SCOTUS Oral Arguments

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Chiles v. Salazar Oct 07, 2025

Show notes

Argued on 2025-10-07.

For petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.; and Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.

Question Presented:

Kaley Chiles is a licensed counselor who helps people by talking with them. A practicing Christian, Chiles believes that people flourish when they live consistently with God's design, including their biological sex. Many of her clients seek her counsel precisely because they believe that their faith and their relationship with God establishes the foundation upon which to understand their identity and desires. But Colorado bans these consensual conversations based on the viewpoints they express. Its content- and viewpoint-based Counseling Restriction prohibits counseling conversations with minors that might encourage them to change their "sexual orientation or gender identity, including efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions," while allowing conversations that provide "[a]cceptance, support, and understanding for ... identity exploration and development, including ... [a]ssistance to a person undergoing gender transition." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12- 245-202(3.5). The Tenth Circuit upheld this ban as a regulation of Chiles's conduct, not speech. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split between the Eleventh and Third Circuits, which do not treat counseling conversations as conduct, and the Ninth Circuit, which does. The question presented is: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES A. CAMPBELL

(00:27:00) ORAL ARGUMENT OF HASHIM M. MOOPPAN

(00:44:51) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SHANNON W. STEVENSON

(01:21:36) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES A. CAMPBELL

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Villarreal v. Texas Oct 06, 2025

Show notes

Villarreal v. Texas, No. 24-557

Argued on 2025-10-06.

For petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal. For respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF STUART BANNER

(00:39:50) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANDREW N. WARTHEN

(01:01:58) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN J. BARBER

(01:12:39) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF STUART BANNER

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Berk v. Choy Oct 06, 2025

Show notes

Berk v. Choy, No. 24-440

Argued on 2025-10-06.

For petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, Colo.

Question Presented:

This case presents a clear, recognized, entrenched conflict over an important question about the application of state procedural rules in federal court. Delaware, like numerous states, requires that in certain actions the plaintiff must also file an affidavit of merit ("AOM") with the complaint. See 18 Del. C. § 6853. An AOM is an affidavit signed by an expert stating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that each defendant has committed the alleged misconduct. See id. § 6853(a)(l). The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits hold that AOM provisions and comparable statutes do not govern actions in federal court because they answer the same question as-and therefore conflict with-several different Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Third and Tenth circuits, in contrast, hold that they present "no conflict" with any Federal Rules. In the decision below, the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, for at least the fifth time, refused to hold that an AOM statute conflicts with any Federal Rules. Judge Phipps "concur[red] in only the judgment." Third Circuit precedent required him to vote to affirm, he explained, but ''writing on a clean slate ... he may not [have] arrive[d] at that same conclusion." The question presented is: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:31:02) ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK R. YARGER

(00:59:29) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ANDREW T. TUTT

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Trump v. CASA, Inc. May 15, 2025

Show notes

Trump v. CASA, Inc., No. 24A884

Argued on 2025-05-15.

For applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For state and city respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N. J. For private respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

(01:03:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEREMY M. FEIGENBAUM

(01:43:34) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KELSI B. CORKRAN

(02:13:33) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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OK Charter School Board v. Drummond Apr 30, 2025

Show notes

OK Charter School Board v. Drummond, No. 24-394

Argued on 2025-04-30.

For petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va. For petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

This Court has "repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits." Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin , 596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022). Three times, the Court has applied that principle to strike down "state efforts to withhold otherwise available public benefits from religious organizations." Id . at 778-79 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer , 582 U.S. 449 (2017); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue , 591 U.S. 464 (2020)). Contrary to those precedents, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education. These rulings implicate an entrenched circuit split and present two questions for review: 1. Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students. 2. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES A. CAMPBELL

(00:37:18) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL H. McGINLEY

(00:58:19) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

(01:17:41) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY G. GARRE

(02:08:53) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL H. McGINLEY

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Martin v. United States Apr 29, 2025

Show notes

Martin v. United States, No. 24-362

Argued on 2025-04-29.

For petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo, Arlington, Va. For respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills, Charleston, S. C.

Question Presented:

Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees "have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law." Pet. App. 17a (quotation omitted). 2. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10062 GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1) WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION ’ S SUPREMACY CLAUSE BARS CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT WHEN THE NEGLIGENT OR WRONGFUL ACTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HAVE SOME NEXUS WITH FURTHERING FEDERAL POLICY AND CAN REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS COMPLYING WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FEDERAL LAW. 2) WHETHER THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION IS CATEGORICALLY INAPPLICABLE TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO TO THE INTENTIONAL TORTS EXCEPTION. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. CHRISTOPHER MILLS, ESQUIRE, OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION IDENTIFIED IN THE ORDER GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. CERT. GRANTED 1/27/

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PATRICK M. JAICOMO

(00:22:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU

(00:39:34) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS,

(00:46:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PATRICK M. JAICOMO

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis Apr 29, 2025

Show notes

Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis, No. 24-304

Argued on 2025-04-29.

For petitioner: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

(01:09:24) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(01:36:32) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEEPAK GUPTA

(02:12:07) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools Apr 28, 2025

Show notes

A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, No. 24-249

Argued on 2025-04-28.

For petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D. C.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment." App.3a. That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. The question presented is: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROMAN MARTINEZ

(00:23:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICOLE F. REAVES

(00:45:18) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(01:22:40) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ROMAN MARTINEZ

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Soto v. United States Apr 28, 2025

Show notes

Soto v. United States, No. 24-320

Argued on 2025-04-28.

For petitioner: Tacy F. Flint, Chicago, Ill. For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment. Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement." The question presented is: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?

Oral Argument Links:

SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

SCOTUS Docket Page

Question Presented

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF TACY F. FLINT

(00:30:02) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CAROLINE A. FLYNN

(00:57:46) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF TACY F. FLINT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA Apr 23, 2025

Show notes

Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, No. 24-7

Argued on 2025-04-23.

For petitioners: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D. C. For federal respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For state respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.

Question Presented:

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B). In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EP A's waiver would have any effect on automakers. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties. 2. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.

Oral Argument Links: