer. If we want an extreme example of this, the brilliant scientist Stephen Hawking provides one. The point is this: the overwhelming majority of physical ailments or disabilities we can experience leave our prohairesis intact. Therefore, they do not affect our moral character unless we choose to allow them to do so. In his book Greek Models of Mind and Self, A.A. Long wrote: Most literally eudaimonia means a divinely favored dispensation. The daimon constituent of the word combines a generic sense of divinity with the notion of fate or fortune. By prefixing to daimon the adverb eu, which qualifies an activity or condition as excellent, the Greek language had a composite term for express


    Exploring Encheiridion 8 – Episode 39 Sep 29, 2021
    Show notes

    Don’t ask for things to happen as you would like them to, but wish them to happen as they actually do, and you will be all right. (Ench 8) This passage, and several other similar passages within the Stoic texts, present a huge, sometimes insurmountable, stumbling block for many people when they begin to study and practice Stoicism. As Simplicius notes in his commentary on this passage: But perhaps this injunction to ‘wish for it to happen as it happens’ will seem to some people to be harsh and impossible. What right thinking human being wishes for the occurrence of the widespread bad effects resulting from the universe – for instance, earthquakes, deluges, conflagrations, plagues, famine and the destruction of all sorts of animals and crops? Or the impious deeds performed by some human beings on others – the sacking of cities, taking prisoners of war, unjust killings, piracy, kidnapping, licentiousness, and tyranni cal force, culminating in compelled acts of impiety? …These things and others of this sort – of which there has been an excess in our own lifetime – who would want to hear of them, let alone see them, take part in them or ‘wish them to happen as they happen’, except a malevolent person and a hater of all that is fine?[1] Within the last month, I responded to emails from two Stoicism on Fire listeners who expressed concern about this concept in Stoicism. I will keep the identity of those listeners anonymous. However, I’m going to use the content of those emails to help express a concern that is likely shared by others. The first is from a man who wrote: I am hoping you may be able to help me with something which has been a source of some vexation to me. I have been studying philosophy for most of my adult life and Stoicism is something I came to in the last 5-years or so. The problem I have is to do with the discipline of assent. It seems that what the Stoic wants is to dispense with the value judgement part of the impression. The idea seems to be that whatever is not in my control is to be expunged by simply not assenting to it. Now, I can perfectly see the argument that when a driver cuts me up or someone says something insulting to me, I may want to remove my value judgements to preserve my equanimity. All perfectly obvious. But what you seem to be saying is that any value judgement based on something not in my control, should be “deleted” from the impression, in order to preserve my equanimity. I’m afraid I find this absurd. Suppose you find yourself in a situation where one of your children has been taken hostage by a terrorist and is being threatened with a knife. There is a high probability that something terrible will happen, but according to the discipline of assent, you will need to delete the value judgement (which any normal father would have) that my child is in danger!!. Having thus deleted the value judgement, you can observe events unfolding from your “Inner Citadel” completely unperturbed. The second email was from a woman, who wrote: I have been reading the Stoics for many years. They have served as my substitute for religion, my preferred cognitive therapy. However my major reservation is that Stoicism does not provide an adequate answer or comfort in times of personal or global tragedy or suffering. When something horrible happens to someone, how can we respond by saying we will things as they are, we will things to happen as they have? Stoicism does not provide a good answer to the natural human emotional response to personal tragedy. It does not appear to accept that it is ok to feel the natural emotional anguish that comes with personal tragedy. I have always seen this as the major weakness. A show on this could be helpful, i.e., how does Stoicism dictate that the practitioner should react to a personal tragedy in their life, and does this make sense? Is it rational to expect sentient human beings to react to tragedy by saying, yes, I will things to happen as they have? Well, here’s the episode you asked for; I hope it helps you with this challenging question about Stoic practice. First, I will say: I fully understand the sentiments of both listeners; I had similar thoughts about this concept when I first approached Stoicism. I suspect most of my listeners reacted similarly to passages like Encheiridion 8 when they first encountered them. Moreover, I’m sure some of you are still struggling with the idea that you should not judge tragedy as “bad” but wish for things to happen as they do instead. Many people will find this mindset wholly unacceptable and abandon Stoicism entirely or ignore this aspect of Stoic practice. For many people, this aspect of Stoicism is counterintuitive because they are judging it, consciously or unconsciously, from the perspective of a worldview that is not compatible with Stoicism. As A. A. Long and other scholars of Stoicism have pointed out, several aspects of Stoicism are counterintuitive apart from the theological worldview the Stoics relied on to create their philosophical way of life. For that reason, I think it will be helpful to consider this difficult aspect of Stoicism using the concerns expressed by these two listeners. I want to make it clear I am not criticizing these listeners. Quite the opposite, I hope to help them, and many others like them, to navigate this difficult aspect of Stoicism. To that extent, I want to thank them for expressing their concern to me and allowing me to address it for the benefit of others who may be concerned about the same thing. The first letter juxtaposes two scenarios. The first includes two relatively trivial incidents: a driver who cuts him off in traffic and someone who offers a personal insult. The second scenario involves a terrorist who is holding his daughter hostage at knifepoint. Obviously, to any rational person, there is a considerable difference in the degree of perceived loss between these scenarios. Only our ego is in play in the first case, and we will likely forget about the incident within minutes or hours. In the second, the life of a beloved daughter is at risk, and her loss could affect the loving father for the remainder of his life. Therefore, a reasonable response to these threats should be proportional to the potential loss. To that end, most people would consider it reasonable to use deadly force to stop the terrorist from harming the woman. Alternatively, it would be unreasonable and irrational to run the bad driver off the road for cutting you off. Likewise, punching, stabbing, or shooting someone who offended you with a personal insult would be a disproportionate and unreasonable response. Our laws are typically codified to prevent the later extreme reaction. On the other hand, laws typically protect those who use deadly force to save their own life or the life of another from an imminent threat of death. The second listener’s email expresses a similar concern more generically. She asks if it is rational for “sentient human beings to react to tragedy by saying, yes, I will things to happen as they have?” As we’ve seen from the commentary by Simplicius, these sentiments represent a common concern about Stoicism. So, if this is a common concern, how does Stoicism resolve it? How is it reasonable for the Stoics to tell us we should wish for what happens even when what happens is an apparent tragedy? I think there are two principles of Stoic doctrine at play here. The first is the difference between what is up to us and, therefore, truly “good” and “bad” for us as practicing Stoics. The second principle entails trust in a providentially ordered cosmos. The Well-Being Balance Scale For every event that occurs in our lives, even those we commonly consider tragic, we must begin with Encheiridion 1 and remind ourselves what is up to us and what is not up to us. Any event that is not up to us is an indifferent. No matter how tragic the event may appear, it does not affect our moral character (virtue) because it is external to our proairesis—our rational faculty, which is up to us and allows us to judge the event as good or bad. Remember, Stoicism teaches us our good character (arete, virtue) is necessary and sufficient for our well-being. Nothing but virtue is needed, and nothing else contributes to or detracts from our well-being. If we lose sight of this fundamental principle of Stoicism, nothing else in our practice will work, and we will not be alright. Therefore, the most common and typically the first mistake we make when apparent tragedy occurs is placing indifferents on the wrong side of the well-being balance scale. For this to make sense, I need you to visualize one of those old-fashioned balance scales. The ones where you put a known, calibrated weight on one side and the substance you want to weigh on the other side. The scale balances when the weights are the same. I will call this a well-being scale because we will imagine using it to weigh things of value to our well-being. I used this imagery in Episode 6 on the topic of what is up to us. The common conception of happiness would have us stack as many preferred indifferents, like wealth, good health, a good reputation, a great job, excellent life partner, etc., on one side of the scale and hope they outweigh any of the dispreferred indifferents, like poverty, illness, etc., that come into our life. The Stoics argue this approach to life can never create well-being. Why? Because it makes our well-being dependent upon externals that are not up to us. That is why the Stoics took a different approach to well-being. The Stoics argue the virtues—wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation, are the only things entirely up to us; therefore, our well-being should depend on virtue alone. As a result, the Stoic practitioner must use the well-being scale differently. Stoicism teaches us to place all externals—that includes preferred and dispreferred indifferents—no matter how seemingly pleasurable or painful they may be


    Exploring Encheiridion 7 – Episode 38 Sep 22, 2021
    Show notes

    When you are on a voyage and the boat is at anchor, if you disembark to get water, you may pick up a little shellfish and vegetable on the way, but you need to keep your mind fixed on the boat and keep turning around in case the captain calls; and if he does call, you must drop all those things, to avoid being tied up and stowed on board like the sheep. That’s how it is in life too. If you are given a little wife and child, instead of a little vegetable and shellfish, that will not be a problem. But if the captain calls you, run to the boat and leave all those things without even turning around. And if you are old, never go far from the boat in case you are missing when he calls. (Ench 7) This parable is interesting, and I cannot find a similar story anywhere in Stoic texts. However, the fact that Arrian would include it in his Handbook for Stoic practitioners tells us its meaning would have been clear to the students of Epictetus. Since no story like this appears in other surviving Stoic texts, Epictetus is likely drawing on a commonly understood cultural reference. I am not an expert in Greek culture, literature, or history. Nevertheless, I found the following connections that appear to add some meaning to this passage. The imagery in Encheiridion 7 is similar to that of the ancient Greek myth of Charôn, the ferryman. He transported the souls of the deceased over the river Styx to the underworld. The Greek poet Euripides, who was writing almost 500 years before Epictetus, has his character Alcestis say: I see him there at the oars of his little boat in the lake, the ferryman of the dead, Kharon (Charon), with his hand upon the oar and he calls me now. ‘What keeps you? Hurry, you hold us back.’ He is urging me on in angry impatience. (Euripides, Alcestis 252) Likewise, Machon, a writer of comedies, who was writing approximately 300 years before Epictetus, wrote the following in his Philoxenus: But since Timotheos' Kharon (Charon), the one in his Niobe, does not let me dally but shouts that the ferry-boat is leaving, and gloomy Moira (Fate), who must be obeyed is summoning me. (fragment 786) Machon, the writer of this passage, is quoting from a work by Timotheus of Miletus titled Niobe, written approximately 200 years earlier and 500 years before Epictetus. Note the reference to a piece titled Niobe. There are several versions of the myth of Niobe, the bereaved mother whose children were killed by Apollo as punishment for her hubris. The story of Niobe is not essential for our discussion; however, as I will point out in a minute, the reference to Timotheus’ Niobe is important. First, I also want to point out that Seneca references Charon, the ferryman of the river Styx, several times in his literary writings. This supports the idea this imagery was commonly used and understood during the time of Epictetus. So, how does all of this relate to Encheiridion 7? I think you’ll begin to see the connections after I tie it all together in an often-overlooked passage by Diogenes Laertius’ on the death of Zeno, the founder of the Stoa: The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe: I come, I come, why dost thou call for me? and died on the spot through holding his breath. (DL 7.28) I’m going to set the details of Zeno’s manner of death aside because that is relevant to our discussion. However, Zeno’s response to his imminent death is noteworthy. We can infer two different attitudes from Zeno’s words in this story of his death. First, we could infer some resistance to death from his last words: “why are you calling me?” Alternatively, we can infer an attitude of bewilderment. The Greek word used in this passage means to “cry out, shout, call aloud.” Therefore, Zeno could have been saying, “I’m coming, of course, I’m coming; there’s no need to shout at me?” Zeno’s broken toe likewise provides some interesting symbolism, which may suggest he couldn’t move as fast as the Captain may like. Based on the totality of Stoic teaching and his reputation as the founding Scholarch, I think we have good reason to assume Zeno exhibited the later attitude upon receiving his call from the Captain. While Encheiridion 7 may initially appear obscure, the general meaning becomes more apparent when applying these ancient references. Epictetus is using this parable to highlight the fact our life is a transitory stop on a voyage that can end at any moment when the Captain calls us to return to the source of our existence. Let’s look closer at each of these aspects. Life as a transitory stop The transitory nature of human life is discussed frequently in the Stoic texts. Marcus Aurelius wrote, In human life, the time of our existence is a point, our substance a flux, our senses dull, the fabric of our entire body subject to corruption, our soul ever restless, our destiny beyond divining, and our fame precarious. In a word, all that belongs to the body is a stream in flow, all that belongs to the soul, mere dream and delusion, and our life is a war, a brief stay in a foreign land, and our fame thereafter, oblivion. So what can serve as our escort and guide? One thing and one alone, philosophy; and that consists in keeping the guardian-spirit within us inviolate and free from harm, and ever superior to pleasure and pain, and ensuring that it does nothing at random and nothing with false intent or pretence, and that it is not dependent on another’s doing or not doing some particular thing, and furthermore that it welcomes whatever happens to it and is allotted to it, as issuing from the source from which it too took its origin, and above all, that it awaits death with a cheerful mind as being nothing other than the releasing of the elements from which every living creature is compounded. Now if for the elements themselves it is nothing terrible to be constantly changing from one to another, why should we fear the change and dissolution of them all? For this is in accordance with nature: and nothing can be bad that accords with nature. (Meditations 2.17) Seneca wrote an extended essay on the topic titled, On the Shortness of Life. He opened with these lines: Most of mankind, Paulinus, complains about nature’s meanness, because our allotted span of life is so short, and because this stretch of time that is given to us runs its course so quickly, so rapidly—so much so that, with very few exceptions, life leaves the rest of us in the lurch just when we’re getting ready to live. (On the Shortness of Life, 1.1) Then, a paragraph later, he argues: It’s not that we have a short time to live, but that we waste much of it. Life is long enough, and it’s been given to us in generous measure for accomplishing the greatest things, if the whole of it is well invested. But when life is squandered through soft and careless living, and when it’s spent on no worthwhile pursuit, death finally presses and we realize that the life which we didn’t notice passing has passed away. (On the Shortness of Life, 1.3) Collecting Indifferents How is it that life seems to pass by and leave us in a lurch if, as Seneca argues, we have plenty of time? Here we come to one of the main lessons of Encheiridion 7. While we are ashore during this transitory stop we call life; we will necessarily seek out some preferred indifferents like water and food. We may even choose other preferred indifferents like a spouse or a child. Nevertheless, Epictetus reminds us our primary responsibility is to focus our attention on the divine—represented by the ship and its Captain—while we engage with preferred indifferents to develop our moral character and prepare for the inevitable return of our constituent parts to their cosmic source—the rational, creative fire (divine logos). We are not here to simply drink water, eat, and procreate. That is not the purpose of human life. Yes, it is part of our human experience, but it is not our purpose. As Epictetus reminds us, It is thus shameful for a human being to begin and end where the irrational animals do. Rather, he should start off where they do and end where nature ended with regard to ourselves. Now it ended with contemplation, and understanding, and a way of life that is in harmony with nature. Take care, then, that you don’t die without having contemplated these realities. (Discourses 1.6.20-21) I think it’s interesting to note the items used in Encheridion 7 as possible distractions from our primary purpose. He used high-value preferred indifferents. Food and water are necessary for life, and child-rearing is needed to perpetuate humankind. He could have used more frivolous examples. Epictetus could have said, If you disembark to see the sights, you may search for gold, and gather some beautiful shells on the way, but you need to keep your mind fixed on the boat and keep turning around in case the captain calls. Instead, he used preferred indifferents necessary for life (food and water) and some that help us develop our moral character (a spouse and child). Nevertheless, Epictetus warns us not to let these preferred indifferents, even a spouse and child, distract us from our primary task—to keep our eyes on the divinity and develop our moral excellence, so we are ready when the Captain calls us back. As Epictetus warns us: But as things are, although we have it in our power to apply ourselves to one thing alone, and devote ourselves to that, we choose instead to apply ourselves to many things, and attach ourselves to many, to our body, and our possessions, and our brother, and friend, and child, and slave. And so, being attached in this way to any number of things, we’re weighed down by them and dragged down. (Discourses 1.1.14-15) Again, as I noted in the last episode, the Stoics did not prohibit the acquisition of preferred indifferents....


    Exploring Encheiridion 6 – Episode 37 Sep 15, 2021
    Show notes

    Don’t preen yourself on any distinction that is not your own. If the preening horse should say “I am beautiful,” it would be acceptable. But when you are preening and say, “I have a beautiful horse,” admit that you are preening yourself on a good quality that belongs to the horse. What, then, is your own? The management of impressions. So whenever you are in harmony with nature in the way you perform this function, that’s the time to preen yourself; for then you will have a good thing that is your own to preen yourself on. (Ench 6) Don’t preen yourself on any distinction that is not your own. If the preening horse should say “I am beautiful,” it would be acceptable. But when you are preening and say, “I have a beautiful horse,” admit that you are preening yourself on a good quality that belongs to the horse. What, then, is your own? The management of impressions. So whenever you are in harmony with nature in the way you perform this function, that’s the time to preen yourself; for then you will have a good thing that is your own to preen yourself on. (Ench 6) If Epictetus were teaching today, he would probably not choose a horse as the object of his lesson. Instead, he might say, “Don’t preen yourself on your expensive sports car, sparking diamond bracelet, large, finely appointed house, etc., because the good qualities of those possessions do not belong to you.” The object does not matter; the lesson remains the same. Preening Oneself The first thing we need to do with this lesson is to understand the meaning of the word “preen” in this passage. Most translators use the English word “elated” in Encheiridion 6. However, A.A. Long chose the word “preen” for his translation, and I think his choice brings out the whole meaning of this passage. When I referred to my resources, I discovered the Greek verb used in this passage means to “lift up and set on.”[1] There are two aspects of this verb: to lift up and to set on. Therefore, Epictetus is doing more than warning us not to feel a sense of elation or pride when we look at our expensive sports car, sparking diamond bracelet, large, finely appointed house, etc. We could feel that sense of elation or pride while we’re alone, lying in bed, or daydreaming sitting in a park. The word “elated” seems to overlook the public aspect of this passage, and that may be why A.A. Long chose the word “preen.” The online Oxford Learner’ Dictionaries offers the following definition of preen when used as a transitive verb, which is the case in this passage: [transitive] preen yourself (on something) (usually disapproving) to feel very pleased with yourself about something and show other people how pleased you are.[2] That definition helps us understand Encheiridion 6. Epictetus is warning us not to show off our possessions as if their good qualities somehow transfer to us and lift us up in the eyes of others. The word “preen” is often used to describe a person grooming and admiring himself or herself in a mirror. But that’s not the whole meaning here. Likewise, the word “preen” may bring to mind the myth of Narcissus. Many of you are likely familiar with that Greek myth, from which we get the psychological construct of the Narcissist. Narcissus was a beautiful young man who wandered upon a still pool of water while he was hunting. When he saw his own reflection in the pool of water, he fell in love with it and remained there staring at it for the remainder of his life. While Narcissus was quite happy to remain at the pool, staring at and loving his reflection, that is not the point of Epictetus’ lesson. However, with some modification and modernization of that myth, we can make Epictetus’ point clear. Imagine a modern version of Narcissus who walks into their bathroom one day and sees their reflection in the mirror. They feel elated by their own beauty. WOW, they think, I look hot. So, they pull their smartphone out and take a photo of themselves in the mirror. After admiring the picture for a second, they post it on Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms. Why? Because they want others to see how attractive they are. They are trying to lift themselves up by setting their attractiveness on display for others to see. They want others to attribute their beauty to them so they will be lifted up in the eyes of others. At this point, you might be thinking, but that is their attractiveness; that is a quality that belongs to them. Not exactly. Here is Epictetus on the topic: But what does Zeus have to say about this? ‘If it had been possible, Epictetus, I would have ensured that your poor body and petty possessions were free and immune from hindrance. But as things are, you mustn’t forget that this body isn’t truly your own, but is nothing more than cleverly moulded clay. (Discourses 1.1.10-11) According to Stoicism, our body is not up to us. We do not create our bodies. Yes, we take care of our body, and we can make it look better in some ways. Nevertheless, we are not in complete control of what happens to our bodies, and we cannot prevent them from getting sick, broken, or old. In Encheiridion 1, our body is the first item on the list of things that are not up to us. If you prefer a more analogous modern equivalent, I will offer the person who takes a photo of his flashy sports car or her shiny diamond bracelet and posts it on social media for others to admire and envy. Again, they want others to think highly of them because of the possessions they own. My purpose here is not to analyze why people behave this way. Instead, I am interested in the reason Epictetus warns us about doing so. That brings us to the next concept in this passage we need to examine. Qualities that do not belong to us. Yes, you own a flashy red sports car, but Epictetus would tell you the qualities of that car do not belong to you; they belong to the sports car. That’s a beautiful diamond bracelet you own, Epictetus might say, but that beauty does not belong to you; it belongs to the bracelet. I hope you’re starting to get the point. The qualities of our possessions, even the qualities of our body, are not ours, and they are not up to us. Therefore, we are mistaken when we attempt to lift ourselves up in the eyes of others by wrongly thinking we can transfer the good qualities of our possessions to our soul or self. Sadly, there is a reasonable motive for the behavior Epictetus is warning us against in Encheiridion 6. People do judge us based on our looks and possessions. Our character is not typically the first quality society uses to evaluate us. In fact, a person’s character may be several places down the list of qualities most people look for in a friend, life partner, employee, etc. Here’s an experiment you can try to prove this point. Tell a young man you want to introduce him to a young woman you know. Then say, “She’s really sweet and a good person.” What image just popped in his head? You know what he’s imagining, and it’s not a gorgeous female who looks great in yoga pants. Do the same with a young woman. Hey, I think you should meet my friend. I think you’ll like him. “He’s a really nice guy and a good person.” What image just popped into her head. She’s probably not picturing a hot guy with a muscular physique and a flashy sports car. Even though we described both people with positive character traits, we may not get an immediate positive response. Why? A good character may not make the top three traits on their list. I don’t think that’s because people consistently undervalue character. I think it has more to do with the images our society offers as “good.” Movies, television, and commercials sell us images of the “good,” and we unconsciously buy into them. Additionally, we cannot see a person’s character immediately, so we look for other qualities to quickly determine another person’s value. In the West, in particular, we were raised to identify the value of other people by their appearance, job, clothing, the car they drive, the house they own, etc. Pick up any success book, and you will likely come across some version of the “fake it till you make it” strategy for success. What is that? It’s a tactic whereby you wear nice clothes, an expensive watch, and drive an expensive car to leave others with the impression you are already successful, even though you haven’t arrived yet. You fake it till you make it. Success books typically offer this tactic to salespeople where their image is thought to influence potential buyers. Many real estate agents and outside sales professionals employ this tactic, and it works. If you’re interviewing real estate agents to sell your house, you’re more likely to pick the one who drives up in a Mercedes wearing nicely fitted clothing over the Honda Prius driving disheveled looking realtor. We tend to make assumptions about people based on their appearance, which may not be justified at all. As Stoics, we must look beyond the façade and attempt to see a person’s character, and we cannot judge character by appearance. Consider Socrates. He was a pretty homely guy based on historical accounts, and he didn’t dress for success. If a modern equivalent to Socrates approached you today, would you ignore him based on his appearance and attire? I suspect most of us would. Before we move on, I want to make one point clear. The Stoics were not opposed to having possessions. Yes, they prescribed ascetic practices for training purposes, but they were not renunciates. In reference to another passage in the Discourses where Epictetus warned about placing value on possessions, the Stoic Scholar A.A. Long wrote: Does it not follow, then, that Stoic philosophy taught the utter indifference of owning and protecting property? It does not follow, and that for two reasons. The first reason is that, though wealth, as an external commodity, has no moral value in Stoicism, it has instrumental value for `living in agreement with nature',...


    Exploring Encheiridion 5 (part II) – Episode 36 Sep 08, 2021
    Show notes

    Uneducated people blame others when they are doing badly. Those whose education is underway blame themselves. But a fully educated person blames no one, neither himself nor anyone else. (Ench 5) In Episode 35, I covered the first part of Encheiridion 5, where Epictetus added death to the list of things outside of our full control and, therefore, not inherently bad. If you’ve listened to Stoicism on Fire for a while or read my Traditional Stoicism blog, you likely understand this concept, which is frequently called the Dichotomy of Control, and you’ve probably been attempting to adopt this Stoic mindset toward externals. However, understanding this concept intellectually and putting it into practice are entirely different things. The practice of Stoicism is hard. I have been at it diligently for ten years, and I occasionally feel like a complete beginner. I understand the Stoic doctrines; I had a firm grasp of those within a couple of years. But, the goal of Stoicism is perfect practice, not perfect doctrinal knowledge. Perfect practice is the ideal of Stoicism. That is the standard attributed to the Sage and one none of us are likely to achieve. Which begs the question, “What then is the point of Stoic practice?” The answer, of course, is progress. Even though we will likely never arrive at the level of wisdom the Sage possesses, we can make progress toward that ideal. In the second part of Encheiridion 5, Epictetus outlines a three-step progression by placing all people into one of three categories: the uneducated, those whose education is underway, and finally, those whose education is complete. I think it is vital for us to understand these categories and their implication for our Stoic practice. Before we get into the categories, it is essential to note that education for the Stoics was more than memorization of doctrines. Education meant training (askesis). The Stoic training regimen required the student to put Stoic principles into practice. In other words, the distinction in Encheiridion 5 is not between those who are entirely ignorant of Stoic doctrines and those who memorized them all and can recite them at will. Epictetus infers more than book knowledge in this passage. We could relabel these categories as follows: those who are untrained in Stoic practice, those whose training in Stoic practice is underway, those who have completed their Stoic training and are completely wise—the Sage. Now, let’s consider these categories in a little more detail. Pay attention to the observable behavioral characteristics Epictetus provides for each of these categories. The uneducated person lives his or her life desiring and seeking things that are not within their complete control (wealth, pleasure, fame, political power, a good reputation, etc.). Simultaneously, they fear and attempt to avoid other things beyond their complete control (poverty, pain, obscurity, death, etc.). Now, here’s the behavioral characteristic of the uneducated person: When they are doing badly, they blame others. The uneducated blame others when they are not getting what they desire and getting what they fear instead. If you doubt this truth, turn on the news for a few minutes. You will observe an endless parade of uneducated people who are angry because they don’t have what they think they deserve to make them happy. They frequently claim to be victims of circumstances or someone else’s bad behavior, and think others have the power to make them happy or miserable. Marcus described them in Meditations 2.1 as “ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people.” Then, he proposes that he remind himself each morning that these are the people he will encounter during the day. Marcus continues this passage by noting the reason uneducated people behave this way: They are subject to all these defects because they have no knowledge of good and bad. (Meditation 2.1) The uneducated seek well-being in externals that are not within their complete control because they don’t know what is truly good (a virtuous character) and truly bad (a vicious character). In Encheiridion 1, Epictetus told us what happens when people desire and fear externals: they will be pained, frustrated, and troubled, and they will blame gods and men. When we see “ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people” on the news or in public, we need to remind ourselves why they are that way. They are uneducated. They may be knowledgeable about many things. They may be college-educated. They may even have a Ph.D., but, as Marcus notes, they have no knowledge of good and bad. Therefore, they are angry that they are doing badly in life and believe the fault lies outside themselves. They think they are unhappy because society is unfair, unjust, or otherwise organized in a way that makes them a victim of circumstances. Let me offer a word of caution here. Marcus’ words about these uneducated people can take us in two directions attitudinally. We can use Meditations 2.1 to judge people because they have no knowledge of good and bad. Or, we can have compassion for them because they have no knowledge of good and bad. I have no doubt Marcus intended the latter when he wrote Meditations 2.1. That was his character. We need to use this reminder in the same way when we encounter ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people. As you likely know from listening to the podcast, I’m a law enforcement officer. I’m a detective now, but I started my career on the street in a tough, low-income, crime-infested area. What I experienced on the street drove me to seek out Stoicism more than a decade ago. Early in my Stoic training, I learned a practice called hypomnemata from my mentor. Essentially, that is what Marcus was doing when he wrote his journal, which we now call his Meditations. Hypomnemata can take various forms; one form is rewriting Stoic passages to personalize them for yourself. As you might imagine, Mediations 2.1 has special significance for anyone in law enforcement. Daily, the profession entails dealing with ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people. One of the hardest things for any cop to do is to maintain their humanity while they are submerged in the inhumane behavior of others. For that reason, in 2012, I personalized and rewrote Meditations 2.1 for my purposes as a law enforcement officer. I hope it expresses the message I’m attempting to deliver here. Namely, we need to have some compassion for the uneducated: When you are face-to-face with criminal behavior, remind yourself this person’s vice-inclined character is not entirely their making. They are morally responsible for their actions; however, the web of prior causes which formed their immoral character includes many causal agents and events—the actions and neglect of their parents, the culture of their community, tragedies they did not cause, and the zeitgeist of a society which fills their soul with anger and hatred toward others they blame for their circumstances. This person is both a perpetrator and a victim of the vice-inclined character, which drives their behavior. Remember, they are a human being—they share in the same divine mind as you. They are ignorant of the true nature of good and bad and have not learned to discipline their desires and fears. Temporarily remove them from society—your role requires that of you. However, do not judge them as evil; they cannot touch your soul. I encourage you to try hypomnemata using Meditations 2.1 as a model. Maybe your ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people are customers. Perhaps they are your students, coworkers, or your mother-in-law. You get the idea. Use Mediations 2.1 to help you withhold judgment from the impression these people can harm your soul and to remember they share in the same divine mind as you. Okay, that’s enough about the uneducated person. Now we’re going to contrast that with the person whose education is underway. This is the Prokopton, who is actively attempting to put Stoic principles into practice in their life. They are beginning to distinguish correctly between what is good and bad for their character. They understand that many things and events they used to consider good, like good health, a high-paying job, other people’s opinion of them, etc., are only preferred indifferents that do not affect their moral character or good flow in life. Likewise, they understand many things and events they formerly considered bad, are dispreferred indifferents that do not affect their moral character or good flow in life. The prokopton understands it is possible to have a good flow in life even while living in poverty, pain, or circumstances restricting their liberty. They might prefer circumstances to be otherwise, but they do not count on them for their good flow in life. The person whose training is underway understands moral excellence (virtue) is the only good, and moral vice is the only truly bad thing. They accept responsibility for their well-being because they know it does not depend on anyone else or any external circumstances. Therefore, when they are out of step with Nature and experiencing emotional distress, they know they are the only ones to blame for their unhappiness. They are far from perfect in their practice of Stoicism; however, they are paying attention to their desires, assents, and impulses to act. They are on the path of the Stoic prokopton, making progress toward the ideal of the wise Stoic Sage. Finally, we come to the educated person who does not blame anyone when things appear to be going badly. Why? Because, as Keith Seddon notes, The fully wise person whose Stoic training is complete will never be in a position to blame anyone at all (not even themselves), because this person has secured a ‘good flow’ (euroia) that is stable and enduring – they simply do not assent to false evalua


    Exploring Encheiridion 5 (part I) – Episode 35 Sep 01, 2021
    Show notes

    It is not things themselves that trouble people, but their opinions about things. Death, for instance, is nothing terrible (otherwise, it would have appeared that way to Socrates as well), but the terrible thing is the opinion that death is terrible. So whenever we are frustrated, or troubled, or pained, let us never hold anyone responsible except ourselves, meaning our own opinions. Uneducated people blame others when they are doing badly. Those whose education is underway blame themselves. But a fully educated person blames no one, neither himself nor anyone else. (Ench 5) This passage complements Encheiridion 1, where Epictetus taught us that desiring and fearing things beyond our complete control will leave us “frustrated, pained, and troubled” and will cause us to “fault gods and men.” In Encheiridion 5, Epictetus takes this fundamental Stoic principle to its ultimate conclusion by adding death to the list of things we should not fear. He declares it is our opinion about death, rather than death itself, that troubles us. It is September 2021, and the Specter of death, in the form of the COVID pandemic, has been ever-present for more than two and a half years. This pandemic has changed our lives and our world. For some people, it has become an all-consuming fear. Yet, in this passage from the Encheiridion, Epictetus declares that death is nothing terrible. For most people, particularly those raised in the West, an assertion like this by Epictetus might seem bizarre, and it may even provoke a negative response or dismissal. Let’s be honest. This claim is completely counter to the way most of us think and attempt to live our lives. We were taught that externals like the negative opinions of others, poverty, sickness, and especially death are inherently bad and necessarily entail unhappiness. We learned this lesson early in our childhood, and we learned it well. So well, in fact, that we spend a great deal of time, money, and energy attempting to avoid all these externals, death in particular. However, practicing Stoics are repeatedly confronted with lessons like this in the texts that teach the opposite. Stoicism teaches us we can have a good flow in life regardless of our present situation. This doctrine is the crux of Stoic philosophical practice. At this point, some of you may be wondering, “In what way can that assertion by Epictetus be true? How can it be true that poverty, sickness, and even death are not terrible? How can it be that wealth, good health, and life are not inherently good?” Well, in every case except death, the answer provided by the Stoics is quite simple even though many people will likely find it unsatisfactory. The ancient Stoics teach us we must change our thinking about what is truly good and bad. They teach us that moral excellence is the only inherent good. Therefore, the Stoic path trains us to set aside our aversion to poverty, sickness, public shame, and everything that is not within our complete control, including death. There is no overstatement in this passage. Epictetus is not trying to shock us with hyperbole. He is simply restating a profound truth we repeatedly see throughout the Stoic writings. An excellent character (virtue) is the only true good, and a corrupted character (vice) is the only truly bad thing. Therefore, if we seek happiness in things and events we do not entirely control, we will be frustrated, pained, and troubled. Likewise, we will be miserable if we strive to avoid anything other than those irrational thoughts and wicked intentions that corrupt our character (soul). Okay, you may be thinking, I understand that virtue is the only good, and everything else is an indifferent and should not be desired as something good, in itself, or feared as something bad in itself. But how can death not be terrible? After all, Stoicism does not offer the consolation of an afterlife. To answer this question, Epictetus appeals to Socrates, one of the few the Stoics acknowledged as a Sage. He asserts that death is not terrible; otherwise, it would have appeared that way to Socrates. At first glance, this might appear to be a rather trite argument for not fearing death. Alternatively, it could appear as an unsophisticated appeal to authority. However, this passage has an unspoken message, which the students of Epictetus would have understood. Remember, the Encheiridion is a handbook designed to keep the lessons of Stoicism close at hand. Arrian created this handbook to remind practicing Stoics about the lessons with which they are already familiar. That is certainly the case here, so we need to dig a little deeper to understand this passage. As I noted in Episode 4, Zeno embarked on his philosophical path after reading about the life of Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Socrates was considered a Sage by the ancient Stoics. Therefore, to understand the meaning of Epictetus’ appeal to Socrates, we must turn to Plato’s Apology, which tells the story of Socrates’ trial. This story is what Epictetus is referring to in Encheiridion 5, and his students would have understood it. As most of you likely know, Socrates was put on trial for impiety and other false charges. Socrates refused to beg, grovel, and weep for his accusers or the jurors during his trial. If you read Plato’s Apology, you will see Socrates was defiant, almost belligerent, during his trial. Then, after he was found guilty of the false charges, Socrates agreed with Meletus, one of his false accusers, that the sentence for these charges should be death. The jurors then held a second vote and condemned Socrates to death. After warning the jurors their fate would be worse than his for the injustice they have done, Socrates turned to those who voted for acquittal and explained why he did not consider his death sentence a terrible thing. He reminded the jurors about his inner daimon or spiritual guide that always warned him when he was about to do something wrong. Socrates said, At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifestation, frequently opposed me, even in small matters, when I was about to do something wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced with what one might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of evils, my divine sign has not opposed me, either when I left home at dawn, or when I came into court[1] Let’s unravel this. Socrates’ argument goes something like this: (P1) In the past, my divine sign, the Stoics called this a daimon or god within, always warned me when I was about to do something wrong, even if it was about a small matter. (P2) My divine sign has been silent since I left my home to come to this trial. It was quiet when I refused to beg and plead for my life, and it was silent when I agreed the death sentence was appropriate for the crime for which I was accused and judged guilty. (P3) The silence of my divine sign is evidence I have done nothing wrong, including recommending a death sentence for myself. (C1) “What has happened to me may very well be a good thing.” (C2) “Those of us who believe death to be an evil are certainly wrong.” This is what Epictetus was appealing to as evidence that death is not something terrible. Epictetus is not simply saying death is nothing terrible because Socrates said so. Instead, he is arguing death must not be terrible; otherwise, it would have appeared so to Socrates. How? Through a warning from his divine sign or daimon. The ancient Stoics held Socrates in such high regard; they trusted his experience with his daimon about death. Additionally, we must consider death within the context of Stoic theory. In Stoic physics, the cosmos is a divine, rational, living organism permeated by pneuma, which constituted its soul. Thus, the Stoics argued the cosmos is conscious. As Diogenes Laertius noted, The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. (DL 142-3) The Stoic reasonably argued that nothing comes forth from nothing. If humans are rational, that rationality comes from the cosmos. Therefore, the cosmos is rational. In his brilliant book, The Inner Citadel, Pierre Hadot notes, ...all the dogmas of Stoicism derive from this existential choice. It is impossible that the universe could produce human rationality, unless the latter were already in some way present within the former.[2] Throughout the surviving Stoic texts, we see an acknowledgment of a connection between the divine part of our individual nature and the divinity that is the cosmos. In Meditations 3.13, Marcus reminds himself to, ...keep your doctrines at the ready, to enable you to understand things divine and human, and so to perform every action, even the very smallest, as one who is mindful of the bond that unites the two realms… The daimon is a fragment of the divine within us. I covered this topic in a little more detail in Episode 25. In Letters 41.1-2, Seneca called this daimon the “sacred spirit” that dwells within us. In another of his Letters, Seneca tell Lucilius, You must devote your efforts to that which does not deteriorate over time, and which no obstacle can bar. What is that? It is the mind—but specifically this mind, which is upright, great, and good. What else would you call it but God dwelling in a human body? (Letters 31) Finally, here is one of many examples were Epictetus points out the relationship between us and the divinity that permeates the cosmos: But you for your part are of primary value; you’re a


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